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# CHRONOLOGICAL LIST OF PAPERS.

Date	From	To	Subject	Page
1847				
April 1	Major Lawrence, Assistant to the Resident, stationed at Peshawar	The Resident at Lahore (Lieutenant - Colonel H M. Lawrence)	Cow-killing — Amended spirit of the Sikh army . . .	3
" 5	The Governor-General (Viscount Hardinge)	The Secret Committee	Praise of the Sikh authorities	1
" 7	The Secretary to the Government of India with the Governor-General	The Resident	Umritsur canal . . .	8
" 19	Major Lawrence	The Resident	Advantages derived by the people from the employment of British officers — Reduction of the Sikh Army — Praise of Lieutenant Lumsden . . .	5
" 20	The Governor-General	The Secret Committee	Tranquillity . . .	1
" 20	Mr Vans Agnew, Assistant to the Resident	The Resident . . .	Oppression suffered by the people . . .	1
" 29	The Resident at Lahore	The Secretary with the Governor-General	Administration of the Dewan Moolraj — Judicial appointments in the Punjab — Finances — Reports of evil intentions on the part of the Sikhs . . .	5
May 4	Lieutenant H B Edwards, Assistant to the Resident	The Resident	Bunnoo Revenues — Praise of the Sikh troops — Praise of General Cortlandt . . .	8
16	Major Lawrence	The Resident	Benefits granted to the Sikh soldiers — Reduction of their number — Improvement of the country — Mission of Lieutenant Lumsden to the Eusufzyes	9
" 19	The Secretary with the Governor-General.	The Resident	Superintendence by European officers — Statistical information required . . .	7
" 25	The Secretary with the Governor-General	The Resident	Praise of Major Lawrence and Lieutenant Lumsden . . .	7
" 25	The Governor-General	The Secret Committee	Reports of evil intentions on the part of the Sikhs — Good conduct of the Sikh army — Benefits conferred upon it — Praise of Major Lawrence . . .	1
June 2	The Resident	The Secretary with the Governor-General	Difficulty of obtaining information from the Durbar offices — State of the Punjab — Preyma conspiracy — Advantages derived by the people from British officers — Forced-labor system. — Revision of Customs — Employment of the Resident's assistants — Sooltan Mahomed Khan	10
June 8	The Governor-General	The Secret Committee	Tranquillity . . .	8
" 9	The Resident . . .	The Lahore Durbar and the Maharanee	Conduct of the Maharanee . . .	26
" 10	The Maharanee	The Resident . . .	In reply . . .	26
" 10	Lieutenant H B Lumsden, Assistant to the Resident	Major Lawrence . . .	Report on the Eusufzye country . . .	14

Date.	From	To.	Subject.	Page
1847				
June 12	The Secretary with the Governor-General.	The Resident ..	Malpractices of Dewan Dowlut Rae ..	13
„ 14	The Secretary with the Governor-General.	The Resident .	General Avitabili's Revenue settlement of Murdekee ..	14
„ 18	The Resident .	The Secretary with the Governor-General	Malpractices of Dewan Dowlut Rae.—General corruption ..	13
„ 18	Major Lawrence	The Resident ..	Reduction of the army — Good conduct of the troops — Redress of grievances — Cases of murder — Necessity for severe punishment — Lieutenant Lumsden's report on the Eusufzye country — Praise of that officer ..	15
„ 19	The Resident ..	The Secretary with the Governor-General.	General Avitabili's revenue system ..	14
„ 21	The Resident ..	The Secretary with the Governor-General	Impolicy of continual interference with the Sikh Government officers ..	16
„ 23	The Governor-General	The Secret Committee	Tranquillity ..	12
„ 24	The Resident ..	The Secretary with the Governor-General	Reduction of the power of Jagheerdars — Abolition of private collections of customs.—Capital punishment.	16
„ 25	The Resident	Lieutenant J Nicholson, Assistant to the Resident	Instructions on giving him charge of the Sind Sagur district ..	17
July 3	The Secretary with the Governor-General	The Resident ..	Power of the British Government to control the administration of Lahore, under the treaty with that State — Employment of British officers — Captain Abbott — Good conduct of the Sikh soldiers. Forced-labor system ..	18
	The Secretary with the Governor-General	The Resident .	Reductions in the Sikh army — Praise of Major Lawrence. — Administration of the Eusufzye country — Capital punishment — Dost Mahomed Khan of Cabool ..	19
	The Resident.	The Secretary with the Governor-General	Judicial Administration — Character of the Sikh Government officers — Proposed civil establishment — Revenue and expenditure. — Reduction of the Sikh army. — Simplification of accounts. — Tunkwah system — Pay and furlough to troops — Arrears due from revenue officers — Survey of the country — Infanticide — Suttee — Tranquillity of the country.—Praise of Major Macgregor, and of the other assistants ..	20
„ 3	The Resident	The Secretary with the Governor-General	Correspondence with the Maharanee — Her mission to Dewan Moolraj of Mooltan. — The Preyma plot ..	25
7	The Governor-General	The Secret Committee	Tranquillity ..	13
20	Major Lawrence ..	The Resident .	Removal of Sikh officers — Practice of torture and mutilation — Traffic in girls — Tranquillity of the country ..	28
„ 21	The Secretary with the Governor-General	The Resident ..	Furlough to troops — Balance due from Golab Sing.— Praise of Major Macgregor. — Grant of sunnuds to Jagheerdars. — Coinage of Lahore — Presentation of nuzurs to travellers in Cashmere ..	27
23	The Governor-General	The Secret Committee	State of affairs ..	20

Date.	From.	To.	Subject	Page.
1847				
July 26	The Secretary with the Governor-General.	The Resident.. ..	Mr. John Lawrence to take temporary charge of the Residency	28
August 2	The Resident.. ..	The Secretary with the Governor-General.	Pay of the troops — Proclamation against forced labor. — Difficulty of obtaining accounts — Balance due from Golab Sing — Praise of the Resident's assistants — Administration of Golab Sing — System of drill for the Sikh troops — Removal of Sikh officers. — Employment of General Cortlandt — Proclamation against infanticide, suttee, and child-stealing. — Improved state of the country — Anxiety respecting Hazara — Necessity for coercive measures — Tranquillity of Lahore, in spite of mischievous reports — Conduct of the Durbar and chiefs — Proposal to grant titles of honor — Account of some of the Sikh chiefs. — Code of laws of inheritance, &c — New Customs' rules. — Conduct of the Maharanee ..	28
" 5 .	Captain James Abbott, Boundary Commissioner	The Resident.	Measures taken to punish certain chiefs of Simulkund for murders .. ..	29
" 7 .	The Resident.. ..	The Secretary with the Governor-General	Grant of titles of honor to certain Sikh chiefs — Insult shown to Sirdar Tej Sing, by the Maharajah, at the instance of the Maharanee .. ..	54
" 9 .	The Resident.	The Secretary with the Governor-General.	Recommending the Maharanee's expulsion from the Punjab — Preyma conspiracy — Proposition of the Durbar with respect to the Maharanee, and her brother Heera Sing .. ..	35
	Depositions of certain parties		The Preyma case .. ..	37
10	Mr. John Lawrence The Resident. .	The Secretary with the Governor-General.	Remarks on the Preyma case Measures adopted to repair the affront put on the chiefs by the Maharanee — Conduct of Heera Sing .. ..	40
" 11	The Resident.. ..		Remarks on the Preyma case	43
" 14	The Secretary with the Governor-General	The Resident	Articles of war, system of drill, &c., for the Sikh troops — Proclamation against suttee, infanticide, and child-stealing .. ..	44
" 14	The Governor-General	The Secret Committee	Discipline of the Sikh army — Forced-labor system — Proclamation against suttee, infanticide, and child-stealing .. ..	34
" 14	The Resident.	The Secretary with the Governor-General.	Captain Abbott's proceedings for the punishment of certain chiefs of Simulkund .. ..	28
" 16	The Secretary with the Governor-General.	The Resident.. ..	Approval of the grant of titles of honor to certain Sikh chiefs — Preyma conspiracy. — Necessity to separate the Maharajah from the Maharanee, and to remove her from Lahore — Instructions as to her future place of residence	55
" 20	The Resident.. ..	The Secretary with the Governor-General	Removal of the Maharanee to Sheikhoopoor	46
" 20	The Governor-General	The People of the Lahore territories.	Removal of the Maharanee from Lahore .. ..	50
				53

Date.	From	To	Subject	Page
1847. Aug. 23 ..	John Lawrence, Esq., Acting Resident at Lahore	The Secretary with the Governor-General.	Departure of Lieutenant-Colonel Lawrence from Lahore — Mr Lawrence's assumption of the duties of Resident ..	53
" 28 ..	The Secretary with the Governor-General.	The Resident.. ..	Approbation of the removal of the Maharanee to Shek- hoopoor .. ..	53
" 28 ..	The Acting Resident..	The Secretary with the Governor-General	Tranquillity of Lahore —Be- haviour of the Maharanee — Proposed reduction of her stipend, and of that of her brother — Reduction of the land-tax. — State of the finances. — Tranquillity of Mooltan, and other districts	56
" 31 ..	The Acting Resident..	The Secretary with the Governor-General	Proclamations against slave- dealing, forced-labor, suttee, and infanticide .. ..	58
Sept 3 ..	The Secretary with the Governor-General.	The Acting Resident..	Reduction of the stipends of the Maharanee and Heera Smg.—Approval of a mode- rate Revenue settlement — Praise of Mr Lawrence ..	57
" 5 .. (No 62.)	The Governor-General	The Secret Committee	Removal of the Maharanee from Lahore — Conduct of the Maharanee. — Preyma plot .. ..	34
" 5 .. (No. 63.)	The Governor-General	The Secret Committee	Tranquillity .. ..	54
" 10 ..	The Acting Resident..	The Secretary with the Governor-General.	Revenue settlement of Pesha- war —Necessity for a gene- ral Revenue settlement, and for a reform of the Customs —Management of the trea- sury —Necessity for the em- ployment of European officers	60
" 10 ..	The Acting Resident..	Major Lawrence ..	Instructions for the Revenue settlement of Peshawur	62
" 13 ..	The Acting Resident..	The Secretary with the Governor-General.	New system of Customs.—Be- nefits to the country arising from British interference ..	58
" 14 ..	The Acting Resident ..	The Secretary with the Governor-General.	Preyma plot —Punishment of the offenders .. ..	64
" 20 ..	The Secretary with the Governor-General	The Acting Resident..	New system of Customs.—Pub- lication of .. ..	60
" 20 ..	The Governor-General	The Secret Committee	Pensions for Sikh soldiers — New system of Customs ..	57
" 21 ..	The Acting Resident..	The Secretary with the Governor-General.	Pension rules for the Sikh sol- diers .. ..	64
" 22 ..	The Acting Resident..	The Secretary with the Governor-General	Complaints, and custody, of the Maharanee .. ..	65
" 25 ..	The Acting Resident..	The Secretary with the Governor-General	General report on the Punjab —Tranquillity —Benefits of British interference —Popu- larity of new Customs' laws Finances —Accounts of de- faulters —Necessity for a Revenue settlement —Maho- medan cry to prayers.—Na- vigation of the Chenab ..	66
" 29 ..	The Resident.. ..	The Secretary with the Governor-General	New Customs' laws.—Revenue settlement .. ..	70
" 30 ..	The Secretary with the Governor-General	The Acting Resident..	Mahomedan cry to prayers ..	70
" 30 ..	The Resident.. ..	The Secretary with the Governor-General	Mahomedan cry to prayers ..	70
" 30 ..	Captain Abbott ..	The Acting Resident..	Revenue settlement of Hazara	71
Oct. 1 ..	Major Lawrence ..	The Acting Resident..	Revenue administration. — Good conduct of troops.— Pensions for them.—New Customs' laws .. ..	72
" 4 ..	The Governor-General	The Secret Committee	Sentences on the Preyma com- spirators. — New Customs' laws .. ..	60
" 4 ..	The Acting Resident..	The Secretary with the Governor-General.	Conduct of the Maharanee ..	74

**CHRONOLOGICAL LIST OF PAPERS.**

Date.	From.	To.	Subject.	Page
1847.				
Oct. 4 ..	The Acting Resident..	A. H. Cocks, Esq., Chief Assistant to the Resident.	Instructions on sending him to make a Revenue settlement of Jhung .. .. .	74
" 6 ..	The Acting Resident..	The Secretary with the Governor-General.	Instructions to Mr. Cocks ..	75
" 6 ..	The Acting Resident..	The Secretary with the Governor-General.	Revenue settlement of Hazara	75
" 13 ..	The Secretary with the Governor-General.	The Resident.. ..	Improvement in the adminis- tration of Maharajah Golab Sing .. .. .	75
" 20 ..	The Resident.. ..	The Secretary with the Governor-General	Celebration of the Dusserah festival .. .. .	76
" 21 ..	The Governor-General	The Secret Committee	Inclosing papers .. .. .	71
" 30 ..	Major Lawrence ..	The Resident.. ..	Revenue settlement of the Eu- sufzye country — Praise of Lieutenant Lumsden ..	78
Nov 6 ..	The Governor-General	The Secret Committee	Return of Lieutenant-Colonel Lawrence to Lahore — Tran- quillity .. .. .	76
" 8 ..	The Resident.. ..	L. Bowring, Esq., As- sistant to the Resident	Instructions on sending him to make a Revenue settlement of of Pind Dadun Khan ..	77
" 8 ..	The Resident.. ..	Lieutenant J. Nichol- son, Assistant to the Resident.	Instructions on sending him to make a Revenue settlement of the districts north of the Salt Range .. .. .	77
" 13 ..	The Resident.. ..	The Secretary with the Governor-General	Instructions to Lieutenant Ed- wardes, on sending him to make a Revenue settlement of Bunnoo, &c — Employ- ment of the several assist- ants — Praise of Captain Ab- bott — New Customs' laws — Payment of arrears by col- lectors — Endeavours to re- duce expenditure — Postage alteration — Intention to be- stow more titles of honor — Tranquillity of the country — Education of the Maharajah	80
" 13 ..	The Resident.. ..	Lieutenant Edwardes..	Instructions on sending him to make a Revenue settlement of Bunnoo, &c — Praise of him .. .. .	82
" 15 ..	The Secretary with the Governor-General.	The Resident.. ..	Prohibition of the seizure of coolies, carriage, &c, by British officers .. .. .	84
" 20 ..	The Governor-General	The Secret Committee	Tranquillity .. .. .	77
" 26 ..	The Resident.. ..	The Secretary with the Governor-General.	Titles of honor conferred ..	87
Dec 2 ..	The Governor-General	The Secret Committee	Tranquillity .. .. .	78
" 7 ..	The Governor-General	The Court of Directors	Memorandum by Mr H M Elliot, Secretary to Govern- ment, on the revenue and expenditure of the Punjab — Praise of Mr Elliot ..	85
" 16 ..	The Acting Resident..	The Secretary to the Government of India	New system of Customs — Revenue settlement — Rules for the guidance of the Dur- bar. — Codes of law — Rules for Revenue collectors — New Courts of Justice. — Reduction in the Sikh army, and in the pay department. — Necessity for British inter- ference — Financial diffi- culties. — Debt due to the British Government — Post Office arrangements. — De- wan Moolraj, of Mooltan; his desire for a reduction of the amount he pays for Mooltan, or to resign his office. — Administration of Moolraj .. .. .	91



Date.	From.	To.	Subject.	Page
1847.				
Dec. 20 ..	The Acting Resident..	The Secretary to the Government of India	Code of Law, drawn up by Mr. C. Saunders.—Praise of him .. ..	94
" 21 ..	Dewan Moolraj ..	" .. ..	Resignation of the charge of Mooltan .. ..	90
" 27 ..	The Acting Resident..	The Secretary to the Government of India	Dewan Moolraj discussions with him his resignation.—Future Administration of Mooltan — Employment of the Resident's assistants. — Revenue and expenses of Hazara.—Reduction of the Sikh army —Financial difficulties.—Discovery of a large amount of treasure .. ..	87
" 27 ..	Lieutenant Edwardes..	The Acting Resident..	Difficulty of subduing the people of Bunnoo. — Recommending that they be disarmed .. ..	95
" 29 ..	The Acting Resident..	Lieutenant Edwardes..	Objecting to that proposition — Investigation of rent-free tenures — Proceedings against Revenue defaulters. — Uniform weights and measures .. ..	96
" 30 ..	The Acting Resident..	The Secretary to the Government of India	The disbanding of a Sikh regiment recommended .. ..	97
1848				
Jan. 2 ..	Jeebun Sing, Agent of the Maharanee	The Secretary to the Government	Representation from the Maharanee .. ..	107
" 4 ..	The Acting Resident..	Lieutenant Edwardes..	Objections to disarming the people of Bunnoo — Method of conciliating them .. ..	97
" 7 ..	The Acting Resident	The Secretary to the Government	Impolicy of disarming the people of Bunnoo .. ..	99
" 12 ..	The Acting Resident	The Secretary to the Government.	Progress of the Revenue settlement — Ancient abuses — Settlement of the accounts of the great farmers of Revenue — New Courts of Justice — Reduction of the Sikh army Mahomedan cry to prayer — Statistics of Lahore — Military code — Praise of Major Macgregor .. ..	99
" 14 ..	The Secretary to Government, (Lord Dalhousie's Government)	The Acting Resident..	Mooltan proceedings respecting the government of that province to be suspended, until Sir F. Currie reach Lahore .. ..	91
" 15 ..	The Secretary to Government	Sir Frederick Currie, Bart	Appointed Resident at Lahore, during the absence of Lieutenant-Colonel Lawrence in Europe — Praise of Sir F. Currie .. ..	86
" 19 ..	Major Lawrence ..	The Acting Resident..	Revenue settlement — Employment of his assistants — Praise of Lieutenant Bowie	101
" 21 ..	The Governor-General in Council (the Earl of Dalhousie).	The Court of Directors	Appointment of Sir F. Currie to be Resident at Lahore .. ..	85
" 22 ..	The Governor-General in Council.	The Secret Committee	Correspondence with the Acting Resident .. ..	86
" 23 ..	The Secretary to the Government of India.	The Acting Resident..	Approval of his proceedings on the question of disarming the people of Bunnoo .. ..	101
" 26 ..	The Secretary to the Government of India.	The Acting Resident..	Approval of the intention to disband a certain Sikh regiment .. ..	101

Date.	From.	To.	Subject.	Page
1848.				
Jan. 31 ..	The Acting Resident..	The Secretary to Government.	Progress of the Revenue settlement — Reduction of Customs' duties. — Disturbance at Umritsur — As to disarming the people of Bunnoo. — Proceedings of Dewan Moolraj — Hazara Revenue settlement. — Diminution of expenses — Reduction of the Sikh army — As to the reduction of the Jagheerdar horse .. ..	101
Feb. 3 ..	The Acting Resident..	Lieutenant Edwardes..	Expectation of a disturbance — Military reinforcements for Bunnoo, and Peshawur ..	102
" 4 ..	The Secretary to the Government.	The Acting Resident..	Debt due to the British Government .. ..	101
" 4 ..	The Acting Resident..	The Secretary to the Government	Expectation of a disturbance — Military reinforcements for Bunnoo, and Peshawur ..	103
" 4 ..	The Acting Resident..	Major Lawrence ..	Sikh army — Proportion at Peshawur .. ..	103
" 7 ..	The Governor-General in Council	The Secret Committee	Discovery of treasure — Part to be paid to the British Government, in discharge of a portion of the debt due to them .. ..	91
" 12 ..	Lieutenant Edwardes..	The Acting Resident..	Proceedings in Bunnoo ..	109
" 18 ..	The Secretary to the Government	Jeebun Sing .. ..	As to his claim to be received as Agent for the Maharanee ..	107
" 18 ..	The Secretary to the Government	The Resident (Sir Frederick Currie)	On the same subject ..	107
" 19 ..	The Acting Resident..	The Secretary to the Government.	Execution of Akalees for murder committed at Umritsur ..	109
" 21 ..	The Governor-General in Council	The Secret Committee	Correspondence with the Acting Resident ..	102
" 21 ..	The Acting Resident..	The Secretary to the Government	Tranquillity in Bunnoo ..	110
" 21 ..	The Acting Resident..	Lieutenant Edwardes..	Military movements with respect to Bunnoo ..	110
" 23 ..	Jeebun Sing .. ..	The Secretary to the Government	Complaints of the Maharanee ..	108
" 23 ..	The Acting Resident	The Secretary to the Government	Payment made by Lahore on account of the debt due to the British Government — State of the Lahore treasury ..	110
March 1 ..	The Acting Resident..	The Secretary to the Government	Measures taken in the expectation of an Affghan invasion of Bunnoo — State of Peshawur, Hazara, and Mooltan — Disturbance at Umritsur — Removal of the Judge. — Want of executive officers among the Sikhs — A Sikh regiment disbanded — Revenue settlement — Income and expenditure of the Punjab. — Reduction of the expense of presents, &c. .. ..	111
" 8 ..	The Resident (Sir Frederick Currie) ..	Dewan Moolraj, Nazim of Mooltan	As to his resignation, or retention of office .. ..	121
" 10 ..	The Secretary to the Government.	The Acting Resident..	Reduction of the Sikh military establishments .. ..	113
" 16 ..	Dewan Moolraj ..	The Resident .. ..	Resignation .. ..	122
" 22 ..	The Governor-General in Council	The Secret Committee	Tranquillity. — Improvement in the administration of Lahore .. ..	104
" 24 ..	The Lahore Durbar ..	Dewan Moolraj ..	Accepting his resignation ..	123
" 28 ..	The Resident.. ..	P. Vans Agnew, Esq., Assistant to the Resident.	Practice of giving and receiving presents. — Maintenance of native customs .. ..	123
" 31 ..	The Lahore Durbar ..	Sirdar Khan Sing Man	Instructions on sending him to Mooltan, in the room of Dewan Moolraj .. ..	123

Date.	From	To.	Subject.	Page
1848.				
March 31 ..	The late Acting Resident.	The Secretary to the Government.	General report on the Punjab, and the measures taken for the improvement of the Country and Government ..	114
April 5 ..	The Resident.. ..	Mr. Vans Agnew ..	Instructions with regard to the administration of Mooltan ..	125
" 6 ..	The Resident .. ..	The Secretary to the Government.	General report on the Punjab. —Comments on the changes which have been introduced. —Proceedings with respect to Dewan Moolraj —Appointment of Mr. Vans Agnew and Lieutenant Anderson —Praise of them —Financial prospects —The Maharanee's complaints ..	127
" 8 ..	The Governor-General in Council	The Secret Committee	Dispatches from the Resident	109
" 13 ..	Lieutenant Edwardes..	The Resident.. ..	Military force in Bunnoo ..	148
" 14 ..	Mr Agnew .. ..	The Resident.. ..	Arrival at Mooltan ..	151
" 19 ..	Mr Agnew .. ..	The Resident.. ..	Attack on him and Lieutenant Anderson .. ..	151
" 21 ..	The Resident .. ..	The Governor-General	Attack on Mr Agnew and Lieutenant Anderson.—Sikh troops dispatched in consequence —The Durbar ready to take any measures the Resident may suggest .. ..	152
" 22 ..	The Resident.. ..	The Governor-General	Sikh troops dispatched in consequence.—The Durbar ready to take any measures the Resident may suggest ..	153
" 22 ..	Jemadar Kesra Sing, servant of Mr Agnew	.. ..	Account of the murder ..	153
" 22 ..	Lieutenant Edwardes..	The Resident.. ..	Attack on Mr Agnew —Intention to march to his rescue .. ..	149
" 22 ..	The Mooltan Sikhs ..	The troops under Lieutenant Edwardes	Account of the murder, and soliciting assistance	150
" 24 ..	The Resident.. ..	The Governor-General	Fears that the officers have been murdered —Intention to move British troops on Mooltan	156
" 24 ..	The Resident .. ..	Major-General Whish, commanding the Punjab division	Necessity for moving a British force on Mooltan ..	158
" 24 ..	Peer Ibraheem Khan, British Agent at Bahawalpore	.. ..	Account of the murder	158
" 25 ..	The Resident .. ..	The Governor-General	Intelligence of the murder of Mr Agnew and Lieutenant Anderson —Consequent change of plan —The British force cannot be moved —The Sikhs must punish the aggressors —Probability of disturbance throughout the Punjab ..	159
" 25 ..	Lieutenant Edwardes..	The Resident.. ..	Murder of Mr Agnew.—Occupation of Leia ..	151
" 26 ..	Lieutenant Edwardes..	The Resident.. ..	His proceedings .. ..	152
" 27 ..	The Resident.. ..	The Governor-General	Declaration of the Sikh Sardars that they alone cannot punish Moolraj, and that they cannot depend on their troops —Political necessity for the immediate punishment of Moolraj .. ..	140
" 27 ..	The Resident.. ..	The Commander-in-Chief in India.	Declaration of the Sikh Sardars that they alone cannot punish Moolraj, and that they cannot depend on their troops.—Political necessity for the immediate punishment of Moolraj .. ..	141

Date.	From.	To.	Subject.	Page
1848.				
April 27 ..	Lieutenant Edwardes ..	The Resident ..	Attempt, on the part of the Sikhs at Mooltan, to seduce the Sikhs under Lieutenant Edwardes—Levy of troops ..	153
" 28 ..	The Secretary to the Government.	The Resident ..	Approval of the deputation of Mr. Agnew to Mooltan ..	113
" 28 ..	The Commander-in-Chief	The Resident ..	Countermand of the movement of troops on Mooltan ..	154
" 29 ..	Lieutenant Edwardes ..	The Resident ..	Doubts of the fidelity of the Sikhs in his camp ..	156
" 30 ..	The Commander-in-Chief	The Resident ..	Inexpediency of moving a British force against Mooltan at the present season ..	142
May 1 ..	Lieutenant Edwardes ..	The Resident ..	Account of his proceedings.—Communication with Moolraj—Objections to permitting a Sikh army to assemble before Mooltan ..	157
	Mustapha Khan, in the fort of Mooltan	Lieutenant Edwardes ..	Communication from Moolraj.—Declaration of his innocence ..	159
" 2 ..	The Governor-General in Council	The Secret Committee	Papers relative to the Punjab ..	113
" 3 ..	The Resident ..	The Secretary to the Government	Opinion of the Commander-in-Chief that a military movement against Mooltan is not, at present, practicable ..	161
" 3 ..	Lieutenant Edwardes ..	The Resident ..	Compelled to re-cross the Indus	160
" 5 ..	The Resident ..	The Secretary to the Government	Movements of Lieutenant Edwardes.—Reported defection of his Sikh troops—Fears for his safety—Reinforcements for the garrison at Lahore ..	155
" 7 ..	Lieutenant Edwardes ..	The Resident ..	Retirement of the rebels from Lea to Mooltan ..	161
" 8 ..	Lieutenant Edwardes ..	The Resident ..	Suspicious of the designs of the Sikh troops ..	161
" 8 ..	Lieutenant Taylor ..	The Resident ..	State of Bunnoo—Reinforcement sent to Lieutenant Edwardes ..	162
" 9 ..	The Resident ..	The Secretary to the Government	Plot to seduce the British Sepoys ..	162
" 10 ..	The Resident ..	The Secretary to the Government	Concurs with Lieutenant Edwardes in regretting the delay in moving on Mooltan.—Doubts the guilt of Sirdar Khan Sing ..	162
" 11 ..	The Governor-General in Council	The Secret Committee	Papers relative to the Punjab ..	114
" 11 ..	The Governor-General in Council	The Secret Committee	Murder of Mr. Agnew and Lieutenant Anderson.—Detail of circumstances connected with Dewan Moolraj.—Measures to be taken for the punishment of the offenders ..	116
" 11 ..	The Resident ..	The Secretary to the Government	Execution of two Sikhs, for endeavouring to seduce the British Sepoys.—Complicity of the Maharanee ..	163
" 11 ..	Gunga Ram and Toolsee Ram	" ..	Confession as to the plot to seduce the British Sepoys ..	164
" 12 ..	Lieutenant Edwardes ..	The Resident ..	Occupation of the fort of Mungratah.—Movements of Moolraj.—Plan for confining him and his troops to Mooltan, with the aid of the Bahawalpore army ..	165
" 13 ..	The Commander-in-Chief	The Resident ..	Force to be collected at Ferozepore by November 1 ..	166
" 14 ..	The Resident ..	The Maharanee ..	Removal from Sheikhoopoor ..	223
" 14 ..	The Resident ..	The Chiefs who have the custody of the Maharanee	Removal from Sheikhoopoor ..	223



Date.	From.	To.	Subject	Page
1848.				
May 23 ..	The Resident .. ..	The Secretary to the Government	Praise of Lieutenant Edwardes. —Movement of the Bahawalpore troops .. ..	177
" 23 ..	J. Lawrence, Esq., Commissioner in the Trans-Sutlej States	Brigadier Wheeler, commanding in the Jullundur	Bhace Maharaj Sing .. ..	182
" 23 ..	Mr. Lawrence .. ..	The Resident .. ..	Bhace Maharaj Sing .. ..	182
" 23 ..	Lieutenant Edwardes ..	The Resident .. ..	Moolraj does not regard the Sikh troops as enemies — Necessity of obtaining assistance from Bahawalpore .. ..	188
" 25 ..	The Resident .. ..	The Secretary to the Government	Movements of Lieutenant Edwardes — Effect of the Maharanee's deportation .. ..	178
" 25 ..	Lieutenant Edwardes ..	The Resident .. ..	Proposing to cross the Indus, and unite with the Bahawalpore troops .. ..	180
" 26 ..	The Resident .. ..	Mr Lawrence .. ..	Bhace Maharaj Sing .. ..	183
" 27 ..	The Secretary to the Government	The Resident .. ..	Approbation of the conduct of Lieutenant Edwardes, except in regard to offering terms to Moolraj .. ..	179
" 27 ..	The Secretary to the Government	The Resident .. ..	Reduction of the stipend of the Maharanee .. ..	179
" 27 ..	Lieutenant Edwardes ..	The Resident .. ..	Junction with General Cortlandt — Proposes to unite with the Bahawalpore troops .. ..	191
" 27 ..	Captain Mackenzie ..	Major Mackeson ..	Voluntary offer of the 4th Regiment of Sikh Local Infantry to march against the Mooltanees .. ..	193
" 29 ..	The Resident .. ..	Lieutenant Edwardes ..	Success at Dera Ghazee Khan — Objections to his crossing the Indus — Ordered to confine himself to the maintenance of his authority in the Trans-Indus districts .. ..	185
" 30 ..	Lieutenant Edwardes ..	The Resident .. ..	A Sikh regiment, suspected of infidelity, sent against the fort of Hurrund — Anxiety to join the Bahawalpore troops, and act against Moolraj. — Objections to the grant of certain remissions of revenue .. ..	193
June 2 ..	Lieutenant Edwardes ..	The Resident .. ..	Movement of the Bahawalpore troops — Plan for cooperating with them — Distrust of the Sikh troops .. ..	195
" 3 ..	The Governor-General in Council	The Secret Committee	Plot to corrupt the British Sepoys — Execution of two of the offenders — Complicity of the Maharanee — Her removal to British territory. — Further reduction of her stipend — Operations of Lieutenant Edwardes. — Reinforcement of Lahore — Number of troops to be assembled, in order effectually to put down the rebellion. — Extent of reparation to be demanded from the Sikh Government .. ..	143
" 3 ..	Koobub Shah .. ..	.. ..	Deposition as to the murder of Mr Agnew and Lieutenant Anderson .. ..	460
" 5 ..	The Resident .. ..	The Secretary of the Government	Praise of Lieutenant Edwardes — Army raised by him. — Inactivity of the Durbar — Proceedings of Moolraj. — Sympathy of the people for him. — The Bahawalpore troops urged to cross the Sutlej, and threaten Mooltan. — Lieutenant Lake to accompany them .. ..	197
" 5 ..	The Resident .. ..	Lieutenant Edwardes ..	Praise of his exertions .. ..	199

Date.	From.	To.	Subject.	Page
1848.				
June 5 ..	Lieutenant Edwardes ..	The Resident ..	Movement of the Bahawalpore troops.—Necessity for going to their assistance ..	199
" 6 ..	Lieutenant Edwardes ..	The Resident ..	Movement of the Bahawalpore troops.—Necessity for going to their assistance.—Praise of Lieutenant Taylor ..	200
" 8 ..	Lieutenant Edwardes ..	The Resident ..	Inactivity of the Bahawalpore troops ..	202
" 9 ..	The Resident ..	Lieutenant Lake, of the Engineers	Instructing him to join the Bahawalpore troops ..	204
" 10 ..	The Governor-General in Council	The Secret Committee	Lieutenant Edwardes. — Actions at Leia and Dera Ghazee Khan.—Bhaee Maharaj Sing —Force to be assembled against Mooltan ..	180
" 10 ..	The Secretary to the Government	J. Newmarch, Esq., Solicitor	Custody of the Maharanees ..	227
" 10 ..	The Resident ..	Lieutenant Edwardes ..	He must act according to his discretion, but should risk as little as possible —Lieutenant Lake sent to the Bahawalpore troops — Defeat of Bhaee Maharaj Sing.—As to certain remissions of revenue ..	204
" 10 ..	Lieutenant Edwardes ..	The Resident ..	Retirement of Moolraj's troops. —Pursuit of them ..	206
" 11 ..	Lieutenant Edwardes ..	The Resident ..	Retirement of Moolraj's troops. —Pursuit of them ..	207
" 12 ..	Lieutenant Edwardes ..	The Resident ..	Retirement of Moolraj's troops —Pursuit of them ..	209
" 13 ..	The Resident ..	The Secretary to the Government	Bhaee Maharaj Sing —Account of ..	210
" 13 ..	The Resident ..	Lieutenant Edwardes ..	Distrust of Shere Sing's troops, and of the whole Sikh army ..	213
" 13 ..	Lieutenant Edwardes ..	The Resident ..	Desertion of a Sikh regiment. —Disaffection of the Bunnoo troops — Movement against Moolraj's troops ..	214
" 15 ..	Lieutenant Edwardes ..	The Resident ..	Movement against Moolraj's troops ..	215
" 16 ..	The Resident ..	The Secretary to the Government	Reply to newspaper charges as to the removal of the Maharanees from Sheikhoopoor ..	229
" 17 ..	The Resident ..	The Secretary to the Government	Hope that Mahomedan influence will prevent Sikh support to Moolraj —Disloyalty of the Sikh army —Desertion of part of one regiment ..	216
" 17 ..	Lieutenant Edwardes ..	The Resident ..	Movement against Moolraj's troops ..	221
" 18 ..	Lieutenant Edwardes ..	The Resident ..	Victory over Moolraj's troops at Kineyree ..	218
" 20 ..	The Resident ..	The Secretary to the Government	Desertion of part of a Sikh regiment —Impracticable to withdraw British officers from detached posts ..	217
" 21 ..	Lieutenant Edwardes ..	The Resident ..	Further account with regard to the victory of Kineyree.—Complaint as to the Bahawalpore Commander ..	230
" 22 ..	The Resident ..	The Secretary to the Government	Praise of Lieutenant Edwardes. —Victory of the 18th of June. —Disaffection of all the Sikhs. — Redress required from the Lahore State ..	219
" 22 ..	The Resident ..	The Secretary to the Government	Desertion of part of a Sikh regiment ..	231
Without date	Captain Abbott ..	The Resident ..	Desertion of part of a Sikh regiment ..	232
June 22 ..	Lieutenant Edwardes ..	The Resident ..	Proposing to undertake the siege of Mooltan ..	223
" 24 ..	Lieutenant Lake, Assistant to the Resident	The Resident ..	Arrival at Bahawalpore.—Suggesting that a detachment of British (native) troops should be sent to Bahawalpore ..	224

**CHRONOLOGICAL LIST OF PAPERS.**

<b>Date.</b>	<b>From.</b>	<b>To.</b>	<b>Subject.</b>	<b>Page</b>
<b>1848.</b>				
June 26 ..	Lieutenant Edwardes ..	The Resident ..	Arrangement for supplies. — Propriety of keeping the Sikhs at a distance from Mooltan. — Communication with Moolraj	232
" 27 ..	The Resident ..	Lieutenant Edwardes ..	Objections to sending him siege artillery without a British force — Recommending him only to invest Mooltan ..	224
" 27 ..	Lieutenant Edwardes ..	The Resident ..	Advance against Moolraj. — Distrust of the Sikh army ..	234
" 28 ..	The Resident ..	The Commander-in- Chief	Suggesting that one brigade of British troops should be sent immediately, to reduce Mooltan	225
" 28 ..	The Resident ..	The Commander-in- Chief	Suggesting that a brigade of British troops should be ready to form the garrison of Mool- tan, when taken. ..	226
" 30 ..	The Resident ..	The Secretary to the Government	Conspiracy to tamper with the British troops — Complicity of the Maharanee — Property taken by her ..	235
" 30 ..	Lieutenant Edwardes ..	The Resident ..	Advance against Moolraj — Disaffection among the Sikhs	236
July 1 ..	The Secretary to the Government	Mr Newmarch	Channel of communication re- specting the Maharanee ..	227
" 1 ..	The Commander-in- Chief	The Governor-General in Council	Amount of British force to be sent immediately to Mooltan	238
" 1 ..	The Commander-in- Chief	The Resident ..	Objections to undertaking im- mediately the siege of Mooltan by a British force ..	238
" 2 ..	Lieutenant Edwardes ..	The Resident ..	Victory of July 1. — Battle of Suddoosam ..	239
" 2 ..	Lieutenant Lake ..	The Resident ..	Victory of July 1. — Battle of Suddoosam ..	242
" 3 ..	The Governor-General in Council	The Secret Committee	Success of the Khosa tribe over the rebels at Dera Ghazee Khan — Movement of the Bahawalpore army against Mooltan. — Lieutenant Lake directed to join that army, and act as Political Agent with it — Lieutenant Edwardes' com- munication with the Dewan Moolraj. — Moolraj's prepara- tions for defence — Defeat of Bhaee Maharaj Sing. — Lieu- tenant Edwardes' victory of June 18 ..	186
" 3 ..	Lieutenant Edwardes ..	The Resident ..	Urging the movement of British troops. — Lieutenant Ed- wardes wounded — Anxiety arising from Shere Sing's troops ..	243
" 5 ..	The Resident ..	The Secretary to the Government	Distrust of the Sikhs ..	239
" 6 ..	Lieutenant Lake ..	The Resident ..	Urging immediate movement of British troops ..	245
" 7 ..	Lieutenant Edwardes ..	The Resident ..	No fear of inundation ..	246
" 8 ..	The Secretary to the Government	The Resident ..	Thanks to Lieutenant Ed- wardes, to General Cortlandt, and to the Nawab of Bahawal- pore, with respect to the vic- tory of the 18th of June at Kineyree ..	246
" 9 ..	Lieutenant Lake ..	The Resident ..	Steam-vessel on the Chenab — Lieutenant Christopher ..	246
" 10 ..	The Governor-General in Council	The Secret Committee	Brigade of British troops to be sent against Mooltan ..	221
" 10 ..	The Resident ..	The Secretary to the Government	Second victory gained by Lie- utenant Edwardes. — Battle of Suddoosam ..	247
" 10 ..	The Resident ..	Lieutenant Edwardes ..	Second victory gained by Lie- utenant Edwardes. — Battle of Suddoosam ..	247



Date.	From.	To.	Subject.	Page
1848.				
July 10 ..	The Resident ..	Lieutenant Lake ..	Second victory gained by Lieutenant Edwardes.—Battle of Suddoosan ..	248
" 10 ..	The Resident ..	The Secretary to the Government	Reasons for an immediate movement of British troops on Mooltan, and for its not having been made before. — Wide-spread conspiracy among the Sikhs ..	248
" 10 ..	The Resident ..	Major-General Whish	Immediate movement of British troops ..	251
" 11 ..	Major-General Sir J. Littler, Member of Council	Minute ..	Objections to undertaking immediately the siege of Mooltan by a British force — Amount of force, if any be sent ..	252
" 11 ..	The Secretary to the Government	The Resident ..	Objections to undertaking immediately the siege of Mooltan by a British force — Amount of force, if any be sent ..	253
" 11 ..	The Secretary to the Government	The Adjutant-General	No preparations involving expense to be made without further orders ..	253
" 13 ..	The Adjutant-General	Major-General Whish	Putting him in command of the troops destined for Mooltan ..	254
" 13 ..	Lieutenant Edwardes ..	The Resident ..	Raja Sing's protestations of loyalty — Belief in the loyalty of the Sirdars, and disaffection of the soldiers — Advantage of the movement of British troops ..	254
" 14 ..	The Secretary to the Government	Major Macgregor, the Governor-General's Agent at Benares	Property taken by the Maharanees.—Custody of the Maharanees ..	255
" 14 ..	The Resident ..	The Secretary to the Government	Necessity for the immediate movement of British troops against Mooltan. — Commencement of the move — Exertions of the Durbar to provide carriage ..	255
" 14 ..	The Commander-in-Chief	The Resident ..	Amount of force to be sent to Mooltan ..	259
" 15 ..	Lieutenant Taylor ..	The Resident ..	Quiet state of Bunnoo, &c — Advantage of the speedy movement of British troops — Spirit prevailing in the Sikh army ..	256
" 16 ..	The Resident ..	The Secretary to the Government	Probability of the close of the Mooltan rebellion — State of the troops in Hazara ..	258
" 18 ..	The Resident ..	The Secretary to the Government	Bhaee Maharaj Sing ..	258
" 22 ..	The Secretary to the Government	The Resident ..	Objections to the immediate movement of British troops, but sanctioning it ..	258
" 22 ..	Proclamation ..	The people of Mooltan	Warning them of the approach of a British force, and to return to their duty ..	260
" 24 ..	The Resident ..	The Commander-in-Chief	Amount of the force to be sent to Mooltan ..	259
" 24 ..	The Resident ..	Captain Abbott ..	Conduct of Sirdar Jhunda Sing ..	300
" 26 ..	The Resident ..	Lieutenant Edwardes ..	Proclamation to the people of Mooltan ..	260
" 26 ..	Lieutenant Taylor ..	The Resident ..	Suppression of the mutiny in Bunnoo ..	261
" 28 ..	Lieutenant Edwardes ..	The Resident ..	Interview with Shere Sing as to Chuttur Sing's wish for the celebration of the marriage of his daughter with the Maharajah Duleep Sing ..	270
" 29 ..	The Secretary to the Government	The Resident ..	Praise of Lieutenants Edwardes and Lake ..	259
" 29 ..	Captain Abbott ..	The Resident ..	Conduct of Jhunda Sing ..	300
" 29 ..	Mr. Newmarch ..	Major Macgregor ..	Communication with the Maharanees ..	264
" 29 ..	Jeebun Sing ..	The Maharanees ..	Reporting his proceedings in her behalf ..	265

Date.	From.	To.	Subject.	Page
1848.				
July 31 ..	The Resident ..	The Secretary to the Government ..	Wide-spread conspiracy among the Sikhs. Arguments in favor of moving a British force immediately on Mooltan	261
Aug. 1 ..	Lieutenant Edwardes ..	The Resident ..	Conduct of the Futteh Pultun, Sikh regiment ..	271
" 2 ..	Major Lawrence ..	The Resident ..	Seizure of an emissary from Moolraj ..	272
" 2 ..	Major Macgregor ..	The Secretary to the Government	Arrival of the Maharanee at Benares Ineffectual search for papers ..	263
" 3 ..	The Resident ..	Lieutenant Edwardes ..	Marriage of the Maharajah with the daughter of Chuttur Sing	272
" 4 ..	Lieutenant Edwardes ..	The Resident ..	Conduct of the Futteh Pultun regiment. Necessity for re-modelling the Khalsa army	273
" 7 ..	The Governor-General in Council	The Secret Committee	Custody of the Maharanee ..	226
" 7 ..	Captain Abbott ..	The Resident ..	Murder of Colonel Canora ..	301
" 8 ..	The Governor-General in Council	The Secret Committee	Discussion with respect to sending British troops immediately to Mooltan A force sent under Major-General Whish	
" 8 ..	The Resident ..	The Secretary to the Government	Lieutenant Edwardes' victory of July 1st Praise of Lieutenants Edwardes and Lake	227
Without date	Major Lawrence	The Resident ..	Feeling of the Sikh army Disbelief of Chuttur Sing's treachery. State of Shere Sing's troops Reasons for moving a British force on Mooltan	274
" 8 ..	Major Macgregor ..	The Secretary to the Government	Execution of an emissary from Moolraj Captain Nicholson sent to Attock, in consequence of the Hazara outbreak	275
Without date of the day	Captain Nicholson, Assistant to the Resident	The Resident ..	Soliciting instructions as to the communications of Mr Newmarch, and Jeebun Sing, with the Maharanee ..	264
" 10 ..	Lieutenant Edwardes ..	The Resident ..	Occupation of the fort of Attock ..	276
" 10 ..	Captain Abbott ..	The Resident ..	Causes of the outbreak in Hazara Shoojan Sing found guilty of treachery. Place for Shere Sing's force in the attack against Mooltan	276
" 11 ..	Brigadier Young, commanding at Ferozepore	The Adjutant-General	Murder of Colonel Canora Intrigues of Chuttur Sing	301
" 11 ..	The Resident ..	Captain Abbott ..	Departure of British troops for Mooltan ..	278
" 11 ..	Major Lawrence ..	The Resident ..	Intention to send Mr Cocks to Hazara to inquire into the causes of the disturbance ..	277
" 12 ..	Major Macgregor ..	The Resident ..	Reports of the treachery of Shere Sing. Belief in the fidelity of the troops at Peshawur ..	278
" 12 ..	The Resident ..	The Secretary to the Government	Papers found in the Maharanee's boxes ..	266
" 12 ..	The Resident ..	Major Lawrence ..	Disbelief of Chuttur Sing's treachery. Murder of Colonel Canora ..	279
" 12 ..	The Resident ..	Captain Nicholson, Assistant to the Resident	Disbelief of Chuttur Sing's treachery Murder of Colonel Canora Execution of Moolraj's emissary Mission of Captain Nicholson to Attock ..	281
" 12 ..	The Resident ..	A. Cocks, Esq., Principal Assistant to the Resident	Instructions on his being sent to Attock ..	281
" 12 ..	The Resident ..		Instructions on sending him to Hazara ..	282

Date.	From.	To.	Subject.	Page
1848.				
Aug. 12 ..	Captain Nicholson ..	The Resident..	Arrival at Hussan Abdal.— Causes of the outbreak in Hazara —Urging the dispatch of a British brigade to Hazara	282
" 12 ..	Lieutenant Lake ..	The Resident..	Orders requested on Shoojan Sing and others charged with treason, in conspiring against Shere Sing ..	302
" 13 ..	The Resident..	The Secretary to the Government	Captain Nicholson's occupa- tion of Attock Measures taken with respect to Chuttur Sing. Mr Cocks not to pro- ceed to Hazara Jhunda Sing sent ..	283
" 13 ..	Captain Abbott ..	The Resident..	Murder of Colonel Canora — Terms offered to Chuttur Sing	302
" 13 ..	Captain Abbott ..	The Resident..	Murder of Colonel Canora.— Terms offered to Chuttur Sing —Treachery of Jhunda Sing	304
" 13 ..	Captain Abbott ..	The Resident..	Excuses made by Chuttur Sing ..	305
" 13 ..	Captain Nicholson ..	The Resident..	Proceedings taken in conse- quence of the threatened desertion of a Sikh regiment	284
" 14 ..	Captain Nicholson ..	The Resident..	Conduct of Sikh troops ..	307
" 14 ..	Major-General Whish	The Adjutant-General	March of British troops towards Mooltan ..	284
" 15 ..	The Resident..	The Secretary to the Government	Causes of the outbreak in Hazara — Captain Abbott, and Chuttur Sing ..	285
" 15 ..	The Resident..	The Commander-in- Chief	Causes of the outbreak in Hazara. — Captain Abbott, and Chuttur Sing —Death of Colonel Canora —Objections to moving a British brigade to Hazara ..	286
" 15 ..	Captain Nicholson ..	The Resident..	Proceedings taken against the Sikh troops.—Military ar- rangements ..	307
" 15 ..	Major Lawrence ..	The Resident..	Causes of the outbreak in Ha- zara —Advantage arising from having sent Lieutenant Nichol- son to Attock —Trust in the troops at Peshawur —Praise of the Governor, Golab Sing	287
" 16 ..	The Resident..	The Secretary to the Government	Hazara outbreak —Praise of Lieutenant Nicholson —Good conduct of the Durbar ..	289
" 16 ..	The Resident..	Captain Nicholson ..	Approval of his proceedings — Hope that the Hazara out- break will be suppressed with- out British troops ..	289
" 16 ..	The Resident..	Captain Abbott ..	Hopes of an arrangement being made with Chuttur Sing ..	290
" 16 ..	Captain Nicholson ..	The Resident..	Terms which Chuttur Sing would perhaps accept. — Necessity for British troops	308
" 17 ..	Major Lawrence ..	The Resident..	Treachery of Chuttur Sing — Necessity for employing British troops against him ..	290
" 17 ..	Captain Abbott ..	The Resident..	Measures taken against the mutinous Sikhs.—Account of the Hazara outbreak ..	309
" 17 ..	The Resident..	Lieutenant Lake ..	Sentence passed on Shoojan Sing and others convicted of treason ..	312
" 18 ..	The Governor-General	The Secret Committee	General combination in the Punjab against the British power ..	259
" 18 ..	Major-General Whish	The Adjutant-General	Arrival before Mooltan ..	291
" 19 ..	The Secretary to the Government	Major Macgregor ..	As to what communications may be held with the Maharanee	266
" 19 ..	The Resident ..	Captain Nicholson ..	Approval of his proceedings.— Excuse for Chuttur Sing ..	312

Date.	From.	To.	Subject	Page
1848.				
Aug 19 ..	The Resident ..	Captain Abbott ..	Cause of Chuttur Sing's conduct—Terms to be offered to him ..	313
" 19 ..	Captain Nicholson ..	The Resident ..	Chuttur Sing's attention to the offers made to him.—Necessity for sending two British brigades to Hazara ..	292
" 19 ..	Lieutenant Edwardes ..	The Resident ..	Satisfactory interview with Shere Sing as to Chuttur Sing.—Shere Sing's earnest declaration of his own loyalty ..	293
" 20 ..	Captain Nicholson ..	The Resident ..	Further offer made to Chuttur Sing—As to sending British troops to Hazara ..	295
" 21 ..	The Commander-in-Chief	The Resident ..	Objections to sending British troops to Hazara ..	314
" 22 ..	The Resident ..	Major Lawrence	Cause of the outbreak in Hazara.—Proceedings against Chuttur Sing ..	296
" 23 ..	The Resident ..	Captain Abbott ..	Interview with Golab Sing, son of Chuttur Sing—He and Shere Sing were ignorant of any intention on the part of their father to rise in rebellion—Chuttur Sing summoned to Lahore.—Conviction of Shere Sing's loyalty ..	296
" 23 ..	The Resident ..	Captain Nicholson ..	Approval of the offers made to Chuttur Sing—His son, Golab Sing, has urged him to come to Lahore.—Inexpediency of sending British troops to Hazara ..	297
" 23 ..	The Resident	Lieutenant Edwardes	As to his interview with Shere Sing—Good conduct of that chief—Hope that the outbreak in Hazara will be suppressed, without military interference ..	297
" 23 ..	Captain Abbott ..	The Resident ..	Proceedings against the Sikh troops ..	311
" 23 ..	Major Lawrence	The Resident	Necessity for sending British troops to Hazara—Chuttur Sing's rebellion will, probably, be more formidable than that of Moolraj ..	315
" 24 ..	The Resident ..	The Secretary to the Government	Endeavour to effect an arrangement with Chuttur Sing—Satisfactory account of the Peshawur and Bunnoo forces ..	298
" 24 ..	The Resident ..	Captain Abbott ..	Remarks on his proceedings in regard to Chuttur Sing ..	316
" 25 ..	Captain Abbott ..	The Resident	Measures taken against Chuttur Sing's force—The Sirdar has no intention to submit ..	317
" 26 ..	Captain Abbott ..	The Resident ..	Negotiations of Captain Nicholson with Chuttur Sing.—No trust in the sincerity of Jhunda Sing ..	317
" 27 ..	Captain Abbott ..	The Resident ..	Military movement against Chuttur Sing.—His treachery—Distrust of Jhunda Sing ..	318
" 27 ..	Captain Nicholson ..	The Resident ..	Military movement against Chuttur Sing.—His treachery ..	319
" 28 ..	The Resident ..	Major Lawrence	Belief that Chuttur Sing will come to Lahore.—Objections to sending one British brigade alone to Hazara ..	320
" 28 ..	Major-General Whish	The Adjutant-General	Sickness on the march to Mooltan ..	320
" 28 ..	Captain Nicholson ..	The Resident ..	Proposed measures for opposing Chuttur Sing.—Uselessness of Jhunda Sing ..	321
" 28 ..	Captain Nicholson ..	The Resident ..	Deceit practised by Ootar Sing.—Urging the dispatch of British troops ..	321

Date.	From.	To.	Subject.	Page
1848.				
Aug. 29 ..	Captain Nicholson ..	The Resident ..	Retirement from Hussan Abdal on the advance of Chuttur Sing.—Want of British troops	322
" 30 ..	The Secretary to the Government	The Resident ..	Praise of Captain Nicholson and Mr. Cocks.—As to sending political officers on detached, and distant, service..	298
" 30 ..	The Resident ..	The Secretary to the Government	Fear that Chuttur Sing will not come to Lahore.—Necessity for assembling an army at Ferozepore, and for the reorganization of the military establishment of the Punjab ..	322
" 30 ..	Sirdar Chuttur Sing ..	Sirdar Sooltan Mahomed	Invitation to join in the rebellion ..	350
" 31 ..	Captain Nicholson	Major Lawrence ..	Soliciting reinforcements for Attack ..	323
" 31 ..	Captain Nicholson ..	Major Lawrence ..	Soliciting reinforcements for Attack.—Necessity for Captain Nicholson keeping the field ..	324
" 31 ..	Major Lawrence ..	Captain Nicholson ..	Troops sent to him, also to Lieutenant Herbert ..	324
Sept. 1 ..	The Resident ..	The Secretary to the Government	Chuttur Sing has finally taken his course—Preparations for the movement of a British force against him ..	323
" 1 ..	Major Lawrence	The Resident ..	Regrets that it has been determined not to send any British troops, unless a large force can be sent—Rebellion of Chuttur Sing—Conduct of Jhunda Sing—Lieutenant Herbert sent to Attack ..	324
" 1 ..	Captain Nicholson ..	Major Lawrence ..	Arrival of Lieutenant Herbert at Attack—State of the fort	
" 2 ..	The Secretary to the Government	The Resident ..	Necessity for British troops	325
" 2 ..	Major Lawrence	The Resident ..	Appointment of political officers to each column proceeding to Mooltan ..	326
" 2 ..	Major-General Whish	The Resident ..	Chuttur Sing's determination to persist in rebellion ..	326
" 2 ..	Major-General Whish	The Adjutant-General	Reconnaissance before Mooltan—Good conduct of Sheik Ema-moodeen's troops—Praise of Lieutenant Christopher of the Indian navy, and of Mr James	326
Without date	Captain Nicholson ..	The Resident ..	State of Attack—Operations against Chuttur Sing—Necessity for British troops ..	338
" 3 ..	Lieutenant Edwardes ..	The Resident ..	Transmitting a proclamation, summoning the garrison and inhabitants of Mooltan to surrender ..	327
" 4 ..	Proclamation by Major-General Whish	The garrison and inhabitants of Mooltan	Summoning them to surrender	327
" 4 ..	Lieutenant Edwardes ..	The Resident ..	Course which Shere Sing will probably take ..	329
" 4 ..	Major-General Whish	The Adjutant-General	Arrival of the siege train at Mooltan ..	338
" 5 ..	The Resident ..	The Secretary to the Government	Suspensions entertained of Jhunda Sing.—Deena Nath sent to dissuade Chuttur Sing from his rebellion.—Operations against Mooltan ..	328
" 5 ..	The Adjutant-General	The Secretary to the Government	Objections to detaching one brigade only of British troops to Hazara, and to reducing the force in the Jullundur ..	339
" 5 ..	Major Lawrence ..	The Resident ..	Disaffection among the troops at Peshawur ..	339
" 6 ..	Major Lawrence ..	The Resident ..	Improvement in that respect ..	340
" 7 ..	The Governor-General in Council	The Secret Committee	Custody of the Maharane ..	263
(No. 73.)				

Date	From.	To.	Subject.	Page
1848, Sept. 7 (No. 74)	The Governor-General in Council	The Secret Committee	Arrival of British troops at Mooltan.—Revolt in the Hazara country.—Disaffection of Chuttur Sing.—Murder of Colonel Canora.—Difference of opinion between the Resident and Captain Abbott.—Praise of Captain Nicholson, and of Captain Abbott—Captain Nicholson sent to Attock. — Improbability with regard to the Sikhs, no reason for disbelief	267
" 7	Lieutenant Edwardes	The Resident	Discussion of plans for attacking Mooltan.—Conduct of the Sikh Government officers.—Fate of Bhace Maharaj	330
	Major-General Whish	The Adjutant-General	Commencement of attack against Mooltan	340
	The Resident	The Commander-in-Chief	No good result expected from the mission of Deena Nath to Chuttur Sing.—Necessity for sending British troops to put down the Hazara rebellion—Military movements suggested	332
" 8	The Resident	The Secretary to the Government	As to the probability of Shere Sing joining in the rebellion	333
" 9	Mr. Lawrence	The Resident ..	Proceedings against Ram Sing and his gang	341
" 9	Captain Davidson	The Adjutant-General	Disturbance at Puthankote	341
" 9	Major-General Whish	The Adjutant-General	Progress of the siege	341
" 10	The Resident ..	The Secretary to the Government	Mode of attacking Mooltan — Character of Chuttur Sing — Conduct of the Sikh Government officers	334
" 10	Lieutenant Edwardes .	The Resident	Conversation with Sheik Emamooddeen as to Chuttur Sing, Shere Sing, &c.—Conversation with Shere Sing.—His protestations of loyalty	343
" 10	Major Simpson, commanding at Hajepore	The Adjutant-General	Disturbance at Puthankote	345
" 10	Major-General Whish	The Adjutant-General	Attack on the enemy's position, under Colonel Pattoun	342
" 11 .	The Commander-in-Chief	The Resident	Necessity for military preparations on a large scale — Propriety of forming the army at Ferozepore	345
" 11 .	C. B Saunders. Esq.	Mr. Lawrence	Capture of the fort of Shahpoor from Ram Sing's party	347
" 12	The Resident .	The Secretary to the Government	Coercive measures necessary against Chuttur Sing.—Extensive military operations inevitable	348
" 12	The Resident	The Commander-in-Chief	Expectation of a general Punjab war.—Mischief arising from the delay in subduing Mooltan. —Strength of the place.—Reinforcements ordered from Sind. — Intercepted letter from Chuttur Sing to Sooltan Mahomed	349
" 12	The Adjutant-General	The Secretary to the Government	Orders for certain troops to be held in readiness to move	348
" 12	Major-General Whish	The Adjutant-General	Attack on the enemy's entrenched position.—Death of Colonel Pattoun, Major Montzambert, &c.	352
" 13	The Resident ..	Major Edwardes, C.B.	Interview with Sheik Emamooddeen and with Shere Sing.—Proceedings of Chuttur Sing and of Deena Nath	350

Date.	From.	To.	Subject.	Page
1848.				
Sept 13 ..	Major-General Whish	The Adjutant-General	Attack on the enemy's position. —Death of Colonel Pattoun	353
" 13	Mr. Lawrence	Brigadier Wheeler	Operations against Ram Sing	351
" 14 .	The Secretary to the Government	The Adjutant-General	An army to be collected at Ferozepore, but the Lahore and Jullundur forces not to be weakened	334
" 14	The Secretary to the Government	The Resident	Disturbance in Hazara.—Conviction that Chuttur Sing is faithless—Approval of the determination not to send a small British force to Hazara—Army to be collected on the frontier	335
" 14 ..	Major-General Whish	The Adjutant-General	Raising of the siege of Mooltan	355
" 14 .	Major Napier, of the Engineers	The Resident	Raising of the siege of Mooltan—Reinforcements required	356
" 14 .	Major Edwardes ..	The Resident	Defection of Shere Sing.—Raising of the siege of Mooltan	357
" 14 .	Mr Lawrence	Mr. Inglis, Secretary to Sir F. Currie	Disturbance created by Ram Sing.—Reinforcements for Kangra and Noorpoor —Praise of Mr Saunders	364
" 15 .	Mr Lawrence	Brigadier Wheeler	Operations against Ram Sing	366
" 16 ..	Major Macgregor	The Secretary to the Government	Refusal to allow Jeebun Sing to act as vakeel to the Maharane	335
" 16	Major Edwardes .	The Resident	Proceedings of Shere Sing against the English	360
" 16	Shere Sing .	The Resident ..	Manifesto issued by him	362
" 16	Mr. Lawrence	The Adjutant-General	Operations against Ram Sing	366
" 16	Major-General Whish	The Adjutant-General	Change of ground for his camp	362
" 17	The Resident	The Secretary to the Government	Raising of the siege of Mooltan—Cause of that proceeding—Defence of his conduct in moving troops against Mooltan—Reinforcements for the besieging troops—Occupation of the citadel of Lahore by British troops—Arrest of certain Sardars	354
" 18 .	The Resident .	The Secretary to the Government	Arrest of Golab Sing, son of Chuttur Sing.—Shere Sing's plans—Prompt military measures necessary	358
" 19 .	Raja Shere Sing	Sirdar Golab Sing .	Intention to join Mooliaj	359
" 19 .	Major Napier	The Resident	Raising of the siege of Mooltan	363
" 19	The Resident ..	Brigadier Campbell, C.B	Disturbance in the Kangia district.—Measures for reinforcing Kangra and Noorpoor	363
" 19	Mr Lawrence .	The Secretary to the Resident	Necessity for strengthening Kangra and Noorpoor—Good conduct of Sikh local corps—Attack on Ram Sing	367
" 19 .	Major Hodgson .	Mr. Lawrence	Attack on Ram Sing .	367
" 19 ..	Major Fisher .	The Brigade-Major to Brigadier Wheeler	Attack on Ram Sing .	368
" 20 .	The Governor-General in Council	The Secret Committee	Open rebellion of Chuttur Sing.—Treachery of Jhunda Sing—Objections to sending British troops to Hazara—Army ordered to be assembled at Ferozepore	298
" 20 ..	The Adjutant-General	The Secretary to the Government	Raising of the siege of Mooltan—Reinforcements for Major-General Whish.—Assembly of an army at Ferozepore—Increase to the army of India	373
" 20 ..	Mr. Lawrence ..	The Secretary to the Resident .	Attack on Ram Sing.—Praise of Mr Cocks, Major Fisher, and the other officers engaged	368
" 21 ..	The Resident ..	The Secretary to the Government	Occupation of the fort of Govindgurb.—Praise of Mr. Cocks and Brigadier Campbell	370
" 22 ..	Mr. Lawrence ..	The Secretary to the Resident	Complete dispersion of Ram Sing and his followers	369

Date.	From.	To.	Subject	Page
1848.				
Sept. 22 ..	Major Edwardes	The Resident ..	Incendiary proclamation issued by Shere Sing.—Promises made to Sikh troops who continue faithful to the Government.—Belief in the fidelity of his own troops	376
	Shere Sing and Moolraj	The Sikh Army	Exhorting them to rise against the British	376
" 23	The Secretary to the Government	Mr Newmarch ..	As to his communications with the Maharanee	335
" 23	The Resident .	The Secretary to the Government	Proceedings of Shere Sing against the English	360
" 24	The Resident ..	The Secretary to the Government	Reinforcements for Mooltan — Reasons for having supposed that the force formerly sent was ample—Prospect of a general Punjab war—Probable movements of Chuttur Sing — Brigadier Wheeler ordered to the Beas	371
" 25	The Secretary to the Resident	The Secretary to the Government	Suppression of the disturbance in Noorpoor	370
" 27	The Resident ..	Major Edwardes	Praise of General Cortlandt and his troops —Promises made to certain Sikh soldiers, if they remain faithful to the Government.—Mode of dealing with the Sikh soldiery	377
" 29 .	The Resident ..	Major Lawrence	Praises for his exertions—Excellent conduct of Sirdar Golab Sing, Powmdea—Instructions in case the troops at Peshawur revolt	377
" 30	The Secretary to the Government	The Adjutant-General	Augmentation of the army—Assembly of a force on the frontier	378
" 30 .	The Resident .	The Secretary to the Government	Conduct of Deena Nath	378
Oct. 1 .	Major Lawrence	The Resident .	Reinforcement sent to Attock —Urging the dispatch of British troops to the Jhelum	392
" 2 .	Major Lawrence	The Resident .	Murder of Colonel Holmes by the Sikhs in Bunnoo	379
" 3 .	The Secretary to Government	The Resident	Occupation of the fort of Govindgurh — Praise of Mr Cocks and Mr Inglis, and Colonel Mac Sherry	374
" 3 .	The Secretary to Government	The Resident .	No trust to be placed in the people of the Punjab, and no guarantee to be given, which may impede the future measures of Government —The State of Lahore considered at war with the British Government	374
" 4 ..	The Resident ..	The Secretary with the Governor-General	Conduct of Chuttur Sing, and of Shere Sing —General feeling of disaffection throughout the Punjab.—Murder of Colonel Holmes	380
" 4 ..	The Adjutant-General	The Secretary to the Government	Dispersion of marauders under Ram Sing —Praise of Major Fisher	382
" 6 ..	The Resident ..	The Secretary with the Governor-General	Consideration of the question whether Maharajah Golab Sing is a friend or an enemy —He has been permitted to assemble a force, for the purpose of acting against Chuttur Sing	382
	Maharajah Golab Sing	The Resident ..	Protestations of friendship	384
	The Resident ..	Maharajah Golab Sing	Permission to act against Chuttur Sing	385
" 7 ..	The Governor-General in Council	The Secret Committee	Correspondence regarding the Maharanee ..	335
(No. 78)				



Date.	From.	To.	Subject.	Page
1848. Oct. 7 .. (No. 79)	The Governor-General in Council	The Secret Committee	Defection of Shere Sing's whole force.—Raising of the siege of Mooltan.—Augmentation of the Indian army.—Reinforce- ments ordered from Bombay —Army to be formed on the north-west frontier — Move- ments of Chuttur Sing.— Danger of Dost Mahomed joining the insurgents — Occu- pation of the fort of Govind- gurh, and the citadel of La- hore, by British garrisons.— Intention of the Governor- General to proceed to the north-west frontier	336
" 7 .	The Resident ..	Brigadier Campbell	Troops to be sent against Run- gur Nuggul and Moraece	392
" 7	The Resident .	Brigadier Campbell	And Goojranwalla	393
" 8 .	The Resident .	The Secretary with the Governor-General	Tranquillity at Lahore during the Dussera	386
" 10	Major Edwardes	The Resident ..	March of Shere Sing from Mooltan to join Chuttur Sing	386
" 11 ..	The Resident .	The Secretary with the Governor-General	Detachment sent against Urjun Sing	416
" 12	Mr. Newmarch, a soli- citor of Calcutta	Major Macgregor, the Governor-General's Agent at Benares	Expenses of the Maharanece	575
" 13	Major Lawrence	The Resident	Murder of Futteh Khan by the troops in Bunnoo	387
" 13 .	Major Lawrence	The Resident .	Urging the dispatch of British troops towards Peshawur	387
" 15	Brigadier Wheeler	The Adjutant-General	Capture of the fort of Rungur Nuggul	417
" 16	Major Macgregor	The Secretary with the Governor-General	Remonstrance on the part of the Maharanece	575
" 18 .	The Resident .	The Commander-in- Chief	Mooltan has ceased to be the great object with the Sikhs —The battle of their inde- pendence is to be fought near Lahore —Shere Sing's move- ments —Necessity for rein- forcing Lahore	388
" 19	The Resident ..	The Secretary with the Governor-General	March of Shere Sing from Mooltan to join Chuttur Sing	389
" 20	The Resident ..	The Commander-in- Chief	Urging the dispatch of troops across the Ravee	389
" 20 ..	The Commander-in- Chief	The Resident .	Troops ordered to cross the Sutley	394
" 20	Captain Abbott	The Resident ..	Engagement with Chuttur Sing's forces	394
" 21	Captain Nicholson	The Resident	Advance of the insurgent army. —Urging the dispatch of British troops	389
" 22 .	The Resident	Brigadier Campbell	Military movements in con- sequence of Shere Sing's ad- vance	390
" 22	The Resident .	The Commander-in- Chief	Military movements in con- sequence of Shere Sing's ad- vance	390
" 22 .	The Adjutant-General	The Secretary to the Government	Reduction of the Fort of Run- gur Nuggul.—Praise of Briga- dier Wheeler	417
" 23 ,	Major Macgregor ..	The Secretary with the Governor-General	Expenses of the Maharanece	577
" 24	The Resident	The Commander-in- Chief	Movements of Shere Sing on Lahore —Soliciting reinforce- ments	396
" 24 ..	Major Lawrence	The Resident ..	Revolt of the troops at Pesh- awur	397
" 25 .	Major Lawrence	The Resident ..	Revolt of the Peshawur troops. Escape from Peshawar to Kohat	398
" 25 ..	Brigadier - General Wheeler	The Adjutant-General	Capture of the Fort of Ma- raraee	419

Date.	From.	To.	Subject.	Page
1848.				
Oct. 26	The Resident ..	The Commander-in-Chief	March of Shere Sing,—and of the Bunnoo troops to join him	399
" 27	Major Edwardes ..	The Resident ..	Movements of the Sikhs who revolted in Bunnoo.—Excesses committed by the Sikhs against the Mahomedans	399
" 31	Brigadier Campbell	The Adjutant-General	Bridge of boats near Lahore attacked	400
Nov. 1	The Governor-General	The Secret Committee	Revolt of the Sikh troops in Bunnoo—Murder of Colonel John Holmes, and Futteh Khan Towannah.—Departure of Shere Sing from Mooltan, to join Chuttur Sing—Test of Maharajah Goleb Sing's friendship—Measures adopted at Bombay for the reinforcement of the troops before Mooltan	375
" 1	The Resident ..	The Secretary with the Governor-General	Shere Sing's movements	401
" 2	The Resident	Brigadier-General Cureton	Urging him to advance to Eminadab	402
" 2	Brigadier-General Cureton, commanding the Cavalry	The Adjutant-General	Passage of the Ravee—Intention to advance	401
" 3	The Resident	The Secretary with the Governor-General	Gallant affair between Captain Abbott's levies and the troops of Chuttur Sing—Praise of Captain Abbott	402
" 4	The Secretary with the Governor-General	The Resident	Operations against Mooltan to be resumed at the earliest practicable moment.—The Sikh army must be dispersed and crushed	403
" 5	The Secretary with the Governor-General	Major Macgregor ..	Expenses of the Maharanee	577
" 5	Lieutenant Herbert, commanding at Attock	The Resident ..	Protestations of fidelity by the garrison of Attock.—Promises of reward made to them	404
" 6	The Resident	The Secretary with the Governor-General	Revolt of the troops at Peshawur—Treachery of Sooltan Mahomed.—The most prominent rebels are those who have been most favored by the British Government—Threats held out to Chuttur Sing, &c., if harm be done to any of the British officers	404
" 6	Major Edwardes	The Resident ..	Revolt of the troops at Peshawur—Lieutenant Taylor dispatched to bring away the British officers and ladies	406
" 7	Major-General Whish	The Adjutant-General	Orders for an attack on the enemy's position	406
" 7	Major Wheeler ..	Brigadier Markham's Major of Brigade	Operations against Mooltan	410
" 8	Major Lawrence	The Resident ..	Conduct of Sooltan Mahomed towards the British officers who took refuge with him.—Formal entry of Chuttur Sing into Peshawur.—The charge of the province made over by him to the Barukzye Sirdars	419
" 8	Brigadier Markham	Major-General Whish..	Successful attack on the enemy's position at Sooraj Koond	409
" 9	Major-General Whish	The Adjutant-General	Details of the attack on the enemy's position, made by Brigadier Markham on the 7th of November ..	408
" 9	Major Edwardes ..	Major-General Whish..	Share of his troops in the action of the 7th at Sooraj Koond ..	421
" 9	Lieutenant Lake ..	The Resident ..	Share of his troops in the action of the 7th ..	424

Date.	From.	To.	Subject.	Page
1848.				
Nov. 9.	Lieutenant Lake ..	Major-General Whish .	Share of his troops in the action of the 7th ..	425
" 9.	Major Edwardes ..	Major-General Whish .	Desertions to Mooltan ..	421
" 9.	Major Edwardes .	Major-General Whish .	Report of the operations of the irregular troops on the 7th of November ..	421
" 9	Lieutenant Pollock	Major Edwardes ..	Desertions to Mooltan	423
" 10	Major Edwardes .	The Resident ..	Desertions to Mooltan	420
" 10	Major Mackeson, Superintendent of Cis-Sutlej States	The Secretary to the Resident	Incendiary letter from Shere Sing	411
	Shere Sing	The Protected Chiefs, Cis-Sutlej	Exciting them to rebellion	412
" 11	The Resident .	The Secretary with the Governor-General	Revolt of troops at Peshawur — Intrigues of Sooltan Mahomed. — Praise of Major Lawrence	418
" 12	Major-General Whish	The Adjutant-General	Reports from Major Edwardes and Lieutenants Lake and Pollock, with respect to the attack on the enemy's position on November the 7th .	420
" 13 .	Lieutenant Taylor ..	The Resident ..	Attempt to deliver the English prisoners	426
" 13 .	Major Lawrence	Lieutenant Herbert	Surrender of British prisoners to Chuttur Sing — Chuttur Sing's offer to Lieutenant Herbert	427
" 14	P. Melvill, Esq., Under Secretary with the Governor-General	Major Macgregor	Refusal to renew the investigation into the Maharanee's conduct	578
" 14 ..	Lieutenant Herbert .	The Resident	Promises of reward to the garrison of Attock. — Overtures from Chuttur Sing ..	428
" 14	Lieutenant Herbert	Major Lawrence	Confidence in his position	428
" 15 .	The Resident	The Secretary with the Governor-General	Incendiary letters from Shere Sing to chiefs within the British dominions	413
	Shere Sing .	Bikrama Sing	"	414
	Shere Sing ..	The Sodce of Anundpore	"	414
" 16 .	Shere Sing ..	Hoshiarpore Regiment	"	414
" 16 .	The Resident	The Secretary with the Governor-General	The Commander-in-Chief has crossed the Ravee — Reasons for remaining at Lahore — Mr Cocks sent with the Commander-in-Chief, also Misi Sahib Dyal, on the part of the Durbar	444
" 17 .	The Resident	The Secretary with the Governor-General	Revolt at Peshawur — Character of Sooltan Mahomed — Notification to him that he will be held responsible for the safety of the British prisoners	415
" 18	The Resident .	The People of the Punjab	Admonitory proclamation on the Commander-in-Chief entering the Punjab	449
" 18	Lieutenant Taylor ..	The Resident .	Surrender of British officers by Sooltan Mahomed to Chuttur Sing. — Conduct of the garrisons of Lukkee and Duleepghui	429
" 19	Major Edwardes	The Resident ..	Sooltan Mahomed has sent for the British officers from Kohat to Peshawur — Report that Dost Mahomed is collecting troops	430
" 22 ..	The Governor-General	The Secret Committee	Revolt of the Peshawur troops. — Machinations of Sooltan Mahomed — Probable effect on the Mahomedan population. — Praise of Major Lawrence, Captain Abbott, and Lieutenant Herbert. — Brigadier Markham's success at Mooltan	390

Date.	From.	To.	Subject	Page
1848.				
Nov. 22	Mr. Lawrence .	The Resident	Operations against insurgents near Puthankote .	430
" 23	The Resident ..	The Secretary with the Governor-General	Sooltan Mahomed has made over the British officers to Chuttur Sing .	431
" 23	Brigadier - General Wheeler, C B, commanding Jullundur hill force	The Adjutant-General	Reduction of the fort of Kullalwala	464
" 23	The Commander-in-Chief	The Governor-General	Action at Ramnuggur—Death of Brigadier-General Cureton and Lieutenant-Colonel Havelock .	445
" 24	Brigadier-General Campbell, C B	The Adjutant-General	Action at Ramnuggur—Death of Brigadier-General Cureton and Lieutenant-Colonel Havelock	446
" 24	The Resident .	Mr Lawrence	Operations against insurgents near Puthankote	432
" 24	The Resident	The Commander-in-Chief	Operations against insurgents near Puthankote	432
" 24	Shere Sing, &c	The Resident	Paper of grievances	432
" 25	The Resident	The Secretary with the Governor-General	Prospect of Lieutenant Herbert's relief at Attock—Views of Chuttur Sing with regard to the British prisoners—Proceedings of Dost Mahomed	436
" 26	Mr. Lawrence ..	The Resident	Operations against insurgents near Puthankote—Good conduct of Sikh soldiers .	436
" 27	The Commander-in-Chief	The Governor-General	Action at Ramnuggur—Brigadier-General Campbell's report .	446
" 27	The Commander-in-Chief	General Orders to the army	Action at Ramnuggur—Brigadier-General Campbell's report .	448
" 27	The Commander-in-Chief	The Governor-General	Reduction of the fort of Kullalwala	463
" 27	The Resident .		On Shere Sing's paper of grievances	437
" 28	The Resident	The Secretary with the Governor-General	Paper of grievances put forth by Raja Shere Sing, &c	438
" 28	Mr Lawrence	The Resident	Operations against insurgents—Expediency of Brigadier-General Wheeler crossing the Ravee	439
" 29	Mr. Lawrence	The Resident	Operations against insurgents.—Expediency of Brigadier-General Wheeler crossing the Ravee	464
" 30	The Resident	The Commander-in-Chief	Insurrections beyond the Jummo boundary—Suspensions as to Maharajah Golab Sing	441
" 30	The Resident .	Mr. Lawrence	Brigadier-General Wheeler to cross the Ravee	440
" 30	The Resident .	Brigadier - General Wheeler	Brigadier-General Wheeler to cross the Ravee	440
" 30	Mr. Lawrence	The Resident	Proceedings against insurgents	465
(No date)	Lieutenant Herbert .	The Resident	Batteries erected by the enemy against Attock—Promises made to the garrison	428
Dec 1	Captain Jackson	The Brigade-Major to Brigadier - General Wheeler	Good conduct of Sikh troops .	467
" 1	Mr. Lawrence ..	The Resident .	Operations against insurgents	466
" 2	The Secretary with the Governor-General	The Resident	Praise of Major Edwardes, Lieutenant Lake, General Cortlandt, &c, for their services on the 7th of November	441
" 2	The Secretary with the Governor-General	The Resident	Disposal of Major Edwardes' levies, and the Bahawalpore troops, after the arrival of the Bombay reinforcement	441

Date.	From.	To.	Subject.	Page
1848.				
Dec. 2 ..	The Secretary with the Governor-General	The Resident	Surrender of British prisoners to Chuttur Sing.—Defence of Attock.—Praise of Lieutenant Herbert ..	442
2	The Secretary with the Governor-General	The Resident	Shere Sing's paper of grievances ..	442
2	The Resident .	The Secretary with the Governor-General	Admonitory proclamation of November the 18th, issued to the people of the Punjab	448
2	Brigadier - General Wheeler	The Adjutant-General	Pursuit of insurgents—Good conduct of a Sikh regiment	466
2	Mr. Lawrence .	The Resident ..	Pursuit of insurgents—Good conduct of a Sikh regiment	468
2	Lieutenant Gordon	Major Ferris	Action near Teeta.—Mr Barnes	473
3	Lieutenant Gordon	Major Ferris	Action near Teeta	472
3	Major Simpson	Mr. Lawrence	Good conduct of the troops in an attack on Jowian insurgents	469
3 .	Major Hodgson	The Staff Officer of Major Simpson	Good conduct of the troops in an attack on Jowian insurgents	471
4 .	Mr Lawrence .	The Resident .	Suppression of the disturbance in the British Trans-Sutlej territories.—Praise of Mr Barnes and Lieutenant Gordon ..	470
4	Major Edwardes	The Resident .	Overtures from Moolraj and Chuttur Sing to Sheik Emamooden—Good conduct of Sheik Emamooden ..	437
4	Lieutenant Herbert	Lieutenant Taylor	Soliciting speedy aid	477
5	The Commander-in-Chief	The Governor-General	Battle of Sadoolapoor under Sir J Thackwell.—Passage of the Chennab	449
5	Major Simpson	Mr Lawrence .	Praise of Major Hodgson	471
5	Mr. Lawrence ..	The Resident	Suppression of the revolt in the British Trans-Sutlej districts	471
	Major Ferris, commanding the 2nd regiment of Sikh Local Infantry	Mr. Lawrence	Report of the action near Teeta.—Praise of Lieutenant Gordon ..	472
	Major-General Sir J. Thackwell, K C.B.	The Adjutant-General	Passage of the Chenab—Battle of Sadoolapoor	452
	Mr. Lawrence ..	The Resident ..	Praise of a Sikh regiment, and of Major Hodgson	474
	Lieutenant Herbert	The Resident .	Soliciting speedy aid—Disturbance of the garrison	453
	The Governor-General	The Secret Committee	The British prisoners are in the custody of Chuttur Sing.—Sooltan Mahomed Khan is said to have asked for the assistance of Dost Mahomed—Skirmishes near Lahore—Capture of the fort of Kullalwala.—Action at Ramnuggur.—Death of Brigadier-General Cureton.—Battle of Sadoolapoor.—Tranquillity of the Cis-Sutlej country.—Friendly disposition of the chiefs and people	415
6 ..	The Resident	The Secretary with the Governor General	Deposition of Kootub Shah, with regard to the murder of Mr. Agnew and Lieutenant Anderson—Conduct of Sardar Khan Sing, Man ..	459
" 6 .	The Resident	The Secretary with the Governor-General	Suppression of disturbances in the British Trans-Sutlej districts.—Praise of Mr. Lawrence, &c. ..	474
" 6 .	The Resident	Major Edwardes	Praise of Sheik Emamooden	458
" 6 .	The Resident	Mr. Lawrence ..	Suppression of the disturbances in the Trans-Sutlej districts.—Praise of Mr. Lawrence, Mr. Barnes, Lieutenant Gordon, &c., and of the Sikh soldiers ..	474

Date.	From.	To.	Subject.	Page
1848.				
Dec. 10.	The Commander-in-Chief	The Governor-General	Battle of Sadoolapoor under Sir Joseph Thackwell.—Praise of that officer ..	451
" 10 ..	Lieutenant Taylor	The Resident ..	Sooltan Mahomed's excuses for delivering up the British officers.—No belief in them	478
	Sooltan Mahomed Khan	Lieutenant Taylor ..	Excuses for delivering up the British officers	478
	Sooltan Mahomed Khan	Lieutenant Taylor	Safety of Mrs Lawrence and her children ..	479
" 11 ..	The Secretary with the Governor-General	The Resident .	No terms to be offered to the chief insurgents — They are to be imprisoned during the pleasure of the Government	474
" 11	The Secretary with the Governor-General	The Resident .	Praise of Mr Lawrence and Mr. Barnes ..	475
" 11 .	Mr. Lawrence .	The Resident .	Report from Major Ferris of the action near Teera — Praise of the Sikh soldiers .	475
" 11	Mr Lawrence .	The Resident ..	Attempts of the Sikh chiefs to excite rebellion among British subjects.—Good conduct of the Sikh local regiments	475
" 13	The Secretary with the Governor-General	The Adjutant-General	Capture of Kullalwala — Thanks to Brigadier-General Wheeler	476
" 13 ..	The Secretary with the Governor-General	The Resident .	Approval of his remaining at Lahore	440
" 14	The Secretary with the Governor-General	The Resident ..	Approval of the proclamation of November the 18th	449
" 14 .	Major-General Sir J Thackwell	The Adjutant-General	Battle of Sadoolapoor.	456
" 15	Major Edwardes ..	The Resident	Letters from Moolraj to Dost Mahomed, Sooltan Mahomed, and Chuttur Sing — Sooltan Mahomed's conduct in delivering up the British officers to Chuttur Sing — Dost Mahomed's intrigues — Praise of Sheik Emamooddeen	480
	Dewan Moolraj	Dost Mahomed, of Cabool	Battle of Sadoolapoor	453
	Dewan Moolraj	Sirdar Chuttur Sing		
	Dewan Moolraj	Sirdar Sooltan Mahomed		
" 16	The Commander-in-Chief	The Governor-General	Reports as to Dost Mahomed. — Siege of the fort of Lukkee	483
" 16	Lieutenant Taylor	The Resident	Rising for Islam	484
" 17 ..	Dost Mahomed	Ghujam Hussun Khan	Praise of his efforts — Advance of the British army	458
	The Resident .	Lieutenant Herbert	Terms to be granted to Shere Sing, &c — Negotiation for the exchange of prisoners — Threats in the event of the British prisoners being ill-treated.—As to offering a reward for the release of the British prisoners	456
" 18	The Secretary with the Governor-General	The Resident	Report that the prohibition of the slaughter of kine has been cancelled ..	486
" 18 ..	Major Edwardes ..	The Resident ..	Transmitting a memorandum showing that a conspiracy existed, before the outbreak at Mooltan, for expelling the British from the Punjab	492
" 18 .	The Resident .	The Secretary with the Governor-General	Memorandum	492
" 19 ..	The Resident ..	The Resident ..	Doubts as to the garrison resisting.—Dost Mahomed's directions.—Strength of the besieging force.—Request for speedy aid	506
	Lieutenant Herbert .	The Resident ..	Promotion of certain native soldiers on account of the action near Teera.—Refusal to allow a captured standard to be used as an additional colour by the capturing regiment ..	476
" 20 ..	The Secretary with the Governor-General	The Resident ..		

Date.	From.	To.	Subject.	Page
1848.				
Dec. 20	The Resident	The Governor-General	Letters from Moolraj to Dost Mahomed, Sooltan Mahomed, and Chuttur Sing -- Belief that Dost Mahomed is acting against the British Government	479
" 21	Lieutenant Herbert	The Resident	Dost Mahomed's attempt to seduce the garrison -- Answer returned to him -- Spirit of disaffection. -- Necessity for speedy aid	484
" 22	The Garrison of Attock The Governor-General	Gool Bashah of Peshawur The Secret Committee	Offers of Dost Mahomed Action at Ramnuggur. -- Injunction to the Commander-in-Chief with regard to his movements -- Battle of Sadoolapoor -- Refusal to treat with Shere Sing -- Warning to him as to treatment of the British officers -- Defence of Attock -- Suppression of insurrection in the Jullundur -- Praise of Mr Lawrence and of Brigadier-General Wheeler	485
" 23	The Resident	Major Edwardes	Prohibition of the slaughter of kine	442
" 23	Lieutenant Hodson	The Resident	Insurgents driven across the Chenab	486
" 25	The Resident	The Secretary with the Governor-General	Transmitting list of the Sikh Sirdars ascertained to be in rebellion	487
" 25	Lieutenant Taylor	The Resident	List of the Sikh Sirdars ascertained to be in rebellion	489
" 26	The Resident	The Secretary with the Governor-General	Progress of the siege of Lukkee	459
" 26	Lieutenant Herbert	The Resident	Report that Dost Mahomed had arrived in Peshawur, and had confined Chuttur Sing	507
" 26	Lieutenant Herbert	The Resident	Arrival of Doorianee soldiers against him -- Better spirit in the garrison	482
" 27	Lieutenant Herbert	The Resident	Weak state of Attock -- Distrust of the garrison, if Dost Mahomed arrive	507
" 27	Major-General Whish	The Adjutant-General	Re-commencement of operations against Mooltan	508
" 28	The Resident	The Secretary with the Governor-General	Dispersion of marauders at Buddee Pind -- Gallant conduct of Lieutenant Hodson	514
" 28	Major-General Whish	The Adjutant-General	Successful attack under Brigadier Dundas, driving the enemy within the walls of Mooltan	486
" 28	Brigadier Honorable H Dundas	Major-General Whish	Successful attack, driving the enemy within the walls of Mooltan	515
" 28	Brigadier Capon	The Assistant Adjutant-General	Operations against Mooltan	516
" 29	Major Edwardes	Major-General Whish	Repulse of an attack made from Mooltan -- Praise of Lieutenants Lake, Pollock, Pearse, and Young, Mr Quin, and Mr MacMahon	518
" 29	Mr Money, Magistrate at Allahabad	Mr Lowther, Commissioner	Escape of the ex-Raja of Ladwa	521
" 30	The Resident	The Secretary with the Governor-General	Objections to the offer of rewards for the release of any of the British prisoners	547
" 30	Major-General Whish	The Adjutant-General	Explosion of the principal magazine in Mooltan	490
" 31	Major-General Whish	The Adjutant-General	Progress of the bombardment of the city of Mooltan	521
Jan. 1	Lieutenant Hodson	The Resident	Shere Sing's attempts to create disturbances in the British districts. -- Complaint of the rebels being permitted to pass through the territories of Maharajah Golab Sing	522
				534

Date.	From.	To	Subject	Page
1849.				
Jan 1	Mr Newmarch	The Maharanee	Advising an appeal to England, and stating the conditions under which he would undertake to prosecute it	578
" 2	Lieutenant Herbert	The Resident	Arrival of Dost Mahomed's army before Attock — Determination to abandon the fort, as dependence can no longer be placed on the garrison	509
" 2	Major-General Whish	The Adjutant-General	Assault of the city of Mooltan	522
" 3	Mr. Newmarch	Major Macgregor	Papers to be delivered to the Maharanee	578
" 3	Brigadier Markham	Major-General Whish	Assault of the city of Mooltan	524
" 3	Major Edwardes	Major-General Whish	Movements of his forces in aid of the storming of the city of Mooltan — Praise of Lieutenant Pollock and Mr MacMahon	529
" 3	Major-General Whish	The Adjutant-General	Expected desertions from Moolraj	529
" 4	The Governor-General	The Secret Committee	Arrival of the Bombay reinforcement at Mooltan — Resumption of operations against the place — Arrival of Sir Henry Lawrence — Advance of Lord Gough's army — List of Sikh Sardars opposed to the British Government — Reports relating to Dost Mahomed — Sooltan Mahomed's conduct with respect to the British prisoners — Praise of Lieutenant Herbert for his defence of Attock	476
" 4	The Secretary with the Governor-General	The Resident	Thanks to Lieutenant Hodson	488
" 4	Major-General Whish	The Adjutant-General	Expected desertions from Moolraj	530
" 4	The Resident	The Secretary with the Governor-General	Measures taken by Sher Singh to excite disturbances in Puthankote — Complaint that the insurgents are permitted to pass through the territory of Maharajah Golab Singh	535
" 4	Lieutenant Hodson	The Resident	Defeat of the insurgents under Gunda Singh	536
" 5	Dewan Moolraj	Major Edwardes	Wishing to negotiate	531
" 5	Major Edwardes	Dewan Moolraj	Unconditional surrender required	531
" 5	Captain Abbott	The Resident	Fall of Attock. — Supposed escape of Lieutenant Herbert — Movements of Dost Mahomed	510
" 6	The Governor-General	Minute	No fear of the enemy's forces, but danger from their intrigues	512
" 6	Major-General Whish	The Adjutant-General	Reported appearance of Dost Mahomed in Peshawur — Communication to be made to him	512
" 6	Major Edwardes	The Resident	Reply to overtures from Moolraj — Expected desertions from Mooltan	530
" 6	Major-General Whish	Dewan Moolraj	Overtures from Moolraj — Battered state of Mooltan	530
" 7	Major-General Whish	The Adjutant-General	Unconditional surrender required	532
" 7	Brigadier the Honorable H. Dundas	Major-General Whish (i.e. to his staff-officer)	Assault and capture of the city of Mooltan	523
" 7	Brigadier Stalker	The Assistant Adjutant-General	Assault of the city of Mooltan	525
" 7			Operations against Mooltan	526



Date.	From.	To.	Subject.	Page
1849.				
Jan 7	Major-General Whish	The Adjutant-General	As to overtures from Moolraj, and expected desertions from Mooltan.—Attack on Major Edwardes' force.—Praise of Lieutenants Lake, Pollock, Pearse, and Young, Mr. Qum, and Mr. MacMahon	532
" 7	Major Edwardes	The Resident	Overtures from Dewan Moolraj	531
" 8	Major-General Whish	The Adjutant-General	Overtures from Moolraj.—Progress of the siege	532
" 9	Major-General Whish	The Adjutant-General	Overtures from Moolraj.—Civil charge of the city of Mooltan made over to General Cortlandt ..	533
" 9	The Resident	Major Edwardes	Unconditional surrender required from Dewan Moolraj	531
" 9	Major Edwardes	The Resident	Overtures from Dewan Moolraj	533
" 10	The Resident	The Secretary with the Governor-General	Letter said to have been written by Dost Mahomed to Captain Abbott ..	511
" 10	Ameei Dost Mahomed	Captain Abbott	Reasons for marching to Peshawur	511
" 10	Lieutenant Taylor	The Resident	Capture of the fort of Lukkee	510
" 11	Major-General Whish	The Adjutant-General	Progress of the siege	549
" 11	Major Macgregor	The Secretary with the Governor-General	Requesting instructions as to the delivery to the Maharanee of certain papers prepared by Mr. Newmarch	580
" 11	Commander Powell, of the Indian Navy	The Commodore of the Indian Navy	Operations of a detachment of the Indian navy against Mooltan ..	559
" 12	The Secretary with the Governor-General	The Resident ..	Praise of Lieutenant Herbert	509
" 12	The Secretary with the Governor-General	The Resident	Efforts to save Captain Abbott and Lieutenant Herbert	509
" 12	The Secretary with the Governor-General	The Resident ..	Maharajah Golab Sing bound to assist the British Government.—Rebels may be followed into his territories	537
" 12	The Secretary with the Governor-General	The Resident ..	Thanks to Lieutenant Lumsden	537
" 12	Lieutenant Taylor	The Resident	Preparations for defence against the Affghans	569
" 15	The Resident ..	The Secretary with the Governor-General	Transmitting list of Sirdars who have not openly joined the rebels ..	546
(Without date)	Lieutenant Taylor	The Resident ..	List of Sirdars who have not openly joined the rebels	547
" 15	Lieutenant Taylor	The Resident ..	Proceedings of Dost Mahomed	570
" 15	The Maharanee	Major Macgregor	Measures taken for the defence of Lukkee against him	571
" 16	The Commander-in-Chief	The Governor-General	Desire to return to the Punjab, and offer to advance British interests there	581
" 17	The Governor-General	Notification	Battle of Chillianwalla	538
" 19	The Secretary with the Governor-General	The Resident	Battle of Chillianwalla	538
" 19	Major-General Whish	The Adjutant-General	Assurances to be given to Maharajah Golab Sing that Dost Mahomed will not be permitted to injure him, if he continue true to the British Government.—Warning to be given to him of the consequences of proving faithless	537
" 19	Major Edwardes	The Resident ..	Progress of the siege.—Overtures from Moolraj ..	550
" 21	The Secretary with the Governor-General	Major-General Whish	Reinforcements for Lieutenant Taylor, sent under command of Lieutenant Pearse.—Praise of Lieutenant Taylor ..	550
" 21 ..	Major-General Whish	The Adjutant-General	Instructions to join the Commander-in-Chief ..	561
			Overtures from Moolraj	551

Date.	From.	To.	Subject.	Page
1849				
Jan. 21	Brigadier-General Wheeler	The Adjutant-General	Operations against Ram Sing on the heights of Dulla	561
" 21	Major Edwardes	The Resident	Moolraj has agreed to surrender unconditionally ..	552
"	Dewan Moolraj	Major-General Whish	Offer to surrender ..	552
"	Major-General Whish	Dewan Moolraj	The surrender must be unconditional ..	553
" 22	The Governor-General	The Secret Committee	Fall of Attock.—Dost Mahmud's hostility — Battle of Chillianwalla — Capture of the city of Mooltan — Capture of the fort of Lukkee — Retreat of Ram Sing ..	491
" 22	Major-General Whish	The Adjutant-General	Unconditional surrender of the citadel of Mooltan — Praise of officers employed in the siege	554
" 22	Major Edwardes	The Resident	Surrender of Moolraj, and of the citadel of Mooltan ..	555
" 23	The Secretary with the Governor-General	Major Macgregor	Refusal to allow the delivery to the Maharanees of certain papers prepared by Mr Newmarch ..	580
" 23	The Adjutant-General	The Secretary with the Governor-General	Assault of the city of Mooltan — Praise of Major-General Whish	533
" 23	Major-General Whish	The Adjutant-General	Additional praise of officers employed at the siege of Mooltan	556
" 23	Major-General Whish	The Adjutant-General	Additional praise of officers employed at the siege of Mooltan	557
" 23	Major-General Whish	..	Casualties before Mooltan ..	557
" 23	Major Garbett	The Assistant Adjutant-General	Praise of officers for services at Mooltan	635
" 23	Brigadier Cheape	The Assistant Adjutant-General	Praise of officers for services at Mooltan	635
" 23	Major Napier	The Assistant Adjutant-General	Praise of officers for services at Mooltan ..	636
" 23	Captain Siddons	The Brigade-Major of Engineers	Praise of officers for services at Mooltan ..	637
" 23	The Adjutant ..	Major Edwardes	Praise of Lieutenant Taylor	572
" 23	Major Macgregor	The Secretary with the Governor-General	Letter from the Maharanees, requesting leave to return to the Punjab ..	581
" 24	The Governor-General	General Order	Battle of Chillianwalla	564
" 25	The Governor-General	Notification ..	Unconditional surrender of Dewan Moolraj and of the citadel of Mooltan ..	557
" 25	Commander Powell	The Commodore of the Indian Navy	Services of a detachment of the Indian navy against Mooltan	560
" 25	Brigadier Honorable H Dundas	Commander Powell	Thanks for the services of the Indian navy ..	560
" 25	The Secretary with the Governor-General	The Resident ..	Removal of Moolraj to Lahore	562
" 25	Major-General Whish	The Secretary with the Governor-General	Preparations for marching to join the Commander-in-Chief	562
" 25	The Resident	The Secretary with the Governor-General	Praise of Sheik Emamooddeen	563
" 25	Bedee Bukrama Sing	Sheik Emamooddeen	Exhortation to join the rebels	563
" 25	The Resident	The Secretary with the Governor-General	As to the guilt of Moolraj ..	562
" 25	The Resident	Major Edwardes	Civil charge of the Mooltan province ..	563
" 26	The Commander-in-Chief	General Orders	Capture of the citadel of Mooltan	554
" 26	The Resident ..	The Secretary with the Governor-General	Reinforcements to Lieutenant Taylor	572
" 26	Major-General Whish	The Adjutant-General	Funeral of Mr. Agnew and Lieutenant Anderson	586
" 27	The Secretary with the Governor-General	The Resident ..	Call upon Maharajah Golas Sing for military assistance ..	567
" 28	The Adjutant-General	The Secretary with the Governor-General	Surrender of the citadel of Mooltan ..	553
" 28	The Resident ..	The Secretary with the Governor-General	Record of the proceedings of Captain Nicholson after leaving Attock.—Praise of him	572

Date.	From.	To.	Subject.	Page
1849.				
Jan. 29	The Resident	The Secretary with the Governor-General	Paper recorded by the Durbar, in May, 1848, setting forth their reasons for the removal of the Maharanee from the Punjab ..	582
„ 29	Major Edwardes	The Resident	Arrangements for reinforcing Lieutenant Taylor at Lukkee	626
(Without date of the day)	Lieutenant Taylor	The Resident	Account of the siege of Lukkee	627
„ 30	The Adjutant-General	The Secretary with the Governor-General	Brigadier-General Wheeler's success against Ram Sing	565
„ 30	The Secretary with the Governor-General	The Resident	Praise of Lieutenant Taylor	572
„ 30	The Secretary with the Governor-General	The Resident	Approval of Major Edwardes' answer to Moolraj as to terms of surrender	563
„ 30	The Resident	The Secretary with the Governor-General	Maharajah Golab Sing's protestations of friendship	568
„ 31	Maharajah Golab Sing	The Resident	Protestations of friendship	569
„ 31	The Secretary with the Governor-General	The Adjutant-General	Battle of Sadoolapoor, under Sir J Thackwell, and passage of the Chenab	565
„ 31	The Secretary with the Governor-General	Major Macgregor	As to the Maharanee's letter requesting leave to return to the Punjab	582
Feb 1	The Governor-General	The Court of Directors	Sir H Lawrence reappointed to the office of Resident at Lahore — Thanks to Sir Frederick Currie ..	548
	The Governor-General	General Order.	On the capture of the citadel of Mooltan	561
	Major Edwardes	Lieutenant Young, of the Engineers	Instructions on sending him against the fort of Hurrund	631
(Without date)	Sirdar Chuttur Sing	The Resident (Sir H Lawrence)	On his arrival at Lahore	590
„ 5	The Resident	Sirdar Chuttur Sing.	Advising him to give up the British prisoners, and to surrender himself ..	591
5	The Resident	Proclamation	Terms on which the rebels may obtain pardon, except Sooltan Mahomed	591
„ 7 (No 9)	The Governor-General	The Secret Committee	Unconditional surrender of Moolraj — Occupation of the citadel of Mooltan — Major-General Whish's march to join the Commander-in-Chief — General Order on the battle of Chillianwala — Junction of Chuttur Sing with Shere Sing — Some of Dost Mahomed's Horse have also joined the rebels — Warning given to Maharajah Golab Sing — Defeat of Ram Sing — Position of Lieutenant Taylor — Proofs of the hostility of Dost Mahomed	548
„ 7 (No. 10)	The Governor-General	The Secret Committee	Correspondence regarding the restrictions placed on the Maharanee	575
	The Secretary with the Governor-General	The Resident	Praise of the Sikh troops under Captain Davidson in the operations against Ram Sing	590
	The Resident	The Secretary with the Governor-General	Correspondence with Chuttur Sing — Proclamation of the terms on which the rebels may obtain pardon	590
	Lieutenant Taylor	The Resident	Reinforcements under Lieutenant Pearce and Lieutenant Pollock — Small success of the Affghans in raising a religious movement — Good feeling of the people towards the British. — Means of attacking the fort of Duleepghur — Defences of Lukkee	588

Date	From.	To	Subject	Page
1849				
Feb. 12 ..	Brigadier-General Wheeler	The Adjutant-General	Tranquillity on the frontier ..	623
" 12 .	Lieutenant Young, of the Engineers	Major Edwardes	Capture of the fort of Hurrund	632
" 13	The Secretary with the Governor-General	The Resident .. ..	Thanks to General Cortlandt	586
" 13	Major-General Whish	The Adjutant-General	Addition to the list of officers recommended for services at Mooltan — Reports from several officers	634
" 14	Lieutenant Young ..	Major Edwardes	Capture of the fort of Hurrund	633
" 15	The Secretary with the Governor-General	The Resident .	Custody of Moolraj ..	586
" 15	The Resident .. ..	The Secretary with the Governor-General	Conveyance of Moolraj — Disposal of prisoners taken at Mooltan	587
" 16	The Resident .	The Secretary with the Governor-General	Praise of Lieutenant Taylor	588
" 16 .	The Resident ..	The Secretary with the Governor-General	Warning to Maharajah Golab Sing .	391
" 16	The Resident	Maharajah Golab Sing	Active assistance required of him	592
" 16 .	Major Edwardes	Lieutenant Young	Praise for the capture of the fort of Hurrund	633
" 16	Lieutenant Taylor ..	The Resident	Communication with Dost Mahomed	624
" 19	The Secretary with the Governor-General	The Resident ..	Moolraj to be confined in Govindguh — Trial of the reputed murderer of Mr Agnew	587
" 19	The Secretary with the Governor-General	The Resident	Praise of Lieutenant Taylor .	590
" 19	The Secretary with the Governor-General	The Resident ..	Approval of his communication to Maharajah Golab Sing	592
" 21 .	The Governor-General	The Secret Committee	Junction of the Mooltan force with the Commander-in-Chief. — March of Shere Sing to Goojerat — Surrender of Naram Sing and the fort of Chumote — Trial of the reputed murderer of Mr Agnew — Moolraj confined in Govindghur — Praise of Lieutenant Taylor — March of Lieutenant Pollock to reinforce him — Maharajah Golab Sing's protestations of friendship — Warning given to him — Capture of the fort of Hurrund — Movements of Captain Abbott	584
" 21	The Commander-in-Chief	The Governor-General	Victory of Goojerat .	595
" 22	The Commander-in-Chief	The Governor-General	Sir W Gilbert detached in pursuit of the enemy, also Brigadier-General Campbell	620
" 22	Brigadier - General Tennant	The Adjutant-General	Victory of Goojerat	601
" 22	Brigadier Lockwood	The Deputy Assistant Adjutant-General	Victory of Goojerat	606
" 22	Major-General Whish	The Adjutant-General	Victory of Goojerat	608
" 22 .	Brigadier-General the Honorable H Dundas	The Adjutant-General	Victory of Goojerat	614
" 22	Major Leeson . . .	The Assistant Adjutant-General	Victory of Goojerat .	615
" 23 .	Brigadier Hearsey .	The Assistant Adjutant-General	Victory of Goojerat	606
" 23 .	Brigadier - General Campbell	The Adjutant-General	Victory of Goojerat .	612
" 23 ..	The Governor-General	Notification ..	Victory of Goojerat .	595
" 23 .	Major-General Sir W. Gilbert, commanding a detached field force	The Adjutant-General	Pursuit of the enemy .. ..	621
" 23	The Resident .. ..	The Secretary with the Governor-General	Letter sent by Lieutenant Taylor to Dost Mahomed .	624

Date.	From.	To.	Subject.	Page
1849.				
Feb. 24 ..	The Governor-General	Notification ..	Victory of Goojerat ..	595
" 24 ..	Major-General Sir W. Gilbert	The Adjutant-General	Victory of Goojerat ..	611
" 24 ..	Major-General Sir W. Gilbert	The Adjutant-General	Pursuit of the enemy ..	622
Without date	The Commander-in-Chief	The Governor-General	More guns captured—Praise of Captain Nicholson ..	621
" 24 ..	Lieutenant Taylor ..	The Resident ..	Recovery of the province of Bunnoo, and occupation of the fort of Duleepgurh ..	630
" 25 ..	The Commander-in-Chief	The Governor-General	Return of Brigadier-General Campbell ..	621
" 25 ..	Major-General Sir Joseph Thackwell	The Adjutant-General	Victory of Goojerat ..	603
" 26 ..	The Commander-in-Chief	The Governor-General	Detailed account of the battle of Goojerat—Number of guns captured ..	597
" 26 ..	Brigadier Cheape	The Adjutant-General	Victory of Goojerat ..	603
" 26 ..	The Resident ..	The Secretary with the Governor-General	Proclamation requiring the restoration of the British officers and ladies ..	623
" 27 ..	The Governor-General	The Commander-in-Chief ..	Instructions for Sir W. Gilbert in prosecution of the war ..	620
" 28 ..	Major-General Sir W. Gilbert	The Adjutant-General	Pursuit of the enemy ..	622
March 1 ..	The Governor-General	General Order	Victory of Goojerat ..	596
" 1 ..	Major-General Sir W. Gilbert	The Adjutant-General	Pursuit of the enemy ..	623
" 3 ..	The Resident	Lieutenant Taylor ..	Praise of Major Edwardes and Lieutenant Taylor ..	631
" 3 ..	The Resident ..	The Secretary with the Governor-General	Praise of Major Edwardes and Lieutenants Taylor and Young ..	634
" 5 ..	Brigadier-General Wheeler	The Adjutant-General	Effect of the victory at Goojerat ..	638
Mar. 7 ..	The Governor-General	The Secret Committee	Victory of Goojerat—Pursuit of the enemy by Sir Walter Gilbert. — Cooperation of Maharajah Golab Sing required. — Movements of the Affghans — Their abandonment of the fort of Duleepgurh. — Praise of Captain Abbott ..	592
" 10 ..	The Secretary with the Governor-General	The Adjutant-General	Lieutenant-Colonel Birch ..	638
" 12 ..	The Resident ..	The Secretary with the Governor-General	Trial and sentence of Goodhur Sing, the murderer of Mr. Agnew ..	638
" 14 ..	Major-General Sir W. Gilbert	The Secretary with the Governor-General	Surrender of the Sikh chiefs and army ..	640
" 15 ..	The Governor-General	Minute	Trial and sentence of Goodhur Sing, the murderer of Mr. Agnew ..	639
" 15 ..	The Commander-in-Chief	The Governor-General	Lieutenants Lumsden, Hodson, and Lake ..	638
" 16 ..	The Commander-in-Chief	The Governor-General	Surrender of the Sikh chiefs and army ..	641
" 17 ..	The Governor-General	General Order ..	Surrender of the Sikh chiefs and army to Sir Walter Gilbert. — Delivery of the British prisoners. — Pursuit of Dost Mahomed and the Affghans ..	641
" 18 ..	Sir W. Gilbert. . .	The Adjutant-General	Occupation of Attock ..	642
" 19 ..	The Secretary with the Governor-General	The Resident at Lahore	Praise of Lieutenants Taylor and Young ..	634
" 19 ..	The Resident ..	The Secretary with the Governor-General	Letter from the Maharanee to Chuttur Sing ..	639
	The Maharanee ..	Chuttur Sing ..	Exciting him against the English	640

Date.	From.	To.	Subject.	Page
1849.	The Governor-General	The Secret Committee	Delivery of the British prisoners.—Surrender of the Sikh chiefs and army to Sir Walter Gilbert.—Occupation of Attock. — Operations against Dost Mahomed and the Affghans. — Disarming of the people of the Punjab.—Trial and sentence of Goodhur Sing, the murderer of Mr. Vans Agnew.—Intention to put Dewan Moolraj on his trial. —Intercepted letter from the Maharanee to Chuttur Sing	625
March 24 .				



# P A P E R S

RELATING TO

## T H E P U N J A B

1847—1849.

### No. 1.

*The Governor-General of India, Viscount Hardinge, to the Secret Committee of the East India Company*

*Simla, April 5, 1847 (No. 25.)*

THE Sikh authorities, composing the Dui bar, appear to be carrying on the government of the country, under the British Resident, with a sincere desire to insure a successful result. The ablest man in the Council, Dewan Deena Nath, continues to afford to Lieutenant-Colonel Lawrence a cordial and able co-operation. The Sirdar Lehna Sing, Majeetia, the most respectable and influential chief of the old Sikh families, has assumed charge of the Manjha district, which comprises the greater portion of the country between the Ravee and Beas Rivers, down to Kusoor, and, as this tract is thickly inhabited by Sikhs, and disbanded Sikh soldiery, there is every reason to expect that it will remain undisturbed, from its being placed under the Sirdar's immediate superintendence.

### No. 2

*The Governor-General to the Secret Committee*

*Simla, April 20, 1847 (No. 27)*

EVERYTHING is perfectly quiet, and nothing has occurred worthy of remark

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### No. 3

*The Governor-General to the Secret Committee*

*Simla, May 25, 1847. (No. 35.)*

I FORWARD a dispatch from Lieutenant-Colonel Lawrence of the 29th of April.\*

The Resident, in his dispatch, takes a general review of the acts and conduct of the chiefs, and of the Dui bar, and of the state of parties in the Punjab.

The Resident observes that, as usual, all sorts of reports are raised of evil intentions on the part of the Sikhs, and even of the chiefs, against us, which he declares to be greatly exaggerated, and many obviously false; that those who have been accustomed to revolution and excitement, are ready to take part

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\* Inclosure 4 in No. 3



in any disturbance, and that the means consist of 10,000 or 20,000 disbanded soldiers, on the surface of society; but he much doubts whether, in any man's mind, the thought has yet risen of serious, and overt, opposition to British power; and that the time has not yet come for anything beyond private schemes of treachery. Nevertheless, these passages in the dispatch seem to anticipate that those who have nothing to lose, and all to gain, by revolution, may, hereafter, when the memory of recent defeats has partially passed away, be ready to venture their lives, and property, in the cause of the Khalsa, and in the chances of a revolution which may improve their position.

The Resident, then, expresses his wonder at the good conduct of the Sikh army, during the last twelve months; which is followed up by the declaration, that nothing is too foolish, nothing too desperate, for Asiatic zealots and desperadoes to attempt.

I so far coincide with the Resident, that this desire to escape from a foreign yoke, may, very naturally, be felt by a large disbanded army, and by a population which has displayed a national character for independence, not very usual in the East, and that the attempt to revolt might be made, if the opportunity were to be afforded, but the same opinion could be given, with equal truth, of various portions of Hindostan, especially amongst the Mussulman population. Such attempts are less likely to be made under existing arrangements, than if the Raj had been subverted, and the Punjab declared to be a British province.

I do not find that the Resident has any facts which entitle these impressions to more credit now, than they would have obtained at any other time; and I have not addressed him officially on this subject, having been in daily expectation of receiving some explanation of the passages to which I have alluded.

These impressions of possible events would have been as likely to happen at any antecedent period of our occupation. In a very recent dispatch, the Resident declares that the Punjab has never been so tranquil, in the memory of man; and nothing has transpired at Lahore to justify any unusual feeling of apprehension.

I have, therefore, every reason to believe that no change has taken place in the state of public feeling at Lahore, or in the Punjab. We must, from time to time, expect the occasional display of ill-temper, on the part of a few selfish and disappointed chiefs, and to hear reports of disaffection.

As far as the Sikh army is concerned, it appears to me that the system which I have encouraged, and instructed the Resident to pursue, of making the British officers the direct and ostensible instruments of conferring boons on the Sikh soldiery, is practically working well, and will gradually render this army a contented body of men, after having been, for so long a period, accustomed to mutiny and rapine. If British influence can thus be felt by the armed force, it appears to me an essential object to be gained for the pacification of the country, which, for centuries, has been in a state of anarchy. In favor of this system, exclusive of its justice, it may be observed, that there is no feature in the Asiatic character more strongly marked than this, that the Eastern soldiers are almost invariably faithful to the employer who pays them well, and regularly, and whose power is permanently established.

The confidence of the Sikh troops in the integrity of British officers has undergone no diminution. The report, from Lieutenant Edwades, of the conduct of the five Sikh regiments which accompanied him to Bunnoo, is most satisfactory, evincing, as they have done on all occasions, a cheerful obedience, and a steady discipline.

In further confirmation of this opinion, I beg to refer to a very able letter, of the 19th of April,\* from Major G. Lawrence, at Peshawur, in which he gives a clear report of the result of his arrangements in carrying out the system of direct, but judicious, interference. I have desired† my approbation to be expressed to Major Lawrence.

The British garrison at Lahore continues to be healthy, and the troops observe the same good conduct for which they were so distinguished during the past year.

\* Inclosure 2 in No. 3.

† Inclosure 6 in No. 3.

## Inclosure 1 in No. 3.

*Major G St. P. Lawrence (Assistant to the Resident) to the Resident at Lahore*

*Peshawur, April 4, 1847.*

FOR some days, there has been considerable excitement, caused by the seizure, at one of the gates, of cows' flesh. the authorities are desirous of hanging all concerned in the slaughter of these sacred animals; but I have quietly intimated that this, the extreme penalty of the law, cannot be enforced, but that other severe punishment, such as imprisonment, with hard labor on the roads, fines, and flagellation, may be resorted to. five culprits are in custody

I would here mention, as proof of the amended tone and spirit of the Sikh army, that formerly, had such a report as that of cow-slaying been even bruited, the troops would have proceeded at once, en masse, to burn and destroy the whole quarter, or village, plundering man, woman, or child; whereas now, not a man (though they are perfectly aware of it) has moved, not even to complain of it to their officers.

## Inclosure 2 in No. 3.

*Major Lawrence to the Resident at Lahore*

*Peshawur, April 19, 1847*

THE arrival of British functionaries, in this remote, and hitherto neglected, portion of the empire, may be considered, under Providence, its salvation: to such a state had oppression driven the people that all were ready to rise against their rulers, which they most assuredly would have done, had not they been deterred by the prompt suppression of the Cashmere insurrection, and their hopes of amelioration raised by the intelligence of my deputation

Since the departure of General Aitabili in 1843, there has been little strength in the Government of Peshawur, his stern, strong rule of five years, and the prestige of his name, with the want of unanimity among the people, kept them down

As may be supposed, the harvest of plunder has been great, right and left, they are said to have sold life, honor, and property, to the highest bidder; men's wives and daughters were never safe, and any murderer, fornicator, or adulterer, could compound, by cash, for his crimes. Never did a day pass without murder, in open day, occurring in one village or another, and scarcely a petty squabble occurred that was not followed by blood-shedding. Such was the state of affairs when I arrived

My tent was, forthwith, daily surrounded by hundreds of petitioners, and so it continues with but little diminution. All are clamorous in their demands for instant redress. many complaints are, doubtless, frivolous and vexatious, but the majority are well grounded

I had not been here many days before I ascertained that the treasury was empty, while the Ramgoles, or Irregulars, said to amount to 4,000 men, were from eight to eleven months in arrears, and clamorous for pay. petty outbreaks had taken place amongst them, and the authorities were evidently alarmed, and unable to pacify them. It had been the practice to give them orders for pay on the several Kardars, or, in other words, to permit them to live gratis on the country. I suggested the immediate discontinuance of this practice, and, by a few prompt, and well-timed, acts of severity, soon established a wholesome dread amongst them. It may be imagined how desperate they had become, or how miserably weak was the Governor, when he complained to me of a party of them having seized his bridle, and declared they would not let him out of the city, till their arrears were paid.

I am now engaged in taking their muster, which, by at least 500 men, is less than represented, selecting the most efficient, and discharging the remainder, by which I hope to reduce their numerical strength to 2,500, and save the State nearly two lakhs per annum. As soon as the money you have sent me arrives,

this will be done peaceably and quietly: all officers and non-commissioned officers, of whom there are many, who either promoted themselves, or were promoted by their men, or Sirdar Shere Sing, during the reign of terror, will be reduced to their former grades, or altogether discharged.

The regular army under General Golab Sing, amounting\* to 6,053 men, as per margin,\* I have seen, en masse, and in detail, and I am happy to be able to report most favorably of them. Their pay has once been issued since my arrival, in my own presence, a circumstance which appeared to please them much, they are now rather more than three months in arrears, but money is daily expected for two months' issue: they fully understand that, while discipline and prompt obedience will be rigidly enforced, every consideration and attention will be paid to their wants and grievances. Among the true Khalsas, the chief fault is drunkenness, which prevails to a great extent, though I am in hopes gradually to lessen it, if not altogether suppress it. I cannot sufficiently express my thanks to General Golab Sing, for his unwearied zeal and attention to all my wishes and suggestions, he is ably seconded by his son, Colonel Ahim Sing, and other colonels, indeed, it is to their exertions that I mainly attribute the improved tone and spirit of the troops.

Revenue affairs engage much of my attention, but, as yet, I am unprepared to offer a decided opinion thereon, the renewal of the year's contracts is being made, and requires minute inquiry and scrutiny.

It may possibly be considered that I take too prominent a part in the management of affairs, but it should be borne in mind that the Governor is a cypher, his councillors totally wanting in principle, and the whole machinery of government utterly disorganized, consequently, to keep the machine moving, the burden of all the work must devolve upon myself and Lieutenant Lumsden. I endeavour in all practicable cases to make it appear that all orders emanate from the Sikh authorities. My chief councillor is General Golab Sing, and he never fails me.

I cannot conclude without acknowledging the essential aid I have, in every way, received from Lieutenant Lumsden, without which, indeed, I could not have got through half the work I have. His unwearied zeal, temper, and patience render him a most valuable assistant.

Mr Assistant Apothecary Thompson is most assiduous in the performance of his medical duties, and has been very successful in his treatment of many cases; he has formed a dispensary, and has considerable gratuitous practice.

#### Inclosure 3 in No 3

*P A Vans Agnew, Esq (Assistant to the Resident) to the Resident at Lahore*

*Asman Khatri, Lahore Territory, near the Indus,  
April 20. 1847*

I HAVE been listening, for the last three days, to the complaints of the people in these parts making every allowance for exaggeration, they have, indeed, been unmercifully maltreated. I give them hopes for the future, but discourage appeal for redress of past extortions. Yet I hope that something may be restored from their oppressors. The Kardars universally, and those of the Mulicks who were of their party, are gorged with plunder. The people cannot, and will not, understand that they have met with justice, unless something is taken from the Kardars (they are already removed), and some mark of displeasure be shown to the oppressive Mulicks: considering what they have really suffered, and the consequences former exactions have entailed on them, the poor people are wonderfully patient. I have no yelling, nor outcries, no unreasonable demands. The report of the justice done at Peshawur has given all confidence that they

Horse Artillery	271
Sabres	1,281
Firelocks	4,501
<b>Total</b>	<b>6,053</b>

will be heard, and they also see that they are not neglected in the appointment of the Bhaees. But though the Bhaees had many good qualities, these chiefly consisted in their refraining from the enormous exactions of others, and being men of their word. What they demanded, in the first instance, from the Zemindar, they exacted to the uttermost farthing, without reference to any change of circumstances, but they never exceeded it. Now, if the settlement, for I presume it will be revised, is fair, these are just the men you want, but if it is heavy, there will be great mischief. I need not remind you that, since the commencement of the reign of Runjeet Sing, the country has been overburdened with taxation, and now I feel sure that the enormously increased demands of the late few years of trouble have made the cup run over. Government must sacrifice something, or the country will be deserted. The resources of the payers are exhausted. I am well aware how easy it is to suggest remission, and how difficult to obtain the consent of Government to it. In this case, I think it positively and absolutely necessary. Hus-san Abdal is, I am told, a healthy place until August, and I can remain there, and see to both Rawul Pindce, Khair, Chuch, and Hazara. I can manage for a house I have no doubt.

With reference to demands of restitution from the Kaidars and Mulicks, if you will allow a dozen of them to be entertained, measures taken now will insure the forthcoming of the money. By and by, there will be no getting at it.

I, also, would like to know what you wish to be done with cases of murder committed, not during actual tumults, but unnoticed on account of the general confusion. There is one very serious one of fratricide, by one of the chief Mulicks of Khair, committed before Jowahir Sing's death, which, I think, should certainly be investigated.

Crimes of this nature should, surely, not go unpunished, though it may not be expedient to sift the misconduct of Government functionaries.

Is there no way in which the people in these distant parts might hear of the reforms in progress in Lahore? You mention a proclamation against bribery; no one here knows anything of it; nor ever will, unless you take measures that they shall.

'Till the Bhaee's arrival I can do nothing but collect information, excepting, as I did to-day, give a puiwanna, which will bring back Zemindars to a deserted village.

#### Inclosure 4 in No 3

*The Resident at Lahore, Lieutenant-Colonel H M Lawrence, C.B., to the Secretary to the Government of India with the Governor-General*

*Lahore, April 29, 1847.*

LIEUTENANT NICHOLSON has returned from Mooltan, and, on the whole, gives a favorable report of Dewan Moolraj, whose administration, though strict, and even grasping, is favorably contrasted with that of the other Punjab Governors. The Dewan keeps his officers and Kaidars in good order, they hold him in much awe and are not permitted, as elsewhere, to plunder at will. Their violences and extortions may, therefore, be fairly placed at his door. Traders, and debtors to himself, or to those who owe him money, are the chief sufferers under the Dewan's rule. He has, evidently, been in the practice of acting as if he were the sovereign of the country, and was, in the first instance, inclined to resent Lieutenant Nicholson's visit. The Dewan's notions of administration are primitive, and arbitrary. He, evidently, approves of the law of retaliation, and, I fear, has rather encouraged, than otherwise, the border feuds between Mooltan and the Jhung District. The people are, universally, robbers, graziers, and trackers, or a combination of all, now feeding their flocks, now stealing their neighbours', and then again, with extraordinary skill, following the foot-prints of their own, or those of their friends, that have been stolen. Lieutenant Nicholson was able to investigate, and bring in the leaders in, two gang robberies, in both of which several lives had been lost. That on Sutguh of Jhung, from Mooltan, occurred three months ago, but was made in consequence of a similar attack, from the Jhung side, on a Mooltan village, last year. The Jhung people had taken refuge in Bahawalpore, and were, at Lieutenant Nicholson's requisition, surrendered, and all parties will, I hope, be now so dealt with, by the Durbar, as to check the repetition of such occurrences.

In instance of the little consideration given to life in Mooltan, and, indeed, throughout the Punjab, I may remark that Lieutenant Nicholson, having heard, on his way down, that a party of Sowars in the Mooltan service had killed a villager, inquired into the case, and ascertained that, while moving across the country, they seized two men, on the plea of their being of the same tribe as a party who had murdered one of their friends; one of the captives attempted to escape, and was, forthwith, killed by one of the Sowars. The Kardar on the spot acknowledged that, although he knew all about the matter, he had not even placed the murderer under restraint. On receiving Lieutenant Nicholson's letter, I requested the Durbar to issue orders to have the Kardar and all the Sowars sent to Lahore; and, next day, repeated my suggestion. In the interim, Dewan Moolraj had told Lieutenant Nicholson that the murderer had escaped; but, on receipt of the Lahore orders, and on Lieutenant Nicholson's repeated injunctions, the man was delivered up, and is now in Lahore, under trial by the Durbar. Everywhere, throughout the country, similar, or worse, atrocities are daily occurring. Gradually, I hope to effect improvement. Several desperate highwaymen and gang robbers are now in the Lahore jail, some of whom will shortly be made an example of, and I expect that the conclave of Bedees (descendants of Gooroo Nanuk) will, in a few days, cause the Bedee who murdered his step-mother and brothers, to be hanged at Dera Nanuk, where the offence occurred; they have found him guilty, and signed his condemnation; sentence only remains to be executed. A few examples are required, or the country will be infested by bands of the discharged soldiery, and the other ruffians who have, for so many years, been privileged to rob and slay.

As a measure of protection to the people from their Kardars, and of prevention generally of crime, I have caused the nomination of judges, throughout the country. It will scarcely be credited that, except at Lahore and Peshawur, there was nowhere in the Punjab a single individual whose duty it was to administer justice; the Kardars, or chief oppressors, being invariably themselves judges and magistrates, as well as collectors.

When the reductions and reforms are completed, and accounts squared, I propose, with the permission of Government, to fix salaries for the several new appointments; taking care that, after all the expenses of the State are paid, there remain some surplus. This will, however, yearly increase, as the regular infantry of the army gradually falls from 20,000 to 15,000 men, and the Sowars from 12,000 to 10,000. In the rough, I estimate the revenue at one crore of rupees, and that, on the present footing of the army, the expenses of the State can be reduced to ninety-five lakhs.

There are, as usual, all sorts of reports of evil intentions of the Sikhs, and even of the chiefs, against us, but all greatly exaggerated, and many obviously false. That there are many who, like Sirdar Shere Sing, have not found all the advantage they expected from the recent arrangement, is most true, that there are others who, accustomed to revolution and excitement, are ready for any move that, by turning out those in power, may, by possibility, bring in themselves, or friends, is also true, and that there are ten or twenty thousand disbanded soldiers, still on the surface of society, ready to take part in any disturbance, is also correct, but I much doubt if, in any man's mind, there has yet risen the thought of serious, overt opposition to British authority. No; the time has not yet come for anything beyond private schemes of treachery. The discontented will grumble and talk and cabal, they will even consult their priests and pundits, for auspicious days, and for the time when the Khalsa may again be victorious, but, beyond highway robberies, burglaries, and assassinations, little evil is to be expected from those who have so lately been defeated in four battles. In the course of time, when the memory of recent defeats has partially passed away, if opportunity be given, the natural independence of the Sikh character may dictate the attempt to escape from under a foreign yoke; for, however benevolent be our motives, and conciliatory our demeanour, a British army cannot garrison Lahore, and the fiat of a British functionary cannot supersede that of the Durbar, throughout the land, without our presence being considered a burthen and a yoke, not only by those who have nothing to lose, and all to gain, by revolution, but by many of the bolder spirits among the better classes, who are ready to venture their lives, and property, in the cause of the Khalsa, and in the chances of a revolution that may make Generals, Sirdars, and even a Vizier, or a Maharajah.

I see around me, and hear of, so many men, who, having been Generals and

Colonels in the Sikh army, are now struggling for existence; so many favorites of the Jummoo Viziers of Lahore, who were discarded by Sirdar Jowahir Sing; and so many of his again, that were thrown adrift by Rajah Lal Sing; and, at the same time, know that so little justice has been done, even in recent reductions, that my great wonder has been the good conduct of the Sikh army, during the last twelvemonth, and the almost perfect quiet that has, during the last five months, pervaded the land.

I am well aware that neither independent feelings, nor lawless habits, are easily eradicated; and I am quite satisfied that there is nothing too foolish, nothing too desperate, for Asiatic zealots or desperadoes to attempt. I endeavour, therefore, to be on the alert, and am well supported by my assistants, and am happy to be able to record my opinion that the command of the garrison of Lahore could not be in better hands than those of Brigadier Campbell.

Inclosure 5 in No 3.

*The Secretary with the Governor-General to the Resident at Lahore*

*Simla, May 19, 1847*

THE Governor-General desires me to bring to your notice that there are certain points, connected with the civil administration of the Punjab, on which your letters contain little information, but which must necessarily be placed upon record, before we can ascertain the true position of affairs in the Punjab, and satisfy ourselves that the administration of the Government is conducted efficiently, and with a due regard to economy.

Should any district, either on account of civil mal-administration or for the purpose of more fully developing its resources, require the personal superintendence of an European officer, his Lordship is prepared to sanction his deputation, for such a period as circumstances may appear to require, and even to place the services of other practised civil officers at your disposal for this purpose, should you deem such a measure requisite for its attainment.

Whenever officers, as in the case of Lieutenants Edwards and Nicholson, are deputed for special purposes, and as a mere temporary measure, you should make it a particular instruction to them to report upon the resources of the countries which they traverse. It is not sufficient for them to state that the land is covered with grass jungle, or with tamarisk, or that it is quite uncultivated, but they should ascertain whether the land is incapable of cultivation, whether it cannot be brought under the plough by ordinary industry, and a judicious outlay of capital, and whether the population of the neighbourhood could not be induced to such efforts, by the promise of security and just assessment, which the present system is calculated to introduce. Independent of personal inspection, much information may be obtained by free communication with the people, by ascertaining the prevailing rents for various crops, and the modes of collection, and by other judicious enquiries directed to this object.

Scientific enquiries also are not unconnected with the object of his Lordship's wishes. Anything that will tend to enlarge our knowledge of the Punjab, not only with respect to its productive resources, but its minerals, metals, natural history, antiquities, navigation, canals, and commerce; any suggestion that may be made by you, or your assistants, relative to these objects, will meet with his ready attention, and any scheme which may be devised, for the furtherance of these enquiries, will be promoted to the utmost of his power.

Inclosure 6 in No 3

*The Secretary with the Governor-General to the Resident at Lahore*

*Simla, May 25, 1847.*

THE Governor-General desires me to request, with reference to Major Lawrence's communication from Peshawur, that you will express to that officer the satisfaction which his Lordship has experienced from the perusal of his letter. It evinces not only great zeal, but a very sound judgment, and the

Governor-General is persuaded that, under the Major's able and firm management, the important station under his charge will rapidly improve, and the troops composing its garrison will, very shortly, be brought into a satisfactory state of discipline.

The Governor-General requests that Major Lawrence may be directed to express to Lieutenant Lumsden his Lordship's gratification at the zealous co-operation he affords to his superior officer, who is, on his part, so anxious to acknowledge it.

#### No 4

*The Governor-General to the Secret Committee.*

*Simla, June 8, 1847 (No. 39.)*

**PERFECT** tranquillity prevails in the Punjab

#### Inclosure 1 in No. 4

*The Secretary with the Governor-General to the Resident at Lahore.*

*Simla, April 7, 1847.*

THE Governor-General is anxious that you should depute some junior engineer officer, whose services are available, to examine, and report upon, the practicability of opening the canal between Umritsur and Lahore

The Governor-General is of opinion that, if this canal could be re-opened under our auspices, it would serve to render our occupation very popular with the native population

#### Inclosure 2 in No. 4

*Lieutenant H. B. Edmunds (Assistant to the Resident) to the Resident at Lahore.*

*Camp, Teetur Khail in Munaut, May 4, 1847*

THE Bunnoo revenue accounts having been closed yesterday, I requested Dewan Hookur Chund to arrange them in a tabular form, for future reference, and I have now the honor to forward to you the statement he has prepared

Summed up, the account stands thus —

Dr	Rs	a	p	Cr	Rs	a	p
Arrears of Revenue for two and half years, due from the Mulicks of Bunnoo	1	30	000	0	0		
				Paid by the Mulicks in cash and kind	44,281	15	9
				Allowed in per centage, daily allowance, &c &c	4,963	4	0
					49,245	1	9
				Balance due	80,754	12	3
	Rs 1,30,000	0	0		Rs 1,30,000	0	0

To this account, however, should be added the sum of 7,940 rupees 2 annas, being the value realized by Government for the green corn cut and consumed by the camp, but not allowed to the Zemindars in part of revenue, so that the account is really as follows:—

	Rs	a	p
Realized of the Rs. 1,30,000	49,245	3	9
Corn cut besides	7,940	2	0
Total receipts	57,185	5	9
Expended in per centage, &c.	4,963	4	0
Net receipts	Rs. 52,222	1	9

The above is the immediate, and very unfavorable, pecuniary result of the expedition. Its permanent result, both in a financial and political point of view, I believe to be more fortunate for the Sikh Government. For, had complete success rewarded our present efforts, had the Bunnoochees been wise enough to seize the golden opportunity afforded them, and paid up the whole of the revenue arrears, they would have become entitled to a lease, for the future, at the easy rate of 40,000 rupees per annum, a smaller sum (as they now acknowledge) than they paid, even to the Cabool kings, whose yoke, by all accounts, sat very lightly upon them. And, supposing that this agreement had been faithfully abided by; that the Bunnoochees had paid in, regularly, and voluntarily, the said 40,000 rupees, and the Maharajah had been saved the necessity of sending a biennial army across the Indus, Bunnoo would still have remained a mere tributary state, enjoying its own laws, or rather its own anarchy; and destroying the integrity of the Trans-Indus frontier, by cutting off Kohat, and Peshawur, from communication with Murwut Esakhail, and Dera Ismael Khan. From what I have seen of the people, also, I am quite convinced that internal dissensions would always have prevented them from fulfilling their engagement, even if they had been assessed at 20,000 rupees, instead of 40,000, so that the day of interference, and of assuming the direct management, would only have been postponed for a year. It is every way better, therefore, that the Bunnoochees have, at once, refused the terms which were offered them, and shown that no amount of moderation and justice will ever induce them to pay revenue, unless they are obliged. The permanent occupation of Bunnoo must, now, be undertaken in the autumn, and the most highly-favored spot by Nature which I have seen north of the Sutlej, will, for the first time, become incorporated with the Punjab kingdom.

I cannot close the last report I have to make, connected with the Bunnoo expedition, without doing justice to the troops who composed it. Restraint is new to the Sikh army; but I do not believe that the best disciplined soldiers of the most civilized nation in Europe, ever marched through so rich a country with so little licence. The discipline of the camp reflected the highest credit on General Cortlandt, and I have much pleasure in bearing testimony to the good sense, great experience, and practical military knowledge, of that officer.

#### Inclosure 3 in No 4

*Major Lawrence to the Resident at Lahore*

*Peshawur, May 16, 1847.*

I HAVE explained, through General Golab Sing, to the troops, the Governor-General's desire that they should be regularly paid, if possible, be never more than two months in arrear, that they shall have periodical leave of absence, without forfeiture of pay, beyond the loss of batta, and that the estates of deceased men shall receive all arrears up to the date of the casualty.

These advantages, as may be supposed, evincing, as they do, the interest the British Government takes in the soldiers' welfare, have been joyfully received, and, in my opinion, the results will be most beneficial in gaining a hold upon their attachment in the point they are most sensible—self interest. That we have already gained their confidence we have proof, in their bringing their money to be remitted through this treasury, in preference to their own pay office, which I suggested, but of which they would not hear. The anxiety also manifested by corps to remain at Peshawur, a post hitherto considered little short of banishment, may be justly held as indicative of their appreciation of our efforts to ameliorate their condition.

The elevation of their general, Golab Sing, who is much respected and liked, to the Governorship of this important province, and prospective, as it is, of higher honors, has evidently been a source of gratification and pride to the troops. I took the opportunity of reading the Durbar Order of his appointment, at a general parade, and pointed out to the officers that such was the result of good and tried service, and expressed my hope that some of themselves might prove equally worthy, and as fortunate.

My earnest attention has been directed to the speedy reduction of the Ram-



goles, or Irregulars, being fully aware that every day they remained added to their arrears, and the burden of the State; but, being without funds, I could do but little beyond taking a muster of the whole; a measure which had not been done since Avtabili's time, and reducing, to their original grades in the ranks, the illegitimately promoted, and discharging about 650.

The state of the country is, I think I may say, decidedly improved; men's minds have become more settled: at first, the arrival of an officer, willing and anxious to redress their grievances, raised undue hopes, which, however, have calmed down, they find that my object was not to upset the old order of things, but gradually to reform them, they also find that there is, now, both strength and consistency in the Government, and that it has not only the desire to deal justly, but the power to punish evil doers, my having seized some despisers of the law, who fancied themselves secure in their inaccessibility, has had the happiest effects.

The removal of the boy-Governor and his unprincipled advisers, and appointment of an old and approved soldier in his place, cannot but prove most salutary. The new Governor is most grateful to us for his elevation, and has sense to know that in our support is the strength of his government.

I have deputed Lieutenant Lumsden on a tour through the Eusufzye country, more to obtain, by personal inspection, an insight into its affairs and condition, and to settle petty boundary disputes, than to make any permanent arrangement; reserving this for myself, when leisure admits. He represents the country to be almost a waste from oppression, but to have every capability of soil and water; he describes the people as all at feud with each other, and most bitter against the Sikhs. His escort is only 50 horse, and 120 foot, yet he has traversed the district of Lhoonkhore, considered in rebellion, and which has not paid revenue for two years, and then only at the point of the bayonet. He is a most active, energetic officer, and I expect much from his trip.

#### Inclosure 4 in No 4.

*The Resident at Lahore to the Secretary with the Governor-General.*

*Lahore, June 2, 1847.*

IT is not easy to estimate the difficulty I have, in obtaining authentic information from the Duibar offices. Occasionally, I might, through indirect channels, procure what I want, but it would be at the expense of giving offence to the Sirdars of the Council, which, as far as possible, it is desirable to avoid. Within the next two months, I hope to be able to lay before Government a full report on the resources and condition of the country, and, in the interim, I shall lose no opportunity of obtaining information, and improving the condition of the people.

With the experience of fourteen months, I can certify to this people having settled down in a manner that could never have been hoped, or believed of them; but yet they have not lost their spirit. To this fact I frequently testified last year, and commented on their bold and manly bearing. A large majority of the disbanded soldiers have returned to the plough, or to trade; but there are still very many floating upon the surface of society; and, such is the fickleness of the national character, and so easily are they led by their priests and pundits, and so great is their known pride of race, and of a long unchecked career of victory, that if every Sirdar, and Sikh, in the Punjab were to avow himself satisfied with the humbled position of his country, it would be the extreme of infatuation to believe him; or to doubt, for a moment, that, among the crowd who are loudest in our praise, there are many who cannot forgive our victory, or even our forbearance, and who chafe at their own loss of power, in exact proportion as they submit to ours. But this was not to be avoided, and, so far from being a discouraging feature of our position, is the best assurance we can have of our strength; for it proves that, whoever our secret enemies may be, they can neither find a weak point, nor an opportunity. About three months ago, there was, indeed, some sort of plot concocted, but of so vague and weak a nature that, to this day, (though the chief agent is in confinement) the object, and even existence, of the conspiracy remains doubtful, and the only conspirators who are suspected, with anything like reason, are a Fakeer and the Maharanee. After great pains in investigating the matter, I am unable to

decide whether it had its rise in political, or personal, motives. The lives of Sirdar Tej Sing, Dewan Deena Nath, and other chiefs, were to be attempted, as well as mine; and, perhaps, the most likely solution is, that the Ranee, deprived of both her lover, and her influence in the State, conceived the wish to revenge her private and public quarrels at a blow, by disturbing the present Government. In such an aim she must know where to find all who would assist her; yet she seems to have found but few, and those of the lowest grade of malcontents; and, on the whole, I think it fortunate that anything has occurred to show the chiefs, the army, and the people, how very small must be the chances of success in such machinations, how great the danger of betrayal, when the least scrupulous, though by no means the least able, personage in the kingdom, could attempt it, and so miserably fail.

It would have scarcely been worth while entering so fully into this matter as I have done, except that it is wise to keep before our eyes the fact that the animus of unrest and insurrection slumbers, but is not yet dead, in the Punjab. It would be a miracle if it were otherwise; for, assuredly, the habits acquired during six years of anarchy are not to be laid aside in a month, or a year. At no period of Anglo-Indian History, for instance, has any great conquest or crisis been immediately followed by complete peace and security in the countries annexed to our dominion; or by the universal good-will of a people whom we had beaten in the field. The opposite error to over-confidence is, however, not less mischievous. People here are partial to quoting the Cabool catastrophe, and, unfortunately, have too often the example set by those among ourselves who should know better than to consider the British position at Lahore in any point comparable with that at Cabool. Here, however, as there, our fate is in our own hands. I do not disguise from myself that our position at Lahore will always be a delicate one; benefits are soon forgotten, and little gratitude is to be expected. Moreover, there are the daily refusals, the necessary resumptions, the repressing, or patching up, of domestic squabbles; all leaving behind them more or less of ill-will, petty enough in detail, but, in the mass, sufficiently powerful to affect, for years to come, the movements of any honest administration in the Punjab. I do not know that the Sirdars, and officials, of this kingdom are naturally more evil disposed than those of any other part of India; but their country is certainly more backward in civilization; was but the other day reclaimed from a state of the most ignorant barbarism; and has been but little subjected to the wholesome restraints of a regular government. Even Runjeet Sing's government could not be called a settled one. To the day of his death, he was carrying on war, and plundering, rather than governing, the greater part of the country beyond the Jhelum. Dewan Deena Nath, and two or three others still alive, were witnesses of acquisitions within a hundred miles of Lahore. Neither was there any thing in Runjeet Sing's institutions that gave promise of stability. He seems not to have taken thought of what would occur on his death: unless indeed, in bequeathing an unwieldy army to an imbecile son, we accuse him of the monstrous design of collecting materials for his own funeral pile, and devoting to the flames a kingdom which he saw none of his successors was worthy to inherit.

I am gratified with daily reports of the advantage of our presence to the cultivating classes. In old cases, I endeavour to settle matters by compromise; and by telling Chiefs, and Kardars, to silence parties by restitution, in part or whole, of exactions. In this way, Kishen Kour, late Kardar of Rawal Pindce, restored 10,000 rupees, and is now surrounded by a fresh batch of Zemindars, who, hearing of the success of their brethren, have thought it worth while to come in, a distance of 250 miles, with their complaints. In like manner, I tell Sirdar Shere Sing, he had better settle the Peshawur, and Eusufzye, demands; which he quietly assents to, remarking, that some have been accounted for to the Durbar, and others were occasioned by the necessities of the times. I take up no by-gone case that I can avoid. Lieutenant Edwardes' and Lieutenant Nicholson's marches through the country did much good in restraining Kardars; and, already, I can perceive a like advantage attending Lieutenant Taylor's progress.

Captain Abbott alludes to the curses of the Begaree, or forced labor, system. It is one so inherent in native institutions, that I fear there will be great difficulty in eradicating it. Very early, I turned my attention to the subject, and strenuously endeavoured to procure marching allowance to the troops; and even

went so far as to tell the Bunnoo troops they would get it; but, although Dewan Deena Nath agrees so far to bear me out as to make to the soldiers who went to Bunnoo a present equal to the allowance, he and Tej Sing set their faces against its being made a rule; saying there is no necessity for it, as the men's baggage is carried on Government camels. When other finance matters are settled, I will return to the subject, and do all in my power to restrain the seizure of carriers; but the fact is that chiefs, soldiers, and servants consider that low caste men and Mussulmans were created to be their beasts of burthen. Gradually, we may improve matters; but the commencement must be by the soldiers, on a march, having no need of carriers, or excuse for seizing them.

I am promised an entire revision of the customs' system, at present so harassing, not only to traders, but to travellers: I have repeatedly explained to the Dubar the actual advantage, as well as credit, that may be gained, by taxing only a few articles, on a single line.

Lieutenant Edwardes has returned from Bunnoo, with a large stock of valuable information regarding that interesting quarter. He tells me, that his double progress across the country has satisfied him that it would be many years before it would pay in our hands. To-morrow, Lieutenant Nicholson proceeds to Umritsur, for the purpose of inspecting, and reporting on, Govindghur, and the general management of the Umritsur district and Mr Cocks goes, to-night, to Ramnuggui, for ten or twelve days, to look after the Kardais in that direction. In this way, by visits of a week or a month to different quarters, we may help the executive, as well as protect the people, but any lengthened residence must weaken our influence with the latter, as much as affect the authority of the former.

Peace continues throughout the whole extent of the Punjab, and Jummoo, territories; and I have strong hope that the arrangement by which Hazara has been restored to Lahore, will tend to its continuance; though, meanwhile, the day of transition is an anxious one, for there are, in Hazara, some as averse to the Sikh, as there are others to the Jummoo rule, and, at any time, a very small spark in that quarter may kindle a large flame. The force being sent thither is double what is believed necessary for its eventual occupation, and this, with good treatment, and judicious remissions, ought at least to be a guarantee against insurrection. Captain Abbott is eloquent on the advantages of the exchange of territory.

Lieutenant Lumsden has returned from his excursions into the Eusufzye country to Peshawur, where all is going on satisfactorily. I have requested Major Lawrence to discourage, though not positively forbid, Sirdar Sooltan Mahomed Khan's correspondence with his brothers. He is a desperate intriguer, and, of old, leagued with the Candahar chiefs against Dost Mahomed. indeed, it is not impossible that the Ameer may suppose he has now been sent to Peshawur to do him injury. He, Sooltan Mahomed, once held Cabool for a few months; surrendered it ignominiously to Dost Mahomed, as he afterwards did Peshawur to the Sikhs; and finally, when he had been the main instrument in collecting an Affghan force for the recovery of the province, he betrayed his kinsmen.

Among a people little addicted to the truth, Sirdar Sooltan Mahomed's character is notorious for falsehood. His protestations towards us are now great, and it is possible he may feel some gratitude for his release from Lahore, where, assuredly, Sirdar Tej Sing would have kept him long enough. Major Lawrence will bear in mind the Government instructions that, while we are polite in our dealings with Dost Mahomed, we avoid communications beyond the passes, that may give designing individuals the opportunity of using our name, for their own purposes.

## No. 5.

*The Governor-General to the Secret Committee.*

*Simla, June 23, 1847. (No. 41.)*

**AFFAIRS** continue in as tranquil and satisfactory a state as at the time of my last dispatch.

## Inclosure 1 in No. 5.

*The Secretary with the Governor-General to the Resident at Lahore.*

*Simla, June 12, 1847.*

THE Governor-General observes, from your assistant Lieutenant Edwardes' reports, that the Dewan Dowlut Raee continues in a course of oppression towards the people of Murwut, and neglect of ordeals, which renders it desirable that he should be removed from the administration of that territory. Such an example, His Lordship remarks, would be most politic; and I am directed to enquire what step the Durbar propose to take, in order to check the mal-practices so generally ascribed to the Dewan

## Inclosure 2 in No. 5.

*The Resident at Lahore to the Secretary with the Governor-General*

*Lahore, June 18, 1847*

DEWAN DOWLUT RAE was some days back recalled, and is only permitted to remain at Dera Ismael Khan, during the present month, to enable him to realize the spring crop, for which he is answerable to have sent another Kardar to do so would have caused loss to the State, without adequate advantage to the people. Last week, by my desire, the Durbar fined Dowlut Raee 3,700 rupees, for a gross case of collusion with the Killedar of a small fort on the Indus, who had plundered a Cabool merchant. The Killedar himself has been relieved, and called to Lahore, where he shall be imprisoned.

I am not sure that Dewan Dowlut Raee's character is worse than that of the average of Kardars. Major Mackeson lately addressed me in his favor; Lieutenant Edwardes heard him well spoken of, at Dera Ismael Khan, among the Hindoo traders (whom, possibly, he may favor), and I believe his exactions and oppression to be more the work of his agents, than his own acts. He is described as the weak indolent son of an active intelligent father, whose place, but not whose ability, he succeeded to. Complaints enough will come in against him, when once it is generally known that he will not be permitted to return to Dera Ismael Khan, and I will take care they are heard.

Sookraj, the Kardar of Khatir, who was, last month, recalled by my desire, for oppression, is now in confinement. I am doing my best to weed the service of the worst oppressors, but corruption is so general, plunder is, even now, so easily obtained; and punishment must, even yet, be so uncertain, that much of the old system must be expected still to obtain. I have long since made known my sentiments to the Durbar, regarding bribery, corruption, and violence; and shall not fail to make the severest possible examples of all against whom these crimes may be proved, since our assumption of authority.

## No. 6

*The Governor-General to the Secret Committee.*

*Simla, July 7, 1847 (No 43.)*

I TRANSMIT various papers connected with the affairs of the Punjab.

They are of a satisfactory character, showing a progressive improvement in the civil and military administration of the country.

The Punjab is reported to be in a state of the most perfect tranquillity, and the health of the British garrison at Lahore, both European and Native, to be most satisfactory.

## Inclosure 1 in No. 6.

*Lieutenant H. B. Lumsden (Assistant to the Resident) to Major Lawrence.*

*Peshawur, June 10, 1847.*

HAVING just returned from a hurried tour through the Eusufzye country, undertaken in accordance with instructions received from you, I now do myself the honor of submitting a few remarks I was enabled to make, on the state of each elaka, or khanship, as I passed through it, and hope that, although the information is very limited, it will be found tolerably correct.

General remarks.—Considering Eusufzye as a mere portion of the Peshawur district, the first thing that strikes one is that, although acknowledging the Khalsa supremacy, and paying all demands made by the Sikh Governor, each Khan is still a perfect despot, as far as the management of his little khanship is concerned, and imposes taxes, levies fines, and, in many instances, punishes capitally, without further reference.

The customs imposed are not so objectionable from their aggregate amount as from the constant worry and delay which an inquisitorial examination of goods, every ten or twelve miles, must entail on the traders; and the tax on Hindoo marriages was burdensome in the extreme, being in many cases as high as 100 rupees, and seldom below thirty.

The fines, levied as punishment, were generally calculated more from the exigencies of the judge's exchequer, and the circumstances of the accused, than the proofs, or the enormity, of the crime under consideration.

The mode of collecting revenue varies in every Tuppa, in Tooroo and Hootee half the produce is considered the Government share, in Lhoonkhore, the Mullicks get little, or nothing, for themselves, and only pay revenue at the point of the bayonet, the amount extracted on these occasions being about 8,000 rupees.

In Amazeic and Razur, the people pay, partly on the produce, and partly by a house-tax, which varies according to the circumstances of the inmates, while, in Punjar and Ootman, the Khans pretend to fix the rate according to the season, but, in fact, screw all they can possibly get out of the Ryots, without endangering their own lives.

Each Khan has a body of Sowars, which he pretends to pay, but who, in reality, live on the Ryots, and are known to be engaged in most of the robberies which take place in the district, not unfrequently with the knowledge of, if not the direct consent of, the Khans themselves, who, on some occasions, have been known to accept a bribe, for the restoration of plundered property.

From the little I have been able to see of the country, I should say that a few years of peace and quietness, under a firm and just rule, will enable this district to cultivate nearly a third more land than is at present under the plough, and yield an increase of revenue above Avitabili's demand, though nothing like the amount at which Shere Sing and his hungry fellows attempted to fix it.

## Inclosure 2 in No. 6.

*The Secretary with the Governor-General to the Resident at Lahore*

*Simla, June 14, 1847*

LIEUTENANT TAYLOR speaks highly of a system pursued by General Avitabili, in the revenue settlement of Murdekee, and other Khalsa villages, which appears to have given satisfaction to the people. I am desirous to suggest whether this system could not now be renewed.

## Inclosure 3 in No. 6.

*The Resident at Lahore to the Secretary with the Governor-General.*

*Lahore, June 19, 1847.*

GENERAL AVITABILI'S system and rates will receive full consideration, in the assessment now about to be made of Wuzeerabad.

## Inclosure 4 in No. 6.

*Major Lawrence to the Resident at Lahore.**Peshawur, June 18, 1847.*

WITH advertence to the hope expressed that my next would report the strength of the Ramgoles to be 2,500, I have the honor to acquaint you that, though it has not been fully realized, yet as much has been done as prudence would admit, and I fully believe the efficiency of this arm is, in no way, impaired by the reduction.

The discharged men have been paid, in full, and have, for the most part, proceeded to their homes, while those retained have received nine months' arrears, and will shortly receive two more.

My intention has been to retain all the officers and men of Avitabih, of good character, where there was no physical unfitness, and, by strictly adhering to this rule, equalizing their pay, having all paid in my presence, and attending to their real or alleged grievances, I have been enabled to carry out this extensive reduction, without the slightest difficulty.

I continue to have every reason to be satisfied with the conduct of all ranks in the force, hitherto; in this, the fruit season, the men considered it their privilege to help themselves freely from the gardens, and stalls in the market place, but, now, not one complaint has been made, they pay for every thing, appear most anxious to please me, and are very obedient, and respectful.

The enquiry into the complaints against Kumroodeen Khan, the guardian of the road hence to Attock, having concluded, I made him satisfy, as far as pecuniary compensation could, all proved cases, which amounted to some hundreds, and then removed him, and his men, from their charge, leaving him a tenth of his jagheer, or 2,000 rupees, to subsist on. the protection of the road I have entrusted to men holding jagheers in its vicinity, who hitherto enjoyed them, without performing any adequate service: the arrangement has been in force a month, and appears to work well.

I have called on others who hold jagheers, under condition of furnishing small quotas of horses, to regularly muster, and produce them, keeping a portion always in attendance on the Governor, so that I may be enabled at once to have them out, as occasion may require, either to preserve the peace, or to apprehend outlaws and robbers; their local knowledge makes them especially useful in this line, within the last week, by sending six men, where I had heard two villages were preparing for a fight, the parties instantly separated, and no breach of the peace has, in that quarter, occurred.

It is with great regret I have to record that several cases of murder and manslaughter, in the district, have recently occurred, and chiefly in open day; this will not surprise you, who well know the nature of blood feuds among these people; their jealousy of their women, and spirit of revenge, with the constant recourse General Avitabih had to the punishment of death; when I acquaint you that, since his departure, but one man has suffered the extreme penalty of the law.

The natural result of such a system is that the people, having no fears of the consequences, regard murder as a venial offence. Though it was my wish to submit all such cases for the orders of the Durbar, deeming an immediate example necessary, I have yielded to the wishes of the Governor, and Chief Justice, and confirmed their sentence of death on four men, principals in two instances; the accessories in both cases being sentenced to five years' imprisonment, with hard labor on the roads, the latter at my suggestion. I trust that this severity will have the desired effect. punishment so quickly following the crime appears to have caused considerable sensation.

Lieutenant Lumsden returned from his tour in Eusufzye, on the 27th ultimo; his valuable report\* is annexed,—it fully corroborates the previous accounts of the sad state of that country, a remedy for which, time, and much forbearance on the part of Government, alone can supply. It would be superfluous in me to request attention to the energy and zeal which has enabled this officer, in the short period of twenty-five days, not only to traverse so much

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\* Inclosure 1 in No. 6.

space, but to collect such a mass of information, besides settling many petty disputes which he has modestly not mentioned. I have sent for the Khans, and, on their arrival, will assemble all at my house, with Sirdar Golab Sing, and Dewan Hakim Raee, when I purpose holding a Jeerga, or Council, at which I hope to be able to arrange something for them, the people, and the state, which will lessen, if not put an end to, oppression and intestine feuds, though, from all parties being so long accustomed to act as they pleased, I am by no means sanguine

Inclosure 5 in No. 6

*The Resident at Lahore to the Secretary with the Governor-General*

*Lahore, June 21, 1847*

IT seems to me that, if we interfere on every occasion, we shall not only nullify the authority of the Durbar and its executive officers, but, by being so constantly heard, our voices will cease to carry the influence they now do,—we may guide and advise, we may drive out of the field great oppressors, we may establish Courts, at which, at least, a hearing will be given, we may fix the assessment, we may protect the high roads, and put down gang robberies, all this we may, within a reasonable time (perhaps the next three months) effect, but, if we were to attempt to decide every case, and to collect the revenue ourselves, which we must do, if we interfere with the details of management, my assistants would require to be increased tenfold; and not only would the chiefs and officials be disgusted, but they would become virtually disqualified from managing the country, when the term of our occupancy expires. I look upon it, that the spirit of the late arrangement requires that all orders shall emanate from the Durbar and its agents, and that we shall only step in when they cease to act.

The terms of the agreement of exchange between Lahore and Jummoo, arm Captain Abbott with extraordinary powers, but they do not authorize him to remove a Kardar. However, as I have told him, there will be no sort of difficulty in effecting the recall of any individual against whom a good case can be made out.

Inclosure 6 in No. 6.

*The Resident at Lahore to the Secretary with the Governor-General.*

*Lahore, June 24, 1847.*

REFERRING to Lieutenant Lumsden's notice of the bands of Horse in the service of the different Eusufzye Khans, as also to some recent observations of Major Lawrence on the authority assumed by Jagheerdars, I have requested that officer to reduce all such persons to the position they held in Runjeet Sing's time, except in regard to mutilation, and capital punishment, which no man is to inflict. Those who have grossly misused their authority can be, to a greater or less degree, deprived of it; and every one shall be made responsible for the conduct of his armed retainers. I hope, shortly, to be able to put a stop to private customs' collections, by inducing the Durbar to pay commutation to all persons now entitled thus to molest travellers and traders. The trading city of Umritsur, at this moment, has eleven independent leviars of custom dues; and, until the deaths of Rajas Dhyan Sing, Heera Sing, and Soochet Sing, it had three others collecting on their account.

The one band of predatory Horse, specially referred to by Lieutenant Lumsden, shall be put down, by fair means, or force. When Major Lawrence has leisurely visited Eusufzye, it may be time to consider the advantage of locating there a respectable native official, on the part of the Durbar, to collect the revenue, and protect the people, by being a check upon the chiefs. If a Mahomedan of this description can be found so much the better.

In regard to capital punishment, Major Lawrence has been told, only to carry out the sentence of the local officers, when he agrees with the Judge, and

Governor, and the case appears so urgent as not to admit of reference to Lahore. I am aware that one prompt execution may save the necessity of many.

All the roads are now, more or less, patrolled, and I have desired liberal rewards to be given for the apprehension of every notorious character. I have some difficulty in preventing King's evidences being set at liberty, and am trying to persuade the Durbar that the man is fortunate who saves his neck, after having been concerned in a gang robbery, or murder. Almost the only thought, with Lahore officials, is how to procure restitution of the stolen property; and, this effected, thieves and robbers have as often obtained their release as otherwise; more than a hundred of them are now in irons working at the Cantonment road.

Inclosure 7 in No. 6.

*The Resident at Lahore to Lieutenant J Nicholson, Assistant to the Resident.*

*Lahore, June 25, 1847.*

BEING deputed to the Sind Sagur, or country between the Jhelum and the Indus, you will consider that tract as your especial charge.

You are requested to cultivate the acquaintance of the two Nazims, Sirdars Chuttur Sing and Lal Sing, as also of their deputies, and indeed of all the respectable Kardars that you meet. Much may be done by cordiality, by supporting their just authority, attending to their moderate wishes, and even whims, and by those small courtesies that all natives look to, even more than they do to more important matters. I need only hint at these points to insure your zealous attention to them.

The protection of the people from the oppression of the Kardars, will be your first duty. In connection with, this will come the maintenance of discipline among the troops; the safety of the high roads, the prevention of seizure of carriers and cattle, the speedy redress of grievances, and *non-interference*, by the agents of Government, in the ordinary affairs of life. Indeed, the more the village communities can be left to settle their own affairs, the better, and, as long as they pay their revenue, and abstain from violence, the seldomer a Lahore official sets foot in their lands the better. Whenever there appears to be collusion between the Nazim and Kardar, or the former fails to take up, in a right spirit, appeals against the latter, call his attention to the fact; and, if your exhortations fail, report him to me.

Your next most important care will be the army. Wherever you are, mix with the soldiers, and talk to them and their officers, and encourage them to bring their complaints (through their commanding officer) to you. Be present occasionally at the pay-table, and keep me informed of any delay in its distribution. The Governor General is most anxious on this important point, and desires that the fact be, thus insensibly, kept before the soldiers that they owe their present regularity of pay, and certainty of position, to British influence. Should any men wish to send cash to their homes, either within the Lahore, or British territory, through my office, you can direct deductions to be made by the Bukshee, and send me rolls, carefully prepared, in the enclosed form, when I will have the cash remitted, and receipts obtained for the satisfaction of the remitter. You shall be provided with long rolls of the troops stationed in your quarter, which will assist you, when complaints are made in regard to promotion, leave, pay, &c. See that every man has his term of leave, that pay is given, with only the legitimate deductions, and that every man signs, or puts his own mark to, the book, in acknowledgment of the pay he has received.

Without allowing the troops to be unduly harassed, see that parades and drills are attended to. I insist upon insubordination, and plunder, being promptly punished, and bring to my notice any particular instances of good conduct.

Avoid, as far as possible, any military movement, during the next three months; but, should serious disturbance arise, act energetically. The troops will be under the orders of the Nazim; who, however, will be desired not to employ them, unless with your full concurrence, and, whenever time will permit, you will apply for instructions from Lahore.



## Inclosure 8 in No. 6.

*The Secretary with the Governor-General to the Resident at Lahore.*

*Smla, July 3, 1847.*

OUR position is not that of active agents, but of friendly advisers, with the power, where necessary, of enforcing our advice, and, when justice cannot otherwise be obtained, of directly acting ourselves; but this must be the last resource.

This view is strictly in accordance with the spirit, and even the letter, of the treaty—which gives to the Government of India, represented at Lahore by its Resident, full authority to direct, and control, all matters, in every department of the State, he may interfere as much, or as little, as he chooses. He will be regulated by the course which he may deem it most expedient to adopt to ensure good government. He is required to pay attention to the feelings of the people; to preserve the national institutions and customs, and to maintain the just rights of all classes.

It is, therefore, politic that the Resident should carry the Native Council with him, the members of which are, however, entirely under his control and guidance—he can change them, and appoint others—and, in military affairs, his power is as unlimited as in the civil administration—he can withdraw Sikh garrisons, replacing them by British troops in any, and every, part of the Punjab.

These powers, under ordinary circumstances, will be useful, in proportion to the temperance with which they are exercised—and, up to this hour, your administration has been marked by moderation and judgment.

There are districts, however, in the Punjab, of so much importance, in a political and military point of view, that they may be required to be managed by the more direct, and active, agency of British officers such as Peshawur, where it is absolutely necessary to have, at all times, a large, and effective, Sikh garrison, kept up in a state of perfect contentment, and discipline. The policy of maintaining one-third of the Sikh army, in this advanced position, in good order need not be insisted upon. In devolving these duties of a mixed character on a British officer, there has been no interference with national customs and institutions. General Avitabile exercised much greater powers than those so safely entrusted to Major Lawrence the Sikh troops, composed of various tribes, have, during the last quarter of a century, been accustomed to the control of European officers, and Major Lawrence's superintendence is popular with the troops, because they feel that his interference is beneficial.

• The same reasoning applies to the Hazara country—the Sikh force in the vicinity of those hills, will be considerable, the Mussulman population is warlike, and difficult of control, and, as the tribute they pay is small, the necessity of interference in the internal administration of those mountainous tracts, will not require many fiscal arrangements. The Governor-General has no doubt that Captain Abbott, assisted by Lieutenant Nicholson, would render essential service, if employed in superintending this district, now transferred to the Lahore state.

It does not follow that British officers, in the position of Major Lawrence and Captain Abbott, if they were entrusted with the revenue, police, and judicial administration, of any district, should employ the regular, and expensive, system of administration in our own provinces. Native Sikh agency must be employed under them.

This system is no novelty—during the minority of the Rajah of Nagpore, Sir Richard Jenkins had the management of that territory, he placed British officers in charge of certain districts, who administered its revenues, its police, and judicial affairs. Although a British officer in each district was the directing instrument of the Resident, native officers, belonging to the Maharajah, were employed in all matters of detail, and the success, during the ten years the system lasted, was most complete.

Another instance, equally decisive in its results, was the management of the Nizam's dominions, when the late Lord Metcalfe was appointed Resident at Hyderabad. Having firmly established the authority of the British Government, he employed British officers in the divisions of the territory, principally to define the amount of the revenue, which should be paid by the villages. The Nizam's revenue officers acted under the British Political Agents. Leases were granted

for five years; and, as soon as the British Resident had fixed the extent of the Government demand on the villages, tranquillity was, at once, restored, because immediate relief was afforded to the people.

In the Punjab, it is not, at the present moment, necessary to resort to so extensive, and general, a measure. The district, administered by Sirdar Lehna Sing, Majeetia, between the Ravee and the Sutlej, had better remain entirely under native management; and, wherever chiefs of ability, and integrity, can be found, it is unquestionably better to employ them, in preference to British officers, as the directing agents; and, in particular, near the seat of Government, where their conduct can be more immediately brought under your vigilant control, or that of your assistants

An extensive, and general, system of deputing a British officer to administer the various districts of the Punjab, would entail considerable expense, and, on principle, it is preferable that the Resident should endeavour, as you are now doing, to maintain, as far as possible, native institutions, and forms of administration, with such improvements as they may admit of, so as to facilitate the restoration of the territory to the Maharajah, when that period shall have arrived

The authority to employ British officers, in the manner adverted to in this letter, has already been given, in my letter of the 19th of May;\* and the Governor-General will be ready to sanction such deputations, whenever you may be of opinion that a case has been made out, justifying the necessity of appointing a directing British officer

The duration of the British officer's superintendence must, of course, depend upon circumstances, it had better not be made permanent for the term of occupation.

With regard to the powers to be delegated to these officers, the Governor-General entirely concurs with you, in reply to Captain Abbott, that he has already ample powers for all useful purposes

The Governor-General assumes that the duties of this officer, as the Boundary Commissioner, will shortly cease; and, if you are of opinion that he can be advantageously employed in the Hazara country, his Lordship will place that officer at your disposal

For this duty, he combines, with other qualifications, the professional acquirements of a military officer, and can, under your instructions, be authorized to superintend the regularity of payment of the Sikh troops, taking care that his influence be felt, by attending to the just rights of the troops, without which it is impossible to enforce a safe system of discipline; although the Governor-General must observe, that the Sikh troops, and even the disbanded portion, have, since March, 1846, greatly surprised his Lordship by their excellent conduct, and soldier-like qualities.

In conclusion, the Governor-General desires me to state, that you cannot confer a greater boon on the laboring classes of the Punjab, and more raise the character of the British Administration, than by abolishing the system of forced labor, so ruinous to the agricultural population of the country

Inclosure 9 in No. 6.

*The Secretary with the Governor-General to the Resident at Lahore.*

*Simla, July 3, 1847.*

THE judicious, and just, principle on which Major Lawrence has carried out the reductions in the army, has his Lordship's entire approbation. It appears, from the report, that the Ramgoles at Peshawar are, at present, to be kept up at 2,781 men, being 2,000 less than in Shere Sing's time; eventually, there will be 2,500 men, being a reduction, in expense, of 1,90,000 a-year.

The Governor-General approves your intention of locating a native agent, on the part of the Durbar, in the Eusufzye country, for the purpose of collecting the revenue, and affording protection to the people. This may be done, after Major Lawrence has visited the place.

\* Inclosure 5 in No. 3.

The Governor-General concurs in the instructions you have issued to Major Lawrence, in regard to capital punishment, viz: that he should, when he agrees with the Judge, and Governor, and, if the case appears so urgent as not to admit of a reference to Lahore, carry out the sentence which the local officers may pass upon the culprits.

In reference to the observations of Major Lawrence, respecting the fears of the Ameer Dost Mahomed Khan, of the intentions of the British Government towards Afghanistan, the Governor-General desires me to observe, that it is much more becoming the British Government to let the Dost satisfy his own fears, if he has any, which his Lordship doubts, than to be making professions of our intentions. The Governor-General has no objection to verbal assurances, such as those given by Major Lawrence to the Vakeel, who may go, and come, when he pleases: courtesy is to be reconciled with perfect indifference. If the Dost seeks our friendship by any overtures, the Governor-General will be ready to hear, but not to encourage, them, or to court any interference in Cabool affairs.

#### No 7.

*The Governor-General to the Secret Committee.*

Simla, July 23, 1847 (No. 50)

I LAY before you the correspondence relative to the state of affairs in the Punjab, that has passed with the Resident at Lahore since the dispatch of my letter, No 43, dated the 7th instant.

#### Inclosure 1 in No 7

*The Resident at Lahore to the Secretary with the Governor-General.*

Lahore, July 3, 1847

I HAVE the honor to inclose tabular statements, showing the judicial work done by the officers of the Agency, from January up to the 30th of June, 1847.

In judicial cases affecting life, and in other serious questions that are brought before me, I call in, at least, two of my assistants, or, in cases of appeal, send the proceedings to one, or two, of them separately, for opinions, before I take them up myself. Before the close of the present month, I expect that very few, if any, arrears will remain. I am quite alive to the necessity of speedy justice for such a people as we have to deal with, and my almost daily remark to the Dui bar officials is, that I do not call it justice at all, giving a poor man what he asks for, after having kept him waiting for weeks, or months, from his home. My assistants are, one and all, quite as anxious as myself on this point.

Heretofore, there does not appear to have been the semblance of justice in the land. There is no kind, or form, of oppression that has not hitherto been, almost openly, committed by Governors, Judges, Magistrates, and Constables. No one seems to have thought, for a moment, that the law was intended for any but the rich and the powerful. The poor settled their affairs their own way, by village arbitrations, by the sabre, or the cudgel except in the cities of Lahore and Peshawur, I cannot find that there was any person endowed with the powers of an adawlutee or judge; in the other towns, as Umritsur, Ramnuggur, and Rawul Pindie, there were Thannadars, but they were more military than civil officers, intended merely to watch over the peace of the country, put down petty disturbances, or, at most, catch an occasional thief, fine, and release him. On such occasions, if the stolen property was recovered, the Thannadar, or Kardar, was authorized to claim a quarter of its value, from the owner, as a reward for going so far out of the line of his duty as to take upon himself the administration of justice. It was, nominally, for the benefit of the State, but, more generally, went to the executive officer.

In fact, the only officers exercising judicial powers, were those from whom the people required most protection, the Kardars, holding Jagheers, or receiving salaries of one, two, and three thousand rupees per annum, have had districts yielding from one to ten lakhs made over to them; to the plunder, and harrying

of which, they would devote themselves with indefatigable zeal, leaving the welfare of the people, the social rights of the innumerable subdivisions of a motley community, half Hindoo, half Mussulman, the adjustment of village differences, and even the hearing of petitions, to hungry deputies, on ten or twenty rupees a month. There was no sort of check, no other authority, between these warders and the Maharajah. In extreme cases, some desperate men, imprudently oppressed beyond endurance, would betake themselves to Lahore, to seek revenge rather than redress; and either bribe, or force, their way to the presence. A hearing might then, possibly, be secured, and a favorable order passed, but, as a general rule, no punishment seems to have been inflicted on Kardars, unless, when defaulters to the State; and they had, therefore, nothing to do but squeeze out of the Ryots all that was to be squeezed, above the Government revenue. In this manner, for years and years, the Sirkar did not receive, from some of the richest tracts of the Punjab, one-half, or one-fourth, of what they actually yielded. It is true that Runjeet Sing balanced the account, in the end, by plundering the families of his officials, after their death; but, during the last seven years, the country has been much more the property of the Kardars than of the Maharajah of the day.

The shiftings of river courses, every where a fruitful source of fraud, are peculiarly so in the Punjab, intersected, as it is, by so many large rivers, and their numerous feeders. The Jagheers of the chiefs, and officials, are often scattered, by single villages, over the whole country, so that there are few to whom more or less has not fallen on the banks of some of the rivers. Whenever the floods carried away the banks on the Jagheedar's side, compensation was soon made to him, if he had influence; but he kept very quiet, when the eccentricities of the stream threw up new deposits, or added its old bed to his Jagheer. so that, as in the perpetually settled districts of Bengal, it has often been found that, in continuous Khalsa, and Jagheer, villages, the former have gradually shrunk as the latter have swelled out, until, in some cases, Jagheers of mere hundreds of rupees have risen to as many thousands. Not until the fortunate Jagheedar fell into disgrace, often, not even at his death, were these encroachments, and happy accidents, discovered. To adjust them for the past, and guard against them for the future, can only be effected by a revenue survey of Jagheer boundaries.

The remedy for such a state of things as I have imperfectly sketched, is not to be obtained in a day. All classes of officials, from the highest to the lowest, regard office only for what is to be obtained by it; and consider the people as just so many cows to be milked. In the words of one of themselves, they are all branches of the same tree, all leaves from the same bough. This very practice that every man has, of calling his neighbour a liar and a thief, and excepting only himself from the mass of iniquity, is symptomatic of the spirit of the times. No man that comes to me fails to say, that he himself tells only the truth, but that all else are to be mistrusted.

The remedies I would offer are, good pay and honors on one hand, and disgrace and punishment on the other. These may fail, but I think they should be tried. Already have Judges, with each a deputy, been appointed to each Doab, to Hazara, and the Manjha. Besides their Jagheers, handsome salaries shall be attached to these situations. I now propose to reduce the number of Kardars from fifty-one to about thirty, and to give each of them two deputies; the Kardars to receive, besides their Jagheers, not less than from 2,000 rupees to 5,000 rupees per annum; the pay of Thannadars, Kotwals, &c., to be similarly increased; and the powers of all to be defined. The Kardar must still be judge and magistrate, as well as collector, or we should be interfering with the first principle of a native Government; but I hope to render the office as unobnoxious as possible, by never allowing the Kardar to retain a rupee in his own hands, making him give receipts to the Zemindars, in their village-registers provided by the Durbar, and lodging, periodically, the collections in the Government Provincial treasure-chests, eleven of which have been established. As a judge and magistrate, the Kardar will listen to appeals from his deputies; and judicial appeals from both will again lie to the Chief Justice, or Nazim, of the Doab. The latter officer, however, will have no authority over the collection of revenue, or provincial treasure-chests. I have already removed seven Kardars, and imprisoned one. I propose, in gross cases, to fine and imprison, and even to confiscate Jagheers, where they are held, as is generally the case.

From five to six lakhs of rupees a year, will cover all the salaries I propose, including those for the Council. I have not yet talked over the items with the

chiefs, and they may be somewhat modified; but it strikes me that a scale, some what such as is in the margin,\* will answer. I may mention that, except to Kardars, I propose only to give half salaries, until the State is clear of its debts, which I now estimate at thirty-five lakhs; and thus it will take three years to clear off the amount.

I regret that, hitherto, I have been unable to give the returns of income and expenditure, with the precision I would wish. Dewan Deena Nath has not furnished me with full returns, but, at each of his visits, he has brought me some one item or other, according as, by his own account, he has been able to clear it up. From his *visà voce* communications, and from such other documents as I have been able to procure, I have the honor to submit a statement, giving an estimate of the present income, and of expenses; the latter falling short of the former by 5,24,735 rupees. In a month, or at most in two, I will forward revised and corrected statements; when I expect that the surplus revenue will be shown to be about 21,54,735 rupees. The gradual reduction of from 1,500 to 2,000 more irregular horsemen, and the diminution of the infantry, by discharging absentees, and not filling up the numbers, until they fall to 600 per regiment, will further improve the finances. In the Punjab, I do not think it advisable to have strong regiments, and indeed would prefer, as soon as possible, reducing corps to 600, even if it entails the necessity of raising two or three extra regiments of Ramgoles. For convenience' sake, I have had the four regiments of regular cavalry divided into five. The regular cavalry and irregular infantry are the working men for every day occasions.

I thus look for increase of revenue with some confidence, for though remissions must be made, in some quarters where the people have been screwed, yet there are other tracts that do not pay what may fairly be demanded from them, and such is the nature of the country that there is little fear of any extensive drought to interrupt the cultivation of the soil, or cause anything like a general failure of the crops. In several directions too, such as the Manjha and the Bar, or waste tracts of the Rechna and Jinhut Doabs, a little timely expense in canal digging, and opening out wells, will yield large returns. In the deserts alluded to, I understand that there are hundreds and thousands of old wells, filled up in former days of confusion, and that the soil is generally productive. I am taking measures for re-opening them, and have told Dewan Deena Nath to offer lands free for two years, to whomsoever will dig new wells, or open out old; I have also authorized him to make advances for these purposes.

The pay of the regulars is now pretty square, but still not so much as I could wish. The irregulars, it will be observed, are still a year in arrears, but the pay, now under distribution, will reduce this to eight months. Want of money is my excuse for these arrears. I found the treasury empty, and have, within the last six months, reduced establishments, and troops, to the amount of nearly thirty lakhs of rupees per annum, including not less than 7,000 regula-

* 7 Councillors	- - - - at	12,000	Rupees per annum	84,000
+ 1 Commander-in-chief	- - - -	8,000	"	8,000
+ 1 President of Council	- - - -	8,000	"	8,000
+ 1 Commandant of Irregular Cavalry	- - - -	8,000	"	8,000
+ 1 Killedar of Lahore	- - - -	8,000	"	8,000
+ 1 Chief Dewan of State	- - - -	8,000	"	8,000
1 Superintendent and Judge of Lahore	- - - -	12,000	"	12,000
1 Ditto of Rechna Doab	- - - -	12,000	"	12,000
1 Ditto of Jinhut Doab	- - - -	12,000	"	12,000
1 Ditto Sind Sagur Doab	- - - -	12,000	"	12,000
1 Ditto Dera Ismael Khan	- - - -	12,000	"	12,000
1 Ditto Peshawur	- - - -	18,000	"	18,000
1 Ditto Hazara	- - - -	18,000	"	18,000
1 Ditto Manjha	- - - -	18,000	"	18,000
8 Deputies ditto	- - - - each	6,000	"	48,000
30 Kardars, at average of each	- - - -	3,000	"	90,000
60 Naibs ditto	- - - -	1,000	"	60,000
Killedar of Govindgurh	- - - -		"	6,000
				4,60,000
Thannadars and Amla	- - - -		"	1,00,000
				Rupees 5,60,000

The five Chiefs marked thus + are Councillors. Sirdar Tej Sing is Commander-in-chief and President of the Council.

and irregular cavalry, who, on an average, were not less than fifteen months in arrears; and nearly twice as many infantry, including Ramgoles, to whom little less was due. All these have been paid up, and the accounts of the remainder have, for the first time, been faced by the Durbar, and brought into some shape.

As fast as money comes in, pay shall be issued, and the troops in Hazara, and Peshawur, shall be first considered, until all the regulars are only two months, and the irregulars three months, in arrears, which, with my will, they shall never exceed.

To bring the cavalry down to the standard of 12,000 men, there must, still, be about 2,700 reduced. The proportions proposed to be retained are 3,000 regular, 5,000 irregular, paid in cash, 4,000 Jagheerdaes, including contingents of chiefs. Of the number in excess of establishment, nearly half may, within the month, be struck off, from absentees without leave. Within two months, I hope to have the roll square, as the spring revenue instalments, now coming in, will supply funds to clear off their arrears. Deficiency of cash, as I said before, and entire want of public credit, have tied my hands, indeed, but for the loan of seven lakhs of rupees granted by our Government, I do not know what I could have done.

I beg that all the returns of establishments, and expenses, submitted with this letter, may be considered only as approximations to the truth, to be replaced by verified returns, which will be furnished with my next monthly report. Indeed, until I can obtain numerical long rolls, I shall not be satisfied of the entire accuracy of the returns. I have furnished the Durbar with forms for returns in every department, and may expect full details, in good time to enable me to submit them, in a complete state, on the 1st of August. I have already received the rolls of about half the army, in a book which will remain in my office, and enable me henceforward to check the dismissal, enlistment, and promotion of every individual.

I am anxious to make no innovation that is not absolutely necessary, and of which reasonable natives themselves cannot see the propriety. Simplification of accounts is among the first requisites. But, in endeavouring to obtain this, I was prepared for the indirect opposition of those who benefit by mystification. Provincial treasure-chests, and check-books in the hands of the Zemindars, ought to do much good. The former are established, and the latter have been given in the Manjha, and some neighbouring districts. The attention of Messrs. Cocks and Bowring is now being directed to giving them generally, east of the Jhelum. Major Lawrence, Captain Abbott, and Lieutenant Nicholson will see to the same, in their respective neighbourhoods. I have absolutely prohibited the Tunkwah system, or payment of troops, and other public servants, by assignments on Kardars. They were a perfect plague to the country; the means of pestering an honest Kardar, if such was to be found, and of enabling all others to play with, to accept, or to dishonor, Government bills, almost at will. Tunkwabs on village Zemindars had even a worse effect, enabling horsemen and footmen, and every attaché of Government, to live at the expense of the villagers, until such time as the amount of the order could be raised. On the other hand, contumacious Zemindars would not pay powerless Tunkwadars, and, in short, the system was one of continued extortion, or chicanery.

In like manner, the army accounts must be simplified. At present, the standard of pay is rendered, to a certain extent, nominal by various deductions, under one pretence or another, called Kussoorat, Kattyanu, &c. For instance, in the cavalry, so much per saddle is levied, and, in different deras, so much kussoorat per cent, varying from rupees  $\frac{2}{3}$  to rupees  $\frac{3}{4}$ . The custom originated, it is said, in the Goorchurras refusing to take a particular coinage, which was at a discount of one anna in the rupee; on which, Runjeet sent them to be paid in new nanuk-shahees from the treasury, but ordered a fine equal to the discount to be levied from each horseman. I have proposed that these standing items of deduction be, at once, struck out from the scale of pay, so that, in future, every man may know exactly what sum of hard cash he has to receive, and not be cheated by an imaginary balance which melts away at the pay table.

By the present system, the men are very much at the mercy of the paymasters, and, accordingly, during the days of anarchy, they revenged themselves by killing many of them. According to regulation, when a soldier is absent, in quarters, his pay is cut, and when so, on service, two days' pay for one of absence is deducted; absence across the Indus was punishable with dismissal. I have

suggested, for the consideration of the Durbar, the propriety of making one rule for all quarters; commanding officers to have authority to give three days' leave, commanding officers of stations fifteen days', at such times as ten men per company are not absent: general leave to be only granted, during the hot weather, and rains, by Durbar orders, or specially under the same authority: absentees for one day, without leave, to be, for the first offence, forgiven, for the second, to be fined two days' pay; for two days' absence to lose four days' pay; for from three to thirty days' absence to be, for the first offence, fined three times the amount of pay, for the second offence, to be discharged: absentees for any period above a month, to be struck off the roll. Some such rules as these will be an improvement on the present system. Deference to local prejudices alone restrains me from substituting extra duty for fines.

Hitherto, my endeavours have been fruitless to induce the Durbar to effect a settlement with certain chiefs and Kardars, against whom considerable balances lie; but I have now said that, if any more delay takes place, I will send an officer to superintend the investigation. So closely are defaulters fenced in by friends, or so safe do they consider themselves under our system, that I do not expect to realize more than twelve lakhs of arrears.

The commissariat officer informs me that the account of commissariat expenses for last year that was furnished, is incorrect, and he has not yet been able to provide a revised one, but it is daily expected. Estimating, however, the debt of the Durbar, for last year, at nine lakhs, the account will stand, at the end of the present year, leaving a balance of Rs 13,95,265, which, I fear, cannot be paid off under a year and a half, exclusive of the twenty-two lakhs' subsidy yearly.

The Governor-General may, however, confidently rely on my endeavouring to prevent a rupee being spent unnecessarily, until the liabilities of the State are cleared off. When the debt is paid up, I hope to be permitted to increase the sum allowed for wells, roads, canals, and surveys, from six lakhs per annum up to three-fourths of the clear surplus revenue, until tolerable roads are cut throughout the country, all old wells are re-opened, and one or two small canals are cut, and a geographical survey of the country is prepared. The boundary survey now in progress under Captain Abbott, will be a good base on which to rest this work. The engineers have already measured two base lines, and their boundary pillars can, hereafter, be connected with the trigonometrical survey. If the Governor-General will permit the two young engineer officers and sapper company, now on the boundary, to remain, or even the officers, with a dozen selected sappers, and grant me the services of the four officers and sergeants applied for in my letter, dated 2nd ultimo, all the works proposed may be, before the expiration of the present year, taken in hand. I propose to have fifteen or twenty natives taught to survey, and to put some of them under each officer. The survey of Hazara having been already authorized, the services of the present establishment will be required there, for at least a year. With permission, however, I will leave only one engineer officer in that quarter, and place some uncovenanted and native assistants under him. I have sent Lieutenant Young, with Mr. Agnew, to Gilgit, but requested that, at latest, they return by December next.

I do not ask that the British Government shall pay more than the establishment now employed on the boundary, but propose that all extra expenses be borne by the Durbar, and have included them in my estimate.

The Durbar is most unwilling to grant marching allowance to the troops, but I hope, in my next letter, to be able to report that the order has been issued. It has too long been the fashion to grant nothing except from external pressure. The chiefs have been so accustomed to the clamors of the troops that they cannot believe the latter can require anything, or have any claim, unless they mutiny about it, or, at least, are very noisy on the subject. The chiefs enjoy the power, now in their hands, of discharging, without fear of consequences, any officer or soldier whom it is necessary to be rid of, but they cannot understand the necessity of acting fairly by them, in regard to arrears of pay, &c. Even to this day, I am often molested with complaints regarding the one and two months' deductions made from Sikh soldiers on enlistment. The answer of the officials is, that it was the practice of Runjeet Sing, and that he never restored it; to which I reply, that the Maharajah never discharged hundreds, much less thousands of men, from no fault of theirs.

Major Lawrence has introduced the rule of giving leave of absence to one-fifth

of the Ramgoles at Peshawur. This, I think, is a very judicious measure. Though, under the wretched system which Major Lawrence found in force, the Ramgoles were more dangerous to the State than to an enemy, they are a very useful body of men, who, in Avitabili's time, did good service, and were in all respects more trusted by him than the Regulars. For years, the Ramgoles have done all the teasing duties of Peshawur, and reaped few of the advantages of the service. It is not surprising, therefore, that they have been in continual recusancy, and, whenever opportunity offered, have helped themselves by plunder.

In the instructions now given to Durbar officers going into the districts, I am glad to perceive that payment is strictly enjoined for fodder, and all provisions. The judicial officers are also ordered to punish, and prevent, infanticide. I hope, ere long, to see this crime, as also suttee, publicly prohibited. As yet, I have contented myself with sending copies of the Jyepore and Gwalior correspondence on these subjects, to the Durbar, with a few words referring to the crimes in question having been proved to be prohibited by the Shastres.

The hill and plain country is perfectly quiet: although this, the sowing time, is generally prolific of disturbances and feuds, I hear of none of any consequence, and believe that the land has enjoyed, during the last eighteen months, more peace than during any equal period of the last century.

The British troops are healthy and well behaved. Of 1,130 European soldiers, only 145 are on the sick list, being twelve per cent, and, of them, very few are bad cases.

Major MacGregor, the city magistrate, has been as conciliatory as he has been zealous. He makes an admirable magistrate. Indeed, I have to repeat my acknowledgment of the good service of all my assistants, who, one and all, have labored cordially, and zealously.

#### Inclosure 2 in No. 7.

*The Resident at Lahore to the Secretary with the Governor-General*

*Lahore, July 3, 1847.*

I FORWARD a Roobukaree of mine to the Durbar, and a letter, in reply to its contents, from the Maharanee.

The letter is a little ambiguous, most probably on purpose. The Persian language is peculiarly favorable to double meanings, and my impression is, that Her Highness meant to say very severe things, in a safe manner, to be, very politely, in a great rage. Her satirical cut at the Durbar has given great offence. The letter was not shown to the Sirdars, before it was sent to me, but I forwarded a copy for their information. I understand that she considers my having done so as a breach of confidence.

The sentence in the original which has been translated "So long as the Maharajah is sovereign of his own kingdom, it is the same as if I was sovereign myself," bears also the construction. "Until the Maharajah comes to the government of his own kingdom, you may say that I am the supreme authority;" and this is the meaning which struck me, and all my assistants, on first perusal; but, as the native Moonshes all understand it the other way, Lieutenant Edwardes has so translated it. If there is any difference in the presumption of the two readings, the received one is the most offensive, as embracing both the minority and majority of the Maharajah.

Having vented her indignation in the above letter, Her Highness has been very quiet since. She sent one of her slave-girls on a mission to Mooltan, and she returned the other day with a white "Ak" tree, called, in England, Swallow wort, which is said to be of great virtue in Hindoo incantations; but, as there is no harm in the Ranee gathering any herbs she has a fancy to, and the embassy of the slave-girl was kept a profound secret, until it oozed out in the Mooltan Ukbar, it is generally believed that the "Ak" tree is a mere invention to conceal the real object of Her Highness's correspondence with Dewan Moolraj.

Boota Sing, the Ranee's confidential Moonshes, is still in confinement, and the Sirdars are all of opinion that the interviews between him and Preyma are fully proved. A Khidmutgar about the Palace who came last week to tell me



that he had been witness to interviews between Boota Sing and the other conspirator, Lal Sing, Adawlutee, was, a few days afterwards, confined under pretence of debt.

Whether the Preyma plot will ever resolve itself into an intelligible form is doubtful, but, whatever it is, I have little doubt that the Ranee was the instigator, and that not a single Sirdar was concerned. An abstract of the depositions taken in the matter, is being made, and will be submitted for the information of the Governor-General.

Roobukaree sent by the Resident at Lahore, to the Lahore Durbar, for their perusal, and the information of the Ranee.

*June 9, 1847.*

By the Articles of Agreement, concluded on the 16th of December 1846, between the Lahore and British Governments, Her Highness, the Maharanee, mother of Maharajah Duleep Sing, has no share whatever in the Government of this kingdom. A lakh and a half of rupees per annum are assigned to her that she may pass her days in honorable retirement.

But I hear that Her Highness is in the habit of holding levees of fifteen or twenty Sirdars at a time, and also of giving private interviews to individual Sirdars and officials. For the last month, too, I have been told that Her Highness admits daily, within the private apartments of the palace, fifty Brahmins, and herself feeds them, and washes their feet.

On one occasion also, Her Highness was reported to have sent 100 Brahmins to Punnundul.

Entertaining, as I do, a sincere wish to maintain the dignity and honor of the family of the late Maharajah Runjeet Sing, and to establish good government in every department, high and low, it is right that I should, in time, and with all due respect and delicacy, point out to Her Highness wherein her present and future interests really consist.

I now, therefore, write to say that the conduct of Her Highness, in the above respects, is quite without precedent, and altogether unnecessary, and out of place. It is, moreover, a breach of female decorum and royal etiquette.

The regard I have for Her Highness's honor and reputation, obliges me, therefore, to beg that she will, in future, regulate her private life in strict conformity with the treaty already alluded to, permitting no one, whatever his rank may be, to have access to her, but her own servants and confidential followers.

If the Maharanee wishes to give alms to the poor, and to feed religious men, let her do so on the first of each month, or any of those days which, by the laws of the Shastries, are peculiarly sacred to charity, in short, let her follow the example of Maharajah Runjeet Sing.

And with respect to visits of ceremony, or polite inquiry, from the Sirdars, it seems to me much more decorous that five or six should call together, once a month, and that, even then, Her Highness should sit behind the screen, as do the Princesses of other Courts, such as Jodhpore, Jyepore, and Nepal.

If Her Highness will condescend to accept this advice, and cease to admit strangers within the private apartments of the Palace, it will save considerable trouble, both now, and for the future, to the ministers, Sirdars, and officers of the State.

#### The Maharanee of Lahore to the Resident at that Court

I have read the memorandum in which you so kindly touch on certain matters, and thoroughly considered its contents.

You say that I have no share whatever in the Government. Remembering the ancient friendship that existed between the two Governments, I invited a British force and British officers to stay at Lahore, solely for the sake of punishing the faithless servants of the State, defending the Maharajah and myself, and protecting the people; and now you set me on one side, and consult my servants only, in conducting the affairs of the kingdom.

So long as the Maharajah is sovereign of his own kingdom, it is the same as if I was sovereign myself. But if the new treaty has devised some better plan for securing the State's welfare, why, I am content.

With respect to what you write about the allowance which has been made me of a lakh and a half of rupees per annum; the subject is not worth alluding to. Somehow or other, people manage to live under any circumstances, what matters how they do it?

For the rest, whatever arrangements you make for governing the country during the Maharajah's minority, will, doubtless, be solely for his advantage and security.

As for the levees of Sirdars which I am said to hold, and the private interviews which I give, the facts are as follows:—I have, on two occasions, sent for the Sirdars to advise with them on matters of importance, namely, once, on my return from Umritsur, to declare my opinion that Preyma's visit to Lahore could be for no good and again, to arrange about the Maharajah's privy purse.

Sudar Tej Sing and Dewan Deena Nath do, certainly, have occasional audiences on matters of business.

For the future, since you desire it, I will send for five or six Sirdars, when I have anything to say.

Concerning my own confidential servants only being allowed to have access to me, I mentioned to you, the day when you called on me, four or five persons who waited on me, and with whose attendance I could not dispense. To this day, besides the persons in question, no one is admitted.

Again, with respect to the fifty Brahmins whom you say I feed, and whose feet I wash every day; it is a triennial custom enjoined in the Shastres which I always rigidly observe, and, this happening to be the month, I was engaged as usual, but, from the day when your wishes were conveyed to me, I have discontinued it, and, in future, shall confine my works of charity to those seasons which you particularize.

The mission of the Brahmins to Purmundul, which you mention, happened as follows.—Brahmins are constantly being assembled to pray for the health and safety of the Maharajah, and, on the occasion in question, it was with the sanction and knowledge of the chief Sirdars. The Brahmins chose Purmundul Jee for the purpose, because it is a sacred place.

Referring to that part of your memorandum wherein you express your anxious regard for the honor of Maharajah Runjeet Sing's family, the good government of the kingdom, and the shielding of my honor and reputation, I am much obliged to the British Government for taking such care of my fair fame. But you institute a comparison between me and the Princesses of Jodhpore, Jyepore, and Nepal. It is easy for them to keep themselves aloof behind their purdahs, since there are in those States wise and faithful ministers, who watch over the interests of those to whom they owe allegiance. Here, you need not to be told what sort of ministers there are. Rely on one thing, however, that I have never been in the habit of admitting strangers to my private apartments; and never mean to. But as you have so kindly taken upon yourself the guardianship of my honor, let me beg of you to appoint some Sirdar of tried fidelity (not one of the Council), whose business it may be to see to these things, and report to you.

It is a subject of deep congratulation to me that both the Maharajah and myself are now reaping the benefits of the friendship which Maharajah Runjeet Sing sowed with the Company.

Continue, if you please, to give me your advice.

Inclosure 3 in No. 7.

*The Secretary with the Governor-General to the Resident at Lahore*

*Simla, July 21, 1847.*

THE rule introduced by Major Lawrence of giving leave of absence to one-fifth of the Ramgoles at Peshawur, is approved by the Governor-General.

Of the balance of the debt due by Maharajah Golab Sing, the Governor-General will leave you to exercise your own discretion as to whether it should be paid at once, or six months hence, reporting the decision for the information of his Lordship.

The Governor-General desires me to express his satisfaction at the praise bestowed by you on the services rendered by your assistant, Major MacGregor,

in his magisterial capacity, and also to convey to you his Lordship's acknowledgments for your useful and comprehensive report

The plan which you intend to adopt for the grant of future sunnuds to Jagheerdars, viz, that the title of no Jagheer shall be considered valid, during British occupation of the Punjab, without the counter-signature of the Resident, his Lordship considers to be a good one, and he hopes to learn that it has been soon carried into execution.

It may be suggested to the Durbar, when it carries out its intention of calling in the various coins now in circulation in the Punjab, that the value of the new coin to be substituted instead, be made precisely the same as the Company's rupee

With reference to Pundit Kunhya Lal's Cashmere diary, in which the seizure of ponies for travellers, and the constant presentation of nuzzurs, are represented, the Governor-General desires me to remark that it would be impolitic, if this practice be continued, to permit strangers to visit those parts. If travellers are permitted to cross the frontier, they should be instructed, civilly to decline nuzzurs

#### Inclosure 4 in No 7.

*The Secretary with the Governor-General to the Resident at Lahore.*

*Simla, July 26, 1847.*

INSTRUCTIONS have this day been issued to Mr John Lawrence, directing him to take temporary charge of the Lahore Residency, whenever you may make known to him your intention of leaving that station for the benefit of your health

Mr Lawrence will continue to conduct his duties as Commissioner in the Trans-Sutlej States, till further orders.

#### No. 8.

*The Governor-General to the Secret Committee*

*Simla, August 14, 1847. (No 54.)*

THE reports from the Resident at Lahore are, as usual, satisfactory. The measures urged by Lieutenant-Colonel Lawrence, and assented to by the Durbar, for the improvement of the army, are calculated to promote its discipline, and secure its obedience

The marching batta of one rupee a month will enable the military authorities gradually to abolish the begaree system of forcing the inhabitants to carry the personal baggage of the Sikh soldiery, on which occasions, exclusive of the loss of time, they are subjected to much ill treatment.

I have also the gratification to send to you a proclamation issued by the Lahore Durbar, prohibiting the practice of suttee, infanticide, and child-stealing. I have desired the Resident to convey to the Durbar my cordial approbation of a measure so well calculated to promote the best interests of humanity, and to elevate the character of the Maharajah's Council, not only in the estimation of the Government of India, but of all civilised States, and I shall cause this proclamation to be published in the "Calcutta Gazette," forwarding to every native State, a Persian letter, recording in terms of high praise the approbation of the Government of India

#### Inclosure 1 in No. 8.

*Major Lawrence to the Resident at Lahore.*

*Peshawur, July 20, 1847.*

I HAVE been under the necessity of removing, from the command of the 2nd Regiment, ex-Colonel Ram Doss; you will find him mentioned as contractor of the Khuttuck district, against whom two hundred complaints had been lodged,

and settled by payment of 6,000 rupees. From the first, I doubted his fitness for the command, still, as by the new arrangements he was reduced from colonel to commandant, and I knew I could keep him under my own eye, I deemed it but just to give him a trial; but when, having recently convicted him of some disreputable transactions, it was reported to me that he had been heard talking to his orderlies "of the state the Sikhs had come to, when they allowed two Feringhees to rule them," I thought it high time to take measures against him, and therefore requested the General to place him in confinement (arrest is unknown among the troops), pending the orders of the Durbār.

Finding I could get little work out of the cazee, and proving that many of his decisions were unjust, and contrary to law, after repeated warnings, I removed him, and appointed Fuzla Ahmed, one of the sons of the late Cazee Mahomed Hussun Khane, moollah of the late Timour Shah and Shah Shoojah-ool-moolk, he had acted as cazee for six months at Cabool, and had given satisfaction to the people.

I believe I have entirely stopped the practice of torture and mutilation, and hope soon to suppress the traffic in women and guls, hitherto carried on to a great extent: I have seized several men engaged in kidnapping these unfortunates from a distance, and bringing them in, for sale to brothel-keepers and others; and, by severely punishing them with fine and imprisonment, I doubt not they will find it their interest to give up this nefarious trade already, have ten females been thus rescued from a life of infamy.

I held the jeerga, or council, of Eusufzye Khans, adverted to in my dispatch of the 18th ultimo, at which many promises were made, but I doubt if with much intention of fulfilling them, they have all, however, returned to their homes, and, as yet, I have heard of no affrays among them.

Of these, I am happy to say there has only been one within the last month, and that at the notorious village of Mushoo Khail, in which six men were wounded, but I seized all the parties, and they have been sentenced to various terms of imprisonment, with fines, while my papers show the singular fact of the late freebooter, Dewan Khan, chepawed in April, by Lieutenant Lumsden, sending in twenty head of cattle, which he had recovered from robbers' and the no less extraordinary incident of two rival parties in a village soliciting me to deprive them of their arms, to prevent the possibility of their again subjecting themselves to the rigor of the law, two of their number having been executed last month. The country is wonderfully quiet; many Zemindars and Ryots, who had fled from the oppression of years, have returned, and others are daily returning. One old lady has written to me from Kooner that, in consequence of what she hears, she intends returning to lay her bones with her ancestors at Chump Kumry, the village of the infamous Kumroodeen Khan.

#### Inclosure 2 in No. 8

*The Resident at Lahore to the Secretary with the Governor-General.*

*Lahore, August 2, 1847*

I HAVE the satisfaction to report that the Durbar has consented, though not very willingly, to allow one rupee a month batta to each infantry soldier, while marching, and while in camp, and proportionally to all other ranks of the regular army, east of the Attock; this not to be given beyond that river, the one-and-half rupees per month, already allowed, covering the marching batta. It is very much the fashion of this Durbar to keep their troops unnecessarily exposed, for months and years, in camp: I, therefore, very much against their will, added the clause "and while in camp," to the marching order edict; the fact being that a standing camp in the hot weather is very much more disagreeable than marching in the cold season. Having effected this preliminary measure, I induced the Durbar to issue a proclamation against the seizure of begarees, and for the payment of cattle, carriages, and carriers. I am, now, having an officer brought as a prisoner from Hazara, and another fined there, for not paying for fodder on their way up; and I observe that, in all the recent instructions given by the order of the Durbar, and by the subordinates, it is strictly enjoined that everything is to be paid for. Time alone will eradicate an oppression of centuries; but I hope, by constant attention to the subject, that much mischief may be prevented.

I call upon the Durbar, in one way or other, at least six times a week, for the several required returns. It, certainly, seems to us that Dewan Deena Nath, and the Dufferees, are surrendering with a very bad grace their stores of information; but much allowance is due for men who have been accustomed to carry on business for years and years, without ever being required to furnish a plain statement, or a clear account. For many years, Runjeet Sing kept no accounts at all, and men now alive tell tales of his conquering a hundred villages one day, and giving them away *vidâ voce* the next, keeping neither a record of the fact, nor granting a sunnud for the gift. In the same way, he trusted to his memory for remembering complicated accounts of expenditure (generally in grain and kind) to his troops, and, for many years, periodically allowed the rough memoranda of those who were responsible to himself to be destroyed. The founders of his several Duffurs are still in office, and, brought up under such a system, may well be expected to be perplexed by demands that call for an application to business, a division of labor, and minute superintendence in all branches, that they never before dreamt of.

I have informed Maharajah Golab Sing that his Lordship has allowed him four months more to pay up his balance, and I have enjoined him to take advantage of the respite to pay up his troops.

I feel thankful for the Governor-General's commendations to my assistants, Majors MacGiegor and Lawrence, and Lieutenants Edwards, Lumsden, and Taylor, for I believe that never was any man more efficiently and zealously assisted than I am. And, in offering this testimony to the merits of my assistants, I am happy to have no exception to make, from first to last, they work prudently and honestly, and, though I have not had the same occasion to mention Messrs Cocks, Bowring, and Melvill, or Lieutenant Nicholson, I beg to state that the conduct of each individual has done full justice to the Governor-General's nomination. Messrs Cocks and Bowring are busily employed in revenue, judicial, and miscellaneous duties here. Mr Melvill has been picking up useful information, without giving possible cause of offence, in Cashmere, and will now assist Lieutenant Taylor in his most important duties there till September. Lieutenant Nicholson is in his element on the troubled border of Hazara, where his soldierly bearing will be most useful to the Hazara officials.

Captain Abbott is, as usual, zealously employed in his various duties.

Captain Abbott is an excellent officer, but, as he honestly allows, is too apt sometimes to take gloomy views of questions. I think that he has unwittingly done Dewan Jowala Sahae injustice, and all I have heard of that Dewan from Mr Agnew and Captain Abbott, does not alter my opinion of him. I only know one better native. According to the light he has enjoyed, the times he has lived in, and the school in which he has been brought up, he is a respectable, as he is, assuredly, an able, man.

Lieutenant Taylor is, I think, doing much good, with as little offence as possible to the Maharajah, who, however, must feel his dignity touched by the presence of a British authority in the capital of Cashmere. But he has fairly brought the penalty on himself, for I have always tried to impress on him two things: first, that we did not wish to interfere with him, secondly, that we must insist on the terms of the treaty, and look to the protection and rights of the people twice made over to his rule. Over and over, I have told the Maharajah, and his agents, that the last thing I desired was to meddle in any way with his matters, as I know it is injurious to his credit. Before I left Cashmere last October, I gave him plain rules how to remain independent, and it has only been, step by step, as the cry grew louder of his not having fulfilled the terms of his agreement, that I have raised my voice, and directly interfered, but, even now, I tell my assistants to discourage applications to them, and, as much as possible, to act through the Maharajah, and to pay him all proper respect.

Major Lawrence is not relaxing his exertions at Peshawur. It must be strange indeed in that quarter, hitherto the most neglected portion of the empire, for the soldiers to find themselves, on the 20th of July, paid up, without deductions, to the 9th of June. Heretofore, the payment of the troops has been a service of danger; now it is a means of obtaining popularity. No exertion shall be spared in clearing off the arrears of the Goorchurras, but even they are, already, twice as well off, in regard to regularity of pay, as in the time of Runjeet Sing.

I consider Major Lawrence's suggestions regarding drill, standards, guards, &c., so practically useful, that I have addressed the Durbar, leaving it to them to

select one system of drill, whether English or French, also to choose a national flag, and to issue some general orders regarding guards and orderlies, taking care that the troops are neither unnecessarily harassed, nor allowed too much indulgence.

Colonel Ram Doss, of the Ramgoles, who used traitorous language to his orderlies at Peshawur, has been ordered in to Lahore, and shall be, not only dismissed the service, but imprisoned. The artillery colonel who made the false muster has also been sent for, and will be punished, and probably not again employed. Examples are necessary; though, in all cases where there are extenuating circumstances, or there is hope of amendment, I will gladly give due weight to the argument of the great change that has so suddenly been effected, and of the difficulty that men have to adapt themselves to it.

General Cortlandt, who has been appointed to the charge of the strip of territory beyond the Indus, between Peshawur and Dera Ghazee Khan, is already known to the Governor-General, but I can assure his Lordship that he shines much more as a Lahore officer than a British agent. He gave great satisfaction to Lieutenant Edwardes in Bunnoo, and I have been well satisfied with what I have generally heard and seen of him, during the last few months. For the new country of Bunnoo, and the hitherto oppressed tract beyond the Indus, it is an object to get a Superintendent over whom we have as great a hold as possible. Twelve thousand rupees a-year more than doubles General Cortlandt's pay, though, listening to newspaper reports, he believed that he was about to be removed from the service altogether. I have told him that, as long as there are no complaints against him, and he gives satisfaction to the Durbar, and to the people, he may remain in his present office, until he is promoted to a better one, but that I will not spare him, if he gives reasonable ground to suspect that he is corrupt, or negligent. Lieutenant Edwardes will again proceed, in October, to Bunnoo, and remain in that quarter for some months.

I have much pleasure in herewith inclosing a copy of a proclamation that has been issued by the Durbar against infanticide, suttee, and child stealing. In the first instance, on my sending copies of the Jyepore and Gwahar papers, and reprobating the inhuman practices referred to, orders were sent to the several Nazims, forbidding the crimes. On which, I suggested the issue of such a proclamation as is now enclosed, remarking that, if published in the Punjab, it would probably be re-published under the Governor-General's orders, and the Durbar would, thereby, obtain a good name over India, and even as far as London. No time has been lost in issuing the proclamation, and sending me a copy. I will take care that it is carried out. The practice of suttee is not common in the Punjab, but infanticide is very much practised, and will be difficult to eradicate. Child-stealing for purposes of prostitution,—a perhaps more atrocious crime than suttee or infanticide,—is even more common than either, but happily it is more easily dealt with. Major Lawrence's letter,<sup>6</sup> herewith inclosed, shews that, already, he has been very successful in this good cause. Within the last few days, I was obliged to bring to the notice of the Durbar, the fact of a wife of Sirdar Sooltan Mahomed Khan, Barukzye, selling a slave-girl to a bawd.

I request attention to the fact of a lately rebel village-chief having voluntarily sent twenty head of cattle recovered by him from robbers, and of the other signs of improved security, shown in Major Lawrence's dispatch. The Manjha, and country around Lahore and Umritsur, continue most tranquil, and I hope that the roads are becoming more safe. They are, at least, well patrolled, and more than a hundred robbers have been seized.

The neighbourhood of Hazara still causes anxiety. The Gundgurreeas have lately come down, and committed several murders, and, in reply to Captain Abbott and Lieutenant Nicholson's demand for the surrender of the murderers, the leading Gundgurreeas have pretty plainly declared, that their evil practices will be continued, until their jagheers are increased. The reason that their claims were not sooner adjusted, was because I could not reconcile the statements they furnished through Mr Agnew with those of the Durbar: the chiefs were, however, fully assured of every consideration, but it was on the distinct condition of good conduct, for, at an early day, Mr. Agnew referred to something like a threat on

their part, on which I replied that I would not hold communication with them at all, if they talked foolishly, and that, as I could assure them of fair treatment and kindness for good conduct, they might equally rely on the severest measures being taken against them, if they persisted in plunder and murder. Captain Abbott, Lieutenant Lumsden, and Lieutenant Nicholson consider their coercion as absolutely necessary, and the Durbar is very indignant at their conduct, and occasionally I hear insinuated that the Saheb-log are so soft that, now, every man will make a disturbance as the means of obtaining a jagheer.

I have moved up the two regiments from Jhelum, one to Rawul Pindee, and the other to Hussan Abdal, and have told Captain Abbott that he may make his demands, as soon as he considers he has full means of enforcing obedience; and if the Gundgurrecas' chiefs, within a reasonable time, fail to obey his orders, he may attack them. I have, however, endeavoured to impress on him, and the other officers, the necessity of avoiding the possibility of a check, and the desirableness of concluding all such matters by a single blow. There will now be eight regiments of infantry, two of cavalry, besides 1,000 Irregular Horse, and four batteries, in Hazara and its neighbourhood. I have said that I would prefer, if possible, delaying operations until October, but that the country must be protected against plunderers. A severe example of one tribe, such as the Gundgurrecas, will do more to preserve peace, than removing every tax and impost from the Hazara people. Their next demand would be for payment for not plundering the road to Peshawur. Harsh as the doctrine may seem, severity, as much as justice, is required with such a people.

The city and neighbourhood of Lahore is as quiet as any in Asia. There are, as usual, some absurd stories abroad, evidently spread by designing individuals, some of whom I hope to catch. That several of the principal chiefs are to be seized, as soon as Mr John Lawrence arrives, is one of the present stories; another is that, eight days hence, the European soldiers are to be let loose on the women of the city. Scarcely a week passes but we have reports of fictions like these—many repeat them from sheer idleness, some from mischief; but the misfortune is, that there is no report too absurd to be believed by natives, especially in a new country, where our laws and customs are unknown.

On the whole, the Durbar, and the chiefs, give me as much support as I can reasonably expect. There has been a quiet struggle for mastery, but as, although I am polite to all, I allow nothing that appears to me wrong to pass unnoticed, the members of the Council are gradually falling into the proper train, and refer most questions to me, and, in words at least, allow, more fully even than I wish, that they are only executive officers, to do as they are bid. I have proposed to the Maharajah to raise Sirdar Tej Sing to the rank of Raja, and at the same time to give the other members of the Council, as also six or eight other chiefs and officials, Persian titles of honour,—the ceremonies are to be performed in a few days.

Sirdar Shumshere Sing, Sindanwalla, has been absent on leave, since his return from Bunnoo. I am desirous of his voice being more frequently heard in Council. Bhace Nidhan Sing continues a silent member of the Board; and Fakeer Nooroodeen says little to any one but myself and assistants. I am happy to say that Sirdar Lehna Sing has, at length, consented to join the Council. On his arrival, I proposed it to him, but he excused himself, declaring, however, that he would always be glad to give me his opinion in private on any subject, and such I have found to be his practice. He is free enough in conversation with me, but, at Durbar, he seldom speaks out. For a long time, he evidently contemplated, if possible, returning to Benares, but I laughed at the idea, whenever his Vakeel referred to it, remarking that there was no objection, but, if the Sirdar turned Fakeer, of course he would not require his jagheer in the Lahore territory. Latterly, I have heard nothing in the matter, and I am inclined to believe that the Sirdar considers that affairs are in a tolerably settled state, and that he may safely trust himself to remain. He has exerted himself in the apprehension of murderers, dacoits, and robbers in the Manjha, but has strong objections to capital punishment. The very fact of his joining us will, moreover, show the country that the most far-seeing and timid of the Sirdars is, for the first time since Runjeet Sing's death, willing to take an active part in the administration. I request that his nomination may be gazetted.

Sirdar Shere Sing, Attareewala, is now well satisfied. He was not unnaturally annoyed at his family being bowed out of Peshawur, the most fruitful field for

plunder under the Durbar, and he was, for a long time, anxious as to the result of the numerous complaints against him and his brothers, but I have come to an understanding with him that has apparently quite relieved his mind. The demands against him amounted to about 50,000 rupees; but, considering that the greatest part had been re-extorted from other Durbar servants, who, in days when every man plundered, had doubtless extracted it from the clients at their mercy, I have thrown them out altogether, and compounded with the Sirdar to pay 8,000 rupees to poor people from whom unusual exactions did appear to have been made. Shere Sing has gladly paid down the money, which has been remitted to Peshawur, and Major Lawrence has been instructed to divide it among those who have been most oppressed, but to listen to no new complaints against the Attarce family.

Shere Sing's father, Sirdar Chuttur Sing, being now Governor of Hazara, and one of the younger sons being provided for there, and the other at Lahore, the family has, now, good reason to be satisfied, and I think is so. Sirdar Shere Sing's frank and bold manner is strangely contrasted with the demeanour of that of almost every other chief in the Durbar.

I am very much troubled by family contentions between brother chiefs, almost every family has its feud, and the matter of a well, or a house, affects individuals with a more lively anxiety than the most important affairs of the State. No decision, moreover, will silence both parties in any such disputes, for they have practice and precedent both ways to plead in almost every possible case, and no established law in any. No chief could come without prejudices, one way or other, to the preparation of a code of laws of descent and inheritance. I have, therefore, caused fifty of the elders of the principal Jaut Sikh villages in the Manjha to be summoned to Lahore for the purpose of forming themselves into a commission to lay down rules of inheritance, marriage contracts, &c. The code will then be brought up to the Durbar to be made law, and the chiefs will have a sufficient opportunity of collectively discussing its spirit, and recording their approval, or dissent.

The new customs' rules are under preparation. I propose to place all the customs of the Punjab under the old customs' collector, Mistr Rulla Ram, a man who has served the Durbar forty years.

The woman Mungla has returned from Benares, and is stung herself to recover her jagheers. At her bidding, the Rancee lately summoned Sirdar Tej Sing and Dewan Deena Nath, but they declined visiting Her Highness, without being accompanied by their colleagues. The result was that all went, but that, then, the Maharanee took the two former apart, and urged them to press me for a jagheer for Mungla. As Her Highness will thus interfere, I see no reason why she should have any communication at all with the Sirdars more than any of the other Rancees, when she has anything to say she might send to me. Mungla is as bad as herself, and I should have been glad if she had stayed at Benares.

The Maharanee's brother, Sirdar Heera Sing, has been at Lahore during the last week. He is conducting himself pretty well, and took the reduction of his jagheer very much more rationally than I expected. I proposed to the Council to take from him about three-fourths, being nearly all that Raja Lal Sing had given him last year, but they pleaded for leaving him about half, to which I assented. He is a foolish, dissipated young man, but is evidently on his good behaviour. He talked to me reasonably enough, when I told him that, though I had taken away half his jagheers, I was more his friend than Lal Sing who gave them to him. At the request of the Council, I have proposed that Sirdar Heera Sing receive the title of Bahadoor at the approaching installation of the chiefs.

I have been informed that Khan Zeman, one of the principal chiefs of the Gundgurees, has come in to Captain Abbott, and that Futeh Khan Gheba, a notorious character, who has been off and on for years in rebellion, has surrendered to Lieutenant Nicholson.



## Inclosure 3 in No. 8.

*The Secretary with the Governor-General to the Resident at Lahore**Simla, August 14, 1847.*

THE constitution and discipline of the Sikh regular army has always engaged the Governor-General's most anxious attention, and his Lordship thinks that, in the framing of Articles of War, if it be politic to have any, for some time to come, a few simple rules, like those of our irregular cavalry, would be sufficient for all purposes at present, but, on this subject, the Governor-General will hold personal communication with you, on your arrival at head-quarters. It would, perhaps, be expedient to abolish the French system of drill, and if the Durbar could be persuaded to adopt the English tactics and discipline, so much the better, but his Lordship does not desire to press this matter on the Durbar.

The Governor-General will cause the publication in the Official Gazette of this Presidency, of the Proclamation issued by the Lahore Durbar, relative to the abolition of suttee, infanticide, and child-stealing. His Lordship requests that you will, immediately, convey to the Durbar his cordial approbation of a measure so conducive to the best interests of humanity, and so well calculated to raise the character of the Maharajah's Council, not only in the estimation of the Government of India, but of all civilised nations.

The accession of Sirdar Lehna Sing to the Council will also be notified.

## No 9

*The Governor-General to the Secret Committee**September 5, 1847 (No 62)*

I TRANSMIT various letters, and documents, which have passed between me and the Resident at Lahore, relating to the removal of the Maharanee from the palace.

Since Her Highness's loss of power, in December, 1846, the most hostile spirit of enmity has been evinced by the Ranees against the members of the Durbar, and there can be no doubt, on the recent occasion, when honorary distinctions, and rewards, were bestowed on the chiefs connected with the Government, on the Resident's advice, that Her Highness did tutor the young Prince to pass a public affront on Raja Tej Sing, and the other members of the Durbar, in order to gratify her vindictive spirit.

I do not consider that Her Highness ought to be held responsible for the acts of interference of her confidential secretary, in communicating with Pirmas, the chief conspirator in the plot to kill Tej Sing. The evidence is inconclusive, and I have rejected it.

On political grounds, a strong case of necessity exists for removing Her Highness from Lahore, and of separating her from the Prince. Her Highness's whole conduct shows her determination to thwart the Government, and to train up her son as the instrument of her hatred against the Durbar, and to instil into his mind sentiments of aversion to the Resident, and to the chiefs who are engaged in administering the affairs of the Punjab. Her Highness has taken pains, by collecting Fakeers, and discontented persons, around her, to let it be publicly known that she disapproves of the present system of Government, and desires to be regarded as the rallying point for all those who are dissatisfied with the new order of things. But, if Her Highness's political conduct, instead of being a determined course of hostility to the Government, had been one of a friendly character, the necessity of separating her from her son, must, shortly, have been a duty imposed upon the Governor-General, on moral considerations.

The Ranees's personal conduct, since her separation from her paramour, Raja Lal Sing, in December, 1846, has been marked by the same habitual indulgence in low debauchery as that which has been so frequently recorded in the official papers dated in 1845, and which have been laid before Parliament.

It became, therefore, the duty of the Governor-General, in his capacity of guardian to the young Prince during his minority, to allow him no longer to remain in the zenana, and to remove him from the danger of the debasing influence of such a mother. The occurrence in Durbar, on the 7th of August, may have accelerated the period, but the boy, now eight years of age, as he grew older, must, in a short time, have been separated from his mother.

The whole of the circumstances connected with this separation are contained in the papers now transmitted to you.

You will not fail to observe, that, upon the question of exiling the Ranee from the Punjab, the Durbar were unwilling, as I had anticipated, to assent to the Ranee's removal into the British territories. At the same time, they entirely acquiesced in the propriety of Her Highness being sent to the country palace at Sheikhoopoor, about twenty-five miles from Lahore. The Resident concurred in this proposal, and I have entirely approved of all his proceedings.

I have desired that, in all public acts relating to Her Highness's separation from her son, the measure taken may be proclaimed to have been ordered by my authority, exercised for the benefit of the Prince and the State, under the unlimited powers which the Governor-General possesses by the Treaty of Bhayrowal.

My sentiments on all these points are fully conveyed in my instructions to the Resident, dated the\* 16th and 28th of August.

In all probability, it may, eventually, be necessary to remove Her Highness out of the Punjab, but, on the present occasion, bearing in mind the reluctance of the Durbar to adopt such a course, I am satisfied that the more moderate line was to be preferred, and that the Resident has acted judiciously in giving it his concurrence.

#### Inclosure 1 in No. 9.

*The Resident at Lahore to the Secretary with the Governor-General*

*Lahore, August 7, 1847.*

THIS morning, at a full Durbar, at which many of the officers of the garrison, and all the chiefs and officials of the Lahore State attended, Sirdar Tej Sing received the title of Raja of Sealkote, and the fourteen chiefs and ministerial officers, whose names are given in the margin†, severally received Persian titles of honour. To eleven of these, distinctions were given, for good service during the past six months, and to all, for good conduct during the British occupation of Lahore. Sirdar Heera Sing was included in the list, at the request of the Maharajah, and I consented, on the grounds of his late improved conduct, and of his being the Maharajah's uncle. Sirdar Umeer Sing, Majeetha, is a respectable old chief, against whom nobody has any thing to say, although he has the ill fortune to have four sons, who were all, more or less, concerned in the disturbances of the last few years. Sirdar Urjan Sing Runganughia is of one of the oldest Sikh families, and was forward in the Cashmere expedition. Misr Rulla Ram is Kaidar of the large district of Jhung, separated last year from Mooltan, of which it formed nearly a third. The old man was, for forty years, at the head of the customs' establishment of the Punjab, and, in concert with his son, Misr Sahib Dyal, is now engaged in remodelling the system of imposts, so that, instead of every description of article paying duty, not above six or eight shall do so. I have already recorded Misr Rulla Ram as, by reputation, one of the best men in the Punjab. His son also bears a good character, and is even more intelligent. Sirdar Chuttur Sing, the father of Sirdar Shere Sing, is Governor of Hazara. All those who received honors, except Chuttur Sing, were present in Durbar.

\* Inclosures 7 and 10 of No. 9.

† Raja Tej Sing, Sirdar Shere Sing Attareewala, Lehna Sing Majeetha, Shum Shere Sing Sindanwala, Chuttur Sing Attareewala, Utter Sing Kalewala, Heera Sing, Umeer Sing Majeetha, Urjan Sing Runganughia, Mahtah Sing Majeetha, Bhace Nidhan Sing, Fakeer Noorodeen, Dewau Deena Nath, Misr Rulla Ram, Race Kishen Chund.

Having, during the last few months, to carry many measures, not altogether agreeable to the chiefs, and having, latterly, been obliged to press them to much more exertion in the war of business than they had ever been accustomed to; these honors, and the declaration that every official shall, according to his position, and exertions, receive a fair salary, have given great, and almost universal, satisfaction. Herefore, on all changes of ministry, many were glad to save their lives, at the expense of their jagheers and offices. Since December last, no man not even Raja Lal Sing's brothers, has lost anything on account of his connexion with the fallen minister, but we have gone strictly upon rule, respecting old jagheers, and old families, and equally mulcting all who had risen unconstitutionally to power, and wealth, during the late disturbances, whether friends, or enemies, of Raja Lal Sing.

The forms of court etiquette have been all duly observed. Having made up my mind as to the propriety of the step, I, last week, addressed the Maharajah on the subject, advised the promotions and honors, and requested that an auspicious day might be fixed for the installation. Monday, the 2nd, (two days after the receipt of my letter) was selected by the Court Astrologer, but I suggested more delay, to give time for deliberation and preparation, on which, 17 minutes past eight o'clock, A.M. of this day was declared to be the precise moment of good fortune. In the evening, there are to be fireworks and illumination in the throne court of the palace.

The ceremonies were performed in the great hall of the Tuklitgab, or Place of the Throne of the Delhi Kings, which was beautifully fitted up for the occasion. All went off well, except for a momentary check, occasioned by the decided refusal of the Maharajah, to make the saffron "*teeka*," or mark of Rajaship, on Sudar Tej Sing's forehead. At first, I thought it might be bashfulness, or a dislike to wet his fingers with the saffron paste, but when I pressed the point in vain and, on Sudar Shere Sing's leaning forward, and begging the Maharajah to comply, His Highness folded his arms, and shrunk back into his velvet chair, with a determination foreign to both his age and gentle disposition. The truth at once flashed across my mind, and I called upon Bhacee Nidhan Sing, the head of the Sikh religion, and member of the Council, to officiate, which he did, with a prompt alacrity, which prevented the *contempt* from being observed by any but a very few of the principal chiefs around the Maharajah. The circumstance however, is just of that nature to be deemed important by natives, and, doubtless, it will soon be widely spread, and discussed, throughout the country. Priests as often officiate in these portions of Hindoo ceremonies as the secular head of the State, and, had the chiefs at first arranged that Bhacee Nidhan Sing should apply the "*teeka*," it would have caused no remark, and all would have been well. As it was, the chiefs were as much surprised as we were, for the Maharajah (who is always courteous and good-humoured) had, for a full hour before, been even more than usually affable, and had been sending for singing-birds and pictures from his play-room, to show us; and, on my questioning him, told me the names of every tree, building, &c., in a landscape. I had, indeed, just observed to my assistants, and Brigadier Campbell, that His Highness evinced more intelligence than most English children of equal age would do.

There cannot, therefore, be a doubt that the young Maharajah had been carefully schooled by his mother, not to take any part in the ceremonies of the day, further than as a mere looker on, but more particularly to refuse to have any hand in making a Raja of a Sudar she so much dislikes as Sudar Tej Sing. He did not touch any portion of the two or three first khuluts, which, as usual, I presented to him, before giving them to Tej Sing, Shere Sing, and Lehna Sing, I, therefore, just went through the ceremony with the rest, without putting them near enough to be touched, determined there should be no favoritism at least, though I could not repress spite. Raja Tej Sing, Dewan Deena Nath, and Sudar Shere Sing, could scarcely conceal their chagrin and agitation, and, though there may be little in common between the three on other points, not only they, but all who received titles to-day, (including members of almost all the principal families in the country) this morning found themselves in the same category; having been elevated by the times to honors which a boy-King, misled by his mother, has not confirmed. The little Prince is ignorant, now, of the meaning of the airs they taught him to enact, but, if the same influence is to continue to mould his acts, he may some day call these, his best Sardars, to account, and even take their lives. I cannot,

indeed, conceive a stronger expression of opinion on the part of the Maharanee and her advisers. Among the latter, I do not reckon a single chief, and scarcely except her brother. I did, for a moment, think of passing him over, and omitting to give him his khillut, and title of Bahadoor, but, thinking it a pity to disturb the harmony of a day devoted to good-will between the Lahore and British Governments, I determined to take no present notice of the occurrence; and the Sirdar's own conduct, shortly after, confirmed the opinion that I had come to, for he begged me to ask Mr John Lawrence to be kind to him during my absence. I shall, however, hereafter, put the plain question to him whether he was cognizant of the intended affront to Sirdar Tej Sing, and the Durbar, and, whatever excuse he may plead, if he be proved to have taken a part in it, I shall allow the Council to act much as they consider proper.

I have before reported that I look for no contentment from the Maharanee. Money is not enough for her, she must have power, and, to be happy, must have free scope to satisfy her lusts, and to avenge her supposed wrongs. I cannot conceive Raja Tej Sing now considering his life safe, while those who advised the Maharaja's conduct of to-day, are at his ear. Dewan Deena Nath whispered, on the instant of the occurrence, to Mr John Lawrence, the word "agwai," (hint, signal, instigation) meaning that the Maharaja had had his cue or lesson. Raja Tej Sing was too much agitated to say anything, but his Vakeel, as well as Sirdar Shere Sing, spoke out to me plainly enough, as I was leaving the palace. I replied, that we would talk on the matter in the evening. I observed that Sirdar Heera Sing was as anxious as the others that I should sign the sumud of his new title, but I did so to all on the back, only as a witness. The wording of the title, however, set forth that the documents were given by the Maharajah, at the advice of the Resident.

After General Cortlandt and some Kairanis had received their khilluts, previous to departure for their provincial appointments, the Durbar broke up.

I nearly omitted to say that, early in the morning, while waiting for the auspicious moment to commence the investitures, Bhace Umcei Buksh, the Maharanee's door-keeper and confidant, begged that I would visit Her Highness and introduce Mr John Lawrence, before I left Lahore. I fixed this day week for the visit (from behind a purdah), but shall, probably, now decline paying her the attention, sending her an official notice of the reason.

It is, perhaps, as well to explain that the affront I have related, though it is full of meaning, and resulting, doubtless, from angry passions, caused no scene in the Durbar. It was the embarrassment of a moment, felt deeply, but not dwelt upon, and was probably known to not more than twenty persons in the assembly. Even Major MacGregor first heard it from me on our return home.

3, P.M., August 7, 1847

My news-writer has just reported that Raja Tej Sing, Sirdar Shere Sing, Dewan Deena Nath, &c, &c, have been, ever since the Durbar, closetted in consultation, and the Maharanee will not allow the little Maharajah to change his clothes, as a sign of grief and discontent. She talks too, I am told, of sending an ambassador to Smula, to complain of the pass to which she is reduced, when Rajas of the kingdom are created, and she not consulted! Here, I suppose, we have the clue to the mystery.

#### Inclosure 2 in No. 9.

*The Resident at Lahore to the Secretary with the Governor-General*

*Lahore, August 9, 1847.*

IN continuation of my dispatch of the 7th instant,\* I have the honor to report, that it was not until the Sudars had sent several remonstrative messages to the Maharanee, the last through her brother Sirdar Heera Sing, that she would consent to allow the Maharajah to be dressed for the evening's Durbar of that day. I found His Highness himself in high spirits, delighted with the fireworks.

\* Inclosure 1 in No. 9.

Dinner having been laid out for the English visitors, I sat down with them, for a few minutes, and then retired with the chiefs; when Raja Tej Sing and Dewan Deena Nath told me, that the members of the Council of Regency had been in consultation during the day, and were of opinion that some decided step was necessary to prevent a recurrence of such conduct as had been displayed in the morning. Neither of them would, at that time, say what measure was proposed, but both told me that it was "pukka," (strong, decided,) several times. There can be little doubt what they wish, but, whether they will have the courage to come forward with a distinct proposition, before they know whether it will be sanctioned, is another question. I do not think they are so bold. Dewan Deena Nath seemed much excited, repeatedly said, he was altogether ours, and looked only to us, and added that, from the day that the new arrangements were determined on, he had taken his cue, as the Maharanee had taken her's, and that it was not likely she could, or ever would, become reconciled to the scheme that deprived her of power. Several of the other chiefs have, each in his own way, since expressed similar sentiments.

Natives of India seldom look beyond the day, I, therefore, expect that, if any distinct proposition be made by the Durbar, it will be that the Maharanee be restricted to the Summun Boori, have none but greybeards, and women, around her, and that access from without be forbidden. Such, however, would only be a half measure, and would still more embitter her mind, without diminishing her influence over her son, unless, indeed, he could be kept from her. But this I do not consider possible. In short, it is my opinion that, with any materially greater restrictions on her conduct than those now in force, the Maharanee would become a subject of sympathy to the country, and there would soon be found agents to carry messages between the parent and the child, and to indoctrinate the latter into the idea that his mother was a sacrifice to her exertions in his behalf.

The alternative is expulsion from the Punjab for ever. Nothing short of it will insure tranquillity after our departure. The Sirdars may now be satisfied with the remedy for the day, but their own safety will require that a woman's revenge be not allowed to come between them and their sovereign, on his assumption of the reins of Government. I, therefore, foresee a struggle between them and her during the next few years, as to which shall get the other put out of the way.

On the 7th, Dewan Deena Nath, more than once, referred to the Pievma conspiracy, and distinctly attributed it to the Maharanee. I do not recollect that he ever before did so, but the assercion, on this occasion, is at least evidence of his present sentiments regarding her.

Herewith are inclosed translations of the depositions taken in the case. They are very unconnected, and afford no conclusive evidence against even the Maharanee, but, taking into consideration native habits and practices, and remembering how recently Raja Lal Sing was convicted, solely and entirely, in the opinion of parties here, on the documents to which he was mad enough to fix his own signature, we may believe that an angry woman would plan anything, but that a wily one (as she undoubtedly is) would not commit herself, by giving anything under her own hand. The general opinion at Lahore is, that there was a conspiracy, and that its early detection alone prevented it from ripening into execution. At mid-day, at the Shalimar, on the occasion of my giving a fête to the officers of the garrison, Fakcer Noorooddeen came to me, breathless with haste, and, in plainer terms than I recollect him ever using before or since, advised me to strengthen the guard, as he had heard that Lal Sing, Adawltee, (one of the conspirators) was hovering about, with evil intentions, accompanied by 200 men. A month or two ago, I asked Dewan Deena Nath, if he had, at that time, heard anything of the kind, to which he replied, 'That of course he had, and that it was on that account the chiefs had come down in the afternoon, and planted sentries and parties all along the road to the city and cantonment.'

In the depositions herewith inclosed, it will be observed that Dewan Ali says he was engaged, with four others, to attack me on that day in the garden. The man appears quite in his senses, and has no apparent motive for hazarding his neck, I therefore conclude that he knows much more than he chooses to tell. The same may be said of several of the other prisoners. I would also draw attention to the fact of Shahzad Sing Bundelkhundiya (one of the first who gave information in the matter) allowing that he considered himself the judge whether

he should join the Ranees, or the Sudars, in case of their differing, in fact, that he was at liberty to choose his side, according as, in his opinion, it might be for the benefit of the Maharajah. I refer to these points, with no wish to convict the Maharanee, on any such evidence as is yet given, but to show that men do still take her name, and in proof that, as long as she is here, and opposed to the administration, there is a strong likelihood of at least intrigue, if not of conspiracy. In short, I look on her as the main source of difficulty.

While here, and in command of money, she will always be able to command certain services. The Sadhs and Brahmins, whom she liberally fees, are in her interests. The names of several, besides those noticed in the depositions, have been mentioned. One reason assigned for her last act is, that a scheming astrologer has told her, that the English will only remain six months longer at Lahore, when a calamity will befall them, and she will regain her position.

I have been led, by a natural train of ideas, to associate these two affairs together, the abortive plot to take away Sirdar Tej Sing's life, and the more matured one to detract from his honours, and insult his colleagues in the ministry. It is right and proper too that these, the only overt acts of ill-will and opposition which have troubled the administration of affairs, since the new treaty, should be considered in connection with each other, proceeding, as they have done, from one common source of disaffection. I do not disguise from myself, nor do I wish the Governor-General to be ignorant of, the fact, that the Maharanee is the only active enemy to our policy that I am aware of, in the country. Others may feel pinched occasionally by our arrangements, and constrained by our high standard of official honesty, but they work on—the Maharanee alone turns obstinately against us. And it is an invidious task to be always watching, and controlling, a woman.

While I am writing, Rane Kishen Chund has come in, with the propositions which the Durbar have directed him to submit to me. They are almost exactly what I anticipated, only a little more decided—They wish, first, that Sirdar Heera Sing should have all his jagheers, except 10,000 rupees, taken from him (his present allowance being about 80,000), and that even this be in some insignificant village, in a quiet part of the country, far from either city or town; where he can do no mischief—Secondly, that Jewan Sing, Bhaee Umeer Buksh, Moonshree Hur Dyal, and indeed all the creatures now about the person of the Queen, be sent off to their own village homes, on a moderate subsistence; Mungla, the slave, to be turned adrift without any thing. "she was bought with a price," they say, "and its quite enough to give her her liberty." Doubtless, during her long administration as female Vizier, she provided well against contingencies of this sort—Thirdly, that the Maharanee be confined to the palace and its gardens, ("what business have women out of doors?") and that some respectable old attendants, who have passed the age of passion, be appointed to wait on, and look after her. "This," added the Rane, "is step the first—step the second will be whatever you please, if the Ranees does not profit by the warning."

From this it will be seen, that the weight of the Durbar's indignation falls, for the present, on Sirdar Heera Sing—he is offered up as a sacrifice for his sister, not without reason, however, as the following explanation will show. In the earlier part of this letter, I mentioned that Dewan Deena Nath, on the evening of the 7th, appeared much excited, and declared himself now entirely devoted to us. The cause of this now appears. Before the arrival of the Residency party at the palace to see the fire-works, the Sirdars had, in vain, sent messages to the Maharajah. At last, they deputed his uncle Sirdar Heera Sing to go and bring him, which he did. The little boy, however, (whether still under instructions or not, it is difficult to say) sat silent, and out of humour in the assembly, paying no attention to the brilliant display around him—It was then that Dewan Deena Nath heard Heera Sing address the Maharajah thus: "Your Highness seems out of spirits; if you do not like all this, I'll bring up a company, and soon show you some sport!" The Dewan had seen too many revolutions in the Punjab not to understand the covert meaning of such a speech, and, turning quickly to Rane Kishen Chund, asked, "Did you hear that?" and repeated what he had heard. The Rane had not heard it; but, as he said, when he told me the story, "If Deena Nath heard it, that's enough." I am inclined to agree with him, for I remember when, a month ago, I strongly urged the Durbar to take almost all Heera Sing's jagheers away from him, and leave him only enough to live on, the Dewan was the person who stood his friend, and begged that half might be

left him. I consider, therefore, Deena Nath's evidence as the strongest that could be produced against the Sirdar. But I do not agree in the remedy with which they propose to meet the case. If the incendiary speech attributed to Heera Sing can be proved, he ought to be put in prison as a disturber of the public peace.

Should the Governor-General approve of the modified measures proposed by the Durbar, I would suggest that the Lahore Palace is not the place for Her Highness's residence. She would, of course, consider herself a prisoner, and, profiting by the discovery of the mischievous influence she possesses over her son, would devote her leisure to the short-sighted task of widening the breach between him and his ministers. To keep her separate from the Maharajah would be impossible. It would be better to remove her to a distance from both Lahore and Umritsur. She herself talks of taking up her abode at Shalimar, and passed the day there yesterday, herself, with her lover Jewan Sing, in one room, while the Maharajah was consigned to the guardianship of Mungla, in another. At one time, Her Highness proposed not to return to Lahore. I shall take the hint, and see that she has not another opportunity of leaving it.

In closing this letter, which has grown to an unexpected length, I wish again clearly to submit my own opinion to his Lordship, viz that confining the Maharanee to certain bounds is a half measure, it is treating her as a naughty school-girl, whereas she is a dangerous and bitter enemy. As such, I think she should be banished from the Punjab, which she troubles.

#### Inclosure 3 in No 9

#### *Abstract of the Depositions in Preyma's Case.*

SHAHZAD SING BUNDELKHUNDIYA states, that a Brahmin took him to a Byragee, at the Toksah-Gate, where he met Preyma, who told him of the conspiracy which was in preparation to attack the British troops at Lahore, and take Sudar Tej Sing's life. I endeavoured to dissuade him, but, finding this useless, went to the Durbar, not finding admittance there, I went to Sirdar Tej Sing, and warned him. Preyma thought that I was a pundit, and asked me when an auspicious time would come. Afterwards states, that he waited three days to see whether anything would come of Preyma's schemes, after which, he went to the Sirdar as above-mentioned. Says, that he would have joined in the plot, or not, according to his opinion, whether it was for the benefit of the State, or not.

Hurdhun Sing Sowar deposes, that he was ordered by his officer, Shahzad Sing, to take a message to the Byragee, for the purpose of warning a person who came there, that he should remain quiet, and not create a disturbance, as, otherwise, it would fare ill with him. This deponent did, and saw the person alluded to, whom he can recognise.

Ruttun Chund says, that Khosiyal Pundit came to him, and informed him, that a Hill Brahmin had visited him, to inquire about the auspicious time, as he had been promised the Raj of the Punjab, and intended to create a disturbance, attack the British, and kill Sirdar Tej Sing. I met Shahzad Sing, who remarked that he had heard the same story, we then went together to the Durbar, and then to Sirdar Tej Sing.

Khosiyal Pundit deposes, that a Hill Brahmin, named Preyma, came to him, to ask for an auspicious time, and explained to him that a conspiracy was to be concocted; but deponent told him, that a Raj was not to be procured without troops and treasure.

Khilaree Brahmacharee. I am evidence that Preyma and Shahzad Sing came to present their offerings to me, and conversed together. Preyma offered him, Shahzad Sing, three lakhs of rupees, if he would join in a conspiracy against the English. "I tried to dissuade them," says the witness. Uttur Sing, and Sukram, Preyma's nephew, accompanied them. Preyma said, he would gain over the British army through Purusram Bog.

Baboo Panduh deposes, that his adjutant informed him that some person who had come from a distance, was raising troops. The informer was Sheodeen Sing. Witness informed Tej Sing. Shomaram, adjutant of the last witness, confirmed this statement.

Sheodeen states, that he heard a Hill man, and two Sepoys of the British, talking about people who were going about recruiting

Soojan Sing deposes, that Lal Sing Adawlutee came to the commandant of his troop, by name Bheemma Sing, and told him, that the Maharanee had ordered him to collect his forces, and to act according to the instructions of Boota Sing, the Ranee's confidential moonshee. Lal Sing mentioned the following persons as implicated:—Shumshere Sing Sindanwalla, a Peshawaree (Sirdar Sooltan Mahomed), Baboo Panduh, Adjoodyha Pershad's regiments, Jowahir Mull, Sirdar Nahar Sing, a relative to the Maharanee, and Jumbur Sing.

Bheemma Sing deposes, as the former witness, that Lal Sing came to him, mentioning the following conspirators:—1 Baboo Panduh; 2 Sirdar Sooltan Mahomed Khan; 3 Dewan Jowahir Mull; 4. Sirdar Shumshere Sing Sindanwalla; 5. Sham Sing; 6 Boota Sing; 7, Sadhoo Sing Nahuug. Deponent informed Utter Sing, Kaleewala, who went to Sirdar Tej Sing

Futteh Sing; evidence of no value.

Hayat Khan deposes, that Preyma sent for him, and consulted him about his Dhurmuths, which he was unsuccessful in getting cleared. On asking the reason of Preyma's being visited by so many Goorchurras, soldiers, writers, &c, Jowahir, Preyma's nephew, told him of the plot that was in preparation. Deponent went to Fakeer Noorodeen, and gave him information, but Preyma absconded, on hearing that he was to be arrested. States, that he had heard from Preyma the following names of persons concerned in the plot; Boota Sing, Lal Sing Adawlutee, Gunda Sing, Dewan Jowahir Mull, Buhman Sing, and Shahzad Sing, Bundelkhundiva. Among the Sikhs who visited Preyma, were Shibdiyal, the family priest of the Ranee, a Sadh, living at the Mustee Gate, near the Bruhmacharee Gate, and another named Khilaree Ram

Thakoor Doss, Moonshee of Preyma, states, that a letter was sent by the Bhaee Maharaj to Preyma, written in Goormookhee. Recognises among those who visited Preyma, Shibdiyal Bada or Brahmachuri, Khilaree Ram, Ruttun Chund, his father Debidujal, and his brother Gourdujal. Jowahir, Preyma's nephew, told him of the plot, but did not mention the names of the Sirdars who were to be made away with.

Khan Sing denies ever having spoken to Preyma, or having anything to do with the plot

Purusram deposes, that Shahzad Sing demanded where Preyma was; deponent visited Preyma, having been directed to his abode by Shibdeen, an orderly, and asked, what is this disturbance? Preyma swore that there was no disturbance going to take place.

Hakim Khan states, that he was directed by Kazee Mohkumooddeen to find out Preyma, which he did, by means of Man Sing. Nahung Preyma wished him to join in the plot, and promised him a jagheer

Bheem Sen states that, being out of service, he went to Hakim Khan, who said, join me, and took him to Jowahir Sing, who informed deponent that a plot was in preparation.

Man Sing Akalee states, that he was in Jowala Sahae's service, but was dismissed, and then went to Preyma, who promised him support. On Preyma's going to Kohistan, he sent for deponent, through Hakim Khan, and told him, that the affair was to be commenced, as soon as all the Sirdars joined him. General Bhadoor Sing Dusoowalia, Bugwunt Sing, Soojan Sing, and Kulal Sing, were engaged with Preyma in the business, and promised to support him; as did also Runjore Sing, and Kishen Sing, brother of General Mewa. The Maharanee said to Sundiyal, one of Preyma's relations, that she would not give any written instructions under her own hand, but that she would join any one who would previously instigate an insurrection against the British, and kill Sirdar Tej Sing. Faiz Tullub Khan said, he would join Preyma, and get up an outbreak at Anarkullee, if Preyma would advance him the necessary means, which Preyma promised to do, when he went to Lahore.

Man Sing deposes, that Jug Sing came to him to inform him that Preyma was about to be seized, and had fled from his home. Deponent told Mr. Turton all that Jug Sing had said to him. Jug Sing is known to deponent, from his residing with the Sadhs in the Badamee Gardens.

Dewan Ali deposes, that Nehal Chund, Preyma's nephew, met him and said, "The Resident is going to the Shalimar Gardens; you join us, and we will kill him." Ten of us went, but our courage failed, as there was a large concourse of gentlemen there; we returned, not having accomplished our object.



Nussura states, that he went to the house of Faiz Tullub Khan, by the Residency Meer Moonshée Murlire Rujub Ali's orders. An Akalee, Dewan Ali, and Hakim Khan were there. Dewan Ali told deponent of the failure of the scheme for taking the Resident's life. The Akalee said that, with the exception of Sirdars Lehna Sing, Tej Sing, Dewan Deena Nath, and Fakeer Noorooddeen, all the Sirdars were engaged in the conspiracy, and he mentioned the following names — Mihur Sing, Runjore Sing, and Sirdar Shere Sing, Attareewala. Raja Faiz Tullub Khan seized the Akalee and the others. On Hakim Khan's effects being searched, a letter from Preyma was found among them. On their being arrested, the Akalee complained of Faiz Tullub Khan's treachery.

Goormuck Sing states, that he visited Man Sing, on account of his being a relation, and for the purpose of giving him subsistence, but denies his knowing anything concerning Preyma. Deposes, that Man Sing informed him that he had been imprisoned, on suspicion of being connected with Preyma. His account of himself is proved false by Man Sing.

Mr Turton states, that Man Sing Akalee told him of the disaffection of the British Sepoys, and of a plot to assassinate the Resident, and attack the British troops.

Preyma deposes, that he came to Lahore to get his Dhurmuths released, which had been confiscated by the Lahore Government, and that Shere Sing had told him that he might accomplish his business, through the Bhaee Maharaj at Umritsur. The Bhaee gave him a recommendation to the Maharanee; and Her Highness's confidential moonshee, Boota Sing, informed him, under an oath of secrecy, and the promise of being rewarded, that a conspiracy was to be got up, for the purpose of killing Sirdars Tej Sing, Shere Sing, and Dewan Deena Nath, and giving battle to the British, in which affair the following persons were concerned — 1. Sooltan Mahomed, with his troops. 2. Mir Umeer Chund, and Bugwunt Sing, with their troops. 3. Khan Sing Kohoorah. 4. Sadhoo Sing Nahung. 5. Sham Sing, cashiered Colonel, formerly in the Cort Regiment. 6. Golab Sing, of Umritsur. 7. The Kohistanee Regiments. 8. The Poombya Regiments. 9. Boota Sing's matchlockmen. 10. Sirdar Shumshere Sing Sindanwala. 11. The orderlies under Buhman Sing. 12. Lal Sing Adawlutee and Sheehunbog, who declared that they would induce the Sepoys of the British to join in the plot. Further deposes, that he met Boota Sing in his house, in the presence of Bhaee Budh Sing, and Uttur Sing, and that, in all communications which passed between him and Boota Sing, Lal Sing used to visit deponent on the part of Boota Sing, and that, on deponent's part, Uttur Sing visited Boota Sing. Buhman Sing, Sadhoo Sing Nahung, and Sham Sing were dwelling in the house of some Sadhs, at the Toksal Gate. Sham Sing informed the deponent that the secret had been divulged, upon which, deponent fled from Lahore, and remained concealed in various places, until a letter from Jowala Sahae induced him to return. Further deposes, that he met Shahzad Sing Bundelkhundiya at the temple of Baba Sahid, near the Toksal Gate, when the latter asked him what Boota Sing had said, and deponent told him of the plot above mentioned.

Boota Sing denies that he ever met Preyma, and declares that the latter has implicated him through enmity, because he is a servant of the Ranee, and Preyma a servant of Maharajah Golab Sing; asserts that if Budh Sing should depose that he had met him in company with Preyma, Budh Sing must have been bribed.

Bhaee Budh Sing deposes to having been present at an interview between Preyma and Boota Sing at the latter's house. The evidence is very unwillingly given.

Man Sing Nahung says, that he arrived at Lahore on the day of Preyma's running away. On asking Khosiyal Sing Nahung and Sadhoo Sing Nahung about this affair, they told him that the secret had been divulged. Uttur Sing's people informed deponent that Preyma was at Koona, beyond Miyanmeer, whither he went to see him. Preyma next day went off to Tilhoorkee. Deponent afterwards met Sukram, Preyma's nephew, at the house of Loopookur, a Bramin, near the Gomtee Bazar, and told him of Preyma's having absconded. Further deposes, that he met the Kohistanee regiments, in company with Sookha Sing Langurka and Unoop Sing Chutur, as well as the sadhs who reside in the Badamee Garden. Sul Goorwala Bahadoor Sing Dussowala told Bugwunt Sing, Sookha Sing, and Hakim, that he would join them. Surrundial Boorial, Loopooke, and Sukram held consultation with Bugwunt Sing and Bahadoor Sing, and gave them encou-

agement, on the part of the Ranees. Deposits, that he also met Soojan Sing, who informed him that Kishen Sing, Runjore Sing, and Khan Sing Majeetia were also concerned in the plot.

Inclosure 4 in No. 2,

*" Remarks on the Preyma Case by Mr. John Lawrence.*

THE evidence in the case which may be termed the Preyma conspiracy, is not satisfactory. There is abundant evidence on the face of the proceedings, as well as from the admissions of the parties concerned, to show that dangerous schemes were under contemplation. It is difficult, however, clearly to determine what were the actual designs of the conspirators, and still more so, who were the influential movers of it. The names of the Maharanee, Mean Jowahir Sing, nephew of Maharajah Golab Sing, and indeed of every Sirdar, except Tej Sing, Dewan Deena Nath, and Noorooddeen, are more or less used by the different actors.

The ostensible design is stated to have been an attack on the British troops, and the murder of Sirdar Tej Sing, and the Resident. It is probable that the first scheme was a mere pretext for endeavouring to accomplish the other plans, viz., the murder of Tej Sing, and the Resident. Though the names of so many Sirdars are mentioned, it is curious that there is not only no evidence to implicate any of them, but none, in my mind, even to bring any of them under reasonable suspicion. The conspirators appear generally to be needy, discontented adventurers, without money, influence, or connexion.

The facts which appear fairly proven are as follows—

Early in February, Preyma, late a commandant in Maharajah Golab Sing's service, came to Lahore, and commenced intriguing with various officers and sepoys of Sikh corps, to create a disturbance. He is proved to have had various meetings with different parties, with Boota Sing, a moonshee of the Maharanee, and to have consulted Brahmans for an auspicious day.

The parties implicated in this affair, and who are deserving of punishment, are Preyma, Boota Sing, Lal Sing, and Shahzad Sing.

It is a curious circumstance, and one worthy of note, that the servants of Maharajah Golab Sing appear to have had much influence with some of the principal conspirators, and that Preyma himself came in, on the assurance of Jowala Sahae, the Minister. Hayat Khan, a jemadar in the Jummoo service, was not only evidently cognizant of what was going on, but was entering into the confidence of the conspirators.

There can be little doubt also, that there was a design to kill the Resident, and Tej Sing, particularly the former, on the occasion of a fête at Shalimar. Dewan Ali plainly admits, that he was one of the party with Nehal Chund, Preyma's nephew, who went there for that purpose. Nussura, who was acting his part, and joined the conspirators as a servant of Runjore Sing Majeetia, declares that it was the subject of discussion in his presence. Man Sing, when in confinement, also informed Mr. Turton, a fellow-prisoner, in custody for some other offence, of the same design. Man Sing also, in his second deposition on the 21st of May, stated that Jug Sing, alias Goormuck Sing, had warned him of Preyma's being about to make an attack on the Resident.

The\* fact of Boota Sing, the confidential moonshee of the Maharanee, being proved by the admission of Preyma, and substantiated by the evidence of Budh Sing and Man Sing, the two latter engaged in the affair, would not amount to proof that the Maharanee was actually a party in this conspiracy, but would clearly show that her name was actually used, which fact, joined with her well-known intrigues and ambitious character, affords strong ground of suspicion that she was actually cognizant of the intrigue and machinations which were going on.

\* Sic in orig.

## Inclosure 5 in No. 9.

*Remarks on the Preyma Case by the Resident.*

August 11, 1847.

REFERRING to the evidence, such as it is, against Preyma, and the other persons, said to have been concerned in a plot against the Lahore ministry, and the opinion given by Mr. John Lawrence, who comes fresh to the subject, without any pre-conceived prejudices, there can be no doubt that there was a conspiracy; but the more I have seen and heard of the matter, the more I am puzzled to understand its nature.

Raja Tej Sing was, at first, in great alarm, and has since had occasional fits of fear. almost every chief in the Durbar has, at one time or other, declared his belief in the fact of a conspiracy. All the chiefs, councillors, and principal Durbar officials, to the number of sixteen, agreed, unanimously, that Boota Sing had met Bhaee Budh Sing, which he positively denied; and they are generally of opinion, that whatever mischief was contemplated, was at the instigation of Boota Sing, who, it will be remembered, was the confidential moon-shee of the Maharanee. I may here mention that Her Highness has not only invariably expressed the utmost interest in his fate, but that her messages to me of good-will and contentment were very much more frequent, about the time the inquiry was going on regarding Preyma, than at any other time since the occupation of Lahore. Bhaee Budh Sing gave his evidence against Boota Sing most unwillingly, and I am sure that, if I had not instantly sent for him, and had him brought direct to me, on his name being first mentioned, he would have been silent, as is Boota Sing himself; indeed, on Budh Sing being that day confronted with Boota Sing, he, Boota Sing, prevaricated, and, in a manner, denied what he had before said; though I need hardly remark that there was not a shadow of coercion used towards him. All this goes to prove him the friend, rather than the enemy, as asserted, of Boota Sing. It will be observed, that the persons concerned are all of low station, or Sadhs and Brahmins. Several whose names do not appear in the depositions, were also, at one time or other, mentioned to me. I mention\* three instances: Jug Sing, alias Goormuck Sing, the Sikh, who clandestinely, and under a false name, visited Man Sing Akalee, when in our guard, was a servant of five Sadhs, living in the Ranee's garden. Baba Luchmun Sing, the deputy of Sirdar Lehna Sing, told me, in February last, three or four days before the first formal invitation was given, of an intended disturbance; that, when at Umritsur, a day or two previous to talking to me, a Sadh had warned him not to go to Lahore at that time, as there would be a commotion. Having promised Luchmun Sing not to mention the Sadh's name, I have been prevented from summoning him, but have in vain tried to persuade the Baba to induce the man to come to me. The Sadh says, he will do so, when I go to Umritsur. Baba Luchmun Sing also told me that, on Sirdar Lehna Sing's arrival at Lahore from Hindostan, another Sadh came to him (the Baba) to ask him to try and induce his chief to support the Ranee. Different little matters of this sort, added to the circumstances of the Maharanee's alms, washing of feet, consultation of Pundits, embassages of scores of Brahmins to shrines, &c., &c., all go to show that she has been endeavouring to obtain religious support in some particular undertaking.

Even at the expense of some repetition, I will here recapitulate a portion of the evidence, which, it must be remembered, was taken at different places and times, as parties and persons were apprehended, and that, to avoid unnecessary publicity, there has not been any minute confronting of the prisoners.

The fact is, that the Durbar officials, though originating the case, have done little or nothing in it, indeed, nothing to elicit the truth, that was not literally forced on them. This is chiefly to be attributed to timidity and caution, and the fear of appearing hostile to individuals, who may eventually be acquitted, and then have opportunity of avenging themselves.

Much of the evidence is worthless, but I am satisfied that many that say little could say much. No documents were given, except the enigmatical letter to the Akalee, Man Sing, which may mean anything, but which the chiefs unanimously pronounced to be of a mischievous tendency; in which opinion I agree.

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\* See in orig.

The first witness, or rather informer, Shahzad Sing, is evidently a desperate character and deep intriguer. I have little doubt that he gave notice of the conspiracy, because he saw no chance of its success. It is suspicious that he has, ever since the affair was made known, been anxious to obtain his discharge. The Lal Sing, Adawlutee, mentioned in several of the depositions as one of the conspirators, is a notorious character, who was very much employed, previous to the late war, in endeavouring to seduce the British sepoys. The Utter Sing referred to by several, is a disaffected ex-commander in the Sikh army. On the force returning from the expedition last October, (November) against Sheik Emam-ooddeen, this same Utter Sing was reported to me as going about endeavouring to stir up the Sikh troops, by offering them increased pay, privileges, &c. He was said to give out that Mean Jowahir Sing, the nephew of Golab Sing, was his instigator. Utter Sing and Lal Sing both fled, on the first intimation being given to the Durbar by Shahzad Sing.

The witness, Thakoor Doss, moonshee of Preyma, gave his evidence very unwillingly. Hakim Khan, the 16th on the list, is a very bad character. A month before he, finally, appeared, he was brought to me, as willing to find out where Preyma was concealed. I obtained a promise of reward from Sirdar Tej Sing for him; but, while the Sirdar and I were talking in his presence, he was recognised by Sirdar Shere Sing, as having been concerned in disturbances in Peshawur. He accordingly walked off, and did not return, until brought by the Jummo Vakeel.

Purusram is of a Hindostanee family, notorious for their attempts at seducing British sepoys. I more than once traced deserters into his brother's house at Peshawur.

In regard to Man Sing Akalee, I consider him to have concealed much that he does know, and to have certified to what is false. The same may be said of Dewan Ali's deposition. It is, however, puzzling to know why, having told as much as might hang him, he should not tell more. In the Punjab, however, an attempt at, or intention of, murder, is not considered as coming at all under the same head as the actual crime.

As already observed, Boota Sing, the Maharanee's moonshee, failed to show the slightest cause of enmity, on the part of either Preyma or Bhaee Budh Sing, as he endeavoured to do; indeed, Budh Sing, when confronted with Boota Sing, prevaricated, and was not disposed to answer at all. He evinced much fear, and, perhaps, some friendship, but not a shadow of enmity. At page 74 of the depositions are recorded the names of sixteen Sirdars and officials, who, on the 3rd of June, severally and separately, gave their opinion that no enmity existed between Bhaee Budh Sing, and Moonshee Boota Sing, and, secondly, that it was proved that the Moonshee had met and communicated with Preyma. On the 30th of May, the depositions were all read at the Residency, before seven of the Councillors, and they were invited to give their opinions thereon, and to make further investigations.

Finally, though there is no evidence on which to convict any one as instigating a conspiracy, and though Dewan Jowahir Sing's name is mentioned, and even Maharajah Golab Sing's is whispered, I cannot divest myself of the opinion, that the Maharanee did either instigate a disturbance, or was cognizant of her confidential servant, Boota Sing, doing so. I see no shadow of reason for supposing that what Preyma and others, on one side, and Rajah Faiz Tullub and others, on the other, say, is from any enmity to the Ranees or any one else. It is almost impossible to believe that Maharajah Golab Sing was concerned in any intention to make a disturbance, much less that he was in league with the Maharanee, or any of the chiefs of Lahore. Preyma was apprehended in a sanctuary by the Maharajah's servants, who thus violated Hindoo prejudices, on my requisition for his surrender. Rajah Faiz Tullub is Maharajah Golab Sing's bitter enemy, and yet he rather exonerates him than otherwise.

I believe that an evil design was contemplated, but that its magnitude has been exaggerated. I believe that the Maharanee was cognizant of such design, if not its instigator.

## Inclosure 6 in No. 9.

*The Resident at Lahore to the Secretary with the Governor-General.**Lahore, August 10, 1847.*

AFTER leaving the Durbar, on the morning of the 7th, I thought it necessary to repair, if possible, the affront which had been put by the Maharajah on Raja Tej Sing, and the rest of the Sirdars and officials who received distinctions on that day. By way of marking, therefore, in an unmistakeable manner, my sense of what had taken place, and the certain support which the friends of good order at the Sikh capital will always receive, in the face of any opposition, from the British Government, I directed my Meer Moonshee to write separate congratulatory letters to each of the fifteen servants of the State, who had been honored by us, and covertly insulted by the Ranee. And to make the compliment the more pointed and impressive, not only I signed the letters, but also Mr. John Lawience, and my four assistants, who had been present at the inauguration. It was quite unexpected, and a most gratifying attention to all concerned. More than this, they felt that it was an earnest of future support, and a sunnud that may one day be useful. Many of them have since expressed their thanks to myself, and assistants, in warm terms, and particularly Dewan Deena Nath, who is wise in his generation.

Sirdar Heera Sing took horse, and rode over to Duleepgurh, early on the morning of the 8th, without giving notice, or receiving leave; which, at any other time, would be nothing more than an impertinence, but must now be regarded as a strong confirmation of the report made by Dewan Deena Nath, and reported by me yesterday. He probably was alarmed at his own boldness. I have desired that he be recalled, when I will confront him with Dewan Deena Nath.

## Inclosure 7 in No. 9.

*The Secretary with the Governor-General to the Resident at Lahore.**Simla, August 16, 1847.*

I HAVE the honor to acknowledge your letter dated the 7th of August\*, reporting that Sirdar Tej Sing had received the title of Raja of Sealkote in full Durbar, and that titles of honor and distinction had also been conferred on other officers of the ministry, and influential chiefs.

The Governor-General entirely approves of all your proceedings in this matter. It was judicious and politic to mark, by public rewards, your acknowledgments of the services rendered by these councillors, and chiefs, in faithfully exerting themselves to promote the interests of the Maharajah, and the welfare of the country.

The Governor-General trusts that these distinctions will encourage the chiefs of all classes to co-operate with you in consolidating the government during His Highness's minority. In order to prove to all the chiefs, at the present time, and to record, for the Prince's information hereafter, that this act has received the entire approbation of the Governor-General, a letter will be addressed to the Maharajah, and signed by his Lordship, which you will yourself deliver to His Highness, and cause its contents to be publicly made known.

The wording of the titles in the sunnuds, setting forth that they had been conferred on the chiefs by your advice, was most proper, under any circumstances; but more particularly so, in reference to the refusal of the Prince to confirm them, as described by you in your letter of the 7th instant. There can be no doubt, considering the age of the child, that he was tutored by the Maharanee to pass this affront on the assembled chiefs; the proof that His Highness's conduct could not have proceeded from the sudden caprice of childhood, is to be found in the fact, related by you in the postscript of your letter of the 7th, and in the subsequent letter† of the 9th, that the Prince was not allowed to be dressed to witness the display of fireworks in the evening, and, at a later hour, attended

\* Inclosure 1 in No. 9.

† Inclosure 2 in No. 9

solely on the remonstrance of the chiefs, conveyed to the Maharanee by Heera Sing, Her Highness's brother, who was deputed to request the Prince's presence.

Your narrative of these transactions, with your comments on the conduct of the Ranee, is given with great clearness, in the letter of the 9th instant, which is in continuation of your report of the 7th instant. The Governor-General agrees with you, and has no doubt, that the Maharanee was actuated by a determination to make her son the instrument of publicly affronting the Durbar, and of obstructing the Government, to which, by treaty, the Governor-General in Council has confided the power of ruling the Punjab, during the minority of the Prince.

His Lordship has perused, with great attention, those passages of your dispatch, which describe, in forcible terms, the deep sensation which these acts of the Ranee, for they can only be considered as her acts, have made on the minds of the Durbar.

The Council apprehend, not only great difficulty in carrying on the government, at the present time, if the mother of the Prince is to be left in the full exercise of influence over her son, but they are alarmed as to the future consequences which may, personally, be the result to themselves, if she is to be allowed daily to inculcate in the boy's mind sentiments of aversion and hatred against all the chiefs who are entrusted with the government of the Punjab.

In your dispatch, you state that you had received a message from the Durbar, to the effect that, after consultation with each other, they are of opinion that the Maharanee ought to be restricted to the palace and garden in the Lahore citadel, and her brother and other attendants dispersed in certain villages in the country. At the same time, this proposal was accompanied by the observation that if this, the first step, as a warning, should fail, the second might be what you may be pleased to adopt.

You then adduce several forcible reasons for not considering the remedy which the Durbar proposes, to be a sufficient corrective for the evil of which they complain, and you conclude the letter of the 9th, by giving your opinion that Her Highness ought to be banished the Punjab.

The adoption of such a step the Governor-General observes would, doubtless, be the most effectual mode of obviating all the present, and future, embarrassments which her presence, and her control over her son, cannot fail, sooner or later, to produce; but, before his Lordship enters upon this part of the subject, which is the real point at issue, the depositions taken in what is termed the Preyma conspiracy, and which have been very properly sent, must be noticed, in order to show that Her Highness's intrigues, and efforts to make mischief, have not been confined to the recent instance of spite and revenge to affront the Durbar, but that Her Highness is looked up to as the party in the State, the most hostile to the British Government administering the affairs of the country, through a native Council, and that there is strong ground for suspicion, that Her Highness was implicated in this plot.

As to the objects of that conspiracy, the Governor-General agrees with you that it is difficult to understand its nature, or ultimate objects, when we consider that the conspirators appear, generally, to be needy, discontented adventurers, without money, influence, or connection. Mr J. Lawrence has no doubt on his mind, after perusing the depositions, that there was a design to kill the Resident, and Tej Sing, on the occasion of the entertainment given by you to the officers of the garrison, in the Shalimar Garden, about six months ago.

The witness Nussura declares, it was the subject of discussion in his presence. Shahzad Sing states, that Preyma told him of the plan to attack the British Troops, and to kill Tej Sing; and Dewan Ali avows, that it was intended to take the Resident's life. The main fact now for consideration is, whether there is, in these depositions, sufficient proof that the Maharanee did take any part in instigating the actors in those intended deeds of violence.

It appears, by the depositions, that the Maharanee's private moonshee, Boota Sing, did communicate with Preyma. You, then, having heard most of the witnesses give their evidence, proceed to state your opinion\*, in the remarks of the 11th instant, that "the Maharanee either did instigate a disturbance, or was cognizant of the fact that her confidential secretary, Boota Sing, was concerned in the plot."

Mr. J. Lawrence makes the following statement in the remarks appended to the depositions:

"The fact of Boota Sing, the confidential moonshee of the Maharanee, being proved by the admission of Preyma, and substantiated by the evidence of Bodh Sing and Man Sing, the two latter engaged in the affair, would not amount to proof that the Maharanee was actually a party in this conspiracy, but would clearly show that her name was actually used; which fact, joined with her well known intrigues, and ambitious character, affords strong ground of suspicion that she was actually cognizant of the intrigue, and machinations, which were going on."

The same impression seems to have been made on the mind of Dewan Deena Nath, referred to in your letter, in which the Dewan, for the first time, distinctly attributed the plot to the Maharanee; but, as this avowal was made four or five months after some of the witnesses had been examined, and when he was under excitement by a sense of the indignity offered to him, and the danger to which he might be, hereafter, exposed, it can only be admitted as an indication of the importance which he attaches to the object of separating the Maharanee from her son; and that the Dewan, the shrewdest man in the Durbar, clearly sees that the time has come, when he, and his colleagues, must take a decided line.

Having made these preliminary observations, I am directed to express to you the Governor-General's opinion that the fact having been substantiated that Her Highness's moonshee did hold communication with Preyma, is a presumption so strong of Her Highness's having been cognizant, through her confidential secretary, of the intended plot, that it might justify his Lordship, on presumptive evidence, in coming to the conclusion that Her Highness, the Maharanee, was implicated in that transaction.

It would not be advisable, however, in his Lordship's opinion, to found any formal proceedings against Her Highness, such as sending her out of the Punjab, on depositions which, on the whole, are not sufficiently conclusive against her.

There can be no doubt that the impression which the depositions are calculated to make, on every man's mind who reads them, is very strong against the Ranee; the evidence has induced his Lordship to view her Highness's recent conduct in a more unfavorable light than if her tutoring the Prince had merely been the single act of the anger of a disappointed woman in affronting the Durbar whom she disliked.

It is clear that there exists, in Her Highness's mind, a fixed determination to exert her hostility against the Durbar, on every occasion. The letter written to you by Her Highness, in the month of June†, may be cited in proof of her disposition, to depreciate, and thwart, the Council, on every occasion, who are attempting, under the treaty, to save the Raj, and to promote her son's welfare, and the prosperity of the country.

You will recollect that, in November last, in the instructions to Sir F. Currie, on his repairing to Lahore, the Governor-General stated his decided opinion that it was an indispensable condition to insure the success of the meditated arrangement, that Her Highness should be deprived of all authority. This stipulation was sanctioned by the chiefs; and, in the treaty, unlimited powers are given to the Resident, acting under the instructions of the Governor-General; and the Ranee, from that time, ceased to be Regent.

The acts of Her Highness, in thus obstructing the Government, purposely established, by treaty, for the welfare of her son, are political offences, the continuance of which the Governor-General can no longer tolerate.

In Her Highness's instance, these offences cannot be considered as the mere caprices of temper. Her Highness's character is well known, as being most unscrupulous as to the means by which any end of ambition is to be obtained.

In confirmation of this, may be adduced the established facts, that the Sirdar Heera Sing, when minister of the Maharajah Duleep Sing, was put to death by the army, excited by the Ranee to perpetrate this act, in 1844; and, in the following year, December, 1845, the Sikh army invaded the British territory, at her instigation, and under her orders, as Regent.

To allow the Prince, a child of eight years of age, to be trained up under

\* In Inclosure 2 in No. 7

the baneful influence of so unprincipled a mother, would not only be contrary to prudence, but would be a departure from the spirit of the treaty of Bhyrowal, and, in effect, would neutralize, and obstruct, the power expressly given to the British Government, for administering the affairs of the Punjab, during the Prince's minority.

There is, therefore, in the Governor-General's opinion, a sufficient justification, on political grounds, for separating the Prince from his mother, at the present moment. The docility of his disposition would render him helpless to resist the systematic efforts of a clever woman, in moulding his mind and sentiments according to her personal enmities, either against the chiefs, or the British Government. The interests of the Prince, and the fulfilment of the treaty, require that he should be protected from the effects of this influence, which can only be done by separating him from the Ranee.

But, in addition to these considerations of a political nature, the Governor-General is bound to be guided by the obligations which the British Government has contracted, when it consented to be the guardian of the young Prince, during his minority. The Government ought to take care, as he grows older, that he shall not be exposed to be contaminated by the evil example of so profligate a mother. At his age, the Prince ought to be taken out of the Zenana. It is a precaution which is necessary, even if the Ranee were well disposed to the Government, instead of being its bitter enemy, and, each month as the Prince advances in age, it becomes more imperatively the duty of the Government to separate him from his mother, considering the notoriety of her personal vices.

Under these circumstances, the Governor-General has no hesitation in deciding that a case has been made out, both on political, and moral, considerations, exclusive of the Preyma depositions, on which it is not deemed expedient to act; and his Lordship, therefore, authorizes you to take the necessary steps to remove Her Highness from Lahore. The Governor-General has no right to take any measures against Her Highness, merely on account of the immorality of her personal conduct, with which the Government of India has no concern, except in its capacity of guardian to the Prince, in not allowing him to be exposed to the danger of being brought up under so pernicious an example. In this view, the act is justified by the motive, and is dictated by the obvious duty of protecting the Prince, and the State.

The Governor-General would much prefer that the future residence of the Maharanee should be selected on the Trans-Sutlej side of the British frontier, rather than in our provinces on this side. His Lordship considers it desirable that the national scandal which may arise out of the public removal of Her Highness from Lahore, should be as much veiled, and be rendered as little offensive as possible towards the widow of Maharajah Runjeet Sing, and the mother of the Maharajah Duleep Sing, but, in selecting a residence for Her Highness on the other side of the Sutlej, it must be clearly understood that, on the first attempt on Her Highness's part to carry on any political intrigues, Her Highness will be removed into the British Provinces, or, if it should be absolutely necessary to remove the Ranee at once from the Punjab into the British Provinces, on the representation and solicitation of the native Council, every means will be adopted to prevent such an act from being considered as an affront to the Sikh people.

The Governor-General perceives a very natural timidity on the part of the Durbar to act with decision in this affair. It will be proper that you should have the distinct acquiescence of the Durbar in the removal of the Maharanee, before it takes place; but you are at liberty to inform the Durbar, and to let it be known by the public, that the Governor-General, acting as the guardian of the Prince, has deemed it his duty to separate the Prince from the Maharanee, on the grounds which you and the Council will give, as being the best calculated to satisfy the Sikh chiefs, the priests, and the community at large, provided that the reasons to be announced for this measure as proceeding from the Governor-General, are in accordance with the sentiments expressed in this letter.

It appears to his Lordship that this course will relieve you, and the Durbar, from the personal effects of any dissatisfaction which may possibly be the result of this decision. You will not fail, by this proof of your readiness, and that of the Governor-General, in supporting and protecting the Durbar, to encourage them to do their duty, and to afford you their willing co-operation in carrying on



the government. It ought to be, and the Governor-General has no doubt will be, the means of strengthening your hands for the future.

In conclusion, I am desired to observe that it does not appear, from the proceedings now submitted, what has become of Dewan Ah, Nehal, Preyma, and other parties implicated, with the exception of Boota, who is understood to be in confinement, but his Lordship is decidedly of opinion that sufficient evidence has transpired, on this trial, of their being concerned in a dangerous conspiracy, which should be visited with punishment.

The leniency with which, on any other occasion, their participation in such projects, so common of late years at Lahore, might be viewed,—must not be allowed, on the present, to influence his Lordship's decision. By the depositions which have been taken, and by the frequent consultations which have been held with the Durbar respecting the plot, it has obtained a notoriety which forbids us to put aside such strong presumptive evidence as altogether inconclusive, and to suffer the chief conspirators to escape with impunity.

It may be true that there is not enough on record to establish what particular scheme was aimed at by these men, but the indefiniteness of their views, (which was indeed to have been expected where no definite object could have been attained) by no means divests those views of the character of determined malice, extending even to schemes of assassination, and subversion of the existing Government, and those who were criminal enough to entertain them, have thus rendered themselves liable to be treated with the utmost severity.

His Lordship, therefore, desires, that all those men against whom you consider sufficient proof lies, or whose enlargement would be attended with injury to the State, and danger to the lives of the Councillors, should be imprisoned, for any length of time which the Durbar, with your concurrence, deem expedient, and proportioned to the nature of each man's guilt. Such punishment will be considered, by the criminals themselves, as slight, compared with their detected offence, which, no doubt, under the former Government, would have met with nothing less than capital punishment.

#### Inclosure 8 in No. 9

*The Resident at Lahore to the Secretary with the Governor-General.*

*Lahore, August 20, 1847.*

I LOST no time in putting myself in communication with the Council, but, accompanied by Mr. John Lawrence, and my assistant, Lieutenant Edwardes, had an interview, at daylight, with Sirdar Shere Sing, Dewan Deena Nath, and Raja Tej Sing, at the house of the latter. These three Sirdars, I need not inform you, are the leading and executive members of the ministry; and, anticipating his Lordship's decision in the present case, I had, two days before, at my own house, asked their private opinion as to the course to be pursued with the Ranee. They all advised her separation from her son, and then I acquainted them that I had recommended her removal to Hindostan. They concurred in the propriety of some such measure, and I begged them to make, quietly, such preparations as would enable them to move Her Highness into camp, upon an hour's notice. This had been done; and I now proceeded to discuss with them the most fitting place for the Maharanee's residence.

I am afraid that I have somewhat mistaken his Lordship's wishes on this point. The memorandum suggested the Trans-Sutlej side of the river, as preferable to the Cis; the object not being to punish Her Highness for her past intrigues, so much as to guard the Maharajah, for the future, from her pernicious example. I, therefore, not unnaturally, interpreted trans-Sutlej as applying to the Punjab, and advised the Sirdars to send the Ranee either to Kussoor, or Sheikhoopoor. In the fort at the former, she would have been well situated, under the eye of the Durbar, and significantly near to the British frontier, in case she should again dabble in revolutionary plots. Sheikhoopoor has also a fort, and was, for many years, the place of confinement of the mother of Maharajah Kurruck Sing. It is, moreover, in a quiet part of the country, away from the high road, in the midst of a Mussulman population, and affords accommodation very prior to that of Kussoor. I was not surprised, therefore, when the Sirdars chose Sheikhoopoor, and said it was the most suitable place in the whole

We then summoned the other members of the Council, and I, formally, communicated to them in a body the contents of the Governor-General's memorandum. The decided expression of his Lordship's opinion had the effect which was intended, and relieved the most timid from the embarrassment they might otherwise have felt in advising what they believed to be expedient, but which they were not sure would be acted on. The Sirdars unanimously concurred in the proposed measure, and an attempt was immediately made to separate the young Prince from the Maharanee, under pretence of an excursion to Shalimar. By this time, however, the sun was high up in the heavens, and His Highness was not inclined to go further than round the city; after which, he returned to the palace. It was agreed, therefore, to defer the Ranee's removal till the evening; and, to prevent accidents, Sirdar Shere Sing was desired to close the outer doors of the inner apartments of the palace, for the rest of the day. Having verbally expressed to the Sirdars the congratulations, on their late promotions, which his Lordship declares his intention of conveying to them by letter, and with which they were highly gratified, I returned home, first, enjoining the Ministers to keep their own counsel, and carry on every thing as usual, during the day.

On reaching the Residency, I found two letters awaiting me, one, from the Maharanee, asking for an interview, which, as being useless, I declined; and another, from the Governor-General's private secretary, detailing three places in the British trans-Sutlej territory (viz., Noorpoor, Chumba, and Kangra) as the most suitable for the Maharanee's residence, in the event of her removal. I regret that this should not have reached me sooner, both because it would have enabled me more fully to carry out the Governor-General's views, and because I quite agree with his Lordship in thinking that the Ranee would be much better out of the Punjab altogether. It was now, however, too late to re-agitate the matter, and as I believed the Sirdars were really not prepared to take, at once, so decided a step as sending Her Highness across the Sutlej, I contented myself with sending word, by my Meer Moonshee, of the receipt of the additional letter, and of its contents, leaving it to themselves, under the circumstances of the case, to adopt the alteration, or abide by their own arrangement. They deferred giving an answer until the evening.

At 5 P.M. I went to the usual evening Durbar, in the palace, accompanied by all my assistants, and found, as I expected, that the Sirdars were averse to sending the Ranee to Kangra. I expressed my decided opinion that that fort is a better abode for Her Highness than Sheikhoopoor, but, finding the chiefs decidedly averse to incur what they consider the odium of participating in effecting the banishment of the Maharanee, I yielded the point, and am not sure that they are not right. The unquiet spirit which could not content itself with the voluptuous freedom of the Summun Boorj, and an income of one and a-half lakhs of rupees, is not likely to slumber in the dull seclusion of Sheikhoopoor, and be pleased with the large reduction of allowances, which I shall now deem it my duty to advise. I can only regard, therefore, this removal to Sheikhoopoor (and I am not alone in the Council of this opinion) as the first step to the final banishment of Ranee Jhunda from the country which she has so long disturbed.

In the course of the morning, the guards and artillery, (two companies of infantry, 200 Sowars, and two guns) intended to escort Her Highness to Sheikhoopoor, were passed over the Ravee, and it only remained to separate the young Prince, with as little pain as possible, from his mother. A trip to Shalimar was proposed, and he went away with pleasure, attended by Sirdar Golab Sing Attareewala, brother of Sirdar Shere Sing, a fine young lad, who seems very well behaved, and a fit companion for the little King. I then drew the ministry aside, and told them that the sooner they communicated the real state of affairs to the Ranee, and started her on her journey the better. Sirdar Heera Sing, the Ranee's brother, was deputed to carry her the evil tidings. Much frightened on his own account, he consented, and returned with very humble assurances from his sister that she was ready to do anything she was told. Thus encouraged, the chiefs proceeded to procure palankeens, elephants, carriages, and everything requisite to conduct the Ranee in all the comfort, and honor, which circumstances admitted of. I, particularly, and repeatedly, directed that no search should be made of the property of Her Highness, or any of her women, but that she herself should be asked to leave one or two confidential slaves to bring away, after her, unquestioned, whatever jewels, money, clothes, or other valuables she left behind; so that, (to quote my own

words) "no room should be left for Her Highness to say afterwards, that she had been robbed of this or that." Raja Tej Sing values the jewels, gold, &c., which she had thus given up to her, at not less than six lakhs of rupees. I proposed to Sirdar Heera Sing to remain in charge of his sister's property, during the night; but he begged to be excused; and, finally, it was arranged that Maggy, the slave-girl next in estimation to Mungla, with another trusted female servant, should remain. To prevent accidents on the road, as also to prevent the possibility of outrage, I desired Sirdar Urjan Sing, Runganuglia, and Sirdar Goormukh Sing Sumba, to accompany the cortège to Sheikhoopoor, and enjoined them, as well as several of the inferior agents, that they were to be careful to pay all proper respect to Her Highness, and to be most careful of her person. At 8 o'clock, we left the palace, and returned home, Mr Bowring alone remaining to comfort the Sirdars, who still seemed to expect a scene. At 9 p.m., Mr Bowring returned to the Residency, and reported Her Highness's departure without any crying or angry words, but Race Hursurun Doss, my chief news-writer, (whom I directed to see the cortège across the Ravee) reported, this morning, that the Ranees soon recovered her usual spirits, and was at last violent in her threats "to appeal to London." As yet, there has not been time to hear of Her Highness's arrival at Sheikhoopoor, but, as the distance is not more than thirty miles from Lahore, I expect she will reach in safety, early to-day.

The charge of the Maharanees in Sheikhoopoor has been given to Sirdar Boorh Sing, brother of the Boodh Sing who died defending Maharajah Shere Sing, when he was murdered by the Sindanwallahs at Shah Bulawul. The Durbar proposed, very sagaciously, to relieve the guard of the fort every fifteen days.

The Maharajah is still at Shalimar, where the chiefs think it will be better he should stay and amuse himself for a day or two, instead of returning so soon to the palace after his mother's departure. Sirdar Shere Sing asked me, this morning, how the news should be broken to the young Prince; and, as the Sirdar said that, although a boy, the Maharajah had already begun to understand his mother's character, and the impropriety of sundry goings on in the palace, I advised a plain, but kind, statement of the real truth, viz. that the Maharanees's reputation was so notorious, her vices so incorrigible, and her example so pernicious, that the Governor-General thought it wrong to leave him with her any longer. Word has just been brought that the Maharajah took this disclosure with much indifference, is deeply engaged in playing, and sent me his salaam.

Annexed is a proclamation that I have requested the Durbar to circulate throughout the country, expressing, as desired by the Governor-General, the grounds on which his Lordship has ordered the separation of the Maharanees from her son, the Maharajah.

I have little doubt it will satisfy all reasonable minds, of the propriety of the measure, though it must be expected that some few will pretend to misconstrue our motives. As the Ranees emerged from the palace, two of the armed attendants at the gate went up to her palankeen, and, in presence of the Sirdars, told her that their power was gone, or they would assist her. I impute their conduct rather to a mistaken sense of duty than to evil intention.

The duty that has devolved on me has been one of a very unpleasant nature, but I have endeavoured to execute it with as much delicacy as possible, consistent with the preservation of the peace. It may appear harsh to have so abruptly separated parent and child, but, by no other means, could the measure have been effected, without some unseemly scene that could have done no good, even to the unfortunate lady, and might have left a lastingly injurious impression on the young Maharajah's mind.

I have only to add, that part of the message which the Ranees sent to the Sirdars by Heera Sing, yesterday evening, was that, instead of going to Sheikhoopoor, she would rather be allowed to go on pilgrimage. By this, I understood Benares, and doubt not Her Highness had some faint vision of seeing Raja Lal Sing again. Should Her Highness continue in the same mind, the Sirdars would, I dare say, not object to gratify her wish to visit the British Provinces, and I see little objection to her going to Hurdwar and Benares, with a small train, on terms of, eventually, residing at such place as might be fixed by Government. Kangra is, however, itself a place of pilgrimage, and Jawala Mookhee, as well as other shrines, are in its neighbourhood.

## Inclosure 9 in No. 9.

*A General Proclamation, for the information of the Chiefs of the Lahore Durbar, the Priests, Elders, and People of the Countries belonging to Maharajah Duleep Sing.*

*Lahore, August 20, 1847.*

THE Right Honorable the Governor-General of India, taking into consideration the friendly relations subsisting between the Lahore and British Governments, and the tender age of Maharajah Duleep Sing, feels the interest of a father in the education, and guardianship, of the young Prince

With this end in view, it appeared to the Governor-General to have become absolutely necessary to separate the Maharajah from the Maharanee, his mother; an opinion in which the Durbar perfectly coincided: accordingly, on the 19th day of August, 1847, Her Highness left the palace of Lahore, and was taken to Sheikhoopoor.

The reasons for this step are shortly these: First, that, at the time of the making of the Treaty of Bhyrowal, it was considered necessary to exclude Her Highness the Maharanee from all share in the administration of public affairs; and that she should have a separate maintenance appointed her, to enable her to pass the rest of her life in honorable retirement. Notwithstanding this, Her Highness has, ever since, been intriguing to disturb the Government, and carried her opposition to the Ministers so far as quite to embarrass and impede the public business.

Secondly. The Maharajah is now a child, and he will grow up in the way he is trained. It was only too probable, therefore, that his mother would instil into him her own bitter feelings of hostility to the chiefs, and that he would have thus grown up at variance with the Sirdars, and Ministers, of his kingdom. This could not be allowed. The young Prince should be reared up in the cultivation of every natural and acquired excellence of mind and disposition, so that, at the expiration of the present treaty, peace should be preserved, by the kindly understanding existing between the Maharajah and all classes of his subjects, a blessing which could not be hoped for, if the young Prince remained with his mother.

Thirdly. So long as Her Highness the Maharanee occupied the Lahore Palace, strangers visited her without restriction, and every seditious intriguer who was displeased with the present order of things, looked up to the Queen-Mother as the head of the State; some of them even went so far as to plan the subversion of the restored Khalsa Government.

Let all ranks, therefore, rejoice, throughout the kingdom, that the Right Honorable the Governor-General of India has so much at heart the peace and security of this country, the firm establishment of the State, and the honor of the Maharajah, and his Ministers.

## Inclosure 10 in No. 9.

*The Secretary with the Governor-General to the Resident at Lahore.*

*Simla, August 28, 1847.*

I AM directed to express the approbation, and entire concurrence, of the Governor-General in the propriety of all your proceedings. His Lordship considers that the proclamation\* is well suited for the purpose for which it is intended.

## Inclosure 11 in No. 9.

*John Lawrence, Esq., Commissioner and Superintendent of the Trans-Sutlej States, on duty at Lahore, to the Secretary with the Governor-General.*

*Lahore, August 23, 1847*

LIEUTENANT-COLONEL LAWRENCE, C.B., left Lahore on the 21st instant at 7 P.M.

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\* August 20. Inclosure 9 in No. 9.

The Maharajah being at Shalimar, it was resolved, in communication with the members of the Council, that a Durbar should be held in those gardens, when the Resident should take his leave, and I should present the letter of the Governor-General deputing me to Lahore in his place. Accordingly, all the political officers at Lahore waited on His Highness the Maharajah, at 5 p.m. We were received with much politeness by the Maharajah, and, with the exception of a slight shade of sadness, I observed no change from his ordinary demeanour. It was the first Durbar, since the removal of the Maharanee. All the chiefs in Lahore were in attendance, and, whether it was owing to Colonel Lawrence's departure, or from the circumstances which had lately occurred regarding the Maharanee, they evinced more than the usual marks of attention and civility. They accompanied the Resident to his carriage, repeatedly shaking hands with him, and expressing their hopes for his speedy return.

## No. 10

*The Governor-General to the Secret Committee*

Simla, September 5, 1847 (No. 63.)

I TAKE this opportunity of forwarding a copy of a dispatch\* from the Officiating Resident, Mr John Lawrence, reporting on the state of the Punjab generally, on the occasion of his assuming, temporarily, the duties of the Resident at Lahore, during the absence of Lieutenant-Colonel Lawrence at Simla.

You will be glad to learn, from the above report, that complete tranquillity exists in the Punjab

## Inclosure 1 in No. 10

*Captain James Abbott, Boundary Commissioner, to the Resident at Lahore.**Camp, Simulkund, August 5, 1847.*

HAVING in vain cited to my Court the chiefs of Simulkund (marginally noted)† to answer for the most dastardly and deliberate murder of women and children at Bukkur, I begged Lieutenant Nicholson, in political charge of Sind Sagui, to move up his force to Huzroo, so that, in a single movement, he might fall upon Simulkund.

This being effected, and Lieutenant Nicholson finding it advisable to assume a still more advanced position at Ghazee, I, at 10 o'clock on Monday night, the 2nd instant, marched from Kot, at the head of about 350 bayonets, (Colonel Richpal Sing's regiment) over the Gundgurl mountain, upon Simulkund, whilst Sirdar Jhunda Sing, under my instructions, marched from Hurkish-rugurh, by the same route, at the same hour, with a wing of Dhara Sing's corps, some cavalry, and fifteen zumboorahs.

Lieutenant Nicholson's two columns arrived at Simulkund, shortly after sunrise. He found the place entirely abandoned, and took possession. The rear companies of my column, owing to the straggling of their files through the negligence of the officers, got separated from the van, in the ascent of the mountain, and took, in consequence, the wrong path, so that I was detained nearly two hours at the summit. I arrived, of course, later than I had anticipated, and found the place occupied by Lieutenant Nicholson's corps.

Sirdar Jhunda Sing's column arrived about two hours after me, the excessive negligence of Colonel Dhara Sing, in leaving his corps unprovided with flints, until the very hour appointed for march, having detained it.

I had, for some time past, held but faint hopes of capturing the murderers, for, since the submission of Khan Zeman, and the majority of the Tarkhails, it was necessary to inform them of the operations proposed, lest they should apprehend the invasion of their own possessions; and, although I delayed this to the

\* Inclosure 3 in No. 10.

† Ahmed Khan, Sirdar Khan, Atar Mohamed Khan, Golam Mohamed Khan, Shu Mohamed Khan, Dilal Khan, Mahomed Khan

latest possible moment, there was space sufficient to warn men who had already prepared themselves for flight, by sending their families and cattle to other lands. In spite of the exercise of all my influence, and although the murderers have blood feuds with those who must be privy to their escape, I have not been able to track their footsteps, and have little hope of their apprehension.

Meanwhile, I am occupying the place with Lieutenant Nicholson and my own force, and am preparing to erect a castle, to prevent the return of the fugitives. The detention here of nearly the whole force will be necessary for this purpose.

I trust that, with a garrison here, and a cantonment in the neighbourhood for the Hussan Abdal force, the whole of this disturbed district may be reduced to order. The Mushwains of Srikote clash with Government, chiefly by affording shelter to fugitives from this horde of robbers and assassins. The presence of a garrison in Simulkund can alone break the neck of this brotherhood, and, when they are put down, the Mushwains may become good subjects. Should this hope fail of being realized, it will be easy to assail them, and re-establish the ruined fort at Srikote.

It is an important feature in the character of this people that, however odious the character of any Zemindar, or however much it may tend to their own interest to bring the culprit to retribution, no one, not even those of the kindred, who would themselves slay him wherever found, will betray him to the Government for trial. Hence, in a country so wild and difficult, the apprehension of murderers, and outlaws, becomes almost impossible, for I have refused to sanction the private murder of such malefactors, by setting a reward upon their heads.

Inclosure 2 in No. 10.

2337

*The Resident at Lahore to the Secretary with the Governor-General.*

*Lahore, August 14, 1847.*

I INCLOSE a report, from Captain James Abbott, of a combined military movement, by that officer and Lieutenant Nicholson, against the robbers of Simulkund, a ridge of the Gundgurb mountain. The attack has failed in its main object, viz., the apprehension of certain murderers, and robbers. But the military occupation of the country, and the erection of a fort commanding it, will be a severe punishment to the offenders, and an example to the neighbourhood. I have told Captain Abbott to beware of leaving so weak a detachment as may, by possibility, be cut off. The troops will remain in the neighbourhood, until the fort is erected, and in all points defensible.

I have called the attention of the Durbar to the negligence of Dhara Sing. The presence of such officers as Captain Abbott and Lieutenant Nicholson will soon improve the discipline, and arrangements, of the troops within their superintendence. The officers are the worst portion of the Sikh army, and, as yet, we have not had time to separate the bad from the good.

Captain Abbott has judiciously agreed to give employment to 200 of Khan Zeman's followers, who, I have desired, may be sent to Dera Ismael Khan, to assist in garrisoning forts in that direction, keeping not above fifty in one place.

The fact of Khan Zeman Khan having gone into Captain Abbott, will do much to pacificate the country; he is, perhaps, the most powerful of many chiefs in that neighbourhood, who would never attend on the Sikh governors. He, however, waited on Mr. Agnew, but, being disappointed at not immediately obtaining all he expected, was inclined to return to his old ways, and, perhaps, would have done so, had it not been distinctly intimated to him, and all, that, though every consideration would be shown to those who submitted, and behaved well, no exertions would be spared to punish offenders against the law.

## Inclosure 3 in No. 10.

*The Acting Resident at Lahore to the Secretary with the Governor-General.*

*Lahore, August 28, 1847.*

LAHORE is perfectly tranquil, and the departure of the Maharanee seems to have hardly been noticed by the native community.

The Maharanee, since her arrival at Sheikhoopoor, has affected to be well pleased with the change, but is evidently chafing under the restraint imposed on her. The members of the Council are anxious regarding her safe custody, and, this morning, hinted to me that they did not consider Sirdar Boorh Sing a sufficiently trustworthy person, and that they wished the entire guardianship to be made over to Sirdar Shere Sing; but that they wished the suggestion to come from me. I do not think that too many precautions can be taken regarding her. Such is her spirit, energy, and intriguing habit, that I am persuaded she will leave no stone unturned to revenge herself on her enemies, and recover her independence. Admonition and warning for her are all in vain. The members of the Council informed me, this day, that they had resolved to resume Sirdar Heera Sing's jagheers, and to give him a monthly stipend of 1,000 rupees, requiring him to live at Deenanuggur. I think they are right personally, he can never be dangerous; his vices and want of intellect will ever insure it, but his money might be effectively employed by the friends and adherents of his sister the Maharanee. The Council also propose reducing the Maharanee's allowance to 4,000 rupees a-month, which appears to be ample to supply her, and her retinue, with everything that is necessary.

The Maharajah does not occupy the apartments in which the Maharanee lived, having, of his own accord, preferred residing in the Tukthgur. His Highness is as courteous and gentlemanlike in demeanour as ever, and (probably from being so tutored) seems anxious to evince that he does not feel annoyed with the British Representative, for the separation from the Maharanee. This morning, on my saluting him, when entering the Durbar, to my surprise, and the delight of his attendants, he exclaimed, "Good morning," very distinctly, in English. On my expressing my admiration at his progress in the language, I was informed that His Highness had resolved to learn English.

The accounts from Peshawur continue to be favorable. From Hazara, I have heard nothing from Captain Abbott, since his failure against the inhabitants of Simulkund, but, from the native accounts, matters appear to be going on satisfactorily. Lieutenant Nicholson is in the vicinity of Rawul Pindie and Gheba, the Zemindars of those tracts, by his accounts, are highly assessed, and impoverished, the crops, during the last season, are also stated to have suffered from locusts.

I received, on the 20th instant, a return from Lieutenant Taylor of the Dhurmurths of Aivin, a pergunnah of Maharajah Golab Sing's, in Cashmere, with the orders His Highness had passed. It struck me that the Maharajah had been sufficiently liberal. What I think is much more required in Cashmere, and over the Punjab, is a light and moderate assessment. The Maafeedars are but a class, and that not the most influential. A moderate, and certain, land-tax, for a term of years, would be felt as a general benefit by the whole country.

From what I have seen of the past history of the trans-Sutlej territory, and of the Punjab generally, it appears that the land-tax under the Sikhs has usually been calculated at one-half the gross produce. The same proportion seems also to prevail in Cashmere. It is impossible that agriculture can flourish under such demands, and that the occupiers of lands can be otherwise than poverty stricken. There can never be contentment and prosperity in the country until the Government demand is reduced and equalised, and the agriculturists secured from all demands but those of the State, fixed on the principles of moderation and equity.

The finances of the Lahore Durbar are certainly not in a prosperous condition. By the return lately submitted to the Governor-General, there is a surplus of 29 lakhs and upwards, but, out of this sum, the annual commutation payable to the British Government, and the extra expenses consequent on the new system of paying councillors, adawluttees, and nazims, must be defrayed. A re-

form of the customs, as well as the land-tax, all absolutely necessary, will, probably, not involve a sacrifice of less than from 12 to 15 lakhs of rupees. I do not mention these things to raise difficulties, or to give a gloomy view to matters. I can see how much has been done, since last year, in the reform, and reduction, of the army, the payment of their arrears, and the good spirit which pervades many of the influential classes; but I cannot fail also to observe that there are still no ordinary difficulties to be encountered, and overcome.

Mooltan is perfectly quiet, but I think that Dewan Moolraj is losing some of the popularity he hitherto enjoyed, and that he has become more grasping than formerly.

Inclosure 4 in No. 10.

*The Secretary with the Governor-General to the Acting Resident*

*Simla, September 3, 1847*

THE Governor-General is not surprised to hear that, although the Maharanee outwardly affects to be well satisfied with her changed position, Her Highness is really impatient of the restraints imposed upon her, and the Governor-General fully concurs with you in the propriety of adopting every proper precaution to guard against the schemes of resistance, and revenge, which a person of her restless spirit and energy may attempt, for the purpose of recovering her lost position, and influence.

With this view, the Governor-General approves of the entire guardianship of Her Highness being made over to a person of the station and character of Sirdar Shere Sing, and his Lordship is also inclined to approve of the resolution of the Council to resume Sirdar Heera Sing's jagheers, granting him a monthly allowance of 1,000 rupees in lieu, and also of their intention to reduce the Maharanee's allowances to 4,000 rupees a month. The stipends thus proposed, for both sister and brother, are ample for every necessary purpose, and for the maintenance of both in dignity and comfort—while, if a larger amount of funds were placed at the disposal of either, it is probable that such would be employed for purposes inimical to the public interests.

The Governor-General entirely concurs with you that a revenue settlement for a term of years—fixed on principles of moderation and equity, and the limitation of all demands on the agriculturist to some specified amount, abolishing all those vexatious cesses, and exactions, which now are permitted to exist, to the great detriment of the State—would prove the measure best calculated to insure the prosperity of the country, and to place it upon some sure foundation.

The Governor-General had, I am desired to state, every reason to be well satisfied with the able manner in which you conducted the arduous duties at Lahore, during the absence of the Resident last year, and his Lordship has the utmost confidence that, on your present deputation, you will not fail to carry on the duty, with the same energy and intelligence.

No 11.

*The Governor-General to the Secret Committee.*

*Simla, September 20, 1847. (No. 65.)*

THE Lahore Durbar has issued a proclamation, granting pensions to officers, and soldiers, of the Sikh army, for long service, or who may be disabled by wounds, or sickness; also pensions to the families of those killed in action. I expressed my satisfaction with the above measures.

This dispatch contains a statement of the new system of customs about to be introduced throughout the Lahore territory, which I have no doubt will afford to all the poorer classes the greatest satisfaction, by abolishing, or reducing, duties on several articles of food of the most ordinary and general consumption, and which, by simplifying the collection of the customs and excise, will be a source of great contentment to the whole community of the Punjab.



## Inclosure 1 in No 11.

*The Acting Resident to the Secretary with the Governor-General.**Lahore, August 31, 1847.*

THE Durbar's proclamations prohibiting "slave-dealing," the "seizure of beggars," "suttee," and "infanticide," have been duly circulated throughout the province. To show the state to which slave-dealing had reached, I may here mention, that I have now a petition under investigation, by which it would appear a mother, her two sons, and daughter, were sold for eighty rupees! I have not heard of any cases of suttee, or infanticide, since my arrival, nor do I believe either of these practices prevail in this quarter.

## Inclosure 2 in No 11.

*The Acting Resident to the Secretary with the Governor-General.**Lahore, September 13, 1847.*

I HAVE the honor to submit the annexed statement, showing, in a concise form, the result of the new system of customs, which, with the consent of the members of the Council, is about to be introduced throughout the Lahore territory. In the statement are exhibited the articles on which customs have hitherto been levied, those which will now be exempted from all duty, those on which duties will, for the future, be raised, but in a very modified shape, and, lastly, the estimated amount of revenue which will be collected.

The reform of the customs will embrace the whole territory under the Lahore Government, except Mooltan, which yields about three lakhs, for which especial arrangements with Dewan Moolraj, modifying the engagements of last year between him and the Durbar, will be necessary, before extending the system into that province. It was, therefore, deemed better to except Mooltan for the present, and try the experiment of a change of system, in the rest of the territory, in the first instance.

The statement shows that, under forty-eight heads, the customs yielded a gross revenue of 16,37,114 rupees, collected at an expense of 1,10,000 rupees, equal to something less than seven per cent, while the reformed customs, limited to twenty-two sources, are estimated to yield 13,04,822 rupees, at a cost of but 37,000 rupees, or less than 3 per cent. By the new system, the duties are abolished, or modified, in thirty-five instances, and one new tax, that of ferry-tolls, introduced.

The customs which have been remitted, are those which press chiefly on the poorer classes, being derived from duties on corn, ghee, vegetables, and fuel, on which four items alone, the revenue amounted to 3,67,590 rupees. Tobacco also has been exempted, because it is produced in the country, and the revenue was collected by a town duty. The new revenue will arise from a change in the management of the abkarry system, whereby the native venders of spirits will have to take out licenses, by the introduction of a light toll on ferries; and an improvement in the management of the salt mines. The new imposts will hardly be felt, while the relief will be great and palpable.

It is not, however, simply that the customs have been limited to twenty-two articles that constitutes the only benefit of the new system. That advantage, however great, is hardly more valuable than the general relief which the country will obtain, by the withdrawal of all the custom-houses, which now hamper internal trade, and depress native industry. The extortion, and insolence, of custom-officers, the delays, vexation, and damage to property, attendant on its examination, will then be confined to the frontier: there will be simply import and export duties, those of transit and town being abolished. The evils, and oppression, of the existing system may be thus exemplified:—At Umritsur, a duty is levied on entering the town; on the transfer of the article from the great mart to the shops; and, subsequently, a third duty is demanded, should it be carried from the shop into the interior of the country.

The town and transit duties being abolished, there will remain three

frontier lines—one for goods coming from the eastward, to run along the Beas and Sutlej; one on the Indus, for the northern trade, and the third on the north-east frontier, for the commerce of Cashmere.

The general result of the new arrangement, therefore, is that, with the loss of 2,22,292 rupees of revenue, taxes to the amount of 6,62,192 rupees have been abolished, among which were included the chief necessities of life; the whole country has been freed from transit and town duties, and the customs confined to import and export duties; and, therefore, that a clearance on the frontier will now free the trader from annoyance, through the length and breadth of the land. On the proposed arrangements being laid before the Durbar, its members expressed themselves much pleased with the result. They seemed to have expected to lose half the revenue, and were greatly surprised that, with the loss of an eighth, so great a change could be effected.

I have proposed to the Durbar, and they have assented, that the whole of the customs of the country should be placed under the superintendence of Misrs Rulla Ram and Sahib Dyal, father and son, two of the most intelligent, respectable, and influential men in the Punjab. They are to render accounts every fifteen days, one copy direct to the Resident, one to the Durbar, and they are to appoint, and remove, the subordinate officials, and to obey no orders but those countersigned by the Resident.

By the excise on salt, the revenue will be increased one-third, without, it is supposed, raising the price to the consumer. The contractors are to pay six lakhs of revenue, by monthly instalments, to undertake the whole expense of management, and sell the mineral at two rupees per maund to the merchant. The salt duties now yield but four lakhs, and, such is the execrable mode of management that scarce a rupee has, this year, been paid into the treasury, the merchants having received credit for the duty they should have paid in cash.

Finally, I may add that, though the loss of revenue is estimated at 2,22,292 rupees, it may fairly be anticipated that it will not amount to this sum. The stimulus to trade and industry, by the change of system, will, probably, increase trade, and the consumption of dutiable articles.

Under any circumstances, the immediate benefit to the community is great, and the prospects for the future are favorable. Politically, the measure will be as advantageous as the benefits to the country are solid and palpable. The community cannot fail to see that British interference has, already, given the people the inestimable benefits of peace and security. It has subdued, and restrained, the violence of the soldiery, while it has ameliorated their condition. It has not only saved the lives of the aristocracy, but added to their wealth and importance. Its fruits are now to be extended to the merchant, and consumer. We want but a reform of the land-tax to complete the good work, a reform which will, directly, affect the condition of the agriculturist, and, indirectly, every class in the country. This would be an easy and simple task, were the British Government the ruling power, in our present position, it will be a more difficult matter, for we shall have to work with the Durbar officials, over whom our superintendence and control must necessarily be incomplete.

Having once placed affairs on their proper footing, having removed every impost and obnoxious cess, it will then but remain to introduce such rules as will insure the revenue being paid into the public treasury, and its economical expenditure.

It is right that I record in this report, that the reform of the customs was the design of the Resident, who had discussed, and arranged, a considerable portion of the details, previous to my arrival. I have but completed, and carried out, the principles which he originated.

P.S.—The only tax which has been remitted, which appears to admit of a doubt, is that on gamblers, which yields a considerable sum. Those who are in favor of the tax, argue that people will, under any circumstances, gamble, and, by taxing the practice, you limit, and restrain, and bring it under control. I do not concur in this view. Experience has shown me that there is much more gambling where it is taxed, and, therefore, legalized, than where absolutely prohibited. So much danger in the latter case attaches to the practice, that it soon becomes confined to a narrow circle. Gambling is then considered as a misdemeanor, and is punished as such.

## Inclosure 3 in No 11.

*The Secretary with the Governor-General to the Acting Resident.**Simla, September 20, 1847.*

IT appears to his Lordship that these arrangements ought to be printed, and largely distributed, as it is expedient that the community should be acquainted with the state of the law, and that it may be perceived that, in the remission of taxes, and duties, selection has been made of those necessities of life which the poorer classes consume

## No 12.

*The Governor-General to the Secret Committee**October 4, 1847 (No 69)*

THE sentences have been passed on the prisoners concerned in the Preyma plot. The individual of that name, and six others, are to be sent out of the Punjab, to Delhi, to undergo their sentences. The usual warrant has been issued under my orders.

I have to request your attention to the letter of Mr. John Lawrence, of the 25th ultimo,\* which contains a clear, convincing, business-like statement of the revenue system which has recently been introduced into the Punjab, and to which measure I adverted, in my last dispatch, in terms of high, but just, praise.

## Inclosure 1 in No 12

*The Acting Resident to the Secretary with the Governor-General**Lahore, September 10, 1847*

I SUBMIT a letter which I have, this day, addressed to Major Lawrence, the principal Assistant to the Resident of Lahore, stationed at Peshawur. Should his Lordship approve of its tenor and purport, I do not anticipate that Major Lawrence will have any difficulty in effecting a settlement of all the Khalsa portions of Peshawur, during the ensuing cold weather.

Colonel Lawrence was, for some months, busily employed in obtaining returns, with the view to a settlement, with much fuller details than I propose, and many of them had already been received, previous to his departure. I merely suggest for Peshawur a simpler, not a better, statement, in order that we may be certain to get them at an early date.

The members of the Durbar express themselves perfectly willing that a settlement be introduced throughout the Punjab; indeed, Dewan Deena Nath, the only one of them whose opposition was to be anticipated, expressed his concurrence to the Resident, previous to his departure for Simla. I think that Major Lawrence will, probably, have less difficulty in obtaining the necessary data than we should have, at Lahore, for other portions of the Punjab, for he will not experience the secret, and interested, opposition of the native officials of the Durbar, who now benefit by the want of system, and mystery, which prevail in every branch of the financial administration.

A thorough reform of the evils which, at present, beset the management of the revenue and finance administration, can only be the result of much time and labor, but a very great improvement can easily be effected. A division of the labor and responsibility which now entirely devolve on Dewan Deena Nath, and a rapid settlement, and reform, of the system of customs, and revenue, are the measures which appear to me to be necessary.

As regards the customs, much had been done to smoothen the way for their reform, before Colonel Lawrence left Lahore. I have now completed what was still required, to the satisfaction of the Durbar, and shall, in a separate report, lay

\* Inclosure 6 in No. 12.

before the Governor-General the result. I shall only here add, that both Colonel Lawrence and I propose to make their management an entirely separate department, over which the Dewan shall have no control individually. We propose that Misr Megraj shall have the entire control over the treasury, that he be obliged to keep a daily account of receipts and disbursements, to be countersigned, periodically, by the Resident, and one of his assistants, and that no voucher, for any item of expenditure, be valid without the Resident's signature.

As regards the management of the land revenue, the completion of a settlement, by which the amount demandable from every village shall be defined, with punctual returns of the collections, will soon work a change. At present, every Kardar does pretty much as he pleases: he is virtually a large renter, not a mere collector, of the land tax. His principle is to realize as much, and pay as little, as possible; there being no exact record of Government demand in any case, and, in many instances, it varying with each season, the calling him to account is too often a mere mockery. He can give in what account he pleases, and, provided he stands well with the officials at Lahore, usually escapes with impunity. It is no doubt true that the Durbar have returns of what is considered the revenue of every rubbee of a large portion of the country villages, and, in settling with the Kardars, these documents are then referred to, and the Government demand against them is limited to the revenue thus exhibited. But the Kardar does not thus act towards the proprietors of the soil, from them he takes as much as he can. In a bad year, he will not collect less than what he pays the Government, in a good year, a great deal more. In this way, all Peshawur had a settlement, yet Major Lawrence informs me that it is in the hands of Izaradars, who collect as they please. The Trans-Sutlej territory also had a nominal revenue, yet the village accounts showed that from 25 to 30 per cent. in addition was taken, and such is the rule throughout the country, otherwise, it would be impossible to account for the rapid fortunes which those intrusted with the revenue accumulate in a few years. Some districts, as Mooltan, Jhung, and, formerly, Cashmere, were in the hands of Nazims, who literally farmed them, and collected as they pleased. I see little difference, in practice, between the one system and the other. With a fixed and recorded revenue to collect, the Kardar can neither plunder the people, nor defraud the Government, to any great extent, without discovery. He can, at a moment's notice, be relieved of his charge, and called to account. Experience has shown that, when once much in arrears, it is nearly impossible to recover balances from the Kardars: they should, therefore, be obliged to account for the collection weekly, and be suspended from employment for the first neglect of this rule.

If the plan of a summary settlement be approved, Major Lawrence might assess Peshawur, Captain Abbott is now engaged in Hazara, General Cortlandt might assist Lieutenant Edwardes in Dera Ismael Khan, and the country beyond the Indus, in that quarter, Mr Cocks might undertake the tract which was severed from Mooltan last year. For the Sind Sagur Doab, an experienced officer would be required, and, perhaps, Mr Vans Agnew might be available. East of the Jhelum, the assessment might be performed under the eye of the Resident himself, by Dewan Deena Nath, or some person in his office, in whom the Durbar have confidence, and Sirdar Lehna Sing might be intrusted with the Manjha, or country round about Umrutur.

In this way, I can see no reason why a summary settlement of the land tax, throughout the Punjab, should not be effected in a single year. This being done, and a copy of the rent-roll in our hands, and regular returns, bi-monthly coming to us, as well as to the Durbar, from the Kardars, no great difficulty could, then, arise. Not only, however, is it necessary that such a system be introduced, but that European energy and honesty be brought in direct contact with the finances, to keep them in order. It is, for this reason, that I think that direct reports from the Treasury, Customs, and Revenue should be made to the Resident. More direct interference even may, at times, be required: certainly, nothing short of it will, I believe, prove effectual.

## Inclosure 2 in No 12.

*The Acting Resident to Major Lawrence, at Peshawur.*

*Lahore, September 10, 1847.*

AS I observe that the revenue of Peshawur is not in as satisfactory a state as it might be, being generally in the hands of farmers, who rent, from the Government, large tracts from which they collect pretty much as they please; it strikes me, as being highly desirable, that arrangements be made for the introduction of a better system,—a system by which that which is levied from the people, shall all, or nearly all, come into the Exchequer, by which the Government demand shall be rendered fixed and certain, and every man shall know what he has to pay, and to whom he is responsible for the amount.

The farmers, or *izaradars*, of Peshawur will, probably, tell you that the system I propose introducing is impracticable, that the people are wild and unruly, that they will make away with their crops, and that the Government officers will never be able to collect the assessments. This, however, I do not believe. The Government officials, if men of energy, activity, and experience, can never fail where a farmer will succeed. Moreover, as my plan will afford the agricultural community an immediate, and sensible, relief from taxation, as it will consolidate, or do away with, numerous vexatious cesses, I feel certain that the people have only to thoroughly understand our object to further it in every way they can.

In the Trans-Sutlej territory, I was, at first, met with such representations from interested parties, and even, in some instances, my offers were refused by the cultivators, particularly where the system of collections in kind prevailed. Gradually, however, all opposition gave way, and, as I proceeded, I found my work become every day easier, until, at last, whole villages belonging to *Jagheer-dars*, and even beyond our frontier, earnestly besought me to arrange for them, as I had done for the Government villages.

What I propose is, that you make a summary settlement of the revenue in Peshawur, for a term of three years, to be continued, or modified, as may be thought necessary, at the expiration of that period. I know little of the details of the revenue of Peshawur, and what proportion of the actual produce is supposed to remain with the occupier of land, after making good all demands of the State, but, judging from what I have seen in the territory lately ceded to the British Government, and what I can ascertain on enquiry here, I believe that the Government demand, with the exaction of *Kardars*, exceeds, rather than falls short of, half the gross produce. I have no doubt also, that if you limit your demand to one-third, the Government will lose little, or nothing, perhaps, on the whole, gain. They will, certainly, do so in a course of years. But, even supposing that the result is a considerable reduction in the rent-roll, the sacrifice will be nothing, compared with the contentment and satisfaction which will ensue. A country in which the land-tax is lightly and equally fixed, is a country pacified; without it, every other remedy will prove fruitless, and with it, almost any other evil will be endured.

I consider that you will have no difficulty in assessing the whole province, in three months\*, if you pursue the plan which I am about to propose, beginning with the districts round Peshawur, where the people are most tractable, and their condition and means most easily ascertained. As you proceed to a distance from the capital, and come in contact with wilder people, and poorer lands, the report of your light taxation will go before you, and smooth your difficulties. It is possible that especial arrangements for particular localities will be required, and even that, in some instances, your plans may for a time be frustrated, but depend on it that, in the end, the most unruly and turbulent will yield where their interests will be so palpably consulted.

In saying that one-third of the produce may be considered a fair demand, I by no means propose that you should invariably exact that proportion. In all cases, after taking into consideration every demand, I would fix the revenue so as

\* The whole revenue is but 13,60,812 rupees,—including jagheers and customs, with which you will not interfere, your work, therefore, will embrace about six lakhs of revenue, in round numbers.

to leave the villagers not only sufficiently well off absolutely, but relatively better off than they have, hitherto, been. In wild, desolate, and thinly peopled tracts a fourth, a fifth, or even a sixth, is, probably, not paid to Government.

I annex a form of statement which I suggest that you circulate to all the izaradars, or farmers, to fill up, and get them, if possible, all in, before you commence operations, in order that the statement may be as correct as possible. In the office of Nazim of Peshawur, you will no doubt find records of the collections of past years, on account of the Government demand, for every village in the country. Your people should prepare a village statement of past receipts, for a series of years. The Kardar's statements, and this return, cannot fail to throw considerable light on the revenue-statistics of the country, and the capability of the villages. You will find the descendants of Canoonzees, and other provincial officers, both capable, and anxious, to give you information, and you will be able, during the ensuing cold weather, to ride about, and judge for yourself, in doubtful cases.

If you find it difficult to prepare your returns by talookas, or local divisions, it can be done, in the first instance, by kardarships. In some instances, you will not be able to obtain returns of arrears, in others, of the proportion of uncultivated and cultivated land, and the like, but you must not, on this account, be disconcerted; the plan is to get as much information as possible, and, when you get little, to make the most of it. In many cases, you will have nothing but the past collections to go by, and these must then suffice.

Under the head of remarks, should be inserted the mode in which the revenue has hitherto been paid, if in kind, by batai or kunkoot,—in cash;—or partly in kind, and partly in money. A detail of all the different cesses under the name of Abwab, should also be noted.

General information should also be collected regarding each tract, the mode in which the revenue has been paid, namely, either through a farmer who contracted for the whole, or by fixed assessments, the facility, or otherwise, with which it was collected, the general condition of its inhabitants, the nature of the soil, the facilities of irrigation, the locality, and peculiar features of the country, the caste of the cultivators, and their habits. When your returns are ready, collect all the influential men, the heads of the villages, and the accountants, in short, encourage as many as possible of the inhabitants to attend. Check the returns of the Kardars by the statements of these people, particularly as to what they have been in the habit of paying. Hear what they may say of their own villages, and of those of each other. Observe their dress, appearance, and bearing. You will quickly perceive if they are over-assessed, and, therefore, ill-fed, ill-clothed, miserable creatures, or a thriving, comfortable population. Lastly, having got all the information in your power, do not hesitate, but, quickly making up your mind, fix your demand, and offer it for their acceptance. It will include, in one sum, everything which, under any pretence, the village can be called on to pay as revenue. As the villages are assessed, give them a putta, stating the exact sum to be paid for the whole year, and the proportion for each harvest, and in each instalment, and make the headmen describe, briefly, in what mode the revenue will be collected. As you secure them from further demands, so also guard the co-partners, and under-tenants, from their extortion. Steadily bind all farmers of even isolated villages, but if, in any particular locality, either from the peculiar influence of an individual, or a family, you find that there is any advantage in so doing, you may make one person responsible for the revenue, provided the people so wish it, giving him a per centage for his trouble.

Record, in the putta, the nam, or perquisites of the headmen, where any exist, and are not extravagant, and detail the amount of rent from land not included in the lease. Where the headmen have no allowances, or rent free lands, give them 5 per cent. on the village collections. In our provinces, this is the sum usually allowed. As you complete your settlements, appoint a Tehsildar for each district, giving him a charge of from 75,000 to 1,50,000 rupees, with reference to the extent of the area, and the poverty, or richness, of the country, and allow him two or three per cent. of the collections, as a remuneration, and give him a small establishment. From among the most intelligent, respectable, and popular of your Izaradars, Canoonzees, Kazees, and similar hereditary officers, who have displayed their zeal and energy in aiding your views, select your Tehsildars.

I propose submitting a copy of this letter for the approval and orders of the

Governor-General. In the mean time, you will only be collecting your statistics. Long before you are prepared to commence your settlement, a reply will be received. As you get in your returns, you can send a few of them to me, with, or without, your remarks, and I will return them, with anything that strikes me on perusal.

Inclosure 3 in No. 12.

*The Acting Resident to the Secretary with the Governor-General*

*Lahore, September 14, 1847.*

I HAVE the honor to state, that the instructions, contained in your letter of the 16th ultimo\*, for the disposal, and punishment, of such persons as might be proved to have been concerned in the Preyma conspiracy, were duly laid before the members of the Lahore Durbar.

These councillors requested that I would be present, and assist them in disposing of the case, and, accordingly, the proceedings and evidence were read over at a public Durbar, on the 11th instant, in the Dewan Am, or public court of the palace. The following officers and Sirdars were present, nearly all of whom had assisted in the original examination of the prisoners.

Raja Tej Sing, Sirdars Shere Sing, Lehna Sing, and Kaher Sing, with Dewan Deena Nath, Mr John Lawrence, Major MacGregor, and Mr. Bowring, all took part, and gave judgment in the case.

The prisoners, Hayat Khan (1), Bacc Budh Sing (2), Khan Sing (3), Boota Sing (4), Man Sing (5), Sheodyal Sing (6), Goodurdas (7), Purusram (8), Dewan Ali (9), Goormuck Sing (10), Thakoor Doss (11), and Preyma (12), were arraigned on the following charges.—

- 1 For being principals in a conspiracy against the Lahore Government.
- 2 As accessories in the above conspiracy.
- 3 Concealing their knowledge of the existence of a conspiracy.

The prisoners, Boota Sing (4), Man Sing (5), Dewan Ali (9), and Preyma (12), were found guilty of the first charge, and sentenced to be imprisoned for life.

Hayat Khan (1), Khan Sing (3), and Purusram (8), were convicted of the second charge, and sentenced respectively to fourteen, seven, and five years, Goormuck Sing (10), and Thakoor Doss (11), were found guilty of the third charge, and each sentenced to three years' imprisonment. Budh Sing, Sheodyal, and Goodurdas (7), being deemed not guilty, were released.

The Durbar are anxious that the prisoners noted in the margin†, be removed from the Lahore territory, and I, accordingly, request permission to issue the necessary warrants to the magistrates of such districts as the Governor-General may deem expedient to receive charge of them, and retain them in custody, during the term of their respective sentences.

Inclosure 4 in No. 12.

*The Acting Resident to the Secretary with the Governor-General.*

*Lahore, September 21, 1847.*

THE pension rules are to have retrospective effect as regards the soldiers now in the Sikh army, and have been circulated to all the stations where Lahore troops are located.

\* Inclosure 7 in No. 9.

† Boota Sing (4), Man Sing (5), Dewan Ali (9), Hayat Khan (1), Khan Sing (3), Preyma (12) and Purusram (8).

## Inclosure 5 in No. 12.

*The Acting Resident to the Secretary with the Governor-General.*

*Lahore, September 22, 1847.*

I SUBMIT a correspondence with Her Highness the Maharanee, as also the Durbar account of her income and expenditure, since the treaty at Bhyrowal. I have requested that all articles, still in the palace, which belong to the Maharanee, be, at once, sent to Sheikhoopoor, but it appears that Her Highness claims property belonging to the Maharajah, and which, therefore, the Durbar refuse to give up.

The account shows that the Maharanee has received all that she is entitled to; and, to satisfy myself of its correctness, I have requested that an account may be sent to Sheikhoopoor, to explain each item, and receive her comments thereon. I believe that the Maharanee wishes that certain items, such as expenses to the monument of her brother, Sirdar Jowahir Sing, and the like, should be debited to the Government accounts.

I believe that the Maharanee's statement of ill-treatment is utterly incorrect. The night of her removal from the palace to Sheikhoopoor, Her Highness met with every kindness and consideration, and was allowed to take away whatever property was pointed out. Her brother, Heera Sing, was asked to take charge of what was unavoidably left behind, which he refused, when two of the most confidential slave-girls remained for this purpose. I presume that the assertion that Her Highness was dragged out of the palace by the hair, is merely a figure of speech, to explain how unwillingly she left Lahore. None of the political officers of the Residency, of course, saw the Maharanee; and the members of the Durbar were so afraid of her that every individual refused even to be the bearer of the intelligence of her intended removal that night, and it was finally broken to her by her own brother, Sirdar Heera Sing.

The proposal of the Durbar that Sirdar Shere Sing should take charge of the Maharanee, has not been carried out. The Sirdar distinctly refuses to take the responsibility, and, when urged by me for his reasons, stated that, unless he was strict in his surveillance, some misfortune would arise, and if he was so, the Maharanee would be dissatisfied, and complain, that, therefore, as he saw no mode by which he could satisfy her, and, at the same time, do his duty, he begged to decline the charge.

Sirdars Boorh Sing and Goormookh Sing appear to be honest and faithful in the discharge of their duty at Sheikhoopoor, but not to be sufficiently determined, and watchful. I ascertained, a few days ago, that Sahib Sing, a discharged orderly of Raja Lal Sing, was allowed to visit the interior of the apartments at Sheikhoopoor. I requested that this might be prevented for the future, and that Sahib Sing should be warned that, if found again within the precincts of the fort, he would be punished.

On the morning of the 18th instant, while at Durbar, a letter was received from the Sirdars at Sheikhoopoor, informing the Council that the Maharanee had given necklaces to a jemadar and havildar of the guard. I recommended that the whole body should be, at once, relieved, and that it should be explained to the troops that any soldier or officer receiving presents from the Maharanee, or any of her retinue, would render himself liable to a severe penalty. I, further, suggested that the necklaces should be taken from those who had received them, and placed in the public treasury, but that, as it was the first offence, and the army had been formerly in the habit of receiving such articles, no punishment should, in this instance, be inflicted on the recipients of the Maharanee's bounty. Sirdar Shere Sing, calling on me this morning, states that the necklaces had been given up, and were of small pearls, worth about sixty rupees each. It is evident from this circumstance that the Maharanee was attempting to tamper with the guard; and I have no doubt that, so long as she possesses the means, she will continue to act in a similar manner. I think, however, that, with ordinary precautions on the part of the Durbar, all her schemes must prove fruitless. I cannot ascertain that Her Highness has any very zealous partisans, or that her seclusion has caused any public sympathy. The members of the Durbar appear to be very uneasy at the charge, and I think now repent that she was not transported across the Sutlej.



The Maharanee, the night she left Lahore, was reported to have expressed her willingness to go to Benares. In her last letter, she alludes to being allowed to go on a pilgrimage, and, I have been given to understand, would very gladly avail herself of such a permission. Her Highness does not seem to think that, if removed from the Punjab, her personal liberty would be any longer interfered with. I think it would be well, if I was allowed to undeceive her on this point.

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Inclosure 6 in No 12.

*The Acting Resident to the Secretary with the Governor-General.*

*Lahore, September 25, 1847.*

THE country is tranquil, and the people, apparently, day by day, learning to appreciate the benefits of British interference.

At Peshawar, affairs appear to be going on well; peace and order enforced; and the Mahomedan population seem well disposed, at the presence of our officers. The revenue, however, is collected with considerable difficulty, especially in the more distant part of the province, and Lieutenant Lumsden has been especially engaged in aiding in its realization in the Eusufzye country, but I do not anticipate much permanent change for the better in the disposition of the people, and their obedience to their rulers, until the izaradars, or farmers, are got rid of, and a light assessment introduced.

In Hazara, Captain Abbott has been going on well. I hear little from this officer direct, but, judging from native reports, his measures are popular, and his arrangements satisfactory. I fear, however, that his assessment is not sufficiently light for so wild and mountainous a country, and doubt whether it would not be a saving to the Durbar, in the end, had he made still further reductions. I see that 5 per cent is about the amount of his reduction of the land-tax, in addition to indirect demands under the term of "abwab," all of which have been done away. I observe that, where his assessment has not been accepted, he has allowed the people the alternative of an annual appraisement of their crops (kunkoot). A reduction of 10 or 15 per cent and a money revenue would, I think, have been a better arrangement for the Government and the people.

Lieutenant Nicholson is still in the Sind Sagur Doab. The people of that country are still discontented; they have had bad seasons and worse Kardars. Dewan Moolraj, the Kardar of Rawul Pinddee and of the salt mines, has made himself highly unpopular, while he has paid little, or no, revenue, and rendered no accounts. He has now been recalled to Lahore, to answer for his misdeeds. The Sind Sagur Doab is in the hands of Kardars, who collect the entire land-tax in kind, by the systems termed "batai," and "kunkoot." This circumstance, with the distance from Lahore, has given them great opportunities for oppressing the people, and defrauding the Government. An intelligent and experienced officer, to effect a settlement of the Doab, would be highly desirable. The Adawlutee, Lal Sing,\* is, I believe, exerting himself, but the people, as yet, do not resort much to these new courts. They prefer coming long distances into Lahore, and appear disappointed at not receiving instant redress on complaining. Great difficulty is experienced in inducing complainants to follow the course laid down to insure them a hearing, to appeal from the Kardars to the Adawlutees; from the latter to the Durbar; and, finally, to the Resident. It is difficult to persuade them to follow such a system. But this will daily mend itself, and I have no doubt but that the institution of these officers will prove a solid benefit to the country, and, indeed, think that they have already done much good. By their powers in civil and criminal matters, the Adawlutees will prove a check on the extortion and oppression of the Kardars; but the difficulty will be to get them to act with sufficient energy and independence.

The country round Lahore and Umritsur is perfectly tranquil. Sirdar Lehna Sing gives more satisfaction to the people than any Sirdar invested with executive authority. At Umritsur, early in the month, a sepoy of the garrison of Govindghur, going armed to the temple, shot and cut down three persons; one of them, a son-in-law of Bhaee Muknu Sing, a well-known priest of the place. Two of the men are dead, and the third in a precarious state. The murderer,

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\* Sic in orig.

a Hindoo, was seized on the spot, but there seems no satisfactory explanation of the cause which led to this atrocity. A society of Sadhs (mendicant priests), near Umritsur, quarrelling as to the succession to the chieftship, resisted the Durbar officer sent to put the successful candidate in possession, and turned out, in a body, well armed, and, apparently, determined to resist. Sirdar Lehna Sing expressed, in open Durbar, his opinion of the necessity of coercing these people, and, as I fully concurred in these sentiments, a part of the garrison of Govindghur, with a body of horse, and a gun, were sent against them, under an intelligent officer; the object being, by a display of force, to necessitate instant submission, without recourse to arms. The Sadhs, on seeing the troops ready to act with decision, surrendered at discretion. These two circumstances, and the seizure of Lal Sing,\* Adawlutee, a leading character in the Pichma conspiracy, who was found lurking in the vicinity of the banks of the Beas, in the disguise of a fakeer, are the only occurrences worth noticing.

I have received very gratifying proofs how popular the reform of the customs has been. On the new rules being proclaimed, by beat of drum, in Umritsur and Lahore, the heads of trades waited on me to express their satisfaction, and, in Lahore, they illuminated the city for two nights. The Punchayets remarked that, for the last 100 years, nothing had been done which had conferred so much benefit on the poorer classes as this measure, and, on my telling them they should thank the Durbar for it, they laughingly replied, that they owed it all to us.

In my report, I estimated that the loss of revenue would probably be about 2,20,000 rupees, the calculation being founded, in a great measure, on the returns, of former years, on those articles still continuing subject to taxation, with a rough estimate of the return from the new sources of revenue. In two items, we have already effected a saving of 68,000 rupees; the tolls on ferries having been farmed for 1,48,000 rupees, instead of one lakh; and the excise on spirits for 50 instead of 40,000 rupees, subject to all the rules and conditions which prevail in the British Provinces. On the whole, therefore, I anticipate that the loss of revenue, for the current year, will sink down to little more than a lakh, or a lakh and-a-half of rupees.

During the month, the Durbar have given much attention to an examination of the accounts of defaulters, considerable sums have been paid in by the Kardars, and arrangements made for the realization of still more. Those of Mir Umeer Chund, the cousin of Raja Lal Sing, who farmed the salt mines, and district of Pind Dadun Khan, have been settled. He asserted that nothing was due, and the Moonshees who were charged with the examination of his accounts, corroborated the assertion. By the late scrutiny, which involved the consideration of accounts to the extent of 30 lakhs (300,000/), he, and his subordinates, are proved, on their own returns, to owe the State 2,85,000 rupees. On this adjustment of the accounts, the Mir refusing to make good a large portion of the amount, on the ground that he had received private instructions from Raja Lal Sing, last year, to cast cannon, and entertain new levies, the expense of which the Durbar now disallowed, the question was referred for my opinion. I decided that all sums which Umeer Chund had expended, on public orders of Raja Lal Sing, should be admitted, but not so, any for which secret instructions, on the Raja's individual authority, had been issued. On the Mir demurring, Raja Tej Sing instantly put him under arrest, and, Dewan Deena Nath having paid me a visit the same day, on telling me what the Raja had done, I remarked that, if the Mir would be reasonable, and show a disposition to meet his liabilities, I would not object to the Durbar remitting a few thousand rupees. Sheik Emamooddeen's accounts are now under scrutiny, and I have little doubt but that an equally advantageous result will follow. There will then only remain those of Runjore Sing, and Buxee Bhugut Ram. The former was under a species of restraint, before Colonel Lawrence left, for pertinaciously refusing to render an account. The latter is the Paymaster of the Forces, and, for ten years, has never, on his own showing, given in a return. I have requested the Durbar to relieve him of all the duties of Paymaster-General, and thus allow him full time to make up his books, and have proposed that, if he fail to do so in a reasonable time, he lose his appointment, and be placed in arrest.

I consider that the Government will, by these measures, recover a large sum of money, though infinitely short of what is really due to it; to which will be added

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\* See in orig  
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the further advantage that those now in office will perceive the uselessness of withholding their accounts for the future.

In my letter, dated the 10th instant\*, I stated as my opinion, that the revenue of the Lahore Government was badly managed, that the people were over-assessed, and that much of that which was exacted from them, did not find its way into the public treasury. I also recommended a settlement as a panacea for many evils which appeared to exist. It was Colonel Lawrence's intention, I was aware, that a settlement should be introduced, and I knew that returns, from different parts of the country, had either been sent, or were in a more, or less, forward state of preparation. I was, then, however, not aware that the Dewan had actually assessed districts to the extent of upwards of two lakhs. He has now also promised to fix an assessment for the jaghoors, resumed from Sirdar Heera Sing.

Since writing the report above alluded to, I have made inquiries, in Dewan Deena Nath's office, of the number of districts, and the amount of revenue, actually settled, and from which a money revenue was taken direct from the proprietors of the soil, and have obtained the following return. It is not, of course, implicitly to be relied on. But any difference which may exist, would probably lessen, and not increase, the amount of land-tax settled, and paid in money.

#### ABSTRACT

	No	Amount
1. Talookahs in farm with Kardars, for which they pay a fixed revenue - - - - -	8	25,49,873
2. Talookahs in farm with the Headmen, for which they pay a fixed revenue - - - - -	8	18,23,556
3. Talookahs held Khan or Amanie, of which the revenue is collected by batai and kunkoot - - -	43	89,44,658
Total Gross Revenue -	Rs	1,33,18,128

Among the districts for which Kardars pay a fixed revenue, nearly all the demand on the people is levied in kind, and depends, in its amount, on the power, and pleasure, of the individual Mooltan, paying 19,00,000 alone, is included in this category. In all these districts, therefore, my arguments and reasoning would apply as regards the people. In forty-three districts, stated to yield 89,44,658 rupees, the proprietors of land pay the revenue on the same principle, and the Kardars account to Government for the return of the grain collections. Here, both the people and the Government must be pillaged. Any revenue officer will admit the difficulty of looking after twenty or thirty villages, under what is termed direct management, and paying anewar rates into the exchequer. No one ever dreams of realizing, by batai and kunkoot, from villages in that state, owing to the loss which Government must infallibly suffer.

What then must be the state of a large country, like this, under that system, aggravated by the practice, in many instances, of rendering no accounts, for a series of years. Umeer Chund's account involved collections, in kind, to the value of 300,000*l*. he is shown to owe 28,500*l* on his own records, probably double that sum is not the true balance against him. For, it must be recollected that the Durbar have no proper way of checking these returns, in a single case. In the same way, when many villages complain of oppression and extortion, under such a system, what has the Adawlutee, or officer, to guide him in the adjustment of the case? He has literally nothing; he is completely in the dark, and must, therefore, confine his interference to urging the Kaidar to give redress, utterly unacquainted with the real merits of the case. I am convinced that a settlement, which reduced the Government rent-roll even 20 per cent., would, eventually, give it more revenue, independent of the inestimable benefits it would confer on the agriculturists. Nor would this be all loss—fewer Kardars, and their followers, would be required, and many instances of fraudulent rent-free lands would come to light, which would go far to meet the deficit. It is a mistake to imagine that, under native Governments, the revenue is more cheaply collected than under the British rule. The deductions, under various heads, under various pretences, is great, whereas, in the North West Provinces, the average expense of collecting the revenue is about 6 per cent., in the Trans-Sutlej territory about 4½ per cent.

In the course of conversation, a few days ago, with Dewan Deena Nath, I asked him how it happened that, with a record in his office of the revenue of nearly the whole territory, so many estates were farmed out. He said, originally, Maharajah Runjeet Sing had fixed money assessments for every village, but that, gradually, the system, as he grew old, had been subverted, and that, for many years, there had been seven great districts: Cashmere, Peshawar, Wuzerabad, Mooltan, Pind Dadun Khan, with the salt mines, the Kohistan of Kangra, with a portion of the Manjha, and the Jullundur Doab, and in these, the Governors did what they liked.

I have dwelt on this subject, at much length, because it seems to be the one point of paramount importance which remains to be grappled with. As an officer bred up in the revenue department, I may give undue value to the matter. I have, however, seen the British provinces, before, and after, a good settlement, with a high assessment, and a low one. I have seen native management, both Hindoo, and Mahomedan, in jagheer estates, and khalsa; and the result of my experience is that, to benefit the people at large, and render the country truly flourishing, you must fix a moderate land-tax for the Government, and secure to the community that they shall enjoy, on paying that quota, the results of their own industry.

As a means of ascertaining the state of affairs in the different parts of the country, and to compare them with our own sources of information, the newsletters and reports of the Durbar have, some time back, been daily read by one of the political officers. This practice, as well as that of looking over the different written orders which the Durbar may issue, is very useful. Since the 15th instant, I have directed Misi Megraj to send me, daily, his cash-book of receipts and disbursements, and have found that it has a tendency to diminish expenditure. I have also objected to the disbursement of various sums, either altogether, or in part, with good effect. The sums of money, however, which the Durbar either expend themselves, or disburse in the name of the little Maharajah, are very great, and quite unreasonable with reference to the state of the finances. Every day, large sums are given away in charity, and, on changes of the moon, eclipses, anniversaries of births, and deaths, additional expenses are incurred. What makes the matter difficult to interfere with, is that the expenditure is more or less connected in each case with religious ceremonies. Some restraint, however, ought to be exercised, if we hope to make the income cover the expenses of the State.

Licut-Colonel Lawrence, at one time, attempted to raise a loan, but did not succeed, for, who would lend to a native Government in the Punjab? Moreover, rich natives find it much more profitable to invest their money in trade, than lock it up in the funds of the State, and, though it is quite true that large sums are thus invested in the British provinces, much of such investments is confined to Calcutta, where the parties speculate on the rise and fall of the funds. I am not sorry that the idea was abandoned, for, though money is much wanted to pay up the arrears still due to the troops, much of it, under the wasteful management of the Durbar, would have been mis-spent. It is only, I conceive, under the positive understanding that the liabilities of the State must be made good out of its revenues, that they will really exert themselves to accomplish that object, so long as money is to be got, they will never scruple to spend it.

I do not, in the slightest degree, intend, by the above remarks, to reflect on the members of the Durbar, the system, and habits, under which they have been brought up, are too strong for them to resist. I have found them most friendly, and ready to attend to everything I say, but the evil is that, though all assent, the result is not attained, or only accomplished by more interference than could be wished.

The Durbar have not yet decided on allowing the Mahomedans to call their "azan," or cry to prayers. They sent me a strong remonstrance, in the first instance, and have not yet replied to my second reference, in which I stated that his Lordship was of opinion that it should be allowed. In a private consultation I had with them, they said little, but evinced great repugnance to the measure. Their conduct is founded on a mixture of timidity, and bigotry. They fear a disturbance, and are certain of opprobrium. As zealous Sikhs, whose ancestors suffered from Mahomedan oppression, they grudge their ancient enemies the free exercise of their religious ceremonies. They cannot understand the political advantage of toleration to every form of religion. On receiving the reply of the

Durbar, which I anticipate will be to throw the responsibility on the British Representative, I will make a report for the orders of his Lordship. That some dissatisfaction will be expressed, I have little doubt, and even am prepared for slight ebullitions of individual violence; but, at the same time, think that there is no probability of any general discontent being manifested. From the northern confines of Peshawur, through the whole extent of Hazara, the Sind Sagur Doab, and Mooltan, the Mahomedan population form a large majority, and, even to the banks of the Ravee, are more numerous than the Hindoos. It is only to the east of that river, that the Sikhs predominate. Under such circumstances, the permission to the Mahomedans to summon their people to prayer, will be as politic as it is just. As a boon, it will be received with gratitude; if withheld, it will probably be exercised in defiance of restrictions.

I am happy to be able to report that Lieutenant Christopher has succeeded in ascending the Chenab, so far as Ramnuggur. I have recommended his pushing on as far beyond Wuzerabad as possible. It is with much pleasure that I add that, during his course up the river, he met with every assistance from the authorities, who, on their part, all express themselves well pleased with his urbanity and consideration.

**Inclosure 7 in No. 12.**

*The Resident at Lahore to the Secretary with the Governor-General.*

*Simla, September 29, 1847.*

I RECOMMEND that we be permitted, with all practicable speed, in concert with the Durbar officers, much in the manner proposed by Mr. Lawrence, to make a summary settlement of the whole of the Lahore territory, except Mooltan, which has still two years of its lease to Dewan Moolraj to run.

Major Lawrence says that the revenue of Peshawur is collected at the point of the bayonet, and the same might be said of almost the whole country, especially of the tract beyond the Jhelum. The removal of the custom duties has rejoiced men's hearts, and raised the British character; a settlement of the revenue will be considered a still greater blessing.

At present, the Zemindars pay revenue, direct to Government, for only one-seventh of the lands under the Lahore Raj; nearly two-sevenths are farmed to Kardars; and, on four-sevenths, the revenue is collected by batai and kunkoot. Renting to Kardars is destruction to the country, and, indeed, the process by which collections in kind are made, is often as injurious. In new countries, however, ignorant people are often afraid of the liabilities entailed by cash payments; where this may be found to be the case, instead of taking proportions of the crop, in the field, or threshing-ground, I will endeavour to induce the Zemindars to pay their kists in fixed quantities of grain. The idea was suggested to me by Mr. John Lawrence, and is, I think, a good one.

**Inclosure 8 in No. 12.**

*The Secretary with the Governor-General to the Acting Resident*

*Simla, September 30, 1847.*

WITH respect to the Durbar's repugnance to the edict proposed for allowing the Mahomedans to call their "azan," or cry to prayers, I have to state that his Lordship will be ready to take the odium of the measure upon himself.

**Inclosure 9 in No. 12.**

*The Resident at Lahore to the Secretary with the Governor-General.*

*Simla, September 30, 1847.*

WITH reference to the remarks on the subject of the azan, in Mr. J. Lawrence's letter of the 25th instant,\* I beg to observe that, Raja Tej Sing having sent me a

\* Inclosure 6 in No. 12

message, by Rasee Kishen Chund, expressive of a wish that this matter might not be pressed at present, I consented to postpone any overt measures, for two or three months more; and wrote, a few days ago, to Mr. J. Lawrence, telling him not to agitate the matter just now, but to inform Captain Abbott, and Major Lawrence, that, although they are not authoritatively to allow the cry to prayer, they are not to permit the Mahomedan population to be molested for the quiet exercise of this, or any other, rite of their religion. Raja Tej Sing is timid, and fears that bigoted Sikhs may take advantage of so much being now done contrary to old custom. I think, therefore, it is only reasonable to allow time for men's minds to accustom themselves to the new state of things. Nothing is thereby lost; for, during the last eighteen months, the azan has been regularly cried at Lahore, and is still so, I understand, in most of the Mussulman districts. The Sikh chiefs have neither objected to, nor noticed, the circumstance; and, even now, they do not ask to put down the innovation, but only desire to escape the odium of putting their names to its sanction. No native likes to be hurried, even in going his own way; but he will follow in the very opposite direction, if gently led. The laws of the Sikh Government may, I have no doubt, be made, with a little patience, as tolerant as our own.

**No. 13.**

*The Governor-General to the Secret Committee.*

*Simla, October 21, 1847. (No 73.)*

1 TRANSMIT further correspondence on the affairs of the Punjab.

**Inclosure 1 in No 13.**

*Captain Abbott to the Acting Resident.*

*Hurripoor, Hazara, September 30, 1847.*

THE whole of the Hazara (one or two small talookahs excepted) is assessed in a fixed rent, which is supposed to be half the gross produce, but varies, in reality, very greatly, in different talookahs, not amounting, in some, to more than a third: over and above this, under the title of Russoom and Nuzzerana, about 15 per cent was taken *previous to my coming*, and the two laws, Mussulman and Sikh, prevailing in the land, left a wide gap for exactions, under the name of fines, the Government interfering in all the domestic concerns of the subject.

Now, so far as I have examined the revenue regulations of the Punjab, I have found there precisely the same system,—half the gross produce taken by Government, with the addition of Nuzzerana, Russoom, and exorbitant fines.

It seemed to me, that I could not, with justice, let the revenue of the country fall very much below the rate prevailing in the Punjab, but I abolished at once all Russoom, Nuzzerana, &c. and took off 5 per cent. universally, reducing the rent, in particular cases, according to circumstances.

In order to realize your view of taking only one-third gross produce (a view in which I most heartily concur), I must have reduced the assessments 50 per cent., which was beyond the limit allowed me. That limit also was named as an extreme instance

Owing to the entire absence of Khusrubs, and the prevalence of fixed rents, it is extremely difficult to ascertain the true produce of the village estates. Although the rate is, nominally, half the produce, yet there are villages where the Malgoozar makes 20 per cent. after paying his rents, others are very much over-assessed. In others, the rents appear to me to be equitable, but these are hill tracts, where collection is difficult. The assessment I am now making, lets down the revenue about 20 per cent., by doing away with all extra charges; and the late order remitting transit duties, is an additional relief of about 8 per cent.

The system, here, has been to over-assess the country, and to bribe the Mullicks to submission, by petty grants of ploughs, mills, arable land, &c. These grants have grown up to something very considerable; but they do not appear in the ordinary register of jagheers, as many of them were granted by Kardars, who

had not sufficient authority. I have deducted such grants from the total rents of their respective villages, believing that their existence is generally a strong symptom of over-assessment, and I am confirming to individuals only those which have been recognised in the collections.

I most fully agree with you in the insanity of over-assessment, and that no Ryot can prosper who gives half his produce

The expenses of Hazara are not paid by the revenue. In Hurri Sing's time, his garrisons (miserably paid, and living partly by plunder) cost two lakhs annually, being 4,000 in number. These were independent of his field force; and, whenever he had any military operation to perform, he was obliged to borrow troops largely from the Punjab. In his time, the revenue was reckoned at 4 lakhs, Goondah rupees, exclusive of Kuroo Khowta, &c. Since then, the country has been desolated by mismanagement and rapine, under Moolraj, and jagheers have been extensively granted to the refugees whom Hurri Sing despoiled.

It is now considerably less than three lakhs of Goondah rupees, or with Kuroo Khowta less perhaps than three and a-half lakhs. But the garrisons will admit of reduction, so soon as the country is settled.

The whole of the Dhoond, Kurrall, Suttie, &c. mountains, yield almost no revenue, but, unless over-awed by forts, they become a harbour for all the banditti of the Punjab, so that it is absolutely necessary to hold them. These mountains stretch from hence, in a south-easterly direction, to the Jhelum, and form more than a third of the entire area of Hazara.

It appeared to me that, in forming an assessment for Hazara, these expenses were a necessary consideration, as, if the revenue should fall very far short of the expense, there would be a strong temptation to increase the assessment, hereafter, when our interference shall cease. It is true that the troops here employed would, otherwise, be idle in encampments elsewhere, and that the Lahore Government, therefore, saves something from the revenue, but this will be forgotten hereafter.

It is also worthy of remark, that the same reward does not attend reduction of rents here, which is reaped in the plains of India, viz. an increase to the cultivated area, for the area here is limited by mountains and rocks, and, excepting in Pukli, where there is a good deal of Ooftadee, the country is already cultivated almost to the extent of its capacity.

I cannot imagine who could have told you I was making a kunkoot assessment. There are a few talookahs which were depopulated by Moolraj, and to those, at their earnest request, three years' kunkoot were guaranteed by Jowala Sahae, and confirmed by me. But I have always objected to the system, as one made for the fattening of revenue officers, and the impoverishment of the Ryot, or of the Government rent, and have sanctioned it, only in villages whose population has been thinned, and in which it is impossible to ascertain the just rent.

As for the three regiments applied for, they are not to coerce people who pay half produce to Government, but the natives of a strong mountainous tract, who pay almost nothing, not more than five rupees a plough.

I have not yet informed the people how many years the settlement is to last, because there is no prospect of the rents being raised.

The people seem to me satisfied with the assessment. I have attended to every complaint of excessive rent, and lowered the rate, upon conviction; but the complaints have not been frequent.

Inclosure 2 in No. 13.

*Major Lawrence to the Acting Resident.*

*Camp, Tooroo, Eusufzye, October 1, 1847.*

THE revenue comes in but slowly; out of 32,608 rupees, only 16,826 have been realized. We have issued a proclamation, calling on all absentees, the most of whom are in the neighbouring hills, to return within one month, under penalty of forfeiture of their lands and rights, which will be given to others.

We purpose fixing an equitable rate on all ploughs, wells, houses, &c., with reference to capability of soil and water, and settling a permanent income on the Khans, to include all demands they now levy from the people, leaving to

them merely the realization of the Government dues; in fact, making them Tehsildars.

The difficulty we experience is, in ascertaining what really has been collected, for the Khans will not furnish true statements, and the Zemindars are still too much in dread of them, to openly come forward, fearing that, immediately the troops are withdrawn, they will be at their mercy.

As indicative of this feeling, and the power of the Khans, I may here mention that, though my camp has now been here pitched for five days, and all know that the object of my coming is to redress grievances, and ameliorate the condition of the people, not half a dozen petitions have been presented, though, while at Peshawur, they daily came in from this very village, and we know that, as soon as we get into another district, they will send them after us.

The official or Duftur records, shewing only what the Government has received, affords no data of what the people have paid, as it is well known that, from the Nazim downwards, all the Government officials have realized on their own account. The principle seems to have been for every one to get what he could, either in cash, or in kind, even to the taking wives and daughters, in part payment, hence the present state of the country.

The 8,000 rupees, sent me by the Resident, as recovered from Sirdar Shere Sing, (a tithe of what he plundered,) I intend to disburse chiefly among the Eusufzys,—who have suffered most,—giving them small sums to repair wells, buy bullocks, and farm furniture, its distribution will, I anticipate, have a most salutary effect, spreading far and wide.

Ursalia Khan, chief of Zedah, who was in arms against the Sikhs, and whose son, Bahram Khan, I found a prisoner of eleven months in Attock, and released, has recently returned from India; he had taken refuge with the Nawab of Tonk, in Rajpootana.

On reporting his arrival, I admonished him on the impropriety he had been guilty of, in not paying his respects to the Durbar, and, when he called, I told him he might expect to be sent for. I am sorry to observe he appears to have imbibed high notions of his own importance, or, as the Affghans say, "got his head full of wind." He will require to be looked after.

I have great satisfaction in reporting most favorably of the troops. the cavalry and Goorchurras with me are picketted close to cultivation, yet not a blade has been injured, nor has a complaint been made to Lieutenant Lumsden, or myself. Some of the Ramgoles with Lieutenant Lumsden murmured at not being allowed to plunder, on the occasion of his chapow, but he promptly confined their officers and non-commissioned, and heartily frightened them.

The proclamation announcing the separation of the Ranec from the young Raja, appeared not to give the troops a thought, whereas that of the Resident, announcing the boon of pensions, and invalid pay, with pay to the families of men killed in action, was universally hailed most joyfully, and fully acknowledged to proceed from the British. I trust the Durbar will be kept up to the letter, and spirit, of this great boon.

The troops have shown that they can be held in hand, as well by their own officers, as by us. Colonel Ruttun Sing recently chapowed the village of Sheikh Mahomdee, at night, executing his instructions fully, without incurring a complaint; and Lieutenant Lumsden reports equally favorably of Colonel Holmes's force.

The promulgation of the new customs' regulation, and abolition of a mass of local taxes, which, though little productive, were creative of oppression and corruption, have given unbounded satisfaction, the people are well aware from whence proceed this novel, though true, policy, and the constant desire evinced to ameliorate their condition.

The Barukzye Sirdars are pressed by the Durbar to pay an old debt of 30,000 rupees, which they persist in declaring not due. this may lead to the confiscation of a portion of their jagheer. I have advised their paying, and remonstrating afterwards.



## Inclosure 3 in No. 13.

*The Acting Resident to the Secretary with the Governor-General.**Lahore, October 4, 1847.*

IN continuation of my letter, dated the 22nd ultimo\*, reporting that the Maharanee had been tampering with some of the native officers of the garrison of Sheikhoopoor, I have the honor to state, that I have addressed Her Highness on the subject, warning her of the probable consequence of again tempting the fidelity of the guard, and begging her to refrain for the future.

Some days ago, I was informed by the ex-Maharajah of Bimber, that he had received overtures, from an agent on the part of the Ranee, to raise men to assist her. He said that there was an idea that if her friends could get possession of the fort, they might hold it, until further assistance was obtained. I, immediately, requested Raja Tej Sing to have all the guns in that fort removed to Lahore, and, accordingly, they arrived last night, sixteen in number, with twenty-four zumboorahs or camel-swivels. Many of the pieces are out of repair, and most are more or less unserviceable, but it appears just as well that they should be in safe custody. For, even if of no real use in a disturbance, the mere rumour of their seizure would give confidence to the evil-disposed.

It is but four days ago that the news-writer at Cashmere advised me, privately, that a Fakcer had arrived at Cashmere, with overtures from the Maharanee for assistance, but that he had received a decided refusal from the Maharajah.

It is, therefore, quite apparent that the Maharanee has friends, however humble, who are exerting themselves in her favor, and that she herself is endeavouring to add to their number.

## Inclosure 4 in No 13

*The Acting Resident to A. H. Cocks, Esq., Chief Assistant to the Resident.**Lahore, October 4, 1847*

YOU will make over charge of your offices in Lahore to Mr Bowring, and at once proceed to Jhung, and, in communication with the officers of the Durbar, make a settlement of the land revenue, for a term of three years certain, with a clause in the agreement that the assessment may be still further extended, should the Government and the people both wish it. The revenue of Jhung, and its dependencies, amounts to about eight-and-half lakhs of rupees, and I am given to understand by Misi Sahib Dyal that the country is by no means over-taxed, but that the people are flourishing and content. Of this, however, you will be the best judge. If this prove correct, I would, certainly, not raise the demand, but confine my endeavours to divide it, as equally as possible, over the country. If necessary, however, you will not hesitate to reduce it. You will also do away with all abwabs, or cesses, of every description, consolidating the Government demand into one sum, and fix the khar for each harvest, so as to give the cultivator full time to dispose of his crops.

The Jhung Ilayna is, for the most part, in the Rechna Doab, but a portion lies beyond the Jhelum. Sudgurra and Heeralie are under separate Kardars, but should be assessed at the same time as Pak Putun.

The revenue of the Jhung Ilayna, I understand, has been, for many years, collected by kunkoot, and, in some places, by money rates. It was formerly a portion of the Nizamut of Mooltan, and was severed from it last year. Where the kunkoot system prevails, from two to four seers for expenses were deducted, in each maund, in favor of the cultivator, and the remainder divided into two equal shares, one for the Government, and the other for the cultivator. This would make the Government demand about 46 per cent of the produce; but, practically, it cannot, I conceive, have amounted to so much. Where batar prevails, two-thirds were fixed as the Government share. About Jhung itself, the assessment is said to have been at the rate of only twenty-two rupees per well, on irrigated lands, and kunkoot, on the bararie lands.

A large income is derived from the pasture lands. In Sindwala it amounts

to upwards of 32,000 rupees on the whole; Ilayna, to about 80,000. In the cultivated districts, it will be absorbed in the village assessments, but Sindwala, I understand, is nearly all forest, and the revenue is almost entirely paid by a tax on cattle. This tax, which was formerly very equally distributed, has now become unequal, from the changes of fortune among individuals, the owner of 100 cattle being assessed as that of ten, the owner of fifty as if he had 100.

After completing the assessment, I request you will divide off the country into four or five kardarships, so as not to make any one much more or less than two lakhs each, keeping the districts in each Doab separate, so that no Kardar shall be under the authority of two Adawluttees.

You should make notes as you go along, of the state of roads, the features of the country, the character of the soil, the habits, character, and physical appearance of the people, the facilities for irrigation, the state of trade, and the like; so as to be able, when you return, to make a full report, for the information of Government. You should also send in, weekly, a brief diary showing what you have done.

I find that the following taxes are levied—

By fines, a sum averaging 92,000 rupees per annum, from thieves and other breakers of the law. I beg you will inquire into this item, and make a report.

Kujoor trees,—3,500; should be abolished, I think, unless in extensive forests, and not on village trees.

Kumeen tax,—1,700. I suppose this sum is collected from weavers, and other poor classes, and if so, it should be abolished.

These animals\* are rendered annually by certain nomade races, who do not cultivate the land, but graze large herds of cattle. If they will consent to pay a commutation in money, so much the better, if not, the animals can, as heretofore, be made good.

#### Inclosure 5 in No 13

*The Acting Resident to the Secretary with the Governor-General.*

*Lahore, October 6, 1847*

MR COCKS left Lahore yesterday to make the settlement of the land-tax for the Ilayna of Jhung. A copy of my instructions to that officer is herewith annexed. The members of the Durbar, so far from placing any obstacles in the way, seemed most anxious that he should be deputed for the duty, Raja Tej Sing, in particular, begged me to hasten his departure at the last Durbar.

#### Inclosure 6 in No 13

*The Acting Resident to the Secretary with the Governor-General*

*Lahore, October 6, 1847*

I HAVE requested Captain Abbott, if possible, to make nothing but money settlements in Hazara, and, where this is not practicable, to fix a specific quantity of grain. It would, I conceive, be far more advantageous to all parties concerned, even if the Durbar had to sacrifice 10 per cent of their revenue. I have also begged him to be quite sure that no village is too highly assessed. If necessary, I am sure the Durbar will willingly, at the Resident's instigation, bear the loss.

#### Inclosure 7 in No 13

*The Secretary with the Governor-General to the Resident at Lahore.*

*Simla, October 13, 1847.*

I AM desired to express the Governor-General's satisfaction that the Maharajah Golab Sing is exhibiting considerable anxiety to meet the wishes of the British Government, and deserve its commendation, by the adoption of measures

\* Camels, 70,—Cows, 10,—Dogs, 7

calculated to improve the country generally, and ameliorate the condition of his subjects.

The Governor-General has observed, with much satisfaction, that the Maharajah has been persuaded to abandon the Government monopoly of rice, the staple article of food of the country; and his Lordship indulges a confident hope that the Maharajah will follow up this liberal measure, by reducing the rates of duty to such an extent as to place this necessary of life within easy reach of the mass of his subjects.

The Governor-General has also observed, with satisfaction, that the Maharajah has adopted a system, by which the very objectionable, and oppressive, custom which has hitherto obtained in Cashmere, of employing forced free labor will be done away with, and the persons remunerated whom it may be found necessary to employ in Government works.

The Governor-General considers that the Maharajah's proceedings with respect to jagheer, and other rent-free, lands are as liberal as, under the circumstances, were to be expected.

The Governor-General trusts that the Maharajah will be induced to carry into effect the wise and politic measure, which it appears His Highness has under his consideration, of keeping his troops only two months in arrear of pay; and his Lordship hopes that you will lose no opportunity of impressing upon His Highness the great advantage which must arise to the discipline of the army, by a system of regular, and punctual, payment.

It is highly satisfactory to his Lordship that proclamations have been issued in Cashmere, for the prevention of the inhuman rites of suttee and infanticide.

#### No. 14

#### *The Governor-General to the Secret Committee.*

*Camp, Caunpore, November 6, 1847 (No. 75)*

LIEUTENANT-COLONEL LAWRENCE, C B, reported his return to Lahore, on the 17th ultimo. On the 19th, the young Maharajah, with the chiefs and people, celebrated the Dusserah festival, on which occasion you will be glad to learn that everything went off with the greatest harmony.

#### Inclosure in No 14.

#### *The Resident at Lahore to the Secretary with the Governor-General*

*Lahore, October 20, 1847.*

YESTERDAY, being the Dusserah, a public Durbar was held in the palace.

Accompanied by Sir John Littler, and Mr John Lawrence, I attended the Durbar, with all my assistants, and a number of officers of the garrison. The courtiers were all dressed in brilliant yellow dresses, so that the scene was splendid and imposing. The little Maharajah did the honors of his situation most gracefully, and was in particularly good spirits. We accompanied His Highness, and *cortège*, to the spot, about a mile from the city, where a numerous crowd of the inhabitants were assembled to celebrate the festival, and then conducted him back to the palace. Everything passed off with the greatest harmony; and the chiefs and people seemed as happy as men well could be. It was a great change from last year, when Raja Lal Sing, apparently afraid to make his appearance in public, had all the pageantry and pomp of the Dusserah confined to the inner court of the palace, to which, of course, the multitude had no access.

## No. 15.

*The Governor-General to the Secret Committee**Camp, Lucknow, November 20, 1847. (No 77.)***EVERYTHING** continues perfectly quiet in the Punjab.

Inclosure 1 in No 15.

*The Resident at Lahore to L. Bowring, Esq, Assistant to the Resident, on deputation to Pind Dadun Khan**Lahore, November 8, 1847.*

YOU will at once proceed to Pind Dadun Khan, and make a summary settlement of all the Talookahs under that Kardarship, as well as all those south of the Salt range. I annex a list of these districts, as far as I can ascertain them from the records of the Lahore Durbar, but, should you find any tracts south of the Salt range, not enumerated, you will not fail to assess them also. On the completion of this portion of the Sind Sagur Doab, you will cross into the Rechnab, or Doab between the Chenab and Jhelum, and make a settlement of all the Talookahs, which, by that time, have not been assessed by the Zemindars coming into Lahore.\*

The principles which I have laid down, for the guidance of Major Lawrence, and Mr Cocks, are those which should guide you. Consolidate the Government demand into one sum, take durkhasts from the heads of villages, and give them puttass under your signature, for three years certain, or until a second settlement.

Where the people are thriving, the country well cultivated, the old assessment will, probably, be acceptable to them, where they are impoverished, and the assessment notoriously high, you will be at liberty to give such moderate reductions as may appear necessary. Where the assessment, with the abwabs, amounts to, or exceeds, one-half the produce, it may be reduced safely to two-fifths, which would give a reduction of about 10 per cent, where less than two-fifths, unless the country is manifestly impoverished, I do not think that more will be required; but, if such be the case, you will make an especial report to me, furnishing full data for the views you have formed. It must, however, be an assessment which will work, or it will be useless.

You should take notes, as you travel through the country and visit the different districts, in respect to its physical features, facilities of irrigation, nature of soil, caste, character, and habits of the people, their past history, the conduct of the Kardars, and the like.

Encourage the people to sink wells, and make improvements in their lands, and insert, in their lease, a clause that parties sinking new wells, or repairing old ones out of use, shall not, for the term of the settlement, be charged, by the head-man, for these improvements.

In all complaints, civil or criminal, which may be made to you, the parties should be referred to the Adawluttees, and Kardars, in the first instance; and where complainants are dissatisfied with the decisions of these officers, you can then take up the case, in the spirit, and on the principles, which, you are aware, have guided me, in my decisions at Lahore. The object is to support the authority and influence of the Lahore officials, as far as consistent with justice and humanity.

Inclosure 2 in No. 15.

*The Resident at Lahore to Lieutenant J. Nicholson, Assistant to the Resident.**Lahore, November 8, 1847.*

MR. L. BOWRING has this day been directed to proceed to Pind Dadun Khan, and make a settlement of all the districts under that Kardarship, as well as all those south of the Salt range.

You will consider that those north of that range are under your control. I wish you to select one district, or Talookha, and, after making a summary settlement of it, send the papers to me, and not do more than collect the data for those of other districts, until you receive my reply.

The principle which I wish pursued, is, to consolidate the Government demand into one sum, which the village will pay, in lieu of all claims. Where the past assessment, direct or indirect, has exceeded one-half the produce, it may be reduced to two-fifths, which is equal to 10 per cent.; where it has been but two-fifths, or less than that proportion, I do not think that any reduction will, probably, be required. but, should you think otherwise, you must make an especial report to me, giving, in detail, your reasons for thinking reduction necessary.

You should take notes, as you go along, in all matters connected with the past, and present, fiscal history of the Talookha, its physical features, the character of the people, their caste, habit, and condition; the nature of the soil, the facilities for irrigation, the extent of cultivation, and the like.

You should encourage the people to sink new wells, and repair old ones, by inserting a clause in their leases, prohibiting the headmen making any demand in excess of old rates, for such improvements, during the settlement; you will take acknowledgments from the heads of villages, and give them leases for three years, until another settlement, and give no farms to strangers.

#### No. 16

*The Governor-General to the Secret Committee*

*On the River Ganges, off Monghyr,  
December 2, 1847. (No. 79.)*

LIEUT-COLONEL LAWRENCE reports every thing to be quite tranquil in the Punjab

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#### Inclosure 1 in No. 16.

*Major Lawrence to the Resident at Lahore*

*Peshawar, October 30, 1847.*

I HAD the honor, in June last,\* to forward a copy of a hasty sketch of the state of the Eusufzye country, and the adjacent districts of Lhoonkhore and Topee Meenee, made by Lieutenant Lumsden, during a fortnight's tour in that neighbourhood, in the month of May, and have since, on various occasions, transmitted brief notices of the state of affairs past, and present, of the Eusufzye district, all illustrative of the miserable mismanagement, hitherto prevalent in the mode of collection of revenue, and government of that country.

I have also reported that, in consequence of the dilatoriness of the Khars in making good their established instalments of revenue, I found it necessary to depute Lieutenant Lumsden, in August last, with a force of two guns, one regiment of cavalry, and one and a half of infantry, to the Eusufzye district, for the purpose of hastening the payment of revenue, and gaining a more accurate knowledge of the principles of assessment, hitherto acted upon with regard to those Tuppas. The nature of settlement at present existing, the administration by the Khans, and its apparent effect upon the character and condition of the people, were also points worthy of enquiry.

It was my particular object, by careful enquiries regarding the system pursued in past years, the produce and capabilities of the soil; the intelligence, energy, and general disposition of the people, to gain sufficient data to serve as a basis for a summary settlement of the revenue of this district. I, accordingly, instructed Lieutenant Lumsden to examine, carefully, the returns of past collections, and all records on the subject that might be obtainable; and, at the same time, to acquire all the local knowledge, and other requisite information, for the object in view, by personal inspection of the existing cultivation of the country, and by conversation with the inhabitants.

Lieutenant Lumsden proceeded first to Tooroo, and from thence to Kaloo Khan, and commenced, and prosecuted, the desired inquiry with his wonted zeal and diligence.

On the 24th of September, I left Peshawur, accompanied by two guns, a regiment of infantry, and 200 cavalry, and directed Lieutenant Lumsden to meet me at Tooroo, leaving his troops in their camp at Kaloo Khan.

I crossed the Cabool River at Nowshera, and reached Tooroo on the 27th, and was there joined by Lieutenant Lumsden, who communicated to me the result of his month's enquiries.

It appeared, on examination, that what was called Government revenue was merely an item in the demand made on the cultivators, all that could be collected, in excess of this amount, being taken by the Khans, and their satellites, who had to make handsome propitiatory offerings to the Governor of Peshawur, his attendants, and the military authorities sent to expedite the collections.

A glance at the last year's accounts of Sirdar Shere Sing and Ootar Sing's administration, will show that those are no inconsiderable items.

The only traces of a fixed rate of revenue, to be found among the Khans' accounts, is the Government demand against them of 5,000 rupees per tuppah, or district, each harvest, and a nuzzerana of 500 rupees per crop. These sums included the salaries of the Khans, which varied under each Government of Peshawur, as also in each district.

This mode of assessment, without reference to the capabilities of the several districts, has proved most injurious, tending, as it did, to the desertion of the poorer ones, and a corresponding influx of population to the richer, and more lightly assessed, districts.

As an instance of the difference in the rates of payment, I need only to state that, in Dalazain, admitted on all hands to be the richest of all the Eusufzye districts, the tax on a well amounts to 5 rupees 7 annas, while in Akkokhale, the poorest, it is twenty-four.

From the foregoing considerations, it is obvious that, even if the sum of 5,000 rupees per district, the Government tax, be taken, all extra demands being carefully excluded, the relief to the cultivators will be fully equal to a remission of 50 per cent, exclusive of the vexatious marriage-tax, &c, which I had previously abolished.

In order to leave the Khans no excuse for continuing their malpractices, I propose giving them a fixed salary, from the Peshawur treasury, totally unconnected with the revenue, the collection of which I will still allow them to make, but increasing this allowance, so as in a measure to compensate for the exactions they are now called on to relinquish.

I have explained to them, that the first man who realizes one anna more than the revenue fixed, will lose his klan-ship, and be otherwise punished, so as to become a lasting example to others.

Having made up my mind on these points, I called a meeting of the Khans, to explain my views, and told them to divide the aggregate sum of 53,500 rupees, per harvest, over the several districts, according to their relative productiveness.

This effected, I caused a jeega, or council, of Mullicks, from the villages of the districts of Tooroo, and Hotee, to be summoned, and made them distribute the sum total, fixed for the Tuppah, over the villages contained in it, and then directed the Mullicks of each village to subdivide this again over their houses, wells, and ploughs. Thus much accomplished, our care will be to equalise, as far as practicable, this distribution in each district, with reference to the relative value of the land.

The foregoing remarks are only applicable to Eusufzye proper, and not to Lhoonkore or Topee Meenee, which are peculiarly situated, and must be considered apart.

From Hotee we marched to Lhoonkore. With regard to this district, it is noted, in the revenue accounts of Peshawur, as yielding 8,000 rupees per annum. This sum was only paid on one occasion, some six years ago, for the last three years, it has been in a state of in-urrection, and paid little, or nothing. And I am sorry to add, that we have seen that the present crop has entirely failed, from the want of rain.

The country, at all times, is poor, and the people a wild, lawless set; at best, little better than robbers, and exceedingly impatient of control. Most of their villages are so situated under the hills, that it would require a strong brigade to

keep them in order; the expense of which would be more than quadruple the nominal revenue. However, as we cannot relinquish our present tenure on the district, with credit to ourselves, I have determined trying a very light assessment, on remitting the three years' arrears of revenue which are due. I fixed the total amount to be paid, by thirty villages, at 6,000 rupees per annum. I may here remark that eight villages are included in this settlement, which never before paid revenue, but have come in voluntarily, and agreed to take their share.

While making this arrangement, I explained to the heads of villages that it was only an experiment, to see if they know their true interests, and that, as long as they paid their assessment into the treasury of Peshawur punctually, no higher rate would be demanded, or troops sent to make collections, but, should they allow this sum to fall in arrears, under any pretext, a force would be sent to collect the original sum of 8,000 rupees, with the addition of the expenses of the expedition.

The Mullicks, one and all, appeared highly satisfied with this arrangement, and have, in addition, signed an agreement, on the part of their several villages, to seize all murderers and robbers who may commit crimes in their district, and send them to Peshawur, to give up all persons required by us on demand, and to become answerable for all robberies committed by the Pullee people, should it be proved that the party has passed through this district, for the purpose of plundering, or on returning with their booty.

I have not yet obtained sufficient data to enable me to form a decided opinion of the arrangements to be made with Topee Meenee, which was, formerly, a portion of Judoon, and is distinct from the other Tuppas of Eusufzye; but it has been reduced to a miserable state, during the rebellion of Uisullah Khan, who ravaged as much of it as he could, while the Sikh troops, opposed to him, burnt what escaped his vengeance. There is, however, every hope that even this unfortunate district may, by good management, be restored to prosperity.

Early next year, I hope to be able to carry out a summary settlement, throughout the whole of the Peshawur district, and I intend it to be much on the same principle as that of the two Tuppas, Tooioo and Hotee, in Eusufzye.

I have directed Lieutenant Lumsden, from whose activity and energy I have received so much assistance, to complete the settlement of the remaining districts of Eusufzye, on the same system as adopted in the above-named Tuppas.

As I considered it extremely important that this settlement, the first we have attempted, should be concluded on practicable, and equitable, principles, and that its working should be, for a time, carefully watched, I have thought it most advisable to leave that officer, who is well versed in the affairs of the whole district, to superintend its accomplishment, while I proceed myself, with Lieutenant Taylor, to Peshawur, it being desirable that he should be with me for some time, to have an opportunity of studying the state of affairs, and gaining an insight into his duties, previous to my departure for Lahore.

As everything is progressing well, and matters bear a peaceful aspect, I purpose availing myself of the Governor-General's sanction to proceed to Lahore, on the 4th proximo, and have made every arrangement for the due performance of the several duties of this province, during my temporary absence.

Lieutenant Taylor will carry on the current duties of the city and district, referring doubtful or difficult cases to Lieutenant Lumsden, who will exercise a general control over all the affairs of the province, paying Peshawur occasional visits.

Both officers will remain in direct communication with me.

Inclosure 2 in No. 16.

*The Resident at Lahore to the Secretary with the Governor-General.*

*Lahore, November 13, 1847.*

THIS day, Lieutenant Edwardes left Lahore, in progress to Bunnoo; and Mr. Bowring, to Pind Dadun Khan. The instructions given to the latter have already been forwarded to Government, and I now inclose a copy of those furnished to Lieutenant Edwardes.

The Shah Newaz Khan referred to, is the grandson of Nawab Sirwur Khan,

of Tank, a tributary of Lahore. His son, Alladad Khan, the father of Shah Newaz, was ejected by the Sikhs, under Koonwur Nao Nehal Sing, about ten years ago; since which time, the country has been given over to another Mussulman family, which, having no sympathy with the people, oppressed them excessively. At the recommendation of Lieutenant Edwardes, I, therefore, lately induced the Durbar to restore the management of Tank to Shah Newaz Khan, the eldest surviving son of the hereditary chief. His character is good, and General Cortlandt writes that, as yet, he has given satisfaction to the people. The fort of Tank is garrisoned by two companies of Lahore troops and one hundred irregulars, but the Killedar is ordered in no way to interfere with the management of the country.

Eight regiments being temporarily required in, and about, Hazara, I have been obliged to order three to move from Peshawur, by the Kohat road, to enable me to make up seven for Bunnoo. The flank movement will be useful, as hitherto the Kluttucks, and other wild tribes in the Kohat direction, have acted pretty much as they liked. They plundered Dr Jamieson, and killed some of his escort, when employed by Government on a scientific mission in that quarter, in 1842; and General Avitabili is reported, on one occasion, to have moved up, for a few marches, into the Kohat Hills, but to have retreated precipitately. I have desired Sirdar Sooltan Mahomed Khan, Barukzye, with half his contingent (1,000 men) to accompany the detachment which Lieutenant Taylor will take down, and move into Bunnoo, on the 5th of December, from the north, while Lieutenant Edwardes enters by the south-east. I do not expect that a shot will be fired. I propose that Lieutenant Taylor should return to Peshawur, and remain there, until Major Lawrence joins, when he will again proceed to Bunnoo, and assist Lieutenant Edwardes in making the military, and revenue, arrangements for Bunnoo, and the adjoining valleys.

Captain Abbott is going on judiciously, and will, I doubt not, soon tranquilize his charge. He has completed three forts, and is daily receiving the visits of chiefs and Zemindars hitherto recusant; some of the Simulkund murderers have even been given up, and others have surrendered. I have warned Captain Abbott not to build a single fort that is not absolutely necessary. He has been busy in the revenue arrangements, but seems not to have sufficiently understood my instructions authorizing him to lower the assessment as much as 20 per cent. He is now looking to the point, and endeavouring to persuade the people to pay in cash, instead of in kind. Captain Abbott is authorized to call up all the regiments from Hussan Abdal, if he requires them, and Lieutenant Nicholson has been desired to attend to Captain Abbott's requisition, should that officer require his services.

Mr. Saunders joined to-day from Hoshiarpore, and will be temporarily employed on miscellaneous duties. Lieutenant Lake, from Kangra, has arrived at Puthankote, near the border, where he has been directed to take up the revenue assessment duties. Mr. Lawrence, assisted by Mr. P. Melvill, is employed on the settlement of the Talookahs around Lahore. Mr. Cocks reports, that he has summarily assessed 350 villages, and says that he thinks he is doing real good. By the end of this month, I expect that twenty lakhs of revenue will have been settled.

Major Lawrence arrived from Peshawur yesterday. He was only eight days on the road.

Lieutenant Nicholson reports that the country around Hussan Abdal, and Rawul Pindie, hitherto, more or less disturbed, is perfectly quiet, and that the Kardars, for the first time for years, move about without guards.

The new customs' system is working well, and is likely to be more productive than was contemplated. There are, however, complaints of oppression at the ferries; this was to be expected; but the matter has been instantly taken up, and the collectors have been heavily fined for exaction. At my suggestion, the Durbar has agreed to invite traders to a great fair at Lahore, early in February next.

Sheikh Emamooddeen has, at last, paid up all his arrears for the Jullundur, but it was not until he was debarred the Durbar, and threatened with arrest. By the system I endeavoured to introduce at the beginning of the year, but which Mr. Lawrence more rigorously enforced, viz., by not permitting Kardars to retain any cash in their own hands, they will no longer have the means of falling into arrears.



Mr. Lawrence is striving to reduce the Durbar expenditure, and check the Maharajah's expenses, or rather what is made in his name. The accounts are now, daily, brought up to the Residency for signature; but even this seems scarcely a sufficient check, for, last week, an order, in the hurry of business, obtained sanction, for ninety pair of paejamah strings for the Maharajah; a small matter, but a specimen of larger ones.

I have suggested that retrospective effect should be given to the pension rules, so as to allow some provision to old servants of the State, who have been, without fault, discharged under late arrangements. The Durbar, however, stand out, on the grounds that, if such an order was issued, thousands of claimants will start up, the chiefs, therefore, beg that I will not insist, and that they will attend to claims of individuals, as they may be forwarded from this office.

Mr John Lawrence has revised the postal arrangements; and we are endeavouring to establish something like a one anna postage for all letters. At present, no trader, or private person, thinks of sending a letter by the Durbar dak, soldiers even will only trust theirs from Peshawur in our private bag. The present expense of the dak is more than 20,000 rupees a-year, and the Durbar seem pleased at the idea of being able to cover a large portion by collections.

I anticipated opposition, in the revenue assessment, from Dewan Deena Nath, but he is, to all appearance, cheerfully co-operating. His character, ability, and influence, is such that I should be sorry to see him separated from the councils of the Durbar. I propose to give him, as also Sirdar Chuttur Sing, Attareewalla, the father of the Maharajah's betrothed, the title of Raja, ten or fifteen days hence, when six or eight Sirdars, and civil officers, will receive inferior titles. These distinctions may appear to be too freely dispensed; but the fact is, they give great satisfaction, at no cost to the State. I was quite astonished at the number of applications for honours, on the occasion of Tej Sing being made a Raja.

There is perfect peace throughout this, and the Umritsur, neighbourhood. Travellers of all classes daily pass perfectly unmolested. During the first half of the present year, gang-robbery of houses, and on the high-roads, was common; but, during the last few months, I have not heard of a single instance.

I now seldom hear the Maharanees name mentioned. The Maharajah seems happy. I propose that one of the junior assistants should daily visit His Highness for an hour, hear him read, see him write, and read and explain a few pages of English, or Indian, history to him. A little at a time may gradually induce a liking for literary and scientific pursuits. He has a mechanical turn, is fond of drawing, and very much enjoys little pictures that Lieutenant Edwardes sometimes draws for him. He rides daily, and is encouraged in manly pursuits, but will not be tempted to play the soldier.

#### Inclosure 3 in No 16.

*The Resident to Lieutenant Edwardes, Assistant to the Resident, on deputation to Bunnoo, Tank, and Dera Ismael Khan.*

*Lahore, November 13, 1847.*

IN your arrangements for Bunnoo and Dera Ismael Khan, &c, I request your attention to the principles laid down in the enclosed letter to the address\* of Mr Bowring. In a new country, such as Bunnoo, a commutation, in cash, for one-third of the crop should be the extreme taken from any man; in Dera Ismael Khan, Kulachee, and the older districts, as much as two-fifths may be taken, where that amount is found not to press on the people. Endeavour to persuade all classes to pay in cash; they will hesitate to do so; but I hope you will be able to convince them that their real interest is involved in paying a definite sum, and thereby escaping all other demands: no nuzzurs, or cesses of any kind, to be continued. the rates of one-third, and two-fifths, are for general guidance: you are, in no case, to make a higher assessment than that of the Sikhs, and can, where you think it advisable, lower it down even to one-fourth of the crop. Runjeet Sing's custom, as well as that of the Trans-Indus

\* Inclosure 1 in No. 15.

country, was to favor Syuds and other religionists; you should continue the practice to a moderate extent, so as to enlist them in our favor. Take nothing that you can avoid, from any man, that he has held for five years, unless it decidedly affects the interests of others; when it does so, money remuneration must be made. For instance, Mullicks, and others, accustomed to leyy customs, must cease the practice; but they must receive full compensation. Again, all who have been in the habit of receiving nuzzurs, and other offerings, should receive some remuneration, not always the full amount, for the sovereignty of the country must now be considered to have passed from the Mullicks to the Lahore State.

It will be advisable to retain, in contentment, and in some authority, the Mullicks of the twenty Tuppas. I observe that, in your report of the 4th of May,\* you estimate their profits to average about one-ninth of the proceeds of the valley, but you remark that, in an arrangement bringing Bunnoo under direct management, the Mullicks would not only lose what they heretofore received, but have to pay revenue on their own lands. I presume, however, that they paid their quota of the tribute to Lahore, and that their lands suffered, like others, from the periodical devastation of the Sikh army. I do not desire to tie you down by orders given on defective information, but would suggest that the Mullicks receive something like one-fourth of the Government share, which would be one-twelfth, or one-sixteenth, of the produce of the country, according as one-third, or one-fourth, is taken. It will be advisable that shares be thus divided, so as to make the Mullicks have a common interest with the Government. The case of Lal Baz Khan of Bazour, and any other man doing Government service, should be separately considered. A jagheer, or exemption from paying revenue on a certain number of Beegahs, should reward such service.

One of your first measures should be to demand the arrears of 80,754 rupees 13 annas 3 pice on the last year's tribute, as well as the amount for the present khureef. Any Mullick, failing to arrange for his quota, should, after being fairly warned, and allowed a moderate time to pay, say a month, or two months, be ejected from his Mullickship. Where there are evidently no means to meet these arrears, you can, of course, use your discretion, these instructions are intended to meet contumacy.

Settlements made by Wuzerees and other foreigners, should be confirmed, if of five years' standing, and all, however recent, if unopposed. Issue a notice that no claim for lands or enams will be heard, unless made within six weeks of your arrival. These squatters must, however, pay the rates of the valley, and give security for good conduct, and be clearly informed that, if discovered aiding or abetting forays, they will be summarily, and severely, dealt with.

All persons who now oppose you, may be disarmed, also any suspicious characters, but it is not advisable to irritate the people, and those who live near the Wuzereee Hills may require arms to defend themselves. Make it, however, known that all who abuse the kindness now shown, will forfeit future consideration.

In the first instance, it may be advisable to garrison the fort in the town of Bazour, but this must always be an invidious measure, and I would recommend that the garrison be Mussulmans, and that they be withdrawn, as soon as you are certain of your supplies. The post of Bazour, as well as all others in the valley not required to repress Wuzereee excursions, may then be dismantled, leaving, however, the dwelling-houses contained in them unmolested.

Seven regiments of infantry, eighteen guns, eighty zumboorahs, one regiment of regular cavalry, and 2,000 irregular cavalry, are ordered for the service; as soon as considered safe, you can send away three regiments of infantry, and 1,000 or 1,500 cavalry. Build a good mud fort, capable of holding 1,200 men and eight guns, in a healthy, central position, if possible, commanding the irrigation of the valley. Unless commanding a wholesome running stream, it should be furnished with wells or cisterns, capable of holding water for the garrison, for six months. Six of your guns can be put into the fort. Its peace garrison should be two companies of regular infantry, 200 irregulars, and a company of artillery. For the next two or three years, four regiments of infantry, one of cavalry, 500 or 1,000 irregular horse, twelve guns, and fifty zumboorahs will remain, in one cantonment, near the fort, and, on any disturbance arising, the mass

\* Inclosure 2 in No. 4.

of this force should, at once, proceed and put it down, leaving their weakly men in the fort. The means of moving two regiments, six guns, and 1,000 horse, at an hour's notice, should be always kept up. Let your cantonment be as compact as possible, one face, at least, covered by the fort, and the further extremities covered by high mud towers, capable of each holding fifty men, and water and provisions for them for a week, all magazines and store-rooms to be in the fort, where six months' supplies for 500 men should always be stored. By making an arrangement with the Mullicks, or traders, near the fort, at the time of settlement, this arrangement will not be expensive. Traders, or Mullicks, will probably be glad to furnish supplies, when crops are cut, exchanging the whole, next year, on receiving 10 per cent of the cost, or, all expense might be saved, by selling half the grain, purchased each year, in the ensuing sowing season, or allowing the person who had provided the whole, to remove half, at the time of the year it is most expensive.

Lieutenant Taylor will join you with the three regiments from Peshawur: you should consult with him, General Cortlandt, and the natives of the country, as to the best place for a fort. Salubrity must first be considered: the reports from Lukkee, of the sickness of the entire regiment in that fort, should be a lesson for the future. Before you talk of forts at all, ascertain from the natives the portions of the valley liable to fever and other diseases.

Do not determine on your military high road, and your posts, until you have thoroughly inspected the valley, and procured full information. The line of road you propose seems to me too near the Wuzerees and Khuttuck Hills. Small detached forts are not safe, and, unless very numerous, robbers might intercept travellers, in the intervals between them. I should prefer having a good military road through the heart of the valley, so as to be available for purposes of Commerce, as well as of Police and War. If there must be towers, let each be large enough to contain one company of infantry and one gun, and let there be a high signal post inside, from which signal fires can be lighted.

When Bunnoo is settled, you should look at Tank, and see that Shah Newaz Khan is dealing fairly by his people, you should, in concert with him, assess the valley, and then fix his quota, allowing him not less than the sum now fixed by the Durbar. In like manner, you should arrange for Kulachee, and then revise the assessment of Murwut, and Dera Ismael Khan, in the spirit of the instructions to Mr Bowring. Consult General Cortlandt, the Kardars, and the Durbar agents, but, in all cases, talk to the Zemindars yourself, and deal with them directly. You are well aware how much may be done by kindly conversation.

I need not further enlarge. You have only to continue the discreet and conciliatory system of last season, and you will hardly fail to give satisfaction to the Durbar, as well as to your own Government. You will remember that the object of your mission is peace, not war, to put an end to the atrocious system, hitherto prevailing, of periodically harrying and plundering the country, and thereby, at immense mischief to the inhabitants, bringing in a mere pittance to the Lahore treasury. The present arrangements will, for some years, cost money, but, if the settlement peaceably secures double what was paid in tribute, it will, I am sure, satisfy the Durbar, even though the expenses of the garrison will be thereby scarcely covered.

Inclosure 4 in No. 16.

*The Secretary with the Governor-General to the Resident at Lahore.*

*Camp, Naelgunge, November 15, 1847.*

I ACKNOWLEDGE the receipt of a notice issued by you, to prevent seizure of coolies, carriage, &c., by British officers, and others, in the Punjab, and frontier stations.

I am directed, in reply, to state that the Governor-General entirely approves of the notice in question. If this improper practice does not cease, you are desired to bring a clear case before the Governor-General, and his Lordship will cause ample and public redress to be afforded, and, through the Commander-in-Chief, hold the military authorities responsible for the strict performance of the orders given by the Government.

## No. 17.

*The Governor-General to the Court of Directors.**On the Ganges, December 7, 1847. (No. 34.)*

I TRANSMIT a memorandum\*, which contains much valuable information relating to the resources of the Punjab, drawn up, at my request, by Mr. H. M. Elliot, Secretary to the Government of India. It also contains calculations of the civil and military expenditure which would require to be incurred, if the administration of that country were to be regulated on the same system as that which prevails in our north-west provinces, and also, if the country up to the Khyber Pass were to be occupied by British troops.

I felt that I could not entrust the compilation of such a work to an abler, or more impartial, officer than Mr. Elliot, whose reputation and experience in all details of the civil administration stand very high, and I, therefore, requested him to condense various returns and reports received from Lahore, which you will find clearly arranged in the memorandum now transmitted.

You will observe that Mr Elliot's researches have not been confined alone to the task of instituting comparisons between the state of our own highly-cultivated and prosperous provinces, and those of the Punjab, but that he has resorted to other very interesting means of comparison, afforded by an examination of the records of the Mogul Empire, 250 years ago, in the time of Akbar. In applying this test of comparative value in land assessments, to the Jullundur Doab, in which we have the most direct interest, it will be found that that Doab was assessed, 250 years ago, at nearly the same revenue that it bears now, namely, 31,75,560 rupees, in Akbar's time, and 30,09,953, for the year 1847, and that, in the four other Doabs belonging to the Punjab, the aggregate revenue, yielded in Akbar's time, was 1,02,09,155, and, at the present time, 96,00,000, exclusive of resumed lands, the value of money at the two periods being nearly the same, either as regards labor, or the price of provisions, making a difference between expected revenue in future years, and that assessed 250 years ago, when the country was in a most flourishing condition, of little more than six lakhs. If, at a later period, the comparison be made, in Aurungzebe's time, the difference, in the aggregate revenue collected, amounts to less than five lakhs.

In all probability, the revenue of the entire kingdom of the Punjab, derived from land, cannot be estimated, even for future years, at a higher sum than one million and a half sterling†; and the inference to be drawn from the data collected, is thus, that, on the most economical estimate of the civil and military administration of the country, the expense of its occupation would exceed the revenues, by more than half a million sterling.

The document is an able and interesting exposition of the resources of the Punjab; and I have expressed my obligations to Mr. Elliot, for the pains and ability he has, so successfully, bestowed on the compilation.

## No 18

*The Governor-General (the Earl of Dalhousie) in Council to the Court of Directors.**Fort Wilham, January 21, 1848 (No 7.)*

WE submit the accompanying papers, relating to an arrangement, proposed by the late Governor General, and concurred in by us, for obtaining the services

\* The memorandum is not inserted in this collection. It is a voluminous document, and the result seems to be sufficiently shewn in the Governor-General's letter

† Revenue		Extra Expenditure	
Land Revenue - - -	1,09,40,000	Civil Expenses - -	85,50,000
Mooltan (additional) - -	5,00,000	Military Ditto - -	1,26,70,000
Jagheers - - -	25,20,000		
Stamps, Abkaree - - -	4,40,000		2,12,20,000
Salt Mines - - -	4,00,000	Deduct - -	1,55,00,000
Customs - - -	7,00,000		
		Deficiency Rs	57,80,000
Rs. 1,55,00,000			

of Sir Frederick Currie, Baronet, as Resident at Lahore, during the absence of Lieut.-Colonel Lawrence, C B, who has proceeded to England, on medical certificate

Sir Frederick Currie having intimated his readiness to undertake this office, and, with it, the superintendence of the administration of the Cis-Sutlej and Trans-Sutlej territories, it was necessary that he should resign his seat as a member of the Supreme Council, in order that his services might be at our disposal. Accordingly, he gave in his resignation on the 14th instant; and, on the 15th, was appointed to be Resident at Lahore, and Chief Commissioner for the administration of the Cis and Trans-Sutlej provinces, retaining, during his absence on this duty, all the honors and distinctions to which he would have been entitled as member of the Supreme Council.

The powers vested in Sir Frederick Currie, under this arrangement, are described in the letter addressed to him by the Secretary, dated the 15th instant\*.

#### Inclosure in No. 18.

*The Secretary to the Government of India to Sir F Currie, Baronet.*

*Fort William, January 15, 1848.*

I AM directed to inform you that, in consequence of the approaching departure of Lieut.-Colonel Lawrence to England, on sick certificate, the Governor-General in Council has been desirous to secure your services to conduct the administration of the Lahore Government, during that officer's absence.

As the only obstacle to this arrangement has been removed by the resignation of your seat in Council, I am directed to communicate the desire of the Supreme Government that you will proceed, with as little delay as possible, to assume charge of your new office

At Lahore, you will be considered as Resident, carrying on, under the orders of the Governor-General in Council, the duties of the Government, according to the conditions of the Treaty which was negotiated by yourself

You will be in immediate communication with the Commander-in-Chief.

The duty of superintending the administration of the Cis and Trans-Sutlej territories, will also devolve upon you, in your character of Chief Commissioner, so long as you are absent from the Council

You are invested with plenary authority in the control of all departments, as Agent and Representative of the Governor-General. In civil and police matters, you will have the power which is conferred upon the Dewanee and Nizamut Adawlut, and, in revenue matters, you will have the power of confirming settlements, reducing assessments, and remitting balances, without any further authority from the Governor-General in Council

While the Governor-General in Council cannot but regret the loss of your advice and co-operation in the Council-chamber, he derives satisfaction from the assurance that the administration of the Lahore Government, and of our new territories in the north-west, cannot be entrusted to abler hands than your own, and that your presence on that important frontier is calculated to add to the vigor and stability of the Government

#### No. 19.

*The Governor-General in Council to the Secret Committee.*

*Fort William, January 22, 1848. (No. 10.)*

WE forward the correspondence which has taken place, with the officiating Resident at Lahore, relative to Punjab affairs.

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\* Inclosure in No 18

## Inclosure 1 in No. 19.

*The Resident at Lahore to the Secretary with the Governor-General.*

*Lahore, November 26, 1847.*

ACCORDING to the determination, several months since made, Dewan Deena Nath was, this day, raised to the dignity of Raja. I had recommended Sirdar Chuttur Sing Attareewala for a similar honor, but, at the last moment, he wrote requesting that his eldest son, Sirdar Shere Sing, might be promoted in his room. I was surprised, but not displeased, at the proposal, for Shere Sing is active and energetic, while his father is in bad health.

I took the same opportunity of having inferior titles of honor conferred on some old Sirdars, and officials, as per margin\*, all have, more or less, done good service, but to Misr Sahib Dyal we are indebted for the arrangement of the customs' line. He and his father bear better characters than any two men in the Punjab.

The ceremony went off well; the Maharajah was in excellent spirits, and it was remarked by the European officers and ladies, as also by the natives present, how well His Highness demeaned himself, and how happy he seemed.

## Inclosure 2 in No. 19.

*The Acting Resident to the Secretary to the Government of India.*

*Lahore, December 27, 1847.*

IN my letter, dated 16th† instant, I stated that Dewan Moolraj had expressed a wish to resign the management of the province of Mooltan, but that I did not think that he would finally make up his mind to do so. Since that date, various intrigues have been going on, with the object of reducing the annual sum he now pays. Raja Deena Nath himself paid me a long visit, one of the chief objects of which was to sound me on the subject.

On Saturday the 18th, at public Durbar in the palace, Raja Deena Nath drew a paper from his vest, and presented it to me, observing that it was Dewan Moolraj's resignation. I asked him to read it out. The paper was a request from the Dewan to be allowed to give up the province, from the commencement of the past harvest. In other words, that he should account to the Durbar for the taxes he might have collected, and we should realize the balance, as well as we could. Such terms would probably have involved the loss of several lakhs of

\* *Sirdars and Officers on whom Titles were conferred, on the 26th of November*

Mubazur-ool-Moolk Samsam ooddowlah, "Raja Tej Sing," Bahadoor Sipah Salar Sudfer Jung  
"Raja Kuln Bahadoor" Raja of Sealkote  
Mukurub bargah Khas-ool-Khas zee-ool-istidar, "Raja Shere Sing Bahadoor," Attareewala  
Raja of Dhan Kullih  
Khyrandeish Doulut alias Dyanitdar Musheer Khas umdar-ool-maham, "Raja Deena Nath Bahadoor," Raja of Kullanoor  
Sirdar Ba-wukar, "Sirdar Golab Sing, Bahadoor," Attareewala  
Sirdar Golab Sing, "Bahadoor," Poovendia  
Sirdar Ba-wukar, "Sirdar Kher Sing, Bahadoor," Sindanwala.  
Sirdar Ba-wukar, "Sirdar Mungul Sing, Bahadoor"  
Sirdar Khan Sing, "Bahadoor," Majeetia  
Sirdar Goomookh Sing, "Bahadoor," Lumma  
Sirdar Ruttun Sing, "Bahadoor," Kerichakea  
Sirdar Jhunda Sing, "Bahadoor," Butalea  
Brahm Moorat oottum Saroop Kripa Nidhan Sironum Punditan Dan adbhikaree, "Pundit Mudsoodun  
Mumtazood dowlah, "Dewan Adjoodhea Pershad"  
Rae, "Bhag Sing"  
Ameen-ood-dowlah, "Misr Megraj"  
Mootam-ood-dowlah, "Dewan Moolraj," Nazim of Mooltan.  
Mohsan ood-dowlah Birbur, "Misr Sahib Dyal," Nazim of Customs  
Rae, "Anuntram"  
Rae, "Mool Sing"

† Inclosure 1 in No. 20.

rupees; for, with the assistance of his friend, Raja Deena Nath, we should have had but an unsatisfactory result from his accounts. I, therefore, arrested the Raja, observing that I did not wish to hear the remainder of the paper, the first condition of which was so objectionable. I added, that the Dewan had behaved unusually in asking for such terms from the Durbar, more especially as I had clearly given him to understand, at our private interview two days before, those on which alone I would recommend the acceptance of his resignation. I, therefore, requested that the Durbar would state to the Dewan, in writing, that he had accepted a lease for three years, and any modification of it must be by mutual consent, and for mutual benefit; that he must now proceed at once to Mooltan, and carry on its management; that, if he wished in reality to give up the province, he must give reasonable warning beforehand, and resign the charge, at such a season as would admit of others taking charge, without danger to the revenue. The Durbar then broke up.

On the 21st instant, the Dewan had another private interview with me, in which, after apologizing for what had happened at Durbar, he added, that he was about to start for Mooltan, but had finally resolved to give up the charge, and, accordingly, gave me a written resignation to take effect from the 10th of March next, the date on which I had previously signified my willingness to receive it. The Dewan only stipulated that I would keep his resignation a profound secret, until the winter revenue had been paid, otherwise, he would have much difficulty in collecting it. This I promised; it being as beneficial to the Durbar as to him. For, unless he collects the taxes, he cannot pay his instalments, and further, the rumour of the contemplated change might be productive of injurious effects in the minds of such a people as the Mooltanees.

I submit a translation of Dewan Moolraj's resignation, he attributes it to ill-health, and discord in his family, but, though not in reality reconciled to his brother and cousin, he is on better terms with them than usual. He had, since his father's death, kept them out of their share of the property, which was one ground of complaint by the Resident, but, a short time ago, this was finally adjusted, and, by common report, the family divided a fortune of ninety lakhs of rupees among themselves.

When it is considered that Sawun Mull, the father of the present Moolraj, collected all this wealth, in the space of not more than twenty years, that he was not engaged in trade, or any speculation in which rapid fortunes are so often accumulated in all countries, and yet that, in comparison with all other governors of provinces, he bore the reputation of being just and considerate to the people, and faithful to his master; what a picture it portrays of native government!

The present charge of Dewan Moolraj comprises the largest portion of the province of Mooltan, for which he pays the Durbar, by monthly instalments, equal to 19,68,000 per annum, and is supposed to collect about twenty-seven or twenty-eight, he probably collects more. Under the former system, he was literally irresponsible, under Maharajah Runjeet Sing, so long as the instalments were paid, no questions were asked, or complaints listened to. On Sawun Mull's death, which occurred in 1844, Moolraj, his eldest son, succeeded, and promised to pay a nuzzerana of thirty lakhs. Had Pundit Julla and Raja Heera Sing lived, this would have been done; but, on their death, everything fell into confusion. Last year, when at Lahore, I finally settled the question both of arrears and future management, Moolraj having come here on a written guarantee from me. He agreed to pay eighteen lakhs of rupees nuzzerana, he lost about one-third of the province, comprising the districts about Jhung, and his payments were raised, for the remainder, from 15,47,183 rupees to 19,68,000.

Since that period, Dewan Moolraj has faithfully fulfilled his pecuniary engagements, but has rendered himself obnoxious for neglect, in not attending to the requisitions of the Resident, when called on by him to redress the complaints of his people. In fact, Dewan Moolraj is a ruler of the old school, and, so long as he paid his revenue, he considers the province as his own to make the most of. He proved himself to be grasping and avaricious, with none of the statesman-like views of his father, and few of his conciliatory qualities. The traders, and agriculturists, of the province had long been complaining of his exactions. The late arrangements of the customs, and the introduction of a fixed assessment of the land-tax, joined with a knowledge that he must be responsible for his acts, has led to the unwonted step, in a native,

of giving up a charge which he has the right to retain for nearly two years. Unless he remodelled his customs, his revenue from that source would have fallen off; unless he gave up some of the most unpopular of the old cesses on the cultivators, many would have abandoned their lands, and migrated into the adjoining districts. He had no faith in the elasticity of trade untrammelled, or the benefits of a light land-tax. He wished that certain dues should be given up, but that all the loss should fall on the Durbar. I proposed that he should introduce the same changes which were working so well in the rest of the Punjab, and compensate himself by the introduction of the additional sources of revenue, which we have found productive, and that, if this was not sufficient, he should reduce his military expenditure, which, in the present state of the political horizon, was still unnecessarily large. Had the Dewan come round to my views, and promised obedience to the precepts of the Council, he might have still held his government. He would have agreed to everything but that the complaints of the people should be heard. With amusing frankness he told me that his (izzut) honor was involved in the matter, and, as I considered our national reputation was equally so, it ended in the Dewan resigning his charge.

By the present arrangement, we have ample time to make every possible arrangement for the good government of Mooltan. My belief is, that, under an able executive officer, it will yield more revenue to the Durbar than it now does, with a large relief to the people. There is not only not a man at Lahore who possesses these talents, there is not one who has even a conception of the duties which would be required of him. I would, therefore, propose to depute two assistants, one of whom to be permanently located in Mooltan, and have charge of the province. A Sikh chief should accompany to command the troops under him.

Should my views meet with the approval of the Governor-General in Council, I would depute, for this duty, Mr. Cocks and Mr. Vans Agnew, should the latter be appointed to this Residency, if not, one of the junior assistants. I would send them to Mooltan, at once, so that they should have ample time to arrange every thing before Dewan Moolraj resigns. With the advantage of his records, they might settle the whole land-tax within the next three months; to commence from the ensuing harvest; without, in any way, compromising the Dewan's position. On his departure, they would thus have sufficient local knowledge, and personal experience, to select the best of his subordinates for service in the province; to divide the country into compact Kardarships; to introduce courts of justice and police; and to discharge such portion of his army and followers as may appear to be superfluous.

While on this subject, I may add that it would appear to be advisable that the net income of Mooltan should be paid directly into the British treasury, it will, no doubt, exceed the annual sum the Durbar is bound by treaty to pay; and thus we shall, gradually, and insensibly, reduce the arrears now due, which, inclusive of the current harvest, exceed forty lakhs of rupees. Some such arrangement would be more grateful to their feelings, and certainly more secure to us. So long as little comes into their exchequer, the Durbar will have less excuse, or temptation, to expend in superfluities; and we shall be relieved from the unpleasant position of constant importunity, without which, I feel certain, we shall not be paid.

I beg to state that affairs are progressing peaceably and satisfactorily beyond the Indus. Lieutenant Taylor, who accompanied the brigade from Peshawur to Bunnoo, has returned to the former place. Lieutenant Lumsden is in the Khuttuck district, settling the land-tax, which has hitherto been in the hands of a farmer, who, by all accounts, has not neglected his opportunities to enrich himself, at the expense of the people. Major Lawrence leaves Lahore, within the ensuing week; and I propose that, on his arrival at Peshawur, Lieutenant Lumsden shall return to Lahore, to organize the guide corps, and assist me in military details.

Lieutenant Edwards is making satisfactory progress in settling Bunnoo. I think that this officer should stay in that district, and carry out his own plans.

Captain Abbott reports the boundary of Hazara as all but complete. He has finished the settlement of the revenue, and the people seem highly pleased with his arrangements. He estimates the revenue of Hazara at but 2,60,000



rupees\*, after deducting jagheers, and its total expenses at 2,04,000, thus yielding but 56,014 rupees of net revenue, to meet the expenses of the army employed there

He considers that the revenue will, hereafter, be increased, but of this, to any extent, I am not sanguine. A country so difficult of access, so rugged, mountainous, and barren, must be lightly taxed. Captain Abbott hopes to reduce the expenses of garrisoning the various forts he has found it necessary to build; and I hope will soon be able to do so, for it is very great. We might also, perhaps, do without a Naib Nazim, who might be transferred, in the new arrangements, to Mooltan, and, at any rate, the host of moonshees and kardars, with which the Durbai has inundated the country, be reduced.

The whole of the irregular horse who have been discharged, and pensioned, have received their arrears of pay, and have departed to their homes, well pleased. We are now disbursing to those retained in the service, and at Lahore, four months' pay, previous to sending them on detachment duty, and recalling those at a distance. This important work has not progressed as rapidly as we could have wished, from want of funds the exchequer not having a lakh of rupees in it to meet current expenses.

Within the month, I expect, however, considerable payments for the late harvest. We also have had a great windfall, in the shape of upwards of three lakhs of rupees, in various gold and silver coins. The way in which this money was discovered is curiously illustrative of the careless mode in which the Durbai managed public affairs. Last year, when Raja Lal Sing was deposed, he was in charge of much valuable Government property, as one of the original toshakhaneas, but which the prompt mode in which he was disposed of, prevented being embezzled. The Resident put guards on this property, which was in the palace. Since that date, no examination has taken place. When, however, it was determined, last month, that inventories of all the Maharajah's wealth should be made out, the apartments in which it was locked up, came under scrutiny. Up to this date, about three lakhs of rupees, in old coins, have been found. of which, 20,000 rupees, in gold mohurs, were but this morning discovered, and, as the search is going on, more may, perhaps, turn up. The whole property thus saved, in money, jewels, and valuable pushmeenahs, is estimated at between seven and eight lakhs of rupees.

### Inclosure 3 in No 19

*From Dewan, Moolraj.*

November 21, 1847.

MY father, the late Dewan Sawun Mull, always rendered good service to the Huzzoor, and, since his death, I have, for the last three years and a half, made it my duty to obey the orders of the Sirkar. Now that I have become weak and infirm through sickness, and my brother and his son, who used to assist me with their cordial co-operation, have, as luck would have it, become inimical to me, and as no confidence can be placed in the Kardars, and I have no means to answer to the different State matters, I beg to tender my resignation of my appointment, and hope that you will be pleased to make over the country, and the different forts in it, to anybody you may like, since the Rubbee of 1904 Sumbut, and honorably discharge me from the office. I wish, first, that my resignation be accepted, and an honorable discharge secured to me.

Revenue of Hazara, after deducting jagheers, enams, and zemindars' per centage, about, Ghoonda rupees		-	-	-	-	-	-	2,60,000
<i>Expenses</i>								
Salary of Nazim	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	18,000
Ditto of Naib Nazim	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	12,000
Ditto of principal Kardar of Hazara	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	5,000
Ditto of Kardar's Moonshees, &c, about	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	30,690
Ditto of Thannadars	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	5,760
Ditto of Thannahs, or Garrisons, at present	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	130,000
Ditto of Moonshees of Thannahs	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	2,536
								2,03,986

Balance - - - Rs 56,014

The Ghoonda rupee is about one-seventh less than the new Nauuk shahes

That the representations of interested persons in all past matters, may not be heard :

That I may be provided for, for the future, being your obedient servant ;— and, lastly—that I may be allowed to take possession of all the grain of the khureef crop of 1904, due from the different talookahs, and which may not have been sold.

Inclosure 4 in No 19.

*The Secretary to the Government of India to the Acting Resident*

*Fort Wilham, January 14, 1848*

WITH reference to your letter\*, dated 27th ultimo, in which you propose to depute Messrs Cocks and Agnew to Mooltan, in anticipation of the resignation of that Government by Dewan Moolraj, I am directed by the Governor-General in Council to request that you will suspend any proceedings you may contemplate, consequent on the Dewan's declaration, in order that Sir F Currie, on his arrival at Lahore, may issue such orders upon the occasion as he may consider expedient

No. 20

*The Governor-General in Council to the Secret Committee*

*Fort Wilham, February 7, 1848. (No 13)*

A LARGE quantity of gold and silver, with jewels and other property, valued altogether at about twenty-three lakhs of rupees, has been lately discovered in the toshakhana, or wardrobe, of which Raja Lal Sing had the charge, and which had remained closed since his deposition. The Durbar have offered to make over to the Resident the gold and silver, estimated to amount to about ten lakhs, as a payment on account of the debt due to the British Government. We have authorized the Resident to accept this offer.

Inclosure 1 in No 20

*The Acting Resident at Lahore to the Secretary to the Government of India.*

*Lahore, December 16, 1847.*

SINCE Colonel Lawrence's letter, dated the 13th ultimo†, giving a precis of affairs in the Punjab, little has occurred of marked interest. We have all been busily engaged in carrying out the different plans which had been laid down, for the amelioration of the condition of the people, and the improvement of the finances of the Government.

The new system of customs works well, at first, there was a slight lull in trade from the fears and suspicions of the merchants, which being now satisfied, I anticipate that traffic will be proportionally brisk. It will take some months before the beneficial effects of the new arrangements will be thoroughly developed. No part of the new system is more satisfactory than that of the salt mines. Formerly, the whole duty was collected, months after it was due from the traders, and accounted for to the Government, years after it was paid. In this way, Moolraj, the late manager of Pind Dadun Khan, owes several lakhs of rupces, and has not, during the past year, paid, literally, anything. The customs are now paid in cash at the mine, on the salt being removed, and the farmer pays a monthly instalment of 50,000 rupees.

The assessment of the land-tax is progressing admirably. The Durbar have resigned all control over it. I estimate that, up to this date, upwards of twenty-five lakhs, or full one-quarter of the whole revenue of the country has been fixed, and the usual leases issued. I am sanguine that, in another three months, the

\* Inclosure 2 in No 19

† Inclosure 2 in No 16

whole assessment of the Punjab will be determined, and recorded;—a change, to the benefit of the agriculturists, which no one, not conversant with the enormous evils of the former system, can fully appreciate

Previous to leaving Lahore, the Resident drew up a set of rules for the guidance of the Durbār. I and Mr. C. Saunders have been engaged in preparing codes of law and procedure, for the guidance of the courts of justice, and kaddars. A criminal code of law and procedure has been completed, and, this day, will be circulated. A code of civil procedure is also ready, and will be issued in a few days; that of civil law will, I hope, be ready in another month. A set of rules is also under preparation, and more than half completed, for the instruction and guidance of the collectors of revenue. However imperfect, they have cost much time and labor, and will, I am convinced, prove a blessing to the country.

The Sikhs, originally a race of peaceful cultivators, driven by oppression to become robbers and rebels, and finally converted, in the course of events, into soldiers and conquerors, have always preserved much of the rudeness and ignorance of the ancestors from whom they have sprung. Custom and precedent by the people, and their own will and pleasure with the chiefs, seem to have supplied the place of any written law. They have no literature except the *Granth*, then holy book, and never appear to have felt the necessity of fixed rules, for the guidance of the officers of justice.

The new courts, which the Resident established throughout the country, will gradually prove of benefit to the people, as those who preside in them become more capable of discharging their duties. The *adawluttees*, or judges, whom Colonel Lawrence selected, were as good, perhaps the best to be had, but they had little, or no, idea of their duty, and no time to learn. Hence they have been overwhelmed with work, which more experienced men could have managed without much effort. The arrears in their courts are considerable, and their decisions do not give as much satisfaction as they ought. Sirdar Lehna Sing, the *adawluttee* of the *Manjha*, or midland country between the *Ravee* and *Sutlej*, had three deputy judges under him, located at different places, and he was thus little more than an appellate or controlling judge. He was thus oppressed with few, or no, arrears, and expedition, which is so essential an attribute of justice, was more nearly obtained with him than with others. Sirdar Lehna Sing is now about to leave the Punjab, and I have resolved not to appoint a successor to his post, as it will effect a considerable saving, and enable us to have some deputies in the other *Doabs*, where the people complain of delay. Sirdars Ram Sing and Lal Sing, in the *Sind Sagur* and *Chuch Doabs*, are doing pretty well; but Sirdar Mungul Sing, and his deputy Anuntram, are both, I fear, failures. They are respectable men; but the latter, from age and temper, and the former, from want of ability, are unequal to their positions.

The Resident resolved on a reduction of 2,000 irregular cavalry, so that the number of horse should not exceed 10,000, and that the old soldiers should receive pensions. This work, it was determined, should be carried on by British officers, as the only certain means of securing to the men fair play. We commenced on 1,300 horse, then present at Lahore, and had two committees, every morning, before whom the men appeared. Majors Lawrence and MacGregor, with Lieutenant Pollock, took the chief duty, Colonel Lawrence and I constantly attending, one or other. The result is, 95 men have been paid up, and discharged, 14 received gratuities, 174 have obtained pensions, ranging from two-thirds to one-fifth of their former allowances. We have given all the pensioners certificates, signed by myself, in the form in use in our army; and have assured the men that we will see they are faithfully paid. On 283 men, the saving to the State will be full 80,000 rupees a year, and, in this proportion, the whole saving on the irregular cavalry may be calculated to exceed three lakhs of rupees.

I say in this proportion, as we only discharged men entertained within the last three and four years, and pensioned those who were manifestly unfit for service. Supposing that, with the rest of the cavalry, the same reductions are made, it will give about 1,200 men; if we make the full reduction of 2,000 at once, it will amount to upwards of five lakhs. The present plan, however, seems the best, and the remaining reduction can be gradually effected. These old soldiers, the companions and partners of Runjeet Sing, in all his conquests, presented a noble spectacle; the majority varied from 50 to 70 years of age, and many preserved the remains of stalwart frames; many were covered with wounds,

and, as they pointed to each, they recounted the place and time they received it. I confess, the Sikh irregulars created a favorable impression on my mind, and those of the other political officers, and appeared to us all, both better mounted, and finer men, than our own irregular cavalry. Though very few voluntarily accepted the pension, a great number have, subsequently, signified their gratification at the arrangement. I observed nearly all those who did accept were Mahomedans, who, as a body, are vastly inferior to the Sikh soldiery.

After going through the horsemen, we had a scrutiny of the moonshees of the force; we found that, for the payment of 5,000 irregulars, the pay department cost 12,000*l.* or 1,20,000 rupees. There were no less than 139 moonshees, thus giving about three to every hundred horsemen. We had these men all paraded, with a nominal list, showing their age, service, and amount of pay, under the different changes of Government, from Maharajah Runjeet Sing downwards. It was then apparent that, as order and system decreased, their pay increased, until it reached its height, in Sirdar Jowahir Sing's time. The subsequent reductions in the army do not appear to have affected the moonshees. We have now discharged all new appointments, and reduced the pay of the remainder to about that which they received from Maharajah Runjeet Sing, when the irregulars were double their present force. This will effect a saving of 60,000 rupees, but the department is still much too expensive, and, therefore, as opportunity offers, some of its members must be transferred to other offices. I must add, that we pensioned several of the oldest of them.

I was curious to see the different views which the members of the Durbar, its soldiers, and civilians, took of this necessary reduction. It certainly created much sensation, much more so than if we had reduced double the amount among the soldiery; and the soldiers themselves said they had got fair play. Nothing, in my mind, shows more clearly the necessity of full interference, and thorough scrutiny into every change that is required, than this reduction. If left to themselves, the Council would never have made it, though the force was ten months in arrears, and they had not the means of paying them. If necessitated to make the reduction, but allowed to carry out the details, we should have had all the moonshees, the old and superannuated soldiers, continued, and the young and vigorous, but uninfluential men, discharged. Up to this day, we have paid up about two-thirds of the arrears due to the discharged and pensioned men, and the whole will be completed in two days more.

The irregular force, then, in Lahore, who continue in the service, will amount to about 1,100 horsemen, and, after receiving four months' pay, they will now be sent out to the different stations, and those from the Jhelum downwards called in, to be dealt with in a similar way as their predecessors. Those in Peshawur will stand fast, until Major Lawrence arrives; those in Hazara and Bunnoo Tank will not be touched, until we can relieve them from Lahore.

The finances are still in a very unsatisfactory state; it is the one great difficulty which now remains. The introduction of the new system of land-tax, the reform in the customs, the loss attendant on reforming the currency, and calling in all the depreciated coinage, with the sums necessary for paying up the arrears of the irregulars, and the civil officials, cannot but amount to a large sum. Much of this pressure, no doubt, is but temporary; still, in the exhausted state of the treasury, it is with the greatest difficulty that the Durbar can meet its demands.

I would not, however, assist them with a rupee: so long as they have any money, they seem to burn to get rid of it, and in any way but that of paying their just debts. When once the Durbar have paid up their own people, I think it would be politic to require them to begin to pay the arrears due to the British Government. Immediate and urgent pressure is the only course which has any effect on them.

At present, we are practising as much economy as possible. Not a rupee is paid away but on an order countersigned by the Resident. The daily receipt and expenditure are punctually recorded, and examined by myself; and I steadily refuse to allow of the disbursement of any sum which can be avoided.

The saving by Sirdar Lehna Sing's secession, by lapses and forfeitures of jagheers, by the reform in the Paymaster-General's office, in the reductions of the irregular cavalry, and its pay department, by remodelling the courts of justice as occasion may offer, and the saving which may be effected in collecting the revenue, when the settlement is completed, cannot fall short of seven or eight

lakhs, and may exceed that sum". Our difficulties, therefore, however great, just now, will, I trust, lessen by the ensuing harvest.

I am happy to add, that the new post-office arrangements, which, for the first time in the Sikh annals, enable the people to avail themselves of these establishments, promise well. For one anna, a private letter is now carried from Lahore to Peshawur. The Postmaster-General, with evident gratification, two days ago, showed me the books, proving that, in six days, no less than 150 letters, pre-paid, had been sent to Peshawur.

Dewan Moolraj, of Mooltan, is still in Lahore. He arrived two days too late to see the Resident, and is now intriguing with the Durbar, especially with Raja Deena Nath, for a reduction of the amount he pays for that province. He complains, that the reduction and modification of the customs throughout all parts of the Punjab except Mooltan, and the new system of assessment, have affected his revenue. He has paid me several visits on the subject, and yesterday told me, as his final decision, that he wished to give up the management of the province, if no reduction was allowed him. I explained that the Durbar had in no way interfered with his charge, in the late reform, and would not interfere during his lease; that he would get no reduction, and might, if he pleased, resign his charge, which I would accept. He then attempted to stipulate for a jagheer, but I gave him to understand that, as he now held none, he could not expect any. I told him to reflect well on the matter, and when he had made up his mind, to put in writing his wishes.

I should prefer that Dewan Moolraj continued to hold Mooltan for another year, for the rest of the Punjab will afford ample occupation for all our energies for that period. Hereafter, it will be well to get rid of the Dewan. His province, under direct control, with a British officer to manage it, as is done in Peshawur, would yield more revenue than it now pays to the Durbar, even with the introduction of reforms, which are now being carried out in the rest of the country; for full eight lakhs of rupees for expenses were allowed, last year, in fixing the sum the Dewan now pays.

Moreover, the Resident has, for some time, been far from satisfied with Moolraj's conduct. It is with the greatest difficulty, and only on reiterated orders, that he will obey a requisition, the people of the country are dissatisfied, and contrast his management with that of other districts, and the traders, on the Indus opposite Bahawalpore, complain of his levying tolls, in defiance of the Treaty of the 9th of March, 1846. The fact is that Dewan Moolraj has so long enjoyed sovereign power in Mooltan that he forgets the duties of a subject, and, where he dares not openly refuse obedience, delays, and hesitates to comply.

Should Dewan Moolraj resign, which, however, I do not think he will do, I would propose to send Mr Vans Agnew down to take charge, until the orders of the Governor-General can be obtained. It requires an officer of experience in revenue and judicial matters, and he is the best man who is actually available.

#### Inclosure 2 in No. 20

*The Acting Resident at Lahore to the Secretary to the Government of India.*

*Lahore, December 20, 1847.*

WITH reference to my letter dated the 16th instant, I submit the second part of the criminal, and the first part of the civil, code. The first part of the criminal one was forwarded with my letter above quoted.

These documents were drawn up by Mr C Saunders, the assistant-commissioner of Hoshiarpore, under my instructions. I have had them, already, translated into Oordoo and Persian, and have circulated them through the Durbar, among the Nazims, Adawluttees, and Kardars of the country.

Should these works meet with the approbation of his Lordship, I propose having a number of copies printed in the different languages above noted: with slight alterations, they would prove useful among the independent chiefs on our

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* Sirdar Lehna Sing	-	-	-	-	-	Rs 60,000
New arrangement of four Paymasters	-	-	-	-	-	30,000
Irregular Cavalry	-	-	-	-	-	3,00,000
Moonshees	-	-	-	-	-	60,000

different frontiers, and even be of service in some of our provinces, where the Government regulations are not in force, and where the people have not the benefit of any written law.

The new codes have been compiled from the spirit of the Government regulations, and the new criminal code of the late "Law Commission" in Calcutta, modified to suit the wants, and customs, of the people of the Punjab. The chief merit of these works is clearness and simplicity, and, if their execution should meet with approval, I shall feel gratified, for Mr C Saunders is an excellent officer, and has exerted himself, since his arrival at Lahore, in preparing them.

Inclosure 3 in No. 20.

*Lieutenant Eduardes to the Acting Resident at Lahore.*

*Camp, Duleepgurh, Bunnoo, December 27, 1847*

IT may, perhaps, be urged that the administration of just laws should conciliate the good opinion of the people, and reconcile them to the loss of their former barbarous liberty. But this theory is at variance with all the experience which we have gained of the Affghan character; and, perhaps, must not be too confidently applied to our oldest possessions in Hindostan. The hope that a Sikh Government, even with all the supervision that British officers can give it, will ever succeed in securing the affections of an ignorant, and, therefore, most intolerant, Mussulman population, is, I am afraid, delusive. What has it to offer them, in return for one-fourth, or one-third, of the produce of their fields?—Nothing but laws. And it has been very fairly doubted whether the want of laws was ever felt by any society which had never known them, though, once enjoyed, their loss is a severe infliction. Certainly, the wholesome restrictions of the law will at first gall, rather than conciliate, both Bunnoochees and Wuzecrees, and they will be submitted to, only because they cannot be resisted.

My own view of the position of the Sikh Government in Bunnoo, though I advance it with deference, is, that it rests now, and ever will rest, solely on military power, that it is in direct opposition to what in other countries is called public opinion, *i. e.* the consent of the majority of the governed, and, consequently, that continuing in the administration of just laws, imposing an easy revenue, and doing its duty to the best of its ability to the people, it should yet never forget that those people are its unwilling subjects—nay, its secret enemies—and be prepared at all times to coerce, instead of relying on obedience.

This view of the occupation of Bunnoo may seem equivalent to saying that it can never pay, and I am bound to submit it as my opinion, after considerable intimacy with the tribes in, and around, it, that Bunnoo never will remunerate the Sikh Government, unless it is disarmed, for the very reason that, till then, the withdrawal of a large force will be impracticable.

I estimated, last spring, the probable revenue that would be derived from Bunnoo, if occupied, at from a lakh to a lakh and a half per annum. Every day, however, develops its resources, and I think I should be safe in estimating the revenue at, at least, two lakhs a year. No new troops being raised to occupy Bunnoo, but only old ones advanced from quiet districts, it might be urged that these two lakhs are clear gain; but this argument is, I believe, not held to be a sound one, as there is no saying when a simultaneous necessity may arise, for the employment of those troops in both the old and the new possessions. If, therefore, Bunnoo is to be debited with the expenses of the troops actually in it, it will only be a profitable annexation, when the garrison can be reduced to the strength mentioned by Colonel Lawrence, which I repeat my belief will be impracticable, so long as the Bunnoochees are in possession of their arms, though it might be done next year, if their arms were taken away now.

In illustration of these remarks, I would adduce the adjoining valley of Murwut. It is now about five years ago since Mullick Futteh Khan Towannah was deputed by Shere Sing to do in Murwut exactly what I am now doing in Bunnoo. He built a fort, and established a garrison, and gave the Sikhs what they never had before—a firm footing. But he did not disarm the people. The consequence was that, after Murwut had been occupied for five years, and the

people should have begun to be reconciled to a Sikh Government, in one single night, and without warning of any sort reaching the garrison in the fort, a common Mullick, named Darikkee Khan, sounded a nukkaruh at midnight in his village; the well-known signal was taken up, and re-echoed from khail to khail, throughout the extensive valley of Murwut, and, next morning, the town of Lukkee (the capital) was destroyed, and the fort besieged. The news of the rising spread like wild-fire; the neighbouring Affghan tribes rushed to the scene of expected plunder, and soon the rebel army numbered 12,000 men. The siege lasted seventeen days, and more than one assault was made, but, though the Rohilla garrison was not 300 strong, they gallantly maintained themselves till Dewan Dowlut Raee came up, with artillery and troops, from Dera, and raised the siege. The rebels dispersed to their homes, burned their arms, and, a fortnight afterwards, when I reached Lukkee with the Sikh army, not a Murwuttee was ever to be seen with a sword or a spear.

The case is strictly in point. I have now forbidden the wearing of arms in Bunnoo, and soon not an armed Bunnoochee will be seen abroad, the presence of a strong force will repress, for the time, the very idea of resistance, and things will go on smoothly, till the apparent complete subjection of the valley induces the withdrawal of the majority of the troops, some trifling spark will then set the valley unexpectedly in a blaze, and the garrison of 1,000 men will find themselves surrounded by a host of armed Bunnoochees and Wuzerees. If they behave with ordinary courage and prudence, they will hold their own till succour can come from Dera; but this is not governing a province, and is certainly not the satisfactory result contemplated in our present labors. On the other hand, were the Bunnoochees now disarmed, the sting would be taken out of them for ever, it would be a difficult task, but it would make the future easy; and I should gladly receive your permission to undertake it.

P.S.—General Cortlandt tells me that, some years ago, he was ordered by Raja Golab Sing to disarm the people of the Doond and Sabuttee, occupying the hill country on the right bank of the Jhelum, between Mozufferabad and Rawul Pindee; he took from them, in the course of one month, about 3,000 stand of arms; and the result was that when, a year and a-half afterwards, a rising took place in the same country, there was not one musket to be found among ten men; and a single regiment sufficed to hunt down the rebel chief. A people, whose country is isolated by mountains, and has little, or no, communication with the world without, are quite unable to replace their arms, when once deprived of them, and are driven to cultivate the arts of peace.

#### Inclosure 4 in No. 20

*The Acting Resident at Lahore to Lieutenant Eduardes,*

*Lahore, December 29, 1847.*

TO forbid the people to wear arms, and, at the same time, to leave those arms in their possession, is to irritate them, without rendering them less formidable. To deprive a whole nation of their arms is very questionable policy, which I would not wish you to adopt in a frontier-state like Bunnoo. There is no objection, however, to your depriving all dangerous and suspicious characters of their arms; and, indeed, all parties who may actually resist authority.

The procedure you propose to adopt in the investigation of rent-free tenures, appears severe. By considering the claims of all Maafeedars collectively, you allow them all to unite in a common cause; and, as the Syuds are the spiritual pastors of the people, it is probable that they will enlist the religious sympathies of their disciples in their own favor. I would recommend your investigating, in the first instance, those grants which are manifestly held on invalid tenure; and when you think rent-free land ought to be resumed, it should be done gradually; in some cases, continuing the grant to the present occupants for life; in others, on payment of half-rent; in others, for a specified term, or on condition of good behaviour:—grants, held under sunnuds of the Mahomedan emperors, or any of the Maharajahs, but Duleep Sing, should not be touched.

Where parties decamp, without paying their revenue, their removable pro-

perty should be attached; if none is forthcoming, their land should be attached; and, after due proclamation for the appearance of the defaulter, and the payment of the balance, the lands, in default, should be confiscated. I do not think that you would be justified in making a tuppā in which they had found refuge, responsible. It would be a circumstance difficult to prove, and dangerous to act on, for it would open the door to extortion on the part of officials.

The adjustment of uniform weights and measures, though a most useful measure, is a difficult one to carry out. It has never yet been effected in our own provinces; and the Kardars are likely to abuse the power thus placed in their hands. In any case, a time should be given to the people to make the proposed change, and standard weights should be furnished the Kardar, with which to assimilate those of the traders.

Inclosure 5 in No 20.

*The Acting Resident at Lahore to the Secretary to the Government of India.*

*Lahore, December 30, 1847.*

THE Dhokul Sing corps, which is commanded by Colonel Man Sing, is the one in which Major G. Lawrence reported, that he had found so many deserters and discharged sepoys of our troops. On the arrival of the corps at Lahore, it would appear to be expedient to disband the regiment, supplying its place by drafts from the élite of the Mooltan troops.

I beg to add that the Dhokul Sing Corps was sent from Peshawur to Bunnoo, with the intention of hereafter coming on to Lahore, with the view of securing the deserters in it, and re-organizing the corps.

Inclosure 6 in No. 20

*The Acting Resident at Lahore to Lieutenant Eduardes.*

*Lahore, January 4, 1848.*

I ACKNOWLEDGE your letter of the 27th ultimo\*, in which you discuss, and advocate, the necessity of disarming the people of Bunnoo. I confess that the question is one of much difficulty, it is one on which much may be said, both for, and against, the measure. On the whole, after giving the subject my mature consideration, I am inclined to doubt the expediency of your proposition.

If you endeavour to disarm the Bunnoochees, we shall come in direct collision with them, on a point on which they must be most sensitive, and, probably, induce them to combine and resist. I consider that any attempt of this nature will prove, in a great measure, unsuccessful. We may disarm the weak and timid, and, therefore, render them a more easy prey to their dangerous neighbours. You may succeed in disarming the Bunnoochees, will you be equally successful with the predatory and migratory Wuzerees? In taking away the arms of the former, can you substitute in their stead sufficient protection? I do not think that any police, particularly in the East, can defend a people who are not able to resist attack, certainly not the unarmed Bunnoochee, who, in the eye of the Wuzerees, has, hitherto, been the object of legitimate plunder.

The arguments you advance for disarming the inhabitants of Bunnoo, are equally applicable to Hazara, and to Peshawur; indeed, to many portions of the British territory; but the plan has never, to my knowledge, been adopted. The Mewat country, south of Delhi, a hilly tract, difficult of access in many parts, from its rugged nature, and the deep ravines which intersect it, could, at the time of its cession, by the account of the people, have mustered 30,000 horsemen. For nearly a century preceding our rule, the inhabitants had been in a state of rebellion, and had not only paid little revenue, but plundered to the gates of Delhi. It is now as quiet as any portion of the upper provinces, and could with difficulty assemble 1,000 horsemen.

I admit that the Sikhs will ever find difficulty in winning the good-will of

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\* Inclosure 3 in No. 20.



a Mahomedan population at the same time, there is no doubt that a firm, but conciliatory, course of policy may so far change their feelings, and habits, as gradually to admit of the military force in Bunnoo being reduced. There can be no question but that the inhabitants would prefer being left untaxed, in their wild, but precarious, independence, yet, as they cannot have that option, as they gradually become sensible to the benefits of peace and order, and are secured in the enjoyment of their own industry, they will have little inclination to rise in rebellion against a power, which they must be aware can crush them.

No doubt, your position is dependent on military power, to a great extent, and must continue to be so; and, if force was the sole engine at your command, I should certainly deem it most precarious, but, surely, such is not the case.

The Durbar will always be able to spare troops for Bunnoo; by treaty, it is allowed to keep up 20,000 infantry and 12,000 cavalry, and has now very nearly that force at its command, with the physical and moral power that upwards of 9,000 British troops at the capital confer. It is thus enabled to employ its own army in Bunnoo, Peshawur, and Hazara, instead of keeping at least a third of them at Lahore. Indeed, but for these outlets for the emergencies of the Sikh soldiery, it would hardly be safe to keep them up to the present strength. We have thus, in the Punjab, a force of full 40,000 troops, independent of Locals, a force amply sufficient for all emergencies which may be reasonably apprehended. A considerable body may, for the present, be left in Bunnoo, with troops in reserve sufficient to reinforce it in the neighbourhood.

The case of Murwut may indeed happen in Bunnoo, but surely is not probable; Maharajah Golab Sing had full 10,000 men in the Hazara, and the whole country was in arms against him. Captain Abbott has not half the number, and yet has completely pacified it. The one is infinitely more alien in religion, habits, and feelings, than the other, to the people, and yet the result of the change of men, and measures, is prodigious, and thus, though no one can dream of doing without troops, it must be admitted that mankind are as much ruled, and kept in obedience, by moral, as by physical, influence. A Sikh force plundering and oppressing the people, and one under discipline and in good order, must make a vast difference. In the postscript to your letter, you cite the case of the people of Doond and Sahuttee, I have understood that, in the rising of 1846-7, they cast out the Sikh garrisons, and afterwards held Maharajah Golab Sing's troops at bay. If, therefore, they were disarmed, as General Cortlandt affirmed, it is quite clear that they must have, subsequently, procured arms in some way or other.

In short, I would not attempt so unpopular and delicate a measure as a general disarming of the people. I would pursue a quiet and unostentatious course, publishing as few proclamations as possible. When absolutely necessary, they should all be of as conciliatory a character as possible. I would avoid placing myself in antagonism with influential classes, such as the religious orders, or the hereditary Mullicks. When it was necessary to make an example, it should be done for specific offences, after due investigation, and proof of guilt. You may gradually weaken the power and influence of such classes, when too great, but let not your course of policy induce them to combine against you.

I would certainly destroy all the forts or strongholds in the country; at the same time, I would not even give out that such was my intention. I do not, by this, mean that I would lead the people in any way to suppose their forts would be spared; I would simply say nothing on the subject. When the Sikh fort was ready, I would begin gradually to dismantle those of the most turbulent. Where resistance was offered, I would disarm the inhabitants, explaining that their misconduct was the reason for so doing. In this way, you would gradually, and imperceptibly, weaken the means of resistance.

To conciliate the people, I would give them a very light assessment, collecting it through their hereditary Mullicks, giving them a handsome allowance for their trouble, but recording the sums they should realize from the village, to prevent extortion. The Mullicks should be the police and revenue officers of the country; through them, I would carry on all details, keeping the villages as free as possible, from any Sikh troops, and thus avoiding that petty, and irritating, interference which aggravates and galls a newly conquered people. The Sikh force should be kept in hand, ready to crush the first attempt at resistance. I would be careful as to acting, until I was certain of the proper course to be taken; but when I did so, it should be promptly and decisively.

It appears to me that the sending a number of Ameens to measure the cultivation of Bunnoo, must have proved distressing to the people; perhaps, it was necessary, from the absence of data on which to form your assessment. They should be looked after most carefully, and got rid of as soon as possible. The lands should be measured in tracts, and not field by field; and, in this way, an active Ameen may measure the whole of the cultivation of a village, in a couple of days.

I fully admit the difficulty of the task before you; at the same time that I conceive it to be, by no means, an impracticable one.

Inclosure 7 in No. 20.

*The Acting Resident at Lahore to the Secretary to the Government of India.*

*Lahore, January 7, 1848.*

I SUBMIT a correspondence between my assistant, Lieutenant Edwardes, and myself, relative to the expediency of disarming the people of Bunnoo.

I consider the measure impolitic, inasmuch as it would unite all classes against us, it would be inoperative, inasmuch as it would be but partially successful; and, lastly, as far as it did succeed, it would be injurious, for it would expose the disarmed Bunnoochee to the attacks of the formidable Wuzzeeree, who, safe in his mountain fastness, could choose his opportunity for attack.

The people of Bunnoo do not appear to be particularly warlike during the twenty-six years that the country has been under Sikh rule, the collision between them and the inhabitants was not frequent, they built no forts, and took no precautions to hold the country properly, contenting themselves with sending a force, every two or three years, to collect the revenue, and despoil the people. It cannot be supposed that, under such a system, the people could be particularly well affected. But, now that arrangements have been made for its permanent occupation, for building a fort, and locating a garrison, when law and system shall be established, with an official of honesty and energy to enforce them, the aspect of affairs should certainly be changed. Lieutenant Edwardes, you are aware, spent some time in Bunnoo last year. He describes the valley as well cultivated and fertile, and fully peopled, the Wuzzeeree and Bunnoochee struggling for its possession. This is not the land where, under gentle, but firm, treatment, under light taxation, and just laws, the people will abandon their lands. To bring, however, the undertaking to a successful issue, it is not alone necessary that plans should be wisely laid, it is essential that a man of experience and ability should remain there, and work out the details.

Inclosure 8 in No. 20

*The Acting Resident at Lahore to the Secretary to the Government of India*

*Lahore, January 12, 1848.*

THE revenue settlement is rapidly progressing, and will, I trust, be completed, before the hot winds set in, even if we include Mooltan. In my next report, I propose giving an abstract of the settlement, which has been finished, of each doab, or province.

When this country has once been settled completely, we shall then, for the first time, have a true rent-roll. The difference between the real and nominal revenue will, probably, be little less than a fourth; and from the former, must again be deducted the reductions on the summary settlement. The savings, from the decreased expenses of management, will go far to meet the last noted deficiency; but still the income will, I fear, inevitably fall short of the expenditure. As I daily become better acquainted with the details of the existing system, I see more clearly the absolute necessity of our entire interference, if we hope to see affairs on a satisfactory footing. As the accounts of the great farmers of revenue are passed by the Durbar, I receive copies, not so much with the object of discovering, and remedying, past frauds; for this would be hopeless; but to obtain a thorough insight into these matters;

and thus be able, for the future, to detect similar malversation. I have now before me those of Dewan Moolraj, of Pind Dadun Khan, the manager of the salt mines, as well as an extensive tract of country round them. By an analysis of the returns of the salt muhal, I find that 8,18,820 rupees were thus accounted for

			Rs	a	p	
By wastage	-	-	13	0	0	per cent.
By expenses of management	-	-	17	0	0	"
By pensions	-	-	1	8	0	"
Due by merchants	-	-	40	0	0	"
Paid into the treasury	-	-	25	8	0	"
Salt in hand	-	-	3	0	0	"

Rs 100 0 0

The accounts of the land revenue are equally melancholy. On a demand of 3,80,000 rupees, I observed the following result:—

			Rs	a	p	
Remissions	-	-	22	0	0	per cent.
Expenses	-	-	15	0	0	"
Pensions	-	-	11	0	0	"
Due by farmers	-	-	5	0	0	"
Paid into the treasury	-	-	47	0	0	"

Rs. 100 0 0

Part of the expenditure at Dera Ismael Khan, and other districts under General Cortlandt, is, no doubt, military, but still the cost of managing the country is excessive, and similar establishments, to a greater, or less extent, exist throughout the Punjab. To clear away all the abuses will require local knowledge, time, and labor, with the certainty of disgusting many, and satisfying no one.

The accounts of the large farmers, and great officers of State, which have been so long under scrutiny, have been finally disposed of, with the exception of Sirdar Runjore Sing's Dewan Moolraj is in confinement, and his balances placed in train of liquidation. Mir Umei Chund has paid up a considerable sum, and will, within the next two months, make good the balance. Sirdar Lehna Sing has rendered his accounts, and obtained an acquittance. Buxee Bhuggut Ram, the late Paymaster of the Troops, has now given in those of his department, involving the details of an expenditure of nine millions of money. Sheik Emamooddeen has made good all the arrears due for the Jullundur, with the exception of some 70,000 rupees, which I have allowed to be suspended, pending inquiries regarding certain defaulters in the Trans-Sutlej territory, and either they, or he, will eventually make good the amount.

The work in the courts of civil and criminal justice is progressing. I do not hear the people complain so much of delay; and, as the presiding officers become more accustomed to their duties, I trust that their courts will become popular. The judicial officers have much to learn, even to acquire a knowledge of the most obvious rules of law and procedure. The new codes will be of much assistance to them; and I hope to be able to furnish them with the second part of the civil code, in a short time.

The reduction, and pensioning, of the irregular horse is going on steadily. Up to this date, we have inspected about 2,000 men, of whom about 400 have been discharged, and the greater proportion pensioned. The work progresses slowly, from the necessity of seeing to everything ourselves, as well as from the fact that the men are scattered over the Punjab. As one body passes muster, they receive four months' pay, and go out on duty, relieving other parties, who return to Lahore, to undergo the same process. The new system of pension is particularly popular with the Sikh soldiery.

The Durbar finally issued circular orders on the 9th of December, allowing the Mahomedan population to call the "azan." I never saw them so averse to any measure we have proposed, as to this one, so reasonable and just. One month has now passed, and the evil effects which they had foretold, have not occurred.

I submit a statistical return containing many interesting particulars of the City of Lahore, which Major MacGregor has caused to be prepared. From it I

perceive that the Mahomedans exceed the Hindoos of all sects, in the proportion of three to two. This is a surprising result, when we reflect that it has so long been the capital of the Sikh power. Major MacGregor proposes leaving Lahore on the 1st proximo; his loss will be sensibly felt, for he is an excellent officer, and highly popular both with the Durbar, and all classes of the European and Native community.

He is now preparing a military code, for the use of the Sikh troops, from notes which the Resident left behind, and some assistance from Major Lawrence, which, I trust, will be completed before he leaves Lahore.

The accounts from Peshawur, Hazara, and Mooltan are all favorable.

**Inclosure 9 in No. 20.**

*Major Lawrence to the Acting Resident at Lahore.*

*Peshawur, January 19, 1848.*

LIEUTENANT Lumsden met me at Attock, and we passed the 15th and 16th together; he then left me to continue his investigation into the settlement of Khuttuck, which, he tells me, has proved a very much more difficult matter than that of Eusufzye, and will require, at least, another month to complete.

Lieutenant Taylor has commenced upon the summary settlement of the Momund district, and I shall take up that of one of the other districts as soon as possible.

Lieutenant Bowie is zealously employed in organizing the artillery, and his exertions and talents are well considered by Lieutenants Lumsden and Taylor.

I am happy in being enabled to report that I found the city and province perfectly quiet, and every thing in good order, and the troops happy and contented.

**Inclosure 10 in No. 20.**

*The Secretary to the Government of India to the Acting Resident at Lahore.*

*Fort William, January 28, 1848.*

IN reply to your letter of the 30th ultimo\*, on the misconduct of the Dhokul Sing corps, I am directed to inform you that the Governor-General in Council approves of your proposal to disband this corps, on its arrival at Lahore.

**Inclosure 11 in No. 20**

*The Secretary to the Government of India to the Acting Resident at Lahore.*

*Fort William, January 28, 1848.*

I ACKNOWLEDGE your correspondence on the subject of disarming the people of Bunnoo, and am directed, in reply, to state that the Governor-General in Council approves of the tenor of your communication to Lieutenant Edwardes.

**Inclosure 12 in No. 20**

*The Secretary to the Government of India to the Acting Resident at Lahore.*

*Fort William, February 4, 1848.*

YOU will take an early opportunity of making a formal application to the Durbar, for the payment of the arrears of debt due to the British Government, for

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\* Inclosure 5 in No. 20.

1846, and the contribution of 1847; and you will warn the Lahore Government, at the same time, of the consequences of allowing the arrears to accumulate, pointing out to them the difficulties in which they will become involved, unless some arrangement is made for paying a part by monthly instalments, and proving to them, by a timely caution, that British forbearance, in not pressing for the immediate payment of these sums according to treaties, is occasioned solely by a desire not to create distress; but that every rupee due must be ultimately paid. This demand should be made, and repeated, if necessary, in order that no misapprehension may arise, and that the motives of the British Government, in being lenient creditors, may not be misunderstood.

No. 21.

*The Governor-General in Council to the Secret Committee*

*Fort William, February 21, 1848. (No. 17.)*

WE forward the inclosed correspondence with the officiating Resident at Lahore, reporting on Punjab affairs

Inclosure 1 in No. 21.

*The Acting Resident at Lahore to Lieutenant Edwardes.*

*Lahore, February 3, 1848.*

I HAVE this day ordered the Futteh Sing Pultun, at Hussan Abdal, to march on Dera Ismael Khan, and there to act as you may direct. I have also ordered the two companies at Goojerat and Wuzeerabad, to join their regiment at once. Lieutenant Taylor will, by this time I hope, have joined you, and was to have taken with him a company of Toora Khan Sing's corps, which remained at Peshawur, when the corps marched.

To-morrow morning, ten guns of different calibres, which Colonel Lawrence had ordered for Peshawur, and which have been delayed, to be put in order by the British Commissary of Ordnance, leave Lahore. Colonel Bheg Sing's regiment of regular cavalry was to have escorted them from Hussan Abdal. I have written to the officer to march with two-thirds of his corps on Peshawur at once, and leave the remainder to bring up the guns.

I have taken these precautions to strengthen Peshawur, because any disturbance in Bunnoo will affect that province also, and the force in it is weakened by one brigade now with you.

I agree with you that, the people of Bunnoo being taxed one-fourth, the Syuds should pay one-sixth. You should carefully record, in each case, what the cultivators are to pay to the Mullicks, to secure them from oppression.

I think the information of a gathering of the Affghan tribes round and about Bunnoo, to attack you, is extremely probable; and I should not be in the least surprised if Khoaja Mahomed Khan, or, indeed, any Barukzye, was concerned. I believe that the whole family are desperate intriguers, and utterly untrustworthy. I think, however, that it would have been the wiser course to have watched his movements, and allowed him to develop his intentions, than to have disclosed to him the information you have acquired. Finding that you are on your guard, and suspect him, may make him more careful, but not less treacherous. It would not be so much to punish him that I would thus act, but to secure myself.

The probability is, as you say, that a rising would not at once take place. The Affghans require no commissariat, or, indeed, money; and they have shown that they can act with effect in the severest cold, but they are more likely to assemble when the crops are ripe, and when, therefore, they can support themselves with facility, which they would do by reaping the Bunnoo harvest.

Your course is to hasten the completion of your fort, to get some of your guns mounted; to lay in provisions, and place your baggage in security. As a soldier, and, moreover, as present on the spot, you are the best judge of the

line of conduct to be pursued, if an invasion, and a rising (for the one will follow the other) do take place. With a staunch commander, and select garrison, in the fort, I should be more inclined, with the rest of my force, to assume the initiative; 2,400 men, and twelve guns, well handled, ought to be irresistible, in the plains, against any tumultuary force, however numerous. The evil of shutting yourself up in the fort would be, that your men would lose courage, and the enemy gain confidence in proportion.

I think you are right in opening communications with Zeywur Shah, and recommend that you confirm his rent-free lands to him, during good behaviour. I would also employ well-paid emissaries in Dom, and the country round about Bunnoo.

I request you will have orders waiting at Dera Ismael Khan, for the Futteh Sing corps, and the companies I have ordered up. Should there be a rising, and they have to cross, they should be joined by all the force at that place, and, particularly, with some guns, so as to advance in strength; and you will, of course, make a movement, if necessary, with part of your force, to enable them to join.

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Inclosure 2 in No. 21.

*The Acting Resident at Lahore to the Secretary to the Government of India.*

*Lahore, February 4, 1848.*

I DO not conceive that there is any danger at Peshawur. As a disturbance, however, in Bunnoo, particularly if the Barukzye chiefs are concerned, would sensibly affect the former province, I have thought it right to reinforce Major Lawrence.

Bunnoo, Hazara, and Peshawur are the three vulnerable points of the Sikh territory, and Attock is the central position from which troops could march in any direction. I have still two corps in reserve, by the above arrangements, to support Captain Abbott in Hazara.

Inclosure 3 in No. 21.

*The Acting Resident at Lahore to Major Laurence*

*Lahore, February 4, 1848.*

IT seems evident that one-third of the Sikh army is considered sufficient for Peshawur, but that a portion should be available for service at a distance, on the right bank of the Indus. When 10,000 men were named as the appropriate force for the province, the Sikh army amounted to upwards of 20,000 infantry, and 12,000 cavalry. Now, the former arm does not exceed 17,000 men, and the latter, if we deduct the men about to be disbanded, nearly one-half of which have actually received their discharge, cannot be estimated above 10,000\*.

I find that you have the following force, present and effective.—

	Men
Regular troops - - - -	4,300
Irregulars - - - -	1,600
Goorchurras - - - -	850

6,750

with a troop of artillery, and three regiments of infantry, and one of cavalry, at Bunnoo.

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	Men.
* Infantry - - - - -	16,972
Artillery - - - - -	1,568
Regular Cavalry - - - -	3,263
Goorchurra ditto - - - -	5,128
Jagheerdar ditto - - - -	3,500
	<hr/> 11,911

By the Durbar returns, which I have taken down this day, I find the following distribution of the regular army:—

	Cavalry	Artillery.	Infantry
Peshawur - - - - -	1	5	5
Bunnoo - - - - -	1	4	7
Hazara - - - - -	1	2 $\frac{1}{2}$	4
Hussan Abdal - - - - -	1*	2	3
Kurri Kahorta - - - - -	0	0	2
Lahore and Umritsur - - - - -	1	1 $\frac{1}{2}$	3
Ramnuggur - - - - -	0	1	0
En route to Lahore, and not available	0	0	1
Regiments - - -	5	16	25

Including, therefore, your brigade in Bunnoo, you have more than one-third of the Sikh army; being two regiments, out of five, of cavalry; six, out of sixteen, batteries; and eight, out of twenty, regiments of infantry.

I have already directed the corps of cavalry at Hussan Abdal to march for Peshawur, two-thirds at once, and one-third with the guns, which left Lahore two days ago.

You will have learnt that there is some danger of a disturbance at Bunnoo; and that I have ordered one infantry regiment from Hussan Abdal to Dera Ismael Khan. I have this day directed that two more regiments march from Hussan Abdal and from Kurri Kahorta: the one for Peshawur, the other to take post at Attock, which you can, however, order up, if you consider it required.

#### No. 22

*The Governor-General in Council to the Secret Committee.*

*Fort William, March 22, 1848. (No. 25.)*

THE perfect tranquillity which prevails in the Punjab, is enabling the Durbar, with the assistance of the Resident, to promote reforms in the administration of the Lahore State, calculated to relieve its finances, and to ameliorate the condition of the people. The settlement of the revenue, and the reduction of the military establishment, are the most important of these reforms, the latter measure will improve the efficiency of the Lahore army, at the same time that it lessens the cost.

#### Inclosure 1 in No 22.

*The Acting Resident at Lahore to the Secretary to the Government of India.*

*Lahore, January 31, 1848.*

THE settlement of the land revenue is rapidly progressing; already, districts to the extent of forty-five lakhs of rupees, as shown in the margin†, and, I hope, before leaving Lahore next month, to have full sixty lakhs completed, as well as to have re-cast the administration of the country, between the Ravee on one side, and the Beas and Sutlej on the other, which is known under the name of the Baree Doab.

In the customs, I have reduced the duties on dried fruits, and other articles, from five rupees per maund to three rupees; on silk, from forty to twenty-four

\* A corps of cavalry ordered to Peshawur, ditto of infantry to Dera Ismael Khan.

	Rs
† Doab of Baree - - - - -	14,00,000
Rechnab - - - - -	17,00,000
Chuch - - - - -	4,00,000
Sind Sagur - - - - -	6,00,000
Hazara - - - - -	2,20,000
Peshawur - - - - -	2,00,000
Total - - -	45,20,000

rupees; on English coarse calicoes, from thirty to twenty rupees; and on sugar, from two rupees to one rupee per maund.

The tranquillity of the country has been slightly disturbed at Umritsur. At the Mohurrum the two sects of Sheeas and Soonees had a violent fracas; these people, who have so long been oppressed by the Sikhs, no sooner begin to enjoy the free exercise of their religion, than they quarrel among themselves. Last year, about the time of the treaty of Bhyrowal, a similar émeute took place at Lahore, which was settled by the prompt interference of Lieutenant Edwardes. At Umritsur, the Sikh authorities mismanaged the matter, and aggravated the disturbance, by publicly parading, through the town, three of the chief religious men of the Soonees, who are said to have been most to blame, on asses, with their faces blackened. From 6,000 to 8,000 Mahomedans assembled at Lahore, from Umritsur and the surrounding country, and filled the streets and bazaars, vociferating for justice. I sent for some of the most influential, and explained to them that nothing could be done, until the crowds dispersed, and returned home, that, if they committed any overt acts of violence, they would bring down ruin upon themselves; reminded them, how kindly they all had been treated, since we entered the country; and, finally, assured them that, when order was restored, I would inquire into the matter, and afford them redress. This, with the cold and hunger so many must have experienced, from the journey, and want of shelter at Lahore, appeased their feelings, and all have, some days ago, quietly dispersed. At Lahore, the Mohurrum, which is the time when such quarrels usually take place, passed off perfectly peaceably, owing to the issue of a few simple rules, which Major MacGregor took care to have effectually carried out.

I have further to report that a fanatic Akalee, with four or five followers well armed, has taken possession of one of the towers which surround the sacred tank and temple at Umritsur, and has, for the last three days, defied all attempts to seize him. A portion of the regiment in Govindgurh was called out against him; but I am sorry to add that, on the first day, he wounded the colonel and a sepoy; and, on the second, killed a subadar, and wounded three sepoys. Partly, from the difficulty of assailing the post, and partly, I conceive, from a certain awe which the Sikhs entertain for such characters, he has not yet been captured. I hear that the party have got provisions; but how they manage for water, I do not comprehend; it is evident that they must have an understanding with some one below. The Durbar have sent a select party from Lahore, with instructions to give the Akalee and his men half an hour to surrender, and, on their refusal, to attack them; but, if this cannot be done without the chance of losing many lives, to undermine the tower, and blow it up.

From Peshawur, the accounts are very favorable. Major Lawrence was received, on his arrival, with demonstrations of good feeling on the part of the people. Lieutenant Lumsden was, in the interior, employed in settling the land. I have directed Lieutenant Taylor to proceed to Bunnoo, and join Lieutenant Edwardes, who, some time ago, asked for assistance, wishing to make a tour through Dera Ismael Khan, Murwut, and other places, with General Cortlandt, the Nazim. It is well not to leave the Sikh troops in Bunnoo without an English officer: I have, therefore, sent Lieutenant Taylor thither.

I regret that another attempt has been made on Lieutenant Edwardes, which has only failed by his shooting the assailant. This officer is still very anxious to disarm the people of Bunnoo; but I am, nevertheless, of opinion that it would be an impolitic measure, and probably lead to much oppression on the part of the troops and police. He has purchased up a considerable quantity of fire-arms, by remitting arrears of revenue, which, he says, he would never have recovered.

I have also to add that, on the night of the 25th instant, a desperate attempt was made, by the convicts at Lahore, to escape. About dusk, they made a rush at the gate, which was shut, with only a small wicket for ingress and egress. Unfortunately, though the gate was shut, it was not locked, and the prisoners, after overpowering the sentry, opened it. The guard, however, quickly turned out, and attacked them; when, three were killed, sixteen wounded, and fourteen escaped. Major MacGregor and Lieutenant Pollock were, shortly after the event, on the spot.

The Nazim of Mooltan, since his return to his government, has been disbanding a portion of his troops, with reference, no doubt, to his approaching resignation. He has evinced a willingness to make reparation for the illegal exactions of his people against traders on the Indus, by remitting to me, on



their account, nearly 5,000 rupees, which they had collected, in the shape of river tolls.

Hazara is perfectly tranquil. Captain Abbott has already, at my instance, made a considerable reduction in the expenses of managing the country, and will, I anticipate, make more. The reductions which he made in the land-tax, will, I feel assured, have the most beneficial effects, enabling him to collect the revenue with facility, and, therefore, at little expense.

The exchange by which Hazara was transferred to Lahore, however politic and wise a measure, was decidedly, in a financial view, advantageous to Maharajah Golab Sing, the expenses of the local management alone swallowing up nearly all the revenue, while the lands His Highness gained cost but a trifle in this way. The reduction in the Hazara settlement has put matters on a fairer footing, the Sikhs having less to give, and being able to manage Hazara more cheaply. But one of the greatest advantages which has accrued from the reduction, is, that it has, probably, saved the district of Bijawut, which was in jagheer to Raja Tej Sing.

The reduction of the Irregular Cavalry is still going on. We have, up to this date, gone through 2,700 men, at Lahore alone, of whom about 600 have been discharged, and pensioned, with a saving of some two lakhs of rupees per annum. The work will now go on still more rapidly, as Major Lawrence has commenced at Peshawur. At the rate of reduction which has, hitherto, been effected, I do not anticipate that we can, immediately, get rid of more than 1,200 horsemen.

The principle has, hitherto, been to pension the old and infirm, and discharge the new levies of the time of Rajas Jowahir Sing and Lal Sing. It was Colonel Lawrence's wish that the whole of the cavalry should be reduced by 2,000 men; but, on the above principle, as I have already stated, we shall not get rid, in all probability, of more than 1,200. We must, therefore, either allow the reduction of the remainder to be the work of time, or hit upon some other expedient.

The Jagheerdar Horse, supplied by the chiefs of note, amount to about 3,500 men, and these can only be reduced as a Jagheerdar dies, without giving much offence. This force is, in a great degree, both useless, and expensive, but it is the system of the country. It is that system, moreover, on which the power, influence, and reputation of the chiefs consist, and, therefore, can only be touched with much delicacy.

When parties misbehave, occasion, as is the rule, can always be taken to reduce their contingents. A few days ago, certain Sirdars were complaining that, in consequence of the new system of land revenue, their villages would be difficult to manage, that the people would now require reductions, for which the State ought to grant indemnity. I proposed, that every Jagheerdar who was thus situated, should be allowed to reduce his contingent, to any extent he pleased, the Government to have the benefit of half the saving, and the chief of the other. To this they all demurred, but it had the effect of silencing all complainants.

As the plan would be very feasible at any time, and would effect a considerable saving, I will take this opportunity of explaining the tenure on which the Horsemen are kept up.

A portion of the fief of every chief is personal; the rest is for the support of his contingent. Thus, an individual, furnishing 100 Horse, will probably have a jagheer of, perhaps, 50,000 rupees per annum. Of it, 20,000 rupees will be his personal jagheer, and the remainder the supposed pay for the men, 300 rupees per Horseman being the usual rate. The chief, however, saves a portion of this sum, as he pays some a-half, some two-thirds, and, perhaps, a few cadets of the family the full sum. Supposing, therefore, that a chief consented to reduce forty Horse, for which he received 12,000 rupees in lands, Government would gain 6,000 rupees, and he add the remainder to his personal jagheer for life.

P. S. Since writing the above letter, I have had the satisfaction of hearing, that the Akalee, and his followers, surrendered, this morning, to the party sent from Lahore.

## Inclosure 2 in No. 22.

*Jeebun Sing, Mooktear to the Maharanee Junda Khore, to the Secretary to the Government of India.*

*Calcutta, January 2, 1848.*

I HAVE the honor to inform you of my arrival in Calcutta, bearing the letter of Her Highness, the Maharanee Junda Khore, mother of the Maharajah Duleep Sing, addressed to the Governor-General of India in Council, and charged with her commission to lay before his Excellency, on her behalf, a representation of the cruel and unworthy treatment under which she now suffers; to demand of British justice a full and impartial investigation of the charges, (but imperfectly known even to herself) under which she has, by British authority, been condemned to incarceration, and to require that the restraint to which she may be subjected pending that investigation, may be such as becomes the widow of one Sovereign Prince, and the mother of another; such as is compatible with the safety of her person, and such as will not deprive her of that intercourse with her friends and advisers which is necessary for bringing the truth of her cause to light.

I beg to solicit the honor of an audience, for the purpose of delivering my credentials, and laying before his Lordship in Council, a further statement of the nature of my instructions, and the object of my mission, or that his Lordship will be pleased to point out in what manner, and through what channel, it will be agreeable to him to receive the representations which I have been commanded to make, on behalf of my Royal Mistress

I request you will do me the favor to communicate his Lordship's reply to me, under cover, to the care of Mr. John Newmarch, solicitor, Calcutta

## Inclosure 3 in No. 22.

*The Secretary to the Government of India to Jeebun Sing, styling himself Mooktear of the Maharanee Junda Khore.*

*Fort William, February 18, 1848.*

I HAVE received, and laid before the Governor-General in Council, your letter dated the 2nd of January, and, in reply, am directed to acquaint you, that his Lordship in Council declines to recognise you as a vakeel of the Ranee Junda Khore, except through the representative of the Government, the Resident at Lahore

## Inclosure 4 in No. 22.

*The Secretary to the Government of India to Sir Frederick Currie, Baronet, Resident at Lahore.*

*Fort William, February 18, 1848.*

I **TRANSMIT** a communication from Jeebun Sing, styling himself Mooktear of the Maharanee Junda Khore.

In acquainting the Ranee that her letter has been received, his Lordship in Council requests that you will inform her, that the Governor-General in Council declines to recognise her vakeel, and that all her communications must be made through the Resident.

## Inclosure 5 in No. 22.

*Jeebun Sing to the Secretary to the Government of India.**Calcutta, February 23, 1848.*

I HAVE the honor to acknowledge the receipt of your letter, in which you acquaint me that the Governor-General in Council declines to recognise me as a vakeel of the Ranee Junda Khore, or to hold any communication with the Ranee, except through the representative of the British Government, the Resident at Lahore.

I beg, respectfully, to express my earnest hope that his Lordship in Council may, on reconsideration, be induced to modify his resolution, which, if adhered to, amounts to a complete denial of justice to my mistress, and which appears to me to have been formed under some misconception of the object of my mission.

My mistress never contemplated my establishment at Calcutta as her permanent vakeel, or opening a means of communication with the head of the British Government in India, other than through its representative the Resident at Lahore, nor did she wish, or expect, that the investigation of the charges under which she has been condemned, should be conducted otherwise than through the agency of that officer; but it is only by measures originating with his Lordship in Council, that an opportunity can be afforded her of forwarding her representations through the channel which you have been directed to point out.

The confinement in which the Ranee is now kept, is of the most close and rigid description. She is shut up in the fort of Sheikhoopoor, formerly used as a gaol for common felons, under the custody of those Sirdars from whose dangerous machinations against her own life, and that of her son, she, first, solicited the protection of a British force stationed at Lahore—all intercourse with her friends and advisers, or even with the ministers of her religion, is strictly prohibited, and the only attendants allowed her are a few female servants, not of her own selection, but appointed by her keepers. So penal is the nature of the treatment she undergoes, that she is not allowed even the privilege of choosing her own diet.

Any attempt on my part to inform my mistress, so situated, of the resolution of his Lordship in Council, would be almost hopeless. Being known as her emissary, were I to re-visit Lahore, I should be exposed to assassination, or should, on one pretence or another, be immediately arrested, and sent to prison, or, grant that I might be so fortunate as to find an opportunity of apprizing her of the necessity of making her representations through the Resident, the means of drawing up a memorial would be denied her, or, when drawn up, it would be intercepted, before it could reach the Resident's hands.

The friends of the Ranee now in Lahore, are so much intimidated that they dare not call the attention of the Resident to the hardships which she suffers.

On the part of my mistress, I beg that directions may be sent to the Resident at Lahore, to inquire into the truth of my assertions, and if he find them to be correct, to remove the Ranee from the custody of those at whose hands she experiences such cruel and unworthy treatment, and place her under the superintendence of a British officer.

And, on the same behalf, I further request that the Resident at Lahore be directed to institute an investigation into the charges under which the Ranee has been imprisoned, and to take down, and transmit to his Lordship in Council, the evidence of all witnesses which may be produced, in support, or in rebuttal, of the accusation. His Lordship, in directing such investigation, will, no doubt, order that, under all precautions which may appear to him prudent, or necessary to prevent an abuse of the privilege, the Ranee shall be allowed such intercourse with her friends and advisers as will enable her to plead her cause effectually.

His Lordship will, I trust, perceive that the object of my presence in Calcutta is not, as he may have at first supposed, to disturb the existing arrangements for conducting the political intercourse between the British Government and that of Lahore, by the establishment of a new agency at the seat of the British Government, but merely to solicit such interference as may render accessible to my mistress that channel which his Lordship has himself pointed out as the proper one for an appeal to justice.

## No. 23.

*The Governor-General in Council to the Secret Committee.*

April 8, 1848. (No. 30.)

WE forward dispatches, received from the Resident at Lahore, on the subject of affairs in the Punjab.

Inclosure 1 in No. 23.

*Lieutenant Edwardes to the Acting Resident at Lahore.**Camp, Duleepgurh, Bunnoo, February 12, 1848.*

I HAVE to thank you for your kindness in giving us another regiment, and ordering our absent companies to rejoin. The force we have here, at present, though small, is in good order, and would be sufficient, I think, to repel any amount of insurgents from the hills; but numbers give confidence in every camp, and if the Futteh Pultun was doing nothing at Hussan Abdal, it will, at all events, be more useful here, in lightening the somewhat laborious duties of our soldiers, who, by day, work at the fort, and, by night, have their pickets and watches, and go cheerfully through all.

The Dourees, at the last moment, have been deserted by their allies, the Khastees and the Muhsood Wuzerees, the former availing themselves of the late heavy snow-storms in the hills as an excuse for not keeping their appointment, and the latter having their attention suddenly drawn home by the unexpected breaking out of a feud, in which one chief's son was killed by the son of another, and the clan divided for a fight among themselves. The hostile combination, in fact, has failed, and, in the emergency, the Dourees, unable still to persuade themselves that we are not waiting to seize their country, are now inclined to throw themselves on our mercy, and make terms for being lightly ruled. Already one Mullick has come in, and the others, I am told, wait but a word from me to follow.

Lieutenant Taylor joined me yesterday, but I shall not start for Kolachee, until the present peaceful aspect of affairs is quite confirmed.

Inclosure 2 in No. 23.

*The Acting Resident at Lahore to the Secretary to the Government of India.**Lahore, February 19, 1848.*

IN my letter dated the 31st ultimo\*, I had the honor to report, that an Akalee, with some followers, had taken post in one of the buildings adjoining the temple at Umritsur, and, in resisting the troops who were endeavouring to capture them, had killed a subadar, and wounded an officer and several men. Before dispatching my letter, I had the satisfaction of adding that these Akalees had surrendered to the party dispatched from Lahore against them.

The culprits were brought to Lahore, and the case investigated before the Durbar. Gunda Sing, the leader of the party, and his eight associates, all Akalees, were arraigned for the murder of the subadar, and wounding the commandant of the corps, and some of his men, with intent to kill. The guilt of the prisoners being fully proven, and there being no extenuating circumstances pleaded in defence, the leader, Gunda Sing, and two of his associates, were sentenced to be hanged, and the remaining six prisoners to confinement, with labor and irons, for seven years.

These sentences I confirmed, on the 14th instant, and accordingly, this morning, the three Akalees sentenced to death were hanged. As this was the first instance in which Akalees have been sentenced to death, I requested the brigadier commanding at Lahore to have the 18th regiment of Native Infantry, whose parade-ground is within one hundred yards of the spot where executions

\* Inclosure 1 in No. 22

take place, drawn up, as a precautionary measure. The ground was guarded by the Sikh troops, and the sentence of the law was carried out, under the directions of Mr. Cocks, Lieutenant Pollock, and Sirdar Khan Sing, the Adawltee of Lahore.

I consider that the execution of these Akalees will have a most beneficial effect on this turbulent race, and thoroughly convince them that the days have gone by, when they could murder with impunity. Gunda Sing, Akalee, was a man of some note; he had been engaged, at different times, in various desperate affairs, and was at feud with Sirdar Lehna Sing, the late Governor of the Manjha country, whose property, on one occasion, he plundered.

As these Akalees are looked up to with respect, and even reverence, by the Sikh population of the Punjab, it is not improbable that the six prisoners who have been sentenced to seven years' imprisonment, may, hereafter, make their escape, with the connivance of their guards. I, therefore, beg to recommend that the Governor-General in Council may be pleased to direct the issue of a warrant, allowing them to be confined, for the period for which they have been sentenced, in one of the gaols in the regulation provinces. The exile of such desperate characters will, I am satisfied, have a most beneficial effect.

Inclosure 3 in No. 23.

*The Acting Resident at Lahore to the Secretary to the Government of India.*

*Lahore, February 21, 1848.*

LIEUTENANT EDWARDES is of opinion that the combination which threatened the peace of the Valley has passed away.

I look with considerable suspicion on any overtures from so bigoted and ignorant a race as the Mullicks of Dour. It may be that the Mullick who visited Bunnoo has personal objects to gain, which might induce him to misrepresent the feelings of his countrymen, but, be this as it may, the occupation of Dour would but increase the difficulties and dangers of the Sikh position on that frontier. It is easy to overrun, or even occupy for a time, these valleys on the borders of the Soohmanee range, but the entrances to them are all, more or less, difficult, and, in times of general insurrection, a body of troops, unless in considerable force, would be in danger of being cut up.

Inclosure 4 in No. 23.

*The Acting Resident at Lahore to Lieutenant Edwardes*

*Lahore, February 21, 1848*

I HAVE to request that, on the arrival of the Futtah Pultun at Dera Ismael Khan, if you consider that all danger of invasion and insurrection has passed by, you order that corps to Bunnoo, and send the Khas regiment to Hussan Abdal. Troops are not now actually required, at this place, for any especial work; but, as a support to Hazara, they are in a good position.

I coincide in your opinion that it would not be expedient to listen to any overtures from the people of the Dour valley, as also in the mode they should be dealt with, in the event of their invading Bunnoo. I should look on all such overtures as excessively hypocritical, and utterly untrustworthy.

Inclosure 5 in No. 23.

*The Acting Resident at Lahore to the Secretary to the Government of India.*

*Lahore, February 23, 1848.*

THE Durbar have paid into this treasury, gold to the value of rupees 13,56,837 Os. 6p.

The Durbar, in making this payment, have now exhausted all the gold that was found in Raja Lal Sing's toshakhana, as well as all that they had

in the *Motee Mundur*, or Great Treasury, with the exception of a few vessels of this metal, which they have retained, as relics of Maharajah Runjeet Sing's time. This gold was of little use to them, and, in the course of time, would have been gradually wasted away; whereas, by this payment, they have reduced their debt to the British Government from upwards of forty lakhs of rupees to less than twenty-seven

I beg to add that I have taken no silver from the Durbar, but have had what was found, melted up, and converted into rupees. They have thus, by economy and care, been able to make good four months' pay of the irregular cavalry, to discharge the whole of the arrears of the men who have been pensioned and disbanded, to meet their current expenses, and have still, at this moment, full eight lakhs of rupees in the different treasuries to meet the public exigencies.

#### Inclosure 6 in No. 23

*The Acting Resident at Lahore to the Secretary to the Government of India.*

*Lahore, March 1, 1848.*

THE possibility, indeed, I may add, the probability, of an invasion of the Bunnoo valley, and an insurrection of its inhabitants has, during the past month, been the object of the greatest interest. On the first news from Lieutenant Edwardes, every precaution which appeared necessary, both to strengthen his position, and that of Major Lawrence at Peshawur; as any disturbance in one part of the Trans-Indus country would, probably, spread to the other parts. I am, however, to add that, by Lieutenant Edwardes' reports, it would appear that the excitement and enthusiasm of the Affghan tribes, round and about him, is considerably diminished. It is by no means certain that an invasion of the Bunnoo valley may not yet take place, but the chances seem against it. As the people learn to appreciate the benefits of peace and security, when they see that they are both protected from the depredation of their predatory neighbours, and from the extortion of their hereditary chiefs at home, they may cease to call for the assistance of tribes, akin to them in religion and lineage, but opposed to them in interest.

Since Major Lawrence's return to Peshawur, matters have progressed most peaceably. Lieutenant Lumsden has been engaged in the revenue settlement in the Khuttuck district, and his principal fully employed at the capital of the province. Lieutenant Taylor who was directed to proceed to Bunnoo, and, for a time, assist Lieutenant Edwardes, has joined that officer.

The country of Hazara seems perfectly tranquil. The judicious measures of Captain Abbott, the considerate treatment of Sirdar Chuttur Sing, the Nazim, and the completion of the light assessment, have worked wonders amongst its turbulent inhabitants. It remains but to reduce the expense of the local establishments, to render the arrangements for Hazara complete,—and some progress with this object has been, already, effected.

Everything is quiet in Mooltan. Since Dewan Moolraj's return, we have had fewer complaints against him. I shall, however, be glad to see him relinquish his charge, that we may extend the reformation in the customs, and land tax, to that province. The income also which this Nazim, now, draws from the country, will go far to compensate the Durbar for the reductions elsewhere.

In the remainder of the Punjab, the public peace has been but slightly disturbed. At Umritsur, the mismanagement of the Adawlutee, or Judge, had nearly led to serious consequences. His harshness in the quarrel between the Sheeas and Soonees, and his want of vigor and courage in the affray with the Akalees, were equally lamentable. The Mahomedan case has been quietly disposed of; the parties whom the executive officer had confined, have been released, and security taken from them for the future. In the Akalee case, as I have reported, it did not end without bloodshed, and the forfeiture of their lives, by three of the most guilty of the party. I have deemed it necessary to remove Baba Lutchmun Sing, the Adawlutee, from Umritsur to a less onerous position.

The state of the tracts termed the Manjha (midland), which is the country from Deenanuggur to Battala, and round about Umritsur, is not satisfactory.

There have been lately some murders, and a number of highway robberies, perpetrated, no doubt, by parties of the soldiery, who have been disbanded during the past year; the large number of men who have thus been thrown out of employment, could not fail to involve much individual suffering, and induce parties to resort to plunder, for a livelihood. The want, however, of men of energy, and practical experience, among the Sirdars, and other influential classes, from among whom the Governors, and the executive officers, of districts are chosen, is the cause of much of the evil. They are so extremely ignorant, and so utterly inexperienced, from previous habits and training, for the duty on which they are employed, that the plainest and most obvious rules are misunderstood, and misinterpreted. It is worse than useless removing them: for, independent of the political reasons for treating them leniently, their successors would probably be no better.

I have now deputed Sirdar Shumshere Sing, one of the members of the Durbar, to this district, and placed under him all the civil and military establishments. Besides the local force employed in revenue and police affairs, he has full 1,300 Horse at his disposal, and I have directed all chiefs, not on duty, who have jagheers in that tract, to join and assist him. I am in hopes that he will be able to hunt down the robbers and marauders: should he fail, I should recommend that one of the most experienced of the assistants be deputed for the purpose.

The Dhokul Sing regiment, which was ordered to Lahore from Bunnoo for misconduct, arrived about the 6th of the last month, and I kept them encamped on the right bank of the Ravee, until I received instructions, in reply to my dispatch, dated the 30th of December last. On their receipt, on the 1<sup>st</sup> ultimo, I caused the corps to cross the river, and encamp at Meean Meer, so as to be within the influence of the British force, but separated from them. On the 21<sup>st</sup>, the men were disarmed, paid up, and discharged, without a voice being raised in expostulation. As they are all strangers to this part of India, nearly all belonging to Oude and its neighbourhood, the example shown by their punallick whadd, not even the lesser evil attending it, of throwing a portion of the population of the Punjab, accustomed to arms, out of employment. I have done nothing regarding the raising of a new corps, leaving this matter in abeyance, until Sir Frederick Currie arrives.

The whole land-tax of the four Doabs, with the exception of Mooltan, has now been completed, with the exception of a small tract on the boundary, which Captain Abbott is now engaged on. At least a third portion of Peshawur has also been finished, and some portion of Dera Ismael Khan, Bunnoo, and the remaining Trans-Indus possessions of the Sikh Government. I cannot estimate that less than fifty-four lakhs of land revenue has been settled, which is by far the larger portion of the Punjab. Mooltan, and the Trans-Indus tracts, will, in fact, be the only work not completed.

Mooltan, now, yields a net revenue of nineteen lakhs of rupees per annum; of which three are derived from customs, the remainder from the land-tax. The customs, if placed on the same footing as that of the Punjab, would probably be reduced one-half; the land-tax, on the other hand, would yield, at least, one-third more, even allowing for a considerable relief to agriculture. This, in the present state of the finances, would be a matter of no small importance.

The whole revenue of the Punjab cannot, exclusive of jagheers and rent-free lands, exceed ninety-four lakhs of rupees; it will probably yield less than this sum. The expenditure certainly exceeds this amount very considerably, even with all the reductions which have, hitherto, been made, and they have been great: with prudence and self-denial, the expenditure might still, however, be diminished, and the income increased. The difficulty will be to accomplish this object, without disgusting the influential classes.

Mooltan, I consider, will yield seven or eight lakhs more. The extension of the old canals, and the opening of new ones, the increase of cultivation, and the enhanced produce which will, then, be derived from the land now under cultivation, will all conduce to the increase of the revenue. Round Lahore, there are extensive tracts which have, for years, been reserved for game; much of it lies along the banks of the Ravee, and, therefore, with little expense, may be broken up, brought under the plough, and irrigated.

The new settlement will allow of the expense of collecting the land revenue being reduced from, perhaps, one-half to one-third. A scrutiny, and muster, of the pensioners who now receive their money allowances, through the native

collectors of revenue, and the further saving which will be effected in the cavalry, and the reorganization of the artillery, and contingent, will also add to the resources of the State\*.

I should also recommend that the system of giving and receiving presents, the grant of sums of money on the marriage of the children of servants of the Durbar, be either altogether done away with, or greatly reduced. The system of presenting considerable sums of money, on every occasion of a change of Resident, or the arrival, or departure, of the assistants on their deputation into the interior of the country, seems altogether unnecessary, and, as an example to the Sikhs themselves, might be abolished: and the giving, and receiving, presents be restricted to a certain moderate sum, and confined to days of state and ceremony.

The system of granting khilluts might also, to a great extent, be done away. These presents involve greater abuses, and much more loss to the State than making presents, and offerings, of money. The shawls, swords, horses, and the like, of which the khilluts are composed, probably cost the Durbar double their real value; so that their loss is not a proportionate gain to the individuals among their own people who receive them, or to the British Government, when conferred on its officers. I have no doubt that the expenses of the toshakhana at Lahore amount to several lakhs of rupees per annum.

#### No. 24.

*The Governor-General in Council to the Secret Committee.*

*Fort William, May 2, 1848. (No. 37.)*

WE transmit correspondence relative to the affairs of the Punjab.

#### Inclosure 1 in No. 24.

*The Secretary to the Government of India to the Acting Resident at Lahore.*

*Fort William, March 10, 1848.*

THE reductions which have been made in the military establishment are highly satisfactory, conducing, as they do, to the great efficiency of the force, no less than to the financial relief, of the Lahore State.

#### Inclosure 2 in No. 24.

*The Secretary to the Government of India to the Resident at Lahore.*

*Fort William, April 28, 1848.*

THE Governor-General in Council approves of the deputation of Mr. Vans Agnew to Mooltan, in the capacity of Political Agent, consequent on Dewan Moolraj's resignation of the Nizamut.

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\* Not including Peshawur, up to this date, the irregular cavalry have undergone the following modifications —

				Men.
Retained in the service	-	-	-	2,419
Discharged	-	-	-	389
Pensioned	-	-	-	367
Under consideration	-	-	-	21
Number inspected				- 3,196
Saving effected, Rs. 2,25,093.				



No. 25.

*The Governor-General in Council to the Secret Committee.**Fort William, May 11, 1848. (No. 42.)***WE** inclose documents connected with the affairs of the Punjab.

Inclosure in No. 25.

*The late Acting Resident at Lahore to the Secretary to the Government of India.**Lahore, March 31, 1848.*

I SUBMIT the reports of the different officers who have been employed, during the past five months, in making the settlement of the land-tax in the Punjab, as well as a report from Major Napier on the canals of the Baree Doab.

These reports contain many interesting particulars of the past history, physical features, and resources, of the districts which our officers have visited; and the local information, thus obtained, will, doubtless, prove of much value, both in the future management of the country, as well as in the event of military operations, hereafter, occurring in the Punjab. With the exception of the province of Mooltan, there is not a district which has not been visited, from the confines of the Soolman range to the banks of the Sutlej and Beas.

That portion of the Punjab which still belongs to the Lahore Government, may be appropriately divided into seven divisions: the four Doabs, termed the Baree, Rechna, Chuch, and Sind Sagur, Hazara, the Trans-Indus districts, and Mooltan, which, with the Jullundur Doab, Cashmere, and the hilly tracts, extending from the right bank of the Sutlej in Kooloo to the borders of Cashmere, comprehended the whole kingdom, created by the valor and policy of Maharajah Runjeet Sing, during a period of thirty years.

The Baree Doab has now been divided into six districts, each under an official, termed a Kardar, who possesses revenue and police jurisdiction, as well as judicial powers in petty cases, under them are the police officers in rural districts, and the civil garrisons in small forts, who also act as police; over all the Doab, are five adawlutees, or judges; the police of the large towns of Umritsur and Lahore is separate from the Kardars, and under the direct control of the adawlutees.

It is nearly impossible to ascertain the former expenses of the Doab: there were, alone, nineteen collectors of revenue where we have now six. I have also dismantled, and reduced the garrisons of twenty forts, and, since Sirdar Lehna Sing left, have abolished his office of Nazim. The nominal expense is estimated to have been reduced by about 20,000 rupees, but the real saving is much greater. The deductions which the collectors received, under the old plan of collecting in kind, and the utter absence of any systematic control over them, entailed great losses on the State.

The public establishments have been rigorously scrutinized, and will not bear reduction, during the incumbency of the present parties, but, as they die off, or are pensioned, still further savings can be effected.

All that is now required, in this Doab, is, a rigid examination of two items\*, which, however, amount to the large sum of 7,19,040 rupees. I shall, indeed, be greatly surprised if a portion of this sum might not be retrenched.

A revenue survey would, no doubt, also restore to the State much land, of which no record exists; but such a survey, under present circumstances, would be impracticable. It may fairly, however, be anticipated that the general security which now prevails, the abolition of town and transit duties, the reform of the customs generally, and the disbandment of large bodies of troops, will all give an impetus to agriculture.

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							Rs
* Jagheers	-	-	-	-	-	-	5,52,577
Cash payments	-	-	-	-	-	-	1,66,463
Total	-	-	-	-	-	-	Rs. 7,19,040

The opening up of new branches of the Husee Canal would, however, do more for the prosperity of this Doab, and the improvement of the finances, than any scheme which could be adopted. I would strongly advocate the expediency of re-modelling the whole system of management.

It is superfluous for me to attempt pointing out the advantages of canal irrigation; they are now fully admitted. If irrigated land, in other parts of India, yield treble, or quadruple, the produce of unirrigated soils, here, the comparative advantages are still greater; the stiff clay uplands of the Punjab are literally uncultivable, without water.

It is well known that the Baree Doab, though containing many Mahomedans, is the seat of the Sikh power, and is the tract from which the flower of their soldiery were recruited. The great mass of these men came from the unirrigated valleys of the Manjha. These spots are now thronged by soldiers, disbanded since the war, but chiefly deterred from taking to agriculture for a livelihood, from the deficiency of irrigation. In a political, therefore, as well as a financial, view, the opening up of new lines of canals would prove of vast importance.

The population of the Rechna Doab is of various castes, Rajpoots towards the foot of the hills, Jats in the centre, and Mahomedan tribes in the south. Many of the Rajpoots and Jats are Hindoo, only in lineage; their forefathers, during Mahomedan power, having turned to that faith. In the whole Doab, the great mass of the population is decidedly Mahomedan. The chief pursuit is agriculture, there are few manufactures, and little trade.

The inhabitants of Chuch Doab are chiefly Mahomedans, whose character much depends on their circumstances and condition. In the waste lands, they are rude and uncivilised, keeping up large herds of cattle, and attending little to agriculture: where the soil is at all fertile, or possesses facilities for irrigation, they are, on the contrary, well-behaved, and peaceable. The Hindoos are but few in number, except in Meenee and Sarewall, where they are the principal merchants and traders.

The revenue has always been collected in this Doab with difficulty. It was not uncommon, in cases where the people would not pay, to quarter bodies of cavalry on districts, to attack villages, and plunder them. Thus, the country has, yearly, become more depopulated, the land has remained untilled, and the people learnt to detest the Government, which oppressed, without controlling them. It is to be hoped that the present equitable system of settlement will bring back peace, order and wealth, to the country. The land-tax of the whole of the district has been settled, with the exception of the border tract which Captain Abbott is now engaged on, and which may be expected to be completed in a few

The population of the Sind Sagur Doab is almost exclusively Mahomedan, many of them lawless and troublesome, and, hitherto, only paying revenue, when coerced.

Of the districts of Hazara, Mooltan, and the Trans-Indus possessions, I shall forbear attempting any account, simply noting that about two lakhs of Peshawur revenue, a portion of Bunnoo, and all Hazara, have been completed.

On the whole, though all the returns have not yet been received, I cannot estimate that less than fifty-four lakhs of land revenue has been completed, within the last five months. I would recommend that the establishments of each division of the country be revised, and statements of income, and expenditure, carefully drawn up, like that of the Baree Doab.

I do not think that the revenues of the Punjab will be found to exceed ninety-four\* lakhs, that is, eighty-four for land revenue, and twelve for customs, exclusive of the three lakhs set apart for public improvements, which are derived from other sources, such as the excise, the tolls on rivers, and the like. The new settlement will not, I anticipate, be found to have reduced the real income 10 per cent., however considerable the reductions may prove on the nominal one; indeed, I am satisfied that the State will have gained by the change, for much of the former revenue was actually embezzled, and never found its way to the coffers of the State. Mooltan, by the new arrangement consequent on Moolraj's resignation, ought to yield an increase of four or five lakhs, making up the revenue to a crore of rupees (one million sterling). The rest of the resources of the country

are alienated. Of the petty parcels of land held rent-free, there is no account: a large number, no doubt, are held under sunnuds, which might be registered; but a very great many are unknown. The jagheers of the chiefs are estimated at forty-five lakhs alone; those, on a more limited scale, must amount to twenty or twenty-five lakhs more; in the Baree Doab alone, they are upwards of five. It may, therefore, fairly be set down, that the revenues of the Punjab, under a rough estimate, are little short of one hundred and seventy-five lakhs, or one million and three quarters pounds sterling, of which but one million will, for a long time, be available for public purposes.

There is no country in the north-west of India, however, more improveable; its population are generally industrious and frugal; its facilities for irrigation, from the vicinity of the mountains, and the presence of five noble rivers, are unequalled; probably, not a fourth of its cultivable area is actually under cultivation. The resources of the State might, therefore, be prodigiously increased; but, for the present, except by the extension of the Husee Canal, little increase can be counted on.

At the present moment, I believe that the expenses are greater than the income; to what extent it is difficult to ascertain. Until the income exceeded the recorded expenditure by 8 or 10 per cent., I should feel pretty certain that it did not in reality cover it. Much of the difficulty of ascertaining the actual expenditure, no doubt, has arisen from the transitory state of all establishments, since the Treaty of Bhyrowal. During the last year, it has been one unceasing course of reduction, in every department. In the irregular cavalry alone, the annual saving is estimated at twenty-two lakhs of rupees.

I need hardly dwell on the great benefits which will accrue to the country, from the settlement of the land-tax: though the apparent relief to the country will, probably, be less than 10 per cent., the indirect advantages are much greater. It will free them, in a great measure, from the inquisitorial eye of the tax-gatherer, and secure to them the fruits of their own industry. What they are taxed, the Government will receive; a large portion of the revenue can, no longer, be made away with, by fraudulent returns.

It was a work of much difficulty to introduce the new system; the ignorance, and indifference, of one party, and the venality of the other, opposed many obstacles, which may, now, be said to be fairly overcome. It will, however, require much energy and watchfulness to work out its details, and insure it a fair trial. If care and attention is not constantly directed towards it, the native officials will use every device to set it aside, or render it a dead letter, in order to return to that system which allowed them to grow rich, at the expense of both Government, and people.

Formerly, was seen the extraordinary anomaly of villages in farm to individuals of the Durbar, to the judges of the courts, to soldiers, and civilians of every grade. Those who should have checked, and controlled, the tax-gatherer, by their power and influence, set him at defiance, and rendered any accounts, or no accounts, as they thought proper. Now, the heads of villages engage for the revenue of their respective villages.

Having once obtained an accurate rent-roll of the country, and divided each district into compact collectorships, and placed them under the élite of the revenue officers, it would be well if a few simple rules were drawn up for their guidance, explaining the process to be observed in collecting the revenue, the system to be pursued in adjusting disputes which may arise from time to time, and detailing the rules by which the accounts should be kept up, and rendered to the State. Now, there can no longer be any excuse for delay, nor, with ordinary supervision, can fraud pass undetected.

No. 26.

*The Governor-General in Council to the Secret Committee.*

*Fort William, May 11, 1848. (No. 43.)*

IT is with great concern that we inform you, that the peace which had prevailed, very generally, throughout the Punjab, since the Treaty of Bhyrowal, of December 16, 1846, has been suddenly disturbed, by a rebellious outbreak in Mooltan, infamously signalized by the murder of two British officers, Mr. Vans Agnew, of the

Bengal Civil Service, and Lieutenant W. A. Anderson, of the 1st Regiment of Bombay Fusiliers.

As yet, it is uncertain whether this event originated in a preconcerted plan, on the part of the Dewan of Mooltan, or whether it is merely to be traced to the occasion of Mr. Agnew's visit to the province, and to the irritated feelings with which the Mooltan soldiers saw a British officer come among them, and receive possession of their fort, with the object of changing the whole system of administration under which they were living, and of giving them a new master, acting under the advice, and subject to the immediate control, of the British authorities.

After the death of Sawun Mull, which took place in September, 1844, his son Moolraj succeeded him, as Nazim of Mooltan. The Lahore Durbar, acting upon the information they had received, of the vast treasures amassed by Sawun Mull, demanded from Moolraj, upon his installation in the Nizamut the sum, it is said, of no less than one crore of rupees, as Nuzzerana. The demand was, eventually, reduced to eighteen lakhs, "which sum (Lieutenant-Colonel Lawrence writes, on the 3rd of July, 1846), would have been gladly paid, but for the misfortunes that, one after the other, pressed on the Durbar, and ended in what appeared its destruction." Upon the establishment, by British power, of the present administration at Lahore, the Durbar determined to compel Moolraj to make good the payment of the eighteen lakhs, and of seven lakhs of arrears, due from him, according to the terms of his contract for the management of Mooltan. They agreed that he should continue as Nazim, if he acceded to these demands; but that, in the event of his refusal, troops should be sent against him, and he should be removed from his office. Moolraj demurred, and troops were sent to coerce him. He, then, applied to the Resident at Lahore to intercede with the Durbar, in his behalf, expressing his willingness to conform to any course that the Resident might think proper, and to come in person to Lahore to settle his accounts. It was, accordingly, arranged, by the Resident, that the Dewan's safety should be guaranteed, and that he should visit Lahore, and endeavour to come to an understanding with the Durbar. On the 9th of October, 1846, Moolraj, accompanied by Dewan Deena Nath, who had been sent to him on the part of the Durbar, arrived at Lahore. A satisfactory negotiation ensued, and, before the end of the month, every difference was amicably adjusted. Mr John Lawrence's\* letter of the 3rd of November, 1846, contains the particulars of the agreement with the Dewan. Of the balance due by him, he paid down eight lakhs, and gave a bond for the payment of the remainder by instalments. The gross revenues of Mooltan being estimated at nearly thirty-five lakhs, of which the Dewan had, hitherto, paid to the Durbar between fifteen and sixteen lakhs, it was settled that certain districts, yielding nearly eight lakhs, of which the Lahore troops had lately dispossessed Moolraj, should be severed from his control, and that, from the remaining gross revenues of twenty-seven lakhs, he should, in future, make good to the Durbar, 19,68,000 rupees per annum. Mr Lawrence thus describes the spirit in which each party regarded this settlement:

"The Durbar are well pleased, for, by our assistance and intervention, they have restrained, and brought to obedience, a refractory vassal, recovered a heavy balance, which, like that due from other Dewans in charge of provinces, appeared to be, otherwise, hopeless, and have gained a large increase of revenue . . . . Dewan Moolraj is well pleased, for he has escaped, with life and honor, from a merciless enemy, with whom he was evidently overmatched, in spite of his slight success (he was successful against the Lahore troops at first), and is continued in the government of a fruitful country. He stood out for better terms, but was evidently glad at those he obtained; indeed he both said so, and showed, by his bearing, that he thought as much." The term of the new agreement was three years. On the 30th of October, Moolraj took leave of the Resident. "He asked me," says Mr. Lawrence, "to put my signature to the documents that had been drawn up between him and the Lahore Government. I told him that I could merely do so as a witness, not as guaranteeing them, and then only at the request of both parties. The Dewan remarked that he had been anxious to have had the affair settled for seven years, or until the Maharajah arrived at years of maturity, but that the Raja had agreed to no more than three years, and that without my signature. I replied, that the British officers were here as mediators, and not as masters, and, therefore, ought to do nothing but with the consent of both parties."

\* Mr Lawrence was temporarily on duty at Lahore, in the room of Lieutenant-Colonel Lawrence.

After Moolraj's return to Mooltan, he seems to have acted, for some time, conformably with the terms of his agreement, and to have rested in quiet subordination to the authority of the Durbar. Only occasional notices of him are to be found, during a year after the Dewan's resumption of office. On the 3rd of August, 1847, it is entered, "That Dewan Moolraj, Nazim of Mooltan, had been requested to send in the rules in force for collecting custom dues in Mooltan, and Dera Ghazee Khan. Dewan Deena Nath said, 'That, with the exception of 900 rupees, the sum of eighteen lakhs of rupees, due by Dewan Moolraj of Mooltan, for which he had given bonds, had been paid up,' and requested that the bonds might be delivered over to the Dewan's Vakeel." And Mr Lawrence, in a letter of the 28th of August,\* writes "Mooltan is perfectly quiet, but I think that Dewan Moolraj is losing some of the popularity he hitherto enjoyed, and that he has become more grasping than formerly."

It was not till the end of November last, that Moolraj's relations with the Durbar were, again, brought prominently to the notice of the Resident. Moolraj was, then, on his way from Mooltan to Lahore, urged thither by the hope of obtaining from the Durbar some modification of the terms of his agreement, which he seems now to have thought too rigorous. A summary settlement of the revenues of the whole of the Punjab, with the exception of Mooltan, had been commenced, and was fast advancing. Mooltan had been excepted from this measure, because, as stated by Colonel Lawrence, in his letter of the 29th of September, 1847, it had "still two years of its lease to Dewan Moolraj to run." For the same reason also, the reform in the customs' duties of the Punjab, had not extended to Mooltan. Early in December, the Dewan arrived at Lahore, "he is now intriguing with the Durbar," Mr Lawrence says, in his letter of the 16th of December, "especially with Raja Deena Nath, for a reduction of the amount he pays for that province (Mooltan). He complains that the reduction and modification of the customs, throughout all parts of the Punjab, except Mooltan, and the new system of assessment, have affected his revenue. He has paid me several visits on the subject, and, yesterday, told me, as his final decision, that he wished to give up the management of the province, if no reduction was allowed him. I explained, that the Durbar had in no way interfered with his charge in the late reforms, and would not interfere during his lease, that he would get no reduction, and might, if he pleased, resign his charge, which I would accept. He then attempted to stipulate for a jagheer, but I gave him to understand that, as he now held none, he could not expect any. I told him to reflect well on the matter, and, when he had made up his mind, to put in writing his wishes." Mr Lawrence goes on to state, in the same letter, that he would prefer that Moolraj should remain another year in Mooltan, "for the rest of the Punjab will afford ample occupation for all our energies, for that period. Hereafter, it will be well to get rid of Moolraj," that Mooltan, under a British Superintendent, would yield much more to the Durbar, and that the Resident had, for some time, been far from satisfied with the conduct of Moolraj, who had so long enjoyed the sovereign power as to forget the duties of a subject, and who, "where he dares not openly refuse obedience, delays, and hesitates to comply." Mr. Lawrence concludes by stating that, should Moolraj resign, which he did not think probable, he would propose to send Mr Vans Agnew to take charge of Mooltan.

On the 18th of December, the Dewan came to the Durbar, and handed in his resignation of the Nizamut of Mooltan, "from the beginning of the last khureef (autumnal crop)." The Durbar referred it to Mr. Lawrence, who pointed out "the impossibility of allowing such a step as this, which would involve the loss of a portion of the last crop;" and explained that, if the Dewan wished to resign from the beginning of the rubbee, or spring crop, he was at liberty to do so. Finally, Mr. Lawrence desired that the Dewan should "be sent off to Mooltan, within a couple of days, to collect the winter crop."

This order was communicated to the Dewan, who, on the following day, (the 19th of December) presented himself at the Durbar, and announced his willingness to retain the government of his province, for another year at least. A few days afterwards, Moolraj returned to Mooltan. Meanwhile, between him and Mr Lawrence, there had been communications, having reference to the Dewan's proposed resignation of the Nizamut; and the impression left by them on Mr. Lawrence's mind was, that Moolraj would certainly resign, after arranging his affairs in Mooltan; and thus, that the administration might be committed to the charge of a new Governor, under

the immediate superintendence of a British officer, and all those reforms which had been introduced, with so much benefit, throughout the other provinces of the Punjab, be extended also to Mooltan.

We directed Mr. Lawrence not to act upon the communications he had received from Moolraj, but to leave them for the consideration, and orders, of Sir F. Currie.

The course which Sir F. Currie adopted in the matter, on his arrival at Lahore, is particularly explained in his letter of the 6th ultimo\*.

It appears that the negotiations between Mr. Lawrence and Moolraj had, at the request of the latter, been kept secret, not being communicated, by either party, to the Durbar; and Mr. Lawrence, on receiving our instructions to suspend his proceedings in the matter, addressed a letter to Moolraj, asking whether he would wish any communication to be made to Sir F. Currie, Moolraj's reply was received on the day that Sir F. Currie arrived at Lahore. It stated, "that the Dewan desired to abide by the agreement he had entered into with Mr. Lawrence, that what was already written was sufficient, namely, that his resignation from the close of the late khureef harvest should be accepted; that his honor and dignity should be guaranteed, that no charges against him should be listened to, that he should only be required to give one year's papers; and that a fitting provision should be made for him for his future life."

This was a totally false representation of what had passed between Mr. Lawrence and the Dewan, and, as it was not clear, from the Dewan's letter, whether he intended to resign his office or not, Sir F. Currie determined to write to him at once, desiring him to state distinctly what his intentions were, and inclosing in his letter a statement, drawn up by Mr. Lawrence, setting forth the actual communications which had passed between him and the Dewan. Moolraj replied, on the 16th of March, by clearly intimating his desire to resign, alluding to his negotiation with Mr. Lawrence, he says, "I begged his permission to resign, which he was good enough to grant, and, on that occasion, sent me a friendly letter, accompanied by another in English. When I received this, I was well content, and now my desire is, that my honor may remain untouched."

The Durbar, immediately, appointed a successor. They selected for the office Sardar Khan Sing Man, described as "a brave soldier, and an intelligent man," and gave him detailed instructions, under the guidance of the Resident, for the management of the province, and for reforming every branch of the administration. They gave him a fixed salary of 30,000 rupees per annum.

The Resident appointed Mr. Agnew to be Political Agent in Mooltan, and directed him to proceed thither, without delay. Lieutenant Anderson was, at the same time, nominated to be Mr. Agnew's Assistant. These officers were selected, on account of their high qualifications for an arduous task. Mr. Agnew, a most zealous and intelligent servant of the Government, had acquired a considerable reputation for his tact in the management of the natives of the country, and for a thorough acquaintance with their character and habits. Lieutenant Anderson was known as an excellent Oriental scholar, and had been employed, with credit, under Sir Charles Napier in Sindh. The unhappy fate of these promising officers must ever be deplored.

On the 17th of April, at 11 o'clock A.M., Mr. Agnew and Lieutenant Anderson reached the Mooltan Ghat, and, on the morning of the 18th, joined the Sikh escort, with which was Sardar Khan Sing. The escort was under 500 men of all arms. Mr. Agnew thus describes its strength, in a private letter to Sir F. Currie, dated the 18th: "Our regiment mustered this morning under arms about 350 (of 489 fighting men); Artillery eighty, and Cavalry 100, instead of 200, as several of these men (the Irregular Cavalry) have been kept by different Sardars and others."

Moolraj, on Mr. Agnew's arrival, appears to have shown him every civility, visiting him in the afternoon of the 18th, and conversing with him for a considerable time. It was arranged that he should show Mr. Agnew over the fort, on the following morning. In his private letter of the 18th, Mr. Agnew says: "I don't know what has put into Sardar Khan Sing's head some imagination that we had better get the fort into our hands as soon as we can, but, in any case, it is right to lose no time in the transfer. Everything seems to bear out the character Mooltan has always borne, for peace and quietness." On the morning of the 19th, Mr. Agnew and Lieutenant Anderson, attended by two companies of Goorkas and some horsemen, and accompanied by Moolraj, inspected the fort. Mr. Agnew placed the

two companies in possession of one of the gates. On coming out of the fort gate, after having received charge from Moolraj, "we were attacked," Mr. Agnew writes, on the very day of the occurrence, "by a couple of soldiers, who, taking us unawares, succeeded in wounding us both pretty sharply." Moolraj, who was riding by the side of Mr. Agnew at the time, galloped off immediately to his own residence; the two officers returned, or were removed, to their encampment at the Edga, not far from the fort.

Mr. Agnew does not appear to have suspected Moolraj of treachery, or of having been concerned, in any way, in the attack. All through the day of the 19th, he remained expecting a visit from him. Moolraj promised to come, but, afterwards, sent to excuse himself, saying, that he was prevented by his troops. "The whole troops have mutinied," Mr. Agnew writes, "but we hope to get them out of the fort."

On the morning of the 20th, at 9 o'clock, a gun was fired from the fort, and the ball struck the Mosque where the British officers were. The fire was returned, and continued on each side, throughout the day. After dark, a general attack being made by the insurgents, Esra Sing, the Commandant of the artillery, which formed part of the escort, went over with his men to the enemy. Khan Sing, thinking all further resistance useless, asked for quarter, and was made prisoner. Mr. Agnew and Lieutenant Anderson, left wounded, and unsupported, were barbarously murdered. The ruffians took the heads of the unfortunate officers in triumph to Moolraj, and received from him presents and commendation.

Having thus given you the narrative of events, we now proceed to state to you the opinion which Sir F. Currie has formed of the measures which should be adopted, for punishing the perpetration of this flagrant outrage, and for vindicating the authority of the British Government.

We would refer you to the Resident's letters to the Governor-General of the 21st, 24th, and 27th ultimo\*.

You will observe that, on receiving the first intelligence of the attack on Mr. Agnew, when the result was not known, the Resident resolved upon moving the British moveable column, from Lahore to Mooltan, with a view to making a demonstration in support of the troops of the Durbar. When, however, the intelligence of the murder of the officers arrived, accompanied by the fact that the Lahore troops had gone over to the enemy, Sir F. Currie considered that the circumstances of the case were altered, and that, the troops of the escort having deserted to Moolraj, and there being strong grounds for believing that the troops of the Durbar would follow their example, "at this season of the year, operations of the magnitude which will now be required, and at such a distance as Mooltan from our resources and magazines," could not be undertaken. He, therefore, summoned back to Lahore the Sikh Sirdars who had proceeded towards Mooltan for the purpose of quelling the rebellion, and who had gone with the expectation that they would be supported by British troops, to explain to them that they must, by their own resources, effect the object in view. On the 26th of April, the chiefs returned, and declared their inability, without British aid, to coerce Moolraj, admitting freely that no dependence could be placed upon their troops, especially the regular army, if employed alone, on such a service against Moolraj.

On the 27th, the Resident addressed the Commander-in-Chief, requesting his opinion on the practicability and expediency, in a military point of view, and under the circumstances, of advancing a British force on Mooltan, at this season of the year. Sir F. Currie forwarded to us a copy of this letter, which was received on the 7th instant, and asked "for any orders which the Supreme Government may desire to give." We were of opinion that it was not advisable that we should issue any orders to the Resident, until a further communication from him, or from the Commander-in-chief, should inform us of their decision respecting the movement of the British troops against the Dewan, and the fort of Mooltan. Whatever that decision might be, we felt that it must have been settled, announced, and acted upon, sometime before we had even received the intelligence that events had occurred that required a decision to be formed. We, therefore, abstained from issuing any orders, during the few days which would elapse before we received intimation of the reply given by the Commander-in-chief to Sir F. Currie.

The reply of the Commander-in-chief has just been received by us. His Excellency is strongly opposed to the movement of British troops, at this season,

\* Inclosures 10, 13, and 17, in No. 26.

We are fully sensible how important it is that this rebellion against the State of Lahore, should, forthwith, be repressed, and that the insult offered, and foul treachery shown, to the British power, should be followed by early, and signal, punishment. But, however imminent may be the risk that, if the British troops do not now move, insurrection, apparently successful for a time at Mooltan, may extend its influence over the Punjab, and may cause disturbance and revolt throughout its bounds, we, yet, think that the dangers, which would thence arise to British interests in India, are far less than those which would be created by our being compelled to discontinue operations once begun, before they had been brought to a satisfactory termination; and by the fearful loss among the troops which is anticipated as the consequence of entering on military operations, on the scale required, in such a district as Mooltan, at such a season of the year as this.

The Resident is taking every proper precaution against the spread of an insurrectionary spirit over the other parts of the Punjab His measures, with this view, have our entire approval

Inclosure 1 in No 26

*Aniakullec, March 8, 1848.*

*Roobukaree*

**Statement.**

A petition from the Nazim of Mooltan was read before me, yesterday, in which he gives utterance to the state of his feelings, referring to verbal expressions made use of by me, at the time of his leaving Lahore, to the effect, "that nothing was to be done derogatory to his honor, that charges on matters connected with his Government would not be entertained, and that complete accounts for one year must be rendered," and concluding with anxious inquiries as to his future maintenance. Now, at the



time when the Nazim entertained the intention of resigning the government of Mooltan, I gave him a written paper, and he gave me a writing in Persian. This document was either destroyed in the fire (at the Residency), or lost in the consequent hurried removal of property. An English translation of it has, however, been preserved. In my paper, I stated that the Durbar was always careful of the honor of those whose conduct was deserving of it, that no charges against him, regarding matters of administration, or collection of revenue, would be entertained, that cases concerning matters of trade, &c in which the Dewan might appear, either as plaintiff, or defendant, would be decided in the Courts of Law, and all papers connected with the receipts of the last nine or ten years, must, certainly, be produced, on account of the large amount of the revenue. With regard to jagheers, I made no promise, nor have I ever given one, verbally.

From what has, hitherto, appeared on record, the meaning of the Nazim's present letter is not very plain, as to whether it be his real wish and desire to resign his government, or not. The original agreement for the government of Mooltan, between the Nazim and the Lahore Durbar, drawn up under the advice of Mr. J. Lawrence, was for a stated period of three years. Of these one only has elapsed, and the Nazim would not, ordinarily, be considered as having the option of resigning his contract within the stipulated period.

At the time, however, at which the agreement was entered into, the affairs of the Lahore Government were conducted, according to the old customs of this State. But, from the date of the arrangement for the administration, concluded on the 16th of December, 1846, a material change has taken place, and, if it be his real wish to throw up his contract, it will be but right that his resignation be accepted.

It was, therefore, determined, after consultation, to address a purwanna to the Nazim, with the view of explaining to him, distinctly, that, if it be his wish to do so, he can send in his resignation without delay. If this should not be his desire, that he can continue to carry on the government of Mooltan with confidence, until the expiration of the period originally specified, that he should not be induced to resign his contract, by any fear for his honor or credit, since the Lahore Government always treats with consideration men deserving of honor, that, in giving in his resignation, however, there must be no stipulation, with regard to jagheers, or the reception of charges (against him). The resignation must be unconditional. To sum up the whole matter in one word, it is optional with the Nazim to resign, or not. In the interval which must elapse, before the answer of the Durbar to his petition can reach him, it will be his duty to see that his measures be even better than before, for the administration of the province, for the comfort of the people, for the suppression of robbery, and for the prevention of outbreaks. He should not be influenced by any alarm. If, in this interval, any thing should occur to disturb the peace of the province, the responsibility will be his.

A copy of this roobukaree to be sent to the Lahore Durbar, that they may issue orders to the Nazim accordingly. Another copy, with the accompanying letter, to be given in charge to the Mooltan Vakeel, Asánund, with directions to take care that a reply be, speedily, sent to me in Durbar.

#### Inclosure 2 in No 26

*Dewan Moolraj to the Resident at Lahore, that it was not  
further commur  
Mooltan of their decr-1848*

YOUR purwanna, inclosing a roobukaree, in which my period for Mr. John Lawrence is considered, and in which, in reply to my respectful request, an order is issued to inquire distinctly whether I wish to resign my charge or not, and the condition of doing so, together with directions for the care of the country and people, has reached me, and I feel highly honored by its receipt. Sir, my family and myself have been faithful servants of the Lahore Government, and, from the first, I have been a faithful and humble friend to the interests of the British Government. The whole circumstances, from first to last, my devotion and services to the State, my probity, and my conduct, are well known to Mr. John Lawrence, and you will have been put in possession of the facts by that gentleman. I begged his permission to resign, which he was good enough to grant, and, on that occasion, sent me a

friendly letter, accompanied by another in English. When I received this, I was well content, and now my desire is, that my honor may remain untouched.

With regard to the order which was given, for the production of the papers of the last nine or ten years, I replied, that I trusted I might only be called on for those concerning my one year of Government. For, through my incessant application to matters of business, the papers connected with my father's Government had been neglected, and been eaten by ants. Some few, which still exist in a box, are utterly spoiled, and nothing can be made of them, and all those pertaining to the eastern districts, were lost during the disturbances. My life is at your disposal. After once sending in my resignation, of what use could these papers be to me? Moreover, my happiness consists in doing good service to the State, and in obedience to your wishes. At all times, I am anxious for the care of the province and the people, both in obedience to your orders, and out of regard for my own good name. But the district of Jhung is infested with plunderers, and, from their example, and in their name, others are beginning to do the same. I have sent a force to punish them, but it cannot go beyond the boundaries of my own province, without permission. The people of these districts have but little thought for the future. I do my very utmost in obedience to my instructions, and will continue to do so. The whole facts of the case must be well known to you. In everything, I trust to your friendship, and am only solicitous for the preservation of my honor, and for future provision. If there should be any balance of revenue for the two last harvests, or any outlay for the army, &c, after March 11, 1848, these sums should be deducted.

Inclosure 3 in No. 26

*The Lahore Durbar to Dewan Moolraj*

*Lahore, March 24, 1848*

YOUR petition, tendering your resignation of the government of the province of Mooltan, has been received, and read. With the consent of Sir F. Currie, Bart, the Durbar have accepted your resignation. In a few days, a Sardar, and a British officer, will be appointed to the charge. You will remain, until the province shall have been entirely made over to their care. On receiving an order to that effect from the Durbar, with the Resident's consent, you will return hither as directed. In proportion to the good faith and trustworthiness exhibited by you, in making over all necessary papers to those officers, will be the favor with which you will be regarded, and the friendly disposition with which the Durbar, acting on the Resident's advice, will be prepared to enter on the consideration of your future maintenance.

All the troops, in forts, or in posts, artillery, infantry, and cavalry, who are, up to the present time, in your service, and present under arms, will be paid by the Lahore Government, from the 1st Cheryt, 1906 (March 11th, 1848). Recognise the authority of our seals, and obey it. Assure yourself of the high consideration of Government.

Inclosure 4 in No. 26.

*The Lahore Durbar to Sirdar Khan Sing Man*

*Lahore, March 31, 1848*

THE Lahore Durbar, by the advice of Sir Frederick Currie, Bart, Resident, have appointed Sirdar Khan Sing Man to the government of the province of Mooltan, with the districts of Munkera, Dera Ghazee Khan, Mittunkote, Sunkur, Hundajul, and North and South Chuch, in the room of Dewan Moolraj, the former Nazim. The Sirdar is, in concert with Mr. Agnew, who goes thither on the part of the Resident, to govern in accordance with the following detailed instructions, and to be zealous in the performance of his duties, with good will and activity.

### 1st. Regarding land revenue:

You will receive the revenue arising from the Rubbee harvest of 1905, according to the regulations in force under Dewan Moolraj's Government, whether it be by a fixed rate ("mushulesa") or by "chaslie," or by "kunkoot," and, in accordance with the existing practice, through his old Kardars. If you think proper, appoint three or four clever men, and, after taking security from them, employ them to look into the collections of land revenue, and inquire whether it be too high, or too low, and to prevent embezzlement, so that no loss may accrue to the Government.

Of the Khurcef Harvest — With a view to the future settlement, first, obtain from the Dewan all papers connected with the last ten years' jumma, from the Rubbee of 1895 to the Khurcef of 1904, and assume one-tenth of the total as the jumma for one year. Should there be any suspicion as to the accuracy of these papers, after instituting a careful inquiry, fix a suitable assessment, assemble all the Zemindars, and, after devising the speediest method of collecting the revenue, from them and the Malgoozars, proceed to carry it into practice. Draw up books for each village, for it will often be found that the Zemindars are content with the old methods, and are averse to a fixed assessment ("mushulesa"). With a view to fixing a proper and equitable jumma, take security from the Kutrees of the village, and make the contract assessment with them. In making the settlement of any districts, should any inconvenience arise, or should it appear that the old system of collecting the revenue be more for the advantage of the State, and the good of the people, after mutual consultation, continue to collect according to the old system. When you have made the settlement arrange for the appointment of tehsildars and treasurers, after consultation, and fix their salaries.

Of Customs, Revenue, and Taxes, which will be under the jurisdiction of Mir Sahib Dyal.

From the 1st Cheyt, 1905, to the 15th or the 20th of Bisak, in the same year, the customs due should be collected, on the responsibility of Dewan Moolraj's Mutsuddees. For the future, in accordance with the Customs' Law, a separate code of regulations will be given by Government into the charge of a Kardar, who will collect the customs' revenue, and, according to the new regulations, appoint Mutsuddees and Chupprasees, at all the Ghats and Chokees. He will himself remain in Mooltan and its neighbourhood, and go on circuits of inspection, and will make all arrangements for the collections. After defraying salaries, he will pay the balance into the treasury. All the officials, Chupprasees, &c., of the customs' department, will be under his orders, and he will send a monthly statement of receipts to the Mir. Give him all the assistance, in the execution of his duties, in your power, and should any other person be appointed by Government to this charge, you will be good enough to assist him in like manner. If the customs' revenue be placed in your own charge by the Durbar, you will act in accordance with the new code of regulations for the administration of justice.

Endeavour to settle properly all cases which may come before you, and remember that you are responsible for the administration of justice to the people.

### Of the Army —

Entertain, according to the following details, whatever force may be deemed proper for the management of the province, and station them, for duty, in whatever place you may, after consultation, deem necessary.

If you wish for more than 500 soldiers, recruits will be enlisted either here, or elsewhere, and sent to you.

Select 1000 young and active men, such as you approve of, from the force now in Mooltan, and retain them in service.

From the regiments, of infantry, hitherto serving in Mooltan, select a good one, and retain it with you. Send the remaining regiments to Lahore, recovering their pay up to the end of the month of Phagon, 1904, from Dewan Moolraj. For the future, they will be paid by Government.

All the Dewan's footmen, infantry regiments, and artillery, of the force hitherto serving in Mooltan, who are included in the above detail, will be in the service of Government. They must be paid, by the Dewan, up to the end of Phagon, 1904, and from the 1st Cheyt, 1905, they will receive pay from Government. In the same manner, the troops who are to be discharged, must be paid, by the Dewan, up to the end of Phagon, 1904, and, by Government, from the 1st of Cheyt, 1905, to the day of their discharge; on production of their receipts, the amount will be authorized.

One instalment of the revenue, for the Khurcef harvest of 1904, has not yet been paid by Dewan Moolraj. You are to recover it from him, and disburse it as

follows :—The amount due is 2,81,000 rupees , of this sum, send 2,00,000 rupees to General Cortlandt and Bukshee Sube Raee, and to the agent of Misr Megraj, to Dera Ismael Khan, for the payment of troops and establishments, for the months of Phagon 1904, and Cheyt, 1905 Keep the balance of 81,000 rupees, for necessary charges, and for paying the arrears of the troops who are to be discharged

The natives of the province are clever at office work you should employ them, and instruct them in your rules and regulations, and methods of doing business If you deem it necessary, entertain three or four individuals who are acquainted with the routine duties, either from hence, or elsewhere, for the courts of justice, collection of revenue, and the distribution, and pay of the troops A treasurer and banker will be appointed by Misr Megraj You will pay them their salaries, according to separate detailed instructions which you will receive The amount will be authorized

Your salary, for the office of Governor of Mooltan, has been fixed at 30,000 rupees per annum, commencing from the 1st Bisak, (11th of April, 1848,) as follows :—

	Rs
Your original jagheer - - - -	12,000
In addition, for the Governorship of Mooltan	18,000
Total - - -	Rs 30,000

The following is a list of pensioners, and jagheerdars, and holders of Dhurmuths, who have been in the enjoyment of their respective grants, from the time of Maharajahs Runjeet Sing, Khurruck Sing, and Shere Sing up to the Khureef harvest of 1904 Send an accurate account of each individually, and act according to the directions you will receive.

(Here follow the names, 11 in all )

Should there be any matters which appear to be required to be especially brought to the notice of the Government, after consultation with Mr Agnew, report the particulars to the Durbar Directions for your guidance will be issued, by the Durbar, in conformity with the advice of the Resident

#### Inclosure 5 in No 26

*The Resident at Lahore to P A Vans Agnew, Esq , Assistant to the Resident*

*Lahore, March 28, 1848.*

I AM afraid that the practice of giving, and receiving, presents at native Durbars, cannot be altogether done away It is a time-honored custom, to which great importance is attached, and your policy must be to conciliate, and to maintain all native institutions, and customs, when they are not incompatible with the interests of the Government, or justice to the people

You should restrict the practice, as much as possible, to state occasions, and endeavour that your return presents may equal in value those you receive

#### Inclosure 6 in No 26

*The Resident at Lahore to Mr. Agnew.*

*Lahore, April 5, 1848.*

SIRDAR KHAN SING MAN, Bahadoor, has been appointed by the Durbar, with my concurrence, as Nazim of Mooltan, and the Sirdar has been directed to proceed, forthwith, to assume charge of the Government.

A copy of the instructions issued to Sirdar Khan Sing, under the signature of Maharajah Dulceep Sing, and myself, has been already furnished to you. The Sirdar will, in the administration of the province, be guided by your advice, on all occasions, and in the conduct of the duties of every department.

Your attention will be, immediately, directed to the realization of the revenue, for the rubbee kists of the current year, the collections for the remainder of this year to be made, according to the system hitherto in force in the province, and at the rates hitherto demanded. The Nazim should, in the execution of this duty, make use, as far as possible, of the Kardais and other officials, employed by the late Governor, associating with them, where it may be necessary for serving the interests of the Government and the people, officers of his own nomination, selected with your concurrence.

You should employ the interval between this, and the assessment of the next finlee harvest, in possessing yourself of the accounts of the revenue collections of past years as far back as you can procure them, and all the information you can gather, to enable you make an equitable summary settlement of the province, during the ensuing season, on the principle which has been observed in the late operations in the other parts of the Punjab.

The revised customs' arrangements, which have been introduced into all parts of the Lahore territories, with the exception of Mooltan, will be, forthwith, extended to that province. Collections will be made, according to the former system, to the 15th of the ensuing Hindoo month, when all town duties, and internal cesses of all kinds, will be abolished, and the revised plan of the demand on exports and imports, on a frontier line, will be brought into operation.

The customs' arrangements will be under Misi Sahib Dyal, the General Superintendent of Customs of the Lahore territories, to whom, and to whose people, you will give all aid and advice, and any necessary instructions in the conduct of their duties. It will be the duty of the Nazim to see that the customs' regulations are attended to, and enforced.

The Nazim has been directed to send into Lahore one of the regular regiments now serving at Mooltan. This regiment, filled to the full complement stated in the regulations, should be composed of the best men, picked from the two regiments now serving there, the remaining men may be paid up and discharged, on the principles and gratuity already established. A regiment of infantry, a horsebattery, and 500 cavalry, have already marched to Mooltan, and another regiment has been ordered from Bunnoo.

The reducing all the unnecessary irregulars, and putting the military establishment of the province on an efficient footing, will have your early attention.

The garrisons of the forts must be looked to, and, when you have had an opportunity of having all the forts surveyed, and ascertaining their usefulness and relative value, you should dismantle all that it may not be considered necessary to retain.

It is of great importance that a system for the administration of justice should be maintained throughout the Mooltan districts. We are not very well acquainted with the practice which has hitherto prevailed in Mooltan, in this department, Dewan Moolhaj, and his father Dewan Sawun Mull before him, having been left to do as they pleased in this as well as in all other matters connected with the administration. In Sawun Mull's time, the province was always said to be well governed, and the people content, though in Moolraj's it has been different. You should not, summarily, and without inquiry, dispense with such system as you may find in force merely for the sake of substituting that which has been introduced in the other portions of the Punjab territory, but, in this, and in all departments, ascertain the state, and the efficiency, of the present system, and only introduce reforms where they are required for securing the interests, and promoting the welfare of the people.

You may, perhaps, find that there was no better system for administering justice, and redressing wrongs, in Mooltan, than in the Khalsa districts, in such case, rules that have been introduced in the latter, may be beneficially applied to the former.

The frontier duties at Mooltan have, hitherto, been very light, the inland customs, and town duties, and cesses on the retail of goods, exorbitantly heavy. The Mooltan trade, having been relieved from all the last-mentioned, can afford a very much heavier impost tax than heretofore, and still feel great relief. But the Afghan trader, who merely paid the light transit duty, and passed on, with his goods, without retailing in the provinces, feels none of the relief that has been granted to the inhabitants, and the high import duty, to be demanded now at the frontier, will, it is

to be feared, act as a total prohibition to the trade, or turn its course to Shikarpore, and Kelat.

I have discussed this point with Mīr Sahib Dyal, but he thinks that our system of open rowannahs, for a fixed period, or of drawback on exports, could never be adopted, with the unscrupulous traders, and dishonest officials, with whom we have to deal. The subject is not an easy one

Inclosure 7 in No 26

*The Resident at Lahore to the Secretary to the Government of India*

Lahore, April 6 1848

HAVING now been just one month in charge of the administration of the Lahore territories, I submit such observations as I think it may be useful to record, on the state of things as I found them and a report of the principal circumstances that have occurred, since I reached Lahore

Considerations of a domestic nature rendered it inconvenient for Mī J Lawrence to leave Lahore, immediately upon my joining. Of this I was not sorry, as so much had been attempted, and was still in progress of accomplishment, of change and reformation in all departments, during the last five or six months, under his immediate control and guidance, that I felt it would be of much advantage to me to have him, for a time, to discuss, and explain, the various measures he had introduced, with the causes of their introduction, and that it would also be beneficial that he should have the opportunity of concluding some of the proceedings in which I found him actively engaged

I requested him to continue his labors in re-modelling the establishments, and in fixing the several judicial, revenue, and police jurisdictions of the Baree Doab, according to the system in each department which he had introduced, and which it is obvious no one could accomplish so satisfactorily, with a view to the success of his schemes, as himself

I, also, suggested that he should draw up a general report of the settlement operations that had been conducted under his orders, with the financial result, as far as he could give it

Both these he has done, and he submitted his settlement report\* direct to you, just before leaving Lahore

Perfect tranquillity prevails, at present throughout all the territories under the Lahore Government, and I have no reason to think that the apparent contentment of the people is other than real. We have now or have had during the cold months, British officers, in all parts of the country, and the impression seems general that all classes are satisfied at the present state of things, in those villages, chiefly in the Manjha, to which numbers of the disbanded soldiery have returned, we sometimes hear of prophetic rumours being circulated, of a day coming when the Sikhs are again to be brought into collision with the British, and with a different result from the last, but, beyond this idle and infrequent talk, there is nothing to indicate that the return of the Khalsa independence is either expected, or desired

The universal civility, and kindness, with which all Europeans of all ranks and callings, whether officials, or travellers, or sportsmen, are treated, is very remarkable

Mr J. Lawrence's several dispatches written during the last few months, have mentioned the measures which have been adopted, since he came to Lahore, in August last, for introducing improved systems of administration, in all the departments of the State. The effect of these measures has, doubtless, been to transfer the administration of the country, from the hands of the Durbar to our own, to a much greater extent than was contemplated, when the introduction of the new arrangements was, at first determined on, and the conduct of all details, even the most minute, in all departments, except that of account, devolves, now, on the Resident and his subordinates

The whole system of revenue administration, and agricultural management, has been changed, by the substitution of money payments, and a fixed annual demand, for a collection of revenue in kind, according to the amount of produce

Any one, at all acquainted with the duties of a collector's office, and the constitution of the village communities in India, will feel what an important undertaking this was, and how it must affect all classes of agricultural interests

From all I can see, this work has been done, as far as it has hitherto gone, much better than could have been expected from the instruments and materials available for its performance, but, there has, certainly, been little opportunity yet of testing, practically, the quality of the work. The officers employed had, with few exceptions, scarcely any experience of revenue matters. Some were altogether ignorant, none had any knowledge of local usages, and accounts. The native kaidars, and officials, with whom the assistants had to work, are the most designing, and unscrupulous of men, and it is not to be conceived that a settlement, introduced now for the first time, on principles new to all parties, embracing an amount of revenue of sixty-four lakhs of rupees, and spreading over so large a tract of country, could be concluded in five months, without many maculae, and much that will require revision, and correction.

The settlement was, of course, most summary, and its details have, yet, to be filled up. Its working must be most carefully watched. The Durbar was averse to its introduction, but yielded, as they always do, and contented themselves, with the exception of Raja Deena Nath, with standing aloof from its execution, leaving the whole matter to the Resident, and his assistants.

Raja Deena Nath seems willing, now, to aid in working out the new system, in which he has, doubtless, some purpose of self-aggrandizement, or other motive apart from that of promoting the public weal. He sees the financial embarrassments of the State, and feels that, the more we interfere with details, especially where the revenue is concerned, the less will be the Durbar's responsibility for financial difficulties and deficiencies.

I could wish that our interference with these details had been less, but it is impossible now to recede. We must do what we can to carry the Durbar, and their officials, with us, to instruct them in carrying on the duty, to watch that they do it fairly, and gradually to withdraw from the mere details, and confine ourselves to more general superintendence.

In the judicial department also, our interference with details has gone further than was at first intended. Adawluttees have been appointed to every district of the provinces and courts for the administration of civil and criminal justice opened, with a code of rules of law and procedure, founded upon our regulations, prescribed, but the native functionaries who must preside in the courts of first instance, are ignorant, and corrupt, to the last degree. They have no notions of the commonest principles of justice between man and man, no system of jurisprudence was ever thought of in the Punjab, and the undertaking of teaching them the application of the rules that have been prescribed, is a most arduous one, especially with the young and inexperienced officers who are the Resident's assistants, and have most of them themselves to learn, ere they can become teachers.

The natives, throughout the districts, seem, like all Asiatics, eagerly disposed to take advantage of the opportunity for litigation afforded them, and, as the rule is—and a necessary one under the circumstances—that appeals in all cases should come to the Resident, and his assistants, it will easily be imagined how we are overwhelmed with work, in this department.

My object is to make the Durbar work, as much as possible, at these appeals, and to hold them responsible for their decisions, but they work unwillingly, and require almost as much instruction, and quite as much urging on, as their subordinates.

Still, I doubt not that, by perseverance and system, and very careful scrutiny and vigilance, we shall succeed in introducing a very fair system of judicial administration, before long.

I do not like to make alterations, where not absolutely necessary, in rules that have been so lately introduced by the Resident, but some of these rules must be modified, for instance, in civil cases, the rule of limitation has been fixed, for suits for real property, at sixty years'. I need hardly remark that the whole property of the country has changed hands, and the whole state of society has been altered, in all its elements, two or three times over, during the revolutions that have taken place in these parts, within that period.

In the customs' department also, an entire change of administration has been lately introduced, the system of a duty on imports and exports, collected on the frontier, having been substituted for the former custom of town and transit duties, and innumerable cesses. This, under the able management of Mir Sahib Dyal, promises to work well, now that the Mooltan independence, which sorely interfered with it, is at an end, and the whole country under the immediate administration of the Lahore Government. The financial result of the change cannot yet be surmised.

An attempt has been made to introduce an anna postage, throughout all the districts of the Punjab, but, hitherto, success has not attended the measure. Hurkaras have only been posted on the few great lines of roads, and, though the transmission of letters and parcels by private hands was strictly prohibited, under very heavy penalties, no means were adopted for carrying letters to the villages in the interior, or away from the general lines. Much dissatisfaction was the very obvious result—especially among the soldiers on distant commands, who seem as fond, as they are in our own provinces, of sending letters to their homes. A remedy for this was adopted by Mr Lawrence, shortly before giving over charge, but it is one of too expensive a kind to answer, involving the charge of half an anna per coss, (one and a half miles) on each letter, intended for a village off the line, in addition to the anna postage.

The state of the army seems satisfactory, but the troops are still kept longer in arrears, at times, than is expedient, owing to the exhausted state of the treasury. The subject is one that is never lost sight of.

The reduction of the irregular cavalry is proceeding gradually—we have an inspection at the Residency, nearly every morning, all recent additions, and inefficient men, or horses, being got rid of, with a gratuity according to their cases, and old worn-out soldiers pensioned, under the rules lately introduced.

I now proceed to mention the state in which I found the question of the future administration of Mooltan, and the arrangement I have made for its government and management.

Mr. John Lawrence, in his letter, dated 27th<sup>th</sup> of December last, described the communications which had taken place between Dewan Moolraj and himself, and the mode in which he purposed acting upon them—if the Governor General in Council approved. At Moolraj's request, the negotiations were kept secret, and were not communicated, by either party, to the Durbar. On Mr. Lawrence receiving the orders of Government, to let the matter lie over till my arrival, he wrote a letter to Moolraj, saying that I was coming to relieve him, and asking him, if it was his desire that Mr Lawrence should make any, and what, communication to me.

Moolraj replied to this letter, that he desired to abide by the agreement he had entered into with Mr Lawrence, and that what was already written was sufficient, viz, (and here the common Punjabee unscrupulousness shewed itself) that his resignation from the close of the late Khureef harvest should be accepted, that his honor and dignity should be guaranteed, that no charges against him should be listened to, that he should be only required to give one year's papers, and that a fitting provision should be made for him, for his future life.

Mr Lawrence received this letter, the day I arrived, and placed it in my hands—he stated, that he had, of course, made no such guarantee, as Moolraj asserted, that he had merely told him, in general terms, that the Government always respected the honor of honorable men, and that he must give, at least, nine or ten years' collection papers, to enable the new comers to make a fair settlement.

The paper, given to Moolraj, was with him in Mooltan, the paper, given by Moolraj to Mr. Lawrence, was unfortunately lost, and Mr Lawrence feared that it might have been burnt, when the fire of the thatch of a part of the Residency took place, in the cold weather, and many papers were destroyed.

It was, at this time, privately intimated to me (and that by his own vakeel) that Dewan Moolraj did not really desire to relinquish his government, if he was left, as heretofore, undisturbed, but that he was alarmed by the report that Adaw-lutees were to be established in the province, and that inducements were held out, by his enemies, to make complaints against him.

Thus, the only records that appeared, on which I could act, were Mr Lawrence's letter to Moolraj, asking him what he wished should be said to me, and Moolraj's reply, referring to a document which was not forthcoming, either in original, or in copy, regarding a transaction which he had requested, and continued to request, might remain secret, till it was completed.

I considered that the proper course to be pursued, at this juncture, was to summon the Councillors, and lay before the Durbar, the circumstances, exactly as they stood, and the two letters. This I did—Mr. Lawrence being present, and laying



on the table a roobukaree, or official note in the Persian language, of what had passed between Moolraj and himself.

Translations\* of the proceedings with the Durbar, and of the subsequent correspondence with Moolraj, are forwarded

As Moolraj was evidently preparing for his departure, and as the Khareef harvest was over, and the season for collecting the Rubbee fast approaching, it was necessary, not to lose a moment in bringing the affair to a termination, one way or other

At my suggestion, a letter was written to Moolraj, stating what had passed in Durbar, explaining to him, that he was still quite a free agent in the matter, that he might either resign, or retain, his government, as he pleased, that if he chose to retain his government, he might do so without apprehension, for that good faith would be kept with him, and his honor as well as his independence, in all administrative matters, would be respected, the State reserving to itself the right to see that he committed no oppression or wrong in his government, but that, if he really desired to resign his Nizamut, he must do so, unconditionally, as the Durbar would make no stipulations with him, regarding indemnity for past misdeeds, or for future provision

In reply Moolraj distinctly declared it his wish and desire to resign, and to be at once relieved from the Government, he stated family dissensions, and infirm health as the chief causes of his wishing to retire from public employment

On the arrival of the reply, I met the Durbar, when the resignation was formally accepted, and the future arrangements for the administration were discussed, and determined on

It was determined to nominate a Sirdar as Nazim of Mooltan, who would superintend the administration of the province, in all departments, on the part of the Durbar, on a fixed salary\*—to act in conjunction with, and by the advice of, a British Political Agent

The post was first offered to Sudar Shumshere Sing, Sindanwala, an active and intelligent officer, but, on his showing reluctance to go, for any long period, to Mooltan, and on his suggesting stipulations, the office was bestowed on Sudar Khan Sing Man Bahadour, a man who bears a very high character, as a brave soldier, and intelligent man

The officer I have selected to fill the post of Political Agent at Mooltan, is Mr P A Vans Agnew, the oldest political officer on this frontier, and a man of much ability, energy, and judgment, with considerable experience in administrative duties

Mr Agnew's duties will be very arduous, as General Khan Sing Man's will be almost nominal, and the administration will be really conducted by the British agent, though in the name and with the instrumentality, of the General, and his subordinates. An Assistant for Mr Vans Agnew was necessary, and it seemed desirable that he should be a military man—the officer who was pointed out to me, by all, as the best qualified for this post is Lieutenant W A Anderson of the Bombay European Regiment, placed at the disposal of the Resident, by the orders of Government, dated the 7th of January last, and employed, hitherto, in the Punjab, on survey duties, under Major Napier

Lieutenant Anderson is an excellent oriental scholar, he was for some time a deputy collector in Sind, under Sir Charles Napier, and has travelled through the whole of the Mooltan districts

Mr Agnew considers himself fortunate in having Lieutenant Anderson associated with him, in his new duties

By Moolraj's engagements, the province of Mooltan yielded 19,00,000 rupees to the Lahore Treasury. There seems every reason to believe that, after paying all expenses, and granting relief where relief is necessary, it will yield, in the hands to which it is now entrusted, 24,00,000 or 25,00,000. Moolraj's brother, with whom he is at feud, sent me a written application, through Raja Deena Nath, offering to take up Moolraj's engagements, at an advance of four lakhs of rupees

It is much to be hoped that our expectations, in regard to an increase of revenue from Mooltan, will not be disappointed. Our present financial prospects are, as Mr Lawrence has explained, far from promising notwithstanding the heavy reductions

\* Inclosures 1 to 4 in No 26

No 1 Letter and Roobukaree to Dewan Moolraj, Nazim of Mooltan

No 2 Dewan Moolraj to the Resident

No 3 Letter from Lahore Durbar to Moolraj

No 4 Letter from Lahore Durbar to Sirdar Khan Sing Man, Bahadour

which have been made in all departments, there seems little hope of the income meeting the expenditure, including the British demand, by many lakhs of rupees. This is the only real difficulty that I see, in the administration, and it is a subject that has my constant and anxious consideration.

The provinces of Peshawur, Bunnoo, Hazara, and the Sind Sagur Doab, where British Officers are located, remain in the same satisfactory state as last reported by Mr Lawrence. There has been a slight movement at Jhung in the Rechna Doab, caused by collision between the Hindoos and Mahomedans, but it is reported to be unimportant, and to have been, already, put down.

The Ranee is little heard of. I have had several communications from her, complaining, as usual, of being removed from the Government, and of the machinations of her enemies. I am assured that her assertions of close confinement, and unkind usage, and unpalatable diet, are without foundation. She is subject to stricter surveillance than at first, doubtless, owing to her having abused the liberty allowed her of free intercourse with persons visiting Sheikhoopoor, and no persons beyond her establishment, are allowed access to her. But, in the employment of her time, the expenditure of her allowance, and the quantity, or quality, of her food, no interference is exercised.

Inclosure 8 in No 26

*Mr Agnew to the Resident at Lahore,*

*Edga, close to Mooltan, April 14, 1848*

WE reached the Mooltan Ghat, at eleven o'clock, yesterday morning.

This morning, we joined our force here, and were visited by Dewan Moolraj. He said all that was loyal and polite, but, as our tents, &c were still behind, I begged him to come again for business at three o'clock.

I do not know what has put into Sirdar Khan Sing's head some imagination that we had better get the fort into our hands as soon as we can, but, in any case, it is right to lose no time in the transfer. Everything seems to bear out the character Mooltan has always borne for peace and quietness.

The fort is by far the most imposing I have seen in India, and is, I dare say, one of the strongest.

We mean to go in, to-morrow morning, with two companies, whom I shall quietly put in charge of one of the gates, until we can ascertain who, among the present garrison, are worth keeping. It would be, perhaps, going into the extreme, and alarm the rest of the sepoys, to change the garrison at once altogether.

Our voyage down was, as usual, very uninteresting, as we passed all the day in our boats, except what was necessary for a hasty meal. In our morning walk along the bank, however, and when we passed the night near a village, we found those we met contented as Zemindars ever are by their own admission.

I write to-day, only to avoid a blank day among the first after my arrival, but my business will be to-morrow. I can also hardly write for interruptions.

Our regiment mustered, this morning, under arms, about 350 (of 489 fighting men) artillery 80, and cavalry 100, instead of 200, as several of these men (the regular cavalry) have been kept by different Sudars and others.

Inclosure 9 in No 26

*Mr. Agnew to the Resident at Lahore.*

*Mooltan, April 19, 1848.*

YOU will be sorry to hear that, as Anderson and I were coming out of the fort gate, after having received charge of the fort from Dewan Moolraj, we were attacked by a couple of soldiers, who, taking us unawares, succeeded in wounding us both pretty sharply. Anderson is worst off, poor fellow, he has a severe wound in the thigh, another on the shoulder, one on the back of the neck, and one on the face. I think it most necessary that a doctor should be sent down, though I hope not to need

him myself I have a smart gash in the left shoulder, and another in the same arm. The whole troops have mutinied, but we hope to get them round ; they have turned our two companies out of the fort

PS (In another handwriting.) I am having my wound dressed, so cannot write myself this moment, to beg of you to ask Cocks to let my friends know that I am in no danger, and also Anderson's father, through Colonel Outram.

Inclosure 10 in No 26.

*The Resident at Lahore to the Governor-General.*

*Lahore, April 21, 1848.*

I SEND your Lordship, privately, to-day, the intelligence received this morning from Mooltan, further particulars will, doubtless, arrive before the next post goes out, and I shall be able to report officially

The accounts received by the Durbar, give very few more details than Mr. Agnew's letter. The express was sent off, immediately after the affair. The impression, however, on the part of the Durbar, is, that the affair was a preconcerted and planned one by Dewan Moolraj. They think, from some expressions in a representation from the Dewan to the Durbar, written two days before the émeute, but received this morning, with the other intelligence, that Moolraj was dissatisfied, at not being allowed to leave the province, on the day of his successor's arrival, that he was alarmed at no promise of indemnity for past misconduct being made to him, and at the number of complainants that were crowding in against him, that he feared the machinations of his own family, and his enemies at Lahore; and that, being a sullen, discontented man, with no son, and no family ties, to care for, he has determined to do a deed of desperation, and die in its execution

The only thing to favor the view of the Durbar as to the Dewan's having contrived the plot, is, that it is stated, in a letter from Sirdar Khan Sing Man, the new Governor, to his confidential agent at Lahore, that the Dewan, at the meeting with the British officers, the day previously, demanded his rooksut and a razeenameh (deed of acquittance and satisfaction), and that, when he was told he must first make over all the papers of collections of the province, angry words passed between the Dewan and Mr Agnew, that, on the morning of the affair, after having shown the new Nazim and the British officers all over the fort, and opened the magazines and store-houses, &c, and having made over charge thereof to the two companies of the Durbar regiment, as the party were riding out of the doorway, Moolraj was six or eight paces behind, and that, when the two sepoys wounded the British officers, Moolraj hastened past them, spurred his horse, and rode off, as fast as he could, to his own residence, where he turned out his troops, and as Khan Sing Man, and the wounded officers, were returning from the fort to their camp, from Moolraj's position, a shotted gun was fired at the party

Hurriedly as Mr Agnew wrote, I think, if this had been the case, he would have mentioned it

Moreover, if the attack was preconcerted and ordered, why was it not more effectual? (It does not appear in any account, how the wounded officers were brought off.) If Moolraj fired a gun, in attack, on the small retreating party, why did he only fire one, and did not, as he might have done, annihilate them?

The affair is a strange and unaccountable one, but it may be serious to the British officers and I am most anxious for the next accounts

Moolraj's own troops have been much dissatisfied with him lately, and the complaints against him, from all quarters, have been most frequent. He has only one friend in the Durbar, and none in his own family.

I have acted on the most serious view of the subject which the accounts, hitherto received, can be considered to present. I have ordered off, to-night, from Lahore, the only disposable Sikh regiment, to be met on the road by a field battery from Ramnuggun and all the available irregulars under Sirdar Uttu Sing, Kaleewala, the commander of the irregular troops, accompanied by Dewan Deena Nath, on the part of the Durbar, and I have ordered General Cortlandt to move down, with two battalions, one of Mussulmans and the other Poorbeahs, and a regiment of cavalry, and a troop of horse artillery, from Dera Ismael Khan. These troops will be in

motion at once, unless the nature of the intelligence received to-night should render counter orders advisable.

Dewan Moolraj is an officer of the Sikh Government, he is in rebellion, if in rebellion at all, to the Sikh Durbar, and the orders of that Government. The coercion must come from the Sikh Government, unaided by British troops, if possible.

If it should be necessary to move a British soldier, the affair will be a serious one for the Durbar, but this will not, I am pretty sure, be the case.

I will write to your Lordship again on the subject, to-morrow.

A sub-assistant surgeon, with medicines, dressings, and all appurtenances, followed Mr Agnew to Mooltan, five days after he left. If, by the next accounts, more surgical aid should appear necessary, I will send down an assistant surgeon.

The Durbar are evidently, one and all, most vexed and troubled at this affair. The members of the Council all came to me, within an hour of the news being received, and are most desirous to do anything I might direct, collectively and individually, to meet the emergency.

Inclosure 11 in No 26

*The Resident at Lahore to the Governor-General.*

*Lahore, April 22, 1848.*

I HAVE but little to tell you, to-day, of the Mooltan affair. There was a post, in the night, but it brought no letter from Mr Agnew. There was a more detailed account, from Sirdar Khan Sing, of what happened during the 19th, up to the evening, when the dispatch was sent off.

This account differs, in some details, from the former. The gun which was fired on Moolraj's return to his camp, (he also is in camp outside the city) is accounted for—it was not, I believe, shotted. The affair does not appear to have been a premeditated one, as far as I can make out, and Moolraj's active concern in it is doubtful; his conduct, however, according to our present accounts, is very suspicious; at any rate, there was much excitement among the troops, and prompt measures to put down the disturbance are necessary. I have put in motion upon Mooltan, from different points, 7 battalions of infantry, 2 of regular cavalry, 3 troops and batteries of artillery, and 1,200 irregular horse. These will proceed on their way, or be stopped, according to the accounts I receive in the next twenty-four hours. A separate account of all expenses will be kept, and be charged to Moolraj, who has seventy lakhs of rupees, the plunder of the province, as his share in the division of the property of the late Dewan.

The fort of Mooltan is very strong, and full of heavy cannon of large calibre. This cannot be taken possession of by force. Except the Mooltan garrison, Moolraj has not many troops, and only five or six field guns. He is very unpopular both with the army and the people, and it is generally thought, by the natives, that he has been urged to what he has done by the machinations of unfriends, who desire to make him compromise himself with us, to effect his ruin.

Khan Sing writes of the wounds of the officers as by no means dangerous.

I hope to have a letter from Mr. Agnew to-night.

Inclosure 12 in No. 26

*Statement of Jemadar Kesra Sing, servant of Mr. Vans Agnew*

ON the 22nd April, Jemadar Kesra Sing came to me (Peer Ibraheem Khan) at Bahawalpore, and gave me the following statement.

On the 17th of April, in the morning, Mr Vans Agnew, accompanied by Lieutenant Anderson, and Sirdar Khan Sing Man, arrived at the landing-place called Rajghat, at Mooltan.

Moolraj, Dewan Moolraj's moonshee, came to pay his respects, and stated that the Dewan had sent an elephant to convey the party wherever they might wish to pitch their camp. Mr. Vans Agnew said, "We will encamp here to-day, and to-morrow, if Sirdar Khan Sing approves, will take up our quarters in the Edga."

On the 18th, they went, in the morning, to the Edga. An hour afterwards, Dewan Moolraj, accompanied by Lala Rungram, and other attendants, had an interview, which lasted for a quarter of an hour. At 12 o'clock, he sent a zecafut. In the afternoon he paid a second visit, remaining for two hours. In the course of the conversation, he requested Mr Vans Agnew to inspect the fort, the troops, stores, &c, to which Mr Vans Agnew replied, that he would come the next day. The Dewan then took leave.

On the 19th, at sunrise, Mr Vans Agnew, accompanied by Lieutenant Anderson, and Sirdar Khan Sing Man, and attended by two companies of the Goorka Regiment and twenty-five Sowais, went to the fort.

The Dewan came out to the Kummur Kota Gate to meet them when they arrived at the outer gate, the grenadier stationed there, asked the Dewan, what were his orders as to letting the British officers enter the fort, the Dewan replied, "The Sahib is master." The Dewan then said, that it would not be advisable to allow the crowd in attendance to enter also, as it would cause annoyance. Mr Vans Agnew, upon this left behind one of the companies and the twenty-five Sowais and took in with him only one company. The Dewan was requested by Mr Vans Agnew to leave some of his people behind also, but he did not do so. The British officers inspected the fort, and, among other things, requested to see a place known by the name of Mozuff Khan's Kutcherry. The Dewan said, that it was used for confining prisoners and was not in a fit state to be seen. Mr Vans Agnew replied, "It is no matter." They then visited a place belonging to the late Dewan Sawun Mull, and Mr Vans Agnew directed the officer in command of the company which they had taken in with them, to place his guards in the same positions which the Dewan's soldiers held previously.

After taking a parade of the golundauzes and other soldiers, Mr Vans Agnew spoke a few words of encouragement to them, telling them that all then officers would maintain the same position which they then held. When they came out, by the Seelhec Gate, the same jemadar who had accosted Moolraj on entering, asked, what his orders were, to which the Dewan replied, "You were formerly my servant, you will now serve the Sahib, who will treat you as well as I have done."

The jemadar said, "I am now your servant, but when I have been removed from your service, we shall see."

Mr Vans Agnew laughingly said, "Don't fear, the Dewan's servants shall be as mine, and mine as his."

Mr Vans Agnew and Dewan Moolraj then proceeded, side by side, on horseback, while Lieutenant Anderson, and Sirdar Khan Sing Man, followed behind. On arriving at the drawbridge, a soldier of a dark complexion, advancing forwards, thrust a spear at Mr Vans Agnew's side, which slightly wounded him, he fell off his horse. Dewan Moolraj's horse reared.

The Dewan then pressed on his horse, and proceeded to the Amkhas. The road being narrow, Lieutenant Anderson and Sirdar Khan Sing moved on a little ahead of Mr Vans Agnew, in order to avoid falling into the ditch.

With the exception of the Dewan, no one knew that the soldier had thrust the spear at Mr Vans Agnew, nor did that officer mention it. The sepoy then made a rush, and cut at Mr Vans Agnew over the shoulder behind, with his sword, upon which Mr Vans Agnew struck him with a stick he had in his hand, and broke open his head. The sepoy then cut Mr Vans Agnew on the arm, while other sepoy, Mussulmans, attacked Lieutenant Anderson, sword in hand.

That officer closed with them, and was wounded on the forehead, and on the back. He was, immediately, set upon by more sepoy, and wounded both in the thigh, and under the arm. Mohkum Naik, and Sunnund Khan, sepoy, took him up and carried him off to the camp in the Edga. Moolraj's soldiers all stood up, and drew their swords.

Sirdar Khan Sing dismounted, and came up to Mr Vans Agnew, who, after having his wounds bound up by Kesra Sing, got on an elephant with Khan Sing, and returned to the Edga. As they passed the Amkhas, in which Moolraj was, they observed his people bringing out three large, and four small guns, in front of the place, upon which, Mr Vans Agnew asked whose guns they were, Kesra Sing replied that they were Moolraj's. Mr Vans Agnew then turned off from that road, and proceeded, in another direction, to the Edga. The golundauzes then fired a gun, the shot of which passed over their heads.

Mr Vans Agnew and Lieutenant Anderson had their wounds dressed in the Edga, during which occupation, Mr. Vans Agnew wrote letters to Lahore and

Bunnoo, which were sent off through the news-writer; at the same time, he sent information to Peer Ibraheem Khan at Bahawalpore.

At nine o'clock, he sent a message to the Dewan, informing him that he did not consider that the Dewan was to blame for what had taken place. In an hour and a half, an old moonshee came, on the part of the Dewan, and said, that his master had intended to pay him a visit, but had been prevented by the sepoy, who had even wounded Rungram, a relation of the Dewan. Mr Vans Agnew remarked, that he did not attach any blame to the Dewan, but desired that the soldiers who had wounded himself and Lieutenant Anderson, might be seized, and imprisoned.

The moonshee observed, that the Dewan would, certainly, make his appearance before evening. In the evening, a follower of the Dewan arrived, and stated, that his master could not, just then, make his appearance, but would come, as soon as it might be in his power.

His arrival was expected during the whole night. In the evening, Sirdar Khan Sing, Colonel Esra Sing, of the artillery, and the other colonel, commanding the Goorka regiment, remarked, that it was strange that the Dewan did not arrive, and expressed a suspicion that he intended to create a disturbance.

Mr Vans Agnew said, that it would be advisable to leave the Edga, and encamp in a place where they would be beyond the reach of the guns in the fort, to which the Sikh officers replied, that the Edga would stand battering from balls, and that water and provisions were both procurable, which, perhaps, they might not be in any other situation.

Mr Vans Agnew agreed with them.

On the 20th of April, at nine o'clock, a gun was fired from the fort, which struck the mosque where the British officers were. The Sikh officers came up to Mr Vans Agnew, and said, "You observed, that you did not think that the Dewan was to blame, there can be no doubt about it now." Mr Vans Agnew remarked, "We must now look after our own protection." The Sikh officers said, that the whole of the troops under them would sacrifice their lives in his service. They then went off to take measures for the defence of their several positions, while, about this time, shots began to pour in from the guns in the fort. Mr Vans Agnew said to Khan Sing, "What ammunition have you?" He replied, "Enough for three or four days." Mr Vans Agnew advised the Sirdar not to fire a gun so long as the guns were being served from the fort, but to commence, as soon as the Dewan's soldiers quitted it. The golundazes of the fort took two of their guns to a raised place, to the south of the Edga, from whence they served their guns. Colonel Esra Sing, however, brought his guns to bear on it, and they were obliged to remove theirs. In the afternoon, four or five guns were again brought up to the same place, while others were taken to the east of the Edga. The artillerymen in the Edga continued their firing.

A man then came, on the part of Moolhaj, to Colonel Esra Sing, with the following message: "The Dewan desires you to stop your firing, and to pay him a visit." The Colonel informed Mr Vans Agnew, on which that officer remarked, that no confidence was to be placed in the Dewan's word, but that, if he would silence his own guns, and send one of his confidants, Mr Vans Agnew would hold an interview with him. After the man had taken his departure, and rejoined the Dewan's troops, the firing was renewed, with greater vigour than ever, and continued till evening, on both sides. Two golundazes in the Edga were wounded, as well as several horses, and an akalee's son was killed on the other side. After dark, an attack was made by all the troops on the Edga, on the east, west, and south sides.

Colonel Esra Sing and his artillerymen, then, went over to the enemy.

Sirdar Khan Sing, immediately, informed Mr Vans Agnew, that these troops had joined the Dewan's soldiers. Mr Vans Agnew remarked, that there was no remedy. When the Dewan's people approached the mosque, Sirdar Khan Sing said, "There is nothing left now, but to die." Mr Vans Agnew recommended him, if it should be the Dewan's wish, to hold an interview with him, as there was now no remedy, the troops having gone over, and resistance would involve an unnecessary loss of life.

Sirdar Khan Sing, then, advanced ten paces, and begged for quarter.

A soldier upon this fired at him, but without hitting him. The Sirdar then fired a pistol at him in return.

The other sepoy then seized the Sirdar, and began to plunder the place. Mr. Vans Agnew, by the assistance of Kesra Sing, raised himself up, and shaking hands

with Lieutenant Anderson, bade him a last farewell. Kesra Sing took Mr. Vans Agnew's gun, and fired at the Dewan's soldiers, one of whom was wounded.

On the insurgents coming close up to the mosque, Kesra Sing and Mr Vans Agnew's kidmutgar left the place, by that officer's order. Dewan Moolraj's soldiers came up to the charpoys, on which the two officers were lying, upon which, Mr. Vans Agnew taking a pistol, fired it at them, but it hung fire. He then took out a sword, and wounded one of them.

A sepoy, then, fired off a gun at Mr Vans Agnew, the charge of which, striking him on the left side, killed him.

The soldiers cut off his head, as well as Lieutenant Anderson's, and mutilated their bodies, in the most barbarous manner.

They, then, took away the two murdered officers' heads, together with the guns, and all the property they could lay their hands on, to Dewan Moolraj, who joined the artillery with his own, took possession of the property, and gave presents to the soldiers who brought in the two heads.

On the 21st, Dewan Moolraj ordered all the remaining property to be brought into the fort, and gave directions for imprisoning Sirdar Khan Sing in the Amkhas.

Kesra Sing visited Sirdar Khan Sing, and asked what he was to do. The Sirdar advised him to get off to Bahawalpore, and then to go up to Lahore, by Ferozepore. The jemadar left the city, and, on his way, saw a sepoy holding Mr Vans Agnew's head in his hand, while he was treating it with insult. The jemadar then traversed the jungle for twelve coss. and succeeded in reaching Bahawalpore.

#### Inclosure 13 in No. 26

#### *The Resident at Lahore to the Governor-General*

*Lahore, April 24, 1848*

I DID not write to your Lordship yesterday, as I was in hourly expectation, until the evening, of more certain information, regarding the fate of the British officers, and the Sikh governor, and their escort.

The news I received about noon was most distressing, I hoped for further intelligence before night.

It is now noon of the 24th, and no further intelligence of any kind has been received.

The intelligence, received at noon yesterday, was contained in a news letter, written by the Moonshee of the Mooltan news writer.

It stated, that the writer had left the city, early in the morning, on his own business, and, in consequence of what had happened, was unable to return to the neighbourhood of the British officers' camp, that search was made for him by Dewan Moolraj's people, and that what he reported he had learnt, at the distance of a mile from the scene of action. He reported that, at about eleven o'clock on the 20th of the month, the whole of Dewan Moolraj's troops attacked the camp and escort of Sirdar Khan Sing and the British officers, that the fire was returned by the Sikh Government escort, that the engagement lasted till sunset, when he sent off his report, ignorant of the result.

Alas! there can be little doubt of what the result must have been, the Sikh escort was under 500 men of all arms, and their ammunition must have been soon expended, my fear is, that the British officers, the Sikh Sirdar, a brave and excellent man, and the escort have been annihilated.

Speculation is altogether at a loss to account for the conduct of Dewan Moolraj. In my letter of the 6th,\* I mentioned the circumstances under which he had solicited permission to resign his government, how Mr Lawrence had engaged to accept his resignation, the steps that I took to ascertain that it was his real and unbiassed desire to be relieved, and the measures I adopted, in conjunction with Mr Lawrence, for relieving him.

Such utterly unprovoked, and apparently objectless, treachery is unheard of, even among this treacherous people.

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\* Inclosure 7 in No. 26

The immediate punishment of this outrage is imperative, but the consequences to be apprehended, throughout the whole Punjab, from this outbreak, and rebellion of Moolraj, unless instantly put down, are most serious.

Measures the most prompt and decisive must be taken.

I told your Lordship, in my last, that I had ordered all the disposable troops in any way available, of the Sikh army, to move upon Mooltan. I have ordered down all the chiefs of the greatest note, and who have the deepest stake in the preservation of the present order of things, to the spot, with the few troops that are at Lahore, to be met at a rendezvous on this side of Mooltan, by the force from Bunnoo, Attock, &c.

But the case is very serious. The Sikh Sirdars whom I have sent may be implicitly relied on, and the influence they have with the soldiery they will make the best use of. But the soldiery themselves are not equally trustworthy, they are dispirited, not satisfied with their Sirdars, and have, as may be supposed, no very kindly feeling for us, or sympathy with the parties so treacherously massacred (if they are so) on this occasion.

The movement in Mooltan appears to be the result of Puthan counsel, and machination. The whole Puthan population, from Mooltan to Peshawar, Transindus, are ripe for mischief.

There are many thousand dissatisfied and discontented spirits throughout the Punjab—quiet, while all around them is quiet, but watching an opportunity for revolt and disturbance. A successful rebellion in Mooltan, which this affair, if not immediately put down, will become, would kindle a flame through the land, which it would be very difficult to extinguish.

I have weighed all circumstances well, and am keenly alive to the many great objections to the measure, but I consider the necessity paramount, and have determined on moving the British moveable column from Lahore upon Mooltan, if the intelligence I may receive by sunset to-day, is not more favorable than my fears anticipate.

I came to this determination yesterday afternoon, and immediately communicated it, privately, and personally, to the Major-General commanding the division.

The place of the troops which move from Lahore will be supplied, temporarily, from Ferozepore.

The knowledge that the British army is in motion from Lahore and Ferozepore, will, in all probability, settle the affair at once, and the demonstration only will be necessary. Confidence will be given to the Lahore troops, and to the country, an immediate check will, it is to be hoped, be put to the hopes, and movements, of the disaffected, and the British troops will not, I trust, have many marches to make this winter.

Had the case been less urgent than I consider it, I should never have consented to move the British troops at this season of the year, and on such a distant expedition, but I feel that the peace of the frontier, and, perhaps, of much more than the frontier, on the Punjab, depends on the measure.

The season is an exceedingly mild one, and, as yet, the weather is not oppressive, but, in another month, it will be so, and Mooltan is a very hot place. The General and the Brigadier, however, are not apprehensive of the health of the troops, if they get back before the rains.

As I said before, I trust the demonstration will be sufficient.

I have not yet communicated officially in writing to the General, but he has warned the troops. I await the result of this afternoon's post, or its non-receipt, (it is now several hours over due,) which will corroborate my worst suspicions.

I shall send a copy of this letter to the Commander-in-Chief, for his Lordship's information.

I must beg your Lordship's indulgence to the haste with which it is written, amidst a press of business, and innumerable interruptions.

Mooltan is from Lahore about 220 miles, and the same from Ferozepore.



## Inclosure 14 in No. 26.

*The Resident at Lahore to Major-General W. S. Whish, C.B., Commanding the Punjab Division.*

*Lahore, April 24, 1848.*

IT is with much regret that I inform you, that circumstances have arisen which make it necessary, that a British force should march immediately towards Mooltan

The late Nazim of Mooltan, Dewan Moolraj, having requested to be relieved of his government, and urged the Durbar, and the British Resident, to send another officer as governor, and make arrangements for the administration of the province, has, on their arrival at Mooltan, treacherously attacked the British officers, Mr. P. A. Vans Agnew of the Civil Service, and Lieutenant Anderson of the Bombay European Regiment, and the Sikh Governor, with their escort, and, as it is feared, destroyed them all

Dewan Moolraj is now, with his troops, in open rebellion to the British Government, and it is necessary that he, and those remaining his adherents, be captured, and the rebellion quelled

A Sikh force, with some of the chiefs of the highest rank of the Lahore Durbar, has been sent to Mooltan, to coerce the Dewan, but to insure success,—to assure the people of the country, and to check the spread of rebellion and disaffection,—a demonstration by a British force, and, if necessary, active operations for the capture of Dewan Moolraj, and the dispersion of his troops and followers, are absolutely necessary

The Sikh force has marched. It is desirable that the British column should move, with as little delay as possible

My chief assistant, Mr. A. H. Cocks, will accompany the British force, through whom, all matters connected with the operations, of a political character, will be communicated to the officer commanding. Mr. Cocks will give all information, and aid, in his power, to the Quarter Master General and Commissariat Departments, with the force

Mr. Cocks will, of course, exercise no interference with the military operations, which will be solely under the control of the Brigadier commanding

There is a fort of some strength at Mooltan, but the garrison is weak, and the military resources of Dewan Moolraj are inconsiderable, his organized force, of all arms, not exceeding 3,000 men, but it is believed that large bodies of disaffected men have joined, and will join, him

Mr. Cocks will furnish the Deputy Quarter Master General with a route. The road lies near the River Ravee, all the way to Mooltan, and the Ravee is navigated, at this season of the year, by boats of large burden

## Inclosure 15 in No. 26

*Statement of Peer Ibraheem Khan, British Agent at Bahawalpore.*

*Bahawalpore, April 24, 1848*

A LETTER has reached me from Mooltan to the following effect. On the 20th instant, the guns began to play on the mosque where the British officers were, and, at nightfall, the officers of the Sikh artillery went over, with their men, to the enemy. Sirdar Khan Sing Man, by the permission of Mr. Vans Agnew, begged for quarter, upon which he was seized, and the two gentlemen killed

Dewan Moolraj bestowed great praises on the soldiers who brought in their heads, and presented a pair of golden bracelets to Hurdas Sing, a jemadar of the insurgent troops. He gave also 100 rupees to some of the soldiers, and said "All the rest will receive similar rewards" He then sent out people, with messages to Dera Ghazee Khan, Sungur, and other districts in Mooltan, instructing his officials to collect soldiers, and stating that all those who made their appearance quickly, would be taken into his service

The Government news-writer in Mooltan was forbidden to send intelligence under pain of punishment. Abdool Ghufoor Khan, jemadar of the Zumboorkhans,

seized a Lahore messenger, and brought him before Moolraj, who took from him all his papers, and gave orders for cutting off, entirely, all communication between Mooltan and Lahore.

The officers, in command of the cavalry, were directed to send out patrols on the Lahore, Bahawulpore, and Dera Ghazee Khan roads, with orders to intercept all messengers.

The Dewan then wrote to his brother, Sham Sing, governor of the district of Shooja-abad, directing him to take, at once, into his service all the soldiers he could collect, and to send them to Mooltan.

From the day of the disturbance, the Dewan has been busily employed in getting together, and inspecting, his troops, in laying in stores, and in collecting money.

The kardars of Mooltan have been instructed to levy, at once, the first instalment of the spring crop. The zemindars seem disposed to try to evade paying the revenue.

#### Inclosure 16 in No. 26

#### *The Resident at Lahore to the Governor-General*

*Lahore, April 25, 1848*

IN my letter of yesterday, I told your Lordship that, if I heard nothing, before sunset, of the fate of the British officers, Mr Vans Agnew, and Lieutenant Anderson, and the new Governor of Mooltan, with the Sikh escort, I should address to the General commanding the Lahore division, an official application for a British force, to move towards Mooltan.

I received no intelligence, and in the evening, therefore, I sent to Major-General Whish the letter, of which the inclosure is a copy.

Finding that the General did not propose sending any heavy guns with the column, I intended, to-day, to explain to him that I considered the demonstration incomplete without them, and that for active operations it would be ineffective.

This morning, I received information, via Bahawulpore, of the sad proceedings at Mooltan, which quite alter the aspect of affairs.

I inclose, for your Lordship's information, the statement of the distressing and disgraceful transactions, sent to me by Peer Ibraheem Khan, the British agent at Bahawulpore.

Your Lordship will, with me, feel the deepest indignation and regret at the cowardly and treacherous destruction of these most promising and valuable young officers.

But, as I said before, the whole nature of the case is altered by this narrative.

I had determined, at all hazards, under the emergency of the case, to support the Durbar troops, and Sirdars, in coercing an officer in rebellion against the Sikh Government, and the British authorities, and offering armed opposition to those troops.

Your Lordship will observe, that the Durbar troops, to a man, went over to the rebellious force, the Sirdar made terms for himself, and the British officers were left to be cruelly butchered, being the only individuals of the whole party who were injured.

We may expect that the other troops of the Durbar, marching on Mooltan, may act a similar part, and that the British reserve, sent to support and succour, would find itself opposed to supposed friends, and foes, united together against it.

I could not consent, under any circumstances, to send a British force on such an expedition, whatever may be the result, and consequences of the state of things which will follow, to the continuance of the Sikh Government.

I have intimated to the General that the British column will not be moved, now, on the service mentioned in my letter of yesterday.

That condign punishment must be visited on those who have committed this perfidious outrage and insult to the British Government, is indispensable; but, at this season of the year, operations of the magnitude which will now be required, and at such a distance as Mooltan from our reserves and magazines, cannot, I fear, be thought of.

The case is a very serious one, the principal Sirdars started this morning, under the impression that the British column would follow, if the emergency of the case as it affected their troops, and Nazim, and the British officers, required. I have sent for them back, to explain to them that they must, by their own resources, put down the rebellion of their own governor, aided by their own troops and their officers, and bring the perpetrators to punishment.

I have little hope of their succeeding, and I fear that very general revolt and disturbance will follow, extending, perhaps, to the total disorganization of the administration.

I shall use every effort and device to prevent such a result. The capital of the country, with the person of the Maharajah, is in our hands, and quite secure. I shall do all I can to prevent the example of Mooltan from being followed in the other provinces.

Your Lordship will, I fear, have to consider how far it is incumbent upon us, how far it is possible for us, to maintain an engagement with a Government, which, in the persons of its chiefs, its soldiery, and its people, repays our endeavours for its maintenance, by perfidy, and outrage, and is powerless to afford us redress.

Doubtless, we have reduced it to its state of weakness, but we are not responsible for its treachery and violation of trust, and the consequences thereof in spoliation and crime.

I shall write to your Lordship daily. I have taken measures for calling into Lahore all British officers scattered about unprotected, and spoken to the General and the Brigadier on the subject, and also on that of looking well to the protection of the cantonments, and the security of the city.

Your Lordship can have no notion of the amount of work which devolves on me; I am interrupted every moment by chiefs and parties who have to be talked to, and my pen is never out of my hand. I have not been able to write, officially, again to-day, but these letters are almost official, and can be put on record if your Lordship thinks fit.

Inclosure 17 in No 26

*The Resident at Lahore to the Governor-General.*

*Lahore, April 27, 1848*

IN my letter to your Lordship, of the day before yesterday, I mentioned that I had recalled three of the chiefs who had started for Mooltan, for the purpose of explaining to them that, under the circumstances which had transpired, I would send no British force, in aid of the Dubai troops, in putting down the rebellion in Mooltan.

The chiefs returned, yesterday morning, and, having heard what I had to say regarding the necessity of their putting down the rebellion, and bringing the offenders to justice, by their own means, as the only hope of saving their Government, they retired to consult, and concert measures. In the evening, they came to me again, and sat in consultation till very late. I could not, therefore, write to your Lordship yesterday.

After much discussion, they declared themselves unable, without British aid, to coerce Dewan Moolraj, in Mooltan, and bring the perpetrators of the outrage which has been described to your Lordship, to justice. They admitted that their troops were not to be depended on to act against Moolraj, especially the regular army of the State, and they recommended that these corps should be kept in their former positions, to maintain the peace of their respective provinces, and to prevent, as far as possible, the spread of the rebellion.

This service they thought the Sing troops might be depended on to perform, under the arrangements they proposed for the chiefs, with their personal followers, going out themselves into the provinces; more especially, if speedy measures were taken, by the British Government, for the occupation of Mooltan.

After what has happened, I feel that, if the question were one merely affecting the maintenance of the Sikh Government, and the preserving the tranquillity of their provinces, we should scarcely be justified in expending more British blood, and British treasure, in such service.

But the question is one which very deeply concerns the British interests, apart from all considerations connected with our Treaty, with the Maharajah's Government, at Bhyrowal

If this outrage and insult to the British Government be not punished, and that speedily—if Dewan Moolraj is allowed to extend his machinations for rebellion and revolt,—we may expect that the Affghans will take advantage of the state of things, and of Moolraj's invitation and encouragement, to establish themselves upon the Indus

If general tumult and disturbance spread through the Punjab, moreover, there is reason to fear that the Cis-Sutlej territory, under Major Mackeson's Commissionership, will not remain quiet there are thousands of the late Sikh soldiery in the Manjha, who will aid Moolraj by every means in their power, they are giving out, generally, that Moolraj is the person, indicated in the prophecies of their priesthood, who is to restore the Khalsa supremacy

I have addressed the Commander-in-chief, stating the political urgency of the case, and consulting him as to the possibility of undertaking military operations, on the scale required, at this season of the year

I send, for your Lordship's information, and any orders the Supreme Government may desire to give, a copy of my letter, just written to the Commander-in-chief

I must beg your Lordship to consider these letters as addressed to you in Council They contain all the information I have to furnish, and if I am to write an official narrative of the occurrences of the past week, it would only be a recapitulation of what I have reported to your Lordship daily.

I have not time to prepare such a document, I am overwhelmed with references, night and day, every chief has to receive his separate instructions from myself, over and over again, if my health were to fail under the work, there is not a person here to give a single direction of any kind I intend, therefore, should the necessity arise, to apply for the co-operation of Mr John Lawrence, a step of which I hope your Lordship will approve

P S—I have just discovered in the office a memorandum of the Fort of Mooltan, with a sketch made by Lieutenant Anderson, in September last the officer who was killed there, on the 20th instant, with Mr. Vans Agnew, a copy of the memorandum and sketch was sent to Government, with Mr Lawrence's letter of the 22d of September

Inclosure 18 in No 26

*The Resident at Lahore to the Commander-in-Chief.*

*Lahore, April 27, 1848*

I HAD the honor to write to your Lordship, by express, the day before yesterday, sending you an extract from my letter of that date to Lord Dalhousie, stating the circumstances under which I had determined to forego my intention of marching the moveable column from Lahore, to aid the Durbar troops in putting down the disturbances in Mooltan

In the other part of my letter to the Governor-General, I reported that I had recalled to Lahore the chiefs who had marched that morning, to communicate to them the intelligence which had reached me after they had left, and to explain to them that, in the altered state of the case, I could not consent to send a British force, in support of troops who had proved themselves so treacherous.

The chiefs returned to Lahore, yesterday, and I had them with me till late last night.

They, distinctly, declare themselves, without the aid of a British force, unable to take measures to reduce the fort of Mooltan, into which Moolraj has thrown himself, and without the reduction of which, the rebellion cannot be put down.

As a question of British policy, unconnected with that of the Punjab administration, and the interests of the Sikh Government, it is a matter of the last importance, that the rebellion on that frontier should be put down, with as little delay as possible. The consequences of revolt and rebellion spreading on this frontier,

from Mooltan to Peshawur, may be of vital importance to the interests of British India. They could not, moreover, it is to be feared, be confined to that part of the country.

In a political point of view, I am satisfied that it is of the utmost importance to the interests of British India, that a force should move upon Mooltan, capable of reducing the fort, and occupying the city, irrespective of the aid of the Durbar troops, and, indeed, in the face of any opposition which those, in that quarter, might present, in aid of the enemy.

It is for your Lordship to determine, in a military point of view, the possibility of such operations at this season of the year.

The military resources of Mooltan are very inconsiderable, a large unorganized rabble may join Moolraj's standard, but, even if aided by a portion of the Durbar troops in their present condition, (which he certainly would not be, if a large British force were put in motion,) Moolraj could make no effectual resistance, outside his fort. The fort is the difficulty, and its strength and position are said to be such that, if ably defended, it would require operations on an extended scale to reduce it.

The season of the year is much advanced, the heat in the province of Mooltan, in the months of May and June, is very great, when the river rises at the end of June, the fort is said to be insulated by the inundation, which extends, for one or two miles, on all sides. In the head-quarters' offices, however, there will be more information regarding the strength of the place than I can, at this moment, furnish.

The question, as a military one, must be determined by your Lordship.

The political urgency is very great.

Eventually, these operations, must be undertaken, if they could be so at once, they would not be required on so large a scale, as, I fear, may be necessary, if they are deferred till after the rains.

I believe the siege train is at Ferozepore, whence there is water-carriage for large boats to the ghauts opposite Bahawalpore, about forty miles from Mooltan. The Nawab of Bahawalpore is a friendly ally. Supplies would be abundant.

Ferozepore is sixteen marches from Mooltan. Shikarpore is about the same distance.

It would not be expedient at the present moment, to take, from the force at Lahore, any troops, without supplying their places from other quarters; except, perhaps, one of the royal regiments, the 53rd is so strong that a wing would be sufficient for the Anarkullee cantonment, while the other wing might occupy the quarters in the city.

I have informed the Major-General commanding the division, of the general purport of this letter to you, personally, that he may be prepared for any orders he may receive from your Lordship.

I send this letter, by express, this morning, that your Lordship may be able to determine the question, with as little delay as possible, though I cannot but fear that your Lordship may consider the military difficulties, owing to the season of the year, as insurmountable.

P.S. I have just discovered, in the office, a memorandum of the fort of Mooltan, and sketch, made by Lieutenant Anderson, one of the officers killed, on the 20th instant, a copy of which is inclosed for your Lordship's information.

Inclosure 19 in No. 26

*The Commander-in-Chief in India to the Resident at Lahore.*

*Simla, April 30, 1848*

I HAVE the honor to acknowledge the receipt of your letter of the 27th instant, which reached me, by express, at 9 o'clock P.M. yesterday, stating your opinion of the expediency of putting down the rebellion at Mooltan, with the least practicable delay, by a British force, irrespective of aid from the Durbar troops; setting forth the difficulties attending it; and calling upon me to determine, in a military point of view, the possibility of such operations, at this season of the year. I shall ever be ready to take upon myself responsibility, when unforeseen circum-

stances imperatively call for prompt and decisive measures, and I should not have shrunk from recommending a movement, could I have conceived that, by so doing, the lives of the two officers who have been sacrificed, could have been saved, or a body of troops rescued. Neither of those objects is now, unfortunately, to be attained but from what you state in your letter, corroborated by Burnes and Elphinstone, there can be no doubt, that operations against Mooltan, at the present advanced period of the year, would be uncertain, if not altogether impracticable, whilst a delay in attaining the object, would entail a fearful loss of life to the troops engaged, most injurious in its moral effects, and highly detrimental to those future operations which must, I apprehend, be undertaken.

It is, therefore, unnecessary to enter upon the many difficulties and delays, consequent upon assembling a force, at this side of the Sutlej, to undertake the reduction of Mooltan, at this season, and I entirely concur in the expediency of weakening Lahore, under the very uncertain disposition of the Sikh army which you describe.

No 27

*The Governor-General in Council to the Secret Committee.*

*Fort William, June 3, 1848. (No 30.)*

AN event has occurred at Lahore, of a serious character indeed, but which has tended, in the result, to strengthen the British influence, and to improve the hope that the general tranquillity of the country may be preserved, until the season shall admit of operations against Mooltan. The Resident, in a letter of the 9th ultimo, informed us, "that a sensation had been created in the city, by the detection of a conspiracy to corrupt the fidelity of the native soldiers of the infantry, artillery, and irregular cavalry, and the seizure of the offenders." His letter of the 11th ultimo† conveys the intelligence of the execution, that morning, of two men,—one, an unemployed General of the Sikh army, named Khan Sing, the other, Gunga Ram, the confidential vakeel of the Maharanee Junda Khore,—who were convicted "of tampering with the native troops of the garrison of Lahore, and cantonment of Anarkulliee and endeavouring to induce them to join in a plan for the surprise of the town, and the expulsion of the British troops."

For the particulars of the manner in which this plot was brought to light, we refer you to Sir F. Currie's letter of the 11th idem.

We have not yet received the detailed proceedings of the investigation, but all circumstances of importance connected with the conspiracy have, doubtless, been mentioned by the Resident. We shall notice them briefly. It is highly satisfactory to observe, that the first intimation of the affair was given to a British officer (Major Wheeler) by two men of his corps (the 7th Irregular Cavalry) who had themselves been tampered with, and were indignant at the base attempt to corrupt their fidelity.

The small success of the conspirators, in their endeavours to seduce the troops from allegiance, might be augured from this circumstance, and the result has proved, Sir F. Currie writes, "that but comparatively few of the Sepoys have listened to the overtures of the conspirators. I do not think that the number can exceed twenty or twenty-five, and it is very doubtful whether these, though they made promises, and received rewards, had really any serious intention of keeping those promises, and acting against the British Government. There have been eight or nine desertions, I believe, since the arrest of the conspirators, and three Sepoys are about to be put on their trial."

The trial of the conspirators was conducted by the Resident, in concert with the Durbar. Four men were convicted on the clearest evidence, and sentenced to be hanged, the sentence on one of them was commuted to transportation for life; and its execution suspended in the case of one of the others, from whom valuable information was elicited.

The most important fact established by the inquiry, was the implication of the

\* Inclosure 17 in No. 27.

† Inclosure 19 in No. 27.

Maharanee Junda Khore in the conspiracy. The conspirators "have one and all declared," the Resident writes, "that Maharanee Junda Khore, the mother of the Maharajah, is the instigator and adviser of all their schemes and plots, and they have produced letters, said to have been written by Her Highness, and other evidences, in substantiation of their assertions." And, in another letter, the Resident says, "nothing is wanting to a moral conviction of the fact (of the Maharanee's guilt); and its notoriety pervades every part of the Punjab."

In our letter to the Resident of the 19th ultimo\*, which reviews his proceedings from the first intelligence of the outbreak in Mooltan, to the time of his determination not to move British troops against Mooltan, at this season of the year, and which conveys to him our entire concurrence in that determination, we stated that, at a moment so favorable for the exercise of her powers of intrigue, it could hardly be doubted that the Ranee was prepared for, if not already busy in, mischief; and we therefore authorized him to take his own measures for her immediate removal to the British territory, with, or without, the consent of the Lahore Durbar. The Resident, however, anticipated these instructions, by removing, with the concurrence of the Durbar, the Maharanee from Sheikhoopoor to Ferozepore, immediately he became aware of the part she had taken in the conspiracy. Sir F. Currie's letter of the 16th ultimo† gives an account of the manner in which the removal of this lady was effected, so as not to excite the minds of the people, or even to attract any notice. She is now on her way, under a guard, from Ferozepore to Benares, where she will henceforward reside, under the superintendence of Major MacGregor, the Governor-General's agent.

You will not be surprised that this measure has become necessary. You are aware that the chief reason of the Maharanee's removal from Lahore to Sheikhoopoor, in August of last year, was on account of her opposition to the established order of things, and because it was believed she was ready to plot for its subversion. By the Treaty of Bhyrowal, she had been excluded from all share in the administration of public affairs, and a separate provision of 1,50,000 rupees per annum assigned to her, to enable her to pass the rest of her life in honorable retirement. "Notwithstanding this," to quote the words of the proclamation issued by Lieutenant-Colonel Lawrence‡, on the occasion of her removal to Sheikhoopoor, "Her Highness has, ever since, been intriguing to disturb the Government, and carried her opposition so far as quite to embarrass and impede the public business."

Every seditious intriguer who was displeased with the present order of things, looked up to the Queen Mother as the head of the State, some of them even went so far as to plan the subversion of the restored Khalsa Government. She would have been removed, at this time, to the British territory, but that the Durbar showed themselves averse to the measure, as too severe against the mother of the Maharajah. The separation from her son they thought was a sufficient punishment. Her removal to Hindostan, they agreed, would be the necessary consequence of her engaging in any future intrigues. That she would attempt intrigues again, no one doubted. "The unquiet spirit which could not content itself with the voluptuous freedom of the Summun Bhoorj, and an income of one-and-a-half lakh of rupees, is not likely," Colonel Lawrence writes, "to slumber in the dull seclusion of Sheikhoopoor, and be pleased with the large reduction of allowances which I shall now deem it my duty to advise. I can only regard, therefore, this removal to Sheikhoopoor (and I am not alone, in the Council, of this opinion), as the first step to the final banishment of the Ranee Junda from the country which she has so long disturbed."

On this occasion, the Maharanee's allowance was recommended to be reduced to 4,000 rupees per mensem, and we have now intimated to Sir F. Currie our opinion that it should be further reduced, leaving an ample provision, especially as it is known that Her Highness has a very large amount of private property, which she is taking with her from the Punjab.

We do not desire that the Maharanee should be treated with more rigor than will be absolutely necessary to prevent her holding any intercourse with parties beyond her own domestic establishment, or corresponding by letter with any person, except through the medium of the officer under whose superintendence she is placed. At the same time, we regard her as entitled to no sort of consideration at our hands, except as being a woman,—the widow of Runjeet Sing, and the mother of the present Maharajah.

\* Inclosure 29 in No. 27.

† Inclosure 24 in No. 27.

‡ Inclosure 9 in No. 9.

The conspiracy to corrupt the fidelity of the troops seems to have had no connection with the rebellion in Mooltan, although it is far from improbable that the Maharanee, as she was certainly the prime instigator of the one, may also have been the moving spring of the other. The conspiracy, however, was evidently a proceeding independent of the rebellion, for the first intimation of it was given to Major Wheler, on the 18th of March, at which time the arrangement for the change of administration in Mooltan, which was the occasion of the outbreak, had not been finally determined on. This corroborates the confession of one of the conspirators, Bhasee Gunga Ram, the night before his execution, that the plot had been long hatching, that is, as he explained, "from about the time that Sir F. Currie arrived at Agra, on his way up to Lahore." Gunga Ram declared also, as did another of the conspirators, that the Maharanee had been in correspondence with the chiefs of the Durbar, "that all the Sirdars, save Tej Sing, great and small, were in league with her, and that the force which was going down to Mooltan, was not going to oppose Moolraj, but would unite with him, when occasion offered." Gunga Ram further said "that all that had lately taken place at Mooltan, was at the Rance's suggestion, and that Sirdar Khan Sing Man had been at the bottom of the plot against Mr. Agnew and Lieutenant Anderson\*."

The Resident, in his letter of the 15th of May, referring to this confession, writes "But little credit is to be attached to the statement made by the Maharanee's vakeel, on the night before his execution, to Lieutenant Hodson, that the Maharanee had written letters to all the parties named by Gunga Ram, is very probable, but I very much doubt if they all of them, or, indeed, if any of them, met with the reception which Gunga Ram described." The simple fact, however, supposing it to be proved, that the Council of State, or some members of it, had cognizance of the Maharanee's designs, which they must have had, if she wrote to them on the subject, is most important. It would amount to a violation of the most essential part of the Treaty of December, 1846,—of that part which provides that the administration of the Lahore State shall be conducted by a Council, acting under the control, and guidance, of the British Resident,—if it should be shown that members of the Council were aware, and yet concealed from the Resident their cognizance, of designs subversive of the British authority at Lahore.

Gunga Ram's declaration of the treachery of Sirdar Khan Sing Man is discredited by the Resident, but it receives some corroboration, from a statement made to Lieutenant Edwades, by Mustapha Khan, a vakeel, on the part of Dewan Moolraj, of whose mission we shall presently speak more particularly. Mustapha Khan said, as related by Lieutenant Edwades, in his letter to Sir F. Currie, of the 10th ultimo, "that, of all the troops who escorted the Sahibs from Lahore, but one man had shown fidelity to his salt, viz, the officer of artillery, a tall man, whose name he could not recollect (though I asked if it was Esra Sing), who replied, alike to bribes and threats, that they might blow him away from a gun, but should never induce him to take service with the enemy. Sirdar Khan Sing Man had no such compunctions, but entered readily into the scheme of extensive rebellion, of which the Sikh garrison was resolved to make Moolraj the centre. With the prudence, however, of a man who had seen many revolutions, he himself suggested the propriety of putting him, formally, under a sentry, in order that his Lahore jagheers might not be confiscated, but, perhaps, be doubled, in honor of his martyrdom." In reference to this account, however, Sir F. Currie says, that Khan Sing Man's conduct "is very differently described by numerous eye-witnesses, who have returned from Mooltan, and there is no doubt that he is, up to this time, a close prisoner, in heavy irons, and subject to very hard treatment."

On the question whether the Maharanee was concerned in the late events at Mooltan, as asserted by her Agent, Sir F. Currie writes, in his letter of the 16th ultimo, "there is no proof, though there is some ground for suspicion, that the Maharanee was the instigator of the late violence and outrage in Mooltan, but it is certain that, at this moment, the eyes of the Dewan Moolraj, and of the whole Sikh army and military population, are directed to the Maharanee, as the rallying point of their rebellion, or disaffection." The riddance of so mischievous a woman, at such a time, and following immediately upon the utter defeat of her deep-laid schemes, cannot but tend to strengthen the British authority at Lahore, by disheartening all those who, being ill-disposed to its continuance, want only encouragement, and the hope of success to resist it.

\* Inclosure 20 in No. 27.

† Inclosure 24 in No. 27.



We now proceed to notice the position of affairs in Mooltan. Sir F. Currie, writing to the Commander-in-chief, on the 17th ultimo\*, says, "Moolraj is not making head just now." He has not altogether, up to this time, 7,000 followers, and the greater part of these are quite undisciplined and ill-armed, and there are already dissensions among them, and continual desertions from them. The Commandant of the Irregular Horse that accompanied Sirdar Khan Sing Man and Mr Agnew, took the first opportunity to quit Mooltan with his troops, and they are now on their way to Lahore. Lahore itself, and the neighbouring country, are in a much quieter state than they were. The late detection of the machinations of the disaffected, the prompt example made of the principal offenders, and the removal of the Maharanees from the scene of her abominable schemes, have had a vastly sedative effect on the spurt of revolt and disaffection that was abroad." You will observe, from this, that the rebellion has not spread in the manner apprehended when the first reports of it were received, in fact, it has not spread at all beyond the immediate vicinity of Mooltan. In Peshawar, and Hazara, and throughout the other districts of the Punjab, all remained, up to the last accounts, perfectly quiet.

At the time of the attack upon Mr Agnew, Lieutenant H B Edwardes, Assistant to the Resident, was occupied in settling the revenue of the country to the south of Bunnoo on hearing of the occurrence, by letter from Mr Agnew, he determined to cross the Indus, and move on Mooltan to his assistance. He had no sooner crossed, however, than he received intelligence of the fate of the British officers, and the treachery of the Durbar troops. On the 25th of April, he encamped at Leia, the principal city of the Sind Sagur Doab, a little way within the boundary of the Mooltan districts, and about sixty miles from Mooltan, this place he took possession of, the Kardar having fled at his approach. The force with Lieutenant Edwardes consisted of 12 infantry companies and 350 Sowars, making in all about 1,500 men, with 2 guns and 20 zumboorahs. His intention was to hold Leia, and so to prevent the spread of rebellion in the Sind Sagur Doab. On the 27th of April†, he writes, "a most important document has fallen into my hands, being a solemn summons, in the name of all that is holy in the Khalsa religion, from the Sikh soldiers in the fort of Mooltan, to the regiment of Sikhs along with me, to march immediately, and join the rebels in Mooltan, that the Khalsa may once more unite, and relieve the Maharajah, and his mother, from the thralldom of the Sahib log." This manifesto was signed by the Sikhs who accompanied Mr Agnew from Lahore.

On the 29th, Lieutenant Edwardes received information that Dewan Moolraj had moved a force of between 4,000 and 5,000 men, with eight heavy guns, to oppose him, and that this force would reach Leia, on the 1st of May. Hearing, however, that its advance had been delayed, he kept his ground on the left bank of the Indus, until the 2nd of May, when Moolraj's advanced guard suddenly made its appearance about four coss from Leia. Lieutenant Edwardes, wisely determining to avoid (as he says‡ in his letter to Sir F. Currie, of the 3rd of May) "so unequal a collision as must have taken place between two guns and 1,500 men (of 1,000 of whom the fidelity was very doubtful), and eight guns and 4,000 men, united in a desperate cause," and encouraged by the knowledge of having friends in his camp, recrossed the Indus, and encamped at Dera Futteh Khan Ghat, where he was joined, on the morning of the 4th, by General Cortlandt, of the Sikh army, with a Mussalman regiment, from Bunnoo, and six guns. By the last accounts, he still remains at this place.

On the 10th of May, there arrived, in Lieutenant Edwardes's camp, a vakeel, named Mustapha Khan, sent by Dewan Moolraj, with overtures of submission. "His instructions," Lieutenant Edwardes says, "were to ask two questions—first, whether I had authority to treat with him, in case of his wishing to make terms, and, secondly, what assurance I could give him for his life and honor, in case of surrender?" Lieutenant Edwardes, first, replied to these questions by stating, that neither he, nor the Resident at Lahore, nor any one else, could have authority to stand between the murderer of two British officers and the retributive justice which their countrymen would demand, but, on the vakeel declaring that his master was innocent of the treachery by which those officers had fallen, and that all he asked for was justice and a fair trial, I, at once," Lieutenant Edwardes adds, "offered to guarantee this, and honorable treatment, in case the Dewan could establish his innocence." He wrote, accordingly, a reply to Moolraj's petition, in these terms. This proceeding was approved of, and confirmed by, the Resident. "If Dewan

\* Inclosure 27 in No. 27.

† Inclosure 6 in No. 27

‡ Inclosure 12 in No. 27

Moolraj," Sir F. Currie writes, in reply to Lieutenant Edwardes, "throws himself on my justice, he shall have a fair trial, and impartial justice shall be done him. If he can clear himself of all participation in the atrocities of the 19th, 20th, and 21st of last month, and can, satisfactorily, establish that his subsequent conduct has been by coercion, he shall be held scatheless. I believe that it is quite impossible for him to do this."

We considered that no proposal but one of unconditional surrender should be admitted from Moolraj; he has offered a flagrant insult to the British Government, he has participated in, and approved of, the murder of two valued servants of that Government; and he is now a rebel in arms against British authority and power.

We have not yet heard, how Moolraj acted, on receiving Lieutenant Edwardes's proposal. The Resident has no expectation of his accepting it. "Dewan Moolraj, assuredly, will not give himself up to you (Lieutenant Edwardes), or to me, and it is pretty certain he could not, if he would. The instant his Sikh and Belooch followers discovered that he was about to desert, they would murder him, without the slightest compunction."

On the 7th of May, the force which Moolraj had sent to Leia, retreated from that place towards Mooltan, in a hurried manner. This is accounted for, by supposing that the Dewan, believing troops to be advancing against him, was anxious to strengthen his position at Mooltan, as much as possible. The explanation is confirmed by the fact that the rebel force has again moved upon Leia. Lieutenant Edwardes, writing on the 12th of May\*, says, "Mustapha Khan told me, that a steamer arriving from Sind, and the report of Bahawal Khan crossing the Sutlej, was what alarmed Moolraj, and made him recall the Leia force. No sooner, therefore, did he find that no operations were, in reality, on foot against him, than he again took courage, and told his army not to recross the Chenab."

On the 11th of May, Lieutenant Edwardes, hearing that the Thannadar of Mungrotah, a strong fort in the Mooltan Trans-Indus territory, was recruiting for Moolraj, sent a detachment against him. The Thannadar immediately fled, and the detachment took possession of the fort. Mungrotah lies between Lieutenant Edwardes's encampment and Dera Ghazee Khan. The object in taking possession of it was to promote the success of a movement, which it was proposed General Cortlandt should make upon Dera Ghazee Khan, to prevent that place falling into the hands of the rebels. Lieutenant Edwardes had intended that General Cortlandt should proceed to occupy Dera Ghazee Khan, while he himself crossed the Indus again, to endeavour to secure the revenue of the Sind Sagur Doab. The plan was suspended, however, as soon as it appeared that the rebel troops were advancing a second time, upon Leia.

On the evening of the 15th, a party of the rebels, consisting of between 300 and 400 horse, with 10 zumboorahs, came upon a picket which had been stationed by Lieutenant Edwardes near Leia, with orders to retire before a superior force. The picket fell back across a nullah, and Lieutenant Edwardes, thinking they might be pressed, strengthened them in the night by 200 men. The rebels, pushing on to the nullah, were, thus, met by a force larger than they expected, and, a struggle ensuing, were totally routed, "and pursued (says Lieutenant Edwardes in his letter of the 16th, † for a coss or two beyond Leia, losing all their zumboorahs, and 12 men killed, besides several prisoners who took refuge in the city streets, and afterwards gave up their arms. On our side, two men were slightly wounded." After this affair, Lieutenant Edwardes, having ascertained that the rebel force was 6,000 men, with 15 guns, and that they would, probably, cross the Indus to attack him, immediately recalled his men from the other side of the river. The last accounts mention that the enemy had crossed a strong force with 12 guns, about thirty coss to the south of Dera Futeh Khan Ghat, and that Lieutenant Edwardes had determined, with the aid of General Cortlandt, to throw up embankments round the fort of Girang. From Sir F. Currie's letter of the 23rd ultimo ‡, it appears that he thinks it probable that the Nawab Bahawal Khan, a firm ally of the British Government, will have thrown his army across the Sutlej, in which case "Moolraj must instantly recall his troops from Leia, or Bahawal Khan, and our force in the Barea Doab, may occupy the town of Mooltan, cut off his returning troops from their fort, and attack them at the ferries of the Chenab."

This is the latest intelligence that has reached us. The force at Lahore has been strengthened, by the addition of a wing of Her Majesty's 14th Dragoons, a regi-

\* Inclosure 21 in No. 27

† Inclosure 26 in No. 27

‡ Inclosure 34 in No. 27

ment of Irregular Horse, two regiments of Native Infantry, and a troop of Horse Artillery.

We expressed to the Resident our entire approval of this measure, and we intimated that we should be glad to hear that he had resolved upon placing a garrison of British troops in Govindghur.

We beg to refer you to the letter from the Commander-in-chief to Sir F. Currie, dated the 13th of May\*, for his Excellency's opinion in regard to the force which should be assembled, early in the cold season, for the reduction of Mooltan. You will observe that the strength of this force would be about 24,000 men of all arms, with 50 siege guns. His Excellency justly remarks, "that we should be prepared for all contingencies, and for detached movements to keep down disaffection, and to watch doubtful allies." An army so powerful as that proposed, might be required to meet the worst contingency that could happen, that of a general insurrection through the Punjab, in which all distinctions of religion, all differences of caste, and all private feuds should be merged, and forgotten, in one general feeling of animosity to the British power. It is true, many of the officers employed under the Resident have expressed forebodings of such an event, but we trust there does not prevail any such general feeling of animosity against the British influence at Lahore, as should unite all classes of the population in an attempt to subvert it. While, therefore, we entirely agree with the Commander-in-chief, that it is well to be prepared for all contingencies, we entertain, in common with Sir F. Currie, a well-grounded hope, that a smaller force than that which his Excellency proposes, will be found ample for any service that may be required in the Punjab.

You may rest assured that this Government would put forth the whole power, if necessary, that they can command, for the purpose of inflicting severe and signal punishment on those guilty of the outrage at Mooltan, and of exacting national reparation from the Lahore State. As to the extent of that reparation, we have requested the Resident to inform the Durbar that it will greatly depend on the manner in which the State of Lahore shall be found to have observed its engagements, and fulfilled its obligations, towards the British Government.

We have conveyed to the Resident the expression of our approval of his prompt and vigorous proceedings in the punishment of the conspirators at Lahore, and in the removal of the Maharance. We are confident that no exertion will be wanting, on the part of Sir F. Currie, to preserve the tranquillity of the Punjab, and to maintain the attitude of formidable strength which the British Government now holds in that country.

P S—Since signing this dispatch, we have received a further letter from Sir F. Currie, dated the 25th ultimo†, forwarding one of the 18th, from Lieutenant Edwardes, by which it appears that the report of Moolraj's force having crossed the Indus is not correct. Sir F. Currie gives his opinion that they will not venture to cross, or that, if they do, they will be beaten back.

Inclosure 1 in No. 27

*Lieutenant Edwardes to the Resident at Lahore*

*Camp, Dera Futteh Khan, April 13, 1848.*

WE reached here yesterday, and, before setting to at the settlement of this place, I took a whole day to write out the settlement of Kolachee, which I, herewith, send, and trust you will approve, remembering that I have no experience whatever in revenue matters.

I will steal another day, soon, to write out the settlement of Drobund and Easkhal.

I saw, by a late Ukhar, that Soobhan Khan's Mussulman regiment, now in Bunnoo, has been told off, for duty in Mooltan. I trust this is a mistake, but if not, the Durbar cannot be aware that that regiment cannot be spared from Bunnoo, without preventing all the other regiments from getting leave, which is so established

\* Inclosure 22 in No. 27.

† Inclosure 36 in No. 27.

a right in the Sikh army that, without it, the men are discontented. There are now in Bunnoo the following corps, of which I forget the exact numbers, but I give them.

Bishron Sing's Regiment	-	-	-	600
Kuthar Mookhee ditto	-	-	-	600
Soobhan Khan's ditto	-	-	-	500
Dogra's ditto	-	-	-	500
$\frac{1}{2}$ Miher Sing's ditto	-	-	-	300
Khos ditto	-	-	-	300

along with me here

Futteh Pultun	ditto	-	-	-	691
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Total Infantry	-	-	-	3,491
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The Khos regiment is to return to Peshawur, as soon as I get back, along with the Peshawur troop of horse artillery, now in Bunnoo. That reduces the number to 3,191 men. Colonel Lawrence ordered the garrison in Bunnoo to consist of four infantry regiments, of 650 each, or total 2,600 men, and the removal of Soobhan Khan's regiment would just about reduce the infantry to that number. But, not a man could then go on leave. My plan (approved by Mr. John Lawrence, but postponed till the new Army Regulations could come out) was, to keep one extra regiment in Bunnoo, so as to allow a quarter of each of my four regiments to go away on leave for two and a-half months, and then another quarter, when they come back, and so on, until the whole had got their leave, and I should be glad if you could still permit me to make this arrangement, and send a quarter away on leave at once.

The fact is all the regiments are lamentably weak. It is not fair, therefore, to look at the number of regiments in Bunnoo, the number of men is the point. The Khos regiment might go to Mooltan, instead of Peshawur, when I go back to Bunnoo, as I know Mr. Lawrence did send another regiment from Nicholson's brigade to Peshawur, or Hussan Abdal.

#### Inclosure 2 in No 27

*Lieutenant Edwardes to the Resident at Lahore.*

*Camp, Dera Futteh Khan, night, April 22, 1848*

AT 3 P.M. this day, an express from Mooltan, directed to General Cortlandt, reached my camp. I opened it, providentially, to see if it was on public business which required attention, and found a letter, addressed to either General Cortlandt or myself, from Mr. Vans Agnew, communicating tidings of the dastardly assault made on that gentleman and Lieutenant Anderson, at the gate of the fort of Mooltan, on the 19th of April, particulars of which have, ere this, reached you.

Mr. Agnew called on General Cortlandt for assistance, and my duty to render it was plain. I have, accordingly, resolved on making a forced march to Mooltan, which is about sixty coss from this, and hope, by midnight, sufficient boats will have been collected, from the neighbouring ferries, to allow the camp to cross the Indus.

I have 2 guns, 20 zumboorahs, 12 infantry companies, and about 350 sowars, a small force, but quite strong enough to create a diversion in favor of our two countrymen, and whatever party the Maharajah may still have in his city of Mooltan. I have written to Mr. Vans Agnew to fall back on me, if he is pressed, and rely on my speedy arrival. From the desert nature of the road, and the intense heat, I do not expect the men will be able to make Mooltan, before the 27th of April, but every exertion shall be made.

Looking to the possibility of the spirit displayed by Moolraj's soldiers being general in Mooltan, and consequent hostilities, I have written to Lieutenant Taylor, in Bunnoo, to put Soobhan Khan's Mussulman regiment (previously told off for Mooltan) and the four remaining guns of the Peshawur troop of Horse Artillery, to which the two guns I have with me belong, into boats at Esakhail, and thus pass them rapidly down the Indus to the Leia ferry, where the men and horses can disembark fresh, and push on to Mooltan.

I feel sure that these measures will meet your approbation. I wound up the revenue settlement of this district, two days ago ; and that of Dera Ismael Khan is of very secondary importance to the duty of rescuing Mr. Vans Agnew and Lieutenant Anderson from their perilous situation.

Inclosure 3 in No. 27

*The Mooltan Sikhs to the Troops under Lieutenant Edwardes.*

April 22, 1848. .

By the favor of the Holy Gooroo.

Written by Esra Sing, Golab Sing, Gooldeep Sing, and the whole of the Khalsa troops under Khan Sing Man.

Wah ! Gooroo-jee-kee futch, from all the Khalsa, Victory of the Gooroo.

THE facts connected with the Khalsa are as follows — We marched from Lahore with the Feringees, and arrived at Mooltan on Tuesday, the 8th of Barsukh (18th of April) On the following day, Dewan Moolraj went to the fort, accompanied by the Feringees and our troops, and, having made it over, placed two of our companies inside One hundred men remained of those who had been stationed there previously The Dewan then left the fort with the Feringees

The following scene took place —

A sepoy out of service thrust a spear at one of the Feringees, who fell from his horse. The sepoy then wounded the other Feringee twice with his sword. We afterwards went off, taking with us to our camp the Feringees and Sirdar Khan Sing, while Moolraj returned to his abode Rungram remarked to the Dewan, that they ought to go and see the Feringees

Moolraj then returned, unattended by any of his own sepoys, when a strange occurrence took place by the Gooroo's will

The whole of the Mooltan Sikhs, together with the Mussulman soldiers, went in a body to the Dewan, and said, " We won't let you go , ' to which he replied, that he must go.

A sepoy then drew his sword, and wounded Rungram three times

In the confusion which ensued, Dewan Moolraj's horse reared and threw him

The soldiers, then, carried him and Rungram off to then quarters, where they told him that it was the Gooroo's order to expel the Feringees by force The Dewan would not consent, that day On the following morning, by God's will, the guns were fired, and the Gooroo ordered us to advance , for so it has been written in the Gooroo's writings Upon this we obeyed his injunctions, and joining the Mooltanees, killed the Feringees

Now we, in accordance with the Gooroo's command, have written to all of you, our Khalsa brethren Those of you who are true and sincere Sikhs, will come to us here. You will receive plenty of pay, and the approbation of the Dewan.

The Maharajah Duleep Sing will, by the Gooroo's grace, be firmly established in his kingdom , there will be no more cow-killing, and our holy religion will prosper

All believing Sikhs, who trust in the Gooroo, will place confidence in our words, and joining us, will honor his name

Forward copies of this manifesto to all our Sikh brethren, and delay not , for those who spread this intelligence, will meet with the approbation of the Gooroo. ~~and~~

You know that all are mortal , whoever, therefore, as becomes a sincerely believing Sikh, devotes his life to the service of the Gooroo, will obtain fame and reputation in this world

The Maharajah and his mother are in sorrow and affliction. By engaging in their cause, you will obtain their favor and support Gird up your loins under the protection of the Gooroo, and Govind Sing will preserve his sanctity Make much of a few words.

Inclosure 4 in No. 27.

*Lieutenant Edwardes to the Resident at Lahore.*

*Camp, Leia, Cis-Indus, April 25, 1848*

I REACHED this place this morning, and have encamped south-east of the city, covering it from Mooltan.

You have, I hope, already got my letters advising you of my determination to cross the Indus, as soon as I heard of the attack on Agnew and Anderson, and move on Mooltan, in the hope of saving them. That hope is declared by general rumour to be hope no more. Agnew and Anderson are said to be both dead, killed by their own men, Khan Sing a prisoner, and Dewan Moolraj going all lengths in preparations to maintain himself in the fort.

This I fully believe, as this Doab is full of his emissaries raising soldiers, and, had I been a day later, I could not have crossed the Indus, instructions having been sent to the Kardar of Leia, to seize the boats, raise 3,000 men, and hold the place.

My crossing took him by surprise, and he fled, with the Leia Thannah, to Mooltan.

Agnew and Anderson dead, and the Sirdar's force either traitors, or prisoners in Mooltan! I have no object in advancing further. Neither could I cross the Chenab, if I wished. Neither would it be prudent to wish it, if I could.

If Mooltan is to be reduced, it must be from Lahore, and by our own British troops, and I hope to God they are already on their way, or the whole of Dera Ghazee Khan will be in insurrection, with Hill tribes summoned by Moolraj. I have written to the Mooltan officers in Ghazee Khan and Sungurh, transferring them to the Sirkar's service, in hopes of quieting their country; but do not anticipate success. Moolraj's service is better than the Sirkar's.

My arrival here has been most timely, and, if I can only hold my own, it will reduce Moolraj to very narrow limits. The rubbee crop is just ripe. I have entertained all Moolraj's officials that had not run away, and set the collections agoing according to the old usages of the land. The shops are re-opened, and confidence is, to a great extent, restored.

Leia is an important city, and the capital of this Doab. Its mere possession by the Sirkar's troops flies through the country and inflicts a blow on Moolraj's prestige, and prevents hundreds of mercenaries from joining his standard. Of this I have hourly proof. Still my position, I cannot but see, is one of great uncertainty and peril. If Moolraj has the spirit and skill to throw a force with guns over the Chenab at once, he might crush us, and return in a cantor to Mooltan, before our own troops can come from Lahore. Already, he is said to have done so. I believe the truth to be that he intends to do so. Perhaps, ere this, his force has crossed.

My mind is made up. I shall throw up entrenchments here, and stand. Great ends will be secured by my success, immense confusion follow a retreat.

I am entertaining men, for the double purpose of securing them from joining Moolraj, and holding this Doab against the rebels. The Doab swarms with "Shumsheerees," Beloochees, and Puthans, ever ripe for mischief. The regiment and four guns, which I have summoned from Bunnoo, cannot reach here, till the 7th or 8th of May, and the interval will be one of immense anxiety.

I calculate that you will have sent off our field brigade on the 24th of April, and that it will reach Mooltan in ten days, but trust that will only be the vanguard of a regular army, for the reduction of Mooltan will be no child's play. I know not if you have good information from Mooltan, therefore, I may as well state my views of this affair.

I think Moolraj has been involved in rebellion against his will, and, being a weak man, is now persuaded by his officers that there is no hope for him but in going all lengths, that the origin of the rebellion was the natural dislike of the Puthans, Beloochees, and Mooltanecs, (men of high family, courage, and false pride), to be turned adrift, after a life spent in military service well rewarded, and that these men will fight desperately, and die hard, unless a provision is held out to them just before the siege (before the last moment, they would not accept it, and only, then, will they do so, with dexterous Vikalul, carried on by one of their own blood, who knows their points of honor).

If I might, without offence, offer a military suggestion, when you have such able

soldiers in Lahore, it would be that Bahawal Khan be called on to cross the Sutlej instanter, and co-operate with a British force from Lahore, and a brigade from Sinde.

Bahawal Khan's country also is full of these noble Beloochees and Mooltances, and already Moolraj has summoned them to join his standard, and they will come, if not detained by Bahawal Khan.

I have opened a correspondence with Moolraj, more with the object of getting a cossid unobstructed into Mooltan, than with any hope of persuading the Dewan to follow my advice, and throw himself on your mercy, before things go any further.

This letter goes by a cossid, viâ Jhung, by which route please send me instructions, as soon as you can, and let me know, daily, what movements are made on Mooltan, that I may co-operate in any way in my power.

There are two guns and 400 or 500 men at Jhung, who would be very welcome here. At present, I am very much like a Scotch terrier barking at a tiger. If a week only passes over, I shall have got together enough men to hold on. If not, we are in God's hands, and could not be better placed.

Inclosure 5 in No 27.

*Lieutenant Edwardes to the Resident at Lahore*

*Camp, Leia, April 26, 1848.*

COMMON report, still, declares that Moolraj has thrown a force, with guns, across the Chenab, to oppose my advance, but my own spies have not, yet, had time to return, and the latest trustworthy intelligence contradicts the report above mentioned, and says, that the greatest consternation reigns in Mooltan, where ghee is at a seer the rupee, and the garrison (officers and all) are engaged in cutting the ripe corn, and carrying it into the fort. They are very hard up also for grass. In this condition, it is not probable that the Dewan will detach men and guns, and weaken his own position. I am entertaining men in self-defence, and to check the tide of recruiting which was flowing to Mooltan. Moolraj is enlisting, right and left, and has unlimited command of money. My treasury is the present rubbee crop, and having re-organized the executive system of officials in the Doab (appointing new Kardars, where the old ones had fled, &c.) I have now got the resources pretty well under my thumb. I have put Hoomum Chund (the Sirkars Dufteree, along with me, an able man, whose father and uncle held these districts, under the Cabool kings,) at the head of all the Kardars, intending to leave him here at Leia, whenever I have to move forward.

The Puthan gentry of the Doab are beginning to come in, among others, Nassur Khan Badozye, the man who gave Lal Sing's detachment such a thrashing two years ago.

I cannot convey to you any idea of the happy effect of our crossing the Indus, and occupying the great body of Moolraj's country, but I may say that it has arrested an extensive rebellion, and made the difference between a siege and a campaign.

I have thought it best to tell Kishen Lal, the Jhung Adawltee, to send me his two guns and 400 men forthwith.

A Puthan gave me a good account to-day of the Mooltan outbreak, and it seems that the Sikh troops behaved most shamefully, going over without any reason whatever. Agnew died like a hero, disdaining to fly, and refusing to yield. His head was cut off by Moolraj's soldiers.

Unanimity is far from existing in the rebel garrison. Three of Moolraj's principal officers, (Surbulund Khan Badozye, and his son, Sadik Mahomed Khan, and Gholam Mustapha Khan Khaghwanee,) were so opposed to the whole proceeding, that they refused to set their seals to the Koran, leaving themselves open to conviction.

I hope soon to hear of the advance of our British troops from Lahore, and may take this opportunity of expressing my conviction, that to send any other troops to Mooltan, after what has occurred, would be to run the most imminent risk of a treacherous catastrophe.

## Inclosure 6 in No. 27.

*Lieutenant Edwardes to the Resident at Lahore.**Camp, Leia, April 27, 1848.*

A MOST important document\* has fallen into my hands, being a solemn summons, in the name of all that is holy in the Khalsa religion, from the Sikh soldiers in the fort of Mooltan to the regiment of Sikhs along with me, to march immediately, and join the rebels in Mooltan, that the Khalsa may once more unite, and relieve the Maharajah, and his mother, from the thralldom of the Sahib log.

It is signed and sealed by all the officers who went from Lahore with Agnew, from Khan Sing down; and it was sent by Esra Sing, of the artillery (Colonel) to his nephew, Dera Sing, a subadar in Futteh Sing's regiment, who took it to his colonel, who consulted with Bhaee Ameera Buksh, and brought it to me next morning, i. e. to-day, for it came last evening.

Along with it, they have brought me a counter-bond of fidelity, signed by all the officers of the Futteh Pultun, professedly drawn up in ignorance of the Mooltan document, and suggested only by the crisis in which we are placed.

I know not what to think of these circumstances. Bhaee Ameera Buksh's character you well know, and his relative connection with the Maharanee. But, on the other hand, he may be "wise in his generation," and has certainly been very zealous on the march. Futteh Sing is a jolly good natured fellow, who served with Lawrence in the Khyber. But what Sikh is not ever prepared to be a traitor?

If this paper has not been seen by the whole regiment, how long will it be before another paper comes, and will that also fall into my hands? I feel bitterly indignant at this treachery, at the very moment when I am giving my life willingly to stem a rebellion, and arrest a whole Doab from a traitor to the Khalsa Government; at the very moment too of success, for, if they will only show a few days' fortitude, what doubt can there be of the result?

But, after the base desertion of poor Agnew and Anderson, what else can any of us expect? You will, however, have to take a wider view of this matter than that which is merely personal to me, and it is for this reason I now write, and not to whine over a danger which duty requires that I should face. Depend upon it, the paper which I have got is a circular, and it is right to be prepared for the possible consequences of its favorable reception among the Sikh soldiers at all points.

Doubtless, you have made up your mind, that a British force must go to Mooltan, and this will naturally bring in fresh reinforcements from the rear.

I do not send the paper to you, as it is too valuable to be risked in the dak at this time.

How strongly now do Lawrence's arguments return to my mind, for banishing that Jezebel from the Punjab, she is a leaven of evil, which some day will leaven a fearful lump of political trouble. You have not forgotten, I dare say, her sending a slave-girl on a secret embassy to Mooltan, last June or July, and her impudent excuse, that she wanted a white ak tree for enchantments. The "tree" has now put forth its leaves, and their "ruag" is much what might have been expected.

With the above exception, all is going on well. Our presence has, at a stroke, secured quiet in this Doab, and those who are disaffected can only sneak off to Mooltan. I have, most fortunately, got with me an exceedingly clever Puthan, of good family, named Fouydar Khan, who is related to many of Mooltan's chief officers, and knows every mercenary on both sides of the Indus. This has enabled me to summon some twenty or thirty leaders, whose swords are in the market, and, in a few days, I shall have a levy of about 3,000 Puthans and Beloochees, equal to twice their number of Sikhs, for any work along the banks of the Attock. For the cost of this levy, I consider Moolraj responsible to the State, and look on this Rubbee harvest here as my own lawful prize; for Mistr Megraj would never have seen a rupee of it, had I not crossed the Indus.

P.S., *Night, 27th of April.* — I have just got your letter of the 21st, written on receipt of Agnew's first letter of the 19th, perhaps, indeed, the last also, poor fellow, that he ever wrote.

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\* Inclosure 3 in No. 27.



You say that the Kaleewala Deena Nath, and Tej Sing, are to start for Mooltan, with one Sikh regiment, and be joined by a troop of horse artillery from Ramnuggur.

The next day's news will have shewn you the necessity of an army; and I look anxiously for your next communication.

Already you know that, several days ago, I summoned one regiment and four guns from Bunnoo, and, this very morning, the reports from Dera Ghazee Khan induced me to order Cortlandt, forthwith, from Bunnoo, with another regiment, two more guns, and 100 Goorchurras, to proceed to Girang, and defend his own frontier, or co-operate with me, as circumstances may require.

Moolraj has urged his lieutenant in Dera Ghazee Khan to disturbance, and, as the said lieutenant is a thorough going Moofsid (Longa Mull), I have little doubt but he will stir up all the tribes he can. However, I have cut him off, and blocked him out, by securing Cheytun Mull, the Mooltan Hakim of Sungurh, who has, this day, sent a most satisfactory answer to my purwanna, transferring him to the Sirkar's service. I need scarcely request that such promises as these, which, at this crisis, I am obliged to make, for the peace of the country, may receive your confirmation.

I am under considerable obligations to Hookum Chund, for his practical revenue knowledge, and zealous assistance in the Trans-Indus settlements, and I should be glad to see him rewarded.

I have laid a dak, to-day, right across the Thull, to Jhung, where it will join the Lahore dak, and bring me into rapid communication with you.

It will be prudent, nay necessary, to send another regiment down from Peshawur, without delay, to Bunnoo, via Kohat, to replace the 2nd, which has now been called away.

Bunnoo is just settling down nicely, but must not be trusted too soon.

Taylor is doing excellently, and has just tired out the obstinate Wuzerees, and got the better of them, in the question of revenue.

With reference to customs, I have not lost sight of them, even in these exciting hours, and have got them well in hand at this moment.

Inclosure 7 in No 27

*The Commander-in-Chief to the Resident at Lahore*

*Simla, April 28, 1848.*

I DEEPLY regret the circumstances which have made it necessary for you to countermand the movement of the troops from Lahore and Ferozepore, specially named in Major General Whish's letter to the Adjutant General of the army.

The total defection of the whole escort, and your apprehensions as to the reliance which could be calculated upon from the Sikh troops ordered down to support the new Governor, together with the certainty that no relief, nor demonstration, could save the lives of the unfortunate officers, renders the conclusion to which you have come imperative, at this advanced season of the year, your means being so limited.

We must now look with deep interest to the conduct of the Sikh army generally, especially to those troops detached with the other British officers politically employed in the Mahomedan States under the Sikh Government, the employment of those officers appearing to me to commit the British Government to resent and punish any insult or outrage that may be offered to its servants.

I trust the Sikh garrison at Govindghur can be depended upon, and that there is a sufficiency of provisions at Lahore for any emergency.

I shall await, with deep interest, further communications from you. ere I address the Governor-General upon the expediency of preparing carriage for a support to our troops at Lahore, should any combination make such a precaution desirable.

I cannot avoid remarking, that I think Major General Whish exercised a sound military judgment, in not recommending that the heavy guns should accompany the column. Two out of the four guns being howitzers, the remaining two (eighteen pounders) might retard, and could have no effect upon such a fortress as Mooltan, although they might be effective against a small work.

Inclosure 8 in No. 27.\*

*The Resident at Lahore to the Secretary to the Government of India.**Lahore, May 5, 1848*

I FORWARD a letter dated the 25th ultimo, received this day, from Lieutenant Edwardes\*.

I take this opportunity of forwarding the other communications from this officer, which have not, as yet, been sent, in due course, to your office.

Lieutenant Edwardes, on receiving intimation from Mr. Vans Agnew of his perilous position in Mooltan, hastened across the Indus to his relief.—on his arrival on the left bank of the Indus, Lieutenant Edwardes received tidings of the sad fate of Mr. Agnew and Lieutenant Anderson, and immediately pushed forward to Leia, the principal town of the Sind Sagur Doab—a little way within the boundary of the Mooltan districts.

When Lieutenant Edwardes wrote on the 25th, he was expecting to be shortly attacked, in his position at Leia, by troops from Mooltan, ordered out by Dewan Moolraj against him.

I cannot account for the delay which has occurred in my receipt of Lieutenant Edwardes's letter. I received, the day before yesterday, a few lines from him, dated the 26th, merely stating that he had written to me, by a new, and he hoped, a quicker, route, on the 25th, fully of his circumstances.

During last night, I received from Bahawalpore, intelligence from Mooltan up to the 1st, in which I regret to say it was positively stated that a messenger arrived at Mooltan on the 29th, from the Durbar troops with Lieutenant Edwardes, giving in their full adherence to Moolraj and his interests, and promising, if the Dewan would send a force ostensibly to attack them, that they would, men and officers, join him. The offer was, of course, instantly accepted by Dewan Moolraj, who sent off troops and guns, on the 30th ultimo, to Leia, with dresses of honor and presents for the Durbar officers and soldiers.

My informant at Bahawalpore, instantly on receiving the above intelligence, sent a cossid from that place to Lieutenant Edwardes, to warn him of his danger.

What may have been the result of the move of Moolraj's troops on Leia, is yet unknown, but I am in the utmost apprehension regarding the safety of Lieutenant Edwardes. It is impossible to do anything to aid him. Leia is nearly 200 miles from Lahore, while it is little more than forty from Mooltan.

I can have no doubt, if Moolraj's troops advanced to Leia, as they proposed doing, that the whole of the troops with Lieutenant Edwardes, with the exception of the Barukzye contingent, about 300 strong, and some of Lieutenant Lumsden's Rifle Corps, will have joined Moolraj. If Lieutenant Edwardes received the information of the treacherous intentions of his troops in time, I am in hopes that he may either have withdrawn them across the Indus again, or have left them, and made his way towards Bunnoo, or Lahore.

Lieutenant Edwardes, however, is of so chivalrous and confiding a spirit that it would take a great deal to persuade him that his troops would desert him. Unfortunately, too, owing to the injury he received at Kolachee, he was unable to ride.

I am most anxious regarding the fate of this intelligent and enterprising officer, and will report for his Lordship's information any intelligence I may receive. On the 25th of last month, on learning the treacherous conduct of the Sikh escort which accompanied the new Governor, and the British officers to Mooltan, and having the best reason to believe that all the Durbar troops sent to coerce Moolraj would join him, I sent instructions to Lieutenant Edwardes, which have since been repeated, almost daily, to keep all the Bunnoo force on the other side of the Indus, and not to use them, in any way, against Moolraj's troops. I cannot tell where these orders may have reached Lieutenant Edwardes, but I am in hopes he may possibly have got some one of them, after writing on the 25th, in time to enable him to re-cross the river, before Moolraj can have advanced on Leia.

Should Moolraj have succeeded in his design, and the Bunnoo force have joined him, it will make the present state of things a great deal more serious than hereto-

\* Inclosure 4 in No. 27.

fore, and I shall have great fears for the safety of Peshawar. An impetus, moreover, will be given to Moolraj's rebellion, which may, probably, be felt in all parts of the Punjab.

The impossibility of undertaking active operations, at this moment, against Mooltan, is a most serious misfortune.

We may be called upon, at any moment, to act nearer Lahore, and we ought to be better provided, than we are now, to do so with effect, and without danger to the garrison and cantonments.

The seven native regiments at Lahore are very weak, a large portion of their reduced complement being away, on periodical leave of absence.

The force in artillery, attached to the Lahore garrison, is inadequate to the service we may expect that it may be called upon to perform. There is one troop of horse artillery, one horse battery, and one bullock battery. We are also very short of cavalry, there being only the 7th Irregulars at Lahore.

The rivers are fast rising, when the bridge at Ferozepore must be broken up, and reinforcements from that post, or the Jullundur, will be obtained with more difficulty.

The Commander-in-chief appears also of opinion, that the force here should be increased.

In consideration of all the above circumstances, I wrote, to-day, to Major General Whish, C B, and Brigadier Campbell, C B, and requested them to call upon me, at the Residency, to consult on the expediency, and the best means, of strengthening our force, at the present moment.

I explained to them the state of the case, as above adverted to, and they entirely concurred with me in the expediency of bringing up, at once, if shelter can be found for them, a wing of Her Majesty's 14th Dragoons from Ferozepore, and a troop of native horse artillery, and another regiment of native infantry, from Jullundur.

The Major-General and the Brigadier are going, in company with the executive engineer, to examine the buildings and accommodations, this afternoon, when it will be determined, if the troops above mentioned can be put up, with due advertence to their health and comfort.

Inclosure 9 in No 27.

*Lieutenant Edwardes to the Resident at Lahore*

*Camp, Lea, April 29, 1848.*

I HAVE no longer any doubt of there being a mutinous correspondence going on between the Mooltan traitors (Khan Sing's troops) and the Sikhs in my camp; and it must be sufficiently evident, for the adjutant of the two guns along with me, came to me last night, and, on his knees, begged me to put the guns on the right, and away from the Sikhs, whom he said were, root and branch, nimuk hurams, and conspiring among themselves, secretly, in the lines. I cannot, of course, move the guns, without declaring my suspicions, and see nothing for it but to be firm, patient, and vigilant, hastening the recruiting of Puthans, and awaiting the arrival of Cortlandt, with Sobhan Khan's regiment, which, I believe, is trustworthy.

But he cannot reach till the 6th, so that I have a whole week of this anxiety to endure.

Not the least difficult task is that of meeting, with cordiality and politeness, the colonel of the Futteh Pultun and his officers, and Bhacee Ameera Buksh, knowing all the time that they have marked me for their prey.

I have replied, however, to the bond of fidelity, which they volunteered to send me, in such terms as to appeal at once to their loyalty and cupidity; and I send you the originals herewith, thinking it would be a good thing if you were to make a great fuss in the Durbar, about the bright example thus set by the Futteh Pultun; send them an ell-long purwanna of approval, and, by assuming them to have virtue, induce them still to wear its mask.

It is probable that the Sikhs, whatever their designs are, will not disclose them till the last moment, reserving themselves for a "grand coup" in front of Mooltan. I shall wait here, therefore, until joined by Cortlandt, by which time I hope to have got 3,000 Puthans together, and thus be too strong for the Sikhs in my own camp.

I propose then to move forwards, and throw myself into a small fort, named Moondeh, twenty-five coss from this place, and about fifteen from Mooltan, pitching the Sikhs and majority of the camp outside, taking the guns inside. In that attitude I should be prepared for friend or foe, which seem just now synonymous terms.

It is, indeed, mortifying to know that the only obstacles in my way are the royal troops. If I had not a Sikh soldier in the camp, my mind would be at ease.

Accounts from Mooltan describe the garrison as constantly engaged in laying in stores, and preparing for resistance.

There is a report that Moolraj has sent to seize two "Mem Sahibs" on the Sutlej.

Another, that Agnew wrote to Bahawal Khan for help, and that a detachment of his cavalry crossed the Sutlej, for that purpose, but re-crossed, on hearing of the catastrophe. There is a great dread of Bahawal Khan's army in these parts; and I hope, ere this, you have ordered him across the river. It is said that part of the Sikh soldiers who went over, have been sent to watch the Ghat, opposite to Bahawalpore.

Perfect tranquillity, thanks to our presence, reigns in this Doab, and I have filled up almost all the vacant kardarships, and set the collections going.

Several Puthan leaders, who have been summoned, with their followers, by Moolraj, have come over to me with his purwannas, and taken service against him. He is enlisting everybody, down to the scum of the city of Mooltan.

P.S.—On the whole, I think it better to send you Khan Sing's manifesto\*, and run the risk of its reaching, not knowing what may happen to myself.

Inclosure 10 in No 27.

*Lieutenant Edwardes to the Resident at Lahore*

*Camp, Moorawallah, on the left bank of the Indus, opposite  
Dera Futteh Khan, May 1, 1848*

ON the 22nd of April, I had the honor to report to you my intention to cross the Indus from Dera Futteh Khan, that night, and march to the assistance of Mr. Vans Agnew in Mooltan, and my notes, since that date, will have fully informed you that, in the course of the 23rd and 24th, I effected the passage, with the loss of, I regret to say, eight men, by the sinking of a boat, that, on the 25th, I marched into Leia, and, there receiving conclusive accounts of the murder of Mr Vans Agnew and Lieutenant Anderson, the siding of the Lahore troops with the garrison, and the open rebellion of Dewan Moolraj, I abandoned the idea of proceeding to Mooltan, with my small force, and determined to try and keep possession of the Sind Sagur Doab, and collect its spring revenue for the Maharajah, instead of leaving it to find its way into the rebel treasury.

On the 27th of April, I reported to you, that I had become possessed of a manifesto,\* issued by Sirdar Khan Sing Man and the other Sikh traitors in the fort of Mooltan, to all the Sikhs in my camp, calling on them in the name of their Gooroo, to unite in a last struggle for the re-establishment of the Raj, and expressing my conviction that this would prove to be a circular to every station in the Punjab, where Sikh troops are cantoned.

On the 28th, I wrote to inform you, that it had become evident, not only to myself, but to the Poorbeah troops with me, that negotiations were going on between the Sikhs in this camp and the Mooltan garrison, that the adjutant of artillery had implored me to move the two guns from the Sikh side to the Poorbeah side of the camp, and that I had lost all confidence in the Futteh Pultun, though its officers had sent me a bond of fidelity, which (together with Khan Sing's manifesto) I inclosed.

I have now to inform you that, late on the evening of the 29th, one of my own cossids returned from Mooltan, and brought the intelligence that Dewan Moolraj had, at last, made the move which, ever since my arrival in Leia, I had apprehended, and thrown eight heavy guns, and between 4,000 and 5,000 men, across the Chenab, to oppose me, which force would reach Leia, without fail on the 1st of May.

Four courses were open to me .

1. To entrench myself, either inside, or outside, of the town of Leia, and fight it out.

2. To move east on Munkerah, a royal fort of great strength, in the heart of the Sandy Desert, 25 coss from Leia, and encamp under its walls.

3. To fall back on Bukkur, three marches to the north, and opposite to Dera Ismael Khan, where there is a small fort, and await the arrival of General Cortlandt, with reinforcements expected at Dera on the 2nd of May.

4 To re-cross the Indus, and await General Cortlandt, under the fort of Girang. Under any circumstances, the first plan would have been hazardous, for my whole force does not amount nearly to 1,500 men, which are too few to hold the streets of a large town like Leia ; and my two horse artillery guns in an entrenchment outside, would soon be silenced by eight heavy guns. But, doubting, as I did, the loyalty of two-thirds of my men , nay, believing that they had themselves invited the hostile movement, I determined, at all costs, to avoid the double danger of a collision

Plan No 2, I rejected for similar reasons The Thannadar of Munkerah is a Sikh, and had been very profuse in his offers of service , but he had also been corresponding, very constantly, with the Futteh Pultun, and Bhace Ameera Buksh, that notorious intriguer , and I argued, that if, on arriving at Munkerah, that fort was to be closed by treachery against me, it would be quite impossible for me to conduct the loyal remnant of my men, in good order and safety, across the desert and the Chenab

If I retreated to Bukkur, it would be three long marches through a country which, for many years, has been under the Mooltan rule, and which looks unfavorably on the present change ; and there was no certainty of finding the Bukkur fort empty on our arrival

All these considerations led me to prefer making only one short march to the Indus, and awaiting General Cortlandt at Girang, on the other bank. The Killedar of Girang is, also, a Puthan of my own appointment.

Accordingly, yesterday morning, we marched from Leia to this place, on the left bank of the Indus , and collected boats for embarkation , but I strictly forbade any one to cross, resolving to wait, one more day, on this side of the Indus, and see if any thing might turn up in our favor

This morning, another cossid has arrived from Mooltan, and says that, out of the 4,500 men ordered to Leia, only 500 have crossed the Chenab, and are encamped on the right bank. The eight guns are halted still on the left bank, the Puthans of the Mooltan garrison having strongly remonstrated with the Dewan, on the folly of weakening the Mooltan fort by such an expedition.

I now hope, therefore, to be able to hold my ground, on this side of the Indus, until General Cortlandt can come up, when, if he has reliance on the Mussulman regiment with him and four guns, I shall lose no time in resuming my former position at Leia, so advantageous, for the administration of the Doab, and co-operation in any plans you may have formed for the reduction of Mooltan Already, I have sent a party of cavalry to Leia, to secure intelligence, collect customs, encourage friends, and show foes that we are not yet gone.

In my note\* of the 25th of April, I reported having opened a communication with Dewan Moolraj He has not replied himself, "fearing the soldiers ;" but Mustapha Khan, his ablest officer, has written his sentiments in an Urzee, which I forward. It is cleverly written, containing, in a small space, half a dozen meanings, and leaving the reader to choose among them. My own belief is, that Dewan Moolraj is under no restraint whatever from "the soldiers," by which expression is meant, the Sikh traitors, and regular regiments of the former Mooltan garrison, the Puthans of Moolraj's service having a supreme contempt for them, and being not at all likely to submit to their dictation. The cossid who brought Mustapha Khan's Urzee certainly said there was considerable division between the Puthans and Sikhs of the garrison, but he added, that the Dewan had, in consequence, broken up the Sikh regiments into small parties, here and there ; which mark of distrust had so offended them that they refused to receive the wages of their treachery, unless they were re-united in battalions. That passage of the Urzee which suggests the only certain way of allaying this rebellion, speaks the real

wishes of the Puthan portion of the garrison, but I should say that the Dewan himself was in much more anxiety about his life than his government. He resigned the latter, without a struggle; and only took refuge in rebellion, when he thought the former was forfeited.

In yesterday's Ukhbar from Lahore, I perceive that the Durbar have ordered several distant regiments to concentrate on Mooltan, and, being so close to the scene of agitation, I feel it a duty to express earnestly my conviction (founded on observation) that a more dangerous risk could not be run, at the present moment, than to give a Sikh army the opportunity of collecting before Mooltan. The Sikh soldiers have neither forgotten, nor forgiven, their humiliation on the banks of the Sutlej, and, incapable of gratitude to us, as they have ever been of fidelity to their own rulers, it is only a very small and reflecting portion of them on whom our extraordinary moderation has made any impression. The large majority would hail any feasible opportunity of rising, as a God-send, and the unhappy coincidence of this rebellion in Mooltan, with the prophecy which was in every Sikh's mouth after the Sutlej campaign, (that in two years and a half the Raj should return to them again!) may well be regarded, by the bigoted Khalsa, as a special dispensation of their Gooroo to suspend that wise policy of the British Government, which dispersed them in small parties over the face of the Punjab.

Even shutting our eyes to the probability of all the Sikh regiments following the example of those under Khan Sing Man, in the hour of trial, a very serious doubt arises, whether the Sikhs could reduce Mooltan, if they wished. Nothing can be more strong than the belief, in this part of the world, that they could not; and it is certain that they accomplished it at last (after two previous failures) with the greatest difficulty and loss, when in the height of their pride and power, and under the eye of their great Maharajah, and it is more as a mere reporter of public feeling in this direction, than as venturing any suggestion of my own, that I confidently report the Mooltan garrison prepared to submit to a British demonstration, but not to yield to a Sikh siege. The rumour to-day, that Bahawal Khan (the faithful ally of the British) is already encamped at Shoojabad, in the Mooltan territory, makes it probable that this is only a part of a combined British movement, and that you have, long ago, anticipated the little information it is in my power to afford.

P S—While meditating, on the night of the 29th, the best plan of retiring from Leia, I dispatched a small party of newly raised Puthans, to see if a fort of Dewan Moolraj, named Mojgurh, twelve coss from Leia, north-east, were occupied or not, and, if possible, to obtain possession. A sower of the party has just come in, with the intelligence that the small Thannah of Moolraj, which was in the fort, surrendered, and the fort is now in our possession. It is described as built of brick, sixty yards square, and capable of offering considerable resistance. I have directed the leader of the party to strengthen himself, by entertaining more men on the spot, and to put 200 rupees' worth of corn into the fort without delay, as it will, certainly, come into use. The fort is one of four which the old Dera Nawab built at equal distances of twelve coss, north, east, south, and west, from the great central fort of Munkerah in the Desert.

Inclosure 11 in No 27

*Urree from Mustapha Khan, Khaghwanee, in the Fort of Mooltan, to  
Lieutenant Edwardes.*

YOUR letter was duly received by Dewan Moolraj, but he dares not answer it, for fear of the soldiers, who would insult and ill-treat him, if it came to their knowledge. He has, therefore, commissioned me to write to you, and say, that, if the smallest thought of rebellion had ever entered into his mind, it is not likely that he would have offered his resignation of Mooltan to the Maharajah and the Sahib Log in Lahore, and requested them to appoint another Nazim, neither would he have made over to Mr. Agnew and Sirdar Khan Sing Man the fort, and guns, and magazine; nor have let the Lahore soldiers into the fort, and commenced relieving all his own guards from the gates and other posts therein. It was, in fact, quite by accident that this affair occurred, and the soldiers, becoming insubordinate, involved him against his will, caused the guns to be drawn out, and commenced hostilities. Orders are issued, and letters written, just as the soldiers

please ; and, by their desire, all the materials of war are now being prepared. In short, nothing can be done without their consent, and the Dewan is afraid to oppose them. If he did oppose them, it would cost him his head and his honor, so that the Dewan desires me to tell you that the only certain way of settling this matter is to return to the former arrangement, and let him remit the revenue regularly to Lahore, as previously, as the soldiers have now got the upper hand, and will not be satisfied with anything short of this. This much the Dewan sends for your information, and I may as well mention that, news having been received of your occupation of Leia, a force has been dispatched in that direction.

Inclosure 12 in No. 27.

*Lieutenant Edwardes to the Resident at Lahore.*

*Camp, Dera Futteh Khan Ghât, May 3, 1848.*

IT is with regret I inform you that I have been obliged to re-cross the Indus. On the 1st of May, I reported to you that I had retired from Leia to the left bank of the river, but I hoped to be able to maintain my ground in the Sind Sagur Doab, until General Cortlandt's arrival, as I had heard that the eight guns, and majority of the 4,000 men, sent against us by Moolraj, had halted on the left bank of the Chenab.

The halt appears to have been nothing more than the delay unavoidable in crossing troops and guns over a large river, at this season of the year, and, on the morning of the 2nd of May, their advanced guard suddenly appeared at Kofilah, only four coss from Leia.

It was, however, still doubtful whether the guns had come on, or not, and I again advanced the whole of my cavalry to Leia, under Sirdar Mahommed Alum Khan, Barukzye, and Foojdar Khan, Alzye, to ascertain the force of the rebels ; to surprise the Kofilah party, if it was unsupported by guns in the rear, and to cover our retreat, if it proved to be only the advanced guard of the enemy's main body.

They had scarcely left camp, when they were met by another cossid, with the information that Moolraj's guns and main body were indeed at Machehwallah, eight coss south of Leia, but they gallantly carried out their orders, reached Leia in the evening, threw out sowars to Kofilah, and having ascertained, beyond all doubt, the character of the hostile movement, fell back, in good order, at midnight.

The intelligence brought by the cossid last mentioned, decided me to lose no time, and, striking the tents at mid-day, I crossed the whole baggage and cattle of the force, to the right bank of the Indus, before night-fall, retaining only the guns and infantry. The men, fully accoutred, lay down in a half moon, with the river in the rear, and the empty boats drawn up ready for embarkation. In this order, we awaited the return of the cavalry, and day, at dawn this morning, the cavalry and guns crossed the Indus in two detachments, and, about 8 o'clock, I brought up the rear with the infantry, just about the time when the enemy must have been marching into Leia, twelve miles behind us.

I assure you that I gave up the Doab with the greatest reluctance, but I have already, in my last letter, fully given my reasons for avoiding so unequal a collision as must have taken place, between two guns and 1,500 men (of 1,000 of whom the fidelity was very doubtful), and eight guns and 4,000 men united in a desperate cause, and encouraged by the knowledge of having friends in my camp. The mortification of the retreat, and possibly its condemnation by those who know not the difficulties of my position, can only be personal to myself, whereas a defeat of the Sirkar's troops, in any quarter, at the present moment, could not fail to have a disheartening influence on the army now advancing from Lahore, and seriously increase the difficulty of quelling the rebellion in Mooltan.

As it is, my withdrawal from the Sind Sagur Doab, can only be temporary. General Cortlandt, with another regiment (of Mussulmans) and I believe six guns, will join me to-morrow, when we shall be in a condition to re-cross, and engage the rebels.

P.S.—9 o'clock, P.M. I have just fired my guns, as a signal to General Cortlandt up the river. It was instantaneously answered by eight guns and numerous sum-

boorahs, in the direction of Leia; which continued for nearly an hour to fire successive rounds. At the end of that time, General Cortlandt answered with two guns, as near as we could guess at Kuchereee, fifteen coss north of this

The delay in his reply I take to be owing to his coming in boats, and having to land before he could fire.

Inclosure 13 in No. 27.

*The Resident at Lahore to the Secretary to the Government of India*

*Lahore, May 3, 1848.*

IN reference to my letter to the Governor-General, dated the 27th ultimo,\* with a copy of my dispatch, of that date, to the Commander-in-chief, I forward a letter just received from his Excellency in reply †

I gather, from this letter of the Commander-in-chief, that it is the decided opinion of his Excellency that military operations of the nature required, cannot be undertaken against Mooltan, at this season of the year, with a fair prospect of success.

Under these circumstances, his Lordship in Council may depend on my doing every thing in my power, with the means at my command, to prevent the spread of rebellion, disaffection, and disturbance, beyond Mooltan, and to defeat the machinations, of Dewan Moolraj and his emissaries, to create a general insurrection in the country, and cause inroads on our frontier, till the season, when operations will be possible, may arrive.

Inclosure 14 in No. 27.

*Lieutenant Edwardes to the Resident at Lahore.*

*Camp, Ghat of Dera Futteh Khan, on  
the Indus, May 7, 1848*

THE rebel army, under Sham Sing, evacuated Leia in the dusk of the morning, and marched precipitately back to Mooltan

The reason given out by the leaders of the rebel camp was, that Maharajah Duleep Sing had sent a purwanna to Moolraj, confirming him in his government, if he would not prosecute the war, an artifice, probably, necessary to bring back the soldiers. It was understood, however, that the Dewan's orders were that the force was to make Mooltan in two marches, a feat just possible, being forty-five coss, with a broad river to cross. This precipitation bespeaks any thing but royal favor, or rebel confidence.

Inclosure 15 in No. 27

*Lieutenant Edwardes to the Resident at Lahore.*

*Camp, Dera Futteh Khan, May 8, 1848.*

I AM awaiting, with much interest, the return of Foujdar Khan from his interview with Mustapha Khan, at Sooltan-ke-Kote Mustapha Khan is Moolraj's brains, as well as his sword-hand; and if he really has come as vakeel from Moolraj, a communication of importance may be expected I scarcely can hope that he will accept my invitation, and come here to have a personal interview, though that would be most satisfactory to us both.

You seem to have estimated most truly what would be the conduct of the Futteh Pultun; and most arduous and anxious was the task I had, after the discovery

\* Inclosure 17 in No. 26.

† Inclosure 7 in No. 27



of their correspondence with the rebels, to manœuvre a retreat, without showing distrust, and preserve discipline, without bringing on resistance. A word, at any moment, would, I felt, involve us in a camp row. The Poorbeahs stuck to me like trumps; and, being more aware than I could be, of how far things had gone among the Sikhs, they were so evidently on their guard, and showed such open expectation of a mutiny, that I had the greatest difficulty in repressing their zeal, and preventing them from hurrying on the very catastrophe they dreaded. So ticklish was it, at the last moment, on the left bank of the Indus, that the Poorbeahs refused to cross the river without me, and I could not trust the Sikhs to go over, either first, or last, lest, in one case, they should keep the boats on the right bank, and, in the other, go over to the enemy on the left; so that I was, at last, obliged to march every company into a boat of its own, at one sound of the bugle, and cross them all, in a body, along with me.

All will, please God, turn out well, and we shall have learned a useful lesson, as to the spirit of the Sikh army, though we might well wish it had been purchased at a less cost than the lives of two fine young fellows, in the spring time of hope and usefulness.

It is very provoking to know that the enemy is in receipt of news two days old from Lahore, and I only getting it after a week.

Inclosure 16 in No 27.

*Lieutenant Taylor to the Resident at Lahore.*

*Duleepgurh, Bunnoo, May 8, 1848.*

THIS country is still quiet. I received intimation, to-night, that the Hatty Khail tribe of Wuzerees intended to attack my parties watching their crops, and carry the latter off. I have reinforced these guards, but directed them not to fight against the whole tribe about them. If the Hatty Khail break faith now, they will suffer for it eventually, though, from all having taken to the hills, I may be unable to punish them now.

The Zemindars of Murwut and Esakhail are becoming unsettled, giving insolent answers to the Kaidars, &c, and the latter call upon me for troops and horsemen, and it is difficult for me to send more to them, as my own lines are stripped very bare.

With reference to the reinforcement of guns, called for by Lieutenant Edwardes, I have, as you know, already sent him two more, making four in all, besides the troop he formerly took; and as the letter he wrote, ordering back the infantry regiment, has missed it, he will receive the whole addition of one regiment of infantry, 100 horse, and two guns.

Inclosure 17 in No 27

*The Resident at Lahore to the Secretary to the Government of India*

*Lahore, May 9, 1848*

A CONSIDERABLE sensation has been created in the city, since yesterday, by the detection of a conspiracy to corrupt the fidelity of our native soldiers of the infantry, artillery, and irregular cavalry, and the seizure of the offenders.

The plot had proceeded to a considerable extent, the whole matter is now under investigation.

Inclosure 18 in No. 27.

*The Resident at Lahore to the Secretary to the Government of India.*

*Lahore, May 10, 1848.*

I ENTIRELY concur with Lieutenant Edwardes in what he says of the importance of an immediate move of troops on Mooltan, and regret, as deeply as he, or

any one can do, that an expedition against Mooltan, at this season, is declared impossible.

I must observe that Lieutenant Edwardes seems to have made a mistake in his letter of the 27th ultimo, and in some of the previous ones, in stating that the document which accompanied his letter of the 29th ultimo was signed by Khan Sing, and was a manifesto on the part of Khan Sing, and all the Sikh troops at Mooltan.

The paper appears to have been drawn up by the Sikh officers in the Dewan's service, and those of the troops that went with Sirdar Khan Sing Man. The Sirdar's name is not mentioned in the paper, nor is his seal attached to it, which would appear pretty good evidence that he was, in no way, a party to the matter.

The accounts regarding Sirdar Khan Sing's conduct are very conflicting; it is very difficult at this distance, and under the circumstances, to ascertain the truth.

He did not act with firmness and courage, certainly; but it is very doubtful if he was guilty of treachery. There seems no doubt that he is still a close prisoner, in irons.

It is worthy of remark that the last name on this paper is Kurm Ahkee Bukah, a commedan of Irregular Horse; and that he is believed to have since deserted Moolraj, with sixty of his horsemen, and to be now at Jhung, on his way back to Lahore.

He wrote to me yesterday, to this effect—stating that he only consented to take service, to prevent being imprisoned, with a determination to escape, the first opportunity.

He was sent with the force to oppose Lieutenant Edwardes at Leia, and left it, with his troop, on the line of march.

If this be the fact, (and there seems no reason to doubt it) it will shake Moolraj's confidence in the fidelity of his new adherents.

Inclosure 19 in No. 27.

*The Resident at Lahore to the Secretary to the Government of India.*

*Lahore, May 11, 1848.*

I HAVE the honor to report, the execution, this morning, of the two individuals described in the margin\*, who were convicted of tampering with the native troops of the garrison of Lahore and cantonment of Anarkullee, and endeavouring to induce them to join in a plan for the surprise of the town, and the expulsion of the British troops.

Soon after my arrival at Lahore, I was told by Major Wheler, of the 7th Irregulars, that an attempt had been made to corrupt the men of his regiment by certain parties in Lahore.

I saw, at that time, one of his sowars, by name Gholam Nubbee Khan; and, having ascertained the nature of the communications made to him, I directed him to continue his connection with the parties concerned, reporting all circumstances to Major Wheler.

The affair went on for a short time, and then seemed to have been dropped; and as, at that time, the sowar could point out nothing very tangible against any individual; at any rate, nothing susceptible of legal proof; no further notice was taken.

Immediately after the transactions in Mooltan, Major Wheler told me that the attempts to seduce his men had been renewed. I sent for Lieutenant Lumsden, and directed him to take the matter in hand; to associate some of his guide corps in whom he could confide with the sowar of Major Wheler; and to sift the matter to the bottom.

The existence of a conspiracy to corrupt the native troops, to which many sepoys of the native infantry, and some of the artillery, were said to be parties, was satisfactorily established.

Lieutenant Lumsden received, at night, from his sepoys and from Major Wheler's sowar, full intelligence of all that was being carried on; and it was hoped that a scheme which we had framed, in communication with Brigadier Campbell, for

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\* Khan Sing, a General in the Sikh army, unemployed. Bhasee Gunga Ram, the confidential valet, of Maharajah Junda Khore.

seizing the conspirators, with the parties who styled themselves delegates from the native corps, when assembled together, might be successful.

This was defeated, by the fact of the communication between Major Wheler's sowar and Lieutenant Lumsden becoming known, in the manner described in the proceedings; when it became necessary, at once, to secure the conspirators, or such of them as were known, and with their papers.

This was very successfully managed by Mr. Cocks and Lieutenants Lumsden and Hodson, who went, with a company of the Guide Corps, in the middle of the night of the 7th instant, to the house of General Khan Sing, the chief person concerned, and seized him, and his people, with all the papers in the house, and afterwards secured the other persons known to the sowar and sepoy.

The crime was clearly proved against the four individuals named in the margin\*.

It was next necessary, at the present moment, that decisive measures should be taken, and a prompt, and severe, example made.

I summoned the members of the Council, and went, with them, through the trial of the parties accused, and already seized. Yesterday, they unanimously concurred with me in convicting the four prisoners, and in sentencing them to be hung.

Three† were sentenced to suffer death by hanging, at sunrise this morning; the remaining prisoner was sentenced to imprisonment for life, with transportation beyond seas.

This morning, General Khan Sing and Bhace Gunga Ram were executed at the public gallows, near the Delhi gate of the city, in the presence of two regiments, and two companies from each of the other native corps of the garrison.

The sentence passed on the prisoner Goolaba has been suspended, and will be commuted to imprisonment for life, or he will be pardoned, as may be determined hereafter. He gave to Mr. Cocks valuable information last night about the other parties, connected with the conspiracy, regarding whom the investigation is being proceeded with.

A perusal of the proceedings will show how deeply the Maharanee is concerned in this very important and serious matter, and I beg attention to the inclosed paper, being the copy of a statement, drawn up by Lieutenant Hodson, of communications made to him, last night, by Bhace Gunga Ram and Toolsee Ram.

I have little doubt that the Governor-General in Council will concur with me that, at the present moment, extreme measures are required; and that his Lordship will approve of what has been done in the present instance.

I shall report further, as to the measure of success which may seem to have attended the machinations of the conspirators, but I have no reason to think that their overtures were entertained by many of the soldiers of the garrison.

#### Inclosure 20 in No. 27.

*Memorandum of a Confession made to Lieutenant Hodson by Gunga Ram, and Commedan Toolsee Ram.*

May 11, 1848.

AT about 10 o'clock last night, I was informed that Toolsee Ram, a prisoner under sentence of transportation, wished earnestly to speak to me, or any British officer. I, accordingly, went to the guard, where he was confined, and, taking him aside, asked what he wished to say to me; first, cautioning him that I had no power in any way to alter the sentence which had been passed on him, and that he must not hope for any mercy. After many general professions of his ability and readiness to afford most important information, if respited, he went on to say, that he could identify all and each of the sepoys of the Company's army who had listened to the seductions of the conspirators, that the Ranee was at the bottom of the whole business, and had not only written to him and to Khan Sing, but had also sent letters to all the Sirdars of inferior rank, and to the chiefs of the Durbar, with the exception of Deena Nath, to Maharajah Golab Sing, and to Dewan Moolraj, at Mooltan.

\* General Khan Sing, Bhace Gunga Ram, Toolsee Ram Brahmin, Goolab Sing, *alias* Goolaba.

† General Khan Sing, Bhace Gunga Ram, Goolaba.

He said that these letters came by the hands of Gunga Ram, who concealed them in an amulet (taveez) worn on his arm; and that Gunga Ram would himself tell me so, if I asked him, and would confess the whole plot.

I then sent to Gunga Ram to say, that if he had anything to tell me I would listen to him. I should add that he, previously, had sent to me to hear what he had to say. As soon as he came near to where I was standing, he went down on his knees, and intreated that his life might be spared, and that he might be transported instead, that, if his life were only spared for one month or so, he would do the most important service possible to the British Government. I assured him that there was no hope for him, but that if he chose to make any voluntary confession, I would listen to him, and should report it to the Resident. He then said that he would tell the truth. I replied that he could say whatever he chose, but that neither truth nor lies could avail him now.

He then stated that the two letters produced on his trial were really from the Ranee, that ten or twelve others had, also, been sent by her to different persons, that she had been in correspondence with all the Sirdars, except Raja Tej Sing, and they were aware of all that was going on, that all the Sirdars, save Tej Sing, great and small, were in league with her, and that the force which was going down to Mooltan, was not going to oppose Moolraj, but would unite with him when occasion offered. He especially mentioned Raja Shere Sing, Sirdar Runjore Sing, and Sheik Emamooddeen, and Hakim Raee Julalpooree.

He, also, stated that all that had lately taken place at Mooltan, was at the be's suggestion, and that Sudar Khan Sing Man had been at the bottom of the plot against Mr Agnew and Mr Anderson.

On my asking him how he knew all this, and how the communications were effected, he replied that the letters had passed through his hands, and that others had been sent to different parties, by men disguised as Fakeers and by old women.

He, also, stated that this had been going on for some months, from about the time that Sir F. Currie arrived at Agra, on his way up to Lahore. I took no notes of what he said to me, but I believe the above to be the substance of all that passed at all bearing on the crime of which he had been convicted.

Inclosure 21 in No. 27.

*Lieutenant Edwardes to the Resident at Lahore.*

*Camp, Ghat of Dera Futteh Khan,  
May 12, 1848*

THE strong and important fort of Mungrotah has fallen into our hands.

Mungrotah is in the Lungurh clauqua, between this place and Dera Ghazee Khan, and is the only fort of any consequence in the Mooltan Trans-Indus territory. It was occupied by Cheytun Mull (the Surpurust of the four districts which constitute the elauqua of Lungurh, and a thannah of Moolraj's) I had retained Cheytun Mull in his office, but, subsequently, heard that he was recruiting secretly for Moolraj, so thought it best to bring his loyalty, at once, to an issue, by sending for him, with the first instalment of his Rubbee collections. At the same time, I sent a party of sowars to Mitha Khan, the head of the Kusranee tribe, close to Mungrotah, and called on him to help my detachment in expelling Cheytun Mull from the fort, should he be inclined to resist.

Mitha Khan sent his drum round the villages, raised the country, and sent word to Cheytun Mull that he had better evacuate Mungrotah with a good grace. The Hindoc took the hint, and fled in haste with his thannah, leaving the fort to my detachment, who marched in triumphantly, and sent me the keys while I was in bed, yesterday morning.

This is a great piece of good fortune, and General Cortlandt will now be able to advance all the way to Dera Ghazee Khan, without being detained to reduce Mungrotah. It will, also, give him a strong point to fall back on, if Moolraj sends a superior force over the Indus.

I have had great difficulty in making up my mind how to act at this juncture. You have only called on me to arrange for the Trans-Indus territories, but I feel sure you expect me to do as much more as I can, and I see no signs of anybody else coming to the Sind Sagur Doab, whose revenue is too important to be lost sight of.

I resolved, therefore, to send General Cortlandt, with the majority of the force, to Dera Ghazee Khan, and myself, with six companies of Mussulman regular infantry, two guns, fourteen zumbocrahs, and my new levies, (about 1000 Puthans,) once more to cross the Indus, and try to get hold of the revenue.

In pursuance of this plan, General Cortlandt marched this morning, with six guns, six zumboorahs, one Sikh, and one Musulman regiment, and about 200 sowars.

My own march was to have been simultaneous, but has been nipped in the bud, by certain information, late last night from the Chenab, that Moolraj's force, of 4,000 men and ten guns, which retreated so hurriedly from Leia, on the 7th of May, had been, as unexpectedly, halted when it reached the Chenab, and is still in the Sind Sagur Doab.

The explanation of this is obvious. Mustapha Khan Khaghwanee told me, that a steamer arriving from Sunde, and the report of Bahawul Khan crossing the Sutlej, was what alarmed Moolraj, and made him recall the Leia force. No sooner, therefore, did he find that no operations were in reality on foot against him, than he again took courage, and told his army not to recross the Chenab. If I am right, we shall again see the rebels in Leia in a few days, and many lakhs of revenue will be lost, if no worse mischief ensues.

My views of the evil consequences of leaving Mooltan uninvested, are, thus early, borne out. So secure is Moolraj of not being molested, that he has not kept 500 men in Mooltan. The rest of his army are across the Chenab, considering, no doubt, in which direction the most profitable circuit may be made.

The Puthans of the garrison may, or may not, retire to Kummurkote; if they do, a diversion will certainly be effected, and Moolraj obliged to call his men from the Sind Sagur Doab. But the same reaction of courage, and apparent immunity, may alter the plans of the Puthans altogether, though I, still, am of opinion that they will separate from Moolraj.

Under any circumstances, however, there is but one move on our part, which is required to secure peace throughout the hot weather, until our troops can take the field, confine Moolraj and his army to the Mooltan fort, prevent him from enlisting another man, and secure all the dependencies of Mooltan, without a shot being fired. That move is, to order Bahawul Khan to cross his army over the Sutlej, and encamp it, for the hot weather and rains, in any district near Mooltan that he pleases. I should be very happy to go and encamp with it, and keep an eye on the proceedings of Moolraj, who would, probably, some morning, escape from the fort, and come in. The whole force could be hutted in with grass-choppers, in a fortnight, and be as comfortable as anywhere else. If this is done, the effect of delay will not be bad, Moolraj being a prisoner in his own fort, otherwise, the whole hot weather and rains must pass in the same insecurity that has been felt, on this frontier, ever since the outbreak.

P.S.—*Morning of 12th of May*—News, already, that the rebels are again in full march to Leia; and I have halted General Cortlandt in order that, if the intelligence is confirmed, we may meet, and concert measures.

Inclosure 22 in No. 27.

*The Commander-in-chief to the Resident at Lahore.*

*Simla, May 13, 1848*

I HAVE submitted to the Governor General in Council my views, and pointed out a detailed arrangement for the collection of a force at Ferozepore, by the 1st of November, ready to move into the Punjab, for the reduction of Mooltan, and to meet any contingency that may arise, either from intrigue, or open defection.

The force I have proposed to assemble, comprises 50 siege guns, 7 troops, horse artillery; 6 light field batteries; 3 regiments, British dragoons; 5 regiments, light cavalry; 5 regiments, irregular cavalry; 7 companies, reserve artillery; 6 companies, sappers and miners, 5 European regiments, infantry; 16 regiments, native infantry; 2 Goorka corps. This force will amount to about 24,000 fighting men, of all arms.

It may, naturally, appear that this force is more than can possibly be required for the reduction of Mooltan; but it must be borne in mind that we should be prepared for all contingencies, and for detached movements, to keep down disaffection, and to watch doubtful allies.

I have heard, through private channels, that Lieutenant Edwardes\* has safely reached Peshawur, and that the Sikh troops there happily continue faithful in their allegiance. I shall be happy to hear these reports confirmed, as such knowledge will very much influence my views upon future arrangements. Indeed, so much so, that, were they confirmed, I should very much doubt the expediency of, possibly, precipitating matters, by an attempt to occupy Govindgurh; particularly, as I understand it has been denuded of guns, other than two honey-combed pieces.

To give effect to the passage of troops during the rainy season, I have solicited the Government to have a steamer placed at Ferozepore.

Inclosure 23 in No. 27.

*The Resident at Lahore to the Secretary to the Government of India.*

*Lahore, May 15, 1848.*

I FORWARD letters received from my assistants, on detached duty on the frontier.

His Lordship in Council will observe how very urgent all the officers are that operations against Mooltan may not be delayed, and how distinctly they describe their apprehensions of the evils which may result from inaction on our part.

My sentiments, and the difficulties in which we are placed, by the impossibility of acting against Mooltan, until an efficient force shall be collected at Ferozepore, and until the season may become more favorable for operations, are well known to his Lordship in Council.

At the same time, I do not altogether despair of being able to prevent the spread of dissatisfaction and rebellion beyond the Mooltan districts, for a few months, though, certainly, the probabilities are much against success.

I have taken the most active measures that the means at my disposal will admit of, for keeping Moolraj, and the large concourse of undisciplined soldiers he is assembling, to the neighbourhood of Mooltan.

If we can only prevent the Durbar troops from joining Moolraj, and keep them faithful to the Maharajah, or at any rate neutral, in their present positions, Moolraj's rebellion will be comparatively of small importance.

I spare no device of judicious intimidation in one place, and encouragement and praise in another, to keep the army, if not faithful to the State, at any rate, from overt acts of insubordination, and treachery.

Up to this time, the example of the troops which accompanied the new Nazim to Mooltan, has, in no instance, been followed.

The Jagheerdars, who have the deepest stake in the country, may, perhaps, prove faithful, but they would not be able to effect much, in an actual conflict with Moolraj.

The troops of the regular army will certainly not fight against Moolraj, but I cannot but hope that, if they see preparations for a large British force to proceed, at an early date, against the rebel Nazim, they will not make common cause with him, which would involve the necessity of fighting against us.

They have, by no means, forgotten the lesson they were taught two years ago.

The city and neighbourhood of Lahore are in a much less unsatisfactory state than they were a week ago.

The detection of the conspiracy to tamper with our sepoy, and the prompt example which was made of the principal conspirators, and the knowledge that I am now fully informed of all their schemes, and of the parties concerned therein, have had a most beneficial effect.

The result of the investigation and scrutiny which has taken place, has been, upon the whole, satisfactory, in more ways than one.

It has proved, I think, that but comparatively few of the sepoy have listened to the overtures of the conspirators.

I do not think that the number can exceed twenty, or twenty-five, and it is very doubtful whether these, though they made promises, and received rewards, had really any serious intention of keeping those promises, and acting against the British Government.

There have been eight or nine desertions, I believe, since the arrest of the conspirators, and three sepoy are about to be put on their trial.

It has also appeared that the parties who combined together with the sepoys, were not persons of much influence or power, with the exception of the vakeel of the Maharanee; that they had no organized plan, and were not associated with persons of note and rank in the State.

But little credit is to be attached to the statement made, by the Maharanee's vakeel, on the night before his execution, to Lieutenant Hodson. That the Maharanee had written letters to all the parties named by Gunga Ram is very probable. I very much doubt if they all of them, or indeed any of them, met with the reception which Gunga Ram described.

Inclosure 24 in No 27

*The Resident at Lahore to the Secretary to the Government of India*

*Lahore, May 16, 1848.*

I HAVE the honor to state, that Maharanee Junda Khore, the mother of Maharajah Duleep Sing, was removed from the fort of Sheikhoopoor, by my orders, yesterday afternoon, and is now on her way, under charge of an escort, to Ferozepore.

By the arrangements I have made, it is expected that the Maharanee will reach Ferozepore, to-morrow morning.

I have been induced to take this step, at the present moment, for several reasons.

In the letter of the Governor-General, dated the 27th of August last, his Lordship directed that, in the event of the Maharanee being found to be engaged in intrigues detrimental to the interests of the Lahore State, she should be removed from the Punjab.

The late investigations of conspiracies for the tampering with our sepoys, and making revolt and insurrection, deeply implicate the Maharanee, and leave no doubt, on my mind, that Her Highness has been intriguing, and will, as long as she continues in the Punjab, continue to intrigue, for the subversion of the present administration, and that she has been using, and will continue to use, all her influence—which is most powerful, especially with the army and the military classes,—against the interests of the British Government.

Her confidential vakeel, Bhaee Gunga Ram, and her correspondent, Colonel (sometimes called General) Khan Sing, have been convicted of the offences above described, and have been executed. Legal proof of the delinquency of the Maharanee would not, perhaps, be obtainable, but nothing is wanting to the moral conviction of that fact; and its notoriety pervades every part of the Punjab.

It would not be consistent in us to take no notice, at this moment, of the Maharanee's misconduct, a formal trial of Maharajah Runjeet Sing's widow would be most unpopular, and hurtful to the feelings of the people, and her summary banishment from the Punjab and residence at Benares, under the surveillance of the Governor-General's agent, at that place, subject to such custody as will prevent all intrigue and correspondence, for the future, seems to me the best course which we could adopt.

There is no proof, though there is some ground for suspicion, that the Maharanee was the instigator of the late violence and outrage in Mooltan, but it is certain that, at this moment, the eyes of Dewan Moolraj, and of the whole Sikh army and military population, are directed to the Maharanee as the rallying point of their rebellion or disaffection. Her removal from the Punjab is called for by justice, and policy; and this is no time for us to hesitate about doing what may appear necessary to punish State offenders, whatever may be their rank and station, and to vindicate the honor and position of the British Government.

But, while doing what we deem an act of justice and policy, it is not necessary, or desirable, to do it in a way to exasperate the feelings of the soldiery, and the chiefs, or people. We must bear in mind that the Maharanee is the mother of their Sovereign, and the widow of our ally Maharajah Runjeet Sing, and we must respect the feelings which they entertain regarding the violation of the seclusion of females.

of high rank—however unworthy, in their personal characters, those females may be of such consideration.

I propose, therefore, that the Maharanee be sent to Benares under a strong guard, that she be allowed to take, with her, her jewels, and such of her property as she may immediately require, and her domestic servants, that she be accompanied by the venerable Fakeer Noorooddeen, the personal friend and adviser of the late Maharajah Runjeet Sing, and a person greatly respected by the Sikhs generally; that the remainder of her personal property, now at Sheikhoopoor, be sent after her, in charge of her brother, Sirdar Heera Sing, to Meerut, or Benares, and that he be allowed to remain and reside with her. He is just as well out of the Punjab.

A steady, judicious, and intelligent officer must be appointed to take charge of the Maharanee, from Captain Browne at Ferozepore, and escort her to Benares.

At Benares, the Maharanee would be under the surveillance of Major MacGregor, C.B., the Governor-General's Agent, and she should be subject to such surveillance and custody as will enable Major MacGregor to prevent her having intercourse with parties beyond her own domestic establishment, without his knowledge, and from her holding any correspondence, by letter, with any person, except through him. As long as she conforms to all the orders and instructions of the Governor-General's Agent, and abstains from all attempts at improper correspondence, or intrigue, her confinement need not be more close than is necessary for the custody and precautions I have described. On the very first occasion of her disobeying Major MacGregor's orders, or showing a disposition to intrigue, she should be sent, forthwith, into close confinement, at Chunar.

The Governor-General in Council may, perhaps, like to know the mode in which the removal of the Maharanee was effected.

I had reason to believe it possible that she had gained over the guard, and the Sirdars in charge of Sheikhoopoor, to her interest, and that they might refuse, perhaps, to give her up.

About a week ago, I changed nearly the whole guard at the fort, and relieved the company of regulars, by a company from another regiment, of Poorbeahs. I added, to the Rohillas appointed by Colonel Lawrence, thirty new men, the jemadar of Rohillas, through whom they were entertained, remaining at Lahore.

I appointed Lieutenants Lumsden and Hodson, with the mounted portion of the Guide Corps, to be the escort of the Maharanee from Sheikhoopoor, and I sent with them, as bearers of my moorasilla to the Maharanee, and the Durbar purwannahs, Race Mool Sing (the confidential vakcel of Raja Tej Sing), Dewan Kedar Nath, as representative of Raja Deena Nath, Sirdar Nar Sing, as representative of the Attaree interests, and Fakeer Noorooddeen.

Sheikhoopoor is twenty miles from Lahore. I was prepared, if opposition was offered, to enforce the execution of my orders. Lieutenant Lumsden's party arrived at Sheikhoopoor, before daylight yesterday morning; the emissaries of the Durbar having preceded them. If any hesitation was shown in opening the gates, I should have known it, soon after sunrise, and, at my request, the two squadrons of Her Majesty's 14th Light Dragoons were saddled at daylight, and two nine-pounders of the Horse Battery ready harnessed with troop-horses, to go down at a moment's warning. This force, accompanied by Major Napier, of the Engineers, who had made a plan of the fort, might have been at the spot in three hours, and Major Napier was satisfied that they would get into the fort, in ten minutes afterwards.

Happily, there was not the slightest opposition, all was acquiescence and civility, from the Maharanee downwards, very probably somewhat induced by the executions which took place a few days ago.

I had provided fresh bearers and elephants, and a fresh escort of a ressalah of Irregulars, half-way between Sheikhoopoor and Kanna Chuch, where the party are halting, for a few hours to-day.

At Kanna Chuch I had a wing of native infantry, and another fresh ressalah as a guard, and the latter as a further escort, and from Kanna a dak of carriages is laid to Ferozepore; and a fresh escort of irregular cavalry, from Ferozepore, is to meet the party at Kusoor.

The affair has been managed, without any notice of our purpose being known; and I have no doubt that, by daylight to-morrow morning, the parties will be safe in the cantonment of Ferozepore.



## Inclosure 25 in No. 27.

*The Resident at Lahore to the Secretary to the Government of India.**Lahore, May 16, 1848*

IN my letter of this day's date, I said that I was making inquiries for an officer to take charge, and command the escort, of Her Highness the Maharajah Junda Khore, from Ferozepore to Benares. Ensign W. H. Cox, of the 70th Native Infantry, now at Loodiana, has been pointed out to me, by several parties, as an officer peculiarly qualified for this duty though only an ensign, this officer has been upwards of seven years in the service, and is, I am told, 29 years of age, having been for two years at Oxford, before he came to this country. He is described to me as an officer of much ability, steadiness, and judgment, and well qualified, by his acquirements, and temper, and knowledge of the natives, for the duty for which I have selected him. I hope, therefore, that the Governor-General in Council will approve my having applied to the Commander-in-chief and the local military authorities, that his services may be placed at my disposal.

## Inclosure 26 in No. 27

*Lieutenant Edwards to the Resident at Lahore**Camp, Ghat, Dera Futteh Khan  
May 16, 1848*

ON the 12th, I had the honor to report, that the rebel army of Dewan Moolraj had not quitted the Sind Sagun Doab, but halted on the right bank of the Chenab, when they discovered that they had retreated on a false alarm of hostilities against Mooltan.

Aware of your intention not to take the field till the cold weather, I have been anxiously watching this army on the Chenab, to see in what direction their next expedition would be made, but they have intercepted, and imprisoned, so many cossids, that it is extremely difficult to get correct intelligence, in time to be useful.

Last evening, however, the picket which I had stationed in Leia, on the other side of the Indus, obtained information that the advanced party of the rebels had reached Oodoo-ke-Kote, with 500 sowars, 2 guns and some zumboorahs, and, later still, that they had arrived at Gooltan-ke-Kote, only 10 coss from Leia.

The picket had standing orders to retire before a superior force, but, afraid of their being pressed, I crossed 200 men during the night, and strengthened them. Before the arrival of this reinforcement, the picket prudently fell back across a nullah, about half a coss to the Western, or Indus, side of Leia, the enemy heard of their retreat, and, as soon as it was light this morning, hurried on to Leia, with between 300 and 400 horse, and 10 zumboorahs, thinking that all was clear. In Leia, they were told that the Sahib's picket had only fallen back to the nullah, and, being under 100 men, would fall an easy prey. The rebels pushed on, therefore, to the nullah, and, great must have been their surprise to find nearly an equal force drawn up ready to receive them, for the picket had been joined by the night reinforcement, and agreed among themselves that, in spite of the zumboorahs, they would not retreat. The rebels immediately opened their zumboorahs across the nullah, and our men, finding this annoying, plunged into the nullah, forded it in the face of the fire, and attacked the enemy on the further side. A short struggle ensued, which ended in the total defeat of the rebels, who were pursued for a coss or two beyond Leia, losing all their zumboorahs, and twelve men killed, besides several prisoners, who took refuge in the city streets, and afterwards gave up their arms. On our side, two men were slightly wounded.

The report of the zumboorahs sounded so loud, across the Indus, that the artillerymen in our camp declared they were guns. I therefore ordered my horse, and desired the whole force to cross along with me, to assist in bringing off the picket, with the exception of the two guns, which I determined to leave in camp, with two infantry companies, in order that we might not be embarrassed with them, on our return. The passage was not completed, when two sowars came in from Leia, with the news of the enemy being beaten back.

The affair was one of considerable gallantry, and did great honor to the picket, which was composed entirely of Puthans, raised during the last fortnight. The excitement it caused in camp among the other Puthans was so great that every voice was for an instant advance on Leia, and I had great difficulty in showing the wisdom of waiting, at least, for farther information, as to the strength of the enemy in the rear.

Only an hour before, I had received a note from you desiring me to confine my attention to the Trans-Indus, and very sufficient reasons could alone justify my again entering the Sind Sagur Doab, so I halted the force on the left bank in the village of Noorawalla, remained myself on the right bank, sent praise to the picket, and ordered them to scour the country round, for information of the enemy's main body.

Most fortunate was it that we were not led away by our morning's triumph. For, in the evening, from several quarters, information reached us, that between 6,000 and 7,000, horse and foot, were marching on Leia, with 15 guns, (9 heavy, and 6 horse,) and had, already, got within a short march of the city. They were delayed by some of their guns being in the rear, and the interval was not to be thrown away.

Immediate orders were issued for the re-crossing of the whole force, including the brave picket, at Leia, and, as I write this, the operation is going on by moonlight. It will be close work, but it will be done in time, and our men certainly retire with honor, after the feat of this morning.

Anxiety, however, now commences in earnest, and my main object, in the present letter, is to claim your most serious and prompt attention to this frontier, which I should be deceiving you if I pretended to think otherwise than in imminent danger.

From the first, I have lost no opportunity of stating the extreme probability of Dewan Moolraj assuming the initiative, if the British Government did not, at once, put him on the defensive, by investing Mooltan, and declared the inability of General Cortlandt and myself to offer any effectual resistance, should Moolraj carry the campaign across the Indus. The time has now arrived when these anticipations seem likely to be realized.

Not content with having marched 4,000 men and 10 guns across the Chenab, Moolraj has now strengthened them to upwards of 6,000 men and 15 guns, and, while marching on Leia, this force is accumulating a fleet of boats, with the avowed intention of crossing to this side, and destroying either my force, or General Cortlandt's, or both.

General Cortlandt has with him 6 guns, 6 zumboorahs, and 2 regiments, one of which is required to keep the other from open mutiny, and desertion to the enemy.

My force consists of 2 guns, (2 more will join me the day after to-morrow,) 14 zumboorahs, (besides those captured to-day,) 6 companies of regular infantry, 200 Barukzye Sowars, and about 1,200 Puthans, horse and foot, newly raised. Total under 2,000 men.

If, therefore, General Cortlandt and I were to unite, our strength would be little more than half that of the enemy's on the other bank, which the enemy may cross, to-morrow, by a skilful choice of a ferry.

The consequences of a defeat on this frontier would be so extensive and disastrous, that, plainly as they stare me in the face, I have deemed the responsibility of not acting on my own judgment greater than that of acting without authority. Supposing that no British force is likely to take the field till after the rains, the only move which can save this frontier, is, in my opinion, the advance of Bahawal Khan's army across the Sutlej, so as to threaten Mooltan, and oblige Moolraj to recall his frontier expeditions. I have, therefore, this evening, addressed a letter to that Prince, stating my position, and recommending him to cross at once; and I have now to request, that you will be so good as to let me know, by return of dak, whether this move meets your sanction, and if not, whether I have your authority to give up Dera Ghazee Khan and Sungurh to the rebels, and fall back altogether on Akalgarh, where alone it will soon be practicable to make a stand; to this alternative we are reduced.

It will be much to be regretted if any circumstances render the former plan impracticable, for it offers exactly those advantages to the Sirkar which the latter will relinquish to Moolraj; if Bahawal Khan threatens Mooltan, he will confine Moolraj therein, prevent his undertaking expeditions to the provinces, and collecting

their revenue, and cut him off from getting more recruits. If General Cortlandt and I are driven into Akalpurh, it will release the provinces from our control, stop the revenue, and send every recruit to Moolraj. I see, by the public papers, that an absurd idea had got abroad that Moolraj has 60,000 soldiers, at present, he has not more than 10,000, but, if Mooltan is not invested, however slightly, and a few months elapse before any steps are taken to check his present career of impunity, those who best know the military resources of this frontier, are quite of opinion that he may gather 50,000. from what I see, I quite agree with them.

P S *Morning, May 17th.*—Information from General Cortlandt has just come in, that the enemy has crossed a strong force, with twelve guns, at the ferry of Peronwallah, about thirty coss to the south of this place. The great zemindars of Dera Ghazee Khan on hearing this, and receiving summonses from the rebels, stopped on their way to the General's camp, and returned to their homes, in alarm, to look after their families. This is the best we could expect from them, under the circumstances. Moolraj has called on all the zemindars of Ghazee Khan and Sungurh to join his army, and wrest Mungrotah back again from us. It is an anxious crisis, rendered still worse by the state of the Futteh Pultun, and, if some move is not made from Lahore or Bahawalpore at once, the consequence can be nothing but disastrous. It is disheartening to perceive that we alone are conscious of our own danger.

I have been reluctantly obliged to order Cortlandt to fall back, in order that we may, unitedly, throw up embankments round the fort of Girang, and make a stand on our own ground. The result is with God, but I trust you will no longer delay to take the field, or you will have to fight all this frontier, as well as Mooltan.

Inclosure 27 in No 27

*The Resident at Lahore to the Commander-in-chief.*

*Lahore, May 17, 1848.*

I HAVE the honor to acknowledge the receipt, this day, of your Lordship's letter of the 13th instant\* informing me of the propositions you have suggested to the Governor-General in Council, for the collecting of a force at Ferozepore, with a detail of the proposed strength of that force.

I trust that one-third of the force your Lordship proposes will be found ample for any service that may be required in the Punjab, though it is doubtless best to be prepared for the worst that can happen.

If all the forebodings of the officers on the frontiers are fulfilled, the force your Lordship proposes assembling will be scarcely too large for the operations that will be required.

If the Khalsa army can be kept from joining Moolraj, the atrocious misconduct of the Dewan and his troops may be easily punished. I have great hopes that this may be effected. There remains, doubtless, the probability of revolt and insurrection of the Mahomedan tribes on the frontier, but, though the Khalsa army will not act against Moolraj, they will I think, against their, almost natural, enemies in their own districts.

My hopes are stronger than they were ten days ago. Moolraj is not making head just now. He has not altogether, up to this time, more than 7,000 followers, and the greater part of these are quite undisciplined and ill-armed, and there are already dissensions among them, and continual desertions from them. The commandant of the Irregular Horse that accompanied Sirdar Khan Sing Man and Mr Agnew, took the first opportunity to quit Mooltan, with his troops, and they are now on their way to Lahore. Lahore itself, and the neighbouring country, are in a much quieter state than they were; the late detection of the machinations of the disaffected, the prompt example made of the principal offenders, and the removal of the Maharanee from the scene of her abominable schemes, have had a vastly sedative effect in the spirit of revolt and disaffection that was abroad.

All this is favorable; still, four or five months are a very long time to look forward to, and it will be very difficult to keep things from getting much worse during so long a period of inaction, and of impunity to those who have so grossly insulted and outraged the British Government.

The heavy guns will, I conclude, go by land to Mooltan, and not down the Sutlej, from Ferozepore, in that case, it would, perhaps, be well to get a portion of them across the river before the rains; the moving them across the Sutlej towards Lahore would have a very good effect at the present moment.

Inclosure 28 in No. 27

*Lieutenant Eduardes to the Resident at Lahore.*

*Camp at Dera Futteh Khan, May 18, 1848.*

ON the 16th and 17th, I had the honor to inform you of a skirmish between our packet at Leia and the advanced party of the rebels, in which the former were completely victorious, and the latter lost their zumboorahs, and twelve men killed, of my withdrawing all my men from the Sind Sagur Doab, under the idea that the rebel army was making for Leia in force, and of the sudden intelligence, from General Cortlandt, that they had altered their plans, and crossed the Indus at the Peronwallah ferry, below the General's position.

General Cortlandt reported only twelve guns, but cossids, on whom I could rely, had seen fifteen on the left bank, previous to the passage, and estimated the force of the rebels as not under 6,000, a reinforcement having arrived from Mooltan.

The inference was, that the rebels had never intended advancing their main body to Leia, but had given out that intention to cover their crossing the Indus, and that the party of 400 horsemen who really did come to Leia, on the 16th, had done so, under the idea that we had evacuated it, and that the revenue was at their mercy.

It became necessary to decide, at once, how this new and imminent danger was to be met, and, as neither General Cortlandt, nor I, could, single-handed, venture to oppose such a force, the necessity of an immediate junction was evident. The only question that remained was, whether General Cortlandt should fall back on me, or I advance to him? His account of the instantaneous defection of those Toomundars who had joined him from Dera Ghazee Khan, when they thought his side the strongest, was too significant a hint to be neglected. It proved that the yoke of Sawun Mull was still strong on that dependency of Mooltan, and that Moolraj's army would have the assistance of the Moolkerah. The faithlessness of the Futteh Pultun, too, hung like a millstone round my neck, whenever I thought of venturing a collision, and, finally, I wrote to General Cortlandt that, if the enemy had actually effected the passage, in force, my opinion was that we must confine ourselves to our own elagua, throw up entrenchments round the fort of Girang, and make the best stand we could, in that position.

Scarcely had this been decided on, than a new difficulty arose. Of the two wells at Girang, one is salt, and causes sickness to those who drink it,—a sufficient obstacle to awaiting a siege at that point! Whither to go next? Akalguh, at Dera Ismael Khan, ought only to be retuned upon, in the very last extremity. To betake ourselves, at once, to it would be pusillanimous. In this emergency, I counted up the number of our new levies. Many horse and foot had, fortunately, joined us, during the day, and they amounted to 1,741 in the whole. Besides these, I had six companies of regular Infantry, two guns, fourteen zumboorahs of our own, and nine taken from the enemy, and two more guns from Bunnoo were only a march behind us. General Cortlandt's force might be 1,600 or 1,700 men, of whom, 800 (the Futteh Pultun) were known to be disaffected. The General had six guns and six zumboorahs. It appeared, therefore, that if we could, in any way, get rid of the Futteh Pultun, we could muster about 3,000 men, (on whom we could rely to fight honestly) ten guns and twenty-nine zumboorahs, a force which, if entrenched, however slightly, might beat back, if it could not conquer, 6,000 or 7,000 men, though the latter had fifteen guns, of which nine were heavy artillery.

I wrote, therefore, again to General Cortlandt, that, if he was still convinced that the enemy had got over the river, he was to detach the Futteh Pultun to the fort of Mungrotah, of which we recently obtained possession, and put that post in the exclusive charge of the suspected corps, making the Colonel responsible for holding it; after which, he was himself to retire, with his remaining men, to Tibbee, a point midway between him and me, where I understood there was good water and an open plain. Here I proposed to join him, and intrench. Tibbee is in the extreme south border of our own elagua; and could not, therefore, be considered a

dishonorable position wherein to await the enemy, while, at the same time, its maintenance would secure the whole of our own country from plunder

The move of the Futteh Pultun may be regarded as a bold, nay, almost desperate, resource; but I would urge that to such resources are we reduced by no move being made on Mooltan, and Dewan Moolraj being at liberty to turn all his strength in the only quarter where he is threatened with hearty opposition. I was not by any means hopeless either, that the conspicuous and unavoidable responsibility, thus forced on the Sikh regiment, would oblige them to be loyal, by leaving them no cover for their treachery. If they held the fort, the service they would render to the State would restore their reputation, and if they gave it up to the enemy, we should have made a good exchange of a secret foe in our own camp, for an open one outside. Moreover, (and this alone is a sufficient reason) the only other means I had of holding Mungrotah, during the retreat of General Cortlandt, was to make it over to Mitteh Khan Kusrance, the chief Toomundar of Sungurb, who would have kept possession certainly, but for both sides, prepared to claim the reward of service from whomsoever was victorious.

This being settled, I marched this morning from the Ghat to the town of Dera Futteh Khan. Here I received later letters from General Cortlandt, contradicting the passage of the enemy, but confirming their intention to do so, as soon as they had collected sufficient boats. The General urged me to join him, in order that, unitedly, we might now try to oppose their crossing, and, as this is one more point in our favor, I immediately agreed.

This evening, I shall put the guns and infantry into boats, and accompany them myself, down the river, to the ferry opposite Dera Deen Punnah, on the right bank of which, General Cortlandt is encamped, and, on the left, the rebels. The cavalry I send by land, and they will, as well as the infantry, reach General Cortlandt, to-morrow afternoon.

If the enemy are discouraged by the defeat their party sustained at Leia, on the 16th, they will, perhaps, consider well before they cross, but it is obvious that they will be again reinforced from Mooltan, and that we have no succour to hope for. I have, candidly, laid the whole state of the case before you, and again repeat my conviction that, if a British force does not threaten Mooltan, or Bahawal Khan cross the Sutlej, General Cortlandt's force and mine must, sooner or later, be destroyed. If neither of these moves seem advisable, I can only assure you of my protracting what resistance is in my power, as long as possible. Circumstances, however, are much altered for the worse, since it was determined to defer hostilities till the cold season. Dewan Moolraj was then merely holding a strong fort against the Sirkar. He is now in the field, hunting the Royal armies.

Inclosure 29 in No 27

*The Secretary to the Government of India to the Resident at Lahore*

*Fort William, May 19, 1848*

THE deep concern with which the Government of India received the intelligence of the treacherous attack upon Mr Vans Agnew and Lieutenant Anderson, and their entire confidence, at the same time, in your ability, firmness, and energy to meet the danger that might arise from that event, have, already, been communicated to you.

On receiving your letter\* of the 27th ultimo, with a copy of the communication you had addressed to the Commander-in-chief, requesting his opinion on the practicability of military operations against Mooltan at this season of the year, his Lordship in Council abstained from furnishing you with any specific instructions for your guidance, feeling that you would not only have decided the question whether a British force should, or should not, be sent, without delay, to Mooltan, but that you would have acted on your decision, long before any instructions on the subject could reach you. Under such circumstances, his Lordship in Council considered that orders given to you, in ignorance of the course of events, and of your determination, might, probably, tend rather to embarrass than to assist you. It was, therefore, resolved to await the communication of the Commander-in-chief's reply to your letter, and the final expression of your views, on being made aware of His Excellency's opinion.

\* Inclosure 17 in No. 26.

His Lordship in Council having now received your despatch, dated the 3rd of May,\* in which you intimate your acquiescence in the opinion expressed by his Excellency, that the movement of British troops, at this season of the year, would be inexpedient, if not impracticable, directs me to communicate to you the entire concurrence of the Government of India in the decision to which you have come.

The movement you first proposed to make, of a portion of the British force, might have been expedient, as a demonstration in aid and support of the troops of the Lahore Durbar, who were advanced for the purpose of repressing the insurrection at Mooltan; but, when intelligence reached you that the Durbar troops who formed Mr Vans Agnew's escort, had, in a body, joined the insurgents, and when you had good ground for believing that the whole Durbar army would, on arriving at Mooltan, have followed their example, you acted with prudence and discretion in pausing before you engaged, and in now finally determining not to engage, the British troops in such a district as Mooltan, and at such a season of the year, in operations on the extensive scale on which they must have been conducted. Had the outbreak occurred a few months, or even a few weeks, earlier in the year, his Lordship in Council would have expected, and required, a different course of action. The British force would, in that case, have been instantly moved, and the outrage committed, the treachery shown, on the part of the leaders and the soldiers in Mooltan, would have been followed by a retribution no less prompt than severe. But, to have moved an army now, against a fort so strong as that of Mooltan, requiring a siege train for its reduction, to have done so with a knowledge of the force collecting there, of the probability, which the admission of the Sirdars have since converted into certainty, that the army of the Maharajah was not faithful—at a season when the heat is intolerable, the rains in early prospect, and the rivers already beginning to swell towards the inundation which they spread over the country,—this would have involved the certainty of a fearful loss of life among the troops, and might have resulted in a temporary failure of the enterprise.

The Government of India are fully alive to the effect which the inactivity of the British power for several months, under such an insult and injury, will have on the minds of the people of the country. His Lordship in Council does not question the existence of danger to British influence, in the course which has been determined on. It is but too possible that the flame, kindled at Mooltan, may spread into conflagration throughout the Punjab. But, on the other hand, his Lordship in Council is convinced, that the discontinuance of operations which the season would have compelled, and the apparent discomfiture implied in that discontinuance, would have caused rebellion to spread as rapidly, and would have produced dangers quite as great as those which delay will produce, while it would have left the Government less fully prepared to meet them.

When the period shall have passed, during which military operations are impracticable, the Government of India will put forth, if necessary, the whole power that they can command, for the purpose of inflicting severe and signal punishment on those guilty of this outrage, and of exacting, from the State of Lahore, that national reparation which the national injury done to the Government of the East India Company imperatively requires. The Lahore Government has failed, and will ever fail, it is feared, to punish the murderers of the British officers, and to repress the rebellion. The British Government must do this for themselves, and they are firmly resolved to do so.

In furtherance of this determination, the Governor-General in Council will issue immediate directions, for the commencement, and vigorous prosecution, of such preparations as may enable the army to take the field, as soon as the season will permit.

In the mean time, every precaution should be taken for securing the present position of the British force at Lahore, and for providing against any danger which may arise within the Punjab. You have, already, directed the reinforcement of the troops near Lahore. The Governor-General in Council entirely approves of this measure.

His Lordship in Council will be glad to hear that you have resolved to place a garrison of British troops in Govindghur. You have the power to do this under the treaty, and it would be an expedient measure at the present time.

At a moment so favorable for the exercise of her powers of intrigue, it can hardly be doubted that the Ranee is prepared for, if not already busy in, mischief.

Having regard, therefore, to the influence which her presence, as well as her ability, would have with the insurgent force, if she could escape and join them, and not having any confidence in the trustworthiness of the Sikh custody, in which she is placed, the Governor-General in Council requests that you will take steps for obtaining the consent of the Durbar to her immediate removal into the British territories, with a view to her temporary safe custody there. In the event of the Durbar showing any reluctance to do this, you are authorized to take your own measures, and (unless reasons, very urgent indeed, lead you to a different conclusion) to remove the Ranee, accordingly, without waiting for the consent of the Durbar.

The Governor-General in Council thinks it advisable to leave to your discretion the mode by which, and the terms in which, you will communicate with Moolraj and the Durbar, and will make known our intentions to them. You will, however, not fail to make it clearly understood that the Government which you represent, is neither indifferent, nor inactive, but that, fully prepared for every event, and deeply resenting all that has occurred, they will assuredly inflict severe punishment, and exact a heavy reparation. You may inform the Durbar that the extent of that reparation will greatly depend on the manner in which the State of Lahore shall be found to have observed its engagements, and fulfilled its obligations, towards that Government which has, hitherto, shown itself so full of moderation and friendship towards the Government of Lahore.

The Governor-General in Council regards with much anxiety the position of Lieutenant Edwardes. His Lordship in Council trusts, that the measures you have taken may secure the safety of that gallant officer, and of the other officers who are employed on detached service.

The Governor-General in Council need not impress upon you the necessity of great vigilance, for the purpose of discovering the attempts made to tamper with the fidelity of the British troops at Lahore. You intimate that such attempts have been made, and that they have been discovered. If you detect an offender, and prove against him the offence of seducing troops from their allegiance, you will deal promptly with him—you are placed in circumstances requiring stern and unhesitating execution of justice—in such circumstances, the measures which your own vigour may prompt you to adopt, will receive strong support from the Government of India.

Inclosure 30 in No. 27

*The Resident at Lahore to the Secretary to the Government of India.*

*Lahore, May 19, 1848*

I HAVE only a private letter from Peshawur to day, which states that unpleasant reports were rife about the rising of the Khalsa army, the date of which was said to be fixed for the 22nd, or 24th, of this month.

I do not attach much importance to these reports. I look with some interest to the effect that the removal of the Maharanee from the Punjab will have on the Sikh soldiery.

Inclosure 31 in No. 27

*The Resident at Lahore to the Secretary to the Government of India.*

*Lahore, May 20, 1848*

ALL continues quiet at Lahore and its neighbourhood. The detachments from Jullundur and Ludiana, of the strength noted in the margin\*, marched into Lahore yesterday morning.

Lieutenant Lumsden returned, yesterday, from Ferozepore, where he left the Maharanee, under Captain Browne's charge. I have now made all arrangements for her march towards Benares, and she will, I hope, leave Ferozepore, in the course of the next three days.

I feel assured that the Governor-General in Council will be pleased with the admirable manner in which Lieutenant Lumsden carried out all the arrangements I made, for the safe removal of the Ranee, from Sheikhoopoor to Ferozepore.

\* 2 regiments, native infantry, 1 troop, horse artillery, 1 regiment, irregular cavalry

## Inclosure 32 in No. 27.

*The Resident at Lahore to Lieutenant Edwardes.**Lahore, May 20, 1848.*

I AM much disposed to discredit Mustapha Khan's statement of Sirdar Khan Sing Man's treachery. His conduct is very differently described, by numerous eye-witnesses who have returned from Mooltan; and there is no doubt that he is, up to this time, a close prisoner, in heavy irons, and subject to very hard treatment.

## Inclosure 33 in No. 27

*The Resident at Lahore to the Secretary to the Government of India.**Lahore, May 22, 1848.*

THERE was a Sikh Gooroo, called Bhaee Maharaj, concerned in the Preyma case, and for whose apprehension a reward was offered, at the time, by the Durbar. This man has, lately, appeared in the neighbourhood of Deenanuggur, and some 200 or 300 vagabonds have joined him, for the purpose of plunder, or disturbance. I have sent the 14th Irregulars, with two guns from the native troop of Horse Artillery, to disperse them, and have taken measures for the seizure of Maharaj himself, by a sudden raid upon him from Mookerian in Jullundur, which is only about fourteen miles from the place he usually retires to

## Inclosure 34 in No. 27.

*The Resident at Lahore to the Secretary to the Government of India**Lahore, May 23, 1848.*

LIEUTENANT EDWARDES is a most energetic, enterprising, and skilful officer; and I have much hope that he will, by the exercise of these qualities, succeed in extricating himself and his force from his very critical position.

Many of my letters have miscarried, doubtless, and he was not, perhaps, aware of the arrangements I had made for protecting our districts, and getting possession of Moolraj's, in the Sind Sagur Doab, without his, or General Cortlandt's, being brought across the Indus

I am glad to say that I have just received communications from Bahawalpore, from which it appears that the Nawab Bahawal Khan was, on the 19th of the month, making active preparations for throwing his army across the Sutlej.

If the Nawab does this, Moolraj must instantly recall his troops from Leia on the Indus; or Bahawal Khan, and our force in the Baree Doab, may occupy the town of Mooltan, cut off his retreating troops from their fort, and attack them at the ferries of the Chenab.

## Inclosure 35 in No. 27

*The Resident at Lahore to Lieutenant Edwardes.**Lahore, May 23, 1848.*

I RECEIVED late last evening your letter, dated the 16th and 17th instant\*, with its inclosure, a letter addressed by you to Nawab Bahawal Khan

My letters already addressed to you, and more particularly those more recently written, will have informed you of my having, from the first breaking out of Moolraj's rebellion, called upon Bahawal Khan to co-operate with us, whenever the moment for making that co-operation most effective should arrive, and that Bahawal Khan declared he had his troops in hand, ready to cross the Sutlej when desired.

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\* Inclosure 26 in No. 27



I sent him instructions, through his vakeel here, ten days ago, to put his force across, at once, and occupy the country, and forts, between Bahawulpore and Mooltan. This injunction, through the vakeel, I followed up by a khurreeta from myself, on the 20th instant, and urged him, if the troops recalled from Leia had been again sent away, to lose not a moment in pushing on as near Mooltan as he could.

I repeated these injunctions by another khurreeta yesterday, in reply to one from the Nawab, asking if he might occupy the lower part of the Sind Sagur Doab, as well as the tract on the Ravee already indicated.

I sincerely trust that Bahawul Khan's army is now across the Sutlej, and threatening Mooltan. The instant Bahawul Khan's troops are across, Moolraj must recall the force he has sent against you, for it comprises his whole army and moveable artillery.

I need not, after what I have now, and before, written, say, that I approve of your having put yourself in communication with Nawab Bahawul Khan, and called on him for co-operation.

Dewan Jowahir Mull Dutt, with his newly raised levies, was at Jeura near Saheenal, on the 16th instant, and Sirdar Jhunda Sing, with his force, was at Ahmedabad on the same day, pushing down to the southward. The approach of these may tend to make the force sent against Leia hesitate to cross the Indus, even if Bahawul Khan's troops are not across the Sutlej. At any rate, Moolraj's army will never follow you to any distance up the right bank of the Indus, if you should have fallen back towards Dera Ismael Khan.

It seems to me that General Cortlandt's information, received by you on the 17th, of the force being actually across the Indus, cannot have been correct, considering where they were on the 16th, according to the account given by your people.

You have acted with the utmost energy and gallantry on this, as on all other occasions, but my object has, all along, been to prevent your bringing your weak force, composed of such uncertain materials, in collision with the rebel army. Therefore, I have always urged upon you to confine your operations to the right bank of the Indus, being sure that, as soon as the newly raised troops should, with Bahawul Khan's co-operation, threaten Mooltan on all sides, Moolraj never could move across the Indus to annoy you.

I am, I assure you, fully aware of the vast importance of preserving the peace of your frontier, and of the extensive and disastrous consequences that will, in all probability, result from the rebellion extending in that direction, and the Trans-Indus districts joining the insurrection, and, in all my arrangements, I have kept in view the necessity of preserving tranquillity, if possible, in your districts.

Your newly raised levies have behaved most gallantly, and you may assure them of my admiration of their conduct, and that it will meet with its just reward.

My position is one of great difficulty, the seige of Mooltan is declared, by the military authorities, by whom it must be undertaken, impracticable at this season. To march British troops, without the means of effecting their object by reducing the fort, would be a mockery.

I look, with the most anxious expectation, for the next accounts from you. The position in which you were placed when your letters were closed, was a very intricate one, but I have such confidence in your judgment, energy, and resource, that I am not without hope that you may have succeeded in extricating your force from the peril in which it was placed.

Inclosure 36 in No 27

*The Resident at Lahore to the Secretary to the Government of India.*

*Lahore, May 25, 1848.*

I FORWARD a letter received this morning from Lieutenant Edwardes, dated the 18th instant.\*

I thought it impossible that Moolraj's force had crossed the Indus, on the 17th. I think it very improbable that it will attempt to do so, at all, in the face of Lieutenant Edwardes' and General Cortlandt's troops, and most likely that, if it does, it will be beaten back.

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\* Inclosure 28 in No. 27

Moolraj's force could not remain where it was : there has been a great rise in the rivers of the Punjab, during the last four days ; and the Indus is said to be the first to feel the influence of those causes which occasion this rise. The right bank, on which General Cortlandt and Lieutenant Edwardes are, is high and steep, all the way below Dera Ismael Khan, while the left is low and sandy ; and, on the first considerable rise of the river, it is inundated for eight or ten miles.

I do not think that, under any circumstances, Moolraj would permit his officers to place the inundations of the Indus and Chenab between his only army and Mooltan.

The reports from Raja Shere Sing's camp are, that the Khalsa soldiery, on hearing of the removal of the Maharanee, were much disturbed they said, that she was the mother of all the Khalsa, and that, as she was gone, and the young Duleep Sing in our hands, they had no longer any one to fight for, and uphold, that they had no inducement to oppose Moolraj, and, if he came to attack them, would seize the sirdars, and their officers, and go over to him.

These are but wild and whirling words, if they were really uttered ; but it is no part of my plan to bring Raja Shere Sing's force into collision with Moolraj's, unless Moolraj's power is broken by other means, and, then, the brave Khalsa army may be depended on, in operations to hasten his downfall.

The intelligence of the Ranee's removal does not appear to have caused any great sensation at Peshawur, or Ilazara.

I have allowed Lieutenant Herbert, and the drill instructors, to proceed to Peshawur, in company with the Nizam-oo-dowlah Mohummud Oosman Khan, with whom, under any circumstances, they would be safe. It is not expedient to appear apprehensive of evil, or to indicate distrust of the troops. Unless we meet with some great reverse or disaster, the Peshawur force will, I think, now remain quiet. They have before their eyes the wholesome dread of the Mahomedan population, by whom they are surrounded, and thoroughly hated, a great part of the force is, moreover, Mahomedan, and this would remain staunch to us, unless Dost Mahomed should come, which is not likely.

Inclosure 37 in No 27

*The Secretary to the Government of India to the Resident at Lahore.*

*Fort William, May 27, 1848*

BY the tenth article of the Treaty, of the 22nd of December, 1846, it is agreed that the sum of 1,50,000 rupees shall be set apart, annually, from the revenues of the Lahore State, as a provision for the maintenance of the Ranee and her dependants. This allowance, though a liberal, was a fitting provision for the mother of the Maharajah Duleep Sing, and she was secure of receiving it, so long as she abstained from hostile intrigues against the Power who guaranteed it to her. The Governor-General in Council is under the impression that, when the Ranee was removed, on account of her intrigues to Sheikhoopoor, the allowance was reduced by the Durbar, at the suggestion of the Resident, to 4,000 rupees per mensem. The position she now holds, is materially different. She has been guilty of plotting against the British interests at Lahore, and, for this offence, the mere removal of her to British territory, cannot be called a punishment, while she is treated in the same liberal manner as before. His Lordship in Council is, therefore, of opinion, that you should consider, in communication with the Council of Regency, the propriety of a further reduction of the allowance, such as would still leave it ample, considering that the Ranee is taking with her a very large amount of private property and jewels.

Inclosure 38 in No. 27.

*The Secretary to the Government of India to the Resident at Lahore.*

*Fort William, May 27, 1848.*

THE Governor-General in Council is desirous that you should convey to Lieutenant Edwardes his approbation of the gallantry, energy, and judgment he displayed in his proceedings, after he received intelligence of the insurrection at Mooltan.

The Governor-General in Council regrets that he is unable to extend the same approbation to the course pursued by Lieutenant Edwardes in, subsequently, entering, without any authority whatsoever, into a correspondence with the Dewan Moolraj, intimating to him the terms he would guarantee, if the Dewan would consent to surrender and submit.

The Governor-General in Council is much concerned that you should have expressed to Lieutenant Edwardes your approval and confirmation of all that he has said.

The Dewan Moolraj has offered a flagrant insult to the British Government ; he has participated in, and approved, the murder of two valued servants of that Government ; and he is now a rebel in arms against British authority and power

To such an offender as this, the Governor-General in Council conceives that no terms should have been offered, and that no overtures should have been entertained, which did not convey the Dewan's unconditional surrender of himself to the British Power, and his unconditional submission to that justice, which it never fails strictly to observe.

The Governor-General in Council, accordingly, requests that, in the event of Lieutenant Edwardes' present proposal not having been accepted, no proposal but one of unconditional surrender shall, hereafter, be admitted from the Dewan Moolraj.

#### No 28

#### *The Governor-General in Council to the Secret Committee*

*Fort Wilham, June 10, 1848 (No. 51.)*

NO new circumstance has arisen in the Punjab, to disturb the tranquillity which prevailed at the date of our last dispatch of the 3rd instant, No 50

Our postscript informed you that the report of Moolraj's force having crossed the Indus was not correct, and, at this late season of the year, it was thought he would not be able to cross

The last accounts from Lieutenant Edwardes are very satisfactory. In his dispatch of the 20th of May,\* he states "The shameful repulse of the rebel detachment at Leia, on the 16th, proved that we are not to be touched, with impunity. The leader, one Jas Mull, who was coming to take possession of Leia, of which Moolraj had, on paper, appointed him Hakim, saved himself from that rout, only by hiding in a tobacco-field, and has become the jest of the country in consequence, and the run-aways, to account for the loss of their zumboorahs, declared that they had been enticed, by the deceitful Feringhee, into an ambush of 3,000 men, which has raised me much in public estimation, without deserving it. Thus, followed by our sudden withdrawal from Leia, and appearance next day at Peronwallah in a formidable fleet, thirty-two coss from where we were last heard of, and just opposite the rebel camp, has completely confounded the enemy" He says, that no cavalry had joined General Cortlandt's force, and adds "If the enemy had not the heart to cross when General Cortlandt was alone, they are little likely to do so now, and, for the time, I consider our position as most materially improved, since last I wrote. The general opinion, indeed, is, that the rebel camp opposite us will give up the idea of crossing, break up, and hurry back to Mooltan ;" and, though he seems to consider it probable that Moolraj will return in force, and cross the Indus, there is nothing in the facts which he reports, which gives color to that supposition.

In his postscript, he reports that he has obtained possession of Dera Ghazee Khan, to which he attaches great importance. He states that Gholam Hyder Khan, the son of Kowrah Khan, a powerful Toomundar of the Khosa tribe, had volunteered to raise his father's clan, and expel Moolraj's party from Dera Ghazee Khan : "Having joined his father, Kowrah Khan, at Dera Ghazee Khan, the two raised their clan for a grand struggle against their enemies, the Lugharees, who mustered 500 strong, around Longa Mull Cheytun Mull, and the remaining Hakim of Lungurh and Mungrotah, had joined his nephew, and the two moved boldly out, in front of Dera Ghazee Khan, and encamped themselves, on the road, to oppose General Cortlandt's anticipated advance. They had one gun and five zumboorahs. In the last watch of the night, the Khosas drew near, and surrounded the two Kardars, who

fired away, at random, till it was light, when the Khosas attacked them, sword in hand. The Lugharees fought desperately, and the fight lasted three hours, when the rebels were overpowered; Cheytan Mull and one nephew killed on the field, Longa Mull taken prisoner, and the gun and five zumboorahs captured. The Khosas were still pursuing the vanquished, when the two cossids who brought this news left Dera Ghazee Khan. This is most important news, and cannot but have great effect upon the enemy." It appears, therefore, that Moolraj had not only been entirely unsuccessful in his attempts on the other side of the Indus, but has lost many posts which were in his possession at the commencement of the rebellion.

The occupation of Dera Ghazee Khan is not only gratifying in itself, but, especially, for the mode in which that post was gained. By the encouragement held out to a native chief of influence, and by the conquest he has effected on behalf of Lieutenant Edwardes, the sympathies of the rude Mahomedan tribes of the Derajat, have been enlisted on the side of that gallant officer, securing for him a greater chance of being able to offer successful resistance to the Sikh troops, in his own camp, whom he suspects of disaffection, and even of more treasonable designs, if they had the means to carry them into effect.

These two actions, at Leia and at Ghazee Khan, will, by their complete success, operate most favorably upon the minds of those who maintain but a doubtful allegiance, and, as the river has already begun to rise, and will now daily increase in depth and rapidity, we have great reason to hope that Lieutenant Edwardes will be able to maintain his position, till the British troops advance to Mooltan.

The other officers on detached duty report, generally, that affairs are tranquil in their respective neighbourhoods, though they all entertain suspicions of the fidelity of the Sikh troops. They have not yet had time to report the effect of the Maharanee's removal, but it is to be hoped that it will be attended with all the good effects anticipated by Sir F. Currie. They still mention that a day has been fixed for a general rising of the Khalsa army, but it is satisfactory to reflect that Major Abbott, at Hazara and Major Lawrence, at Peshawur, do not concur in naming the same day, the former naming the 23rd, and the latter the 25th ultimo, and that, as the Resident's last letter is dated from Lahore, the 29th idem, he had ample time to learn if any such demonstration had occurred, and to communicate it to the Government.

At Lahore itself, all was perfectly tranquil. The result of the expedition against Bhace Maharaj Sing has not yet been reported, but the measures taken to secure his apprehension were prompt, and judicious.

In our last dispatch, we alluded to the proposal of the Commander-in-chief, respecting the force to be assembled, early in the cold season, for the reduction of Mooltan. We have considered that there is nothing, in the present aspect of affairs, to warrant the conclusion that so large a force as 24,000 men and 50 siege guns can be required for any operations that we can be called upon to undertake.

We have endeavoured to secure the object which we have in view, by a more moderate exhibition of strength, and without any increase to the army.

After a most careful consideration of the matter, in all its bearings; after contemplating the possibility of the whole country being arrayed against us, which every day seems now to render more improbable, and having regard to the imposing force at Lahore, and in the Jullundur Doab, which will be maintained without reduction; and to the brigade which will act in co-operation in the direction of Sind, we conceive that the army we have resolved on assembling, on the frontier, as soon as the weather permits, will be found amply sufficient for the purpose of chastising the rebels, and exacting reparation.

Inclosure 1 in No. 28.

*The Resident at Lahore to Major-General W. S. Whish, C.B.*

*Lahore, May 21, 1848.*

I REQUEST that you will give orders for the march, with as little delay as possible, of a regiment of irregular cavalry, and two guns from one of the troops of horse artillery, to Deenanuggur, to disperse a party of disaffected persons assembling at that place.

Deenanuggur is about fourteen or fifteen miles from Mookerian, and the distance from Hajeeport. I would suggest that the officers commanding at those stations be directed to co-operate with this detachment, if called upon to do so, by the officer in command, or the political officer who will join it before reaching Deenanuggur.

Inclosure 2 in No. 28

*Major D Simpson, Commanding at Hajeeport, to Brevet-Major H. Palmer, Major of Brigade, Jullundur*

*Hajeeport, 12 o'clock, May 21, 1848*

I CONSIDER it my duty to bring to the notice of the brigadier commanding the district, that I have just received a letter from Captain Hicks, commanding at Mookerian, with an enclosure from the officer of customs at Pathunkote, stating that a Raja was moving about, with about 400 armed men, consisting of upwards of 100 horse and 250 foot, with the intention of plundering Pathunkote and attacking Noorpoor, this refractory Raja is, strictly speaking, not in our territory, and on the other side of the river, the different fords of which are all watched by parties from the 15th Irregulars.

I have warned a company to be in readiness to strengthen Noorpoor, and will await the orders of the brigadier commanding, should he deem it requisite.

Inclosure 3 in No. 28

*J. Laurence, Esq., Commissioner and Superintendent, Trans-Sutlej States, to Brigadier H. M. Wheeler, C. B., commanding in the Jullundur Doab*

*Dhumsal, May 23, 1848*

I HAVE received authentic information that a Gooroo, or religious character, of the name of Maharaj Sing, is enlisting followers, in great numbers, in the Sikh territory, not far from Puthankote and Soojanpoor, on the British frontier, across the Beas. He is said to have already several hundred followers.

I have directed Lieutenant Phillpotts to march to Puthankote, with the head quarters of the 15th Irregulars, and Lieutenant Wallace from Kangra, with two Companies of the Hill Regiment, with the view of protecting the British villages in that direction. I suggest that Major Fisher, commandant at Mookerian, may be instructed to support these detachments, if attacked in force.

Inclosure 4 in No. 28

*Mr. Lawrence to the Resident at Lahore.*

*Dhumsal, May 23, 1848.*

MAHARAJ SING, a Gooroo, is assembling followers in great numbers.

Maharaj Sing was a disciple of the famous Beer Sing, the Gooroo, who was killed, some four years ago, in Raja Heera Sing's time. He was concerned in the Preyma conspiracy, and has ever since baffled pursuit. Rama, the son of Sham Sing, one of the hereditary Vizeers of Noorpoor, is a dangerous and turbulent character. I have summoned him to me, and, should he refuse, or delay, shall cause him to be arrested.

I believe that Raja Heera Sing, the uncle of his Highness Maharajah Duleep Sing, has been recalled from Deenanuggur, with the view of being sent out of the Punjab. Should he not have yet left, I would suggest his speedy removal from Deenanuggur.

Inclosure 5 in No. 28.

*The Resident at Lahore to Mr. Lawrence.*

*Lahore, May 26, 1848.*

IN consequence of the number of people who were reported to be attaching themselves to the Gooroo, Bhaee Maharaj Sing, in the neighbourhood of Deenanuggur, I sent off, on the night of the 20th instant; the 14th Irregulars, with two guns from the native troop of Horse Artillery, to that place, with orders to Captain Skinner to disperse any assemblages of people he might hear of in the neighbourhood, and do his best to arrest Bhaee Maharaj Sing, and any of his party.

Lieutenant Hodson went off, the night before, with a small party of the guides, via Umritsur and Bhyrowal, to Mookerian, with orders from the general to the officers commanding at Mookerian and Hajeepore, to attend to any requisition he might make for aid from them, for the purpose of endeavouring, with a party of Major Forster's Horse, to get hold of the Bhaee before he should decamp, on hearing of the approach of the detachment from Lahore.

I fancy Bhaee Maharaj Sing was too quick for Lieutenant Hodson, he has, I hear, crossed the Ravee, but I have not, as yet, had any report from Lieutenant Hodson.

I intend that the 14th Irregulars, and the guns, shall remain at Deenanuggur, for a short time, and Lieutenant Hodson with them.

The officers commanding at Hajeepore and Mookerian, have been instructed to co-operate with the detachment from Lahore, if called upon by Captain Skinner, or Lieutenant Hodson, to do so.

P S — The Durbar have offered a reward of 5,000 rupees to any one who will hand over Bhaee Maharaj.

Inclosure 6 in No 28.

*Lieutenant Edwardes to the Resident at Lahore.*

*Camp, Peronwallah, 25 coss directly north from Dera Ghazee Khan, May 20, 1848*

I DISPATCHED the whole of my cavalry, magazine, spare store-carts, heavy baggage, and as many infantry as I had no boats for, by the land route, from Futtah Khan, to join General Cortlandt, opposite Dera Deen Punnah, on the evening of the 18th, and, as soon as the moon rose, embarked the four guns, and the majority of the infantry, in twenty-seven boats, and floated down the branch of the Indus, which passes under Dera Futtah Khan. The river is now very high, rising daily, and its navigation dangerous: so that the Mullahs refused to proceed any further, when we emerged into the main stream, and we were obliged to anchor till morning, when, we pushed off again; and by nine A.M., on the 19th, were abreast of General Cortlandt's camp, at a place called Jung, which however we were unable to approach, owing to an island lying between us, and the inland stream being too shallow for navigation merely exchanging shots, by way of recognition, therefore, we determined to occupy at once the Ferry of Peronwallah, seven coss further south, at which the enemy had for the last three days, been threatening to cross, and we reached it safely, though with much trouble from a baffling wind, at midday yesterday.

The whole of the cavalry reached General Cortlandt's camp, a distance of twenty-five coss by noon, and many of them came, in the evening, to the Peronwallah Ghat, having made a march of thirty-two coss in twenty-four-hours, which, in this weather, is a great feat.

In the evening, at my request, General Cortlandt rode over to my camp to consult about the state of affairs, and, from him, and other parties, during the day, we learnt, that the rebel force in the Sind Sagur Doab, was really designed to recover the Lungurh country, and Mungrotah Fort, and prevent General Cortlandt from getting possession of Dera Ghazee Khan. The nominal chief is Hur Bugwan Doss, nephew of Moolraj's factotum, Dewan Rungram, but the active spirits are Usad Khan Moot Kanee, and Julal Khan Lugharee, to the former of whom Moolraj has (with the generosity of an Alexander) made a present of Lungurh, and to the latter, Dera Ghazee Khan, of which districts they are respectively natives, and men of note.

It is only just to Ussud Khan, to remind you that he gave me the first refusal of his sword, on the terms that I would give him the farm of Lungurh. The overture was verbal, and I replied, verbally, that he would find it his interest to come in. The Dewan bid higher, and, for the time at least, secured him. Ussud Khan, however, finds that it is not so easy to take possession of Lungurh<sup>1</sup> and, as I write this, he has again sent overtures through Mitteh Khan Kusranee, demanding "the farm of Lungurhs 10,000 rupees cash, and the country of Wuhoa in Jagheer, as the price of desertion<sup>1</sup>," I laughed and told Mitteh Khan, I regarded Ussud Khan as a dead man already, about whom it was useless to dispute, that he was welcome to all of Lungurh he can take; that it is not the custom of the Sahib log, to buy and sell small rebels, and that, if he is determined to be bought, he had better bring away some guns, or do something else, to raise his price. Mitteh Khan dropped his tone at once, and said, Ussud Khan would send a vakeel over to me, to see if the affair could be arranged.

The fact is that, at the present moment, our "ikbal" is once more in the ascendant. The shameful repulse of the rebel detachment at Leia, on the 16th, proved that we are not to be touched, with impunity. The leader, one Jas Mull, who was coming to take possession of Leia, of which Moolraj had, on paper, appointed him Hakim, saved himself from that rout, only by hiding in a tobacco-held, and has become the jest of the country in consequence, and the runaways, to account for the loss of their zumboorahs, declared that they had been enticed, by the deceitful Feringhee, into an ambush of 3,000 men, which has raised me much in public estimation, without deserving it. This, followed by our sudden withdrawal from Leia, and appearance the next day at Peronwallah, in a formidable fleet, thirty-two coss from where we were last heard of, and just opposite the rebel camp, has so completely confounded the enemy that, last night when all was still, I turned my four guns to the Indus, and saluted them with twenty-one rounds as a challenge, they were too prudent even to reply, lest I should make out their position. Yet, there is no doubt they have a very superior force to our's, both in men and guns.

If they had not the heart to cross, when General Cortlandt was alone, they are little likely to do so now, and, for the time, I consider our position as most materially improved, since last I wrote. The general opinion, indeed, is that the rebel camp opposite us will give up the idea of crossing, break up, and hurry back to Mooltan. It is natural to suppose that they will either be recalled by Moolraj, under the influence of fright, or that they will be reinforced by him, to such an extent as will enable them to force the passage, and retrieve the defeat at Leia. The latter seems to me by far the most probable, because there exists no earthly reason why a rebel, with a large army and fifty guns, should allow himself to be bullied by a small army and ten guns. I still adhere, therefore, to my view of the untenableness of this frontier by us, if left unassisted to cope with the whole resources of Moolraj, while, at the same time, I am prepared to undertake the blockade of that rebel in Mooltan, for the rest of the hot season and rains, if you should honor me with that commission, and order Bahawul Khan to assist me. Bahawul Khan would cross the Sutlej, and General Cortlandt and I cross the Indus from Dera Ghazee Khan, Moolraj would be obliged to call in all his men, and, for the rest of the season, he would be a prisoner, unless he had the spirit to give up the advantage of the fort, and hazard an engagement on the plain, in which case, please God<sup>1</sup> we could decide the campaign, without any necessity for a siege.

At present, my movements are dependent on those of the rebels, for, so long as the would-be-lord of Lungurh sits on the opposite bank, eyeing wistfully his promised land, it is impossible for me to pass on to Ghazee Khan, and give him the opportunity of crossing behind me.

Yet Ghazee Khan must be seized. Longa Mull, the rebel Hakim, is said to be standing, with one foot on shore, and one in the boat, prepared to fly as soon as we advance, or to return, and collect the revenue, if we retire, or halt. He has about 500 men, and one gun.

General Cortlandt agrees with me in thinking the best plan will be to send a detachment with two guns, ourselves, with the main body of our force, remaining here, to watch the enemy's main body. Probably, the detachment will start to-morrow.

The state of the Futteh Pultun is so bad as to render treachery a certainty, should we engage the rebels in its company; and, on the same principle that I proposed to put them in charge of Mungrotah, we now think of sending them to Mittenkote, where troops will be required. Mooltan is distant, and Bahawul Khan near, to correct them, if necessary.

While on this subject, it is proper that I should acquaint you with an incident

that occurred at Dera Ismael Khan, a few days ago. Lieutenant Taylor had sent eight companies of infantry to assist me, I believe three companies of Dogras from Zora Khan Sing's regiment, three ditto from Bishen Sing's Mussulman regiment, and two from Mihr Sing's regiment of Sikhs. Bunnoo became, in the meanwhile, so disturbed that I was obliged to write, and order these eight companies to hurry back. The order reached them at Dera, and the Sikhs and Mussulmans refused, I understand, to obey, declaring that "they would go on and see what arrangements were being made by the other prunts or punches in our camp." Sirdar Chunder Sing got alarmed, and communicated his fears to Mrs Cortlandt, whose nerves, having been fortified by some years' residence in the Punjab, enabled her to enlist the artillerymen of two guns, of the same detachment, in her favor, and persuade the companies to return to Bunnoo. The Dogras expressed a determination, throughout, to be faithful to their salt, and obey orders. The conduct of the Sikhs is nothing more than every body would expect who knows anything of their character and history, but that of the Mussulmans is more surprising, and adds, considerably, to the secret danger which is smouldering at this moment throughout the Sikh army. It is observable, however, that the men of Bishen Sing's regiment are Mussulmans of the Manjha, and districts neighbouring thereto. The longer the Mooltan rebellion remains triumphant, the more weak men will it lead astray.

P.S. 11 o'clock at night, May 21—News has just arrived of a most complete victory to our party, and defeat of the rebels, at Dera Ghazee Khan, this morning. In this letter I have mentioned Julal Khan Lugharee as a native of Ghazee Khan, to whom Moolraj had given that country. His bitter enemy is one Kowrah Khan Khosa, a powerful Toomandur, whose vakeel came to me at Futteh Khan, to offer me his submission, fully a fortnight ago. I then told him to send his son to me, with a contingent, which he did. The son, Gholam Hyder Khan, received a khillut from me, and was made over to General Cortlandt, when that officer started for Dera Ghazee Khan. Yesterday this young fellow volunteered to go on a-head to Ghazee Khan, raise his father's clan, and drive Longa Mull out of the country, across the Indus. General Cortlandt gave him permission, but thought so little about it that he never mentioned it to me. It now appears that Gholam Hyder Khan, when he left General Cortlandt's camp, made up his mind to "do or die," and made but one request to a Puthan friend, that, if he fell in the fight, he would "ask the Sahib to avenge his death!" Having joined his father, Kowrah Khan, at Dera Ghazee Khan, the two raised their clan for a grand struggle against their enemies, the Lugharees, who mustered 500 strong, around Longa Mull. Cheytun Mull, uncle of Longa Mull, and the runaway Hakim of Sungurh, and Mungiotah, had joined his nephew, and the two moved boldly out, in front of Dera Ghazee Khan, and encamped themselves on the road to oppose General Cortlandt's anticipated advance. They had one gun and five zumboorahs. In the last watch of the night, the Khosas drew near, and surrounded the two Kardars, who fired away, at random, till it was light, when the Khosas attacked them, sword in hand. The Lugharees fought desperately, and the fight lasted three hours, when the rebels were overpowered, Cheytun Mull and one nephew killed on the field. Longa Mull taken prisoner, and the gun and five zumboorahs captured. The Khosas were still pursuing the vanquished, when the two cossids who brought this news, left Dera Ghazee Khan. This is most important news, and cannot but have a great effect upon the enemy.

Inclosure 7 in No 28

*The Resident at Lahore to Lieutenant Edwardes.*

*Lahore, May 29, 1848.*

I CONGRATULATE you, heartily, on your energetic operations, and on the success of your Affghan ally, Gholam Hyder Khan, and beg that you will convey to him and his father the expression of my approbation and admiration of their conduct, and that you will tell them, if you think it right, that a purwanna and khillut shall be sent to them from the Maharajah.

I cannot, however, approve of your proposal to cross the Indus, at the present moment. You will do the State excellent service by maintaining the peace of your



frontier and jurisdiction, and by holding, and collecting the revenues of, the Trans-Indus provinces

You would put yourself in a false position, if you were to forego your present advantage, and place the Indus in your rear, should Moolraj's force be in the Doab. Should they have retired thence, your presence will not be required; the officers and troops I had sent to those districts, will be able to do all that is necessary.

Your own frontier and districts, should be your special care for the present.

No. 29

*The Governor-General in Council to the Secret Committee.*

*Fort William, July 3, 1848. (No. 57.)*

OUR dispatch of the 10th ultimo, will have informed you of the position of affairs, in the neighbourhood of Mooltan, up to the 28th of May. On that day, a party of the Khosa tribe who had sided with Lieutenant Edwardes, fell in with the rebel Kardar of Dera Ghazee Khan, who had encamped, on the road to that place, for the purpose of opposing the advance of General Cortlandt, of the Sikh army, who was proceeding to occupy it. The Kardar was completely worsted, and the Khosa chief took possession of Dera Ghazee Khan, where he was joined by General Cortlandt, on the 23rd. By this affair, thirty-nine boats which had been collected by the Kardar for the intended passage of Moolraj's force across the Indus, fell into our hands. Moolraj's force remained at a place called Oodoo-ke-Kote, on the left bank of the Indus, facing Lieutenant Edwardes' encampment, until the 23rd, when they suddenly moved southward to Korreyshee, opposite Dera Ghazee Khan. Upon this, Lieutenant Edwardes embarked with his men in thirty-three boats, moved down the river to Dera Ghazee Khan, where he joined General Cortlandt on the 26th. Writing to the Resident at Lahore, from this place, on the following day, he says, "We have now a fleet of seventy-two boats, and could throw 6,000 men across the Indus, at one passage. The enemy to the best of my knowledge, have not a boat, and, as far as I can make out, are very glad of the excuse thus afforded them for not carrying out their instructions to cross and engage us." "The position of General Cortlandt and myself is no longer an object of anxiety to ourselves, and need not be to you. The vacillation and lack of enterprise of a very superior enemy has enabled us in self-defence as it were, to wrest from him sixty coss of country in less than a fortnight and to give him two discouraging defeats at two points, so far removed as Leia and Dera Ghazee Khan, within four days of each other, and now as much more country lies before us, which we have only to stretch out our hand and take. Kardar are now departing to the several districts. We have been joined, as we advanced, by the chief Sowars and their followers, and have steadily continued to enlist men so that we cannot now be less than 6,000 strong, with ten guns, two more on the road from Bunnoo, and thirty zumboorahs. With such a force, (after detaching the Futtch Pultun) we are quite prepared, if necessary, to give the enemy the general action, which so recently our weakness obliged us to avoid; and, now that you have ordered Bahawal Khan to occupy the country between the Sutlej and Mooltan, I trust you will permit me to assist him in turning that move to the greatest advantage, and driving all the rebels into their fort, for the rest of the summer. I have already written to the Nawab to offer to do so."

Early in the month of May, Lieutenant Edwardes had expressed to the Resident his conviction that the frontier of the Trans-Indus territory would be untenable by his small force, unless the Nawab of Bahawalpore should effect a diversion, by crossing the Sutlej, and Sir Frederick Currie had written to the Nawab, urging him to make this move. Bahawal Khan most promptly acquiesced in the suggestion, and, proceeding with a force "of from 10,000 to 12,000 men, well equipped and disciplined, and composed almost entirely of fighting Puthans," crossed the Sutlej, at four different points, on the 30th and 31st of May. Lieutenant Edwardes proposed to Bahawal Khan one of two courses, either to move direct upon Mooltan, or, if he did not think himself strong enough to do this alone, to proceed up the right bank of the Chenab, and to effect a junction with Lieutenant Edwardes' force, at Khangur, opposite to Shoojabad. The Nawab chose the former course, and, by the last accounts, had arrived very near to Shoojabad, a considerable town, with a fort of some strength, and distant about thirty miles from Mooltan. Sir F. Currie writes, "I hope to

hear of Bahawal Khan's main body having occupied Shoojabad. Had a British officer been with them, they would have done so several days ago."

The Nawab had expressed a desire to have the assistance of a British officer. The Resident selected for this service Lieutenant Lake, of the engineers, and sent him to join the force immediately, with instructions to direct its movements, according to his own judgment, and to co-operate with Lieutenant Edwardes. In his letter\* on this subject to Lieutenant Lake, dated the 9th of June, the Resident describes the movement of Bahawal Khan as one having for its object "to occupy, and collect the revenues of, the Mooltan districts on the Bahawalpore frontier, and to confine Dewan Moolraj to his fort, and prevent his sending troops into the Lahore districts in order to create disturbances therein, and promote the spread of rebellion through the other Punjab provinces."

From Lieutenant Edwardes' letter of the 6th ultimo†, it appears that he was expecting every hour to see the rebel force quitting their position opposite to him at Koreyshee, with the intention of returning to Mooltan, to aid in opposing Bahawal Khan's advance. On the 7th, he moved from Ghazee Khan to the bank of the river, making a demonstration of an intention to cross. He did not, however, intend to cross, until he should hear of the surrender of the fort of Hurrund, situated between Dera Ghazee Khan and Mittunkote. The regiment called the "Futteh Pultun," had been sent to take possession of Mittunkote, but Moolraj's officer at Hurrund having refused to surrender, it was necessary to force his submission first. Intelligence of this having been effected has not yet reached us.

Sir F. Currie having left a discretion to Lieutenant Edwardes to cross the Indus, and move in the direction of Mooltan, that officer intended, it appears, to proceed to Raj Ghat, on the right bank of the Chenab, two coss from Mooltan—the object being to co-operate with Bahawal Khan's force, in hemming in Moolraj, and keeping him to his fort.

The result of the communication between Mustapha Khan, the supposed agent of Moolraj, and Lieutenant Edwardes, has confirmed the anticipation of the Resident "Mustapha Khan now writes," says Lieutenant Edwardes, "that, on his return from my camp to Mooltan, he strongly urged Moolraj to surrender himself to me, but the Dewan rejected his advice, got angry when pressed, and renewed his preparation for war."

From all accounts, Dewan Moolraj is becoming more determined in rebellion as his cause becomes more desperate. Lieutenant Edwardes hears from Mooltan that the Sikhs "are mustering strong, and determined to fight." And Sir F. Currie writes, "Dewan Moolraj is by no means inactive, he is employing all his resources to raise a large army, and to equip it, to prepare his fort for a siege, and to gain over to his interests the Khalsa troops and the Sikh people." "I am constantly at work, the Durbar merely acquiescing, to defeat the machinations of the Dewan, to confine the rebellion within the smallest limits, and to keep the Dewan and his troops to the neighbourhood of the city and fort of Mooltan, till after the rains, when the business will be easily settled, and it matters little, as far as the British Government is concerned, whether the Khalsa army were to join Moolraj or not."

The destruction of the outlaw, Gooroo Bhaee Maharaj, and the utter discomfiture of his followers, is an event which has greatly tended to support the British authority, and which must have the effect of disheartening the rebels. For a detailed account of this man's proceedings, and of the successful measures taken for his overthrow, we would refer you to Sir F. Currie's letter, dated June 13‡.

On the whole, the aspect of affairs in the Punjab is, at present, more favorable than it has been since the outbreak of the rebellion. The position of the British troops at Lahore is one of commanding strength, every attempt to weaken it, whether by secret machinations, or by open rebellion, has, hitherto, been signally frustrated. The consequence is, that the spirit of disaffection, which is believed to pervade the whole Sikh army, has not broken out in acts of hostility, but has been overawed and restrained. "A strong desire to aid Moolraj (Sir Frederick Currie writes) pervades all the soldiers, but they are not heroes enough to join a falling standard; a few more reverses, and the fidelity of the Sikh troops is secure."

P.S. Since the above was written, four dispatches have come in together from Lahore, dated the 17th, 19th, 20th, and 22nd ultimo. The contents of the letter,

\* Inclosure 13 in No. 29

† Inclosure 11 in No. 29.

‡ Inclosure 18 in No. 29.

which came by "express," are in the highest degree satisfactory. Lieutenant Edwardes, having effected a junction with a portion of the Bahawalpore army, entirely defeated Moolraj's force on the 18th of June. The particulars are given in his letter\* to Sir F. Currie, written on the evening of that day. It appears that the rebel force moved from Koreyshee upon Khangur, and crossed the Chenab to intercept the advance of the Bahawalpore troops. With this object in view, Dewan Moolraj reinforced them by sending 2,000 men and four guns from Mooltan to Shoojabad, Lieutenant Edwardes followed on the track of the enemy to Khangur, and crossing the Chenab with 5,000 men and ten guns, under cover of the Bahawalpore force, which had already been attacked, put the rebels to flight, and took six of their guns. The battle lasted throughout the day of the 18th. Lieutenant Edwardes acted with great skill and gallantry, and the result appears to have been decisive. Sir F. Currie says, "My expectation is that the rebel Moolraj will either destroy himself, or be destroyed by his troops, before the next mail goes out."

Inclosure 1 in No. 29

*The Commander-in-chief to the Resident at Lahore*

*Simla, May 23, 1848.*

ALTHOUGH the force, suggested to be assembled at Ferozepore, may appear much larger than could be required, for the mere capture of Mooltan, and the putting down the present disaffection in the south of the Punjab, still, taking into consideration the probability of other contingencies requiring that a large portion of that force may be called upon for other, equally important, duties at the same moment, I should not feel myself justified in recommending the reduction of a single regiment.

The movement of the required siege-train and engineer-park must occupy a long tract of road, particularly when moving over a country, where it will be difficult to procure water for the vast number of animals required for their conveyance.

Before it can be decided whether it will be most desirable to move the siege-train the whole way by land or take it a portion of the distance by water, it will be necessary to procure much information on the subject of the several approaches towards Mooltan, which are, I understand, intersected by several canals, some of considerable width, which will probably require bridging, this alone would make it inexpedient to cross a part of it over the Sutlej, as you suggest, previous to the rains, as I should have to send a proportionate force to protect it, for which there is no cover. Indeed, I should be greatly indisposed to subdivide our force, whilst the fealty of the Sikh army is so very doubtful.

When the Governor-General's sanction is received for the collection of a force, it will soon be manifest that we are about to take the field with a large army, the very preparations we are making will, no doubt, go forth magnified, the time of the actual movement need not be divulged, but, the sooner preparations commence, the greater will be the moral effect.

Inclosure 2 in No. 29

*Lieutenant Edwardes to the Resident at Lahore*

*Camp, Peronwallah, on the right bank of the Indus, 25 cos north of Dera Ghazee Khan, May 23, 1848.*

THE details of the victory at Dera Ghazee Khan proved to be as first reported, with the exception that there were no zumboorahs in the field, only a gun, and that the loss of men, on both sides, was greater than originally was known. The enemy

lost about 40 killed; the Khosas, or Sirkar's party, 15; and nearly 50 wounded. All accounts agree as to the bloody nature of the contest. Forty boats which had been collected for Moolraj, at the Dera Ghazee Khan ferry, also fell into our hands. The chief part of the killed were Sikhs. The inferior Kardar, (under Longa Mull) named Abdool Ruhman Khan, took refuge in the fort of Ghazee Khan, and was treating for his life, when last I heard. His women were in the city, not the fort, so, of course, he has surrendered.

On the morning of the 22nd, I thought it best to send General Cortlandt's division on to Dera Ghazee Khan, to take possession, and watch the result at Mooltan. He will make it in three marches, his cavalry pushed on the whole distance in one day, to show that a force was on the road, and quiet alarm in the large city of Ghazee Khan. I remained here, to watch the rebel army on the opposite side of the Indus, which, yesterday, was at Dera Deen Punnah, and, to-day, is at Oodoo-ke-Kote. The latter place is rather to the south of me, and I move to-morrow morning to Ulliyannah, which is directly opposite them, and 6 coss from this place on the bank of the Indus.

It is impossible to say what plan will now be followed by Moolraj, defeats are more discouraging to natives than to Europeans, and the Leia and Ghazee Khan affairs are not likely to infuse more vigor into the rebel counsels. Yet, Moolraj's army at Mooltan is daily on the increase, my occupation of the Trans-Indus has cut off most of the Belooches and Puthans from joining him, but I have good information that the Sikhs are coming into him, in large numbers, from the Manjha, and the delay which has occurred, has enabled him to dig up, and mount, all the guns which were buried for concealment in the fort of Mooltan, amounting, they say, to not less than sixty.

My anticipation is, that Moolraj will immediately concentrate all his disposable force of men and guns at Koreysheo, opposite Dera Ghazee Khan, and that Ussud Khan and Ilur Bugwan Doss' army that is now opposite me, will be moved down to the left bank, for that purpose. I shall move parallel, and join General Cortlandt. The two forces will then encamp face to face, and the result depends on Moolraj's enterprise, and your estimate of the danger in which General Cortlandt and I will then be placed.

I, once more, lay it before you, that we have now done our best, in execution of your instructions, and have come, very nearly, to the length of our tether. It is probable that, in another month, we may gain two or three thousand more Puthans, but, in the same time, Moolraj will gain twice as many Sikhs, you cannot fail to have observed the utter indifference with which Moolraj treats the approach of Raja Shere Sing's division, as if it put him to no inconvenience, and by no means required him to draw his forces home, and I venture to prophecy that, when the Raja, with his trusty Jagheerdars, reaches Cheecheewutnee, between which and Mooltan there cannot be 50 coss, and no river interposes, Moolraj's main army will be, still, found encamped on the left bank of the Indus, opposite Dera Ghazee Khan, with the Chenab between them and Mooltan. Why? Because he knows I am his enemy, and because he knows that Raja Shere Sing's force is not. I imply no suspicion against the Raja, because he has much to lose, and nothing to gain, but his men will show forbearance, if they merely remain inactive. The same with the force ordered to Munkerah. This distant investment of Mooltan, if it produces any effect at all, will probably be more sinister than beneficial, and I trust you do not calculate on its affording the slightest protection to the position of General Cortlandt and myself, at Ghazee Khan.

As yet, I have not heard from you, in reply to several letters in which I have stated my opinion, that this frontier is untenable by me, unless Bahawal Khan effects a diversion by crossing the Sutlej. The latest letter I have received from you bears date the 8th of May. I know not, therefore, whether you consider my fears well or ill-founded, and approve, or disapprove, of my request that Bahawal Khan be moved across the Indus, objection there seems to be none, and the advantages are obvious, and may be expressed in a few words—security, for the whole hot weather and rains. There can be no delicacy in exposing the Nawab's troops to the hot season, seeing that the troops with me are certain to be out all the year.

I had written this much, when news arrived of the sudden disappearance of the enemy from Oodoo-ke-Kote, whither it is not known. I believe they had not boats enough to cross to this side, and they must either have been suddenly recalled to Mooltan, or have been ordered to move down towards Ghazee Khan. In a few hours, correct information will be received, but, meanwhile, I have written to General Cortlandt, to march, at once, into Ghazee Khan, however distant, and, if necessary, summon,

me. This is the harassing state of uncertainty in which we must expect to pass the next five months, unless a large body of troops that can be relied on, such as those of Bahawal Khan, are permitted to assist me in shutting Moolraj up in his fort, and putting an end to field operations for this season.

Up to this time, I have not heard again from Mustapha Khan Khaghwanee, though he was to have sent me the answer of the Mooltance Puthans by the 18th. His plans, however, must have been quite disconcerted by the detention of the rebel army on the Chenab, and with it, of many of the Puthan officers, with whom he was to have arranged to leave Moolraj. To correspond with them on such a subject would be too dangerous to attempt, and if Bugwan Doss's army has now been recalled to Mooltan, I shall read that incident as the result of Mustapha Khan's counsel to Moolraj, with the secret object of getting all the Puthan officers together.

A curious piece of information has been communicated to Fojdar Khan in my camp, from a relative in Mooltan, that the scheme to which, latterly, Moolraj had made up his mind, was to leave a force in the fort of Mooltan, and himself cross the Indus, where he proposed to master the whole Derajat, and then adjourn himself, with his own family, and those of his officers, to the hills, and pass the remainder of his life, in trying to establish an independent sovereignty, Trans-Indus. The scheme (to a man possessed of treasure to commence with) is by no means so wild as it looks, and though, ultimately, of course, such a usurpation must have yielded to the systematic opposition of the British power, yet its temporary success was merely a question of time. Had Moolraj crossed the Indus, and anticipated the arrival of General Cortlandt and myself, he would have been joined, at once, by all the mountain tribes, and chiefs of the plains, who have now been obliged to come into us, and, so circumstanced, he would have given much more trouble than the siege of Mooltan can possibly do. Such a contingency has, however, been happily obviated by our rapid appropriation of the Trans-Indus claquas.

It is right that I should report having suppressed a purwanna, sent by the Durbar to General Cortlandt, directing him to remit a third of the revenue to the zemindars of Moolraj's territory, on condition of their paying the remainder to the Sirkar. Such a sign of weakness would be most pernicious in these parts. The Puthans and Jats would agree, "What service have we done to make the Sirkar so kind to us?" Or is this a bribe to coax revenue out of us, which the Sirkar is unable to exact? If so, we are the masters, and there is no occasion to pay any revenue at all." On this side of the Indus, if the enemy do not cross, the whole revenue will be collected, without even an attempt at resistance. If the enemy crosses, not a halfpenny will be paid. And, on the other side of the Indus, in the same way, the revenue will be, unhesitatingly, paid to whomsoever is, undeniably, the strongest party, and, so long as the point of superiority remains undecided, so long will the revenue remain unpaid. I collected a few thousand rupees in the Sind Sagur Doab; so has the enemy, and, though the zemindars have been told, by the Sirkar, that no allowance will be made to them for any revenue which they pay Moolraj, yet it would be impossible to enforce so harsh a decree, the zemindars paying only under compulsion, which it is the fault of the Sirkar that they are exposed to. It will be better, therefore, to wait till the Mooltan affair is settled, when accounts will be equitably adjusted, the zemindar paying all that he has kept back, with interest, and receiving credit for all that Moolraj forced him to pay.

Inclosure 3 in No. 29

*Lieutenant Edwardes to the Resident at Lahore.*

*Camp, Uliyanah, 16 coss north of Dera Ghazee Khan,  
Night, May 25, 1848.*

ON the 23rd, I reported the sudden disappearance of the enemy from Oodoo-ke-Kote, on the left bank of the Indus, and my uncertainty as to their whereabouts; but that I had taken the precaution of ordering General Cortlandt to push on to Ghazee Khan, and secure the ferry.

On the 24th, I marched from Peronwallah to this place, feeling certain that, wherever the enemy was, he was to the south, and not to the north, and have employed these two days, in gaining information from the other bank.

It now appears that, when the rebel camp broke up from Oodoo-ke-Kote, the whole of the cavalry made but a single march, from that place to Koreyshee, a village

on the left bank of the Indus, directly opposite Dera Ghazee Khan, with the object of seizing the fleet of boats which had been collected there, by Dewan Moolraj's Lieutenant, Longa Mull, of whose defeat they had heard.

The move was good, but had been completely anticipated by a party under Nassur Khan Populzye, whom I sent off from Peronwallah, precisely twenty-four hours previously, to strengthen the victorious zemindar Kowra Khan Khosa, and to secure the fleet of boats, which I was afraid Kowra Khan would forget in the excitement of his success. When, therefore, the rebel cavalry reached Koreyshee, they found that the boats were no longer in the Indus, but safely harboured in an inland nullah, out of their reach.

The rebel infantry and guns remained behind, making short marches after the cavalry, and masking what they fondly deemed that masterly manœuvre. Last night, they were at Goraie, and, probably, this morning reached Koreyshee.

General Cortlandt has sent word, that Moolraj has dispatched a reinforcement, of some 2,000 men and five guns, to Longa Mull, to enable him to hold his own in Ghazee Khan, but that detachment also is much too late. It will, however, swell the already very superior force on the opposite bank, and, fearful of any opportunity being given to the Futteh Pultun to fraternize, I have put my artillery into the boats once more, and with them and the infantry, shall, to-morrow morning, hasten to reinforce General Cortlandt at Ghazee Khan. My cavalry goes by land, and will not reach (unless urgently summoned) till the second day.

At Ghazee Khan, I shall have arrived at the most southerly point to which it will be prudent, or necessary, for our main body to go, and, if more active operations are not determined on, General Cortlandt's troops and mine will probably pass the next five months, on the ferry bank of that place, face to face with Moolraj's army at Koreyshee.

But I trust a more stirring lot is in store for us. I have just received your letter of May the 18th, and am sincerely rejoiced to see that that faithful ally Bahawal Khan, has gallantly taken on himself the occupation of all the country between the Sutlej and the gates of Mooltan. Under such circumstances, it would be ungenerous of me not to assist him, and, with your permission, as soon as I can get into communication with him, I propose to cross the Indus, and, unitedly, drive these foraging armies of Moolraj's back into Mooltan. We can, then, close the campaign for the hot weather, in an attitude of dignity, which will make it impossible for the most disaffected to misrepresent the delay which will ensue before the siege. It would be a grave error, I think, to rest, so long as one detachment of the rebels is at large. The fact should be distinctly brought out, that it is for a siege alone that we are unprepared.

When I get to Ghazee Khan, I mean to detach the Futteh Pultun to Mittunkote, where, if it does not do good service, it can do no harm. They want two guns, but it is bad enough that they have got muskets.

Jus Mull, Moolraj's kardai of Leia, has once more gone thither, with 100 horse, to collect revenue. He is a great coward, and thinks himself safe, now our backs are turned, but Sirdar Jhunda Sing ought to be now reaching Munkeria, and I have written to him to drive out the whole batch, and, if possible, put Jus Mull in prison.

Inclosure 4 in No 29.

*Lieutenant Edwards to the Resident at Lahore.*

*Camp, Dera Ghazee Khan, May 27, 1848.*

I HAVE the honor to report the junction of my own and General Cortlandt's force, at this place, yesterday evening.

With the artillery and infantry, I embarked in thirty-three boats at Ulliyanah, yesterday at daybreak, and should have reached our destination by 9 A.M., but for a baffling south wind, which prevails in the Lower Indus at this season, and which kept us beating about, till late in the afternoon, when we reached the mouth of a beautiful canal, called the Kustooree Wahu, which runs inland, and under the city of Dera Ghazee Khan, which is two coss from the Indus. Here we found, securely moored, thirty-nine magnificent boats which the rebel, Longa Mull, had collected, for the passage

of Moolraj's troops, and which fell into our hands, after the victory of the 20th. We have thus a fleet of seventy-two boats, and could throw 6,000 men across the Indus, at one passage. The enemy, to the best of my knowledge, has not a boat, and, so far as I can make out, are very glad of the excuse thus afforded them, for not carrying out their instructions to cross, and engage us.

So lovely and rich a country as that around Dera Ghazee Khan, I have seen nowhere in the Punjab, and, compared with the Northern Trans-Indus territories, it may be called a garden. Date groves stud the fields, and shade the canals, and my new Puthan levies (879 horse and 1,300 foot) for whom I have not yet been able to provide tents, are delighted to get out of the fiery May sun, into this friendly shelter.

The enemy is encamped near Koreyshee, as I anticipated, exactly opposite us, but there are two or three nullahs, besides the river, between them and us, and, had they the will, they have not the means, of crossing over to oppose us.

The only enemy, left on this side of the Indus, is one Mokum Chund, Kardar of Hurrund, who, with about 200 men is holding a strong fort there, three coss from the hills, and nearly fifty from Ghazee Khan. The brother of one of the officers in the fort, is in my service, and I have, this day, sent him, with an open purwanna to the Kardar, to come in with all his officers, and secret purwannas to his Puthan officers, to overpower him and the Sikhs, if they refuse to come in, and consider themselves as my servants, for the future. As the fort is strong, and has two heavy guns in it, I am rather anxious about the success of this manœuvre, but Kowra Khan Khosa has gained such honor in these parts, by his victory over Longa Mull, that I am tolerably confident that the Puthans will be glad of the opportunity of similarly distinguishing themselves against the Hindoo rebels.

This reminds me to report that, after the defeat of Longa Mull by the Khosas, sundry excesses were committed, which are never heard of, in our regular armies, but which almost invariably wind up the vengeance of a native leader, in the hour of victory. Several Hindoos who had no share in Longa Mull's resistance, were plundered by the excited Mussulmans, and some other Mahomedans in the city, who had not been concerned in the fight, took the opportunity of settling a religious feud, which had smouldered since the days of Runjeet Sing, and murdered a Hindoo fakir, for whose accommodation Dewan Sawun Mull and Sirdar Leina Sing had ~~destroyed~~ a musjeed and erected a dhurmsalah on its ruins. The Khosas who defeated Longa Mull, are in no way responsible for this, which seems to have been a spontaneous outbreak of long-repressed and insulted religious feeling, and, though, of course, the case will be taken up, and legally dealt with, one cannot be astonished at such results of persecution. The Hindoos themselves feel the "wild justice" of the retribution, horrible as it was, and have attempted to turn the blame of persecution back on the Puthans, by declaring that, in the days of the older kings of Cabool, a dhurmsalah was destroyed, to make way for the musjeed levelled by Sawun Mull. Kowra Khan Khosa was much incensed with the authors of this murder, and reproached them with destroying all the merit of his victory, and he is now inducing those Puthans who plundered Hindoos after the fight, to restore their booty, quietly, before the law looks after it. I mention these things, because it is as wrong for one side to conceal, as for the other to exaggerate them, and every impartial mind will feel more sorrow than surprise, if so monstrous an evil as war is not, at all times, to be restrained within its licensed channels of destruction.

The position of General Cortlandt and myself is no longer an object of anxiety to ourselves, and need not be to you. The vacillation, and lack of enterprise, of a very superior enemy has enabled us, in self-defence as it were, to wrest from him sixty coss of country in less than a fortnight, and to give him two discouraging defeats, at two points so far removed as Leia and Dera Ghazee Khan, within four days of each other, and now as much more country lies before us, which we have only to stretch out our hand and take. Kardars are now departing to the several districts, we have been joined, as we advanced, by the Chief Toomuns and their followers, and have steadily continued to enlist men, so that we cannot now be less than 6,000 strong, with ten guns, two more on the road from Bunnoo, and thirty zumboorahs with such a force (after detaching the Futch Pultun) we are quite prepared, if necessary, to give the enemy the general action which, so recently, our weakness obliged us to avoid; and now that you have ordered Bahawal Khan to occupy the country between the Sutlej and Mooltan, I trust you will permit me to assist him in turning that move to the greatest advantage, and driving all the rebels into their fort, for the rest of the summer. I have already written to the Nawab to offer to do so, and to ascertain his plans.

Three or four days ago, I received a purwanna, from the Sirkar, for Ussud Khan, Noot Kanee, in the enemy's camp opposite. He has made himself very conspicuous in the rebellion, and ill-deserves the promise of keeping his jagheer, which that purwanna holds out to him, if he comes in. I, therefore, wrote on the back of it that, if he intended to avail himself of its terms, he must do so, at once, or else consider them cancelled, as the Sirkar could not be aware of the lengths to which he had gone. This morning, I received an answer from him, declaring that he is unable to comply, on account of his women being in Mooltan, which is a falsehood, as I have good information that he removed them, some time ago, to the Khangah of Mukhtoom Rusheed Koreyshee, whence he is at perfect liberty to send them whithersoever he likes. I consider, therefore, that he has forfeited all claim to anything but his life, should he surrender, at some future stage of the campaign.

Jullal Khan, Lugharee, with sixty men, has deserted the enemy, and I expect him in, to-morrow, or next day. There are no boats, and he must cross on a mussuck, which will do him good.

Mussoo Khan, who fought at Leia, and has again returned thither, is also expected in; his brother having undertaken to bring him in, in seven days.

This is not to be mistaken for loyalty. The homes of these traitors are on this side of the river, and confiscation is, as it were, on their threshold.

There is a fellow named Jowahir Mull, of Imnabad, in the enemy's camp, whose name is much in people's mouths. It would be well to confiscate his estates, if he has any.

A Sirdar named Ujeet Sing, of Pukka Sindanwalla, on the Sutlej, who enjoys a considerable jagheer from the Sirkar, fought, on the side of the rebels here in Ghazee Khan, on the 20th, and took refuge, at the end of the action, in the fort, whence he was allowed mercifully to emerge, on giving up his arms to the Khosas. I hope this man's jagheer will be, immediately, taken from him. He is again with the enemy on the other bank.

Inclosure 5 in No. 29

*Captain C. Mackenzie, commanding 4th Regiment Sikh Local Infantry, to  
Major F. Mackeson, C.B.*

May 27, 1848.

THE whole of the regiment under my command volunteered, yesterday, to go on service against the Mooltanees, now in insurrection. I beg to explain, distinctly, that neither I, nor my European officers, have had anything to do with this act, which is quite spontaneous on the part of the native commissioned and non-commissioned officers and sepoys, who are apparently eager to have an opportunity of proving their zeal and fidelity.

Inclosure 6 in No. 29.

*Lieutenant Edwardes to the Resident at Lahore.*

*Camp, Dera Ghazee Khan, May 30, 1848.*

THINGS remain much in the same state as when last I wrote. We are encamped here, threatening to cross; and the enemy opposite us at Koreyshee, looking out to prevent us.

Jullal Khan, Lugharee, a zemindar of this district, of considerable note, came over to us, the day before yesterday, from the rebel camp, with about eighty men. He is more trouble to me here than there, on account of his belonging to the party which is at war with the Khosas, who have been doing us much good service; and receiving both in the same Durbar is much like associating a tiger and a lion. But



desertion is so disheartening that I encourage as many as possible to leave the enemy. Last night Mustapha Khan, Suddozye, came over, leaving his tents and horses all standing. He is a Jagheerदार, and, of course, looks to the end. I expect two or three others in a day or two.

An affray has taken place, in the south of the Sind Sagur Doab, near the Sutlej, at a place called Juttoan. The zemindars rose, spontaneously, to pay off some old scores against Moolraj's kardar, one Purubdyal (brother to Sudda Nund, the Mooltan vakeel), and finally made him prisoner, and sent him over the water to Bahawal Khan. Moolraj's kardars are certainly unlucky. Jowahir Mull of Innabab, with 200 horse, has left the camp at Koreyshee for Juttoan, to take vengeance on the Zemindars, who, I hope, will rise in numbers, and repulse him.

This morning, the Futteh Pultun started for the south. It is under the orders of Nassur Khan, Populzye, who has with him 250 sowars and five zumboorahs, and they all proceed via Jampore, and Hurrund, to Mittunkote. Hurrund is a strong fort, in which I have already reported that the kardar, Mokum Chund, is holding out, but I expect he will evacuate, before the force arrives. Should he still refuse to surrender, the detachment now sent will be strengthened, and the place regularly besieged. It has two heavy guns, and is reckoned strong.

Mustapha Khan, Suddozye, describes the Puthan allies of Moolraj to be all out of heart, discontented, and prepared to desert, should an "honorable" opportunity offer itself. But the Sikhs, he says, are mustering strong, and determined to fight. What is strange, he declares that the troops which deserted our officers are dissatisfied with Moolraj, who has not rewarded them, as they expected.

I send a letter from Nawab Bahawal Khan, relative to his movements, from which it would appear that the occupation of the country between Mooltan and the Sutlej, for which he has undertaken to be responsible, is dependent on the simultaneous advance of Sheik Emamooddeen, and Raja Shere Sing, from other quarters, and as yet "he hears nothing of either." Neither can any body else say where those chiefs are, though there has been time enough for them to march two or three times to Mooltan, since the Ukhbar first reported their departure from Lahore. Would it not be better, therefore, to let Bahawal Khan, co-operate with those who will exert themselves at this crisis? General Cortlandt and I are quite prepared to force the passage of the Indus, whenever you give the word, and to unite with the troops of Bahawal Khan, in a plan for driving back the Koreyshee camp to Mooltan. Should Bahawal Khan's army cross at Julalpoore, it is reasonable to believe that Moolraj would, instantly, summon Hur Bugwan Doss's army home, and thus allow us to cross, and follow them, unopposed, but should Moolraj feel secure in his fort, without their aid (which is scarcely credible) we are now quite strong enough to attack Hur Bugwan Doss, under the certainty that Bahawal Khan would prevent any further reinforcements from coming to their assistance from Mooltan. In a few words, my request is, that the task of driving in the rebels be confided to this force, and Bahawal Khan's, leaving us at liberty to adopt our plan of operations. Undoubtedly, there can be no feeling of security for the empire, during the next four months, if the enemy is not confined to the fort of Mooltan, and I am willing to be responsible for reducing him to that condition, if Bahawal Khan's assistance is put at my disposal.

Revenue arrangements are proceeding very satisfactorily, on this side of the Indus, and money beginning to come in, from the districts in our rear, but all will be disturbed, if Jowahir Mull Dutt is allowed to remit, at one stroke of his pen, a third of the whole revenue of the Sind Sagur Doab. This remission can, only, have been devised by the Durbar, under the idea that the Zemindars are in rebellion. Of course, there is a considerable class of the population (Beloochees and Puthans) who, at all times, prefer military service to agriculture, and these men have, now, either joined my camp, or Moolraj's. The cream of the country has, therefore, been skimmed off; and the residue is very thin milk indeed. If half as much revenue again were to be imposed by the Sirkar, as fine for supposed disloyalty, it would be paid, as soon as ever Jowahir Mull arrived at Leia, and if half the revenue, instead of a third, was to be remitted, the other half would not be paid, a day before that city was occupied, and permanent arrangements were made by the Sirkar. The Zemindars do not pay, at once, because they are afraid that, to-morrow, the opposite party will be uppermost, and they will be called on to pay over again. They make no resistance to paying their full revenue. They only want assurance that they are paying to the strongest side. And it is evidently unjust, as well as unnecessary, to make this remission, for it becomes a fine on loyalty, a temptation to the surrounding peaceful districts to

revolt, for the sake of being dealt with as enemies. I am in daily expectation of the Zemindars, Trans-Indus, asking to be treated as their brethren over the water; and the answer I shall give them, will be more arbitrary than logical, namely, that Jowahir Mull is master on that side, and I on this. I trust that a consideration of these circumstances will induce you to rescind the remission of one-third, in all the districts of Jowahir Mull, Shere Sing, and Emamooddeen; the example being most pernicious, and leading to the belief that the Government of the Maharajah is much weaker than it is.

Inclosure 7 in No 29

*Lieutenant Edwardes to the Resident at Lahore.*

*Camp. Dera Ghazee Khan, June 2, 1848.*

THIS morning, I received a reply from Nawab Bahawal Khan, dated the 30th of May, in which he informs me that he is crossing the whole of his force, expects to complete the passage as it were to-day, and shall then move on Shoojabad, which is twenty coss from Mooltan.

I offered to co-operate with the Nawab should he desire it, and marked out two plans as those which lay open to him, one without, and one with, my co-operation, requesting of him to tell me which he meant to follow? The first was, for him to advance alone towards Mooltan, and to force Moolraj to recall the army of Hur Bugwan Doss at Koreyshee in my front. But to do this, I said, "You must be strong and self-sufficient." The other plan was, in case of his not being strong enough to adopt the former, that he should act in conjunction with me, crossing below the debouche of the Chenab, (at Ooch, or somewhere thereabouts) into the lower part of the Sind Sagur Doab, and advancing up the right bank of the Chenab to Khangur, where I proposed to join him by forcing the Indus at the ferry of Kinjur. This offer I made, because Bahawal Khan's friendship for our Government is undoubted, and I thought that, if, out of good will, he had undertaken more than he could well accomplish, in becoming responsible for the occupation of the country between the Sutlej and Mooltan, it would be but right to give him every assistance in my power. His answer, this morning received, adopts the former plan, and implies that he is sufficiently strong to go alone, but hints that I might join him at Shoojabad, which is impossible, without boats on the Chenab.

I am not sorry that the Nawab has taken his own line, since it is the one which obviously offers the greatest military advantages, and which, if followed with any vigor and show of strength, must oblige Moolraj to summon all his troops across the Chenab. At least, I do not give him credit for sufficient courage to withdraw Hur Bugwan Doss, only as far as Raj Ghat, two coss from Mooltan, on the right bank of the Chenab, though that would be quite as safe as if the rebel force were under the walls of Mooltan, supposing that I did not follow them up.

We may daily expect, therefore, to hear of the retreat of the enemy from Koreyshee, and it becomes necessary for me to make up my mind how to act under such circumstances.

Your instructions are distinct, to remain Trans-Indus, to secure the peace of this important frontier, which is of more consequence than the revenues of the Sind Sagur Doab. But it is very questionable whether inactivity on my part is consistent with the preservation of lasting peace in this quarter.

For, let us suppose the Daoodpotra army to have reached Shoojabad. By the Nawab naming that place as suitable for my joining him, I take it he does not mean to go any further north this hot weather, in which case, the rebel forces will not be under the necessity which we contemplate, of shutting themselves up in the fort. At the utmost, they will encamp on the left bank of the Raj Ghat. In this position, they will correspond with Sirdar Jhunda Sing's force at Leia, the same as they did with mine at the same place; and, from Captain Ablott's account, the officers distrusted their men, even before they left Hazara. To expose such rotten troops to four months' tampering would be most unwise; and, at no time, could we be astonished to hear of their going over to Moolraj. Again, the Leia force is linked on to Bunnoo, by the Sowars at Dera Ismael Khan. That place is empty of regular troops, and

none but Sikh Goodhurras from Bunnoo were available for its protection. I hear that these men talk treason very freely, and speculate openly on the events which the next few months are to produce. Of course, these opinions find their way to Bunnoo; and thence to Peshawur and Hazara, with improvements at every stage; and both Lieutenant Taylor, Major George Lawrence, and Major Abbott feel that their garrisons, however quiet, are watching affairs narrowly. This being the case, the smallest spark may, any day, during the next four months, set the cantonments of Bunnoo, Peshawur, and Hazara, in a blaze of mutiny. Such, for instance, as the arrival of Bhaee Maharaj at Mooltan, in the character of a persecuted Gooroo. This is the great danger, which now seems to me to threaten this frontier, unless some vigorous move, on my part, in backing up that of Bahawal Khan, drives the rebels into their stronghold, and reduces them for the rest of the summer to a discouraging and humiliating position in the public eye.

Other apprehensions I have none. From the nature of this frontier, perfect peace is a thing unknown. Some one tribe or other must necessarily be in a ferment, or some hereditary and unintelligible feud must needs be brought, for the hundredth time, to the sharp appeal of the sword; but one gets accustomed to this, and ceases to regard it as an interruption to the general good understanding existing between a prudent ruler, and races fonder of the sword than of the plough.

It would require the residence of one officer, for some years, to make up all enmities, and redress all grievances, so as to establish in the Derajat what is called peace in other districts. What I think we can calculate on, now that all the chief Puthans and Beloochees have joined us, is general subordination and assistance, which is all we want, until this rebellion is settled.

On the one hand, therefore, our presence here, with a large force, is no longer necessary to secure peace with the Puthan population; and, if we moved, we should carry with us, enlisted in our ranks, the best hostages for quiet in our absence; while, on the other hand, to render innocuous the delay of four months, which must occur before the British army takes the field, it seems almost indispensable to get between the enemy and all the north-west stations of Sikh troops, so as to cut off both intrigue, desertion, and coalition.

Raj Ghat, on the right bank of the Chenab, two coss from Mooltan, is the point which, after mature consideration, I should like to reach, as promising more public tranquillity, and moral effect, than any other. Half an hour's consideration of the map will, I am sure, incline you to agree in this opinion.

What I would ask, therefore, is, to be left at liberty on this head, to act on my own discretion according to circumstances. For the present, we are fully employed here, and could not leave under any temptation, until the fort of Hurrund has surrendered. Some days ago, I reported the despatch of a regiment to back General Cortlandt's summons to the Kardar and officers of that garrison.

This morning the Kardar (Mokum Chund) sent in his answer, which is sufficient to hang him, should he be taken alive. It commences with a Persian verse, which, literally translated, means, "Only see how great is the power of the immaculate God, which can enable one man to slay a hundred thousand." It then proceeds to state that Dewan Moolraj made him Kardar, and either Dewan Moolraj or Maharajah Duleep Sing, must order him to give up the fort. The saving clause about the Maharajah is a shallow pretext to gain time, which he certainly shall not have, but I told General Cortlandt to send him one of the numerous proclamations, wherein all persons in this district are called on to obey that officer, and separate from Dewan Moolraj, in order that he may not plead the excuse again, when put on his trial. I rather expect though, that if this is his humour, he will be killed in resisting the Puthan officers of his garrison, whom I have called on to bring him in, and one cannot help admiring the folly of Moolraj in letting such thorough going partisans as Mokum Chund, Cheytun Mull, and Longa Mull, be killed, and taken prisoners, in holes and corners, instead of gathering them round his person, for the grand struggle at Mooltan.

There is no news of any importance from the enemy's camp at Koreyahee. They are very much afraid of our crossing, and often beat to arms, on false alarms of our fleet being under weigh. The Sikh regulars are described as the only men who are prepared to offer any resistance. Ussud Khan Mootkanee has, it appears, not gone to Mooltan, but has fallen under suspicion, and been virtually put in arrest by Hur Bugwan Doss, in a building apart from the camp. This Ussud Khan's name is much used, on account of his old family and rank; but personally, he is a mere time-server, unstable, and unfaithful, taking up a cause for no attachment, and

deserting it as soon as good luck sets him the example. He has not twenty followers. Jowahir Mull, of Innabad, is making overtures to desert to us, with 200 men. I tell him to come, and not talk. Our cosais have great difficulty in penetrating their camp; one got his nose cut off the other day.

A circumstance came to my knowledge, to-day, of which no previous mention has been made that I am aware of. About the time when this rebellion broke out, several boats laden with military stores are said to have been on their way up the Indus, from Kurrachee to Ferozepore, for the British Government, and were intercepted, and seized, by the Kardar of Mittunkote. One boat heavily laden with stores, selected from the above (muskets, &c.) has just been sent by the said Kardar to the enemy's camp at Koreyshee; but a Puthan zemindar and robber heard of the affair, and made a foray on the sepoys in charge, about 20 coss to the south of this place, and possessed himself of the prize. The boatmen, however, talked him over, told him that the stores belonged to the Sahib log, and that he would make a better thing by giving them up to me, than by keeping them. He approved the argument, and sent word of what had happened, and General Cortlandt has sent out twenty horsemen to accompany the boat hither. Have you any report of these boats being intercepted, from the Sind Government?

The Kardar of Mittunkote will not give us any trouble, I trust, after the fort of Hurrund, to the north of him, has been taken. The Futteh Pultun and Nassur Khan Populzye's party will then proceed to Mittunkote. In fact, as far as the country and people, Trans-Indus, are concerned, I have no anxieties whatever; any danger that threatens us is from the Sikh troops.

Inclosure 8 in No. 29.

*The Resident at Lahore to the Secretary to the Government of India.*

*Lahore, June 5, 1848.*

I FORWARD a letter from Lieutenant Edwardes, dated Dera Ghazee Khan, the 27th ultimo.

His Lordship in Council will perceive that that enterprising and energetic officer has entirely succeeded in performing the duty assigned to him, of getting possession of, and holding, the whole of the Mooltan districts, Trans-Indus.

Lieutenant Edwardes has succeeded in raising, according to the instructions sent him by me, such a force of new troops (Mussulman) as to render him quite independent of the fidelity, or otherwise, of the Sikh Regiment, with which alone he commenced operations, just a month before the date of his last letter.

He is also, now, in a position to render it impossible for Moolraj's troops to force the passage of the Indus, for the sake of regaining the districts wrested from them on its right bank; and indeed, if need be, to act on the offensive.

If the chiefs of the Durbar, or any one individual among them, had shewn one-tenth part of the zeal, energy, and judgment exhibited by Lieutenant Edwardes, for the preservation of their Government, the Mooltan rebellion might have been put down, ere this.

But the chiefs are, collectively and individually, utterly without resource or energy. In a crisis like the present, they are quite useless, and, to all appearance, Durbar and all, as far as their actions go, quite indifferent as to what may be the result of the present state of things.

I have warned them, distinctly, openly in Durbar, and each member individually and personally, that, upon their conduct now, and the result of their exertions, depends the only chance that remains for the preservation of the Khalsa state.

In the mean time, Dewan Moolraj is by no means inactive; he is employing all his resources to raise a large army, and to equip it, to prepare his fort for a siege, and to gain over to his interests the Khalsa troops, and the Sikh people.

I am constantly at work, the Durbar merely acquiescing, to defeat the machinations of the Dewan, to confine the rebellion within the smallest limits, and to keep the Dewan and his troops to the neighbourhood of the city and fort of Mooltan, till after the rains, when the business will be easily settled, and when it matters little, as far as the British Government is concerned, whether the Khalsa army were to join Moolraj, or not.

I find it difficult to carry out my plans with any prospect of success, with instruments so bad, and so little to be depended upon, as those at my disposal.

It is extraordinary to what an extent the treacherous and cowardly Dewan has the sympathies of the army, and of the Khalsa portion of the population. Up to this time, he has only their sympathies (with the exception of the numbers of the discharged soldiery and Sikhs from the Manjha, who have taken service with him) ; but any success on his part, or any want of vigilance on our's, would be very probable to give him the service of the army.

No stronger proof of the strength of the feeling in favor of those connected with the present rebellion, can be adduced, than the conduct of all parties,—officials and non-officials,—in the case of the self-styled Sikh Gooroo, Bhaee Maharaj Sing, for whose capture, and dispersion of his followers, we have now a force in the interior, and regarding whose conduct, I shall report separately, as soon as the final result of the present measures for the seizure of the delinquent, is known.

It is of the last importance that Moolraj should not be enabled to send his troops into the Lahore districts, as he has been preparing, lately, to do , the effect would be not only the spread of disaffection, the withholding by the Zemindars of the State revenues, and the prevalence of disturbances and crime throughout the provinces, but the army would, certainly in such case, not remain quiet, and the frontier provinces would immediately revolt, and the rebellion would become very formidable.

The Dewan has now about 6,000 men, horse and foot, with twelve guns, on the left bank of the Indus, opposite Dera Ghazee Khan. He has about 2,000 or 2,500 men, with three guns, on the banks of the Chenab, opposite Jhung, threatening the Lahore districts, and he has a force of about the same strength, or rather less, with two guns at Toolumba, to oppose the approach of Raja Shere Sing, and the Jagheerdar troops.

He has about 1,000 men of all arms, at Mooltan itself, where he is daily collecting new levies.

The above constitutes the whole of his force, up to this time. The generality of these troops are newly raised, ill armed, and totally undisciplined, they have taken service for the pay that has been promised, but they will not face a formidable opponent.

It is very desirable that employment should be found for this army in the neighbourhood of Mooltan where it can do little harm; whereas, in the provinces, it would certainly cause much mischief.

I have therefore urged Bahawal Khan to put his troops across the Sutlej now, and threaten Mooltan, from both sides of the Chenab. The Nawab has a very fine little force of 10,000 to 12,000 men, well equipped and disciplined, and composed, almost entirely, of fighting Puthans.

The Bahawalpore troops crossed, on the 30th and 31st of last month. The Zemindars of the neighbouring districts immediately tendered their allegiance to him, on behalf of the British Government, and Moolraj must now recall his detached troops, to defend the city, and the immediate neighbourhood, of Mooltan.

When he does this, Lieutenant Edwades will cross the Indus again, and in a very different condition from that in which he crossed it, a month ago, near Leia. He will co-operate with Bahawal Khan, and will, I think, very probably drive Moolraj into his fort, there to remain, if not murdered by his own troops, till the British army can take the field.

The Nawab of Bahawalpore is desirous that a British officer should be with his force, to aid in directing its movements, and, as he says, to bear witness to the conduct of his officers and soldiers, in the service of the British Government.

It is very expedient that an energetic and intelligent officer should accompany the force for, though Peer Ibraheem Khan, our agent at the Bahawalpore Court, is an excellent and zealous officer, and is with the troops in the field, yet he does not carry with him the weight of a British officer, even with the force itself, or in the eyes of the people.

Lieutenant Becher, the Bahawalpore Boundary Commissioner, would have done admirably for this duty, but he is, I understand, (though I have had no communication from him on the subject) gone, since the setting in of the hot weather, to Mount Aboo, whence to get him to the frontier would take a long time.

I, therefore, purpose, if he is willing to undertake the duty, of which I have scarcely a doubt, to depute Lieutenant Lake of the Engineers, Acting Deputy-Commissioner, at Jullundur, to Bahawalpore.

Lieutenant Lake is a very intelligent, active officer, with great knowledge of the natives, and peculiar tact in managing them, and gaining their regard. He will co-

operate admirably with Lieutenant Edwardes. I trust, therefore, that if Lieutenant Lake is willing to proceed to Bahawalpore, the Governor-General in Council will sanction the arrangement, on my reporting its final adoption, which I will do, separately, if it takes place.

It is very desirable, now that the Nawab of Bahawalpore's troops are across the Sutlej, that a steamer or two should come up to Ferozepore, this will have a very good effect in protecting the traffic of the Sutlej, now very much interrupted, as well as being useful in communicating between the Bahawalpore camp and Ferozepore, and in aiding the passage of troops across the river, at Ferozepore, during the rains.

Inclosure 9 in No 29.

*The Resident at Lahore to Lieutenant Edwardes.*

*Lahore, June 5, 1848*

THE account you give of the state of your force, is highly satisfactory, and reflects the greatest credit on your zeal and perseverance, which have raised the greater part of it, and made it what it is, in the short space of one month.

You are quite right to record, exactly, without extenuation, or exaggeration, all that takes place in connection with the operations in which your troops, or allies, are concerned. The excesses committed by persons unconnected with the troops, at Dera Ghazee Khan, are to be regretted, but, in the state of society which exists in the Derajat, are not to be wondered at.

You will, of course, mark your displeasure at the occurrence.

If the Durbar officials, and Sirdars, would do, for themselves, one-tenth part of what you are doing for them, the rebellion might be put down at once.

Inclosure 10 in No 29

*Lieutenant Edwardes to the Resident at Lahore*

*Camp, Dera Ghazee Khan, June 5, 1848.*

THE enemy has received another defeat, at Alipore, in the lowest part of the Sind Sagur Doab. Jowahir Mull, of Innabad, with 100 horse and 100 foot, made a forced march of nearly thirty coss, from the camp at Koreyshee, to seize a few thousand rupees of revenue, which had been collected by Sahib Purubdyal, Kardar of Juttoe, and which had again fallen into the hands of the Zemindars, when they rose, and made Purubdyal a prisoner, as before reported. Jowahir Mull was not aware that, in the interim, Moozooddeen Khan, Khaghwanee, an officer of the Nawab of Bahawalpore, had crossed the Sutlej, below Ooch, into the Seetpore district, with 1,500 men, and the consequence was, that he came plump into the middle of them, near Alipore, and I hear that, out of his 200 men, he left 109 dead upon the field, and himself with difficulty escaped, with the remainder, to Khangur, on the banks of the Chenab, opposite Shoojabad, whence he has, probably, continued his flight to Mooltan. You will have got the particulars, probably, from Peer Ibraheem Khan, before this reaches you.

When this information reached me, yesterday, it, immediately, occurred to me that the rebel army at Koreyshee would either retreat upon Mooltan, to escape from the toils closing around them, or else march against the weak party of Moozooddeen Khan, and revenge the defeat of Jowahir Mull. In the former case, it would be desirable to hasten their movements, and secure a footing on the other bank; and, in the latter, to assist the troops of Bahawal Khan would be imperative. This morning, therefore, I marched all our regular troops down to the river, and propose to follow, with the new levies, to-morrow. The strong fleet of eighty boats, of which we are master, has, likewise, been towed out of the nullah in which it was moored, and brought into the open river, in front of the camp. Every demonstration, in fact, has been made, of an intention to cross to the left bank at once, though, as I said in my last letter, I am not prepared to leave this side, without special reason, until some satisfactory settlement has been made at Hurrund, where the fort still holds out. Our detachment has, however, not yet reached it.

Full details of the movements of the Bahawulpore troops have, at length, reached me, from the Nawab, and Peer Ibraheem Khan, from which I gather that the latter, with the main body, will be, to-day, within a long march, or two short ones, of Shoojabad, at which place he presses me to unite my force with the Nawab's. No doubt, the Nawab has told him to do this, and feels apprehensive of Moolraj turning all his troops against the Daoodpotra division. But this was easily foreseen, from the first, and I wrote to the Nawab, a fortnight ago, to tell him not to advance on Shoojabad, unless strong enough to fight single-handed, otherwise, to advance up the Seetpore road, between the Chenab and the Indus, when, I would cross, and join him at Khangur, and, unitedly, we might then proceed which ever way we chose, to Mooltan. He was too proud to accept of this assistance, and thought he could gain all the credit of advancing alone on Shoojabad, and still have all the advantage of my reinforcement, by making Peer Ibraheem Khan apply for it. This is very native, but I must not follow his example, and, having nothing at heart but the successful termination of the campaign, I shall certainly go to his assistance, even at Shoojabad, if I see any chance of his being opposed in strength. I have, therefore, written, in reply to Peer Ibraheem Khan, that my own plan was, to make my way, to the Raj Ghat, whenever I crossed the Indus, and so press the Dewan on the north, while the Nawab's troops pressed him on the south, but that I will now take the Khangur route, as Khangur is only five coss from Shoojabad, with the Chenab between them, and, from that place, I can either cross the Chenab (if there are any boats along with the Daoodpotras), or continue my way to Raj Ghat, whichever the times require. But I repeat, that special reasons only can induce me to cross the Indus, before the reduction of the fort of Hurrund. After that, you are well aware that my opinion is, that the sooner our force can get to the Chenab the better, and though, judging of the matter from Lahore, you urge me to keep on my own side of the Indus, you would not, I am sure, wish me to withhold my assistance from Bahawal Khan, if required. The aspect of affairs, indeed, has never been so good as at this moment. Moolraj is playing his game very ill, and would appear to have no able, or no sincere, military adviser; else, he would not fritter away his strength, discourage his troops, in these detached expeditions, which none of his officers has the skill to bring to a successful issue. Whenever they have been met, they have been signally beaten, and they will now be driven back to Mooltan, which they should never have left, unless for the purpose of forcing me to a disadvantageous action, and so putting me hors de combat, for the rest of the season.

The chief Zemindars of Mittunkote have written to offer to rise, and expel Moolraj's Kardar from that district, where he has assembled some 300 or 400 men, and is collecting revenue. In reply, I have directed General Cortlandt to tell them to rise by all means, but not to let the rebel Kardar escape on any terms. It is a new thing these men of the pen buckling on the sword. Moolraj's rebellion has made all the Kuthrees mad.

The Nawab of Bahawulpore informs me that you made over to him "the Trans-Indus territories, up to the hills," an obscure description, but I take it that, when you thought I should not be able to reach Dera Ghazee Khan, you requested the Nawab to undertake its appropriation. That, however, is no longer necessary, and I have told him so.

Inclosure 11 in No. 29.

*Lieutenant Edwardes to the Resident at Lahore*

*Camp, Dera Ghazee Khan, June 6, 1848.*

I AM happy to have received your sanction to my detaching General Cortlandt across the Indus, or going myself, if necessary, for the support of the troops of Bahawal Khan; and, judging from the aspect of things, in this quarter, I should expect that many days will not pass over, without rendering such co-operation indispensable. We are treading close upon that stage of the rebellion which is to decide whether Dewan Moolraj is to await the British troops, as an already condemned prisoner, in the Fort of Mooltan, or, at the head of an insurrectionary army, in the field; within a fortnight, he will either be shut up in his stronghold, or at large for the hot weather.

My latest news of Bahawal Khan's main body, left it at Julalpore Khakran, which is only eight or nine coss from Shoojabad. At Shoojabad, there is a stout fort I understand, capable of making considerable resistance. It is intrusted to one Jummeent Raze, who is said to have 1,500 men with him. Had Moolraj moved his fleet of boats down from the Raj Ghat to Shoojabad, so as to enable the force, now at Koreyshee, to cross at Khangur, and collected all his moveable forces and artillery, around the fort of Shoojabad, Bahawal Khan's division could not have passed that place, without a general action. At present, it is difficult to tell on what point the Koreyshee force will retreat, but I think it probable they will not be in heart for so spirited a move as that I have mentioned, and will make for Raj Ghat and Mooltan, to-night. The night before last, they fired six guns, either to persuade me that they had won the fight at Alipore, or else to show that their guns were still at Koreyshee, preparatory to sending them away, by forced marches, to the Chenab, themselves remaining to cover the manœuvre. In the latter case, they will follow the Artillery to-night, and make Raj Ghat in two days. That something of this sort is brewing is clear from the increased vigilance with which they have watched the river, to prevent any spy from coming over from my camp, and this is now the second day that none of my messengers has returned.

This morning, I received the long expected letter from Gholam Mustapha Khan, Khaghwanee, in Mooltan. His silence, as I imagined, was caused by the absence from Mooltan, with the army sent against me, of all the Mooltanees Puthan Chiefs whose defection he had undertaken to accomplish, and his reluctance to write, until there was some prospect of success. He now writes that, on his return from my camp to Mooltan, he strongly urged Moolraj to surrender himself to me, but the Dewan rejected his advice, got angry when he pressed, and renewed his preparations for war. In this mood he is encouraged only by two of the Puthan officers, Ahmud Khan and Kalihdad Khan, who have brought their wives into the Fort of Mooltan. All the other Puthans have already removed their families, not only from the fort, but also the neighbourhood, and chiefly to Kumman-ke-Kote, whither you will remember Mustapha Khan proposed that they themselves should retire. In his present letter, he offers to leave Mooltan for Kumman-ke-Kote, as soon as Bahawal Khan's force crosses the river, but I have told him by no means to do so, but wait the return of all the Puthan officers to Mooltan, with the army now before us, and take them with him, as originally proposed. Mustapha Khan's letter is ten days old, yet it contains the significant sentence, "The crisis is at hand."

At the rebellious fort of Hurrund, 100 of the Puthan sowars of the garrison have engaged to come over, but are unwilling to turn upon the rest of the garrison. Probably, their desertion will force the others to follow their example. The country round Hurrund belongs to the Goorchurree tribe of Beloochees, whose equals, for all kinds of violence and lawlessness, are not to be found in this border, and, were they on the same side as the rebels in the fort, its reduction would be a very serious affair; fortunately, they are all with us, burning to distinguish themselves as Kowra Khan and the Khosa clan have done.

Indeed, the whole of my newly raised Puthan levies are in just the temper that could be wished. War is their trade, and also their pastime. They like it. They have met with one or two successes at the outset, and are persuaded that the "Ikbal" is on their side, and my task is to restrain their impatience, which is a good omen when hard blows are to the fore. Their pay is good (six rupees a footman, and fifteen rupees a sowar) and they are all satisfied. They muster now nearly 3,000 men; General Cortlandt has levied nearly 2,000 more, so that a strong division can still be left Trans-Indus, to preserve the peace of the frontier, whenever it may be necessary to send reinforcements to Bahawal Khan.

By a private note from Lieutenant Taylor, I learn that he has dispatched to us another regiment from Bunnoo, viz., General Cortlandt's Kuthar Mookhe Pultun, a strong body of Poorbeahs. This is quite contrary to my wishes, and, once before, I sent back eight companies of Infantry, which Lieutenant Taylor sent to our relief. The disinterested generosity of the action claims my warmest acknowledgments, for I know it to be one of the only two regiments on which that officer could really rely to stand by him in case of a military revolt, and I shall not refuse the reinforcement, now that more active operations lie before me on the other bank, for the argument which Lieutenant Taylor uses to press it upon me, is such as might be expected from his judgment, viz., that his safety depends on my success, not on the strength of his own position. It would be an injustice, however, to him were I not to state what none but myself can be fully aware of, that the extraordinary security of Bunnoo,



at this moment, when older possessions are in rebellion,—the peaceable conduct of the Bunnoschees, who are paying in their guns and swords in part of revenue, and escorting artillery, to me, 150 coss from their own valley,—the happy issue to which the threatening emence of the Thull Wuzerees has now been brought,—and the inability of the neighbouring hill tribes to find allies enough in Bunnoo to get up an insurrection, are results solely to be attributed to the rare union of forbearance and firmness, gentleness and determination, which Lieutenant Taylor has brought to bear on the subjugation of two races, one the most independent, and the other the most vicious, that I ever saw

P S—8 P M One of my spies has arrived from the enemy's camp They have, as yet, not sent away a single gun, and are waiting for orders from Mooltan. The greatest alarm reigns among them, at our preparations for crossing, and Jus Mull, one of their principal officers, has gone off to Mooltan, to show Moolraj a letter from Julal Khan, Luhgaree, (who came over to us) descriptive of our immense numbers, and blood-thirsty intentions, which letter I myself dictated to Julal Khan, three days ago, having intercepted a letter from the enemy to him, asking for news of our camp' The cry among the men is, "If the Dewan intends us to be killed, let it be at Mooltan"

A different version is given of the fight at Alipore, in which it is said that Moozooddeen Khan was not engaged, but only his advanced party of 100 men under Deen Mahomed Shah, which was very roughly handled by Jowahir Mull's cavalry, now estimated at 300 Part of the Syud's men fled to the rear, to bring up Moozooddeen Khan, but the rest stood their ground, and Jowahir Mull, at last, withdrew, in dread of Moozooddeen Khan's arrival, and retreated on Khangur, but carried all his wounded off the field This would make it not quite so good, therefore, as a drawn battle, and it is reported that Bahawal Khan is pouring reinforcements across, with orders to take revenge on the Koreyshee army But I give him credit for more temper and sense

P S *Morning June 7th, 1848, Camp on the ferry-bank of Dera Ghazee Khan on the Indus*—This morning, I have left the town of Ghazee Khan, and joined the camp on the river bank, to hurry the movements of the enemy at Koreyshee

On re-perusing the letter of Peer Ibraheem Khan, it appears that the "Julalpoore" at which Bahawal Khan's army has arrived, was 'Julalpoore Peronwallah,' and not "Julalpoore Khakian," as mentioned in this letter This makes a considerable difference, as the former place is about forty coss from Mooltan, and the latter only eight or nine, and the apathy of the rebels at Koreyshee is thus fully accounted for When Bahawal Khan reaches Julalpoore Khakran, Moolraj must look about him for all the means of resistance he can muster

#### Inclosure 12 in No 29

*Lieutenant Edwardes to the Resident at Lahore*

*Camp, Dera Ghazee Khan, June 8, 1848*

IN a postscript to my last letter, I informed you of my having once more gone into camp, on the banks of the river, below Dera Ghazee Khan, for the purpose of restraining the enemy at Koreyshee from marching against Moozooddeen Khan Khagwhanee's small Daoodpotra force, in the Seetpore district, and hurrying their retirement to Mooltan

A sepoy of General Cortlandt's, who was sent into the Koreyshee camp to gather news, returned this morning, and reported that the rebels had changed their ground, and taken up a position more to the south, at the precise point where our fleet would land, if we made the usual passage of the river

I do not believe the report of the sepoy, who could scarcely have ventured into the rebel camp, so strictly watched as it is, and so ruthlessly as all spies are maltreated. One of their own officers who fought against my picket at Lein, is working out his pardon in secret intelligence, and I have received no notice from him of this move. A salute of five guns was fired this evening by the rebels (I suspect for the arrival of Meer Kool Jus from Mooltan), and the sound was certainly from the direction of Koreyshee, not Khangur. It is extremely probable, however, that there

has been a picket sent to Leyrah, to watch for the coming of our fleet, which is the bugbear of their camp. It is worthy of notice that the soldiers all wish to retire upon Mooltan, at once, while they can, but that move is not to be undertaken without Dewan Moolraj's orders, to obtain which, Mir Kool Jus has been deputed by them to Mooltan. This quite disposes of the Dewan's plea that he has no command over his men.

The Dewan's officers are conducting themselves with great violence towards the Zemindars on the left bank, and have now confined all the Panches of villages, to make them advance the revenue at once.

This morning, I received letters, both from Peer Ibraheem Khan, and the Nawab of Bahawalpore, of a very unsatisfactory nature. The former writes that the main body of Daoodpotras under Futteh Mohamed Ghoree is still idling at Julalpoore Peronwallah, and that the Commander replies to all his remonstrances, by inquiring,—“Why Edwardes Sahib does not come on, and join him?” This is a good joke, that I am to force the Indus, in June, in the teeth of an equal foe, cut them into little pieces, and then march across the Sind Sagur Doab, and swim the Chenab (guns and all) for want of boats, to enable Futteh Mahomed Ghoree, a timid veteran of eighty, to march an army of 7,000 or 8,000 men, twenty coss along the Mooltan road, with nothing in front of him but the fort of Shoojabad, in which there are 332 footmen, thirteen sowars, and two rattle-trap guns! What is worse, the Nawab does not see, or pretends not to see, the absurd pusillanimity of this proceeding, or rather this standing still. He actually backs the request of Futteh Mahomed Ghoree, and reproaches me, as broadly as good breeding will allow, with not keeping my promise to join him. I have, politely, yet firmly, defended myself from this accusation, by requesting the Nawab to re-peruse my letter, wherein I, distinctly, set before him two lines of action, first, to cross the Sutlej at Julalpoore, and advance on Mooltan, without my co-operation, if he was strong enough to do so, and so compel Moolraj to recall the Koreyshee army, and secondly, if he was not strong enough to go alone, then, to co-operate with me, by crossing the Sutlej at Dummar, below Seetpore, and advancing on Khangur, where I would join him (even this last would seem a rash promise, but I relied on the enemy's common sense to retire from between two parallel armies). The Nawab, in reply, dispensed with my co-operation, as I reported to you at the time, and advanced by Julalpoore, yet he now sticks irresolute in the middle of his purpose, and calls on me to do mad things, without the least occasion. He thinks he clenches his appeal, by sending me a copy of your Moorasila consenting to his crossing by the Seetpore route, and authorizing me, in that case, to join him between the Sind and the Chenab. At this very moment, I have not got your sanction to cross the Chenab, under any circumstances, though of course I should do so, if events, of which you were ignorant, demanded such a step.

It is most unfortunate, this hesitation of Bahawal Khan, for the mere marching on, two or three more marches, would, as we have all along calculated, force Moolraj to withdraw the Koreyshee force, I should, then, cross and follow them up to the Chenab, when all the rebels, wedged in between Bahawal Khan and me, would take refuge in the fort of Mooltan. As it is, the crossing of Bahawal Khan has effected nothing, and only exhibited to Moolraj a fourth converging column, which has not the courage to converge (I allude to those of Raja Shere Sing, Sheik Emam-oodeen, and Jowahir Mull Dutt, all of which are as good as none here).

I have tried to stir up the Khan, by assuring him that if he will only tell me, plainly, that his army cannot go on any further, without my coming to its assistance, I will, immediately, force the Indus at all hazards, as there will then be no other alternative except leaving the rebels in possession of the field for the hot weather. Of the result of a general action between my own force and that at Koreyshee, I have no doubt whatever, my only argument is, that such an expenditure of human lives is quite superfluous, if Bahawal Khan will only make the demonstration which he has got so much credit, from you, and all of us, for undertaking to make, and which, moreover, would not cost him a man.

The truth is, that Bahawal Khan, with all his undoubted and sincere attachment to our Government, and readiness to prove it, mingles, like most mortals, a leaven of selfishness in his virtue. He has, I rather think, an eye to those districts south of Mooltan, and about Seetpore, &c., which formerly belonged to Bahawalpore, and, perhaps, calculating on a further dismemberment of the refractory Sikh empire, has already laid down in his own mind the boundary pillars of the share which is to reward his present co-operation. Hence, the anxiety for which you could not account,

to occupy Seetpore, and the consequent splitting of his force into a strong and a weak division. The latter, under Moozobdeen Khan, is, avowedly, bent only on revenue arrangements, appointing Kardars, &c, which might better have been left for another fortnight, till, by an active and united advance of the whole Daoodpotra force in one line, Moolraj's forces had been driven into quarters. The Nawab is not thinking of Mooltan, he is thinking of its southern districts. Doubtless, he will come round, and all will be well. I am merely speculating on this sudden shifting of his task on to my shoulders, where there was quite enough before.

Inclosure 13 in No 29

*The Resident at Lahore to Lieutenant E. Lake, Officiating Deputy Commissioner, Jullundur.*

*Lahore, June 9, 1848.*

I HAVE nominated you, pending the sanction of the Governor-General in Council, as a temporary measure, Political Agent with Nawab Bahawal Khan of Bahawalpore.

The Nawab has, at my request, sent a portion of his troops across the Sutlej, to act against the rebel Dewan of Mooltan, the object being to occupy, and collect the revenues of, the Mooltan districts on the Bahawalpore frontier, and to confine Dewan Moolraj to his fort, and prevent his sending troops into the Lahore districts, in order to create disturbances therein, and promote the spread of rebellion through the other Punjab provinces.

There is, as you are, I dare say, aware, a native agent, Peer Ibraheem Khan, a very excellent officer, at Bahawalpore, he will co-operate with you, and be, while you are on this duty, under your orders.

Your duty will be to join the head-quarters of the Bahawalpore troops, and to give your advice, which will be implicitly followed, in directing the movement of the troops, and the operations which are to be undertaken, for carrying out the objects of Government.

You will put yourself in communication with Lieutenant Edwardes, now at Dera Ghazee Khan, and co-operate with him, according to your own judgment and discretion, for the attainment of the end in view.

It is not probable that any opportunity will be given you of getting possession of the Fort of Mooltan, but such a circumstance is not impossible. Bahawal Khan has great influence with the Puthans in the service of Dewan Moolraj, there is believed to be a strong feeling of jealousy and dislike between the Puthan and Sikh portions of his army, and the former may rise on the latter at any moment, when their first victim would, probably, be the Dewan himself, in which case, the city would most likely be plundered, the force break up, and the occupation of the fort, by the nearest force, might, then, be accomplished.

This is a possible, but by no means a probable, contingency. Should the fort, by this, or any other means, come into the occupation of the Nawab's troops, it must be held by them, till you receive orders for your future guidance from me.

You must, distinctly, understand that you have no authority to make any overtures of any kind to the rebel Dewan, and that you have no authority to entertain any overtures from him, except unconditional surrender to the British power.

You should make the best of your way to Bahawalpore.

You may entertain a personal guard of a Jemadar and a few soldiers, on whom you can place reliance, at a cost not exceeding 100 rupees per mensem. I have directed Jalalooddeen Khan, the brother of the chief of Mundote, and thirty picked horsemen of his own, to accompany you from Ferozepore.

Inclosure 14 in No 29

*The Resident at Lahore to Lieutenant Edwardes,*

*Lahore, June 10, 1848.*

SO long a period must intervene, under the best dak arrangements that we can make, ere you can receive specific orders from me, that I must leave much to your

discretion, to act as you think best, as circumstances may arise, I can do no more than tell you, generally, my views and purposes, and the part, in the general scheme of operations, which I look to you to perform

The great object is, to confine the Mooltan rebellion within the smallest compass, till we can put a final extinguisher on it, by capturing the fort

To do this, the best plan, undoubtedly, is, to shut Moolraj up in his fort, till the British force arrives there.

But we must, at the same time, secure, if possible, the tranquillity of our important frontier

The latter depends very much; perhaps, entirely, on the former. If the Mooltan rebellion were to spread much, the Khalsa troops would, undoubtedly, join Moolraj.

At present, you are in a very secure position, for defence, you are quite safe, but your's and Bahawal Khan's are the only forces that can be relied on, for offensive operations

If you have an opportunity of co-operating with Bahawal Khan, you should do so, but you must bear in mind the fatal consequences that would result from Moolraj's army getting an advantage over you, and you must risk as little as possible

With these general instructions, I must leave you unfettered, to act according as circumstances render it most expedient that you should, with a view to attaining the great object in view

I have every confidence in your zeal and judgment and do not doubt your discretion

I cannot, yet, get a return of Bahawal Khan's force, or find out the strength of any of his detachments. I am apprehensive that, by crossing at four places, as I understand he has, he may have dispersed his troops too much. I can only hear of 1,000 cavalry being in the Sind Doab, and this is an insufficient force for that quarter, in which alone is Moolraj in a position to offer any serious opposition to him

It is highly desirable, that an intelligent British officer should be with the Bahawalpore troops, and as Lieutenant Becher, who would have done very well for the duty, has gone to Mount Aboo, and is, therefore, out of reach, I have deputed Lieutenant Lake, of the Engineers, to Bahawalpore, and I send you, herewith, a copy of my letter of instructions to him

I have never heard of the seizure of seven boats laden with ordnance stores from Kurrachee to Ferozepore, said to have been seized at Mittunkote, and think that it cannot have been the case, had these boats been seized, as stated, the military authorities would, doubtless, have reported the fact to me. Moreover, ordnance-stores are not sent from the Bombay Presidency to the Bengal Stations of the Army, I am pretty sure

You will have heard that Bhace Maharaj's party has been completely cut up, drowned, or captured near Jhung, he himself is said to have been drowned in attempting to swim across the Chenab, in which attempt some hundreds of his followers perished

The reason for authorizing the remission to those of the Mooltan Malgoozars who should at once come forward and pay their revenue to the Durbar, was, that it was generally stated, that the Mooltan districts were much over assessed, and were, accordingly, looking for the arrival of the British officers, on the retirement of Moolraj, to extend to them the same indulgences which had been shown to the Lahore zemindars in the late assessments, extending, in many instances, to a full third of the former nominal annual revenue, and it was deemed by me expedient to mark our disposition to treat the Mooltan zemindars, on their coming directly under the Durbar administration, with the same kindness and consideration which had been shown to the other provinces of the Punjab

The condition attached to the indulgence was the immediate payment of the Rubbee Kist to the Lahore officials.

Inclosure 15 in No. 29

*Lieutenant Edwardes to the Resident at Lahore**Camp, Ferry of Dera Ghazee Khan, June 10, 1848*

YESTERDAY morning, I heard of a ferry, nine coss to the southward, called Danuhwallah, and proposed to embark my artillery, and as many of the troops of all branches as could be stowed away in a fleet of eighty boats, and turn the enemy's position, described in my last letter, by landing on the left bank of the Indus, a few coss below Kanghui; accordingly, I sent out men to explore the land route to the ferry, which the heavy baggage would have to pursue, and the report was so unfavorable as to the state, of the intervening canals, that I, reluctantly, gave up the idea. The news, however, was carried speedily across the river to the enemy, and Hur Bugwan Doss, the commander, held a council of his officers, at which it was agreed that they could not meet me in the plain, and that the best plan would be to retreat to Shagurh, a ruined fort, between Koreyshee and Khangur, and there throw up entrenchments. This had scarcely been determined on, than a message from Mooltan brought orders from Moolraj for the retreat of the Koreyshee force, it is supposed on Mooltan, but it was given out on Shoojabad, and, after the first watch of the night, their guns marched, and were followed by the infantry and cavalry, before dawn this morning. Accounts vary as to the route pursued from Koreyshee, some saying the Mozuffernuggur road, which leads to Raj Ghat and Mooltan, others the road to Khangur, which is opposite Shoojabad.

Either route is probable, and it would be waste of time to speculate on which is most so. Both alike call on me to act, and, as speedily as possible, comply with the request of the Nawab of Bahawalpore, to support his column advancing on Shoojabad, not that that column wants support, but they think they do, which is much the same thing. Moozodeen Khan, Khaghwanee, also, with another weak division of the Daoodpotra force, is between the Indus and the Chenab, and I know not how near to, or distant from, Khangur, having received no reply from him, since I wrote to know what his plans were. It is right that I should put myself in a position to relieve him, should Hur Bugwan Doss come across his path.

Under these circumstances, I have resolved on not delaying a day. Ten guns, and about 2,500 Puthans, are now getting into the boats, and I shall accompany them in person over the river. We make for the Leyrah ferry, described in my last letter. General Cortlandt, with the rest of the troops, will follow to-morrow. The river is nine coss wide, and the boats will not reach this place again, before morning.

Two more guns joined us, this morning, from Bunnoo, guarded by sons of Bunnoo chiefs and their sowars, but two guns (the lightest) will have to be left at Ghazee Khan, so that our number will still be only ten.

With respect to Dera Ghazee Khan, my arrangements are these.—For the present, two guns, 100 horse, and 100 men, will remain with Ubdool Ruhman Khan, the Kardar in the fort, and, in the course of a week, they will be joined by the Kuthar Mootke regiment from Bunnoo, which, for that purpose, I have directed to come in boats, from Dera Ismael Khan. When you consider that the chief Zemindars, with their contingents, accompany us across the Indus, you will, I am sure, agree with me, that we have sufficient security against any insurrection, even if the people were that way inclined, which they are not, the presence of a strong force of Moolraj's, Trans-Indus, could alone induce them to waver. The fort of Hurrund still holds out, though all the garrison but 100 Sikhs have come over to us. I should have been very glad to have seen their fort reduced, before leaving the right bank of the Indus, but it is naturally strong, and would take a long while to breach, with such guns as we have, and, meanwhile, I should be leaving Bahawal Khan to bear the whole weight of the fast approaching crisis, to which he has already declared himself unequal, without my assistance. In war, evils must be balanced when they conflict, and, at this moment, the fort of Hurrund sinks into insignificance, before the operations now on foot at Mooltan. The Kardar of Hurrund, with 300 men, will take up his position in the neighbourhood, and, uniting with the Goorcharee tribe of Belooch Zemindurra, who live in that district and adjoining hills, and who are sworn enemies of the Sikhs in the

fort, will maintain an annoying blockade, which, combined with the news of the retreat of the Koreyshee army, will, perhaps, induce the garrison to forego their expressed intention of yielding only when Mooltan falls.

General Cortlandt will return to Dera Ghazee Khan from the Chenab, whenever I either join Bahawal Khan before Shoojabad, or take up my stand at Raj Ghat for the rest of the season. I take him with me so far, in case we should have to engage the enemy between the Indus and Chenab, when his sound military knowledge, courage, and acquaintance with his men would be invaluable. Indeed, all is so peaceful in our rear (Trans-Indus), that he feels a natural dislike to be left behind. His civil arrangements in this district are completed, and Nassur Khan Populzye, with the Futteh Pultun, will now leave Hurrund, and proceed to settle Mittunkote. Still, I beg you to understand that General Cortlandt will not be absent a fortnight, from his immediate duties.

I will write again from the left bank, but have no time now to give more than an outline of affairs.

A report has reached camp, that Bhace Maharaj Sing, with 300 followers, has arrived at Mooltan.

Jowahir Mull Dutt and Sirdar Jhunda Sing have already written to inform me of three Sikhs having deserted from the Cherunjeet regiment of cavalry, and two from Dhara Sing's infantry. They have begun early.

Inclosure 16 in No 29

*Lieutenant Edwandes to the Resident at Lahore*

*Camp, Seyrah Dewan Wallah, on the left bank of the Indus, opposite  
Dera Ghazee Khan, June 11, 1848.*

YESTERDAY, I reported to you my intention to cross the Indus. I have, now, to inform you, that with about 2,500 of my newly raised Puthans, and 10 guns, I effected the passage, before nightfall, without accident, and, sending back the fleet of boats to General Cortlandt under a favoring south wind, encamped, in a half moon, on the river's edge, at this place. Traces of the enemy were fresh upon the ground, bridges having been thrown by them over all the nullahs, to enable them to bring their great guns against us at this spot, and coolies coming back every moment from the rebel camp at Khangui, whither they had been pressed to carry baggage. Khangui is only nine coss from this, and four or five from Shoojabad, on the other side of the Chenab, which was evidently the point they were making for, and not Mooltan, as was generally supposed yesterday.

A glance at the map will show you what an excellent move this is, so excellent, indeed, that it is difficult to say which is most culpable, Dewan Moolraj for not making it before, or Nawab Bahawal Khan for not preventing him from making it at all. Had Futteh Mahomed Khan Ghoree not halted, like an old woman, at Julal-pore Peronwallah, but pushed on to Shoojabad, as was all along proposed and understood that he should do, that fort would, at this moment, be unsupported, and might have been passed, without any fear of its small garrison creating mischief in the rear. The Nawab's troops would, then, have got between it and Mooltan, and the Dewan in front, and the Shoojabad garrison in the rear, would have been greatly out-maneuvred. As it is, not only has the Koreyshee force gone off to reinforce that garrison, but, by a letter, dated 8th of June, received this morning from Peer Ibrahim Khan (still at Peronwallah Julal-pore!) I learn that 2,000 men and 4 guns have been sent by Moolraj thither from Mooltan, and from other quarters. I hear that Hakim Raee and Sadik Mahomed Khan, who were at Maharajghur with 2 guns and 2,000 men, have also been ordered down to Shoojabad. The long and short of it is, that Moolraj has ordered his whole force to concentrate on Shoojabad; and the Daood-potra force will not be able to get within 20 coss of Mooltan, without fighting a general action.

When we arrived here last night, I dispatched intelligence to Moozooddeen Khan, Khagwhanee, who, with 2,000 men and a few guns, has, as you are aware, been

sent by the Nawab of Bahawulpore to make revenue arrangements in the Seetpore district, and I advised him to advance, at once, to my neighbourhood, that we might concert plans for the future

When, however, the better intelligence of this morning developed this scheme for strengthening Shoojabad, I wrote again to Moozooddeen Khan, and urgently pressed him to cross the Chenab at once, and reinforce Futteh Mahomed Khan Ghoree, whose force Peer Ibraheem reports to be only 9 guns, 20 zumboorahs, 2 infantry regiments, (probably 500 strong each,) 3000 Daoodpotra jahgeerdars and zemindars, and 300 Khood Uspeh cavalry. If he does this, at once, there is nothing to fear. If he does not, but waits for orders from Bahawul Khan, he may be too late to save Futteh Mahomed from defeat, for the latter's force could not possibly stand before such a combination as I have described, unless reinforced

The Bahawulpore Nawab has mismanaged the part assigned him, by attempting too much at once. He should never have divided his troops, by sending one division Cis-Chenab, and one Trans-Chenab, neither equal to doing any thing alone. He should have chosen one Doab, or the other, as the scene of his operations, and advanced up it in strength. The revenue is quite a secondary matter, or, if considered primary, can only be satisfactorily secured by, first, driving the enemy out of the field

You will, I doubt not, be as much astonished as I was, to read that Futteh Mahomed Khan Ghoree has positively declared his inability to advance beyond Julalpore Peronwallah, until "Captain Edwairdes Sahib" comes to help him. At the same time, I receive a pressing request from Jowahir Mull Dutt, at Bukkur, to "send him 400 or 500 Mussulman sowars, without delay," though he has authority to raise 2,000; and again, the Durbar send General Cortlandt orders to detach as many again of the sowars with him to Dewan Dowlut Raee, who is sent to help us. These are the strangest allies I ever met with, who either rob us of our men, or else call on us to do everything for them. The Durbar must, surely, be aware that General Cortlandt is engaged in military operations, and that neither he, nor I, nor Lieutenant Taylor, know which way to turn for want of men. It is a pity, also, that the Durbar have selected Dowlut Raee for military command. He will either do nothing, or get into difficulties from which other people must come and help him out. The Tank jahgeerdars, who are along with him, are of a fighting breed, and might have been better sent to join their relations Kasim Khan, Foujdar Khan, &c., who are doing good service along with me. Maharajgurb, to which Dowlut Raee has been sent, is in the Sind Sagun Doab, and Jowahir Mull Dutt should be quite able to look after it himself, unless indeed Moolraj has already bought his army.

The fleet of boats has only made one voyage, to-day, from the Ghazee Khan ferry to this place, the river being nine coss wide, and I am afraid two more days will be occupied in crossing the whole of our camp. General Cortlandt will bring up the rear, when all once more united, my intention is to lose no time in marching on Khangur, and, probably, it will be necessary to comply with the Nawab's repeated requests that I should join his force. Even, in that case, I would beg to recommend that another assistant be specially deputed to the Daoodpotra camp, first visiting the Nawab. European energy is the material requisite just now, to make the most of the advantages we have within our grasp. Two heads also are better than one, and one man cannot be in two places at once. My health (I thank God for it) has, as yet, not suffered from the exposure and fatigue incidental to these operations; but it would, I think, be prudent to guard against the confusion into which this brave, but heterogeneous, army, composed of every race that peoples the Soolhmannee range and Derajat, would inevitably fall, should any accident happen to me.

## Inclosure 17 in No 29.

*Lieutenant Edwardes to the Resident at Lahore.*

*Camp, Seyrah Dewan Wallah, on the left bank of the Indus, opposite Ferry of Ghazee Khan, Night, June 12, 1848.*

THE relative positions of the four forces remain, much the same as yesterday. The last cossid from the camp of Futteh Mahomed Khan Ghoree left him still at Julalpore Peronwallah, but a distant salute, just now heard, leads me to hope that, hearing of our crossing the Indus, he has advanced to Kot Abil Shah, where his vanguard, under command of a reputed good soldier, Ubdool Khalik Khan, was previously posted. Moozooddeen Khan, Khaghwanee, moved a few coss to-day, from Ghullooan to Julharee, and writes that he will reach Sooltan Shuhr to-morrow. Hur Bugwan Doss, with the fugitive rebel force, is pitched to the east of the town of Khangur, half a coss from the river, awaiting, as he says, the orders of Moolraj, either to cross the Chenab to Shoojabad, or to stand and fight when I come up. A villager has brought in news of his crossing his artillery, but, as yet, it wants confirmation. Our own troops are, as yet, not near over the Indus. The boats are going and coming continually, but, at this season, it is quite a voyage across. I don't think we shall be all collected on this bank, before the day after to-morrow. No delay will then occur in our advance.

An intelligent cossid in my employ has brought interesting intelligence from Mooltan, whither I sent him some days ago, with a verbal message to Mustapha Khan Khaghwanee, asking for an explanation of his silence. In reply, Mustapha Khan sends word, "That the absence of all the Puthan officers with the Koreyshee force, has prevented him from carrying out the plan agreed upon, that he thought I would scarcely thank him for deserting Moolraj alone, without bringing all his friends along with him; and that he is not without hopes of inducing Moolraj himself to surrender. Moolraj wished Mustapha Khan to take command of the reinforcements he was sending to Shoojabad, but the Khan declined the appointment, and, once more, urged the fully of continuing this hopeless struggle. The Dewan got angry, and the Khan requested to have twenty-four hours' leave of absence, to go and see to the defences of Kummun Kote, where his family has been placed for safety. Moolraj declared he could not spare him, as he wanted him to go as his vakeel to the Lord Sahib at Delhi. Mustapha Khan asked, what business he had with such distant officials? If he intended to surrender, he had better do so to me, at once. Ultimately, the Dewan gave him leave to go to Kummun Kote, for twenty-four hours, and promised to send him to me on his return. From Kummun Kote, Mustapha Khan wrote to Peer Ibraheem Khan at Julalpore, that he should certainly go back, and make a last effort to bring in the Dewan. On his return to Mooltan, Moolraj so far listened to Mustapha Khan's advice as to consent to withdraw the Koreyshee force, but said that he thought the return of that force to Mooltan, would render his surrender impossible, and that it would, perhaps, be better to leave them to be destroyed by me! Mustapha Khan very sensibly observed, that if a general action was fought between Hur Bugwan Doss and me, it would close the door of mercy on him for ever. If he (the Dewan) was sincere in wishing to surrender, let him recall the Koreyshee force over the Chenab, and halt them on the left bank, and then, summoning the Puthan officers from among them, get them and their adherents into the fort, close the gates, and then write for me. The Dewan half seemed persuaded; and, if the Koreyshee force really retired, I was to consider it a symptom of Moolraj being inclined to give in, but, at any rate, if, when all the Puthan officers were assembled, they failed to induce the Dewan to go over with them in a body to me, I might rely on the whole of them retiring from Mooltan to Kummun Kote, and remaining there throughout the rebellion.

You are inclined, I think, to distrust Mustapha Khan's sincerity, of which I am as much convinced, and the result alone can decide the question. Meanwhile, you will not have overlooked the testimony borne to his trustworthiness, by both the Nawab of Bahawalpore, and Peer Ibraheem Khan. In reply, I have sent a verbal



message to Mustapha Khan, to exhibit the same patience he has done hitherto, and do nothing decided, till he can do it well.

To retract the guarantee of a formal trial, which, on my own responsibility, I gave to Dewan Moolraj, would be only to drive him to despair, and urge him to leave no stone unturned to plunge the country into insurrection, during the four months of inactivity to which we are condemned. On the other hand, I cannot renew it, in defiance of the commands of Government. I have escaped from the dilemma, by leaving matters just where they are, and verbally sending word to Mustapha Khan to do his best.

Meanwhile, if asked to give an opinion as to the probability of Moolraj acting, or not acting, on the guarantee in question, I should say that it is much more probable that he will surrender now, than it has ever been yet. Bahawal Khan's forces and mine are his staunch enemies, and if the Sikh troops, under Raja Shere Sing and Sirdar Jhunda Sing, only remain neuter, he will, in a few days, be reduced, by our approach, to very narrow limits, and be exposed to continual apprehension, both from us and his own troops, for months. The feeble mind of Moolraj is unequal to the contemplation of so hopeless a vista, and it would not be surprising if his rebellion were to die of the same unmanly fright which gave it birth.

Inclosure 18 in No 29

*The Resident at Lahore to the Secretary to the Government of India.*

*Lahore, June 13, 1848.*

I SEND a brief narrative of the rise, progress, and, as I trust, the termination, of the career of a person who has caused a great sensation in the Punjab, during the last few weeks, by the name of Bhaee Maharaj Sing, and of whom mention has been frequently made in the correspondence lately submitted to Government.

The career of this personage, now that it has been brought to a close, before all the mischief that was intended to be effected by his means was accomplished, is of more value, perhaps, as indicating the feeling, and the conduct, of the people generally, officials, and others, in regard to the present state of things, and the British Government, than on any other account.

His Lordship in Council will remember the affair which took place at Lahore in the beginning of last year, and regarding which, the investigations continued till the close of it, commonly called the *Preyma conspiracy*. Among the persons implicated in those proceedings was a man called Bhaee Maharaj Sing, a chela of the well-known Bhaee Beer Sing. He was supposed to be one of the chief advisers of the parties concerned in the *Preyma* plot, and especially of the *Maharanee*.

Orders were, at that time, issued for the apprehension of Bhaee Maharaj Sing, and a proclamation was issued, offering a reward of 1,000 rupees to any who would seize him, or give information that would lead to his seizure.

Bhaee Maharaj evaded the pursuit, and remained at large, but concealed.

About the end of March, or the beginning of April, it was reported in the *Ukhbar* from Umritsur, that Bhaee Maharaj Sing had appeared in that city, and had set up his flag by the Holy Tank.

Orders were, immediately, issued to the authorities to seize the offender, and send him into Lahore.

He again escaped; but the persons who had harboured him, were taken up, and punished, by the *Adawlutee* of Umritsur.

He remained, for some time, in the villages of the *Manjha*, chiefly in the neighbourhood of Umritsur, passing about from village to village, attended by three or four horsemen, and receiving, on account of the supposed sanctity of his character, maintenance for himself and few followers from the villages.

He never remained for two days in the same place, and the orders to the local officers for his apprehension were unattended to, or at any rate unexecuted.

He was not, at this time, regarded as a person of any great consequence, though the local officers were reproved and reprimanded for not effecting his capture, about which they pretended to be very zealous.

Shortly after the outbreak in *Moeltan*, Bhaee Maharaj's followers in the *Manjha* increased; more stringent orders were sent, and greater endeavours were made to effect his seizure, which, under ordinary circumstances, would have proved successful.

A party of three jamadars and three sowars of the Guide Corps, on whom Lieutenant Jamadar thought he could place full reliance, were sent to associate themselves with the Bhaee, and give information of his proceedings. This they did, for a short time; but their information was never of any value; they were, of course, Sikhs, or they could not have been admitted into his company.

About a month ago, Bhaee Maharaj Sing's followers became more formidable in numbers and description; instead of a few horsemen, with whom he went silently from village to village, he entertained armed soldiers, both horse and foot, to the amount of some hundreds; he had evidently the command of large funds; for he fed the poor wherever he went, and distributed money to those who came for service.

About this time, he removed to the extremity of the plain districts, and remained, for a short time, in the neighbourhood of Deenanuggur, near the foot of the hills. Here the number of his armed followers increased considerably; he no longer pretended to elude the authorities, but he paraded the villages with drums, and with an immense retinue.

When his followers became so many, he was unable to move from place to place as quickly, and as unobserved, as before, and I was in hopes that, by a sudden raid upon him from the nearest military post, he might be taken, and his followers punished and dispersed.

I sent, at this time, Lieutenant Hodson, adjutant of the Guide Corps, with a few guides, round to Mookerian, with orders from the General to the officer commanding at that station, to attend to any requisition he might make for military aid, that he might be ready, with a party of irregular cavalry, if possible, to surprise his camp.

Deenanuggur is about 100 miles from Lahore. When Lieutenant Hodson had started, I despatched from Lahore the 14th Irregulars with two guns of the native troop of horse artillery, to drive the party from that neighbourhood, and to prevent them re-assembling.

The presence of the Bhaee with his force had attracted the attention of the authorities of Jullundur, who were apprehensive of his crossing the border to plunder the Company's districts, and arrangements were made for strengthening the weaker points, and protecting the frontier.

I had no hope that the Bhaee would let the force I had sent from this get near him. I knew that, whatever might be the number of his adherents, directly he heard that a British force had moved against him, he would go off with all speed.

The local officers, kardars, adawlutees, and thannadars, had all of them strict orders with their sowars, to seize the Bhaee and his followers. It was soon evident that these officials not only had no intention of obeying their orders, and were conniving at his proceedings, but that some of them were in communication with him, and were actually aiding him.

The second day after the irregulars and guns left Lahore, Bhaee Maharaj Sing quitted the Ravee Doab, and crossed the Ravee with his armed followers, proclaiming now, for the first time, that he was raising troops to join and assist Dewan Moolraj, in his rebellion against the Government. It was now ascertained that there was an agent of Moolraj's in his back up, who supplied funds for the raising of soldiers, horse and foot.

There was a good deal of excitement on the frontier, in the neighbourhood of Deenanuggur, and it was thought advisable by me that the Irregulars and guns should proceed to that spot, and remain there, for a while, with Lieutenant Hodson, till affairs became more settled. The position is a good one, as communicating with Mookerian, Hajepore, Puthankote, and Noorpoor, military posts in the Jullundur division, any of which could co-operate with Captain Skinner, if the necessity should arise.

After Bhaee Maharaj crossed the Ravee, the disaffection of the people became more open, and unrestrained. The villages in that neighbourhood are almost all Sikh, and were, in Runjeet Sing's time, always turbulent and unruly.

Whole villages went out to meet the Bhaee and his retinue. They fed his army (for he had now some thousands of armed followers, perhaps, at one time, between 5,000 and 6,000) gratis, and brought offerings of sweetmeats, fruit, &c.; and, from every village, numbers of recruits joined his train; while the Kardars, with their police and soldiers, pretending to be following him, for the purpose of arresting his progress, encamped quietly, within a mile or two of him, on the best terms possible.

It is not to be supposed that all this was allowed to pass without attracting my attention, and without inducing me to take measures for counteracting the schemes of Bhaee Maharaj Sing and his supporters.

I had people of my own in his camp, as had Raja Tej Sing, who brought me information daily of his proceedings, and those of the several parties sent by the Darbar to arrest the rebel; but it was difficult to devise a plan for his capture; he had immediate intelligence of a move from Lahore, and none but British troops would attempt his arrest.

I found that it was probable that the rebel with his people would pass within about thirty miles of Lahore, on his way across the Rechna Doab, that he might proceed down, either the right or left bank of the Chenab, by Jhung, towards Mooltan.

Along the left bank of the Chenab, the villages are all Mahomedan, and are very well affected to us, having had a very favorable settlement of their revenue made by Mr. Cocks, for which they are really grateful.

The Kardar of Jhung is Mistr Sahib Dyal; this man, his father, and three brothers are by far the best affected, and the most trustworthy and faithful, of all the officers of the Sikh Government—in fact, they are the only well-affected parties. Sahib Dyal engaged, if Maharaj could be driven through Jhung, that he, with his police and the zemindars, would arrest his further progress.

I deputed some Mahomedan Jagheerdars, over whom I have established considerable influence, and who are desirous of doing some service to deserve the favor of the British Government, to go across to the left bank of the Chenab, and raise the Mahomedan population, with promises of reward, to fall upon the Bhaee and his people, if they should come that way; and, to insure their going that way, I got all the boats of the Chenab to the right bank of the river, so that he could not cross.

These Khans, with a party of Villayuttees that I gave them, mustered about 150 good fighting men of their own, and with these they started on their errand. As they crossed the Rechna, they came to the close neighbourhood of the Bhaee's party, and sent me word that they would hang about him, and, if I would send troops and guns, and disperse his force, amounting, according to their estimate, to 5,000 men, they would fall upon the Bhaee himself, and secure, or dispatch him.

The Bhaee's next march was to be within about thirty miles of Lahore. I determined to try and get a force upon him, before he should be down. I, therefore, in consultation with the General, ordered out the whole of the 7th Irregulars, the mounted portion of the Guide Corps, and a squadron of the 14th Light Dragoons, to cross the Ravee, during the night of the 31st ultimo, make their march of thirty miles before morning, and surprise the Bhaee in his camp.

This would, as it afterwards appeared, have succeeded admirably; but, unfortunately, a heavy storm arose, just as the troops got to the Ravee, which had risen considerably, and the Irregulars were all night crossing, the Dragoons being still, when day broke, on this bank, having been exposed to the storm the whole night.

The information I received, during the next day, determined me to send off the troops above named, in the afternoon, with the addition of a regiment of native infantry, and the remaining four guns of the native troop of horse artillery, to a village called Jhundhalla, about thirty miles from the mouth of the Ravee, near which the Bhaee was encamped, in great force.

As I feared, intelligence of the move on the previous night, frustrated by the storm, was brought to Bhaee Maharaj, about twelve o'clock of the day on which the troops left Lahore, and he made an immediate march about twenty miles further on; so that, on the arrival of the troops at Jhundhalla, after a forced march of thirty-five miles from their cantonment, the rebel force was twenty miles from them, and ready to make a further march, which they, accordingly, did forthwith, having learned that the troops were actually after them.

The move, however, did great good. The people were much surprised to find a large British force of cavalry, infantry, and artillery, at a distance of thirty-five miles from their cantonment, almost before they knew of their march. The infantry—the 73rd Native Infan. of—deserve great credit; they started from their cantonment about 3½ P.M., crossed the Ravee, and accomplished a march of thirty-five miles, by noon the next day; the cavalry and artillery having reached the ground by 7 A.M.

A large part of the Bhaee's force immediately left him, and, as the rest went off in great disorder, our Mahomedan auxiliaries were able to attack their rear, plunder their baggage, and make many prisoners. They took fifty-six, during the first day's run.

The Bhaee's party, believing the British troops to be behind them, a belief which the Khans and their people diligently fostered, made a most precipitate retreat;

along the line of country, desired, towards Jhung. The Khans stuck close to them, constantly alarming them with the report that the dragoons were upon them. They ran, almost night and day, to Jhung, which they reached, on the evening of the third day.

Misr Sahib Dyal was as good as his word, and he and his people kept their

On arriving at Jhung, the Bhaee's force had diminished to about 1,000 or 1,200 men: the Misr's party immediately attacked them; and, though really inferior in numbers, they were fresh, while their opponents were hungry, and tired by a long, and harassing, retreat.

A great many of the rebels were killed in the encounter, and three or four of the Misr's men, and ten or twelve wounded. The whole rebel force was driven into the Chenab, a difficult river to cross at all times, and now formidable, from being much swollen by the rains and the melted snow. It is calculated that from 500 to 600 horse and foot perished in the river—among the rebels, Bhaee Maharaj. Some fifty or sixty got across, and a great part of these were captured, by a party ready for them on the other side.

Three hundred of the rebels got on to an island in the river, and were kept there, by the Misr's force and the Mahomedans, for three days and nights, exposed to the climate, without shelter or food: at the close of the third day, they piled their arms and clothes together, and surrendered unconditionally; when, they were taken off by the Misr's soldiers in boats, and put into confinement in Jhung.

The Bhaee's four officers, Sikhs of some note, were among the prisoners on the island, and are now on their way into Lahore, in irons.

Dewan Moolraj was looking with anxious expectation for the arrival of this party. He has, for the last three weeks, had a force about twenty-five miles from Jhung, on the other side the Chenab, with three guns, waiting for Bhaee Maharaj, through whose influence he hoped to win over the Khalsa troops, and all the Sikhs of the Manjha. The eyes of the army were also fixed, with the utmost interest on Bhaee Maharaj's proceedings.

I have heard of a party of twenty-five men arriving at Mooltan, with tidings of the Bhaee and his host having perished in the Chenab; and I fancy this party constitutes nearly the whole of the survivors of those who accompanied him to Jhung, with the exception of the prisoners in our hands.

I will, in my next, report the measures I have taken, and am taking, for punishing those who were the abettors of Bhaee Maharaj Sing, in his rebellion against his sovereign, and the British Government

P.S.—I was, for some days, sceptical as to the death of Bhaee Maharaj Sing. I thought he had been hidden somewhere, perhaps, by his followers; for the respect and veneration with which he was regarded is most extraordinary, but there seems no reason to doubt that he is drowned. Two of the prisoners, taken on the other side of the river, say that they saw him nearly half across the Chenab, swimming with hold of his celebrated black mare's tail; that they saw him lose his hold, and disappear; after which, they saw him no more. The mare got safe to land, alone, on the other side.

Inclosure 19 in No. 29.

*The Resident at Lahore to Lieutenant Edwardes.*

*Lahore, June 13, 1848.*

RAJA SHERE SING'S force is now at Cheechawultun, and ready to move forward; but, though it is composed of all the Sirdars in the Punjab almost, the Jagheerdar horse, Shere Sing's own artillery, and the two regiments supposed to be the best affected, and most subordinate, I dare not advance them to a point where there is probability of collusion with Moolraj's troops, till Bahawal Khan, or yourself, have gained some further advantage over the Dewan; and it becomes evident to all that the game is up with him.

The whole Sikh army is faithless to the Maharajah; a strong desire to aid Moolraj pervades all the soldiers, but they are not heroes enough to join a falling standard: a few more reverses to Moolraj, and the fidelity of the troops is secure.

Sheikh Imameedeen is, still, at some distance, advancing by Pak Panton. There was delay in his raising his 2,000 new troops. He and they say, I think, depended on. He has two field guns.

All that has been done for the preservation of the Reasut, has (with the exception of the family of the Misra) been done by the Mussulmans.

The destruction of Bhace Maharaj and his host in the Chenab, has been a sad blow to the troops of the Khalsa, and will prove very disheartening to Moolraj.

Inclosure 20 in No. 29.

*Lieutenant Edwardes to the Resident at Lahore.*

*Camp, Seyrah Dewan Wallah, June 13, 1848.*

THE event anticipated by Captain James Abbott, and latterly apprehended by myself, has unhappily occurred. Letters from Sirdar Jhunda Sing and Dewan Jowahir Mull Dutt, dated the 8th of June, communicate the intelligence that the Churunjeeet regiment of Sikh regular cavalry has deserted, bodily, to Dewan Moolraj, with the exception of the officers and a few orderlies. While I was actually engaged in the perusal of this news, the guns of Mooltan were faintly, yet distinctly, heard firing a salute; and I conclude it is, either in honor of the arrival of the Churunjeeet regiment, or of Bhace Maharaj Sing, at the head-quarters of rebellion.

This event is most unfortunate, and commences a new crisis altogether. It tears the veil from the whole Sikh army, and leaves them all to view as traitors, waiting only for the opportunity which the Churunjeeet regiment has found. It is painful to think what the consequences may be to Lieutenant Taylor in Bunnoo, Major Lawrence and Lieutenant Nicholson in Peshawur, and Captain Abbott in Hazara. You are, of course, the best judge of the propriety of keeping those officers any longer at their posts, but, in the territory of which I have charge, I conceive it to be my immediate duty to extricate my junior and Assistant Lieutenant Taylor from the meshes of the army in Bunnoo. The absence of General Cortlandt from the Trans-Indus gives me the opportunity of doing this, without any exhibition of distrust, and I shall write a vernacular proceeding to Lieutenant Taylor (in order that its contents may be made known), informing him of General Cortlandt's unavoidable absence, and requesting him, if Bunnoo is quiet, and the fort completed, to remove his court to Dera Ismael Khan, which is a more central position, and take up all the judicial and revenue superintendence as far as Girang, until such time as General Cortlandt may return, or express his ability to resume charge.

In the place of Lieutenant Taylor, I propose to depute Mullick Futteh Khan Towannah, with charge of Bunnoo, Murwut, Esakhail, and probably Chuchee, as far as Khooshab and the boundary of the old Mooltan Elaqas. His name alone will be a sufficient guarantee for the peace of those districts, and he has, more particularly, great influence with that independent and impracticable tribe, the Wuzerees. The arrangement is not agreeable to the Mullick, who had made up his mind to show his gratitude for release, by exertion in the Mooltan affair; but the fact is, that he will do more harm than good, by introducing dissension into my united force. Most of the Puthan and Mooltanees officers along with me are his bitter enemies, and some have blood feuds to settle with him. In one day that he has been with me, I see the impossibility of my keeping both.

I shall feel quite at rest about Bunnoo, when the energetic Mullick reaches it; and the fact of Lieutenant Taylor being stationed at Dera Ismael Khan, will not only stop the tongues of the Sikh sowars there, and break the chain of communication between Mooltan and Bunnoo, but it will throw an additional difficulty in the way of desertion from the latter place.

The Sikh troops in Bunnoo happen to be particularly dangerous. The Khas and Miha Sing's infantry regiments are of the old Boorcha mutineer breed. Bishun Sing's Mussulman regiment has betrayed perfect sympathy with the Khalsa cause. The cavalry regiment was disaffected, even when it came first from Peshawur with Lieutenant Taylor. The Dogra regiment is angry at not getting leave for two years; and the Irregular Cavalry, under Sirdar Ram Sing Chappah, are mostly

greybeard Goonhazais from the Manjha, and showed their teeth a good deal, when their numbers were reduced in February by invaliding and discharge.

A cossid of mine who was seized by the enemy in the Koreyabee camp, some days ago, and whose beard they have shaved off as a punishment, escaped yesterday from their hands, and came back this morning. He relates that Soonjasee Fakeer, in his presence, related to the soldiers in Hur Bugwan's camp how he had taken the document to Bunnoo, and how the Sikhs there had regretted that Edwardes Sahib had sent them back to Bunnoo, when they were on their way to reinforce him; thus depriving them of the opportunity of joining Moolraj.

Peer Ibraheem Khan writes, that the force under Futteh Mahomed Khan Ghoree has, at last, marched three coss towards Mooltan.

Hur Bugwan Doss's army crossed the Chenab yesterday; and, this morning, part of it, under Hur Bugwan and Jowahir Mull, re-crossed to the right bank, and again took possession of Khangur, with what object is not yet apparent, but the move is so bold, and apparently desperate, that I am almost afraid it has been made in the expectation of the rest of the force with Jowahir Mull Dutt, and Sirdar Jhunda Sing, including the artillery, joining the rebels at Khangur. The sooner I can strike a blow at them, therefore, the better, and as General Cortlandt has now joined me, and reports that all the force will be over to-morrow, I intend to advance the day after on Khangur, halt within a coss or so of it, and engage the rebels the next morning.

P S.—*Noon, June 14.*—I have detained the dāk in hopes of being able to give you more certain information of the enemy's intentions at Khangur. The chief Zemindar of that place has just come in, with the news that another change of plans took place yesterday at noon. Hur Bugwan Doss and his army abandoned Khangur, as hastily as they had returned, and crossed the Chenab to Shoojabad, in the comprehensive language of the Mullick, "not leaving a dog behind."

The reason of their return at this Khangur is described to have been of the kind anticipated in this letter, "the Dewan having written to say that he expected an important reinforcement, through the means of some Gooroo who had joined him," but a subsequent express from Mooltan informed Bugwan Doss that Bahawal Khan's force at Julalpoore had been also reinforced to so great an extent as to render it necessary for Moolraj to muster all his strength to oppose him. This is as it should be. The combination is now working, and, let the Dewan do what he likes, I trust firmly that he has not many more days to keep the field.

Inclosure 21 in No. 29.

*Lieutenant Edwardes to the Resident at Lahore.*

*Camp, Khangur, on the right bank of the Chenab,  
June 15, 1848.*

THE whole of our troops having completed the passage of the Indus yesterday afternoon, I marched, with 3,000 Puthan Irregulars, horse and foot, and 20 zumbroahs, from that river to this, this morning. The distance across the Doab here is not more than twenty miles, but, there being a good deal of sand in the middle of it, the regular troops, guns, ammunition, carts, &c., were unable to make so long a march, and will not be up till to-morrow.

Khangur has an extensive fort, but the enemy had abandoned it entirely, as I believe they have also the two smaller forts of Mozuffurnuggur and Ghuzurpoor Gurh, in the neighbourhood. The only soldiers of Dewan Moolraj that I am aware of, on this side of the Chenab, are a party under Sadik Mahomed Khan at Maharajghur, in the Jhung direction, and that officer is about to desert to us.

This evening, my cossid returned from taking a message to Mustapha Khan in Mooltan, and brought the important news, that Dewan Moolraj had sent the whole of his disposable force of men and guns, against Futteh Mahomed Khan Ghoree's division, which is moving on Shoojabad. The force is put under the command of *Shung Ram*, the man who was wounded by a soldier on the outbreak of the rebellion, for advising Moolraj to fly to the Sahib Beg. Moolraj's orders are positive to fight Bahawal Khan's army before I come up, and the day fixed for the battle is the day

after to-morrow. Rung Ram has not yet recovered from his wounds, but Moolraj forced the command upon him, with an elephant and handsome khillut.

No sooner did I hear this than I wrote off to Moozooddeen Khan to cross the Chenab instantly, and join Futteh Mahomed Khan Ghoree; and to the latter I sent word, through Peer Ibraheem Khan, on no account to seek a fight till I came up, but throw up entrenchments, wherever he may be, and defend himself merely, till I can come to his assistance. If he does this, all will be well, for, to-morrow, bridges will be completed over the canals between me and the ferry of Bindwallah, opposite Futteh Mahomed Khan's camp, and, to-morrow night, I shall march down to that ferry, and commence the passage, at once, in the boats collected by Moozooddeen Khan; so that, let the enemy be as punctual to their time as they like, I hope to be able to throw ten guns into Futteh Mahomed Khan's camp, even if the cavalry and infantry are unable to cross in time. But I much doubt the enemy having courage enough to advance so promptly on a tolerably equal foe, and it is probable we shall be in plenty of time to see the whole affair. Nothing could be more desirable than catching the whole of Moolraj's army thus in the open plain, for it may enable us to finish the rebellion, at one blow.

I have written to Mustapha Khan, in Mooltan, that now is the time for him and his Puthan friends to desert Moolraj, and go over to Peer Ibraheem Khan, or to Kummun Kote, previous to the fight.

To Rung Ram also, the commander of the rebel force I have written to say that I presume he accepted the command to give him an opportunity of coming over to us with his nephew, Hur Bugwan Doss, as it is no secret that his loyalty got him the wounds from which he is still suffering. Should he come over, I have assured him of every kindness. Either one, or the other, of these desertions would damp the ardor of the rebels considerably.

Jowahir Mull Dutt informs me, that the Churunjeet regiment of cavalry only got as far as Leia, on its way to Mooltan, when it halted, probably hearing of the retreat of the Koreyshee force, and our crossing in pursuit. Were there nothing more important to do at this moment, it would be a good thing to go and annihilate this corps at once, as an example to the whole Sikh army, but the situation of Futteh Mahomed Khan Ghoree is critical, and on him depends my own success. It was very unwise of Bahawal Khan to scatter his troops in the way he did, but I hope we shall get over the blunder safely.

*Morning, 16th of June, 1848* I wrote the above last night, and kept it open, to give you the latest news this morning. At day-light this morning, guns were heard in full play, in the direction of the enemy and Bahawal Khan's troops, and the firing lasted for an hour or two. A collision has, evidently, taken place, a day sooner than was expected, and it is most unfortunate that we could not have got up sooner, but we have nothing to reproach ourselves with, in this respect. The very day the enemy left Koreyshee, I crossed the Indus, and a favorable south wind enabled us to complete, in four days, a passage that would have taken ten had the wind lulled. As soon as my troops were all over, I marched, without a day's delay, hither, and my men are now making the bridges, for our advance this evening, to the ferry opposite Bahawal Khan's force. A cousin from Peer Ibraheem Khan tells me that Futteh Mahomed Khan Ghoree began entrenching the day before yesterday, in which case there is nothing to fear. His force was 6,000 strong and 9 guns, and was joined, before the fight, by Moozooddeen Khan, with 2,000 men and 2 guns, and Khoda Buksh, from Mulsee, with near 1000 men, so that Futteh Mahomed will have had 9,000 men and 11 guns, wherewith to meet the enemy, this morning. Moolraj can scarcely have brought up more men, though a few more guns he, probably, has.

Inclosure 22 in No. 29.

*The Resident at Lahore to the Secretary to the Government of India.*

*Lahore, June 17, 1848.*

I HAVE now great hope that the Mahomedan influence and combination I have succeeded in bringing to bear upon Mooltan, and in enlisting in our favor in other parts, will prevent a general Sikh gathering on the side of Moolraj, and the spread of the rebellion through the Punjab provinces, and the Mahomedan frontier.

The Sikh troops are far worse than useless, even in this rebellion against their own Government, they are not only not to be depended on, but they are certain, in the event of an opportunity for successful collision, to take part with the rebel interest. This is felt, and acknowledged, by every Sirdar in the country.

At the same time, they form the disciplined army of the country, and have in their hands all the artillery and munitions of war.

I am obliged, therefore, in appearance, to make use of their agency, while, in reality, my chief concern is to keep them from action, at any rate, till the success of the rebellion is altogether hopeless.

The force marching down the Sind Sagur Doab, under Sirdar Jhunda Sing, is composed of Sikh regulars and Mahomedan levies, in about equal proportions. I intended that the latter should predominate but the whole complement which I ordered, has not been raised.

The Sikhs were, as nearly as possible, going off, bodily, a few days ago, to Mooltan, from which they are still distant about 100 miles.

On entering the Mooltan districts, a few desertions took place, which alarmed Sirdar Jhunda Sing and the other officers much. They soon found proof of what I had all along more than suspected, that the whole of the Sikh portion was disaffected, and only awaited an opportunity to desert to Mooltan.

On the night of the 8th instant, the Churunjeet regiment of cavalry broke into open mutiny, the Sirdars succeeded, with some difficulty, in preventing the artillery, and the infantry regiment, from joining them. Two hundred and fifty-three of the cavalry, with their troop officers, left the main body, and started off, with expressions of defiance, to Leia, on their way to Mooltan.

On the arrival of the deserters at Leia, they heard, as I conclude, of the destruction of Bhace Maharaj Sing and his followers, the capture of his adherents, and the punishment of his abettors, also, of the retreat of Moolraj's troops from Koreyshee, and of the crossing into the Sind Sagur Doab, between themselves and Mooltan, of Lieutenant Edwardes', now formidable, force. They discovered, I fancy, that the accounts they had heard of Moolraj's position in Mooltan were not quite correct, and that, in deserting to join him, they had committed somewhat of a mistake.

They refused, therefore, the zealot of 700 rupees, which was offered them by the Kardar of Leia, and sent emissaries to Sirdar Jhunda Sing, begging to be allowed to return to their duty and that he would intercede for them with me to obtain their pardon.

This has just been reported to me. I shall direct Jhunda Sing to tell them that they are perfectly at liberty to take their own course, if they return, at once, to him, they will be treated as deserters, and dealt with accordingly. If they proceed to join Moolraj, or any of his detachments, they will be treated as traitors to their Sovereign.

Inclosure 23 in No 29

*The Resident at Lahore to the Secretary to the Government of India*

*Lahore, June 20, 1848.*

THE extent of the desertion of the Churunjeet regiment, mentioned by Lieutenant Edwardes, is not so great, hitherto, as Lieutenant Edwardes thought.

Two hundred and fifty-three sowars, with their troop officers, went off, and used their best endeavours to induce the infantry and artillery to go off with them. They have, as yet, gone no further than Leia, where they have gained a Kardar of Dewan Moolraj's, who was about to run off to Mooltan, when they arrived, and persuaded him to remain, stating that the rest of the Churunjeet regiment, with the infantry and cavalry, would join them, on the arrival of the force at Leia.

What Lieutenant Edwardes says of the whole Sikh army is true, I believe, they are all of them traitors in heart and purpose, and want only a favorable and safe opportunity to rise against the Government.

The Churunjeet regiment thought they had found this opportunity, they believed that Bhace Maharaj Sing was marching in triumph to Mooltan, and they credited the reports, industriously spread by Moolraj's adherents, of his extensive and increasing influence and power.

On arriving at Leia, they discovered that Bhace Maharaj Sing and his numerous host were destroyed; and they heard that, if they proceeded to Mooltan, instead of finding Dewan Moolraj in the plenitude of power that they expected, they would



find him deserted by a great part of his followers, and hemmed in by nearly 20,000 Mahomedan troops

Sirdar Jhunda Sing and Jowahir Mull Dutt have halted for the present; they are afraid to advance to Leia, lest the infantry and cavalry should join the rebel Kardar, as the Churunjeet sowars have done, and yet, Jowahir Mull has, by his last report 1,400 Mahomedan troops.

If we meet with no serious reverse at this juncture, I do not expect that the example of the Churunjeet regiment will be generally followed, there may be more desertions from Sirdar Jhunda Sing's force, but I hope to prevent them. And as the Peshawur, Hazara, and Bunnoo forces have not risen hitherto, when the field was so much more open to them, and the success of the Dewan's rebellion so much more likely, I do not expect that they will do so now.

Lieutenant Edwardes is, perhaps, right in the arrangements he has made, under the circumstances, of bringing Lieutenant Taylor to Dera Ismael Khan, and Futteh Khan Towanah will keep the peace in Bunnoo, if it is to be kept.

But I could not attempt to withdraw the British officers from Peshawur and Hazara, without, at once, causing the revolt, which we so earnestly desire to prevent, nor would there be, in that case, much probability of their reaching Lahore in safety. They are safer where they are, in the midst of a Mahomedan population, than they could be any where else, except in a British cantonment.

The answer reported to Lieutenant Edwardes, as having been made by the Bunnoo force to the Faqueer sent by Dewan Moolraj, rather imports, I think, that they consider the time for joining Moolraj as past.

There is every probability that Lieutenant Edwardes' force joined the Bahawalpore army, on the 16th or 17th, if it did so, I think Moolraj's troops would refuse an action, and would run to the fort, where they will be shut up for the rest of the season, if they do not murder Moolraj, and abandon the place.

Inlosure 24 in No 29

*Lieutenant Edwardes to the Resident at Lahore*

*On the field of battle, near the village of Noonar, 4 coss from the River Chenab, 5 o'clock, P M June 18, 1848*

I HAVE the honor and satisfaction to report to you the complete defeat of the whole united army of Dewan Moolraj, this day, by the troops of the Nawab of Bahawalpore, strengthened by about 5,000 of my men, 10 of our guns, and 25 zumbhoorahs, after a pitched battle which lasted for nine hours, commencing a little after 7 o'clock, and not being decided till half-past 4 P M.

Yesterday evening, Peer Ibrahim Khan wrote to inform me that the enemy had certainly advanced from Shoojabad, and it was not known where they had encamped, but it was his opinion that they were making for a village named Bukice, only four coss from the ferry of Kineyree, at which I intended to cross the Chenab, and he requested to know if I wished the troops of the Nawab to move down, and cover our disembarkation. It was evidently necessary, and I ordered the Daoodpotras to march in the middle of the night, and come down to Kineyree, where I would endeavour to have 3,000 men and 10 guns, to meet and reinforce them.

They obeyed my instructions to the letter, marched to Kineyree, and were joined there by 3,000 of my Puthan levies, all on foot, even the cavalry being obliged to leave their horses behind for want of boats. The guns could not be crossed, during the night, at all.

I slept on the right bank, intending to cross, when the fleet that took over the first, 3,000 men, should come back for another detachment, but, at 6 o'clock, the boats had not returned, and, getting anxious, I crossed my own tent and guard in two small boats that had come up from the south, in the interim, at about 7 A M this morning. I had not reached the left bank ere I heard heavy firing commenced on the north-east of Kineyree, and when we landed, not a soldier was to be seen, the whole of my own 3,000 men having joined the troops of Bahawal Khan, two coss from the river. Accompanied by three or four horsemen and half a dozen guides of Lieutenant Lumsden's corps, I set out for the scene of action, and, guided by the smoke and roar of the guns, soon joined our friends, not, however, without some apprehension of getting into the lines of the enemy.

The Daoodpotras were drawn up in a line, in a jungly plain, with my Puthans on the left, and I rode down the whole line, spoke a few words to the Nawab's

officers, counselled patience, and begged them not to make a rash attack, until the evening, when more men and guns would come across, from General Cortlandt's camp, on the right bank. They promised not to advance, till I gave the word, and I proceeded to my own division, on the left

From this time till 3 o'clock, P.M., the firing, on both sides, scarcely slackened, and as the guns were all on the right, with the Daoodpotras, the Nawab's troops had to bear the chief brunt of the long bowls throughout the day. However, we got our turn. By 3 o'clock, the enemy had approached so close as to be able to reconnoitre our position, and, having little or no cavalry, we could not drive back their numerous parties of horse, dispatched to discover our weak point. Thus they effectually did, and at 3 P.M., left the Daoodpotras alone, and turned their whole fire on the left. The galling volleys poured into the new levies, at this time, were enough to shake older troops, and their impatience to be led on to strike a blow, in their own defence, was most difficult to restrain. It was, indeed, an anxious moment, for I had not a gun to return a shot, and I felt certain that General Cortlandt would not fail me, but send the guns for which I had written, by 3 o'clock.

At half-past 3, the enemy, despising our zumboorahs, had pushed up to within a few hundred yards of us, and I was just contemplating the sad necessity of making an unsupported charge, when, in the very nick of time, the guns came up, and, with them, the two regular regiments,—one, General Cortlandt's well-disciplined Sooruj Mookhee, and the other, Sobhan Khan's regiment of Mussulmans. Calling them to the front, and taking command of them myself, in the absence of General Cortlandt, (who had remained on the right bank, by my orders, to cross the force), I gave the long-wished-for word, to emerge from the jungle, and fall upon the rebels.

I feel unable to do justice to the gallantry with which this order was obeyed. Men, whom I had only enlisted a month ago, shook their swords with a will, and rushed upon the rebel cavalry with the most desperate and irresistible valour. The fight was hand-to-hand in five minutes, and the opposing guns were pouring grape into each other, almost within speaking distance. For half an hour, fighting could not have been harder, and we were left entirely to ourselves, the Daoodpotras being either engaged on their own account, or thinking they had done enough.

At a little before four, Commandant Sobhan Khan, at the head of his Mussulman regiment, made the bravest sally I ever saw, upon a single gun of the enemy, and carried it at the point of the bayonet. Confusion fell among their artillery, our's advanced, and cruelly harassed them with grape, the infantry followed up, a momentary struggle ensued for the mastery, and the next minute, the rebels were in full flight. Bravely, I must allow, did they labor to carry off their guns, but, one by one, they all fell to either the sword, or the bayonet. In the morning, they commenced the action with ten guns, and, in the afternoon, advanced with six, across a nullah which was between them and us, leaving four guns behind. All six are now in our possession, but they managed to carry off the more distant four, though we followed them up for two coss after they broke.

God be praised for a most signal victory, gained under the most discouraging circumstances, but to be followed, I hope, by most encouraging results. All have behaved well, many nobly. Our loss is not yet known, nor that of the enemy.

Scouts are, already, after the latter, and I will let you know to-morrow where they halt, but, most probably, it will not be before they reach Mooltan, after the defeat they have got to-day at Kineyree.

Inclosure 25 in No. 29

*The Resident at Lahore to the Secretary to the Government of India*

*Lahore, June 22, 1848*

THE Governor-General in Council will, I am sure, consider the zealous and judicious arrangements of Lieutenant Edwardes, for forming the desired junction with Nawab Bahawal Khan's army, as deserving his Lordship's entire approbation and the energy, skill, and courage displayed by him, in the operations of the 18th of June, as entitling him to the highest praise of the Government of India.

The native agent, Peer Ibrahim Khan, writing from another part of the field, by the same messenger that brought Lieutenant Edwardes' letter, confirms his statement in every particular, and dwells much on the intrepidity and judgment evinced by that officer.

The troops of Bahawal Khan have, also, done excellent service, and I shall not fail at a fitting time, to claim, for the Nawab and his army, the favorable consideration of the Governor-General in Council.

The defeat of the enemy seems to have been complete, he showed more enterprise than I gave him credit for, in marching from his position to prevent the junction of Lieutenant Edwardes's force with that of Bahawal Khan, and in attacking the latter, while moving to cover the passage of Lieutenant Edwardes over the Chenab. The best disciplined native army is never attacked to so great advantage as when on the line of march.

The attack seems to have been well designed, and well executed. The mode in which it was received, the long period for which it was sustained, till reinforcements arrived late in the day, and the subsequent advance, with its results, are not unworthy of the glorious anniversary on which the fight took place, and the victory was won.

The neck of the Mooltan rebellion may be considered, now, broken, and having tried the result of an action on the plain, and been signally beaten, the Dewan Moolraj will not, I think, be able to hold his fort, for any length of time, with his undisciplined and mutinous troops. If he is able to keep the garrison faithful to him till October so much the better.

In the meantime, the Fort of Mooltan is all that remains to the Dewan the whole of the territories are in our occupation, or that of our ally, Bahawal Khan.

My combinations have been everywhere successful. Sheik Emamooddeen, with his Mahomedan levies and two guns, is at Mulsee about thirty miles south east from Mooltan, having made arrangements for the administration of the districts between Pank Puttan and that place.

The rest of that Doab, to the south and south-west, has been taken charge of, by the officers of Bahawal Khan.

The tickish force of Raja Sher Singh and his Sirdars is now at Toolomba, its fidelity may now be depended on, and it will be advanced to Sirdarpore, about twenty miles from Mooltan.

This force has been a cause of much anxiety to me, it has required constant judicious handling. The Sirdars are true, I believe the soldiers are all false, I know. The Sikh army in Peshawar, Bunnoo, and Hazara were watching this force, to take their cue from its conduct. Moolraj was anxious for its approach to Mooltan. My plan was to keep the attention of the Sikh army fixed on it, and to keep it from any position in which its mettle or material could be tried, or in which Moolraj's influence on it could be brought into action, till the rebels' game was lost.

In the Sind Sagun Doab between the Chenab and the Indus, the force under Sindu Jhunda Singh purged of the Churungeet traitors, and no longer doubtful, as Jowahir Mull Dutt has with him 1,500 Mussulmans, is at Leia the whole of the south of that Doab has been occupied by Bahawal Khan's officials.

The Trans-Indus provinces were all taken possession of, by Lieutenant Edwardes and General Cortlandt, before those officers crossed that river, and arrangements for their administration made.

If, therefore Moolraj continues to hold out he must remain confined to his fort, till the British army with a siege-train can be sent to reduce it.

My expectation is, that the rebel will either destroy himself, or be destroyed by his troops, before the next mail goes out.

The Governor-General will not fail to observe that, in the operations which have been undertaken for the suppression of this rebellion, the Durbar has taken no part, and that neither the Sirdars the Durbar officials, nor the army—with the exception of General Cortlandt and his own battalions—have given any aid. What has been done, has been effected by newly raised Mahomedan levies, under Lieutenant Edwardes, or, in other parts of the country, by parties acting under my immediate orders, and by our ally, Bahawal Khan, not only without the assistance of, but in spite of the machinations of, Durbar officials, the Sikh army, and the Sikh population, all of whom were from the first, and have continued to the last, thoroughly disaffected.

This will be more apparent to the Governor-General in Council, when I send up my final report about the abettors of the late rebel, Bhace Maharaj Singh.

If, therefore, this rebellion is brought to a close, now or hereafter, and the delinquents to punishment, and the fort of Mooltan is got into our possession, the British Government will still have to call the Sikh Government to account, for the murder of its officers, under circumstances of unparalleled treachery and atrocity, for which no redress has been made by them, or even, it may be said, attempted.

## No. 30.

*The Governor-General in Council to the Secret Committee.*

July 10, 1848 (No. 59.)

WE forward a letter from the Resident at Lahore, dated the 27th ultimo, with its inclosures, being letters from Lieutenant Edwardes dated the 17th and 22nd ultimo, and from the Resident to Lieutenant Edwardes dated the 27th ultimo

Lieutenant Edwardes' letter of the 22nd ultimo describes his movements after the successful action, reported in the postscript of our last dispatch. His force, combined with that of the Nawab Bahawal Khan, amounts, it appears, to 18,000 men, with 30 guns, but the guns are none of them such as would make any impression on fortifications.

P S—We have just received a further important dispatch from Sir F Currie\*. The Resident, upon receiving Lieutenant Edwardes' letter of the 22nd ultimo, consulted Major Napier, of the Engineers, upon the feasibility of operations against Mooltan, under the present altered position of affairs there. Major Napier has given his opinion that "operations are perfectly practicable, and may be undertaken with every prospect of success." A single brigade, with 10 guns and 20 mortars and howitzers, is now considered sufficient. The Resident has, accordingly, directed that this force be held in readiness, and it will proceed to Mooltan, immediately the Commander-in-Chief's acquiescence is communicated.

Inclosure 1 in No. 30

*Lieutenant Edwardes to the Resident*

*Camp, Gaggianuallah Ferry, on the right bank of the  
Chenab, 11 coss south of Khangur and Shoojabad.*

June 17, 1848

I HAVE to thank you for the confidence you repose in me, in leaving me "unfettered, to act according as circumstances render it most expedient that I should, for the purpose of obtaining the great object in view," without this, indeed, my position would be still more difficult than it is, and the army I have enlisted, be reduced to utility. The operation now going on is a good illustration—Dewan Moolraj has concentrated his whole force, for one decisive effort against the Daoodpotra army, east of the Chenab, with the avowed intention of destroying that army and mine, successively and separately, and so ridding himself of the only enemies he sees in the field. It is quite possible that the Daoodpotra army (which, by my advice, has, in the course of the last two days, strengthened itself, by calling in its detachments west of the Chenab and south-east of Mooltan) would be equal to encountering the Moolraj troops, but they, evidently, were not of that opinion themselves, and, repeatedly, called on me to come to their assistance. The impolicy, also, of leaving them to run the risk was sufficiently obvious, when the event could be made certain by junction, yet I had no authority from you to cross the Chenab, and only a reluctant permission to cross the Indus, under pressing emergency.

In resolving to follow the Koreyshee army across the Chenab, and unite with Bahawal Khan's troops, I have been obliged to incur the, at all times, dangerous responsibility to a political officer, of acting contrary to orders, and it is a relief to me, on the very bank of the forbidden river, to receive your kind and considerate carte blanche.

I am happy to inform you that the heavy firing heard by us at Khangur, yesterday morning, in the direction of the Daoodpotra camp, turned out, not to be an engagement with the enemy, but a prolonged feu-de-joie of artillery, on hearing of our rapid approach to their assistance.

Dewan Moolraj's force, under Lalla Rung Ram, is still encamped within two coss to the south of Shoojabad, taking up a strong position, it is supposed to await our united arrival, instead of hurrying on a collision this morning, as positively ordered, with the Daoodpotras before I could come up. This is a fatal error, as, please God, they will find. The rebel movements show occasional flashes of Mely skill and enterprise in their design, but they invariably fade away when it comes to execution, and end in a weak retreat.

The Daoodpotras are still at Goweyn, twelve coss from Shoojabad, where they have wisely entrenched themselves till our arrival.

General Cortlandt, with the guns and regular troops, joined me yesterday, at Khangui, and, as soon as the moon rose, the march was again resumed to this place between nine and ten coss, even this distance is a great effort in this severe heat. The Daoodpotras are sending us up 47 boats, in which Moozooddeen Khan crossed his detachment yesterday. They will be here in a few hours, when the passage of the Chenab will immediately commence. Our numbers have swelled to nearly 9,000 men, and I am afraid we shall not be all over, under three days, I have left it to Futteh Mahomed Khan Ghozee to fix the point of junction.

When our two forces unite, we shall not be under 18,000 men, 21 guns, and about 50 *zumboorahs*, and I cannot conceive the enemy awaiting such a force at Shoojabad. Even in entrenchments, natives look to numbers, and the rebels have got neither the consciousness of honesty, nor the prestige of success, to support them.

Were the Sikh troops on the frontier to be relied on for a moment, I would, at this juncture, make a rush at Mooltan, and leaving Rung Ram in his entrenchment, get between him and his master, who is left, with a few personal guards only, in the fort.

But the struggle now going on is of such a mixed nature, that the step would, probably, be unsuccessful, Moolraj is chief of the rebellion, merely by the accident of holding the Moshuksah of Mooltan. The Sikhs have not espoused his cause, out of attachment to him, but because it holds out an opportunity of renewing the old Khalsa struggle. It would, therefore, annoy them but little, to separate Moolraj from the rebel army, they would, probably, abandon him to his fate, cross the Chenab, join Jhunda Sing's force at Leia, and call on those at Bunnoo and Peshawar to rise, at once, in the name of the Khalsa. We should quell a rebellion, and get an insurrection, in its stead. I shall bend all my efforts, therefore, to driving the rebels into Mooltan, if we cannot bring them to an engagement in the plain.

The force beyond Leia is a source of considerable anxiety to me, the majority of the Churumjeet regiment has joined Juss Mull, Dewan Moolraj's kaidar at that place, and it is but too apparent, that the guns of Umeer Chund and Dhara Sing's infantry regiment are inclined to join them. Your orders are, to send Jhunda Sing's force to Jhung,—most probably, to avoid this very catastrophe, and I have forwarded the order to Jhunda Sing, but I have, also, told him not to act upon it, if he thinks it would only make the men declare themselves, and go openly over to Moolraj. The Churumjeet regiment were led to decide for Moolraj, by Jowahir Mull trying to get rid of them, by sending them, on a frivolous excuse, to Pind Dadun Khan. Seeing that they were suspected, they threw away the mask, and, instead of marching on Pind Dadun Khan, bent their steps to Leia. It is a serious addition to our difficulties, thus to find our allies turning enemies, but there is no help for it, all we can do, is to increase our efforts to shut Moolraj up in Mooltan, and thus discourage all his friends.

Your appointment of Lieutenant Lake to the political charge of the Bahawalpore force, is both timely and happy.

That officer's personal courage, and professional talent, will find a field prepared for them.

## Inclosure 2 in No. 30.

*Lieutenant Edwardes to the Resident at Lahore.*

*Camp, Shoojabad, June 22, 1848.*

THE rear and baggage cattle of this force having crossed the Chenab, yesterday morning, and joined us at Navrar, by the evening, we marched this morning from that place to Shoojabad, as did the troops of his Highness the Nawab of Bahawalpore, from the intermediate village of Bukree, and the two armies forming a united force of 18,000 men and 30 guns (including 8 captured), are now encamped together.

Such a force would present too formidable an obstacle for Moolraj to encounter in the field, even if his troops had not, already, been disheartened, by the result of the battle of Kineyree, and, though he has now been actually joined by 300 Sikhs of the Churunjeet cavalry regiment from Leia, he has given up all thoughts of contesting anything more than the fort and city of Mooltan, whose defences he is now busily engaged in strengthening.

The night before last, hearing that the Nawab's troops had not yet advanced to Shoojabad, a spark of hope revived in the Dewan's bosom, and he dispatched 200 horsemen and two guns, to re-occupy the Shoojabad fort, intending to reinforce them afterwards, and so delay our arrival before Mooltan. When, however, the detachment reached Adee Walluh Bagh, which is midway between Mooltan and this place, they heard of the surrender of the fort to Peer Ishaheem Khan and Sufiraz Khan, and returned whence they came.

Mustapha Khan, Khagwanee, has now sent me word, that Moolraj intends to send him, to-night to me with a letter, the contents not mentioned, but they are sure not to be satisfactory. My intention is to forward the letter to you, giving only a verbal reply to Mustapha Khan, to the effect ordered by the Governor-General, viz., that if the Dewan wishes to surrender, it must be unconditionally. Mustapha Khan will probably not like to return to Moolraj with such an answer, having already fallen under suspicion, and will go off to Kummun Kote. He has, I fully believe, done his best to induce Moolraj to surrender.

Ussud Khan Nookhanee has, many days since, fled to Bahawalpore.

Two or three Puthans, Khans of note, who had not been concerned in the fight at Kineyree, have come in since, and though their submission is late I have not rejected it. The breach between the Puthans and Moolraj has been much widened by the Kineyree disaster, which the Dewan persists in attributing to their treachery. He is so far correct that they showed none of that hot-headed gallantry for which their race is distinguished, and, having no heart in the cause, left the brunt of the fighting to the Sikhs, who suffered, in consequence, out of all proportion.

It is said that Moolraj, indeed, distrusts the whole force which fought on the 18th, and is not inclined to let them into the fort, but means to encamp them under its walls. So treated, they will, probably, melt rapidly away.

In a few days, the task assigned to this army will be accomplished, and Moolraj and his rebels will be confined to the fort of Mooltan. But we all contemplate, with regret, the prospect of doing nothing for three months. We shall begin thinking of the heat, and get sick. The interval, I think, might be most profitably employed, and, should my proposition be entertained, it will, most likely, obviate the necessity of a British army taking the field at all.

I would suggest that the siege be commenced, at once. We are enough of us in all conscience, and desire nothing better than to be honored with the commission you designed for a British army. All we require are a few heavy guns, a mortar battery, as many sappers and miners as you can spare, and Major Napier to plan our operations. That brave and able officer is, I believe, at Lahore, and the guns and mortars are, doubtless, ere this, at Ferozepore, and only require to be put into boats, and floated down to Bahawalpore. Lieutenant Lake, for whose arrival I am daily looking, is also an engineer, so we should not want science, and every other material is at hand, for bringing to a rapid and honorable conclusion the rebellion of Mooltan.

At present, I may as well mention that, out of thirty guns, we have not one in camp that would make any impression on fortifications, so that we shall be reduced at once to policemen.

Inclosure 3 in No. 30.

*Lieutenant Lake (Assistant to the Resident) to the Resident at Lahore*

*Bahawalpore, June 24, 1848.*

I HAVE the honor to report my arrival at Bahawalpore. Nawab Bahawal Khan is himself at Ahmedpore, whither I shall be obliged to proceed, for the purpose of obtaining an interview. This, and the fact of my tents and escort being some distance in the rear, will prevent my joining the head-quarters of the Bahawalpore army, for some four or five days.

It is, generally, believed that Moohaj will fight a second action with the troops of our allies. That action may decide the fate of Mooltan itself, and place the fort at our disposal. To put so important an acquisition into the hands of any of the troops composing our force, would, perhaps, be imprudent. I would, therefore, suggest the propriety of, at once, collecting a fleet of boats, at Ferozepore, sufficiently numerous to bring down a garrison for Mooltan. The troops to be employed on this particular service might, at once, be told off, and if the brigadier commanding at Ferozepore were authorized, on an application from me or Lieutenant Edwards, to begin embarking the troops, the arrangement would save two or three days' delay. I need not assure you that the application would not be made unnecessarily.

I have not supposed such a contingency as the defeat of Bahawal Khan's army. Were such an event to occur, the movement of a portion of our troops to Bahawalpore would be imperative. In both cases, therefore, whether of defeat or victory, the collection of boats at Ferozepore seems advisable. Indeed, I am not certain that it would not be good policy to move, at once, a detachment of regulars to Bahawalpore. They would not have to undergo any great exposure, for, in boats, a six days' voyage would take them to Bahawalpore, where the Residency would be available to the officers as a place of resort during the heat of the day, and temporary shelter might easily be obtained for the men. You will observe that I contemplate only the movement of native troops. On the advisability of such a move it is for yourself to decide.

Inclosure 4 in No. 30.

*The Resident at Lahore to Lieutenant Edwards*

*Lahore, June 27, 1848.*

IT would be useless sending you heavy guns and a mortar battery from Ferozepore, without artillerymen to work them and an abundant supply of our ammunition.

If our breaching artillery and sappers and miners are employed, the British army will become, to a certain extent, identified with the operations you are conducting, and any check or reverse which you might sustain, would, to the same extent, reflect upon the character of British prowess.

The character of the investing force would be, in a measure, changed by the addition to it of British materials, and, if any part of the British army is employed, it might be considered necessary that such a force should be sent as would render success certain and speedy.

The success which you have obtained, and the presence of a large army at Mooltan, on which we can depend, have changed, in an important degree, the aspect of affairs from that which they presented, when it was determined that operations by a British force should be postponed till after the rains, the interim being employed in collecting the means of taking the field with an overwhelming force of all arms, and it is evident that operations on the scale contemplated, the magnitude of which was one of the circumstances which made delay indispensable,

will not now be required Still, after what has happened, if the British arm is raised at all, it must be with power to strike a blow that shall, at once, vindicate its insulted honor, and crush the insulters

Another circumstance which had great weight in determining the impracticability of operations two months ago, was the belief that, by about this time, the fort and city of Mooltan would, by means of canals and cuts from the Chenab, be inundated, to such an extent, on all sides, as to render siege operations impossible

Further enquiries seem to render the above circumstance, at least to the extent described, doubtful.

It is of much importance that you should, with as little delay as possible, in communication with Lieutenant Lake of the Engineers, report upon the local features of the fort and surrounding country, with reference to the feasibility of siege operations against the fort, during the next two months, and also in October It is believed that very extensive inundations can be produced, by bringing the floods of the Chenab into the low country surrounding Mooltan, but it is stated that, by damming up the head of the one principal canal, the inconvenience may be speedily removed, as the inundation would soon be taken up by evaporation, there being no local rains The whole line of the Chenab being now in your power, the head of the canal could, of course, easily be shut up by your orders

I request you will, in communication with Lieutenant Lake, submit a report on the above subject, with as little delay as possible

You will have abundant occupation for your troops in establishing a close investment of the fort, till more active operations can be undertaken, be they undertaken when they may, and you should, if you have time for the work, make arrangements, forthwith, for the future administration of the Mooltan districts, and the securing of the revenues

It would, doubtless, aid the investing force much, and in no way alter the character of the proceedings, if you would keep the garrison on the alert, by occasional shelling from a mortar battery Raja Shere Sing has two large mortars with him, and more mortars and shells can be sent from the Durbar by the Ravee and Chenab, to General Cortlandt, if thought desirable.

It would be expedient, also, if you would state the nature of the country between the Ghat opposite Bahawalpore and Mooltan, and the means that could be made available for conveying heavy guns with their ammunition, from one to the other.

Inclosure 5 in No. 30.

*The Resident at Lahore to the Commander-in-Chief*

*Lahore, June 28, 1848*

IT is far from impossible that Lieutenants Edwardes and Lake may get possession of the fort of Mooltan, without any aid from us; but it is more probable that the rebel Moolraj will shut himself up in his fort, and hold out, as long as he can

In the latter case, it will be highly desirable, in a political point of view, and also in a military, that the means of reducing the fort should be, at once, provided The excitement which is caused, and the injury which is occasioned to all classes of the community, by the continued existence of rebellion in Mooltan, (confined, though it be, to the fort), are incalculable, and I cannot contemplate, without serious apprehension, the possible consequences of keeping two large undisciplined armies, like Bahawal Khan's and Lieutenant Edwardes', in contact, and in a state of comparative inactivity, for the next three or four months

The altered position of affairs, and the information we have obtained in the meantime, induce Major Napier (whose professional opinion was, I believe, taken by your Lordship, when the impracticability of operations, two months ago, was determined) to consider it quite feasible to undertake the siege, with every prospect of early success, immediately The report from Lieutenants Edwardes and Lake, called for in my letter of yesterday, will be received, ere the preparations for a move can be far advanced, if commenced at once



I send Major Napier's memorandum and plan in original, and request that, when no longer required, they may be returned

A small force only will now be required, except in artillery. A brigade will be sufficient, and the guns and Europeans may be conveyed in boats by either the Ravee or Chenab from Lahore, or the Sutlej from Ferozepore. By the former route, boats of large burden would land their freight within three miles and a half of the fort, by the latter, there would be between fifty and sixty miles of land carriage, from the Ghat opposite Bahawalpore, to Mooltan.

The troops and stores that proceed by land might go by night, as in our provinces there is no enemy now between Lahore, or Ferozepore, and the walls of Mooltan.

I have directed inquiries to be made, as to the amount of carriage, in elephants, camels, carts, and draught bullocks, that can be supplied by the Durbar and by Bahawal Khan respectively. These, added to what the Commissariat can furnish, and what may be sent over from Lieutenant Edwards' force and from Bahawal Khan's army, now stationary before Mooltan, would be ample. There would be no difficulty on the score of carriage, either for guns, ammunition, or stores.

I do not think that, at the present moment, there would be much objection to sending one of Her Majesty's regiments and two regiments of native infantry from this garrison, if it be thought better to do so, than that the whole force should be sent from Ferozepore. The distance is about the same from both. There are only, I fancy, four pieces of breaching ordnance at Lahore.

Inclosure 6 in No 30

*The Resident at Lahore to the Commander-in-Chief*

*Lahore, June 28, 1848.*

I QUITE agree with Lieutenant Lake in the proposition contained in his letter \*. If the Fort of Mooltan falls into the hands of Lieutenants Lake and Edwards, a very possible contingency, it should be garrisoned by British troops, till the determination of the Government of India for its future disposal is communicated.

Your Lordship will be a better judge than I am, of what would be a sufficient force to garrison the fort. Major Napier suggests two regiments of native infantry and one company of artillery.

I have given orders for boats to be collected, and your Lordship will, perhaps, be good enough to have the necessary instructions sent to the officer commanding at Ferozepore.

P S—After this letter was written, I had an opportunity of discussing this matter with Major-General Whish; and it seems preferable, if the fort falls into the possession of Lieutenant Lake, that the force to garrison it should go by water from Lahore. There is a reserve company of artillery, moreover, here, while there is not one at Ferozepore, I believe. I have, therefore, requested the Major-General to hold two regiments and a company of artillery in readiness to proceed to Mooltan, if required, and I have ordered boats to be got ready for their conveyance.

No. 31.

*The Governor-General in Council to the Secret Committee.*

*August 7, 1848. (No. 65.)*

WE transmit a correspondence regarding the custody of the Maharanee of Lahore, under the Governor-General's Agent at Benares

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\* Inclosure 3 in No 30.

## Inclosure 1 in No. 31.

*The Secretary to the Government of India to J. Newmarch, Esq., Solicitor.*

*Fort Wilham, June 10, 1848.*

I AM directed to acknowledge the receipt of your letter dated the 31st ultimo, and its inclosures, from one Jeebun Sing, who represents himself to be the vakeel of the Maharanee Junda Khore of Lahore.

In reply, I am desired by the Governor-General in Council to intimate to you that the Maharanee is no longer in the Punjab, and that she is now on her way to Benares, where she will be placed under the charge of the Governor-General's Agent, Major G H Macgregor, C B, through whom all letters to her, or from her, will pass, in the first instance

## Inclosure 2 in No. 31.

*The Secretary to the Government of India to J. Newmarch, Esq.*

*Fort Wilham, July 1, 1848*

I HAVE the honor to acknowledge the receipt of your letter dated the 17th ultimo, and, in reply, am directed to acquaint you that the Government decline to hold any further communication with you direct, relative to the the Maharanee's affairs. All communications on this subject must be made through the Agent of the Governor-General at Benares

## No. 32.

*The Governor-General of India in Council to the Secret Committee.*

*August 8, 1848. (No 66.)*

IN the postscript of our despatch No. 59, of the 10th ultimo,\* we informed you that, by a letter just received from Sir F Currie, it appeared that he had directed a force to be held in readiness to proceed to Mooltan immediately, and that he only waited for the Commander-in-Chief's reply to a communication which he had addressed to his Excellency upon this subject. A copy of that reply, dated the 1st ultimo, was forwarded to us by Lord Gough, with a letter of the same date,† in which his Excellency intimated to us that he did not feel justified in taking upon himself the responsibility of sending a force so small as that proposed by the Resident, that he saw nothing, in the altered position of affairs, which would justify him in taking upon himself the siege of Mooltan, at the present moment, that, on the contrary, the success of Lieutenant Edwardes rendered it less necessary, in his Excellency's opinion, to risk the lives of the European soldiers, at this season.

This communication from Lord Gough reached us, the day after Sir F Currie's letter. We replied to Sir F Currie, on the 11th ultimo, by informing him, that having carefully considered the various despatches which had been addressed to us, and having weighed the reasons which had been adduced for the immediate despatch of a force against Mooltan, we entirely concurred with the Commander-in-Chief in adhering to our former determination, and in abstaining from moving British troops upon Mooltan, at this season of the year. We beg to refer you to Mr. Elliot's letter of the 11th of July for our opinion at length ‡

We have since received two important letters from the Resident, dated both on the 10th of July,§ the first incloses despatches from Lieutenants Edwardes and Lake, giving an account of another action fought by Lieutenant Edwardes' force, with General Cortlandt's and the Nawab Bahawul Khan's, against Moolraj, at Suddoosam, close to Mooltan, in which the rebel Dewan and his followers, after a struggle of fanatic desperation, were entirely routed. You will read with much interest Lieutenant Edwardes' very clear account of

\* No. 30.

† Inclosure 29 in No. 32.

‡ Inclosures 11 and 12 in No. 32.

§ Inclosures 21 and 24 in No. 32.

this victory, and we are sure that you will fully concur with us in the high expression of approbation of their conduct, which we requested the Resident to convey to Lieutenants Edwardes and Lake

The other letter from Sir F. Currie of the same date, inclosed a correspondence between him and Major-General Whish, regarding the immediate movement of troops and a siege-train on Mooltan, and informed us that he had been induced to take upon himself the responsibility of this movement "notwithstanding the remarks contained in the letter of the Commander-in-Chief, dated the 1st of July, from a conviction of its political necessity, and military practicability, at the present moment." Sir F. Currie's reasons for this determination follow at considerable length.

We replied (by Mr. Elliot's letter of the 22nd ultimo,)\* that, in our opinion, nothing had been advanced by Sir F. Currie, calculated to weaken the strength of those reasons which induced us, notwithstanding the political urgency of the case, to approve of his having refrained from bringing British troops into the field, at this season of the year, or which could have induced us to alter the resolution, already conveyed to him, that British troops should not move against Mooltan, until the fit season for military operations should commence, but that, since he had considered it necessary, in exercise of the powers conferred upon him, to assume the responsibility, and had publicly issued the orders for carrying his resolution into effect, we would not withhold our confirmation of those orders. Adverting, moreover, to the injurious effects which would be produced by any appearance of vacillation, at this critical period, and having regard to the probable consequences in the Punjab, at the present moment, of staying the advance of the British force, when once the intention of moving it forthwith against the rebels had been declared, and active preparations commenced, we informed Sir F. Currie that, if he should, in consequence of the receipt of Mr. Elliot's letter of the 11th ultimo, have countermanded the march of the troops, it was our wish that he should, immediately, direct the advance he had ordered, and proceed with vigor to carry out, at all hazards, the policy which he had resolved upon.

Inclosure 1 in No. 32

*The Resident at Lahore to the Maharanee Junda Khore.*

May 14, 1848.

THE accompanying accredited agents of the Durbar, with my assistants, Captain Lumsden and Lieutenant Hodson, are sent by me to you. Whatever instructions they give you about your removal from Sheikhoopoor, you should immediately attend to. They will conduct you, with all due respect and consideration, no personal injury, or indignity, towards you is intended.

Inclosure 2 in No. 32.

*Purwanna, under the seal of Maharajah Duleep Sing Bahadoor, Raja Tej Sing, Raja Deena Nath, Raja Shere Sing, by his brother Golab Sing, Fakeer Noorooddeen, addressed to Sirdars Goormookh Sing Lumma and Sirdar Bhoor Sing, in charge of the Maharanee, at the Fort of Sheikhoopoor.*

AT this time, according to the advice of Sir Frederick Currie, Baronet, Resident at Lahore, &c., and Fakeer Noorooddeen, Sirdar Nar Sing Attareewalla, Dewan Keedar Nath, (the brother of Raja Deena Nath) Raze Mool Sing, (the confidential agent of Raja Tej Sing) on the part of the Lahore Durbar, with Captain Lumsden and Lieutenant Hodson, deputed by the Resident, are sent for the purpose of removing from Sheikhoopoor, with all due respect and consideration, the Maharanee Junda Khore with her female attendants. You are, hereby, required to consign the Maharanee, &c to their charge, and to take care that there is no delay in Her Highness' removal, which must take place at once.

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\* Inclosure 36 in No. 32.

You will detain two of the confidential female attendants of the Maharanee, in charge of Her Highness' property, which may remain at Sheikhoopoor, till arrangements are made for its removal: this property you will keep under seal

Soobha Dut Subadar, with the company of Poorbeahs, will remain as a guard to the property. The Jemadar of Rohillas, with the Rohilla Sessahees, will attend the Maharanee, and, whatever the Durbar agents and British officers may direct, regarding your accompanying the Maharanee, or remaining at Sheikhoopoor, you will attend to and obey, the remainder of the garrison and guards of the town of Sheikhoopoor will remain as at present. You will admit the British officers, with the cavalry escort, into the fort of Sheikhoopoor, and allow them access to any part thereof, and, for the time they may be at Sheikhoopoor, free ingress and egress in and out of the fort

Inclosure 3 in No 32

*The Resident at Lahore to the Secretary to the Government of India.*

Lahore, June 16, 1848.

I AM not in the habit of paying any attention to statements made in the newspapers, which, in fact, I scarcely ever read, but, understanding that it has been, generally, reported that Maharanee Junda Khore was induced to leave Sheikhoopoor, by being told that she was to come to Lahore, I have referred to my letter to your address, dated the 16th ultimo\*

I perceive that I have not stated, explicitly, the terms of my moorasila, to the Maharanee, or of the Durbar purwanna to the custodians of her Highness, dictated by me

I now send these documents †

I expressly forbade the deputation, in peremptory terms, from using any deceit to the Maharanee. It was suggested by one of them, when the purwanna was written and read, that it would ensure her Highness coming away quietly, if she was told by them that she was coming to Lahore. I impressed upon them all, in strong terms, that they were to use no deceit, that they were to tell the Maharanee no more than was entered in the purwanna, but that, as she would, probably, think that she was doomed to the same fate as her confidential vakeel, Moonshee Gunga Ram, they might assure her that no injury to her person was intended, and that she would be conveyed to her destination, with all proper respect, and consideration to her rank and position

I think it by no means improbable that the Sirdars may, unknown to the British officers, have told the Maharanee that she was to come to Lahore, they are all unscrupulous, and untruthful to the last degree. But they, certainly, did not make her believe it, for, as the party left the fort, her Highness sent for Lieutenant Lumsden, and inquired of him whither she was to be escorted. He replied, that he had no authority to inform Her Highness, but that she was under his protection, and he would assure her that she would be subjected to no injury, or indignity. She expressed herself satisfied on the latter point, but said she was anxious to know whither she was to go

On arriving at Kana-Kuch, the Maharanee again sent for Lieutenant Lumsden she said, "I know now that you are taking me to the British provinces. This is the road to Ferozepore. I have requested your attendance, to beg that you will inform Sir F. Currie, the Resident, that I am under a deep obligation to him for sending me into the Company's territories. I have long wished to leave the Punjab, where I am surrounded by enemies bent on misrepresenting me, and working my ruin. I am now happy and satisfied"

Lieutenant Lumsden, then, told the Maharanee that after resting at Kana-Kuch till the afternoon, they should pursue their way to Ferozepore, that all arrangements had been made for her journey, that, by morning, before it should get hot, they would arrive at Ferozepore, where she would receive full information and instructions from the Resident, regarding her further progress, and future destination.

\* Inclosure 24 in No. 27.

† Inclosures 1 and 2 in No. 32.

## Inclosure 4 in No. 32.

*Lieutenant Edwardes to the Resident.**Noorar, June 21, 1848.*

I HAVE been unable to advance, hitherto, owing to the entire lull of the south wind, and the consequent labor and delay occasioned to our troops in crossing the Chenab. Our camels and rear-guard have not yet come up, but will be all in camp by evening, and, to-morrow morning, it is my intention to march to Shoojabad. The interval has been employed in burying the killed, and attending to the wounded, of both sides.

The loss in our camp proves, I am happy to say, to have been most trifling, only fifty-eight killed, and eighty-nine wounded. In the Nawab's force, Futteh Mahomed Khan Ghoree estimated his loss at 100 men, but I believe he had no regular muster. This would make a total of 247 killed and wounded on our side, whereas there are between 500 and 600 of the enemy's dead alone, left upon the field, and those who have come from Shoojabad, say the road is marked with dead bodies. A deserter from Mooltan says 400 soldiers of Moolraj's Khas Pultun were killed, and that, of the two companies of Goorkas, (who deserted Mr Agnew) only seven men escaped alive.

The enemy's total loss, therefore, cannot have been under 1,000, and the great discrepancy between thens and ours is easily accounted for. Their guns played, from a great distance, on our men (who were posted in jungle) for eight hours, but, when our guns came up, the enemy had (in the belief that there were none) approached so close to us that, when we emerged from the thicket to meet their charge, every discharge of grape took terrible effect.

I under-rated the captured guns, in my account of the action. We took eight, not six, out of ten guns, only two returned to Mooltan.

The routed rebels never halted, I find, till they reached Mooltan, a distance of twenty-three coss, which was a good run for them, after a nine hour's fight, under a June sun, not 3,000, out of 7,000 supposed to have been in the fight, mustered at Mooltan next day, and, doubtless, many went off to their homes. Others who took circuitous routes to avoid pursuit, will, however, have joined again ere this, and it is the greatest pity in the world that we had no cavalry to follow them up with, in which case, few would have lived to give more trouble.

The Nawab's troops should have marched, the day after the battle, to Shoojabad, but I was unable to get them off, till yesterday morning, when they only went three coss.

Early yesterday morning, the Killedar of Shoojabad sent in his submission to me, and the chowdries, bankers, and chief Kutrees (rebels to the back bone, all of them) presented themselves, and begged for kind treatment. This I, readily, promised, though it is more than they deserve, for they have been supplying Moolraj largely with money, stores, and encouragement from the Shastres. The rebellion indeed is a Banyan rebellion, with a Sikh insurrection grafted on to it. One Shroff alone, of Shoojabad, a mean looking little fellow, undertook to furnish Dewan Moolraj with two month's pay for his army, if he would only send them against the Nawab's troops, a circumstance which I shall not forget, whenever we are hard pressed for cash. Such moneyed men are invaluable in these times.

At first, I thought of sending some of my own Puthans to occupy the fort of Shoojabad, but reflecting that I am an intruder in this Doab, and that the Nawab of Bahawalpore undertook to conquer up to Mooltan, I thought it would be but right to put his troops forward, and let him have as much credit as possible. So I sent Peer Ibraheem Khan, along with Surfiraz Khan Lukkozye, of the Nawab's army, to take possession, which they did, peaceably.

I take this opportunity of reporting how constantly and fully Peer Ibraheem Khan has kept me supplied with intelligence of the Nawab's and Moolraj's army, up to the latest moment, to which I am indebted entirely for having been apprised of the rebels' intended attack on the Daoodpotras, and having been enabled thus to defeat it. But I was not aware how much credit was due to him, till I saw the Commander-in-Chief he has had to manage, and whose position at the head of the Nawab's troops is a source of annoyance to every officer in them. I mean Futteh Mahomed Khan Ghoree.

I am very sorry to be obliged myself, thus early, to report his extremely mis-

chievous and unbecoming conduct since the action, but it is necessary that I should do so, in order that you may have an opportunity of judging whether his continuance in command is, or is not, likely to prevent any cordial co-operation between our two forces, in the most important part of the service which is now before us.

In my dispatch of the 18th of June, I remember (though I have no copy) saying as little as I could, about the fact that the great body of the Daoodpotras were not engaged in the real struggle of the day, which commenced at 3 P M upon the left. I thought it invidious and unnecessary to detract from the merit of the Nawab's troops, neither was I, at that time, fully aware how far the Daoodpotras had retired out of the hot fire which had been directed on them all day, having been fully engaged in keeping my own line in its place. Certainly, I never thought any blame to attach to them, nor do I now, and I was only glad that we had had it in our power to save them from a reverse, which the best and bravest troops must, sometimes, meet with. At night, however, my men complained bitterly that the Nawab's troops had followed in our rear, and appropriated all the guns which we had taken, and left behind us, except the two last, which remained in our possession. I laughed the matter off, and said, it mattered nothing who brought in the guns, or who took them, so that the enemy lost them, and the Maharajah got them. To my surprise, however, I afterwards learnt that Futteh Mahomed Khan had no idea of making the said guns over to the Maharajah, considering them as the lawful spoil of his master.

On the morning of the 19th, therefore, when he called upon me at my tent, I took occasion to mention, incidentally, that all the captured guns had better be made over to General Cortlandt.

I have not addressed the Nawab on the subject, and, indeed, I feel quite sorry that so sincere and excellent a friend of our Government should endanger the good understanding subsisting between him and every British official, by employing, in so high a capacity, an old man, whom extreme age has deprived of what little sense he may ever have possessed, one, too, who notoriously ruined his late master, Meer Roostum, of Khyrpore, by exactly the same course of disingenuous and double dealing with the British authorities. Peer Ibraheem Khan, a man of temper and sense, can find no other epithet for Futteh Mahomed than "Ahumck!" or "Fool!" and says he changes his mind so often that he is obliged to be to appear consistent! This is not the sort of man to come in contact with straightforward and truth-loving Englishmen, and, for the good of the public service, I would suggest how materially it would tend to infuse good feeling into the united force before Mooltan, if this driveller could be withdrawn under cover of a khillut, and replaced by the Nawab's eldest son, a man of whom all speak well, and wish to serve under.

Inclosure 5 in No 32

*The Resident at Lahore to the Secretary to the Government of India*

*Lahore, June 22, 1848.*

REGARDING the defection of the Churunjee regiment of cavalry, I have the honor to forward a letter from Captain Abbott, without date, on the same subject.

The example of the 253 traitors has not been followed, hitherto, by the rest of the regiment, or by any of the soldiers of the other corps, and it is not likely now, I think, that it will be.

The deserters remained, for some days, at Leia, but, finding that they were not joined by the others, and that Moolraj had no force in the neighbourhood to support them, they proceeded, on their way to Mooltan.

I heard of the arrival at Mooltan, first, of the Sepoys who deserted before the Churunjee regiment; they went to Dewan Moolraj, and told him that the whole of the Sikh portion of Sirdar Jhunda Sing's force was at his service and disposal, but that he must send some troops to meet them, and cover their retreat to Mooltan.

The Dewan, after taking counsel with his officers, replied, that he had no

disposable force to send, and that he had no evidence of the truth of what they asserted; he told them to go back, and murder the Sirdar, and their officers, and he should, then, be satisfied of their sincerity

A few days afterwards, 105 or so of the Churunjeet deserters, reached Mooltan, they had large presents made to them, and were promoted in the Dewan's service

Inclosure 6 in No. 32.

*Captain James Abbott to the Resident at Lahore*

I HAVE much pain in announcing to you the defection of the Churunjeet regiment of cavalry, which formed a considerable portion of Sirdar Jhunda Sing's brigade. The intelligence was conveyed in a letter from the Sirdar, who was approaching Leia, where about 500 of Moolraj's forces lay. The Sirdar, on learning their disposition, summoned the officers, who, one and all, declared their inability to control their men. The whole of the regiment there present, excepting the officers, deserted, during the night. One troop of this regiment is still here in Pukh, and about twenty more of them form my mounted escort.

This unhappy event may, I much fear, be the signal for more extensive defection.

Inclosure 7 in No. 32.

*Lieutenant Edwardes to the Resident at Lahore*

*Camp, near Secunderabad, June 26, 1848.*

DIFFICULTIES about making arrangements for supplies in future, detained us at Shoojabad till this morning, and I was at last obliged, before marching, to bind down the Hindoo Panches of the districts around, on both sides of the river, in heavy penalties, to forward regular supplies into our camp. The Kutree class are staunch adherents of Moolraj, and more so, the nearer we approach Mooltan. The resources of the country, however, are now quite in our power; and, after the first day or two, I anticipate no scarcity whatever.

I received your letter of the 19th of June, on the evening of the 24th, informing me of the dispatch of Lieutenant Lumsden, to bring the steamer "Satellite" up the Chenab, to co-operate with the army before Mooltan. The steamer will be of great service, if kept plying between Ferozepore and Bahawalpore, and used in bringing up expeditiously military stores when required. I heard from Lieutenant Lake, on the same subject, yesterday morning. His letter is dated Bahawalpore, June 24, and he requests my opinion as to the best way of employing the steamer you have been so good as to place at our disposal. In my last letter to you, I suggested the propriety of commencing the siege of Mooltan at once, and applied for some heavy guns and mortar battery for that purpose, and Major Napier to direct our efforts. With a view to the request being conceded, therefore, I think the "Satellite," which is now at Bahawalpore, instead of coming round by the Chenab, had better proceed on to Ferozepore, to assist in conveying the heavy train, and I take the opportunity of requesting the favor of your ordering the Durbar to send General Cortlandt 200 maunds of powder, and 10,000 cannon balls, of two and a half seers each, (as a farther guide, I may mention that the bore of General Cortlandt's guns is exactly the same as those belonging to Raja Tej Sing.) These munitions we require, as soon as possible, whether the siege is to be prosecuted, or merely a blockade. From Bahawalpore, the train or stores should come, by the land route, lately pursued by the Nawab's army, as it is a great round to go south and enter the Chenab, to say nothing of possible delays in the latter river. But I have ordered wood to be stored on the Chenab banks, in case of need.

It is confidently said that Bhace Maharaj Sing escaped from the death which so many of his followers met with in the Chenab, and, after taking refuge with a Mukhtoom in a khangah at Ooch, was safely conducted by him, a few days ago, to Mooltan, where his arrival has so far revived the spirits of the garrison, that Moolraj is determined to try his fortune once more in the field, before taking himself to his fort.

I did not believe this report, at first, and can scarcely do so now, but it has reached me from so many quarters, that it cannot be doubted that either the Bhaee has re-appeared, or else some impostor, who has assumed his name and character, which comes to much the same thing, for it is the name of a Gooroo which constitutes so powerful an appeal to the Sikh soldiers

One cossid, who has hitherto brought very correct information, startled me, last evening, with intelligence that Sirdar Shumshere Sing and his force had arrived at a place called Mehra, within 20 coss of Mooltan. It is not many days ago since you wrote me word that you had ordered all that force to halt at Chehawutnee; so that, if the Sirdar is really at Mehra, it is against orders, and can bear but one construction. At such a moment it naturally occurs to me that Bhaee Maharaj Sing is the disciple and successor of Bhaee Beer Sing, who fell fighting on the side of Uttur Sing, Sindanwalla (Shumshere Sing's uncle) in Heera Sing's time, and I remember, when Bhaee Maharaj Sing first began to be troublesome at Umritsur, Sirdar Shumshere Sing's name was freely used, in connexion with his schemes, which we all attributed to the enmity of Raja Tej Sing. This chain of circumstantial suspicions involuntarily links itself on to the report now alluded to, but everything I know, and have seen, of the Sirdar's character is against it, and I should be very sorry to find that I had been deceived in him. The mere existence of the rumor, however, is a useful warning, on no account, and under no aspect of affairs, however favorable, to allow the Sikhs at Chehawutnee to come an inch nearer to Mooltan, for, as it is no secret that Dewan Moolraj has invited them to join him, the Sikh troops will show considerable forbearance, if they only remain neutral.

I have, before, reported to you Dewan Moolraj's intention to send Mustapha Khan Khagwanee, a second time, as vakeel to my camp. Mustapha Khan arrived, on the night of the 24th, and I received him yesterday. His message happily relieves me of whatever responsibility was involved in my former guarantee of a fair trial, even if it had not been forfeited at Kineyree, as I consider that it was. The Dewan persists in asserting his innocence, but declines to stand his trial, and modestly offers to come in, at once, if that form is dispensed with. I have refused to give any answer, to prevent misconstruction, or to have anything more to do with the Dewan, further than forwarding to you anything he may please to write. Mustapha Khan, as I expected, declines taking back such a rebuff, and says he is very glad to have had the opportunity of getting away safe. He has, I think, behaved and deserved well, throughout this affair. Of the risk he ran, we may judge by the news of this morning, that Moolraj has denounced the Puthans in a body, and declared it lawful to kill them, wherever found. Sadik Mahomed Khan, who has returned to the south of the Chenab, with the Maharajghur force under Hakim Race, will, probably, fall a victim to this proclamation.

Dewan Moolraj's intentions are, I rather think, to keep his whole force as long out of the fort as he can, for his own security, having lost all confidence in them, though the Sikhs have again renewed their vows on the grunth. For this purpose, he has ordered them to Sooraj Koond, three coss from Mooltan, where a nullah, thirty or forty feet wide, which crosses the road, presents an obstacle impassable without boats, or pukka bridges. A heavy salute just fired proclaims (I expect) the occupation of this point by the rebels. It is an able move, and will embarrass us much; but some resource will, of course, turn up. I do not know that we could desire better than another general action in the plain, especially if the Dewan keeps to his promise of heading the troops himself. Under all circumstances, I have written to tell Lieutenant Lake to lose no time in joining the Nawab's army.

When we arrived here this morning, the fort of Secunderabad, which is about a coss from camp, was occupied by a garrison of Moolraj's, and a sowar of ours had his horse wounded by a shot from the walls, which he, too incautiously, approached. I, immediately, ordered six guns (four of the Nawab's, and two of General Cortlandt's), two companies of regular infantry, as many irregulars, and 300 cavalry, with orders to summon the garrison to surrender, and, if not complied with instantly, to batter in the gate. The demonstration sufficed the majority of the rebel sepoys absconded by a back door, and the rest surrendered. Much to their surprise, I gave the officers khulluts for their sensible conduct, and a good dinner to the sepoys, returning all their swords. The report of this treatment will shake the resolution, probably, of many soldiers now around Moolraj.



Mustapha Khan informs me that the battle of Kineyree diminished his muster roll (what with deaths and desertions) by upwards of 1200 We have put our own garrison into the Secunderabad Fort.

Sheik Emaamooddeen and Jowahir Mull Dutt have both requested permission to join me I have told the former to leave all his Sikhs in the district beyond Mulsee, and join me with all his Mussulmans, and the latter to come down as far as Moozuffnugger, on the west of the Chenab, nine coss from Mooltan, where I will give him further orders These precautions I have taken, not so much in case of any further collision in the plain (for which they will not be in time) as to enable me to blockade Mooltan effectually

I forgot to report that want of money obliged me to ask the Nawab of Bahawalpore for a loan of 40,000 or 50,000 rupees, which I did, without hesitation, as he now holds so much of the Mooltan country, He has, very kindly and courteously, promised to send the money.

Inclosure 8 in No 32

*Lieutenant Edwards to the Resident.*

*Camp, Adee Wallah Bagh, June 27, 1848*

AFTER writing to you, yesterday, a continual stream of ill-tidings poured in upon us all day The advance of Sirdar Shumshere Sing's force from Cheehawutnee was confirmed, and Bhaee Maharaj Sing was stated to have been sent from Mooltan, by Dewan Moolraj, to bring them The four guns of Sirdar Jhunda Sing's detachment, which you ordered off from Leia to Jhung, are said to have arrived at Raj Ghat to join Moolhaj, and two companies of Colonel Tara Sing's regiment at Leia were positively stated to have reached Mooltan Late in the evening, a letter came in from Lieutenant Taylor, giving a most unfavorable account of the state of the troops in Bunnoo, among whom conspiracy was at work, and the Colonel of the Sikh cavalry regiment had informed Lieutenant Taylor that his men intended to follow the example of their brethren in the Churumjeet corps at Leia To crown the whole, there appeared too much reason to believe that many of the Nawab's Daoodpotrias had stolen back to their home, since the battle of Kineyree, and that those who remain with us are, by no means, anxious for a second encounter.

Such an accumulation of difficulties, for a moment seemed to render any further advance impossible for the energy, loyalty, and even success, of one converging column would be but a waste of health and life, if all the others, instead of co-operating with their friends, were treacherously to go over to the enemy, at the very crisis of the campaign Retreat there would then, be none, and we should reach Mooltan as fresh victims, instead of avengers of the past

Reflecting, however, that the treachery attributed to the Cheehawutnee force, if really meditated, was not yet accomplished, that it might be arrested by our advance, but would certainly be hastened by our wavering, and that a second blow struck now at the rebels, before they can be reinforced, would drive them into the fort, and put us in a position to cut off all fresh comers, above all, remembering (as I do night and day) that the lives of all our officers in Bunnoo, Peshawur, and Hazara, depend on the speedy reduction of the rebellion to the smallest possible compass, and the complete humiliation of Moolhaj in the public eye, I, finally, resolved to make not a single halt, but trust to the justice of our cause, and the Providence which defends the right

This morning, accordingly, we marched, at day-break, from Secunderabad, with all our cavalry in advance, the infantry and guns in the centre, and the baggage in the rear of all, prepared to dispute the bridge at this point of the main road to Mooltan, should the enemy have advanced from Sooraj Koond in the night No opposition was, however, met with, and we have taken up a strong position on the banks of the canal, 9 coss from Mooltan

The news of this morning from that city is of a much more encouraging nature, and rather tends to show that Moolraj is under apprehensions from the Cheehawutnee force, but there is not a moment's reliance to be placed on any Sikh army whatever, and I heartily wish Raja Shere Sing and Sirdar Shumshere Sing, and all the Sings with them, were at this moment 200 miles off, and that

I was left alone to cope with Moolraj. It is now too late, however, for regrets. All that can be done is to meet the evil boldly, and I have again urged Sheik Emamooddeen to join me with all his Mussulmans, told Jowahir Mull Dutt to come down to Raj Ghat, and block up that approach, summoned General Cortlandt's Poorbeah regiment, and two guns, left behind at Dera Ghazee Khan, and hope to be able to seize Sooraj Koond ourselves to-morrow morning.

I expect Lieutenant Lake will join us to-morrow. His presence with the Daoodpotras will strengthen my hands much, and I may as well mention that the Nawab is sending up more men and military stores, so that, if any of his militia have gone back without leave, their places will be filled up by new comers, and this sort of fluctuation must, I suppose, be expected in an army composed of vassals, and not regularly-paid soldiers.

#### Inclosure 9 in No. 32

*The Resident at Lahore to the Secretary to the Government of India*

Lahore, June 30, 1848.

SOME parties connected with the late conspiracy to tamper with the troops of the garrison, have been seized within the last few days, and with them, a quantity of most important correspondence has fallen into our hands, showing the more influential parties concerned in the conspiracy, and tending to throw light on the origin of the circumstances which led to the rebellion in Mooltan.

A report of all the circumstances will be submitted to Government, when the investigations now in hand are closed.

In the meantime, I have to state, that the correspondence, if genuine, and it seems impossible that it should be otherwise, and other evidences prove, beyond a shadow of doubt the complicity of the Maharanee Junda Khore in the late conspiracy, and in other intrigues and machinations, having for their purpose the destruction of the British force, and the murder of the officers at Mooltan, and Lahore, and on the frontier.

The original letter of the Maharanee, in her own handwriting, we have got, and some important original letters intended for her, which were not delivered, owing to her sudden removal from Sheikhoopoor. There are also copies of the letters addressed to her, to which her letters are in many instances, replies.

It is of great importance that we should, if possible, get hold of the originals of the last described, the letters addressed to the Maharanee, and which, if not destroyed, will be in her possession. I would beg therefore, to suggest that, on her arrival at Benares, the greatest care should be taken to secure all her property and papers, that these should be examined in the presence of the Governor-General's Agent, the Commissioner, and the Magistrate, that the Maharanee should be even subjected to have her person, and those of her confidential slave women searched by respectable females, appointed for that purpose by the Governor-General's Agent, in communication with the Commissioner, and that all papers round be sealed up, and sent to Lahore.

I beg, further, to report, that I find, on inquiry, that when the Maharanee was removed from the palace to Sheikhoopoor last year she was allowed to take with her, property in cash, jewels, bullion, shawls, gold, horse and elephant trappings, military accoutrements, &c., belonging to the State, to an immense amount. Of this I had no notion, when I said that she might take her property with her to Benares. I believed that she had taken nothing but what might be considered as belonging to herself personally, to Sheikhoopoor.

Property of the kind described above, to the amount of many lakhs of rupees, besides one lakh and ten thousand rupees Nanukshahce, was left at Sheikhoopoor to follow her. When I discovered the nature of this property, and when the Durbar mentioned to me that it all belonged to the State, and not to herself, I had it conveyed to Lahore, and it is now being inspected, in presence of one of the assistants. I intend to send to Benares any that may be fairly considered as the personal property of the Maharanee, but the rest I shall place in the hands of the officers of the Maharajah.

The most valuable part of the property taken to Sheikhoopoor is stated, however, to be now with the Maharanee. A large elephant, heavily laden, in

charge of her most trusted slave woman, missed its way, on the night of the removal of the Maharanee, and came in nearly to Anarkullee, instead of going to Kana-Kuch, with the other baggage. This was reported to me at daylight in the morning, and I sent the elephant, with a guard, off to the camp.

The Maharanee expressed herself to Lieutenant Lumsden most anxious for the arrival of this elephant, and begged him, more than once, to send and see what had become of it, as she was put to inconvenience, by not having the services of the female attendant that accompanied it. On the arrival of the elephant, with its freight she seemed very much relieved, Lieutenant Lumsden said, and appeared afterwards content. It is now said that that elephant was laden with gold, and with jewels of the most costly description, to an immense amount.

The Durbar state that the Maharanee, upon one occasion after Raja Lal Sing's exile from Lahore, sent for some of the old state jewels to look at, and that she retained those described in the margin,\* which she has now with her, and which were (they say) in her own palkee, when she was taken from Sheikhoopoor to Feozepore, (thus may have been the cause of her great reluctance to travel in the carriage provided for her from Kana-Kuch, instead of in her palkee). The Durbar have requested that the Maharanee may be called on to restore those jewels.

I think that the whole of the property which accompanies the Maharanee should be taken charge of by the Governor-General's Agent, on the arrival of Her Highness at Benares, and that all articles belonging to the Lahore State should be attached, and returned to them.

But I would, further, propose, in consideration of the facts stated in the former part of this letter, that the confinement of the Maharanee, on reaching Benares, should be much more stringent than was at first intended, pending the orders of the Governor-General in Council on the result of the present investigation, and that, under all circumstances, as a state prisoner, she should not be allowed to have the command of wealth, of which she has, hitherto, not scrupled to make use to accomplish purposes the most treasonable, and to procure open violence and murder, and secret assassination.

I shall send instructions to Ensign Cox, and a copy of this letter to Major Macgregor, that he may be prepared for any orders he may receive, on the subject, from the Governor-General in Council.

Inclosure 10 in No. 32

*Lieutenant Eduardes to the Resident at Lahore.*

*Camp, Sooraj Koond, June 30, 1848.*

ON the morning of the 28th, we advanced from Adey Wallah Bagh to this place, five coss, of the most difficult country imaginable for troops, intersected as it is, with broad, deep, and elevated nullahs, only passable by bridges. The most highly disciplined army could scarcely fail to be thrown by them into confusion, and I could not but marvel, during the march, at the folly of Moolraj, in not turning his local knowledge to account, and attacking us among these dykes.

Sooraj Koond is between three and four coss from Mooltan, and, about half a coss to the east of it, and across the Mooltan road, runs an immense nullah, thirty feet broad, between banks ten feet high. The bridge over this was in possession of the enemy, who held it with four guns and from 1,000 to 1,500 men. At our approach, they destroyed the bridge, but remained ensconced behind the furthest bank, to act as an outlying picket, and convey intelligence of our movements to Moolraj. We pitched our camp south of the village, just out of the range of these guns, and proceeded to consider on which side of Mooltan we should finally advance, and pitch our standing camp.

It was reported, on our arrival, that Dewan Moolraj had determined to stand

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\* 1. One necklace of 103 very large pearls. 2. A pair of earrings (English manufacture), with one large emerald, and seven pearls in each. 3. A pearl necklace of two strings, containing 131 pearls, with carved emerald clasp and emerald drop, with Jowahir Sing's name engraved on it. 4. A pair of pearl bracelets of nine strings each, containing 732 pearls.

one more engagement in the plain, before he betook himself to the walls of his fort, and, as the soldiers refused to fight, unless he headed them himself, it, at first sight, appeared a highly favorable opportunity of deciding the rebellion. The most suspicious reports, also, were in circulation as to the disposition of the Sikh force under Raja Shere Sing, which, according to orders, should have been at Toolumba, but was said to have arrived within a few coss of Mooltan. Bhaee Maharaj Sing (it was added) had been deputed to go out, meet, and bring them in. Letters came in, in the course of the day, from the Raja and other Sardars commanding that force, and I sent the soldiers who brought them to eat a good dinner with General Cortlandt's Sikh orderlies, knowing that the result would be a disclosure of the real state of the Raja's camp. I am sorry to say that the account, thus obtained, fully justified, though it did not confirm, all the details of the report we had heard. Artillery regiments and Jagheedaree horse were all declared to be in favor of Moolraj, the very remarkable feeling among the Sikh being this: As a nation we are found out, the cloak is withdrawn from our designs, things have been prematurely hurried on, and concealment is no longer possible. As soon as the Mooltan affair is settled, the Sikh army will certainly be reduced as unsafe, and we shall all be thrown out of employ. Let us, therefore, prevent this rebellion from being settled. If Moolraj makes satisfactory arrangements with us, and will go all lengths for the religion, we will assist him, if he does not, we will not assist in reducing him. We will fire over the heads of his soldiers. If the Sardars oppose us, we will tie their hands behind them, and send them to Moolraj—Very similar reports reached us of the Sikh portion of Sheik Emamooddeen's force, and it became apparent that the unhappy re-appearance of the Sikh Gooroo at Mooltan had revived the spirits of all the disaffected, who had not been actually involved in the defeat at Kinneyree. While, therefore, Moolraj's own troops were depressed, and unwilling to fight again, recruits were coming in, with fresh courage, from the Manjha, and overtures from every Sirkaree army, except ours, now converging against Mooltan. The question then arose. could we, by forcing the broad nullah in front of us, and advancing on Mooltan by the eastward, strike another, and decisive, blow at the rebels, before things grow worse, and they are reinforced by desertion from Shere Sing's army and the Sheik's?

Lieutenant Lake, (who joined us yesterday, having ridden in from Bahawalpore, in expectation of a battle), General Cortlandt, and some of my Puthan officers, were of opinion that we should secure an immediate engagement by crossing the nullah, but the majority argued that, if Moolraj was anxious for a fight, he would not have destroyed the only bridge at which we could cross, that, until reinforced by very large desertions, he was so numerically inferior as to be unable to run so great a risk, that all his anxiety was to prevent our crossing the nullah, that if we effected the passage, he would immediately retreat into Mooltan, and we should be committed as it were to take up our stand on the worst side of Mooltan, where there is no ground suitable for a camp, and no grass for the cavalry. These arguments seemed to me good, and were coincided in, also, by both Lieutenant Lake and General Cortlandt, so that we finally resolved not to attempt to cross the nullah, but make for Abid Khanke-Bagh, directly west of the city of Mooltan, and there take up a permanent position, which should command Raj Ghat, and all our relations with the Sind Sagur Doab, and territories Trans Indus.

Sheik Emamooddeen's force had arrived within twelve coss of us, and was too weak to be left any longer alone. so we halted, yesterday, to allow them to come up, and they reached Bahawalpore, about four coss to the south of us, that same morning. Unfortunately, then line of march had brought them to Moolraj's side of the nullah, instead of ours, and it was necessary to take immediate steps to extricate them from their dangerous proximity to the rebels; five coss from Mooltan; with nothing between them and the enemy, and a wide nullah cutting them off from their friends. I sent a strong party, immediately, to raise the villagers, and construct a bridge for the Sheik's passage, but about 5 P.M. our spies reported that Moolraj's troops were moving down the east side of the nullah towards Bahawalpore. Great was our anxiety, and I thought it necessary to send two regiments under General Cortlandt, to the Sheik's assistance. The night came on, stormy and dark; the detachment lost their way, and wandered about the jungle till day-light, when they found that the bridge had been completed in sufficient time to allow the Sheik's troops to cross over

before night fall, and all parties came safely into camp at Sooraj Koond, this morning. The rebels finding the birds flown, returned to Mooltan.

To-morrow morning, we intend to go half-way to Abid-Khan-ke-Bagh, and there are rumours of the Dewan fighting us, the Sikh Gooroo having fixed to-morrow as an auspicious day.

Inclosure 11 in No 32

*The Commander-in-Chief to the Governor-General of India in Council.*

*Simla, July 1, 1848.*

I DO not feel justified in taking upon myself the responsibility of sending such a force as that now proposed by the Resident\*.

Although I should much prefer the plan of operations hitherto contemplated, still, if your Lordship in Council should decide on an immediate movement, the following is the smallest force I would recommend

A brigade of infantry, to move from Lahore, consisting of one European and two Native regiments of infantry, and a Native troop of horse artillery, to be replaced by an European troop, if deemed necessary

Lahore to be strengthened, during the absence of this brigade, by the wing of the 14th from Ferozepore

A brigade of infantry, to move from Ferozepore, consisting of one European and three Native regiments, the European regiment to be replaced by the 98th from Umballa, and one Native regiment to be moved up from Loodiana

A brigade of cavalry, to be composed of the 11th Light Cavalry, the 11th and 13th Irregular Cavalry—the two first are at Ferozepore, the last at Mukho. to replace these, I would move up the 8th Light Cavalry from Loodiana to Ferozepore, and the 5th Irregular Cavalry from Meerut to Mukho

This brigade of cavalry to be accompanied by the Native troop of Horse Artillery from Ferozepore

The foot artillery, to accompany the siege train down the Sutlej, to consist of the reserve companies from Umballa, Loodiana, and Ferozepore, joined by one from Subathoo

Inclosure 12 in No 32

*The Commander-in-Chief to the Resident at Lahore*

*Simla, July 1, 1848.*

I BEG leave to state, that I cannot see anything, in the altered position of affairs, which would justify me in taking upon myself the siege of Mooltan, at the present moment. On the contrary, the success of Lieutenant Edwardes renders it less necessary, in my opinion, to risk the lives of the European soldiers, at this season.

Moolraj is shut up in his fort—all, I take it, that was contemplated by the movement of the Bahawalpore force, and that under Lieutenant Edwardes

The revenues of the whole country will now be collected by us, whilst the Dewan's disheartened followers will, undoubtedly, it may be expected, daily desert from him, and his means of paying and feeding them have been, by the recent events, greatly lessened, if not wholly prevented

Rebellion, although still existing, has been shorn of its worst feature—the probability of extending itself, and I cannot contemplate that the complete success of all your combinations can produce the evil you now apprehend, from the forces of the Bahawalpore Nawab and Lieutenant Edwardes remaining in contact. I should conceive that ample employment to occupy their time and thoughts may easily be found, until the proper season for military operations shall arrive.

Having a very high opinion of Major Napier's professional knowledge, I communicated with him, when, first, the question of attacking Mooltan was

\* Inclosures 5 and 6 in No. 30.

mooted ; but there are many points in undertaking military operations, on which an engineer officer's opinion cannot be considered definitive.

The force now proposed by Major Napier, and apparently assented to by you, I consider quite inadequate. I never could consent to an insufficient force, such as one brigade, of any strength, being sent

I have always understood from you, that both the Sikh army and Sikh population are disaffected, and should be guarded against. I take it that these objections to weakening our force at Lahore, and on the frontier, still exist. The movement of a siege train under those contingencies, with so insufficient an escort as a brigade, would, in my mind, be a most impolitic measure.

The supposition, from recent enquiries, that the neighbourhood of Mooltan is not so inundated as you supposed, would make the undertaking of a siege less difficult. That it could be attacked from the town side, as proposed by Major Napier, was always self evident, as the town itself could not be supposed to be under water, but it must be remembered, that this would conduce to two operations—the taking of the town itself as a preparatory one—always inadvisable when it can be avoided, as, in such attacks, discipline is rendered almost nugatory.

A siege train must be accompanied by a proportionate force of reserve artillery, four companies would be the least that would be required for the train of thirty pieces proposed by Major Napier, one of these companies would have to move from Subathoo

By the Deputy Commissary-General's letter which I forwarded to you some time back, the transport train bullocks would have to come from Cawnpore. I am not aware what the Durbar could collect. Elephants, without harness and unaccustomed to draught, would be of little use, except as an aid in helping guns out of difficulties.

I always understood that the carts at Bahawalpore, and I take it on the other side of Sutlej also, are not calculated for the carriage of the siege material.

With regard to Commissariat supplies, I only know that, whatever force moves at present, we shall have to look to the Durbar for everything for them.

If the services of Major Napier are disposable for the duty, he might proceed with the force as Chief Engineer.

#### Inclosure 13 in No. 32

*The Resident at Lahore to the Secretary to the Government of India*

*Lahore, July 5, 1848*

I FORWARD two letters from Lieutenant Edwardes, dated respectively, the 26th and 27th ultimo, received together on the 31st instant.

The reports referred to by Lieutenant Edwardes, were mostly without foundation.

The Sikh troops are doubtless not to be relied on, but the only desertions not hitherto reported, that have taken place, that I have heard of, are of a party of nearly 400, from Sheik Emamooddeen's newly raised levies.

I doubt not I shall have to report a further collision between the troops of Lieutenant Edwardes and Bahawal Khan, with those of Dewan Moolraj, and I trust with a similar result.

#### Inclosure 14 in No. 32

*Lieutenant Edwardes to the Resident at Lahore*

*Camp, Tibbee, 2 coss south-west of Mooltan, July 2, 1848.*

MY hasty note of yesterday evening will have gratified you with the intelligence of the battle of Suddoosan, the second general action, and second victory, which this force has fought, and gained, within a fortnight. I now proceed to give you the details.

Sheik Emamooddeen's division having joined us on the 30th of June, we

marched on the 1st of July (yesterday) to this place, which is about three coss. To make a longer march was not possible, for we have heard that the Sikh Goorjoo, with great forms and ceremonies, had consulted the stars, and fixed yesterday as the happy day, when Dewan Moolraj would be invincible. Inspired with this assurance, Moolraj resolved to fight, and laid his plan, to come down to the bridge at Sooraj Koond, and play his guns from behind the high banks of the nullah, on our camp. Knowing that if he did so, we should be unable to get at him from want of bridges, and that if a gun was fired on us, it would look ill to decline an engagement, we resolved to strike our camp, and march, with the first dawn, three or four coss nearer to Mooltan, on the west of the nullah, and, by thus threatening the city, prevent the rebels from attacking us in rear.

This plan was pursued, and the whole of our infantry and artillery, under command of General Cortlandt, in order of battle, marched to Tibbee, yesterday morning, the baggage of the army being in the centre, behind the infantry, and Lieutenant Lake and I bringing up the rear, with all the cavalry. The expected attack from the Sooraj Koond bridge did not take place, and when, at 11 A M we reached Tibbee, with the rear guard, the van had received intelligence that Moolraj no sooner had comprehended our move, than he changed his own, recalled his troops from the Sooraj Koond bridge, and, marching them parallel with us on the other side of the nullah, concealed by the banks, crossed the water, at a masonry bridge in front of the city of Mooltan, and emerged on the plain, a coss and a half in front of us.

At first, we could scarcely believe that the rebels intended to force on a battle at midday, after their morning's manoeuvres, and thought they would merely take up such a position as to prevent our approaching too closely to Mooltan. But, messenger after messenger brought in word that they were advancing in line, and at last our pickets retired, with the news that they were close at hand. This was at noon.

We beat to arms, turned out, formed line, and advanced to meet them in the following order: the Daoodpotia force on the right, commanded by Lieutenant Lake, Mooltan Khan's Mussulman regiment, the Sooraj Mookhee regiment, and General Cortlandt's ten guns, in the centre, commanded by the General, my own Puthan infantry levies, on the left centre, flanked by my Puthan cavalry; and, on the left of all, Sheik Emamooddeen's troops, of whose fidelity I was doubtful, and whom I determined to watch closely.

Lieutenant Lake, seeing some high mounds (the ruins of an old canal) in front of him, with great judgment, hurried on, and took possession of them with his Daoodpotias, planting his guns securely behind this natural entrenchment, and, from this commanding position, commenced the action by a heavy fire on the enemy's left, which was as heavily returned, but was rendered harmless by the protection of the ground.

The Daoodpotias had been engaged about a quarter of an hour, when the centre and left overtook them and drew off the enemy's fire. The battle then became general, General Cortlandt's artillery in the centre, the Daoodpotias on the right, and Sheik Emamooddeen's two guns, being all brought to bear upon the enemy, who selected his ground at the village of Suddoosam, with that defensive cunning for which Sikh soldiers are renowned, planting almost the whole line under jungle cover, and the artillery strongly ensconced in mud villages and date tree groves. A pause, and severe artillery struggle, ensued, during which, the infantry, of both sides, lay down behind ditches, in line.

The enemy were variously stated to have had 7, 8, 9, 10, 11, and 12 guns, but the best accounts say 10. It was impossible therefore for them long to sustain the superior fire of 22, which were brought into action on our side; though justice requires me to pay the tribute of admiration to the obstinacy with which Moolraj's Sikh artillerymen stood their ground. Once moved, the day was ours, for the native army that retires is lost. Proximity to the city, however, and the knowledge that they could always take refuge there, added to the desperate courage which Bhaee Maharaj Singh's solemn blessings and promises of victory had inspired in the rebel army; and the rest of the action was a series of struggles in which the rebels were driven back from village to village, grove to grove, and their total rout was much delayed by the nullahs and ditches, with which the ground was intersected; the bridges and fords of which were known to the enemy, but not to us. Sheik Emamooddeen's two guns were thus put

*hors-de-combat* very early in the day, and the Daoodpotras were unable, until very late, to extricate their artillery again from the banks of the canal which they first occupied, so that, during the greater part of the day, the artillery on both sides was equal.

At last, Dewan Moolraj, who commanded in person, and who is said to have got a fall from his elephant by a shot catching the howdah, mounted his horse, and retreated precipitately from the field, carrying with him all the guns but two, which remained to mask the movement, and were most desperately served. The Sooraj Mookee regiment of infantry finally decided the day, by a most brilliant charge against these two guns, which they captured in a style which British troops alone could excel. They were led on by Mr. Quinn, my writer, a young man, but old soldier, whose conspicuous bravery deserves special notice. A rush of the whole infantry and cavalry followed, and the broken enemy fled from the hard-fought field in irrecoverable disorder.

Almost under the walls of Mooltan, I halted our fatigued troops, and, the failing daylight not permitting us to ascertain whether we were under the fire of the fort or not, I thought it best to return to our own camp.

The highest estimate of the rebel numbers does not make them above 12,000, and I scarcely think they were 11,000, though they left hardly any men in the fort, and have been reinforced by large desertions, during the last three days, from the forces of Sheik Emamooddeen and Raja Shere Sing, but the majority of Moolraj's troops are old soldiers, many deserters who fight with halts round their necks, and two-thirds Sikh and Hindoo fanatics, to whom it has become a war of faith to uphold the Khalsa and their Kutrec master. The desperation, therefore, with which they fought, more than counterbalanced the difference of numbers, and I attribute our victory, entirely, to each division of our host, being led and sustained by European officers. Lieutenant Lake will himself give you an account of the share taken in the battle by the Daoodpotras, but it is for me to inform you how much their good service was due to the judgment with which he took up their successive positions, and the confidence which they could not but imbibe from witnessing his personal intrepidity under the hottest fire. To him, and General Cortlandt, your warmest praise is due. The latter maintained a solid and unshaken centre throughout the day, and handled his regular regiments and artillery, like a good soldier and brave man. Sheik Emamooddeen's troops were hardly engaged at all, though his return shows a list of eighty-one killed and wounded. Several of the Puthan Chiefs made dashing charges against Moolraj's cavalry, whenever they showed themselves, amongst them I could distinguish Gholam Sirwur Khan Khagwanec who killed several Sikhs with his own hand, and was shot through both bones of his right arm, in the midst of the enemy's line. To Foujdur Khan Alizye, who has, throughout these operations, acted as my Adjutant-General, and who, in spite of a severe sword wound received at Kineyree on the 18th of June, took command of the cavalry, yesterday, at Suddoosain, and directed their movements, I feel under the greatest obligation, and, at some future time, shall lay his services more particularly before you.

We lost some few Puthans of note, Futteh Khan of Khyssore, Hussun Khan, Mooshezye, and Ruheem Khan, Khoodukka, a relation of the Nawab of Dera, all brave men, who will be remembered on this frontier with regret.

In Lieutenant Lake's force, Captain McPherson of His Highness the Nawab of Bahawulpore's service, fell, at the head of his regiment, and we buried him this morning with military honors.

The total of killed and wounded in the whole force, is 281.

The enemy are said to have suffered very heavy loss, increased by a cruel and treacherous act of the Dewan's. Between the field and the city runs the same large nullah on which we were encamped at Sooraj Koond, and there is but one bridge at that part of it which is nearest Suddoosain. No sooner had Moolraj got across this bridge himself with his artillery, than he planted two guns on it to stop his own soldiers from retreating. The majority of the enraged fugitives forced the barrier with some loss, but many of them tried to swim the nullah, and were drowned. Hundreds never re-entered Mooltan, but struck off into the country, and have gone, probably, to their homes. Of 400 Goorkas (who deserted our officers), only 150 answered to their names again at Mooltan. Moolraj's courage, however, seems to remain unbroken. This morning, he mustered his soldiers, invited them to go out with him again to fight, and



a poor parade was got up, when the kettle-drums of our cavalry (who in a body swept round the country this morning to reconnoitre), were heard approaching the city, and the soldiers left their ranks in confusion. Baffled, but not disheartened, Moolraj is said to have again consulted the stars, and fixed another "auspicious day" for to-morrow. It remains to be seen whether he can induce his army to come out.

Peer Buksh Adawlutee, the worst, and most influential, adviser of Moolraj, received a severe sword cut across the back while flying from Suddoosain, from the hand of one of his own men, a Sikh, who declared that Peer Buksh had sold the day to the Sahib log. This incident, and Moolraj's firing on his own troops at the bridge, gives a very fair idea of the dissension and distrust which pervades the rebel army. They are, indeed, only held together by the fanatic cry of "Dhurum," so artfully introduced into the contest. Unfortunately, experience proves that it is the strongest tie by which natives can be bound.

Inclosure 15 in No. 32.

*Lieutenant Lake to the Resident at Lahore*

*Camp, Tibbee, 2 coss from Mooltan, July 2, 1848.*

NAWAB BAHAWUL KHAN'S army, yesterday, took part in an engagement fought against the rebel troops, headed by Dewan Moolraj in person.

At twelve o'clock, it was reported that the enemy was marching ~~in~~ force against us, and that our pickets had been driven in. We immediately moved to their support, and fell into position. I directed the Nawab's troops to occupy some high ground on the right of our line, which not only afforded them the advantage of cover, but enabled their guns to fire from a considerable elevation down into the plain. This was a matter of no small importance, in a country abounding with brush-wood, behind which the enemy were seen with difficulty.

The action was commenced by the Bahawulpore artillery, who opened a steady and well-directed fire on Moolraj's advancing line. This fire was continued, until Lieutenant Edwardes had advanced to some distance beyond my position. The Daoodpotras, and regular infantry, then came forward and engaged with the enemy's left, in support of Lieutenant Edwardes, who had attacked the enemy's right and centre. The Dewan's left had occupied a small village, under the cover of which they served their guns, and from which I found it was impossible to dislodge them, without the assistance of artillery. Unfortunately, some delay occurred in bringing up the guns. At length, however, their arrival enabled me to drive the enemy out of this position, and to bring a heavy fire upon the last point at which he seemed inclined to make a stand. Shortly afterwards, a brilliant charge, made by General Cortlandt's regiments, fairly drove the rebels back, and they fled in great confusion. The battle was severely contested to the last.

All branches of the Bahawulpore army behaved well. The infantry advanced steadily from point to point, and were never beaten back, although, at times, the heavy fire of the enemy forced them to halt, the artillery served their guns admirably; and the cavalry checked a body of Sikh horse, who had been sent to outflank our position.

Peer Ibraheem Khan, the Government agent, was present during the whole of the action, and was of great service in bringing up the guns, which had delayed coming up in support of the infantry.

I annex a return of killed and wounded, among the former, I regret to say, are Shah Mahomed Khan, a Daoodpotra, of some distinction, and Captain Macpherson, the Commandant of one of the Nawab's regular regiments.

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## Inclosure 16 in No. 32.

*Lieutenant Edwardes to the Resident at Lahore.**Camp, Tibbee, 2 coss from the city of Mooltan,  
July 3, 1848.*

DEWAN MOOLRAJ'S army were in no condition this morning to avail themselves of the "Mahoorut" fixed by the Brahmins and the stars, both of which authorities have fallen into disrepute since the battle at Suddoosain. I have not even heard the great Gooroo's name mentioned during the last two days, and conclude he is going over his calculations again, to see where he made the mistake.

The Dewan has slept in the fort the last two nights for security, and passed the days in a shivallah in the city. His troops have been collecting the dead carrion off the field, and dragging up the drowned from the nullah under the city walls. All have been burnt, and, the Adjutant of the traitor Goorka regiment having been killed, his wife performed the rite of Suttee on his funeral pile.

For the present, at least, it is clear that the rebels have resigned all pretensions to the plain, and are limiting their operations to the defence of the city and fort. At the bridge over the nullah they have planted six guns, and lined the nullah bank nearest the city with zumboorahs. Between the city and the said bridge, also, they have erected a battery on a natural eminence, called Ali Mahomed Khan Badozye Reejah, from the house of that Puthan chief being situated thereon, and knocked down to make way for the guns. In the fort they are casting more guns, and, of course, these preparations will continue, as long as ever the advance of the British siege train is delayed.

I trust that it will not be thought presumptuous on my part to moot again the settled question of immediate action, or delay till the cold weather, but the enemy is now reduced to so humble a position, is so hemmed in, disheartened by defeats, and weakened by desertions, since the last battle, that we all here feel it would be matter for great regret, if you should not bring to bear on the rebellion, at once, the very little extra impulse which is required to end it.

Such is the state of feeling now in the rebel army, that I am quite confident the announcement of a British brigade and heavy train leaving Lahore or Ferozepore for Mooltan, would be the signal for so great a desertion, as would leave the fort in a hopeless state of indefensibility. Even the Sikhs have been shaken by this last thrashing, and large numbers of them threw their arms into the nullah, and, divesting themselves of every appearance of soldiers, returned again to the Manjha. To lose so favorable an opportunity of avoiding a siege, by a simple demonstration, would be courting difficulties, and the conduct of the Sikh troops during the delay, which has already taken place, and whose danger has been merely counteracted by our successes at Kineyree and Suddoosain, warn us, in an unmistakeable language, to take "fortune at the flood," and not give another two months to the Khalsa, wherein to forget Moolraj's disasters, and take up the broken threads of their wide-spread web of mutiny.

It is generally said that many deserters from Raja Shere Sing's force fought against us at Suddoosain; but fled again after the battle, astonished at finding that their hero, "Moalla," was but a Bunyah after all, and not an incarnation. Now then is the time to strike; and it is quite painful to me to see that I have reached the end of my tether, and can do no more. Here we are, upwards of 18,000 men, completely thrown away, eating up the revenues of the country, which might be employed to purposes of peace, at a time too, when the State is bankrupt. I have hard work, I assure you, to feed and pay this army, and, in every point of view, think it would be well to bring their occupation to a speedy end, by vigorously following up the advantages they have gained. Heavy guns and mortars, sappers and miners, two European and two Native regiments, a young brigadier, and a smart engineer staff, supported by three good Native regiments and a General Cortlandt, and my irregular hordes to scour the country round, would close Moolraj's account within a fortnight, and obviate the necessity of assembling 50,000 men in October.

Now that we are at Mooltan, the inclemency of the season is no longer an argument against sending Europeans, for I will undertake to dry the nullah, and put them under cover, in the city of Mooltan, within forty-eight hours after their

arrival They could come from Lahore in boats down the Ravee and Chenab, in a week

4th of July I had written thus far, yesterday, when a false alarm from the picket in our front, caused the whole line to turn out, and, in the hurry of thrusting my pistols into my belt, one of them accidentally went off, and the ball passing through my right hand lacerated it severely, but I believe no bones are broken It is unfortunate, however, at this crisis, as it entirely disables me from handling either a sword or a pen Mi Quin, my writer, now writes this, from my dictation I am happy to observe that you have fully anticipated the necessity of the immediate move of British troops and heavy guns, above recommended

It will, certainly, be the best plan for those troops that are to come from Lahore, including Her Majesty's 10th foot, to pursue the route of the Ravee and Chenab, and those that are to come from Ferozepore, with the heavy guns, to come down the Sutlej, to the Ghat opposite to Bahawalpore on the right bank, and march from thence to Mooltan The position of our force here equally covers the approach of both

I have made over all the Mooltan districts which are not held by the Kardars of the Nawab of Bahawalpore, to the charge of General Cortlandt, who has, this day, issued orders to the respective Kaidas to collect and feed good sheep for the Europeans At this time of the year the grass fed sheep are in excellent condition

The heat of the weather here is certainly, not of that intensity which we were led to expect I should think that many houses at Lahore, and perhaps the barracks, now occupied by the Europeans, must be quite as hot as this.

Raja Shere Sing's army has been, and still is, a source of great anxiety to me. Without orders, as far as I can make out, the Raja seems to have advanced from Toolumba, and, though I have repeatedly requested him to halt, he has now advanced as far as Gogran, six coss from the city of Mooltan I, at first, thought this was attributable to the Raja having no command over his men, and the latter being determined to join Moolraj, but I find that the Raja has made severe examples of one or two soldiers in his camp who gave license to their tongues, and I now believe that his march upon Mooltan is owing to the sanguine hopes raised by the successes of our force, that Moolraj himself would speedily surrender, and still more to the eager desire of the Raja and the other Sirdars along with him, to prove their own freedom from disaffection This very morning, also, I have been informed that the 200 Sikhs who, some days ago, joined Moolraj, as it was then said, from Raja Shere Sing's camp, were, in reality, the re-assembled remnant of Bhaer Maharaj Sing's scattered followers Of the secret disaffection of the Sikh troops of Raja Shere Sing, it would be weakness to doubt, after the proofs we have lately had, that no amount of generosity, moderation, justice, and impartial administration, which the British Government could bestow, can ever conciliate the goodwill of the Runjeet generation

But the jagheers of the Goorchurras are tolerably good securities for their keeping their opinions to themselves, at least, until some opportunity presents itself of revolting with success. The present plight of Dewan Moolraj does not offer so decided an encouragement, and I hear that he, yesterday, informed his officers that his resources were exhausted, that he could neither lavish on them rewards, or even give them their pay, that those who were not prepared to fight for their mere religion, had better leave him, many are said to have taken him at his word Under these circumstances, the danger to be anticipated of Raja Shere Sing's force joining the enemy's, is very much diminished. Another danger, however, has risen in its place Supposing Raja Shere Sing's army to be true, it becomes the enemy of Dewan Moolraj, and the latter's interest to destroy it, and, should the rebels move against the Raja, with the city of Mooltan between him and us, we should not be able to go to his assistance, and he would, infallibly, be defeated, and lose his guns I cannot, therefore, leave the Raja exposed alone at Gogran, neither can I order him back, and I have been obliged, therefore, quite against my own will and judgment, to extricate him from his peril, by ordering him to join me Even this he cannot do, without crossing the wide nullah which divides us from Mooltan; and I shall not be free from very great apprehension on his account, until he has crossed this obstacle without a collision.

Inclosure 17 in No 32.

*Lieutenant Lake to the Resident at Lahore.*

*Camp, Tibbee, 2 coss from Mooltan, July 6, 1848.*

I AM glad to learn that you consider it desirable to move, at once, with British troops against the fort of Mooltan

The battle of Suddoosain will, doubtless, confirm you in those views, for it has reduced the rebel Moolraj to so abject a condition, and made his followers so dispirited, that no combination of circumstances would render him less formidable than he is now. His cause is now wholly despaired of, large numbers of his adherents are daily deserting him, even the so-called Bhacc Maharaj Sing has thought it prudent to decamp, and the news of a British force being on its way to Mooltan will be enough to disperse those who are still wavering. Those who fight with halters round their necks, will, of course, cling to him to the last.

Not only the state of Moolraj's force, but that of our own, makes it incumbent upon us to act immediately. The main strength of this army (as you are, perhaps, aware) is the regular regiments. Hitherto, they have shown no symptoms of dissatisfaction, but, as Moolraj spares no efforts to corrupt them (and they will shortly be joined by Raja Sher Singh's force, whose fidelity is questionable), it would be in the highest degree imprudent to leave them inactive for the next three months, in the immediate vicinity of Mooltan. As for the irregular Puthan levies, their fidelity is to be depended upon, so long as Lieutenant Edwardes is present to guide them; at the same time, it must not be forgotten, that they are mere mercenary troops; that the personal attachment they feel for Lieutenant Edwardes, and the success which has hitherto attended their efforts, are the only links which bind them to our cause. The Bahawalpore troops are, as you know, inexperienced, and badly paid, and, although there is no fear of the Daoodpotias going over to the enemy, there is every probability of their returning to their homes, if the contest is a very protracted one.

It is hardly necessary for me to dwell upon the evils of inactivity, the courage and confidence which it cannot fail to give the enemy, the distrust it must inspire among our own men, the great anarchy and disorder which must prevail in the districts of Mooltan until the capture of the fort, besides the great expense of keeping so large an army in the field.

All these are arguments, not only for sending a British force to Mooltan, but such a force as will bring the matter to a speedy conclusion. Nine thousand men will take more time to move than three thousand, but the time lost by the former, in arriving at the point of action, will be more than saved, after they have once begun operations.

Neither do I see any reason why siege operations should be impeded, as, from all I can learn, inundations are confined to the north side of the fort, and the west side of the city. On the east and south, the ground is comparatively high, and is in no way affected by the water in the surrounding canals and drains. Of four gates which the fort contains, the Khudree is the only one which will be inaccessible from water. In front of three other gates, and on the city side, is some very high ground, which is not only above the reach of inundation, but on a level with the fort itself. There is no reason why the attack should not be made from this quarter.

It must not be forgotten that these inundations are produced by the river, and not by the rains, and that there is every probability of the river containing more water in October than July. If, therefore, the extent of this inundation is to prevent us acting in July, it will equally prevent us in October.

The ground on which the fort is built is said to contain 300 biggahs of land, within this area there is not only an outer but an inner inclosure; the space within, for the location and movement of troops, must, therefore, be contracted, under these circumstances the advantage of bringing a number of mortars is evident.

I regret that I am unable to furnish you with a more detailed account of the fort, as the distance which we still are from Mooltan, makes me dependent upon others for information.

## Inclosure 18 in No. 32

*Lieutenant Edwardes to the Resident at Lahore.**Camp, Tibbee, 2 coss from Mooltan, July 7, 1848.*

IT is impossible to help coming to the conclusion that this bugbear of inundation has been carefully disseminated at Lahore by the friends of Moolraj, and the enemies of the State, to delay the vengeance of the British Government, and give the disaffected time to mature their plans, and ripen the rebellion of Mooltan, into a second Punjab war. Our engineers may rest assured that they will find, in whatever month they arrive before Mooltan, "ample room and verge enough" for their scientific operations, and all that they will gain by delay will be an increase in the number of their enemies, more batteries and fortifications day by day strengthened to oppose them.

I have quite made up my own mind, from report, as to which is the most vulnerable side of the fort and city, and have carefully abstained from going near it, pitching our camp upon the most formidable side of Mooltan, and thereby inducing the Dewan to exhaust his attention and resources at a point which will, probably, never be assailed.

## Inclosure 19 in No. 32

*The Secretary to the Government of India to the Resident at Lahore**Fort William, July 8, 1848.*

THE account\* of the successful action fought by Lieutenant Edwardes and the troops of the Nawab Bahawal Khan, against the rebel force of Dewan Moolraj, on the 18th of June, has afforded the highest satisfaction to the Governor-General in Council, and his Lordship in Council desires me to convey to you, and to request that you will communicate to Lieutenant Edwardes, the cordial expression of the approbation with which the Government of India have regarded his proceedings, their recognition of the foresight and skill by which he effected a junction with the Nawab's troops, and their high sense of the steady gallantry by which he made good his opportunity, and achieved the important success which merits these thanks.

His Lordship in Council desires, also, that his acknowledgments of their services may be made known to General Cortlandt, and to the Nawab of Bahawalpore, and to all the troops engaged in the action at Kineyree.

## Inclosure 20 in No. 32.

*Lieutenant Lake to the Resident at Lahore.**Camp, Tibbee, July 9, 1848.*

LIEUTENANT CHRISTOPHER, of the Indian navy, has this day joined our camp, and, in consultation with him, Lieutenant Edwardes has determined upon the propriety of bringing a steamer up the Chenab to Mooltan. It is calculated that this steamer will be very useful in assisting the transit of troops which may join us by the way of the Ravee and Chenab.

At the same time, Lieutenant Christopher (who has considerable experience of the Punjab rivers) is of opinion that the Ravee is not well adapted for the conveyance of troops after the month of August, and is, in this respect, much inferior to the Sutlej.

\* Inclosure 24 in No. 29.

## Inclosure 21 in No. 32.

*The Resident at Lahore to the Secretary to the Government of India**Lahore, July 10, 1848*

IT is with much gratification that I forward the correspondence relative to another complete victory\*, obtained by the combined forces of Lieutenant Edwardes and Nawab Bahawal Khan, on the afternoon of the 1st instant, over the troops of the rebel Dewan Moolraj.

His Lordship in Council will, I am sure, admire the gallantry, skill, energy, and judgment of Lieutenants Edwardes and Lake, displayed on this occasion, and will consider those officers, and the troops under their command, as deserving his approbation and commendation.

## Inclosure 22 in No. 32.

*The Resident at Lahore to Lieutenant Edwardes.**Lahore, July 10, 1848.*

IT falls to the lot of few men to have the opportunity of rendering such brilliant and useful service to their country as you have been enabled to perform, and the gallantry, energy, skill, and self-devotion with which you have gloriously improved the opportunity afforded you, must command the admiration, while the great value of the services effected, will call forth the grateful thanks, of the Governor-General of India in Council, as they do, in an eminent degree, my own.

You have, indeed, performed most eminent and valuable service which his Lordship in Council will, I am sure, appreciate as I do, and will greet with the same hearty acknowledgment.

This second victory is a very important one. It will, I doubt not, have the effect of disheartening the followers and the partisans, open and secret, of the rebel Moolraj; and of enabling you to confine him and his remaining army to the city and fort, till a British force shall put a period to the rebellion by crushing him in his stronghold.

I shall address your gallant companion, Lieutenant Lake, separately, in reply to his letter reporting the victory, and the conduct, of the troops of our ally, the Nawab of Bahawalpore.

General Cortlandt has again distinguished himself, his skill in managing his troops, and his intrepidity in action, are in the highest degree creditable to him, and entitle him to the warmest thanks of the Maharajah and myself.

Your account of Mr. Quin's gallant conduct is highly satisfactory, and I shall take care that the excellent service which he has so heroically rendered to the Government, on this occasion, does not pass unnoticed, or unrewarded.

To Gholam Sirwur Khan, Khagwanee, whose personal prowess you speak of in terms of praise, my admiration and thanks are due; as also to Fouzdar Khan, Alizye, who, though still suffering from the wound he received in the action at Kineyree, while gallantly charging the enemy's cavalry, was again at your side at Suddoosain, commanding your cavalry, and rendering you excellent service.

I request that to the above officers especially, and to all the officers and soldiers who fought with you on this occasion, you will communicate the assurance of my approbation and grateful thanks.

The Durbar have, at my instigation, addressed a purwanna to the officers and men of General Cortlandt's regiment, and have, in a proclamation to the troops of their army, spoken of the conduct and services of these corps in terms which will, I trust, be gratifying to them; while it is to be hoped that their conduct, with its reward, may have the effect of stimulating the other Durbar troops to the exhibition of similar fidelity to the Government.

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\* Inclosure 14 in No. 32.

## Inclosure 23 in No. 32.

*The Resident at Lahore to Lieutenant Lake.**Lahore, July 10, 1848.*

I HAVE received the description of this second victory gained by the force of our ally, Nawab Bahawal Khan, assisted by that under Lieutenant Edwardes, with the highest satisfaction

I have addressed to His Highness the Nawab congratulatory letters, on this second occasion of his army's distinguished success

While I request that you will communicate to Futteh Mahomed Khan Ghoree, and the officers of the force, my appreciation of their courage and services, I feel that to yourself my thanks and admiration are peculiarly due, for the skill and gallantry with which you directed the movements and operations of the force, to which Lieutenant Edwardes bears such ample testimony, and to which the success of the Bahawalpore army is in an eminent degree attributable

I am satisfied that the Governor-General in Council will appreciate and acknowledge the great value of your services on this important occasion.

I request you will tender my thanks to Peer Ibraheem Khan, and assure him of the high estimation I entertain for his courage and conduct, not only on the field of Suddoosam, but in all the proceedings that have taken place connected with these operations.

I regret very much the death of Captain Macpherson, and of the other officers of the Nawab, killed in this action

## Inclosure 24 in No. 32.

*The Resident at Lahore to the Secretary to the Government of India.**Lahore, July 10, 1848.*

I FORWARD a correspondence which has, this day, passed between Major-General Whish, C B, and myself, regarding the immediate movement of troops, and a siege tram, on Mooltan

I have been induced to take upon myself the responsibility of this movement, notwithstanding the remarks contained in the letter of the Commander-in-Chief, dated the 1st instant, from a conviction of its political necessity, and military practicability, at the present moment

Strong as have been the reasons in a political point of view which have urged the expediency of a military movement by the British Government, to crush the rebellion in Mooltan, from the first moment of its appearance, they have never been stronger than they are at the present time.

When the emeute took place, there had been, many months, (as it appeared at that time, and subsequent investigations and events have made certain) a wide spread combination and conspiracy, throughout the Sikh army, to which very many influential persons were parties, and of the existence of which scarcely any were, I believe, ignorant, to create a disturbance somewhere, and of some kind, (the place and nature of this not being, I think, fully determined) whereby a large portion of the Lahore garrison might be detached, which was to be the signal for a more general insurrection for a final struggle, with a view to the re-establishment of Khalsa independence, and the expulsion of the English.

The attack on our officers at Mooltan, and their subsequent murder, (though the first attack was, I still believe, accidental,) was immediately seized on, as the opportunity for the development of the scheme and its execution

Had the Sikh troops been moved towards Mooltan, at that time, and the moveable column sent away from Lahore, the insurrection would have, at once, broken forth, Lahore would have been attacked (with a belief of treachery in the garrison), and the moveable column, at a distance from its resources and magazines, would have been placed, at any rate, in great difficulty

The column stood fast, at which the Sikh army was surprised. The garrison, instead of being weakened by detachments going to Mooltan, was strongly reinforced by the addition of other regiments and more Europeans. By this, the

contemplated plan of the conspirators was baffled, the existence of that part of the conspiracy which attached to the tampering with our soldiers was detected, and some of the ringleaders thereof executed. This confounded the disaffected still further; and the sudden removal of the Maharanee, the great head and promoter of all the treacherous combinations, came as a sort of climax to their perplexities: all these events tended to frustrate their scheme, and account for the delay in its development.

Still Moolraj remained unpunished, and the rebellion in Mooltan unchecked, there was yet a rallying point for the army and the disaffected, and, at this moment, Bhaee Maharaj Sing made his appearance.

The career of this impostor, whom the Sikh army declared was the promised Gooroo who was to restore their supremacy, was watched, with much interest and anxiety, by the army, and by the disaffected of all ranks. His rapid rise to importance was remarkable, and, had he succeeded in making his way to Mooltan, with the large retinue of horse and foot whom he had collected—joined by those who it is ascertained were preparing to join him, the difficulties of the rebellion would have been exceedingly enhanced, and the Sikh army would, in all probability, have been, at this time, at Mooltan, at any rate, that part of it that had escaped from Mahomedan vengeance on the frontier. The conduct of the Churunjeet regiment, and some others of Sirdar Jhunda Sing's force, was a fair index of the state of feeling at this juncture.

The career of this Gooroo was happily terminated, in the manner reported\* to Government, and his followers were either destroyed, seized, or dispersed.

This was another great blow to the interests of the disaffected and designing, particularly as, by the persons seized, and the investigations occasioned, the extent of the conspiracy, and the parties implicated, were in a great measure revealed.

But the rebellion still existed in Mooltan, and the conduct of the force under Shere Sing—insignificant in itself, with reference to the materials of which it is composed—was more than ever the object of attention. There was yet a hope that they might fraternize with the rebels in Mooltan, when the army now deeply committed, and aware that its general disposition was known, would have made that its opportunity for revolt.

The troops under Shere Sing, under circumstances the result of anxious arrangements, have arrived at Mooltan, disposed at this moment to do deeds of fidelity to the Maharajah and the British Government.

But the feverish excitement in the Sikh army is unallayed, its disaffection is in no way cured, and it is as disposed to mischief as ever, while its fears of a reckoning, should it commit itself no further, are weakened.

The rebellion in Mooltan being put down with a strong hand, tranquillity would be restored, and the coward obedience of the Sikh army insured.

The suppression of the rebellion has been gradually progressing, and, by the gallant conduct, and excellent arrangements and energy of Lieutenant Edwardes, it has been brought to its present state of repression, earlier than I expected, or, indeed, intended.

But we have "scotched the snake, not killed it," it may revive again, and I have shown how eagerly and dangerously its revival is longed for by the army. I think the other portions of the community have, on account of the continued failure and discovery of their schemes, now very much withdrawn from the cause of treachery and revolt, though they also would return to it, if a good opportunity arose.

Nothing would so probably cause the revival of the rebellion as a check at the present moment in the progress of its destruction, and the slightest reverse in the operations for that purpose. No one is more aware of that fact than Lieutenants Edwardes and Lake, in the midst of their exciting successes. What might not be the result of three months' inaction, and the exposure of our men to the intrigues and machinations of Moolraj, during that time? and how could we calculate on our present troops being satisfied to sit quiet, watching the fort, but unable to proceed against it for so very long?

We have, as I said before, not killed the snake, though it is grievously hurt; if we can, at this moment, put our heel on its head and crush it for ever, it is surely our wisdom to do so, for, if it revive again, I have shown its sting may be deadly; and the position of our gallant officers and their troops, who have ren-



dered the conclusion of the affair, with all its excitements and anxieties and dangers, comparatively easy, would be one of great peril.

I consider that it was never more necessary than at the present moment, to crush the rebellion, were it only for the security of the Punjab and our own provinces, and, if it should appear that we have it in our power to punish the murderer of the British officers and the insulter of the British Government, it is our duty to those officers, and to that Government to do so.

In a military point of view, circumstances are materially changed from what they were, when it was declared by the Commander-in-Chief that operations against Mooltan could not be, then, undertaken with a fair prospect of success. At that time, the rebellion had just broken out, and the extent to which it might spread was quite uncertain. The enemy was gaining head at Mooltan, and it was thought highly probable that the whole Sikh force would leave the frontier cantonments, and unite with the rebel. A general insurrection, throughout the Punjab districts, was spoken of as at hand, and the conduct of the Affghans beyond the Indus was uncertain, we had, it appeared, nothing but enemies in the whole province, excepting the garrison of Lahore, and our cantonment of Anarkullee.

A very large force must have taken the field, at that time, if any. No part of it could be supplied from the troops at Lahore, or Jullundur, without their being replaced, and siege operations against Mooltan, late in the season, were believed to be impracticable, on account of the inundations.

The requisite force was not available, and the means of moving the siege train necessary for the operations, were not to be had.

But, while the circumstances and events, alluded to in the former paragraphs of this letter, were in progress, measures were being taken for counteracting the machinations of the disaffected, and for creating the means of checking his rebellion, by calling into existence a force on which dependence could be placed, and which would be, at the same time, a check on the Durbar army, and enable us to oppose the forces of the rebel, independently of the Sikh battalions.

His Lordship in Council is aware to what an extent Mahomedan levies and Mahomedan influence have been enlisted for these purposes, in co-operation with the army of our ally the Nawab Bahawal Khan, and of the success which has, hitherto, attended the measures employed.

During the interval, also, the Commander-in-Chief has moved up troops to the frontier stations, has reinforced the Lahore force, and has provided the means of moving the frontier army, and the siege train at Ferozepore.

At this moment, Moolraj has no troops in the field. His army has been twice beaten in two general actions, by the forces of Lieutenant Edwardes and Bahawal Khan, and he has been driven to the protection of his fort and fortified city.

Instead of the state of things in which the rebellion commenced, there is comparative re-assurance throughout the Punjab districts, and we have a faithful army in our interest of above 20,000 Mahomedans, with 30 guns, investing Mooltan, and merely requiring the aid of British skill, and British siege materiel, to enable them to reduce the fort, which may, as further investigation and better information have established, be approached, and attacked, at any season of the year.

An overwhelming force, such as was not available, is no longer necessary. All the troops that can be required are at hand, and carriage in abundance for the transport of the siege train has been procured.

The season also is less unfavorable than it was, the rains have, to a certain extent, allayed the fierceness of the heat, and the rising rivers afford water carriage for the Europeans, to within a short distance of the walls of Mooltan, of which the absence of an enemy in the intervening districts may enable them to take advantage.

We have but to march, and send by water, a British force, with siege guns, about 220 miles, to effect our object at once, and that object is the important one of vindicating our power, by punishing the insulter of our authority, and the murderer of our British officers, and of putting an end to a dangerous rebellion.

The work done, our European troops may be provided with comfortable shelter in Mooltan, until the season for marching back to their cantonments, without inconvenience or risk to their health, shall arise.

These are the circumstances which have induced me to direct the movement of a British force on Mooltan at this time, and I trust they will be considered by the Governor-General of India in Council as justifying the measure.

## Inclosure 25 in No. 32.

*The Resident at Lahore to Major-General Whish, C.B.**Lahore, July 10, 1848.*

I REQUEST that you will take immediate measures for the dispatch of a siege train with its establishment, and a competent escort and force, for the reduction of the Fort of Mooltan

It is of importance that no delay take place in the dispatch of this expedition

If siege operations are undertaken against the fortress of Mooltan now, there will be no opposition, except from the garrison of the fort itself, the surrounding country is in our occupation, and its resources at our disposal; while the fort itself is, to a certain extent, invested by the united forces of the Nawab of Bahawulpore and that under Lieutenant Edwardes, amounting in the aggregate to about 18,000 men of all arms

The fidelity of this force may be entirely depended upon, and its aid and services in all the operations of the siege will be available.

Associated now with Lieutenant Edwardes and Bahawul Khan's forces is a corps of Durbur troops, consisting of one regiment of regular infantry, one troop of horse artillery, four guns of another troop, and about 2,000 or 2,500 Jagheer-daree horse

This corps is under Raja Shere Sing, and the principal Sirdars of the country, and may be relied on to do no mischief in its present position. The Sirdars are faithful, and the troops might be annihilated in a couple of hours, if they committed themselves by any treacherous proceedings.

The remainder of the Sikh army is on the distant frontiers, with the exception of two weak regiments, one at Govindghur, and the other on its way to Lahore, to take the palace guards.

I consider that the following force will be quite ample for the duty required; and, with reference to the season of the year it is not desirable that more European troops should be employed than may be necessary to insure the entire success of the operations undertaken

From Ferozepore —The second class siege train, with three companies of sappers and pioneers (the head-quarters to join immediately from Loodiana), and two reserve companies of artillery, two regiments of native infantry, one troop horse artillery (native), one regiment of regular cavalry, and one regiment of irregular cavalry. From Lahore —one British regiment, one regiment of native infantry, one troop of horse artillery (native), one regiment of irregular cavalry, and one reserve company of artillery

At Ferozepore, boats have been collecting for some days, in expectation of the necessity for this move, and choppers have been made for several of them. There will be no difficulty about sending, by water, to the Ghat opposite Bahawulpore, such part of the force as it may be deemed expedient to forward by that route.

Sufficient boats for the siege train and four companies of artillery are reported by Captain Browne to be now ready

At Lahore, boats are being prepared, and a sufficiency, for the European regiment, of comfortable boats, with choppers, will, I trust, be ready in a few days.

Other carriage has also been collected. A memorandum of that now ready, exclusive of the public cattle under the Commissariat officers, is annexed.

I should propose that from Ferozepore—

The siege train and reserve companies of artillery go by water.

Also one of the regiments of native infantry, if boats are ready in time.

The cavalry brigade, with one regiment of native infantry and the sappers and pioneers, should go by land, down the right bank of the Sutlej, to join the train at the Ghat opposite Bahawulpore

The bullocks, elephants, camels, and carts, for the siege train, may go by land from Lahore and Ferozepore, to meet the train at the Ghat

From Lahore, the European regiment may go in boats down the Ravee and Chenab; the rest of the brigade marching. The road lies by the river bank the

whole way, and the troops may, if it be considered necessary or expedient, be together every afternoon.

Raja Shere Sing, in marching down this road last month, had, I understand, his fleet of boats with him at every encamping ground

As soon as the route is communicated, orders for supplies will be issued, and there will not, I believe, be difficulty in providing what is usually required for the native troops.

I trust that all expedition may be used in the dispatch of these forces. The political necessity for their departure is great. The time of the year is not the most favorable for these operations, I am fully aware; but it is not so unfavorable as it was two months ago, or as it will be two months hence

P.S.—Subjoined is a memorandum of the boats and carriage already available at Ferozepore and Lahore, exclusive of that under the Commissariat officers.

*Ferozepore.*

29 boats	-	-	25,000 mds
57 Bombay bridge boats	-	-	22,800 „
Cattle and carts for the regiments, collecting			

*Lahore*

40 boats, more collecting daily.

19 large Durbar elephants, 18 more procurable.

600 draught oxen fit for gun carriage.

1,600 camels with gear complete, will be made up to 2,000, in three or four days

6,000 Brinjara bullocks, supplied with strong bags, fit for carrying shot, will be made up to 8,000, in a day or two

160 carts of four bullocks each, more coming in daily

In addition to the above, there is a good deal of carriage collected in the districts, awaiting orders, and from the forces of Raja Shere Sing, Lieutenant Edwardes, and Nawab Bahawal Khan, about 1,000 draught bullocks, and 500 or 600 camels, may be sent to the Ghat to bring up siege materiel

Inclosure 26 in No. 32.

*Minute by Major-General Sir J H Littler, G.C.B*

*July, 1848.*

I ENTIRELY concur with his Excellency the Commander-in-Chief as to the inexpediency of immediate operations against the fort of Mooltan, with a British force

That fort is now surrounded, and closely invested, by the troops of the Nawab of Bahawalpore and Lieutenant Edwardes, and they are, no doubt, strong enough to maintain their ground against any attack that can be made by Dewan Moolraj's party. The revenues and resources of the whole district are, thus, entirely at their command

I, therefore, cannot anticipate any great inconvenience that would attend the delay of a month or two, until the proper season for operations shall arrive

It might, probably, have been better to have undertaken the siege, in the first instance, rather than to expose European troops, in the months of August and September, which must unavoidably be attended with great sickness, and loss of life. They are the most unhealthy months in the year.

If it should be determined upon, however, to undertake the siege forthwith, I would not recommend a smaller force than that suggested by the Commander-in-Chief, that is, two brigades, with an European regiment attached to each, and a proper proportion of artillery

## Inclosure 27 in No. 32.

*The Secretary to the Government of India to the Resident at Lahore.*

July 11, 1848.

THE Governor-General in Council, having carefully considered the various dispatches which have been addressed to him, and having weighed the reasons which have been adduced for the immediate dispatch of a force against Mooltan, entirely concurs with the Commander-in-Chief in adhering to the former determination of the Government, and in abstaining from moving British troops upon Mooltan, at this season of the year.

The Governor-General in Council can perceive no change of circumstances which either calls for, or would justify, a change of the course originally recommended by the Commander-in-Chief, acquiesced in by yourself, and approved by the Government

His Lordship in Council perceives that the existence of inundations round Mooltan, to such an extent as would render siege operations impracticable, is now considered to be a matter of doubt

His Lordship in Council, however, does not find any satisfactory evidence that such inundations do not prevail, for he observes that, on the day previous to your letter to the Commander-in-Chief, you addressed to Lieutenant Edwardes directions to ascertain the real state of the case, on which no accurate information appears to have been at that time obtained

But, even if the statement regarding the extent of the inundations should prove to be incorrect, the Governor-General in Council observes, that the resolution which was adopted of postponing the movement of British troops, was mainly founded on a consideration of the advanced season of the year, and of the intense heat of the districts in which the army would act, leading infallibly to a fearful loss of life among the British troops employed.

The Governor-General in Council does not see cause to believe that these considerations were without foundation, or that the risk of health and life among the troops was, in any degree, exaggerated

The reasons, then, which chiefly induced the Government to abstain from bringing an army into the field, until after the cessation of the rains, exist in all their original force, while the dangers, then contemplated as likely to arise from delay, have been, in a great degree, removed, by the measures which you have directed to be taken, and by the success which has attended the gallant exertions of Lieutenant Edwardes and his force, aided by our ally the Nawab of Bahawulpore.

Under these circumstances, the Governor-General in Council concurs in the opinion pronounced by the Commander-in-Chief, on the military question submitted to him, and does not consider it expedient, or wise, to depart from the previous determination of the Government upon that question, maturely considered, and deliberately formed. The force which may now be required, in the event of the Dewan continuing to hold out in Mooltan will, probably, be very much less than any that has hitherto been contemplated. It will be ready to take the field as soon as the season opens

The troops, under the command of Lieutenant Edwardes and the Nawab of Bahawulpore, may be, advantageously and fully, employed in carrying into effect the purposes for which you originally designed them, namely, in occupying the districts of the province of Mooltan, in securing their revenue, and in preventing the spread of disaffection beyond the neighbourhood of Mooltan itself

## Inclosure 28 in No. 32.

*The Secretary to the Government of India to the Adjutant-General.*

Fort William, July 11, 1848.

IT is indispensable, in the present state of public affairs, that preparations involving large expenditure should not be engaged in, until the last moment to which they can, properly and safely, be deferred. The aspect of affairs in the

neighbourhood of Mooltan has already undergone a great change; early intelligence may, very probably, do away with all necessity for assembling an army; but if not, the instructions of the Governor-General in Council will be communicated.

In the meantime, his Lordship in Council requests that no orders may be issued upon these points.

**Inclosure 29 in No. 32.**

*The Adjutant-General of the Army to Major-General Whish, C B.*

*Simla, July 13, 1848,*

THE Commander-in-Chief cannot consent to the employment, at such a distance as Mooltan, of a British force of less strength than was detailed in his letter\* of the 1st instant

The Commander in-Chief places you at the head of this division, with the fullest confidence. He feels satisfied that any operations in which it may be employed, under your command, will be conducted with credit to the Indian Army, and advantage to the Indian Government

**Inclosure 30 in No. 32**

*Lieutenant Edwards to the Resident at Lahore.*

*Camp, Tibbee, 2 coss from Mooltan, July 13, 1848.*

RAJA Shere Sing so incessantly bullies me to report the presence and good conduct of himself, the Sirdars, and the force along with him, in order that Sirdar Golab Sing may wave it before your eyes that I have at last hit upon the expedient of writing to you in English, and sending it through the Sirdar. With respect to the Sirdars, I believe them to be heart and soul on our side, which is the side of Jagheers, titles, employments, and whole throats. But their force, with equal confidence, I report to be against us to a man. What is strange, the Poorbeah regiment (Colonel Apodea Pershad's) is the most disaffected of the whole, and, a few days ago, before there was any certain tidings of the approach of an English force, they had got so bold in their talk, that I have no doubt they would have gone over, had any delay on our part occurred. In Shumshere Sing's graphic language, the news of a British force being positively about to take the field, came upon Shere Sing's camp 'like water upon fire.' The expression is so good that, as you read, you will. I am sure, fancy that you hear mutiny hissing at being extinguished, and dying away into smoke, with sputtering curses at the ever victorious Feringhee. Thus, you see, that, to the last moment of the rebellion, I and my force are doomed to walk hand-in-hand with treachery, but all their conspiracies are only dangerous, when we desert ourselves. Had you hesitated to take the field now, I candidly own that I think my position would have been converted, in a month, to one of the greatest peril, the advantages I have gained would have slipped through my fingers, one by one, and, about a fortnight or three weeks hence, I should be constrained, in self defence, to keep up our prestige by taking the city. A general action would ensue; we should be victorious, Moolraj would be driven into the fort, and the city of Mooltan would be disgracefully sacked, perhaps burnt, by the wild mass of ruffians I have under my command, and I should have the satisfaction of being abused from Lahore to London, without having advanced a step towards ending the campaign, all this, amid treachery, defections of regiments, squadrons, and artillery, and, probably, the rising of all the troops in the north-west.

The very decided nature of your present proceedings in Lahore has, in my opinion, prevented Moolraj from rising superior to his difficulties, and I trust you will not relax until the British force and train are on their way to Mooltan. Moolraj himself, as well as his troops, is at his wit's end, sometimes, he talks of a night attack, and sits up all night in a Hindoo temple near the bridge, cased in chain armour from head to foot, like Don Quixote watching for his knighthood in

\* Inclosure 11 in No. 32.

the cathedral aisle. But nothing comes of it. Another time, he talks of cutting the canal, but is restrained from doing so, by fear of destroying the fort ditch. One day he fortifies the city, another day he fortifies the fort. To-day he tells all his soldiers to leave him, because he has got no money to pay them, and to-morrow keeps up their spirits by assuring them that when iron shot fail, he will fire silver on the besiegers. His army, I think, rather increases than decreases,\* many have been deserting, but new recruits from the Manjha are once more beginning to come in by tens and twelves. I estimate his number at 6,500, he may possibly have 7,000.

All the Mooltanee Affghans but two have deserted him.

As you seem to wish the Khans of Tank to be sent to Sirdarpore, I have ordered them there, they are at this moment near Maharaajghur, and will cross over from Rungpore to Sirdarpore, as soon as they can get boats. I quite agree with you in thinking this move a good one, now that we have troops coming down the Ravee. You seem to be under the impression that Maharajghur, Ahmedpore and Rungpore are in a state of rebellion, whereas their chief zemindars throughout these troubles, have been fighting like Britons on our side, and only a few days ago took their leave from my camp, where they had come to receive my thanks. Under these circumstances, there is no occasion whatever to make those districts over to Misr Sahib Dyal. I have appointed my own kardars, and sent my own thannahs, so please tell the Misr not to trouble himself with the district in question, but keep to his own side of the Chenab, like a good man.

Let me know when the troops actually start from Ferozepore, that I may send off all the carriage I can muster, to the Ghat opposite Bahawalpore. We shall be able to render very extensive assistance in this way.

The Nawab of Bahawalpore has at last recalled his incapable General, but he leaves his office vacant.

After all, I had not the heart to take away the whole ten guns from the Bahawalpore troops, and left them five, which, to this day, they have not repaired, so as to be efficient. Cortlandt has made a very efficient troop of our five.

You say "You see I am not of the reconnoitering parties." I shall deem myself lucky, if I join any reconnoitering party, at the end of three weeks or a month. At present, I am in my bed, and likely to stop there, my hand propped up upon pillows, and kept in the same position for twelve hours at a time, in fact, I am quite disabled.

#### Inclosure 31 in No. 32

*The Secretary to the Government of India to Major G. H. Macgregor, C.B.,  
Agent to the Governor-General at Benares*

*Fort William, July 14, 1848.*

I AM directed to instruct you to make a correct inventory of all the property belonging to the Maharanee Junda Khore, on her arrival at Benares, and place it in safe custody.

You will have the goodness to send an inventory to the Resident at Lahore, in order that the State may make good the claims it has preferred.

The Governor-General in Council requests that all the Maharanee's papers may be seized, but, until further conviction, his Lordship in Council does not wish that her confinement should be made more rigid: you will, of course, effectually provide for her safe custody.

#### Inclosure 32 in No. 32.

*The Resident at Lahore to the Secretary to the Government of India.*

*Lahore, July 14, 1848.*

I FEAR that Lieutenant Edwardes is suffering severely from the accident, when his pistol went off, and the ball passed through his hand.

\* Moolraj had 12,000 men before Kineyree. That battle, and Suddooosain, reduced his army one-half. What I mean to say is, that it is now again rather looking up.

Lieutenant Edwardes and the Bahawulpore forces were still lying before Mooltan; and the Dewan, though desertions seem to be daily taking place from his army, was using every effort to strengthen the defences of the fort and city. The latter even is too strong for Lieutenant Edwardes, with his undisciplined troops, and light artillery

The Durbar force, under Raja Shere Sing and the Sirdars, had joined Lieutenant Edwardes in the mode pointed out by him, and appears to be giving willing co-operation. The Dewan is using all his endeavours to win over the Sikh force to his interest, and, if our troops were not about to move immediately on Mooltan, (the knowledge of which will defeat his schemes), I should be apprehensive of extensive fraternization

The very day that Raja Shere Sing's force took up their position on Lieutenant Edwardes' right, the Sikh advanced picket seized two men entering the camp, disguised as faqueers, and took them at once to Raja Shere Sing. The Raja threatened to blow them from a gun, unless they disclosed their purpose. After a while, they confessed that they were the bearers of two letters, of similar import, to Sirdars Shums-hera Sing and Kelur Sing, of the Sindanwalla family, the highest rank in the Punjab. The letters were produced, and, being then read by the Raja and shown to the Sirdars, they were sent, forthwith, with the bearers of them, to Lieutenant Edwardes

Lieutenant Edwardes advised the Sirdars to send the letters in original to me, which they did, and, having flogged the messengers, they had them turned out of the camp

Moolraj has issued proclamations in Mooltan, that the Sikh army are his friends, and that the Khalsa soldiery are to have free access to the city and bazaars unmolested, and to buy whatever they may want at favorable rates.

I feel every day the increasing evil of allowing this rebellion to continue unsuppressed, and Moolraj unpunished. I hope the column from Ferozepore will begin to cross the river, to-morrow or next day, when the troops from Lahore will move also

When the troops and the heavy train are fairly in motion, all will be comparatively safe

A great change has come over the spirit of the Durbar, they have been making the most decided, and very successful, exertions to procure carriage of all descriptions, for the use of the British troops, and to aid in the conveyance of the siege train: 30 elephants, 2,000 camels, 650 gun-bullocks, 200 carts of four bullocks each, and 8,000 baggage-bullocks for Commissariat purposes, or carrying shot, have been collected in a very short space of time at Lahore. Large numbers of camels have also been collected in the districts, and an abundance of carriages is provided.

#### Inclosure 33 in No. 32

*Lieutenant R. G. Taylor to the Resident at Lahore.*

*Camp, Ghareewallah, Bunnoo, July 15, 1848.*

IN accordance with the arrangement made by Lieutenant Edwardes, I have made over the management of the districts of Bunnoo, Murwut, and Esakhail to Mullick Futteh Khan Towannah, and have put the whole of the troops, here assembled, under him, as distinctly requested by Lieutenant Edwardes, and am now on my way to Dera Ismael Khan *via* Lukkee and Esakhail, from thence to exercise a general control over the whole line of the Derajat, which, at present, is without any general court of reference.

The state of the three districts above alluded to is most satisfactory. The rubbee crop of Bunnoo has nearly been collected in full, and without the least difficulty or ill feeling occurring concerning it.

The Wuzereee revenue, with a few individual exceptions where the parties have gone to the hills, has been realized, and the tribes are friendly and peaceable. Bunnoo itself is perfectly tranquil, and, with the exception of Dilassah Khan, all absentees have returned, and are established in their own villages, and even this stubborn old rebel is now making overtures, and wishing to return to his home.

I have had many conversations with Futteh Khan Towannah, and have been

much pleased with his intelligence, and expressed wish and intention to watch over the interests of the people.

Murwut is also perfectly quiet, and 50,000 rupees of the Rubbee revenue of that extensive district have already been paid up on account. From Esakhail 19,000 have been realized, and, in all three districts, the collection is proceeding without difficulty.

I fear that the appointment of Mullick Futteh Khan is not very popular with the officers of the army, at any rate of the Sikh portion. They are not quite in the humour to welcome a Mahomedan commander. Futteh Khan seems confident of his powers of managing them, and he, probably, knows well what he undertakes. I have no fear of anything in the shape of difficulty occurring, as long as the royal cause prospers at Mooltan, and there is a prospect of the rebels being quickly reduced, but I have heard that there are again doubts of the probable march of a British force to put the finishing blow to the rebellion, and, as every man in the country is expecting it, the news of its having been again deferred will have a very bad effect, and probably lead to more intriguing and speculation. Already, and in the face of complete success, are absurd rumours afloat of Raja Shere Sing having fled from his troops, of Lieutenant Edwardes having been taken prisoner, and others, putting Moolraj in the light of an amiable and interesting martyr, begging those that wish it to leave him, and paying their expenses to their homes, and giving them compensation for their burnt houses, &c.

The great danger is, the now too great propinquity of the forces under Raja Shere Sing and Jowahn Mull Dutt, who may at any time join the rebels, or from whose ranks theirs may be reinforced by desertion. For, though I believe that a large proportion of the Sikhs would be well pleased to see the matter completely settled in favor of Government, still the very nature of the late successes (gained by Poorbeahs and Mussulmans) cannot but be distasteful to them, and add to the feeling expressed in a sentence uttered by one of the parties concerned, in the mosque disturbance here, the spirit of which may be rendered thus "Friend Mussulman has got very high of late," and, therefore, rebellion, as long as it exists in any form, will attract the sympathies of many, and obtain much secret, if not open, support. This being my opinion, it appears to me that a great deal of risk is run, by associating the forces under Raja Shere Sing and the others, with that of Lieutenant Edwardes, and expecting them to blockade the rebels for the next two months, and, should accident or intention bring on a general action, the loyal troops would be always liable to encounter defection or treachery in their allies, at the moment of direst need.

I had written part of this letter, when the joyful intelligence reached me, that a British brigade was to be sent at once to secure the advantages already obtained, and give the finishing blow to the rebellion, by reducing the fort. I consider that the presence, with Lieutenant Edwardes's force, of 1,000 Europeans, would render the matter safe, and while he is strong, the main body of the Sikh army will remain faithful.

I may mention, that Colonel John Holmes, whom I have in all difficulties found a most active and intelligent assistant, and whom I believe to be heart and soul in our interests, has two or three times expressed, with an earnestness that I did not choose to remark, his hope that British troops would be sent to put an end to the rebellion.

It may appear unnecessary for me now to express these opinions, as the move I advocate has been already resolved on, but it appears to me that you have decided on it on your own responsibility. And if you are inclined to allow any weight to my view of the case, on account of my having been for some time associated with the officers and men of the Sikh army, you may not be sorry to see how deeply necessary, even at this advanced and favorable position of affairs, I consider the operation in question to be, and, as I am now proceeding to a post of comparative safety, I write more freely, and perhaps feel more deeply my anxieties for the safety of my brother officers and brave allies, who have, by their successes, given such a favorable turn to the tide of affairs.

The inclemency of the season is, undoubtedly, a difficulty, but the heat, though great, is far from intolerable. I am myself, at this moment, writing in a hill-tent, and do not find the heat very oppressive.

The officers rode out part of the way with me; and I parted in kindness and good-will from all my late assistants. The Bunnoo Mullicks have also



accompanied me, though I gave them their leave, formally, yesterday. A great deal of this, as you know, is very hollow, and there is no personal tribute in it; but I think that if European rule was very unpopular, either in the army, or these wild provinces, such manifestations would not occur. It is the recollection of the past glories of the Khalsa, and of the honored and lucrative position of a soldier in those days, and in those of anarchy and confusion that followed them, mixed with a good deal of military pride and confidence in their union and strength in the field, that makes, and will make, the Sikh soldiery disposed to sedition and rebellion, and not any actual dislike of the influence of the English officers associated with them, from whom, if they are to be commanded, they would rather receive their orders, than from a native commander

Inclosure 34 in No 32

*The Resident at Lahore to the Secretary to the Government of India.*

*Lahore, July 16, 1848.*

IT is not impossible that the knowledge of the British troops and heavy guns being actually on their way, may make Dewan Moolraj do some act of desperation that will close the rebellion, and give Lieutenant Edwardes possession of the fort, ere they arrive

The Sikh troops in Hazara are described by Captain Abbott, as in that state of disappointed fear which sometimes precedes desperation; but I am pretty sure they will not commit themselves by open revolt now

Inclosure 35 in No. 32.

*The Resident at Lahore to the Secretary to the Government of India*

*Lahore, July 18, 1848*

THERE seems no reason to doubt that Bhace Maharaj Sing really perished. Dewan Moolhaj has endeavoured to make it be believed that the Bhace was not really drowned, but made his appearance in Mooltan at the end of last month, and that he decamped, after the Dewan's defeat at Suddoosain, on the 1st instant. This he did, when he found the Puthans had deserted his cause, as a last endeavour to secure the union of the Sikhs with him. The appearance and disappearance were alike fabrications

Inclosure 36 in No. 32

*The Secretary to the Government of India to the Resident at Lahore.*

*Fort William, July 22, 1848.*

NOTHING has been advanced by you calculated to weaken the strength of those reasons which induced the Government, notwithstanding the political urgency of the case, to approve of your having refrained from bringing British troops into the field, at this season of the year, or which could have induced them to alter the resolution they have conveyed to you that British troops should not move against Mooltan, until the fit season for military operations should commence.

You inform the Government\* that you have now ordered the immediate movement of British troops against Mooltan, accompanied by a siege train, sufficient to effect the reduction of the fort

Since you have considered it necessary, in exercise of the powers conferred upon you, to assume this responsibility, and, in pursuance of it, have issued publicly the orders for carrying your resolution into effect, the Government, being anxious to maintain your authority, do not withhold their confirmation of the orders you have issued. Adverting, moreover, to the injurious effects which would be produced by any appearance of vacillation at this critical period, and having regard to the probable consequences in the Punjab, at the present moment, of staying the advance of a British force, when once the intention of moving it forthwith against the rebels had been declared, and active preparations commenced,

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\* Inclosures 24 and 25 in No. 32.

the Governor-General in Council desires me to inform you that, if you should, in consequence of the receipt of my despatch\* of the 11th instant, have countermanded the march of the troops, you should, immediately, direct the advance you have ordered, and proceed with vigor to carry out, at all hazards, the policy which you have now resolved upon

A letter will be addressed to the Commander-in-Chief, requesting that every exertion may be made to ensure the efficiency of this force.

Inclosure 37 in No. 32.

*The Secretary to the Government of India to the Resident at Lahore*

July 29, 1848.

YOU will convey to Lieutenant Edwardes and to Lieutenant Lake the highest approbation of the Governor-General in Council of their conduct in the action†, and the strong sense the Government entertain of the gallantry, energy, determination, and skill, which these officers have displayed.

No. 33.

*The Governor-General in Council to the Secret Committee*

Fort William, August 18, 1848. (No. 70.)

THE Resident's letter‡, dated 31st ultimo, contains an extract from a confidential communication to the Governor-General, announcing that a general combination has, for many months past, been plotting the subversion of our power in the Punjab, and to the westward of Delhi. When the Resident has submitted the proofs and documents on which this assertion rests, the question will, of course, engage our serious attention

Inclosure 1 in No. 33

*The Commander-in-Chief to the Resident at Lahore*

Simla July 14, 1848

THE troops having been ordered to move upon your responsibility, I have only to assure you that every facility and aid in my power shall be freely given, so as to carry out to a successful result the operations against Mooltan

Lieutenant Lake's letter§ of the 6th instant confirms the views I had previously formed, as to the amount of force which it would be judicious to send, and that it would be ill judged to trust a smaller force amongst such a heterogeneous set of men as that now before Mooltan, which, if not supported, would, it is stated, probably disperse, and thereby place the British officers now with them in great peril. Indeed, I hope that the force I have named is sufficiently strong, but as it can always be supported, and is capable of setting at defiance any combination that can arise, before such support can reach it, I am not disposed to recommend any changes in the arrangements that have now been made.

Inclosure 2 in No. 33.

*The Resident to the Commander-in-Chief at Lahore.*

Lahore, July 24, 1848.

I HAVE no doubt that the force which your Lordship has assigned for the reduction of Mooltan, will be found, in all respects, sufficient for the duty which will be required of it; and that if the rebel, Dewan Moolraj, awaits the coming

\* Inclosure 27 in No. 32.

† Inclosure 6 in No. 33.

‡ Inclosure 14 in No. 32.

§ Inclosure 17 in No. 32.

of the British troops in his fort, the reduction of the place will be neither a difficult, nor a long, operation

The rebel has been able to recruit again a little lately; he has, to a surprising extent, the sympathies of the Sikh army and population generally; and the delay, which has taken place in the actual dispatch of the troops and train, has caused a doubt if they were really going. The recruiting will cease now, and the desertions will be extensive, he may have, at this moment, 6,000 men of all arms, a great portion of them with no arms at all

But, with reference to the feeling, and state of preparation for mischief, of a great portion of the Sikh army and people, I think it quite necessary that your Lordship should make the reinforcements you propose at Ferozepore, and that the head-quarters of Her Majesty's 14th dragoons should come to Lahore, for whose reception all arrangements have been made by Brigadier Campbell, C B.

It remains to be seen what effect the actual move of the British force may have at Mooltan: if it should render (which I do not expect) the further advance of the troops unnecessary, I will cause immediate intelligence to be conveyed to the corps coming up from the rear.

Inclosure 3 in No. 33.

*The Resident at Lahore to Lieutenant Edwardes*

*Lahore, July 26, 1848*

I YESTERDAY directed that the accompanying proclamation should be forwarded to you. I request you will cause the Persian copies to be circulated, as widely as possible in Mooltan, and the neighbourhood

I have sent, for distribution, copies of the proclamation to Raja Shere Sing, to Sheik Emamooddeen, to Jowahn Mull Dutt, and to Peer Ibraheem Khan. I shall be obliged by your directing these parties to use their endeavours to have these proclamations circulated among the inhabitants of Mooltan, and the soldiers of the rebel Dewan

Inclosure 4 in No. 33

*Proclamation*

*Lahore, July 22, 1848.*

THE crimes and offences of Dewan Moolraj, the former Nazim of Mooltan, his rebellion against the Government of Maharajah Duleep Sing, his treacherous murder of the British officers, and his schemes and plots for the subversion of the Khalsa Government, are matters of notoriety.

Dewan Moolraj and his force have been twice beaten, in two general actions, by the troops of the Maharajah, under the command of Lieutenant Edwardes and General Cortlandt, and the army of the Nawab of Bahawalpore, and the rebel has betaken himself to the city and fort of Mooltan

A large British force of all arms, with an efficient siege train, is now moving on Mooltan, for the reduction of the fort and city, and the full and complete punishment of the rebel and his associates

This army will not return to its cantonments till these objects are fully accomplished, and such condign punishment has been inflicted on the rebels to the Maharajah's Government, and the insulters of the British power, as will be a warning to all people

But, while the British Government will take ample and awful vengeance on the guilty in this rebellion, it is desirous that the innocent shall not be involved in the ruin which awaits the rebel and his followers, and that those who have only joined the rebel standard as mercenaries, should have an opportunity of escaping the vengeance which will be visited on all those found in arms, aiding and abetting the rebel when the British force arrives in Mooltan.

Notice is, therefore, now given to the people in arms at Mooltan, and the inhabitants of the city. The former are warned to lay down their arms, and depart to their homes. Those who are not the actual perpetrators and abettors of the outrage committed on the British officers, or servants and soldiers of the Maharajah who have deserted their colours, or His Highness' service, and joined the rebellion against the Khalsa Government, will be permitted, if they depart at once, to go away unmolested.

When the British army arrives before Mooltan, it will be too late, the hour of grace will have passed away.

The inhabitants of the city, and those who possess property therein, are warned that if, on account of armed opposition, it becomes necessary to take forcible possession of the city by storm, it will be impossible to save their lives, or those of their families, or protect their property. The city will, of necessity, it is to be feared, be involved in bloodshed, plunder, and ruin.

On the arrival of the British army before Mooltan, if the city has been peaceably surrendered, the fort only will be attacked. If the fort be not unconditionally surrendered, with those therein, to the British power, it will be besieged, and, on being captured by storm, the garrison will be put to the sword.

This proclamation is issued, now, with a view to save unnecessary bloodshed, and that all concerned may be fully informed of what will assuredly take place, and that they may act accordingly.

Inclosure 5 in No. 33.

*Lieutenant Taylor to the Resident at Lahore.*

*Esakhar, July 26, 1848.*

HAVING received satisfactory accounts from Bunnoo, both from Mullick Futtah Khan and Colonel Holmes, of the suppression of the mutiny, I propose embarking, on the 28th, for Dera Ismael Khan.

I have ever carefully avoided treating the present rebellion as "Khalsa Cause" in conversation, yet it appears to me proper to put before the officers and men the great extent to which the misconduct of a portion of the Sikh soldiery has endangered the integrity of the State, and the certainty of its final ruin, if other instances of mutinous conduct and treachery occur, calculated to endanger the tranquillity of the country, and the lives of British officers employed in it. In treating this subject, I have in no way charged the Khalsa soldiery with a rebellious spirit as a body, but have tried to engage the interests and honor of those who love peace, and really wish well to their government, in opposition to the factious members of the army, who would gladly see all order and government subverted, merely in the hope that they may again reap such harvests as they have before done, by being the only source of safety and power, in the midst of anarchy and confusion.

The programme of the plot was much in the old Sikh style, from all I can hear—the officers were to have been killed, the guns seized, and the army, or body of mutineers, to have marched to Mooltan.

The Esakharlees seem happy and contented, but they labor under several peculiar and rather oppressive imposts, which furnish constant cause of (with them) very humbly expressed complaints.

I have animadverted, rather severely, on the want of vigilance in the officers of the Akal regiments, but I do not wish any further notice to be taken of it, they are, I think, both loyal men.

Inclosure 6 in No. 33.

*The Resident at Lahore to the Secretary to the Government of India*

*Lahore, July 31, 1848.*

VIEWING the affairs of the Punjab from the distance at which your Lordship is placed from the theatre of events, and judging only from the imperfect details which my dispatches bring before you, it is impossible for you to know the very uncertain state in which things have been for the last three months, and still are, the circumstances which arise almost daily, and threaten a crisis, and the unceasing watchfulness and anxious management which have been necessary, on my part, to prevent a general revolt and insurrection.

The Mooltan rebellion in itself, apart from the extensive schemes and combinations now connected with it, is quite unimportant; but, in connection with these, its continuance, or otherwise, becomes a matter to the last degree momentous.

I do not yet know all that was intended, or the extent to which hopes are still entertained of success to the scheme for expelling us from this part of

India. Every day brings new revelations, some of which seem to elucidate, and some to mystify, the whole affair.

It is quite certain that, all last autumn and cold weather, plans were forming, combinations were being made, and various interests were being enlisted, with a view to a grand struggle for our expulsion from the Punjab, and all the territories west of Delhi.

The scheme originated, as far as I can make out, with the Ranee, and was contemplated, and her endeavours for its accomplishment set to work, from the time of her being sent to Sheikhoopoor. The plan was communicated to the Sikh army, and to all the chiefs of the Punjab. The members of the Durbar, with perhaps one or two exceptions, were consulted, and promised their co-operation. Emissaries were sent to Cabool, Candahar, Cashmere, and Jummoo, and the Hill States, the protected chiefs on the other side of the Sutlej were consulted, as were the chiefs of Rajpootana, and the Nawabs of Jujurr and Ram-poor. It is positively asserted, that effectual co-operation was promised by all that I have mentioned, with the exception of the Rajpootana States, and Putteeala, the former of which sent no positive replies, and the latter a direct refusal. The great hopes of the conspirators lay in the promised aid from Cabool and Cashmere. Whether either Dost Mahomed, or Maharajah Golab Sing, intended to keep their promises, I cannot tell but there is no doubt that the former has collected a large army in the neighbourhood of Cabool, ostensibly for operations to the north-west, which, it is now said, are impossible on account of the countries having been ravaged by locusts, so that supplies are not obtainable, while an advance has been made towards Jellalabad, on the plea of defensive precautions being necessary, on account of Lieutenant Herbert's having been sent to Peshawur in company with Osman Khan, a British pensioner, and a known enemy of the Dost.

Maharajah Golab Sing has also strengthened all his positions, and added considerably to his army within the last six or eight months, and it is beyond doubt, that he was in secret communication with the Maharanee, in December or January last.

The nature of Golab Sing's communications, I do not know. Letters which have been intercepted, at Peshawur, from one of the Dost's sons, show that promises of aid were made by the writer, as soon as the Sikhs in Peshawur followed the example of Moolraj in Mooltan.

These two chiefs are both too wary to commit themselves with the British Government, while there is a fair prospect of our maintaining our position, but the facts I have stated are beyond doubt, and it is equally certain, that the Sikh army, and most of the chiefs, believe that both Dost Mahomed and Golab Sing are entirely in their interest, the remuneration to the former is to be the restoration of Peshawur, and his other former Trans Indus possessions.

I do not think that any distinct plan of operations had been determined, beyond what I mentioned in my letter of the 10th instant, when the outbreak in Mooltan occurred, from that time, it has been blended with the whole affair, and lately, I have been assured that if Moolraj could hold out till November or December, the whole scheme, as at first planned by the Maharanee, would be executed, and a grand struggle take place, in which Sikhs, Hill Rajpoots, and Mahomedans, were all to join.

I put little faith in this, the combination could never be made, but the Sikh army believe in it, and hence, more than for any other reason, their sympathy with Moolraj, if Moolraj could, at this time, make any head, the army with Raja Shere Sing would join him, and the rest of the Sikh troops would, to a man, go off, with their guns and all their munitions of war, to Mooltan. Our ally Bahawal Khan, with Lieutenant Edwardes' army, would be beaten off, and, perhaps, destroyed, and the British officers in the frontier districts would be sacrificed.

This is what makes Moolraj and his rebellion so important. Reduce Mooltan, punish Moolraj, and put down the rebellion, and the whole conspiracy will be at an end, without the prospect of its revival.

As the Durbar troops under Raja Shere Sing, &c, and Bahawal Khan's army, with Lieutenant Edwardes' levies, are now situated, and with the sympathy which Moolraj has (on account of his connection with their conspiracy) with all classes, I cannot prevent the rebellion from assuming the very formidable character I have described, except by putting it down at once.

But I have, through the assistance of Lieutenant Edwardes, brought things to that pass that I can put down the rebellion, by moving a British force, and such an one as is at disposal, on Mooltan.

Moreover, I can move the force down, without greater danger to the health of the Europeans than if they were in their cantonments, or, at any rate, very little greater; while the native portion of the force can march exactly as if they were in their provinces, sending their tents ahead, and only marching at night.

The season of the year, also, is much less unfavorable than it was. There are no local rains in Mooltan, it is beyond the limits of the Monsoon, but so far within its influence, that the urgency of the heat is allayed, and the air is softened by rains over the neighbouring countries, and the inundations from the streams which flow through it. It is curious that the only two officers on this side of India who have resided in Mooltan and its vicinity, Major Mackeson, and Captain Cunningham, both wrote, in May last, recommending operations in July and August, rather than during the prevalence of the hot winds of May and June.

Very comfortable choppered boats, in abundance, have been supplied for the European regiments. Officers and men are delighted with the arrangements, and no inconvenience from exposure, or otherwise, is anticipated, while the accounts from the land columns are most satisfactory, all are in high spirits at the trip, the only dissatisfied parties being those that are left behind, while, from the number of applications for permission to go with the force, merely as amateurs, (several of which have been granted by the general), one would think that the expedition was looked upon as one of pleasure, rather than to be accompanied by danger and distress.

#### No 34

*The Governor-General in Council to the Secret Committee*

*September 7, 1848. (No 73.)*

... transmit the correspondence with the Agent to the Governor-General at Benares, regarding the safe arrival of the Maharanee of Lahore at Benares

#### Inclosure 1 in No. 34

*Macgregor to the Secretary to the Government of India*

*Benares, August 2, 1848*

THE Maharanee Junda of Lahore arrived at Benares this morning. I have received charge of Her Highness from Ensign Cox, 70th regiment, Native Infantry.

The greatest care has been taken by Mr Reade, the Commissioner of the Benares division, Mr D F McLeod, the magistrate here, and myself, assisted by Ensign Cox, to secure all her Highness' property and papers, and several pottarabs, containing jewels of great value, have been seized, a complete inventory of which is being carefully made in the presence of Mr Reade, Mr. McLeod, and myself, a copy of which shall be forwarded to you, with as little delay as possible.

The Maharane's confidential slave-women were subjected, on their arrival here, to a strict search by two very respectable European matrons, viz, Mrs. Alone and Mrs Stanley, whose assistance was kindly obtained for the purpose by Mr. Reade, the Commissioner. No papers, and nothing indeed of any value, have been found on the persons of the slave-women. I have promised to give Mrs Alone and Mrs Stanley a suitable present on the part of Government, for performing a duty which may be considered of a somewhat invidious nature.

One of the necklaces, claimed by the Lahore State, mentioned in the list \* forwarded in Sir F. Currie's letter to your address of the 30th of June last, has been found among the Maharanee's jewels, the remainder, no doubt, will be forthcoming on further examination.

The Resident at Lahore shall be furnished with a copy of the inventory of the Maharane's jewels and property, as soon as it has been completed.

\* Inclosure 9 in No. 32.

We have not yet had leisure to examine thoroughly, such papers as have been seized, and which were found chiefly in such of the Maharanee's boxes as have been opened. From a cursory glance, they do not contain matters of a treasonable nature.

Inclosure 2 in No. 34

*Major Macgregor to the Secretary to the Government of India.*

*Benares, August 8, 1846*

I FORWARD the inclosed documents, and solicit instructions on the following points

1st. Am I to allow Mr Newmarch, Sirdar Jeebun Sing, and an interpreter, a native of Bengal, to have access to the Maharanee Junda, of Lahore, to confer with her on her affairs?

2nd. Am I to cause the letter addressed by Sirdar Jeebun Sing to the Maharanee, to be delivered to Her Highness?

I was acquainted with a person, when I was at Lahore, last year, who styled himself Sirdar Jeebun Sing, and, if he be the person mentioned in Mr Newmarch's letter, it is right, I think, that I should relate what I know of his character. He was looked upon by Sir Henry Lawrence, then the Resident at Lahore, and by all of the principal Chiefs of the Lahore Government, as a person disaffected towards the Durbar, and inimical to the interests of the British Government, reposing much in the confidence of the Maharanee, and plying her with those evil counsels, which have, doubtless, in no small degree, contributed to her downfall, from the high position she once held at Lahore, to her present confinement and exile at Benares.

I conceive that such a person should not be permitted, either in person or by attorney, to have access to the Maharanee Junda of Lahore.

Inclosure 3 in No. 34

*Mr Newmarch, Solicitor, to Major Macgregor*

*Calcutta, July 29, 1846*

HAVING applied on the part of Sirdar Jeebun Sing, the Wakel of Her Highness the Maharanee Junda Khore, mother of His Royal Highness Duleep Sing, Sovereign of the Punjab, to the Governor-General in Council, for permission to be granted to the said Sirdar Jeebun Sing, and myself, as the Ranee's legal adviser, with an interpreter, a native of the British territories in India, to have an audience of the Ranee, with a view of conferring with her on the present state of her affairs, and preparing a memorial on her behalf, to be laid before the Government here, or in England, as may be deemed expedient, demanding an investigation of the alleged causes of her imprisonment and exile, I have been referred to you, as the officer through whom all communications with the Ranee, or with the Government, on her affairs, must pass.

I have, therefore, the honor to inclose a letter, written in the Punjabee language and character, (with an English translation thereof,) addressed by the said Sirdar Jeebun Sing to the Ranee, and to request that you will cause the same to be delivered to her, and transmit to Sirdar Jeebun Sing, under cover to my address at Calcutta, any answer with which Her Highness may favor him.

I have also to solicit permission for Sirdar Jeebun Sing, myself, and an interpreter, a native of Bengal, to be approved by yourself, to have access to the Ranee, to confer with her on her affairs, and to request that you will be so kind as to send your answer to me at Calcutta, in order that, in case the Government should refuse such permission, we may be saved the trouble, and expense, of an inefficient journey to Benares.

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Enclosure 4 in No. 34.

*Jessem Sing to the Maharanee.*

I LATELY had the honor to forward to your Highness an account of my proceedings in your Highness' service, since I was distinguished by receiving your commands to represent to the Governor-General of India in Council, the grievances under which you suffer. This account was transmitted to you, through the British Resident at Lahore, and I hope that you received and read it, but no reply thereto has been sent to me. I was, consequently, led to anticipate some disturbances at Lahore, and was very sorry to hear, afterwards, that the accusation of your being instrumental to the revolution at Mooltan, was brought against your Highness, and that you were on your way to Benares, and had already arrived at Ferozepore.

With the advice of my legal adviser, Mr. Newmarch, a gentleman on whose good judgment and integrity I can place complete reliance, and of the Bengallee Baboo, who kept me for six years in his house, and taught me a little of English, and enabled me to acquire a full insight into the manners and laws of that nation, when I first came to Bengal, I petitioned the Governor-General in Council for information as to what would be the place for your Highness' future residence. His Lordship, in reply, informed me, that Benares has been selected for your Highness' abode; and that he referred me to Major Macgregor, the Governor-General's agent at that place, as the proper channel for communicating with, and receiving orders from, your Highness, and it was also stated that the Governor-General in Council would hold no further communication with me directly, but through the Agent, who will correspond with his Lordship. A similar answer was given to my first representation, and I was, then also, referred to the Resident at Lahore. Mr. Newmarch expresses himself confident that you will finally succeed in obtaining redress. He observes, that the documents printed, and laid before the British Parliament, disclose an intention of attempting to seek an opportunity of depriving your Highness of power, long before any charges were brought against you, and while you were on terms of the closest alliance with the British authorities. He is confident that, when this is brought prominently forward, it will materially strengthen your Highness' cause, and that, as you will be able to establish, on the clearest evidence, that you have always been innocent, and strictly observed the terms of the Treaty, you have every chance of being ultimately released, and freed from your present rigorous confinement, and of going back to your own country. Mr. Newmarch and myself are anxious to obtain a personal interview with your Highness at Benares, (only five days journey from hence, by dak,) in order that we may confer with you, freely and fully, on your affairs, for which I beg you will previously obtain the Agent's permission, or, if it should seem preferable to your Highness, you will be pleased to send us an account, minutely detailing every occurrence which has been made the pretext for treating you so unjustly. In my letter to the Agent, giving cover to this, I have also not omitted to solicit his permission to be allowed personally to present our respects to your Highness. I beg to add my humble assertions of devotion to your cause, and to entreat my Royal Mistress not to allow confinement and exile to damp her courage, and induce the acquiescence of despair. God is merciful, and the clouds of your misfortune must be dispersed. Patience is necessary in the time of distress, as considerable delay must be apprehended, as the proceedings of English law are always dilatory. I hope, however, that, in the course of five or six months, you may obtain redress. If the local Government is unfavourable to you, justice may be obtained by an appeal to England. I have been told by Mr. Newmarch, that a proclamation was made at Lahore, that, if any letter containing any intrigues be detected, addressed by your Highness to any person of your country, the rigor of your treatment will be much more increased; but, as you never were, nor are, inclined to have recourse to such unworthy means, I am not at all uneasy at it. Mr. Newmarch further says, that, as his business requires his presence at Calcutta, and my presence there also is absolutely necessary, for the purpose of considering the best means of expediting your commands, it may be deemed expedient by your Highness to engage an intelligent and trustworthy man, either English, or Bengallee, to execute your orders at Benares, and to wait on the Agent on your behalf; and it would depend entirely on your Highness' pleasure to entertain either an European, or a clever Bengallee.

An adequate salary for the former is 400 rupees, and of the latter



200 rupees, per month, and I should suppose that, before employing such an individual, the permission of the Agent must be obtained

Major Macgregor, the present Agent at Benares, is a remarkably good man; and everybody praises him for his mildness and justice, and I am happy to say that you will not have to complain of hard treatment, as at Lahore, whose late Resident was always friendly to the Sirdars, your enemies. Benares is, besides, a holy place, and free from your enemies, whereas Lahore is full of persons by no means friendly to you. It is also to be hoped that happier times may come, and that you may again visit your home, when an impartial investigation into your case will show the world that you are innocent. May I request the favor of your informing me, whether all your personal property is with you, and who among your servants are now in attendance on your Highness, whether the Agent treats you kindly, what other arrangements have been made for making your residence at Benares comfortable; and what is the amount of your present stipend?

Any reply which you may be pleased to send to me, must come through the Agency there, to the care of John Newmarch, Esq., No 2 Old Post Office Street, Calcutta, and all communications to your address will, likewise, reach you, through the same channel. Such is the wish of the Governor-General.

It will not be out of place for me here to state that the Agent is at liberty to make himself acquainted, if he pleases, with the contents of all the communications from, and to, your Highness, with a view to ascertain if the letter contains anything prejudicial to the British Government. You are, of course, at liberty to write everything connected with your case, or to intimate your desire of receiving from Calcutta any useful articles. Such orders, I beg to say, will be speedily executed.

I humbly beg to add that, as a faithful and old servant, my devotedness and unremitting exertions on your Highness's behalf, will not be wanting, and I have only to beg, that whatever commands you may be pleased to make to me, may be made as above directed, and that, considering the suspicions that seem to prevail everywhere, you will not condescend to entrust any man with your Highness's confidence, nor carry on any correspondence with any individual, ere communicating with ourselves.

This matter my legal adviser has requested me earnestly to press upon your notice. I entreat you not to be disheartened, but to remain confident that you will, eventually, see better days, as nights are succeeded by bright and beautiful dawns. With my respects to Bodama Ruttoo, and Magee, should they be at Benares

Inclosure 5 in No. 34.

*The Secretary to the Government of India to Major Macgregor*

*Fort William, August 19, 1848*

I AM directed to acknowledge the receipt of your dispatch, dated the 8th instant, with inclosures, soliciting instructions in regard to a letter to your address from Mr Newmarch, and Sirdar Jeebun Sing's letter to the Maharanee Junda of Lahore.

The Governor-General in Council has no objection to Mr Newmarch being allowed to confer with the Maharanee on her affairs, but, with regard to Jeebun Sing, I am desirous to state that, if the Sirdar is the person alluded to by you in the second paragraph of your letter, he cannot be allowed to hold any communication with Her Highness, she must be requested to select some other Agent. All personal communications with the Maharanee should be held in your presence.

You are at liberty to deliver to the Maharanee the letter from Jeebun Sing, ascertaining, in the first instance, that the English version submitted by Mr Newmarch, is a correct translation of the original.

Inclosure 6 in No. 34.

*Major Macgregor to the Resident at Lahore.*

*Benares, August 12, 1848*

I HAVE examined all the papers that were found in the possession of Maharanee Junda of Lahore on her arrival here, of which the accompanying, amounting to 33 in number, written in the Goormookhee character, and appa-





rently by the Maharanee herself, are the only documents which seem to me to contain anything that you would wish to see, indeed, some of those herewith sent are apparently drafts of letters that were submitted by the Maharanee to the British authorities at Lahore when Her Highness was there, none of the said documents, however, bears any address, some of them are couched in terms that are ambiguous to me, but will, probably, be more intelligible to yourself and the Durbar Chiefs

The remainder of the Maharanee's papers now with me, consists of letters addressed to Her Highness by the Residents at Lahore, also, bills, receipts, and such like, these shall also be transmitted to you, on your making known to me your desire to that effect

The Maharanee was evidently quite taken by surprise on her arrival here, on its being intimated to her that we had seized all her pattaahs containing her jewels, papers, and other property, and not being prepared for the search we instituted, I think we should have got possession of the documents you allude to in your letter to Mr Elliot, had they not already been made away with, or destroyed by her Highness

I shall feel obliged by your returning me any of the papers herewith sent on your requiring them no longer

## No 35

### *The Governor-General in Council to the Secret Committee*

*Fort William, September 7, 1848 (No 74)*

WE have received intelligence of the arrival of the right and left columns before Mooltan, and of their being encamped about two and a half miles east of the fortress, but the siege train had not yet reached that place, and it was expected that operations could not be commenced before the beginning of this month

It is gratifying to observe that the troops have been remarkably healthy, and in both columns there have been fewer casualties than in the head-quarter wing of Her Majesty's 14th Dragoons, on its short march from Ferozepore to Lahore

The only incident of any note which occurred on the line of march, was an attack upon the right column, on the morning of the 16th ultimo. Fortunately, in consequence of General Whish having been kept on the alert, by hearing the report of cannon in the direction of Mooltan, he had ordered his camp to be struck, and the troops to be ready to turn out, at the shortest notice. "At 2 P M, the cavalry picket," says the General, "reported a large body of horse and foot being in its front, and it was, as well as the other pickets, soon engaged with them. The line was formed immediately, and I ordered the flank companies of regiments to support the pickets, which they did with great alacrity and decision. The enemy were disappointed in finding us so prepared for them, and retired at 3 A M, after sustaining a severe loss of about forty killed, many more wounded, and a few taken prisoners, who agreed in reporting that their force, which was 1,500 infantry and 350 horse, left Moolhaj's camp at 7 P M on the 16th, the main part of which staid at a village in the rear, that, finding the few hundred sent on in advance had been so roughly handled, and so soon deserted by the cavalry, all commenced their retreat, a great part throwing away their arms to facilitate it

We now turn to a new scene of disaffection and tumult. On the 12th of August, the Resident reported that a serious collision had taken place at Hazara, between the armed Mahomedan population and the Sikh troops in that province, and gave it as his opinion, that this collision has been occasioned by the measures which have been adopted by Captain Abbott, in consequence of the belief with which he is impressed, that Sirdar Chuttur Sing, Attarewalla, the Nazim of the province, is at the head of a conspiracy for the expulsion of the English from the Punjab, and was about to head a crusade against the British forces at Lahore. We are not, however, prepared, by the information yet before us, to decide that Captain Abbott has acted on this occasion with too great precipitancy,

or before he had received full confirmation of the suspicions which he had, for a long time, entertained. From the beginning of July, he had reported that the force in Pukli was in a disaffected state, and, on the first of last month, he mentioned that he had received intelligence from Pukli, "that the infantry of that corps had positively determined to march for Lahore, this morning before daybreak. The news did not reach me until 9 A.M., and I immediately made such arrangements as seemed feasible. I await with some anxiety a confirmation, or denial, of these tidings, which cannot reach me until evening. At the same time, I received intelligence from Hurrpore, that the force there, and in Khafir, is expecting an immediate march to Lahore, and has received assurance of support from the Bunnoo force."

On the 2nd, he says that the news is confirmed, and that the belief is general that Sirdar Chuttur was the instigator of the movement. It is also to be observed he adds, "as I have frequently before observed, that, up to this moment, the Sirdar has not given me a hint that could lead me to suppose any corps in Hurrpore or Khafir to be otherwise than loyal, although it is utterly impossible that he could have been ignorant of proceedings notorious to the whole country." And again, "in Pukli, the troops have sold their stores, broken up their bazaar, and got ready by my last notice to move at a moment's notice. They are, probably, now in motion. It appears that the detention of pay, which, for some days, I deemed expedient, has been made a cause of discontent by the conspirators; and, accordingly, when I wrote to the Sirdar to issue the pay, my letter was detained here by his vakcel for twenty-four hours, and, probably, would not have been sent for several days, had I not discovered the artifice."

On the 6th, Captain Abbott observes, "I have said that the Pukli brigade of about 800 bayonets, 2 troops of horse, 4 field guns, and 20 zumboorahs, had broken up its bazaar, sold off its stores of grain, called in its cattle, packed much of its baggage, and was actually about to march that morning for Lahore, when it found that I had manned all the roads with the armed peasantry of Hazara. It is still in the same state of readiness for an immediate start, and will be joined by the Hazara, Khavta, and Khafir forces, and, in all probability, by that of Bunnoo. Sirdar Chuttur Sing seems to be the immediate mover of the whole. He has been in correspondence with Colonel Bhadoor Sing (who was an attendant of the wai punches of the Sikhs, and a diligent promoter of them), and, to this day, he has not given me a hint of the state of that force, although it has, for the last month or more, been notorious throughout Hazara. He shuts himself up in his house all day, on pretence of sickness, whilst his letters and emissaries are being dismissed in all quarters, to Cabool, Peshawur, Bunnoo, Cashmere, and throughout Hazara and Khafir."

The death of Colonel Canora, an American Commandant of Sikh artillery, appears to have brought matters to a crisis. That officer, when ordered by Chuttur Sing to bring his guns out of Hurrpore, and encamp on the open ground between the town and the fort, refused compliance, unless he obtained the authority of Captain Abbott. The Sirdar asserted that the movement was absolutely requisite, in order to bring the guns under the protection of the fort, and secure them against the attacks of the armed population, which had risen at the instigation of Captain Abbott. The Commandant still refused, and, placing himself between the two guns loaded with grape, threatened to fire on the first man who approached him. The Sirdar persisted in his demand, and a party of his soldiers went behind some buildings within musket range, and shot this gallant officer, before he could discharge the guns.

The Resident defends this proceeding, as the Sirdar acted on the urgency of the occasion, and was persuaded that danger was to be apprehended from the rising of the population. On learning the outbreak in Hazara, Major G. Lawrence, with great prudence, dispatched Lieutenant Nicholson from Peshawur, with an escort of 60 Jagheerdaree horse, and 150 Pathans of the new levies, to seize, immediately, on the important post of Attock, and occupy it with a garrison of his own selection. This duty was cheerfully undertaken by Lieutenant Nicholson, though he was in ill-

health, and successfully accomplished; but not without the show of some resistance, his escort being so reduced as to amount to only thirty men, on his arrival at Attock. Lieutenant Nicholson has since been engaged in raising a small body of troops for his own protection, and in endeavouring to persuade the disaffected to return to the path of duty. In all his measures taken for this purpose, he has evinced considerable judgment, promptitude, and firmness.

Captain Abbott's conduct, since the commencement of the outbreak, has been marked by much vigor and determination. His letters of previous dates had certainly shown him sensitively alive to the dangers of the outbreak, with a nervous anxiety as to the result.

He now appears fully equal to the occasion that has arisen, and to be entitled to some credit for forethought and discrimination, unless the Resident's opinion be found true, that Captain Abbott's suspicions were the cause, rather than the effect, of the hostile attitude assumed by Raja Chuttur Sing. The Resident, at the same time, pays a high compliment to Captain Abbott's character, in saying, "that he has many excellent qualifications as a public officer,—indefatigable application to business, a most scrupulous desire to show the strictest justice in all his investigations, decisions, and proceedings, and a kind and eminently conciliatory manner to the natives coupled with great firmness and intrepidity of character. In Hazara, of which he has made the settlement, he is beloved, in fact almost worshipped, by the people, all persons that I have conversed with, who have come from those parts, are unanimous in their estimation of him. They say that he has gained such an influence over the inhabitants of the province, that he can do whatever he pleases with a race whom the Sikhs could never control, and whom the wily and shrewd Maharajah Golab Sing was glad to get from under his government on almost any terms. This is the people that has now risen at his bidding, and it is to be hoped that he may have influence and power to allay the storm which he has raised of his own authority, and without communicating his purpose to any one."

Immediately on learning the outbreak, the Resident deputed his chief assistant, Mr. Cocks, to proceed to the spot, to make inquiries as to the extent of the Sirdar's culpability, and to adjust the differences amicably, if possible. We are glad that he, subsequently, altered his determination with respect to Mr. Cocks. Sirdar Jhunda Sing was sent, together with a confidential agent, from Sirdar Golab Sing, son of Chuttur Sing, in order to bring matters to a favorable issue, to prevent the shedding of blood, and to induce Sirdar Chuttur Sing to surrender himself, for the purpose of having his whole conduct investigated at Lahore.

Major Lawrence entertains no doubt that Sirdar Chuttur Sing is at the bottom of the movement. Captain Nicholson considers that Sirdar Chuttur Sing's proceedings arose as much from suspicion, as any other feeling, and states, that it was the intention of the Hazara force to effect a junction with the Pukh brigade, and march upon Lahore. He is urgent for the immediate dispatch of a British brigade in that direction, but it is satisfactory to observe, that Captain Abbott is confident in his own means of resisting any attack, and of even annihilating the force in Pukh, if he were authorized to take the initiative.

The Resident, it will be observed, is most unwilling to believe in the guilt of Sirdar Chuttur Sing, and attributes the untoward event solely to the alarm generated in his mind, by Captain Abbott's withdrawal of confidence. But it appears to us, as at present informed, that Captain Abbott had ample reason to withdraw his confidence, and great colour is lent to his suspicions, by the conduct of Chuttur Sing since the outbreak,—by his movements and measures, avowedly hostile, by his intercepting of communication, by his tone of defiance to Major Lawrence and Captain Nicholson, by his refusal to surrender Comedian Canora's murderers, by his treasonable correspondence with other brigades; and by his dispatch of emissaries to neighbouring Potentates. The Resident himself\* says, in his letter of the 16th of August, to the address of Captain Abbott:—"The Nazim's complaints of your want of confidence in him, of your having set him aside in the Government, till he had become a mere cypher, of your suspicion and misconstruction of his conduct on all occasions, during the past two or three months, and of his feelings of distress and humiliation on the subject, to have

\* Inclosure 25 in No. 35.

had any weight, and to have merited consideration, should have been preferred at the time, and not now that he has assumed an attitude of opposition, which he finds it difficult to maintain."

"Another paper has also fallen into my hands, sent to me by a member of the Durbar, and of a character which must prove, if such proof were necessary, the absence of all complicity of the sender in the Sirdar's proceedings, from which the misconduct of the Sirdar, since the late outbreak, is established; and from this, and other papers regarding the Pukh force, submitted by the Sirdar himself, it is quite evident that a large part of that force was in a mutinous state for some time, that this was known to the Sirdar, and that he, whatever may have been his motive for so doing, connived at what was going on. The state of the force was, certainly, such as to justify your taking any precautionary measures to defend a treasonable outbreak, and I have no doubt that the present professed loyalty and amenability to orders of the Sirdar, and the disposition to obedience and subordination evinced by the troops, are caused by the prompt and efficient measures you have adopted, having made the course, which the Nazim and the troops contemplated, more difficult and dangerous than they anticipated."

The reasons which the Resident urges, to show the improbability of Sirdar Chuttur Sing's being concerned in any open display of disaffection towards the present system of Government, namely—that he is old and infirm, father-in-law of the Maharaja, with more at stake than any man almost in the Punjab—his accumulated wealth, his honorable position in the present administration, his protestations of loyalty and long tried fidelity,—all these lose their force, when we contemplate the events of the last six months in the Punjab. Reasons equally cogent might have been urged, why the whole body of troops should have remained staunch in defence of the present régime, their position has been, in every respect, bettered under the existing administration, and all the ordinary considerations which bias human conduct, would make us unwilling to believe that they could, possibly, be faithless, and yet, we find them aspiring to even a better and more independent condition, joining in an apparently hopeless cause, and still flocking to a rebel's standard, though he has been twice ignominiously defeated by raw levies, and has immediate ruin staring him in the face. When ignorance and fanaticism combine to effect such results, and when we find all classes of Sikhs the creatures of a blind infatuation, we must cease to give Sirdar Chuttur Sing the benefit of those considerations which ordinarily impel a sensible and sober man to a particular course of action. His participation in these guilty scenes cannot, therefore, be disproved, by its apparent improbability.

The latest letter received from Sir F. Currie is dated the 24th of August\* in that, he expressed his apprehension that a collision had actually taken place between the Sikh troops and Mahomedan peasantry, but three days have elapsed since the receipt of this letter, and nothing further has been heard.

The state of the forces at Peshawur and Bunnoo was reported satisfactory, up to that date

Inclosure 1 in No 35.

*Lieutenant Edwardes to the Resident at Lahore*

*Camp, Tibbee, 2 coss from Mooltan, July 28, 1848.*

YESTERDAY evening, Raja Shere Sing Attareewalla begged me to grant him a private interview, at which he laid before me the wishes of his father, Sirdar Chuttur Sing, with reference to the celebration of the marriage of his daughter with Maharajah Duleep Sing.

He said that Sirdar Chuttur Sing had enjoined him to tell me (with a view, of course, of my submitting the same to you) that he is anxious to pass the few remaining years of his life in the performance of such religious duties as are becoming one of his age. Two things remain for him to do in this world, one to perform the prescribed round of pilgrimages, and the other to celebrate the marriage of his daughter. The latter duty he considers to have the first call upon him, but the event is dependent upon the wishes of the British Government. If it is not your intention that the nuptials of the Maharajah should be

celebrated sometime within the next twelve months, the Sirdar would wish to be allowed to lay aside the duties of his Hazara Government, and proceed on pilgrimage for two years; if, on the contrary, the marriage is to take place this year, the Sirdar would suggest that, with your sanction, the Durbar should appoint astrologers on the part of the Maharajah to fix an auspicious month and day, in conjunction with other astrologers on the part of the bride, for the Raja says that, after the day has been fixed, it will take nearly a year to prepare the costly presents which Sirdar Chuttur Sing will have to give on the occasion.

The above is the substance of the Raja's conversation, and he earnestly requested me to procure him an answer from you within ten days. The request seems strange at the present moment, but the Raja particularly explained that his father would not have mentioned the matter, had he not looked upon the Mooltan rebellion as a thing disposed of. The secret motives of men are difficult to divine, but there can be no question that an opinion has gone very prevalently abroad, and been carefully disseminated by the evil disposed, that the British meditate declaring the Punjab forfeited by the recent troubles and misconduct of the troops, and, whether the Attarewalla family have any doubts, or not, upon this point themselves, it would, I think, be a wise and timely measure to give such public assurance of British good faith, and intention to adhere to the Treaty, as would be involved in authoritative preparations for providing the young Maharajah with a Queen. It would no doubt settle men's minds greatly.

Inclosure 2 in No 35.

*Lieutenant Edwardes to the Resident at Lahore*

*Camp, Tibbee, 2 coss from Mooltan, August 1, 1848*

A PUTHAN Chief, named Nassur Khan, Populzye, has been holding the country at Dera Ghazee Khan, during General Cortlandt's absence, and blockading the fort of Hurrund. As you are aware, the disaffected Futteh Pultun, which formerly sold my head for 12,000 rupees, was, purposely, left behind with Nassur Khan, to get rid of so many secret enemies out of our own camp, and to give the regiment an opportunity of redeeming its character, if so inclined, by performing good service before the fort.

Hitherto, I have heard no complaints of the conduct of the regiment, Nassur Khan has always reported them as engaged in blockading the fort, and obeying his orders. A fortnight or three weeks ago, Sirdar Shumshere Sing informed me that Dewan Moolraj expected to be joined by the Futteh Pultun, but, as the daily reports from the regiment received by General Cortlandt were satisfactory, I thought no more of the matter.

This morning, General Cortlandt received information from Nassur Khan, that he had detected the Futteh Pultun in correspondence with the rebel garrison of Hurrund, and when he took the intercepted letter to the colonel of the regiment, and that officer called up all his subordinates to investigate the matter, the soldiers broke out into open mutiny. Nassur Khan retired to his own camp, and the Colonel and Commandant, separating themselves from the men, accompanied him. The mutineers proceeded to beat to arms, and Nassur Khan followed their example; rallying around him his own cavalry, and several contingents of the neighbouring Mussulman tribes. Seeing Nassur Khan prepared, the Sikhs did not come to a collision; but Nassur Khan concludes his letter by saying that it was their intention, he believed, to join the rebel garrison; if they attempted which, he intended to muster all the Mussulmans he could, and fall upon them.

In reply, I have instructed General Cortlandt to order Nassur Khan to raise the Mahomedan tribes without delay, and, on the slightest attempt on the part of the Futteh Pultun to join the rebels, to put every man of them to the sword. To induce the Beloochees to give this assistance to Nassur Khan, I have written to tell them that, should Nassur Khan find it necessary to call upon them to destroy the regiment, all the plunder that they take in the Futteh Pultun camp, whether crown property or private, shall be theirs.

It is not impossible that matters may have come to a crisis between the two parties before this; in which case, I feel confident that Nassur Khan will have



entirely anticipated my orders, and the result will depend upon whether he had time enough to raise the country on his side. He is a brave soldier, and the work is not new to him; for he is the chief, who, with his own sowars alone, charged and defeated the Sikh regiment under Khizan Sing at Leia, capturing two guns. This was in Dewan Moolraj's former rebellion against Raja Lal Sing, in 1846.

I trust the decisive orders which I have sent to Nassur Khan, will meet with your entire approbation; and that you will agree with me in thinking that, after their perfidious conduct with me at Leia in April last, the consideration which has been since shown them, and the encouraging purwanna in which you yourself exhorted the corps to remain loyal to the Maharajah, they would deserve no mercy, even if their numbers were sufficiently insignificant to admit of our showing it.

### Inclosure 3 in No. 35

*Major Laurence to the Resident at Lahore*

*Peshawar, August 2, 1848.*

THE emissary of Dewan Moolraj, having been seized by one of the Eusufzye Khans in the act of inciting to rebellion, has confessed the fact, and I would solicit your orders as to his disposal.

He says, that he was entertained by the Dewan at 15 rupees per mensem, and deputed with an hurkaru to proceed, via Bunnoo, with letters to the Ameer of Cabool, soliciting aid from thence, that, on delivering the letters, the Ameer declared himself our ally, and declined having anything to do with the Dewan; that he then came hither, and from this proceeded into Eusufzye, where he offered Khadir Khan of Akoo a Jagheer of 25,000 rupees, and the people exemption from paying revenue for some years, if they would rise in insurrection about the 18th or 20th of the month Baddoon, at which date, he said, the Sikhs would be all up in arms against the British.

The troops are so orderly, and all is so quiet here, that a summary example of this incendiary is not absolutely necessary, though, as doubtless there are many others about, ultimately his execution here might seem to you desirable.

### Inclosure 4 in No. 35

*The Resident at Lahore to Lieutenant Edwards*

*August 3, 1848.*

I HAVE the honor to acknowledge the receipt of your letter dated the 28th ultimo, stating that Raja Shere Sing had called upon you and had a private interview with you, relative to the marriage of Maharajah Duleep Sing with his sister.

As all the preliminaries to the union of the young Maharajah with a daughter of Sudar Chuttur Sing Attareewalla have been, already, observed, and the ceremonies for affiancing are complete, it would, in common usage rest with the family of the bride to determine the time when the actual ceremony of marriage should take place, which is celebrated, sometimes, some years before the bride finally leaves her own family to reside with her husband.

Of course, with reference to the position of the Maharajah, nothing can be done in this case, without the concurrence and approbation of the Resident.

I will consult, confidentially, the members of the Durbar now at Lahore, on the subject of the time at which the marriage should be celebrated, but you may, in the meantime, assure Raja Shere Sing that the British Government will not interfere in the matter, further than to secure that all is done which may be best calculated to promote the honor and happiness of the Maharajah, and of the bride and her family.

I do not see how the proceeding with the ceremonies for the Maharajah's nuptials can be considered as indicative of any line of policy which the Govern-

ment may consider it right to pursue now, or at any future time, in respect to the administration of the Punjab, and it is, on that account, that I see no objection to the marriage being celebrated, at such time, and in such manner, as may be most satisfactory to the parties themselves, and the Durbar.

Inclosure 5 in No. 35

*Lieutenant Edwardes to the Resident at Lahore.*

*Camp, Tibbee, 2 loss from Mooltan, August 4, 1848.*

IN continuation of my letter of the 1st of August, I have the honor to inform you that, the night after the meeting of the Futteh Pultun, six companies of the regiment struck their tents, and commenced their march to the fort of Hurrund, intending to join the rebel garrison. On hearing this, Nassur Khan, with his own sowars, and as many Beloochees as he could collect, made for the fort by a shorter road, and drew up his little band across the line of march of the Futteh Pultun. This gallant manœuvre met with the success which it deserved, for the mutineers, seeing that they were intercepted, and would not be able to execute their purpose without a struggle, marched back again to their former camp, whence they sent vakeels to Nassur Khan to beg forgiveness; attributing their misconduct to the regiment being greatly in arrears of pay. Nassur Khan, however, assigns a much more probable cause, namely, that a soldier of the regiment had been to Mooltan to make a bargain with Dewan Moolraj, and had just returned with an order from the Dewan to the rebel Kardar of Hurrund, to give the regiment a present of two months' pay, and gold bracelets to the officers, if they joined the garrison.

The Colonel and some few others sided with Nassur Khan throughout, and, strange to say, the other two companies of the regiment, which were on duty in trenches close to the fort, came away, and joined Nassur Khan and then Colonel, instead of joining the mutineers. What is still more curious, these two companies were commanded by Bughail Sing, Commandant, notoriously the greatest intriguer in the regiment. Their good conduct is, perhaps, accounted for by the fact, that the garrison immediately sallied out, and broke up the intrenchments which the two companies had left.

The whole regiment, subsequently, begged Nassur Khan to intercede for their pardon, and went through the farcical Sikh ceremony of swearing fidelity on the grunth. The whole affair is eminently characteristic of the treacherous, avaricious, and intriguing Sikh soldier, another proof, added to the many afforded by the Mooltan rebellion, of the imperative necessity of remodelling the Khalsa Army, if we wish for security in the Punjab. Lieutenant Lumden is, I believe, engaged in revising the internal economy of that army, but, paramount to this is the necessity of totally altering its constitution, which is rotten to the core. This, however, is a subject for after consideration.

I have instructed General Cortlandt, for the present, to send the arrears of pay of the Futteh Pultun (which have only just reached this camp from Lahore) to the Kardar of Dera Ghazee Khan, and write to the Futteh Pultun that the same will be given to them, whenever they make over the ringleaders to Nassur Khan. Nassur Khan has also been warned to place not a moment's trust in the regiment, and be prepared to destroy it, on the first symptoms of another outbreak.

I may take this opportunity of pointing out, that the almost simultaneous émeutes in the districts of Dera Ghazee Khan and Bunnoo, respectively suppressed by Futteh Khan, Towanna, and Nassur Khan, Populzye, together with the increasing desertions from Raja Shere Sing's camp, even at this hopeless moment of the rebels, prove that the suspicions entertained by Captain Abbott in Hazara are not without foundation; though I disagree with that officer, both as to the secret movers of the plots, and the extent of the danger to be apprehended from them.

## Inclosure 6 in No. 35.

*The Resident at Lahore to the Secretary to the Government of India.**Lahore, August 8, 1848*

I HAVE the honor to forward correspondence with some of my assistants, received up to this date

I would beg the attention of the Government of India to these documents, as indicative of the spirit which pervades the Sikh army at the present time, and of their disposition and purposes.

From the first outbreak of the rebellion in Mooltan, my chief object has been to prevent, if possible, the Khalsa army making common cause with the insurgents. Thus, with the consequences which must have followed it throughout all the provinces of the Punjab, and on the extensive western and northern frontiers, was the great danger, to avert which my plans and measures have been directed

These measures, with their results hitherto, were briefly adverted to in my letter\* to your address, dated the 10th ultimo. They have been detailed in my dispatches and correspondence for the past three months.

The present state of the feeling of the army may be gathered from the accompanying papers, and the fact of desertions to Moolraj daily taking place, even now, from the army of Raja Shere Sing

I hope, and I think, that Captain Abbott is wrong in his opinion as to the treachery of the chiefs, and of the complicity of Suda Chuttur Sing, Attareewalla, the Nazim of Hazara, with the defection of the Hazara field-force. I trust he is wrong as to the extent of combination between other classes throughout the country at this time, and I have little doubt that he is misinformed as to the intention of the Hazara field-force to attempt an attack upon Lahore now, but there is no doubt he is right as to the extensive success of Moolraj's machinations, and of the exertions of his emissaries among the Sikh troops, and as to the disposition and desire of the whole Khalsa army to join Moolraj, if they could see, at this moment, any hope of his success. The conduct of the troops at Bunnoo, where a rising has just been suppressed by the vigor of Futch Khan Towanah, of the Futch Pultun, on the other side the Indus as described in these papers, of the Hazara field-force, as painted by Captain Abbott, after all allowances for over-coloring, and of many of Raja Shere Sing's force (constituted almost entirely of Jagheerdare horse, supposed to have the most interest in being faithful), of which a further defection of twenty-five Sowats is reported in a note from Lieutenant Lake, received last night, and thus, while the British columns are within eight marches of Mooltan,—prove clearly to me, who have anxiously watched every movement and occurrence during the last three months, what would have been the consequence of further delay in the movement of a British force to put down the rebellion

It may be thought that Lieutenant Edwardes, after the battle of Kinseyree, on the 18th of June, should not have advanced on Mooltan, where he could do nothing against the town and fortress, but that he would have done better to have taken up a strong position at Shoojabad, or in its neighbourhood, with the troops of Bahawalpore, where he would have been strong enough to repel any attack that Moolraj could make on him, and, at the same time, could prevent Moolraj from undertaking any distant expedition

This is what he should, perhaps, have done, if the force under Raja Shere Sing, or the Sikh troops, could have been relied on to remain neutral. But after reaching Toolumba, Raja Shere Sing's force was no longer under command. Though ordered to halt at Toolumba, it advanced towards Mooltan; the chiefs were, I hope and believe, under the impression that Moolraj would be destroyed by Lieutenant Edwardes and his allies, and were anxious to have a share in the credit of his defeat; the soldiery were impelled by very different feelings, and desired to assist the rebel army. Had not Lieutenant Edwardes advanced, and fought the battle of Suddosain, which seemed to render the rebel cause altogether hopeless, Raja Shere Sing's army would have joined Moolraj on arriving at Mooltan. This Raja Shere Sing and

Sirdar Shumshere Sing confessed to Lieutenant Edwardes themselves (they would in all probability have been first put to death).

The union of Shere Sing's force with the rebels, would have been the signal for the whole Sikh army following their example. The move which, with its disastrous consequences, we have all along been trying to prevent, would have taken place. The united Sikh army would have been altogether too strong for Bahawal Khan's troops and Lieutenant Edwardes' levies, and we must, then, have either taken the field, at once, with a large army (such as we have not at command), or have seen our ally, and our gallant officer, destroyed, without moving to help them.

It may, perhaps, be urged, that it was in that case not judicious to bring Bahawal Khan into the field at all; but it is to be remembered that, had I not put this force across the Sutlej when I did, Moolraj's troops would have beaten Lieutenant Edwardes in the Derajat, where he was threatening him with a far superior force, and that Lieutenant Edwardes' defeat would have been instantly followed by the rising of the whole Sikh army, with all its consequences.

Occurrences have arisen, almost weekly, during the last three months, which have called for immediate measures to meet them; such as appeared to me necessary, I have not hesitated to adopt, on my own responsibility. Hitherto, the rising of the Sikh army generally has been prevented, without moving British troops, but the course of events has now made it absolutely necessary to move them, in order at once to avert the evil, which can no longer be averted in any other way, and to rescue our ally, and our new levies, from a position of imminent peril.

At the same time, these events have been so controlled, that the movement of a sufficient body of British troops has been rendered practicable and easy, without endangering, to any extent, their health, and with every prospect of success.

I trust that the Governor-General in Council will pardon my thus repeating my opinion as to the necessity and expediency of the measure I have adopted

Inclosure 7 in No. 35.

*Major Lawrence to the Resident at Lahore*

*Peshawur, (without date)*

I HAVE the honor to report the execution, this morning, of the Fakeer Wazeer Sing Sing, Moolraj's emissary

A company, Mahomedans, of Meer Junglee's regiment, with a strong body of the police, kept the ground; but there was no demonstration of sympathy made on behalf of the culprit, and I have not heard that it has caused any sensation among the troops

In consequence of a letter just received by Lieutenant Nicholson and Colonel Ruttun Sing, from Colonel Boodh Sing Khan, reporting an émeute of the troops in Hazara, and the murder of Commedan Canora of the Artillery, both Lieutenant Nicholson and I are of opinion that his presence just now is desirable at Attock or Hussan Abdal, to counteract any evil designs that Sirdar Chuttur Sing, who would seem to be at the bottom of the move, may have in that quarter.

Lieutenant Nicholson will, therefore, start to-night, with an escort of sixty Jagheerdaree Peshawur horse and 150 Puthans of my new levies. His health is still, I regret to say, very delicate; but we consider the urgency of the case to admit of no delay, as, should the fort of Attock fall into hostile hands, the effect would be most prejudicial to us.

My Governor is very sanguine as to the troops remaining staunch.

## Inclosure 8 in 'No. 35.

*Captain J. Nicholson (Assistant to the Resident) to the Resident at Lahore.*

*Fort of Attock, August, (no other date) 1848.*

I ARRIVED here yesterday morning, and, in the course of the day, turned out the company of Boodh Sing's corps, which was showing symptoms of disaffection, and some of whom had even gone the length of loading to resist the entrance of some of my men.

That I was able to effect this, is owing to the staunchness of the irregulars, whom I harangued with happy effect, notwithstanding the efforts of the regulars to mislead them. The Thannadar also behaved very well.

The only positive intelligence I have from the eastward is, that the two infantry corps (Boodh Sing's and Baboo Pandya's) and the artillery (Noorooddeen's) marched from Hussan Abdal the day before yesterday, to join Sirdar Chuttur Sing at Hazara, with whom all the Sikh troops in Hazara are said to have sided, against Captain Abbott, who has raised the people of the country.

I have made arrangements for communicating with Captain Abbott, and obtaining intelligence from Hazara and Khatir, on the state of affairs, on which my future movements must depend.

Meantime, I am supplying the fort, and arranging for its security.

I feel much the want of a small body of disciplined men on whom I could depend. Yesterday morning, of sixty Jagheerdaree horse which left Peshawur with me, not half the number arrived along with me, and the infantry (nearly 150 newly raised Peshawur Mussulmans) which should have been in by noon, did not arrive till midnight, so that I had not more than thirty men with me yesterday.

Had I my old detachment of guides, its example would have served as a stimulant, and I should, moreover, have been able to make much use of them in the way of procuring intelligence. I am raising a small party to replace them.

The pay of the irregulars here is less than that of the garrisons of many of the neighbouring forts. This, considering the importance of Attock, is not as it should be. I have promised to raise it. This they will deserve, as all depended on their staunchness yesterday.

The Gundgurreeas, by Captain Abbott's orders, are said to have made a successful raid on some Sikh camels.

Captain Abbott himself, I hear, is among the Mishwanees.

## Inclosure 9 in No. 35.

*Lieutenant Edwardes to the Resident at Lahore*

*Camp, Tibbee, 2 coss from Mooltan, August 10, 1848.*

I ENTIRELY disbelieve Abbott's news, that the disaffection and signs of conspiracy which the Sikh army has lately shown at its several stations, is organized by the Sikh aristocracy, and is assisted by the King of Cashmere. A man should be very sure of his facts before he asks one to believe (in preference to any other theory) that our greatest enemies are one man to whom we have given a kingdom, and another whose daughter we are making Queen of the Punjab. Such things are possible, indeed, as what is not, in a world which occasionally sees mothers strangle their own children; but I would say of them, as of infanticide generally, they are highly improbable. Surely, Major Lawrence having caught an emissary of Dewan Moolraj's in the Eusufzye Country is a sufficient indication of the prime mover of these disturbances; and if Sirdar Chuttur Sing is so deep in the plots of Moolraj that he has seduced a whole brigade to make a diversion at the capital, how comes it that Dewan Moolraj is now writing letters to invite Raja Shere Sing to join his cause? Is the old man so much more forward than his high-spirited son in the cause of national regeneration? Or has Abbott's pre-eminently mild and conciliating behaviour made the British yoke intolerable to Chuttur Sing alone of all the Sikh Sirdars?

Lake has found Shoojan Sing guilty of corresponding with the enemy, and

we intend to send him to you in irons, to receive whatever sentence you think fit; we have recorded no sentence on the proceedings, in order that the Raja's Sikhs generally may believe he is going to be hanged. Rebellion has sung very small among them since Shoojan Sing's capture, and, in a few days, the arrival of the British force will give it a lock-jaw altogether. With respect to your recommendation to keep the Raja's force out of the operations against Mooltan, you must own that this is both a delicate, and a difficult, matter, and would be a poor return for the exertions which I believe the Sirdars to have made to save the credit of the Khalsa, if I were to take advantage of our hour of strength to dishonor them before the whole world. My idea is to assign them a place the same as other divisions, putting them merely in such a position that if they behave well, so much the better, and if they hang back, it will not matter. They would never take an active part against us, after the arrival of the British troops when they had been neutral before. I send you the last ukhbar, and you will be highly amused to see that Moolraj has ordered a gun to be prepared as big as the Chunghee gun at the Delhi gate. By the bye, I think our big guns will be a long while in coming up, and the left column altogether is very much behind time.

P. S —Since I wrote this, a most important seizure has been made, of a large bundle of correspondence between Moolraj and Shoojan Sing, found concealed in the dunghill behind his horse's heels. The Sirdars will bring me the papers to-morrow morning

Inclosure 10 in No 35.

*The Resident at Lahore to Captain Abbott*

*Lahore, August 11, 1848.*

THE Hazara dak has come in, but there is no bag from Shirwan, nor is there any communication from Sirdar Chuttur Sing, either to myself, or to the Durbar.

Intelligence has, however, reached Lahore from other sources, of the occurrences which took place at Hurrupore, on the evening of the 6th instant, and of the death of Colonel Canora.

It appears, from all I can learn, that what has occurred has taken place, mainly, in consequence of mutual distrust and suspicion of each other's proceedings between Sirdar Chuttur Sing and yourself.

It is much to be regretted that you have had, as it appears, no personal communication with the Nazim, on the subject of the state of the troops in Pukli and Hazara, as represented to you by your informers, and that you have withheld to mention the fact of your having raised the Mahomedan population, and the purpose thereof.

Sirdar Jhunda Sing was about to start for Hazara. I have now deputed Mr. A. H. Cocks, the chief assistant to the Resident, to Hazara, to inquire into, and report on, all the circumstances of the affair, and with full authority to pass such orders, and make such arrangements, in regard to it, and to the administration of Hazara, as he may consider necessary.

You will pay the same deference to any instructions you may receive from Mr. Cocks, as you would to orders from myself, and you will give him every assistance in performing the duty which has been imposed upon him.

Orders have been sent to the Nazim, and to the military officers in Hazara, and the neighbourhood, to obey all instructions they may receive from Mr. Cocks, and to stand fast in their present cantonments till his arrival.

I request you will take no step, not actually necessary for the preservation of the district, or of the people, or the army, until Mr. Cocks shall reach you.

It appears from the representations of Colonel Booth Sing, Colonel Noorooddeen, and Baboo Pandee Ramdial, and also of Sirdar Mehtab Sing, Majeetia, that they have all refused to move their troops at the bidding of the Sirdar, without your concurrence and orders.

They have been all told that they have done quite right. I trust you will have kept back the peasantry from any acts of violence, and that the Pukli brigade will have remained in its cantonments, and that no collision will have taken place

## Inclosure 11 in No. 36.

*Major Lawrence to the Resident at Lahore.**Peshawur, August 11, 1848.*

YOU will, ere this arrives, have heard that Abbott's many reports have been, in some measure, verified, at least as far as the force\* and Chuttur Sing are concerned. I confess I am entirely at a loss to understand what this chief can hope to gain by the mischief he has started up—that he is the originator of it, there can be little doubt. I send a copy of a letter which Colonel Ootar Sing received last evening, by the hand of a sepoy of Boodh Sing's regiment, calling on him to march with his corps to his aid, as he was hemmed in by the Moolkias.

On the 9th, we received Abbott's last letter, dated the 6th, and, then, he makes no mention of the Moolkias being up, whereas it would seem that Canora was either murdered on that day, or the previous one, and Colonel Ruttun Sing tells me he understands that Chuttur Sing led the troops who committed the murder.

I am loth to fancy that Raja Shere Sing is playing false, but such is, decidedly, the belief here, and it is not unreasonable to think so, seeing the game his father has commenced. Edwardes is doubtless wide awake, and prepared for all contingencies anything going wrong with us in that quarter, would set the whole Punjab in a blaze. Nicholson tells me he has written to you: it was most fortunate he was so prompt in his movement, and judicious in his measures on reaching, had he not been both, I hold it we should have lost the Fort of Attock, now, I trust it is all safe, and, in a few days, he will be able to direct his energies against the Boota Sirdar and the rebel troops. I have sent him 170 men, foot soldiers, from this, and have directed the Eusofzye Khans to send him 60 horse and 100 foot, so that, with the 70 of the former and 150 of the latter who accompanied him, he will be pretty strong. I could increase them easily to any amount.

I had all the Colonels up at my quarters, last evening, with the Sirdar, and told them that the preservation of the Khalsa Raj was now greatly in their hands, that if this force continued loyal and true, they might look to its remaining entire, but, if it failed, nothing could save the empire. One and all assured me that they were staunch, and had every just hope of keeping their men to their allegiance, that they had every reason to be satisfied with the treatment they had experienced at our hands, and that, in the best days of their great Runjeet Sing, they had never been so much indulged as they had been, since they came under my command; they seemed to speak as if they meant what they said, so I do trust that we shall yet ride our ship safely into port.

I have withdrawn two Sikh companies I had in the Fort of Shahmere Ghur, and put in two Poorbeahs, under a respectable and safe commander. My Governor is most anxious to attend to my most trivial wish or desire, and he is well backed by his son Colonel Alla Sing.

## Inclosure 12 in No. 36.

*Brigadier F. Young, Commanding at Ferozepore, to the Adjutant-General of the Army.**Ferozepore, August 11, 1848.*

I HAVE the honor to report the departure, this morning, of the headquarters and 600 rank and file of Her Majesty's 32nd regiment, towards Bahawalpore, under the command of Lieutenant Colonel R. T. R. Pattoun, by water. The remainder of the regiment will embark, as soon as boats can be procured, which the deputy commissioner hopes will be, by the 18th or 20th instant.

\* Sic in orig.

**Inclosure 13 in No. 35.**

*The Resident at Lahore to the Secretary to the Government of India.*

*Lahore, August 12, 1848.*

I AM afraid from the report I have received, that a serious collision has taken place in Hazara between the armed Mahomedan population and the Sikh troops in that province, and that this collision has been occasioned by the measures which have been adopted by Captain Abbott, in consequence of the belief with which he is impressed, that Sirdar Chuttur Sing, Attareewalla, the Nazim of the province, is at the head of a conspiracy for the expulsion of the English from the Punjab, and was about to head a crusade against the British forces at Lahore.

That the Pukli brigade has been, for some time, in a state of excitement, I have no doubt; and that they have indulged, as is the habit of the Khalsa, in mutinous and treasonable boastings about their purposes, is highly probable; and it is by no means improbable that some of them, especially Colonel Bahdoor Sing's regiment, may have intended, if an opportunity offered, to go off to Mooltan; and other regiments may have purposed joining in the expedition; but that Sirdar Chuttur Sing, an old and infirm man, the father-in-law of the Maharajah, and with more at stake than any man almost in the Punjab, should have taken the leading part in an affair of the kind described by Captain Abbott, is altogether incredible.

I have, constantly, cautioned Captain Abbott about receiving as true the rumours which are brought to him, and pointed out the absolute necessity of his testing the accuracy of the information he receives; and, while I have told him that, in the event of an actual treasonable movement on the part of any regiment or brigade, he would be justified in preventing, by every means in his power, the accomplishment by such corps of its treasonable purpose, I have warned him of the necessity of only acting when the émeute had actually taken place, and that with great caution, as the calling up of an armed population in aid of the civil power is a momentous business, and I have pointed out to him how much easier it is to raise, than to allay, a power thus brought into action, and impelled by religious antipathies and feelings of long cherished hatred.

Living, as we do, in such an atmosphere of treachery, perfidy, falsehood, and deceit, in the Punjab, it is certainly not easy to determine what is, and what is not, worthy of credit, but it has been for some time to me evident that Captain Abbott was being practised upon by parties, for what purpose I know not, who were exaggerating existing dangers, and fixing the authorship of treacherous proceedings on persons unconnected therewith.

The constant suspicion with which Captain Abbott regarded Sirdar Chuttur Sing, seems to have, not unnaturally, estranged that chief from him, and induced the Sirdar to withdraw from that free and confidential communication, without which it is impossible for persons holding the positions they do respectively, to conduct their business.

This state of feeling seems to have been taken advantage of, by persons interested in widening the breach between the two; till Captain Abbott looks upon Sirdar Chuttur Sing as a sort of incarnation of treason, and the Sirdar has been led to believe that Captain Abbott is bent upon the annihilation of himself, and the Khalsa army in Hazara, on the first opportunity.

The raising of the armed Mahomedan population of Hazara by Captain Abbott, for the purpose of preventing the Pukli brigade from moving from its cantonments to march either on Mooltan or Lahore, caused great alarm to Sirdar Chuttur Sing and the Sikh troops of Hazara. It is reported that the mountaineers assembled in large numbers, and surrounded the town of Hurripore, in the strong fort of which, Hurkishengurh, Sirdar Chuttur Sing resides; while Captain Abbott has, since May last, been at Shirwan in the hills, about thirty-five miles off. There is, as it is described, an open space of some 200 or 300 yards between the walls of the town of Hurripore and the fort; and the Sirdar directed the detachments of Durbar troops, stationed in the town for its protection, to bring their guns, and to encamp in the open space above described, under the protection of the guns from the fort.



Commedan Canora (a European or an American, I know not which, who has long been in the Sikh service,) refused to obey the Sirdar's orders, unless backed by Captain Abbott. The Sirdar repeated his orders, saying that Captain Abbott could not know the peril they were in, from the threatened attack of the armed population, who would easily seize the guns where they were, and that he would take the responsibility of the movement on himself. The Commedan refused obedience; and, placing himself between his two guns, which he had loaded with grape, threatened to fire on any one that approached him.

The Sirdar, it appears, said that his orders must be obeyed, when, as it is stated, some soldiers got behind buildings, &c., within musket range, and shot the Commedan, before he could discharge his guns.

It is reported, though I have no particulars, that when the death of Commedan Canora, who was believed to be in the interest of the Mahomedans, became known, an attack was made on the Sikh troops at Pukh; and that the whole country was thrown into a state of insurrection and riot.

The Hazara dak has come in for two days, without bringing me any letter or tidings from Captain Abbott; from which I conclude that the road between Shirwan and Hurrpore is not open. The Dak Moonshah at the Chokee, where the Hazara road joins the Peshawur one, states that the packets have been seized, and taken to Sirdar Chuttur Sing.

Sirdar Chuttur Sing has written to the cantonments of Hussan Abdal and Kurara, calling on the officers, in urgent terms, to march instantly to his aid, with their troops and guns, stating that the armed population of Hazara has risen at the instigation of Captain Abbott, and that he and the Hazara troops are in imminent peril.

The officers commanding these cantonments have very properly referred the Sirdar's order to the Durbar and myself, stating that, as the Sirdar's order is not countersigned by Captain Abbott, they have thought it would not be right to act upon it, till they receive my instructions.

This is the state in which things were, when the last accounts came away, letters and reports were received, yesterday afternoon, from Sirdar Chuttur Sing, addressed to myself, to the Durbar collectively, and to Raja Tej Sing, and Deena Nath, and Sirdar Golab Sing (Chuttur Sing's son), detailing the outbreak as above, declaring his own loyalty and long-tried fidelity, and speaking in terms of respectful complaint of the parties who have maligned his character to Captain Abbott, and abused his mind as to the present state and intentions of the army, and the Sirdar's own conduct.

If it were possible for me to leave Lahore, (which it is not, at the present moment, with the brigades advancing on Mooltan, under my instructions,) I should at once go off to Hazara, where I am satisfied that I could, at once, settle this untoward affair. As it is, I have deputed my chief assistant, Mr. Cocks, with full powers on my part, to make such arrangements as he thinks fit, after a full investigation, for the settlement of the district, and the administration of the Hazara province.

On the receipt at Peshawur of the intelligence of this disturbance, which intelligence was conveyed by a letter from the Commandant of the Pukli cantonment, Lieutenant Nicholson immediately started for Hussan Abdal. I entirely approve of Lieutenant Nicholson's having done this, and I have every hope that his presence would tend to prevent further violence on the rising of the population in that neighbourhood, while Captain Abbott, finding that his informer misled him as to the present disposition of the troops beyond Hazara, and the intentions of the Nazim, will have been able to send back to their villages the armed population of the province.

This is the state in which the affair appears to be, from the information which has reached me up to this time, which information is derived from the statement of the Durbar news writer, and other parties who have sent in letters to the Durbar from the neighbourhood, and from the representations of Sirdar Chuttur Sing himself. I am not without strong suspicion of the conduct of the Sirdar, though I do not believe him guilty of the extensive treason laid to his charge by Captain Abbott. The most suspicious points against him, as at present actually developed, are the interruption of the communication between Captain Abbott and myself, the putting to death of Commedan Canora; and the silence observed by him to the Durbar, and to all parties, here and at Hazara, of the disturbed state of the Pukli brigade, of which there appears to be no doubt.

In consequence of Lieutenant Nicholson having proceeded to the neighbourhood of the disturbance on the night of the 8th, I have delayed Mr. Cocks' departure till to-morrow, hoping to hear from Lieutenant Nicholson, or to receive further intelligence in that interim.

Inclosure 14 in No. 35.

*The Resident at Lahore to Major Lawrence*

*Lahore, August 12, 1848.*

I HAVE the honor to acknowledge the receipt of your letter, without date.

I approve of your having carried into execution the sentence passed on the emissary of the rebel Dewan Moolraj, and am glad that the conduct of the troops on the occasion was so satisfactory.

I entirely approve of your having sent Lieutenant Nicholson to Attock and Hussan Abdal, on hearing from Colonel Boodh Sing Man of the untoward occurrences in Hazara.

I have every hope of your being able to keep the troops in Peshawur in a due state of subordination. As far as has yet appeared, this outbreak has been occasioned by designing parties practising upon Captain Abbott, and abusing his mind as to the real state of the troops generally, and as to the conduct and intentions of Sirdar Chuttur Sing, Attarcewalla, the Nazim of Peshawur \*

Inclosure 15 in No. 35

*The Resident at Lahore to Captain Nicholson*

*Lahore, August 12, 1848.*

I HAVE just received a letter from Major Lawrence, dated Peshawur, the 8th instant, from which I learn that, upon hearing from Colonel Boodh Sing Man of the disturbance in Hazara, you have come to Attock, or Hussan Abdal, for the purpose of assuring the troops, and keeping all quiet in your former jurisdiction.

I entirely approve of what you have done, and, if the disturbance has been occasioned, as it would appear from the only documents that have yet reached Lahore, by the armed peasantry of Hazara being raised by Captain Abbott, in consequence of exaggerated statements made to him of the misconduct of the Sikh troops in Pukli, and under the mistaken notion of Sirdar Chuttur Sing's treasonable practices and purposes, I am in great hopes that, by your presence and judicious management, further outrage may be prevented, and peace restored.

I have strongly recommended Sirdar Chuttur Sing, if he desires to prove his loyalty, and the road is open, immediately to go to you. I inclose a Khurreeta to the Sirdar, for you, after being read, to forward to him. There is also inclosed a letter from his son, Sirdar Golab Sing, to the Sirdar, to the same effect.

I also forward the copy of a letter yesterday addressed by me to Captain Abbott, with whom you will put yourself in communication, and with whom you will co-operate to allay, as far as possible, the present disturbance, and to soften all conflicting feelings which may have been occasioned.

I have only the Sirdar's account of the death of the Commedan Canora. If the Commedan was satisfied (and it should appear that he was right in his supposition) that Sirdar Chuttur Sing's purpose was treasonable in collecting the guns outside the city of Hurnpore, he was justified in refusing obedience to the Nazim's orders, and the Sirdar will, in that case, have to render a strict account of his conduct. If, on the contrary, the measure ordered by the Sirdar was merely a precautionary one to protect the force, and to prevent the guns from falling into the hands of the armed Mahomedans, who were about to attack the

\* See in orig.

city, the Comedian was not justified in refusing to obey the Sirdar, when his orders were repeated, and he declared that he would take all the responsibility of the measure not having been directed by Captain Abbott.

Two daks have arrived from Hazara, without any letter from Captain Abbott. The moonshee at Serai Kala states that the packets have been seized and taken to Sirdar Chuttur Sing this can hardly be the case. The seizure by the Sirdar of the Government dak, intended for Captain Abbott, is altogether inconsistent with his professions of fidelity and loyalty.

I am awaiting some further intelligence, before Mr. Cocks leaves this; his dak is laid for this evening. If I do not hear during the day, Mr. Cocks will remain till to-morrow.

I am anxiously looking for a letter from you, that I may know how you found matters on your arrival at Attock and Hussan Abdal.

Inclosure 16 in No. 35.

*The Resident at Lahore to A H Cocks, Esq, Chief Assistant to the Resident;  
on deputation to Hazara*

*Lahore, August 12, 1848.*

YOU are fully acquainted with all the details as far as they have hitherto reached Lahore, of the disturbance which has broken out at Hazara, and I have communicated to you personally my opinion of the expediency of your proceeding, with as little delay as possible, to the neighbourhood of the disturbance, for the purpose of investigating its origin, and all the circumstances connected with it, and for making such arrangements as appear desirable for its suppression, and the prevention of its recurrence. Your cheerful readiness to undertake this duty is very satisfactory to me. I request you will make arrangements for proceeding towards Hazara, with as little delay as possible.

I have directed Sirdar Jhunda Sing, the Naib Nazim of Hazara, who was deputed with a brigade towards Mooltan, and has for the last few days been, by my instructions, at Lahore, to accompany you. Sirdar Jhunda Sing is an officer in whom, till lately, Captain Abbott had the utmost confidence; his conduct, whenever it has come under my observation, has been quite unexceptionable, and, though I had promised to allow him to go to Mooltan, about which he was most desirous, he has, without a moment's hesitation, undertaken the present duty. He has great influence in Hazara, with the Nazim Sirdar Chuttur Sing and with the troops.

On arriving in the neighbourhood of Hazara, you will put yourself in communication with Sirdar Chuttur Sing and with Captain Abbott, and will consider yourself vested with full authority by me to adopt, immediately, any measure you may think necessary, and which there may not be time to refer for my decision, for the restoration of tranquillity in the province, and for bringing the parties who may appear to you guilty, as being the promoters of the disturbance, to justice.

The information we, at present, possess of this affair is, as you know, very limited; that which we may receive, in the course of to-day or to-morrow, will probably alter its complexion. You must make yourself acquainted with all the details you can, as you proceed, and must be guided by circumstances in your proceedings.

Inclosure 17 in No. 35.

*Captain Nicholson to the Resident at Lahore.*

*Camp, Hussan Abdal, August 12, 1848.*

I HAVE the honor to report my arrival here this morning, from Attock, with sixty Puthan horse and forty foot.

I left 150 Puthans in Attock, and having (as previously reported by me) turned out Boodh Sing's company of regulars, I now consider the fort secure from internal treachery.

On my arrival here, learning that the 100 Goorchurras of Sirdar Mehtab Sing, Majeetia, here had abused, and expelled from camp, their Commedan, for refusing to join the Hazara force, I paraded the party, and dismissed and confined the ringleader on the spot. The remainder begged forgiveness, and, having some reason to believe them sincere, and wishing to show that I was not entirely without confidence in Sikhs, I granted it. I shall, of course, keep a sharp look out on them in future.

Captain Abbott is at Nara, and Sirdar Chuttur Sing with the Sikh force at Hurripore. This, though strong in artillery, is under 1,500 men, the regiments being all very weak.

Captain Abbott has, doubtless, acquainted you with all the particulars of the émeute in his district. I shall, therefore, only say that, from all I can learn, Sirdar Chuttur Sing's conduct, at the commencement, was owing as much to nervousness and suspicion as any other feeling, and, but for the murder of the unfortunate commandant of artillery, I should have had hopes of an amicable adjustment.

As it is, the dislike to surrender the perpetrators would alone, I believe, prove an insurmountable obstacle.

My information agrees with Captain Abbott's, as to the present intention of the Sikh troops in Hazara, to effect a junction with the Pukli brigade, and then march on Lahore.

I am raising a militia, for the protection of this district. A regular soldier of any kind I have not with me, and, of the small party I brought with me from Peshawur, there are but three men whom I ever saw till I started.

It would appear that the commanding officers of the troops here, were compelled to join Chuttur Sing by their men. Colonel Boodh Sing returned here yesterday, with about a dozen of his men.

I have written to Colonels Baboo Pandey and Noorooddeen to follow his example.

Sirdars Goordut Sing and Mehtab Sing, Majeetia, at Rawul Pindee, have refused to join Chuttur Sing. The latter has sent agents both to Lahore, and Peshawur, to endeavour to corrupt the troops there, he has also entertained a few hundred men in Potwar, a district in which he has much influence.

Everything, if I may offer an opinion, depends on promptly sending up troops. A single brigade, with a nine-pounder battery, would be ample, with the aid which Captain Abbott and myself would be able to render. Delay will have a bad effect in every way, and may afford the mutineers opportunities of tampering with the Peshawur force.

I write in unavoidable haste and in the midst of many interruptions.

Inclosure 18 in No. 35.

*The Resident at Lahore to the Secretary to the Government of India.*

*Lahore, August 13, 1848.*

THE post hour yesterday had passed before my letter of that date, with its inclosures, was ready for dispatch.

This morning I have received a letter\* from Lieutenant Nicholson, of which I inclose a copy, his prompt occupation of the strong fort of Attock, is a most important move at the present moment.

All was quiet at Peshawur on the 9th, but the troops were beginning to show symptoms of uneasiness at the reports from Hazara.

From Hussan Abdal, I learn that the Sikh troops there have marched, contrary to the orders of their officers, to join Sirdar Chuttur Sing in Hazara. Colonel Boodh Sing Man, with the officers of his regiment, and about fifty Sepoys, had got away from the force, and returned to Hussan Abdal.

Captain Abbott is said, from other reports, as well as in Lieutenant Nicholson's letter, to have left Shirwan, and come to Mishwanee, where, with the Mishwanee tribe and the Gundgurreas, he commands the passes into Hazara: if this be the case, he will be able to communicate, without difficulty, with Lahore,

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\* Inclosure 8 in No. 35.

but I doubt if he will trust his letter to the Durbar post, as he is satisfied that the Durbar, and all the Durbar officials, are in this conspiracy; but I have no reason to think he is correct, in fact, the post has been most regularly conducted, and the proceedings of all parties connected with it, have been most satisfactory in all particulars

It is much to be feared that the present outbreak, let it have arisen from whatever cause it may, will spread to all the troops on the frontier. I have heard from many quarters that there is an impression that, by detaching the troops, we have left ourselves very weak at Lahore and Ferozepore, and that the native troops of the garrison are not to be depended on.

In consequence of the present position of affairs, the mutinous march of the Hussan Abdal force, and the state of the road between this and Hazara, as reported this morning, I have detained Mr. Cocks for the present at Lahore, and have sent off Sirdar Jhunda Sing, with a confidential vakeel from his son, Sirdar Golab Sing, to Sirdar Chuttur Sing, to persuade him to go himself to Lieutenant Nicholson, or to Captain Abbott, and to explain to him that if, as he states, his proceedings have been of a defensive character, on account of the initiative having been taken by the armed Mahomedans, the affair may be easily adjusted, by his returning the troops to their cantonments, and by their obedience to discipline and orders

#### Inclosure 19 in No 35

*Lieutenant Nicholson to the Resident at Lahore*

*August 13, 1848*

AFTER I had dispatched my letter, yesterday, I learned that Captain Abbott's regiment stationed at Kurara, had deserted that post, and arrived, with two guns, at Rawul Pindce, intending to proceed thence to join the Hazara force. I immediately sent orders to the levies *en route* to join me, to concentrate at Margulla, with the view of stopping there the further progress of the mutinous regiment. I rode out myself early this morning, and surveyed the position, it is not of any great strength, but I know not a more suitable one for my purpose, and I trust I shall be able to hold it, though my levies are not very warlike,—were they Affghans or Hazara men, I should have no doubts. The regiment did not attempt to cross to-day, but I hear purposes doing so to-morrow; I shall be at the position myself, my levies amount to about 800

I have written to Lal Sing, Moracce, to keep the returning leave men of the Peshawur and Hazara force by him till he hears from me again. Were they to fall in with the Kurara regiment at present, they would probably join it. I inclose a copy of a moorasila received to-day from Chuttur Sing. I have, in reply, expressed my regret at what has occurred, and my willingness to do what I can towards a peaceable arrangement, but insisted, as a preliminary, on the artillery commandant & murderers being given up, and the force which went from this being sent back. I have stopped all the roads leading to Hazara, and I hear the troops are beginning to get disheartened. I am sure they would lay down their arms, without a blow at present, were one of our brigades to move in sight. I am treating the Goorchurras here with some confidence, indeed, they are as many as myself, my levies being all at Margulla. It is very strange that neither Goordut Sing, nor Mehtab Sing, should have informed me of the movements of the Kurara regiment

#### Inclosure 20 in No 35.

*Major-General Whish, C.B., to the Adjutant-General.*

*Camp, Sndarpore, August 14, 1848.*

I HAVE the honor to report the arrival of the right column of the force under my command, at this place, on the 12th instant. Her Majesty's 10th foot left their boats, and joined our camp on the same date.

The present statement I inclose, will show that the force is in a high state of health and efficiency. The foot artillery, sappers, and 2nd company of

pioneers, being on the river, we have not been able to communicate with them, or receive their returns; and I have no report, as yet, of the remainder of Her Majesty's 32nd foot having left Ferozepore.

On account of the facility of water communication between this and Mooltan, I have directed the commissariat officer to establish a depôt here, for fifteen days' supplies, to be replenished, from time to time, if necessary a party of 300 infantry, and 50 cavalry, of the chief of Sehung, remains for its protection, and the steamer "Conqueror" will communicate with this depôt, from our camp, every four days, if required.

The left column was to have marched to Kurrumpoor yesterday, and continues its march to-day. We proceed to-morrow, and hope to take up our position near Jampoor on the 18th; the left column should join us next day.

The artillery and siege-train boats have been delayed by high winds, and I cannot say the probable date of their arrival at Bindree Ghat, private letters give good accounts of the health of all in that quarter, to the 11th instant.

Having received some information from Lieutenant Edwardes regarding the canal that supplies the waters of inundation at Mooltan, I am sending off by boats, to-night, 100 bildars with tools, under protection of a large body of Malce Sing's troops, and his two guns, (the "Conqueror" steamer accompanying) to stop the head of the canal in the most efficient manner. Lieutenant Glover of the engineers will superintend the work, and I have requested Lieutenant Edwardes to be ready to support the party, if needful. The right column will be within five coss of the canal head, on Wednesday the 16th, the day the work may be expected to commence, and ready to give them any assistance, and probably overawe any interference on the part of the enemy.

#### Inclosure 21 in No. 35

*The Resident at Lahore to the Secretary to the Government of India.*

*Lahore, August 15, 1848.*

I FORWARD a letter, this day addressed by me to the Commander-in-Chief, relative to the state of affairs in Hazara, and on the north-west frontier. These papers will bring before his Lordship in Council all the information that has reached me relative to the émeute in Hazara, since I last wrote.

I am still in hope that it will prove that this disturbance has originated in other causes than those attributed to it by Captain Abbott, and that it may yet be prevented from assuming a very formidable character. The knowledge by the Sikhs that they will have to fight their way every inch out of Hazara, will, perhaps, have the effect of making them amenable to such arrangements as Lieutenant Nicholson and Captain Abbott may make with the Nazim.

His Lordship will have observed a very ready disposition on the part of Captain Abbott to believe the reports that are brought to him of conspiracies, plots, and treasons—a suspicion of every body, far or near, even of his own servants, and a conviction of the infallibility of his conclusions, which is not shaken by finding, time after time, that they are not verified. But he has many excellent qualifications as a public officer, an indefatigable application to business, a most scrupulous desire to show the strictest justice in all his investigations, decisions, and proceedings, and a kind, and eminently conciliatory, manner to the natives, coupled with great firmness and intrepidity of character. In Hazara, of which he has made the settlement, he is beloved, in fact almost worshipped, by the people, all persons that I have conversed with who have come from those parts, are unanimous in their estimation of him. They say that he has gained such an influence over the inhabitants of the province, that he can do whatever he pleases with a race whom the Sikhs could never control, and whom the wily and shrewd Maharajah Golab Sing was glad to get from under his government on almost any terms. This is the people that has now risen at his bidding, and it is to be hoped that he may have influence and power to allay the storm which he has raised, of his own authority, and without communicating his purpose to any one.

It is very much to be regretted that Captain Abbott has, for the last three months, resided at such a distance from the Nazim, and has been thus shut out from all personal communication with him. Had he sent for the Nazim, or gone

himself to him, and conferred with him on the state of the troops, and the reports which were rife about them, and consulted him, personally, on the subjects connected with the government of the province, I am sure this state of things would never have arisen. Sirdar Chuttur Sing is a wily old chief of Runjeet Sing's time, who has been concerned, in his day, in many treacherous proceedings, and is the confidential friend of Maharajah Golab Sing, but he is now infirm and in ill health, and has obtained too\* much wealth, and a very honorable position in the present administration, while his daughter is the betrothed wife of the young Maharajah of Lahore. The Sirdar would not, I have no doubt, hesitate to connive at proceedings that might embarrass us, and get him a good reputation with the priesthood; but that he should take the prominent part assigned him by Captain Abbott, in a conspiracy of the kind indicated by that officer, without apparent object, is hardly to be credited.

Inclosure 22 in No. 35.

*The Resident at Lahore to the Commander-in-Chief.*

Lahore, August 15, 1848

I FORWARD letters relative to the state of Hazara and the north western frontier

No important change in the aspect of affairs has taken place up to this time, and I am yet in hopes that my letters, and the Durbar purwannas, to Sirdar Chuttur Sing, which would reach him to-day, and the emissaries mentioned in my last, who would in all probability, be in Hazara to-morrow, may have the effect of checking future disturbance

It will be seen that Lieutenant Nicholson,† judging from the result of inquiries made on the spot, and without any knowledge of my view, has come to the same conclusion as myself relative to the origin of the outbreak, viz., that Sirdar Chuttur Sing adopted the course he has pursued under an impression of alarm, distrust, and suspicion, as to Captain Abbott's purposes in raising the Mahomedan population.

If this be the case, and the parties have not committed themselves further than has hitherto reported, there is no reason why the affair should not be adjusted. Lieutenant Nicholson does not seem to know the manner of Commedan Canora's death, he calls it a murder, and says that he understands Sirdar Chuttur Sing headed the party that killed him.

From the report the Sirdar himself made to me, and to the Durbar, and in a letter to his son, corroborated by a detailed statement written by an eyewitness to Mir Megraj, the Durbar Treasurer, not intended for my perusal, it would seem that, on the afternoon of the 6th of this month, the town of Hurrpore, the capital of Hazara, was said to be threatened by a vast concourse of armed Mahomedans, collected from the neighbouring districts. Sirdar Chuttur Sing wrote to Captain Abbott to acquaint him with the fact, and to inquire if it was, as was stated, by his orders; in the meantime, the Sirdar called the officers together, and consulted them, as to the best mode of protecting themselves, and the city, from the insurgents. It was determined to bring the five guns which were inside the city gates, outside the town, and place them in the open space between the fort and the city, under the protection of the guns of the former.

Commedan Canora, an artillery officer in the Sikh service, refused to bring his guns out of the town, without special orders from Captain Abbott; the Nazim remonstrated with the Commedan, and said that, if the guns remained where they were, they would inevitably fall into the hands of the insurgents, and that it was, therefore, absolutely necessary for the protection of the force that they should be brought out, and that the Commedan must obey his orders. Canora still refused, saying, that he would apply to Captain Abbott, and, if he ordered the move, it should take place the next morning. The Nazim said, that would be too late, and that he would give the Commedan a written certificate of the move being made by his orders, and on his responsibility. The Commedan still refused obedience to the Nazim's orders, and the latter told the Colonel of the infantry regiment to enforce them. Canora stood between the

\* Sic in orig.

† Inclosure 17 in No. 35.

guns, with the lighted port-fire in his hand, and asid he would fire upon the first man that came near; the Nazim repeated his orders to the Colonel, and the Commedan was shot with musketry, and the guns brought to the place appointed by the artillerymen

Now, if this be the true version of the affair, and the Nazim was really acting for the protection of the troops against the armed population, the cause of whose rising had not been communicated to him, the Governor of the Province, there is nothing in the circumstance which need stand in the way of an amicable arrangement for the suppression of further disturbance.

I have fully explained this to Lieutenant Nicholson, and the emissaries I have dispatched to the spot.

But it is highly probable, that the insurrection has already spread too far to be now put down by the means I have employed. The two regiments, with the troop of horse artillery, have marched from Hussan Abdal, against the orders of their officers, and have joined the Sirdar, and the regiment from Rawul Pindee has done the same, the mutinous Khalsa troops will soon, it may be found, be beyond the control of the Nazim, or any one else, and let the origin of the outbreak have been what it may, the result will be the same, the Sikh troops in the other districts will rise and join in the revolt, and there will be a general insurrection of the Sikh army.

There is no sign, hitherto, anywhere, of the conspiracy or combination among the chiefs, or any parties, at Lahore, as believed by Captain Abbott, or of any complicity on the part of any one connected with the Durbar in the present outbreak. I can account for the émeute in no way save that suggested in my former letter, and by Lieutenant Nicholson. I communicated Captain Abbott's suspicions to Lieutenant Edwardes, with whom Raja Shere Sing, the Sirdar's eldest son, is, before Mooltan. I have inclosed a copy of Lieutenant Edwardes' reply, contained in that officer's letter to me of the 10th instant.\*

As I said before, I am not without hopes of checking this affair, without any military movement on our part, a very few days, at the utmost, will show if I am successful, but your Lordship will perceive that it may be a very serious business. If the troops rise generally, they will feel that they have committed themselves finally, and their last struggle will be as desperate as they can make it.

We must be prepared, as far as we can, for all events, though I trust the more serious may be averted. I am of opinion with the Brigadier, that we are strong enough for anything at Lahore, but we have no disposable troops to move to the westward, should a move become necessary. Jullundur and Ferozepore should be made as strong as possible.

Lieutenant Nicholson recommends the immediate advance of a brigade towards Hazara; a military movement would, at this moment, be premature; but, if a move should become necessary, it must be of sufficient strength to put down all opposition, without trusting to the undisciplined assistance Lieutenant Nicholson alludes to. Such a force as is now before Mooltan, or a little stronger in field artillery and cavalry, would easily beat the Sikh troops now available in the north-western frontier.

The fall of Mooltan, at this moment, would put a stop to all further insurrectionary movement the columns will unite, in the course of four or five days at latest, but I fear, from Major Napier's last report, that it will be very nearly the end of the month before they will be all ready to break ground before the fort. It has never, it appears, entered into the contemplation of any part of the Sikh army to attempt a march to the rescue of Mooltan. They fancy that we have sent a very formidable force in that direction, and that, to enable us to do so, we have weakened ourselves at the capital.

Inclosure 23 in No. 35

*Major Lawrence to the Resident at Lahore.*

*Peshawur, August 15, 1848.*

I AM of opinion the present collision has arisen from Captain Abbott's anxiety to prevent the troops in Hazara from deserting their posts, and proceeding to join Moolraj at Mooltan, in which design he had reason to believe

\* Inclosure 9 in No. 35.



they were aided, and instigated, by the Nazim, Sirdar Chuttur Sing, Attareewalla.

Captain Abbott naturally supposed that the movement of such a body of Khalsas, once commenced, would operate upon all the troops on this side of the Jhelum and Indus, and place the British functionaries in a most critical position, as well as endanger the integrity of the empire.

The Pukli brigade have long talked, openly of their intention to seize the first opportunity to quit Hazara, and there has been a general feeling, throughout the Sikh army, that the Mooltan rebellion was their opportunity for restoring the Khalsa rule to its pristine state. Emissaries have not been wanting to propagate this feeling in all quarters.

From the nature of Captain Abbott's duties, and from the divided state of his force, over a large extent of mountainous country, it strikes me he has not had that intimate connection with them that it has been my good fortune to have with mine, and which is so necessary for their efficient control: more, therefore, has naturally devolved on commanding officers, and, from there being no General commanding in chief, as I have in Sirdar Golab Sing, Povidia, each commandant has done pretty much as he liked, and looked up to Sirdar Chuttur Sing as their leader.

The state of this Sirdar's health and other causes appear to have prevented his seeing much of Captain Abbott, and the delicacy of mind of that officer has, probably, led him to interfere much less in the management of the province, than would have been desirable, or than has prevailed within my jurisdiction.

I am told, and my experience confirms it, that whatever may be the disposition of the Sirdar towards us, his confidential advisers are notoriously disaffected, corrupt, and profligate, and that he holds them in little check.

Under these circumstances, it is not to be wondered that, on the Pukli brigade manifesting a disposition to quit the post, contrary to the repeatedly expressed orders of Captain Abbott, he should have taken the only means in his power to prevent them, by calling on the people of the country to oppose the movement.

Nor is it surprising that the brigade should call on their chief to support them; but, if he be the true and loyal man he would represent himself, it behoves him, first, to show why, on receiving their requisition, he did not, at once, proceed to Captain Abbott, or place himself in communication with that officer, to ascertain the merits of the case, secondly, what was his authority for calling on troops beyond his jurisdiction, and manifestly under the orders of the superintendent of Sind Sagur, and, thirdly, why he not only sanctioned, by his presence, the murder of Comedian Canora, but rewarded the murderers. Surely, with the force at his disposal, he could with as little difficulty have captured this one isolated European, as it appears he experienced in destroying him.

My deputation of Lieutenant Nicholson to Attock, already reported, has been attended with the happiest result, in placing that important fortress in a perfect state of security, and giving the peaceable and well disposed subjects of Sind Sagur the support and confidence which the presence of an European officer invariably confers.

His knowledge of that extensive territory, the esteem in which he is held, and his approved zeal, activity, and judgment will be of the greatest service at this important crisis, and, as time is every thing at such a period, I have directed him to act in all matters, at once, without reference to me.

I have, at his requisition, furnished him with 150 horse and 500 foot from hence, and can send him as many more as he may require, being happy and proud to say that such is the peaceful state of this province, and so well are the troops in hand, that, notwithstanding the many attempts that have, of late, been made to excite sedition, for which I have executed one emissary, and have now two under examination, I have no apprehension of any outbreak. I need scarcely add that my own precautions will be, in no way, relaxed, and that, in all things, I have the cordial support and assistance of the Governor, Sirdar Golab Sing, Povidia.

I would add that, in accordance with the suggestions of the Governor, I addressed Sirdar Chuttur Sing on the 13th instant, announcing the general reports that are current, as to his being the instigator of the *émeute* among the troops, and that although they were incredible to me, still that they came from so many quarters, and carried with them so much plausibility, that, as his friend and well-wisher, I deemed it essential he should, forthwith, furnish me with a statement of the facts.

I, at the same time, wrote to Colonel Boodh Sing Man, applauding his having separated himself from the bulk of his regiment, and returned to Hussan Abdal, and telling him to inform his own officers and men, and those of other corps, that all who return to their duty, at once, would be favorably considered, always excepting those connected with the murder of the unfortunate Canora.

Inclosure 24 in No. 35

*The Resident at Lahore to the Secretary to the Government of India*

*Lahore, August 16, 1848*

I AM, still, without any communication from Captain Abbott, of a later date than the 6th, though I hear, from all quarters, of his being at Nara, with a strong party of hardy mountaineers, guarding the pass into the Hazara districts: he seems to be in constant communication with Lieutenant Nicholson, but he will not write by the dak, and it takes a messenger six or seven days to come in. Still, I ought to have later intelligence, even by a private messenger.

Lieutenant Nicholson has acted with great promptitude and judgment, and his measures have had a great effect in checking the spread of the disturbance.

The accounts, to-day, are, that the soldiers, who so readily obeyed the orders of the Nazim to march to his rescue, find themselves in a predicament they little bargained for, and are well disposed to return to their cantonments, while the Nazim is more than ever desirous of bringing matters to an amicable adjustment.

I hope this may be the case. I have taken every possible means of effecting this, and bringing the outbreak to a close without bloodshed.

It is an extraordinary business. There is no doubt that a large part of the Pukh force was in a very bad state, and meditated mischief, in aid of the cause of Moolraj, at this the Nazim seems to have so far connived, that he did not report it but he seems to have done so, rather from pique with Captain Abbott, than from disaffection. He had taken offence with Captain Abbott on account of his distrust and suspicion of him (whether just or unjust, remains to be seen), and he would not report,—a circumstance which he thought would embarrass that officer.

After the death of Canora (an American, I find, who had been for a great many years in the Sikh artillery service), the Sindai thought himself compromised irretrievably, it would appear, with us, and he is reported, after that, to have meditated rebellious proceedings on a large scale, but I have not yet heard, for certain, of his having done more than call the troops to him from the neighbouring cantonments, his excuse for which is the rising of the Mahomedan population, and their threatening Hurripore and the other towns of Hazara. I can see no sign of the extensive conspiracy of which he was supposed by Captain Abbott to be at the head. The conduct of the Durbar, collectively and individually, has been entirely satisfactory in everything connected with this outbreak, and, indeed, in all other respects for the last two months.

Inclosure 25 in No. 35.

*The Resident at Lahore to Lieutenant Nicholson*

*Lahore, August 16, 1848.*

I ENTIRELY approve of the measures you have taken to prevent the six companies of the regiment from Kunara from passing into Hazara, unmolested; and I feel that the promptness, judgment, energy, and decision, displayed in your proceedings at Attock and Hussan Abdal, have been of the greatest importance, in checking the spread of the disaffection and mutinous proceedings which are still rife in Hazara.

I have, already, given you my instructions on the subject of this outbreak. I trust that, on the receipt of my letters to Captain Abbott, yourself, and the

Nazim, and of the Durbar orders to the latter, you will have been able to take measures for the suppression of the outbreak, which it is most desirable to put down, without the necessity of having recourse to military operations.

Inclosure 26 in No. 35.

*The Resident at Lahore to Captain Abbott.*

*Lahore, August 16, 1848.*

A SPECIAL messenger arrived from Sirdar Chuttur Sing, with communications to myself, to the Durbar, and to his son, Sirdar Golab Sing.

The Nazim's complaints of your want of confidence in him, of your having set him aside in the Government till he had become a mere cypher, of your suspicion and misconstruction of his conduct on all occasions during the last two or three months, and of his feelings of distress and humiliation on the subject, to have had any weight, and to have merited consideration, should have been preferred at the time, and not now, that he has assumed an attitude of opposition, which he finds it difficult to maintain.

Another paper has also fallen into my hands, sent to me by a member of the Durbar, and of a character which must prove, if such proof were necessary, the absence of all complicity of the sender in the Sirdar's proceedings, from which the misconduct of the Sirdar, since the late outbreak, is established. And from this, and other papers regarding the Pukh force, submitted by the Sirdar himself, it is quite evident that a large part of that force was in a mutinous state for some time, that this was known to the Sirdar, and that he, whatever may have been his motive for so doing, connived at what was going on. The state of the force was, certainly, such as to justify your taking any precautionary measures to defend a treasonable outbreak, and I have no doubt that the present professed loyalty, and amenability to orders, of the Sirdar, and the disposition to obedience and subordination evinced by the troops, are caused by the prompt and efficient measures, you have adopted, having made the course which the Nazim and the troops contemplated, more difficult and dangerous than they anticipated.

I am still very anxious that the door of return to obedience and good conduct, should not be closed, by any more overt act of aggression on the part of the Nazim. His position in the State, as one of the negotiators of the Treaty, and his near relation to the Maharajah, make it of the last importance to the interests of the Sikh Government, that he should not be convicted of disaffection and disloyalty. The conduct of his two sons, too, Raja Shere Sing, and Sirdar Golab Sing, make me desirous to look with all leniency on the proceedings of their father.

I know not what reply you may have sent to the Nazim, to the proposition which, he says, he made to you on the 9th of the month, to go himself, or to send his son, Ootar Sing, to you.

I look with much interest to the report of Sirdar Jhunda Sing's arrival at Hazara, with the motmid of Sirdar Golab Sing. I am in great hopes that, through his instrumentality, the untoward affair may be adjusted.

I have written fully to Lieutenant Nicholson on the subject. It is probable that the Nazim will communicate with him more freely than with yourself, after all that has passed, and I am sure that you will co-operate together to bring his matter to a satisfactory issue.

Inclosure 27 in No. 35.

*Major Lawrence to the Resident at Lahore.*

*Peshawur, August 17, 1848.*

ON the 15th instant, I addressed you, giving my views of the rise and progress of the Hazara émeute. On the following day, a motbir of Sirdar Chuttur Sing arrived, bringing letters for me, the Governor, and Sirdar Khan Sing, calling on us to furnish him with three regiments of infantry and some cavalry, to assist his force against the people of the country.

Considering it most probable that the Sirdar's servant might have more

to say than he would impart to me, I suggested to my Governor that, when I left the room, he should quietly ascertain if there was anything Sirdar Chuttur Sing wished to intimate to him confidentially.

The old man's eyes glistened with delight, and the following is briefly what he elicited.

Reports were prevalent in Hazara, that the force here had risen, and imprisoned myself and the other British officers. The letters produced were merely a blind. The motbir's instructions were to bring back with him as many troops as he could.

On the murder of Commandant Canora, Sirdar Chuttur Sing had sent messengers to his sons, Raja Shere Sing, at Mooltan, and Sirdar Golab Sing, at Lahore, announcing what had occurred, telling the former to become *tugia*, i. e., to be ready for action, and the latter to hasten from the capital, in any way he could, and join him at once.

Letters were, also, written to Futtch Khan, Towannah, but Lieutenant Nicholson's arrival at Attock prevented their being sent. His presence had completely paralyzed the Sirdar, who had, previously, made considerable progress in tampering with the men of Chuch and Ghebe.

The ruler of Cashmere was, likewise, addressed, and aid entreated, but, as no answer had been received, it was supposed that Captain Abbott's precautionary measures had completely blocked up the passes.

Lieutenant Nicholson's presence in Sind Sagur, has, likewise, had the effect of stopping Sirdar Chuttur Sing from receiving supplies in money, provisions, and men, which he had, of late, freely drawn from that province, and what with this officer's judicious arrangements, and those of Captain Abbott, he, now, finds himself entirely crippled. Hence, he is anxious to come to terms, but fears he has committed himself too far to admit of his obtaining them.

On becoming acquainted with the foregoing, I considered it prudent to furnish the motbir with a small escort to see him well across the Indus, giving him a receipt for his master's letter, which, I told him, should be answered by post, through Lieutenant Nicholson. Sirdar Golab Sing, Povindea, and Khan Sing, Majeetia, judiciously declined sending any answers to the letters addressed to them.

I hope I may not be deemed presumptuous in stating, that the question, now requiring consideration, would seem to me to be, whether we are prepared to overlook the murder of Canora, and the rewarding of the murderers, the tampering with the troops far and near, the endeavour to obtain possession of the Fort of Attock, the applying to Maharajah Golab Sing for armed aid, exciting to rebellion the people of Sind Sagur, and the rifling of the Government dak, all of which, I understand, can be proved.

Should we be disposed to forego an examination into these grave charges, the matter can be easily adjusted, but, I am of opinion, we cannot do this, with any degree of propriety.

If, on the other hand, the Sirdar's conduct should become the subject of an investigation, I would suggest that he be summoned to Lahore, for that purpose.

His proceeding thither would test his loyalty, besides separating him from the mutinous troops, over whom his name and large possessions give him considerable influence.

Again, should he not comply with the requisition to attend the Durbar, from what I learn from Lieutenant Nicholson, it would seem that a British brigade would be absolutely necessary to coerce him and his troops, for there can be little doubt that the attempt to employ Khalsa troops from Peshawur, or elsewhere, against their brethren, would be attended with fatal consequences, and the people of the country are unequal to the work.

Inclosure 28 in No. 35

*Major-General Whish to the Adjutant-General.*

*Camp, 2½ miles east of Mooltan, August 18, 1848.*

THE right column of the Mooltan field-force encamped in the vicinity of the fortress of Mooltan, this morning, on ground more favorable for ulterior operations than that at first recommended by Lieutenant Edwardes, being about

two-and-half miles east of it (instead of six or seven miles south of it). We are to be joined by the left column to-morrow, and the troops of both are in excellent health and spirits. I have similar favorable tidings of the details with the siege-train, and have reason to believe that they reached Bindra Ghat to day. In the course of to-night, it is expected Lieutenant Glover will have completed the damming up of the canal, alluded to in my letter of the 14th instant, the inconvenience of which, I learn, Moolraj has, already, begun to discover.

I must now go back to the 16th instant, when the forces under Lieutenant Edwardes, and Raja Shere Sing, were to (and actually did) change places, though not willingly, on the part of the latter. Having from 10 P. M. to 10½ P. M., of the 16th, heard very heavy firing at Mooltan, and not having the least idea of its being the Sikh fashion thus saluting on occasion of a change of position, (as I have since learnt was the cause thereof) I began to think seriously of marching the right column to Mooltan (about eleven miles off) during the night, if the firing continued, and, as tents at night, in the weather we have, are of no use, I ordered the camp to be struck, and for the line to be ready to turn out at the shortest notice. The firing ceased at half-past ten, and I decided on postponing our march till a little before dawn. At 2 P. M., however, yesterday, our cavalry picket reported a large body of horse and foot being in its front, and it was, as well as the other pickets, soon engaged with them, the line was formed immediately, and I ordered the flank companies of regiments to support the pickets, which they did with great alacrity and decision. The enemy were disappointed in finding us so prepared for them, and retired at 3 A. M., after sustaining a severe loss of about forty killed, many more wounded, and a few taken prisoners, who agreed in reporting that their force, which was 1500 infantry, and 350 horse, left Moolraj's camp at 7 P. M. on the 16th, the main part of which staid at a village in the rear, that, finding the few hundred sent on in advance had been so roughly handled, and so soon deserted by the cavalry, all commenced their retreat, a great part throwing away their arms to facilitate it.

We only suffered, I am happy to say, to the extent of, in Her Majesty's 10th Regiment, one severely, and three slightly, wounded, 8th Regiment Native Infantry, one slightly wounded, 52nd Regiment Native Infantry, one severely wounded, and in the 7th Irregular Cavalry, two horses wounded slightly.

Amongst the killed of the enemy are said to be two Sirdars. The bodies of eight men have been taken into Mooltan, and twelve of their wounded had been taken back to Moolraj's camp.

Inclosure 29 in No. 35.

*Lieutenant Nicholson to the Resident at Lahore.*

*Camp, Hussan Abdal, August 19, 1848.*

SIRDAR CHUTTUR SING having neither attended to your instructions, nor to my own oft repeated request, to send me a vakeel, and order back to Hussan Abdal the troops withdrawn by him from thence, (although I promised that, on his doing so, the Moolkias should, immediately, return to their homes, without molesting the Sikh force under him), I considered that, in the present stage of affairs, to again renew my proposals would be derogatory to myself and my position.

Captain Abbott and myself, however, both concurred in Jhunda Sing's proposition, that Sirdar Golab Sing, Attareewalla's, vakeel should proceed to Hurripore, and deliver his master's letters and message to Sirdar Chuttur Sing.

Afraid of anything untoward occurring at Hussan Abdal, if I prolonged my absence, I started, on my return again, at noon, and arrived here, at sunset yesterday evening. Since then, I have not heard from either Captain Abbott, or Jhunda Sing.

As I stated, in my letter of the day before yesterday, I should not consider myself warranted in assuring Sirdar Chuttur Sing of a full pardon for his late conduct, nor do I anticipate that you will sanction my doing so; and, without such guarantee, I see no chance of an amicable arrangement being effected.

If I am right in supposing that you will think with me, that the Sirdar has placed himself beyond the pale of forgiveness, I would, with earnestness,

though with all due deference, urge that not a day be lost in dispatching troops in this direction.

There is no immediate danger of any kind, but there would be, should the troops at Pukli manage to effect a junction with those at Hazara. Moreover, the Peshawur force is exposed to much temptation, the Moolkias are fickle, and British troops will be eventually required to take the fort.

In my last, I suggested the dispatch of only one brigade, and I continue of my former opinion that one is enough for all the work at present in hand, but, with reference to the possibility of the sending of a small force inducing the army at Peshawur to make common cause against it, I would now respectfully suggest that, as a precautionary measure, two brigades be sent.

If two cannot, however, be sent at once, better that one only should start, than that there should be any delay for a second.

I had, this morning, the pleasure to receive your letters of the 15th and 16th.

That my proceedings so far had met your approval, is a source of real satisfaction to me, and, though I regret that my exertions to restore peace and order have not been successful, I feel certain that a perusal of my correspondence with the Sirdar will satisfy you that I could not possibly have done more to carry out your instructions.

The force at Hurrpore is said to be determined on an effort to release the troops in Pukli. When I hear of the arrival of Pertaub Sing's regiment at Kurara, I propose moving nearer Hurrpore, and co-operating with Captain Abbott, to prevent any troops being detached for the purpose of creating a diversion in favor of those now in Pukli.

My levies are about 1,000. As I mentioned in my last, I have been compelled to entertain the Ghebe and some other chiefs, solely to prevent their strengthening Chuttur Sing.

Inclosure 30 in No 35

*Lieutenant Edwardes to the Resident at Lahore*

*Camp, Sooraj Koond, August 19, 1848.*

THE night before last, being apprized by your letters of the critical state of affairs in Hazara, and how deeply Sirdar Chuttur Sing had become involved therein, I sent for the confidential servant of Raja Shere Sing, and told him that the time was come for speaking plainly to his master, and I begged him to assure the Raja from me that, as far as I could yet understand the disturbances in Hazara, Sirdar Chuttur Sing must be considered the victim, rather than the leader, of the Sikh soldiery, that if he was so, nothing could be easier than for him to make satisfactory explanations to either Mr Cocks or Lieutenant Nicholson, but that even supposing the Sirdar to be guilty, this ought not to cause the Raja more than the natural anxiety of a son. I had heard, I said, in the morning, that messengers had arrived from Sirdar Chuttur Sing, in Hazara, detailing the Sirdar's desperate position, the length to which he had gone in opposition to Captain Abbott, the murder of Canora, &c, and the impossibility of the credit of the Attareewalla family being now saved, and there being nothing now left for Raja Shere Sing but to go into rebellion and join Dewan Moolraj, not only with all his own force, but with as much of mine as he could manage to seduce, and finally, that the receipt of these incendiary letters had caused the utmost excitement in the Raja's camp, the soldiery calling upon the Raja to follow his father's advice, and the Raja hesitating between prudence and mistaken patriotism.

If, I said, this be true, the Raja's position is evidently a difficult one, but not too much so for the Raja's common sense and loyalty to meet. Let the Raja fully believe that no misconduct of his father could ever criminate the Raja in the eyes of the British Government; and take my word, that if Sirdar Chuttur Sing were to attack Captain Abbott sword in hand, it would in no way diminish the cordial approbation with which the Resident at Lahore has regarded the Raja's loyal endeavours to maintain discipline in the Sikh force before Mooltan.

The Raja's mother was, I think, not prepared for so candid a discussion of

the question, and confined himself to solemn assurances that no such letters had been received from Hazara, adding, that the Raja would himself call upon me next day, read me the letters he had received, and ask my advice upon the whole affair. I had wished to ride out, next morning, to meet General Whish, on his arrival at Mooltan with the right column, but, considering the conduct of the Raja, at this crisis, of the very last importance to the Maharajah's Government, I readily consented to stay at home to receive his visit.

I am very glad that I did so, for I had, yesterday morning, a most satisfactory interview with the Raja, he, frankly, and warmly, thanked me for having opened my mind to him on the subject, and relieved him from the embarrassing idea that he must himself, naturally, be suspected, by the British, of conspiring with his father. The letters from Sirdar Chuttur Sing were then produced, and read to me, and, from their tone, it was clear that the Sirdar was somewhat offended, but much more alarmed, at being wrongfully suspected of treason, and the Raja adjured to exert his influence to set his father's conduct in the right light. As to the murder of Canora, it was spoken of as Canora's own fault, and resorted to only in self defence. Much stress was laid on Captain Abbott not having consulted the Sirdar, who found himself, and the whole Sikh force, suddenly proscribed, and threatened with death, by the Mahomedan tribes.

The Raja discussed the matter with great good sense, and put it to me, whether all that his father had done to oppose the Moolkias was not perfectly natural and excusable, on the supposition that he was innocent of the plots suspected by Captain Abbott. "No man" said he "will allow himself to be killed, without a struggle." At the same time, he quite admitted that his father, Sirdar Chuttur Sing, had been to blame for not keeping up a more friendly communication with Captain Abbott, an estrangement to which he traced all that officer's suspicion.

One argument which the Raja often repeated, was, that his father had called the Hussan Abdal troops to him in Hazara, whereas, if he had wished to assist Moolraj, the Sirdar would himself have left Hazara, and taken the Hussan Abdal troops on his way.

As to himself, Raja Shere Sing said that, if words and protestations were of any use, he would take all the oaths in the grunth, but that he thought actions were the best proofs of loyalty. At a time when no Sirdar in Lahore could be found to lead a Sikh army against Mooltan, for fear of disgrace, he volunteered for the invidious duty, and, that I might judge of the difficulty of the task, even at this moment, he informed me, of what I was not previously aware, that he has never been able to entrust the only regular regiment with him with the custody of the guns, sentries for which have always been furnished by his own Ramgoles, with orders to fire upon the Poorbeahs if they attempted a surprise. "At Sirdarpore," he said, "when the Ghobarchees grumbled, it was I who flogged them, at Sooraj Koond, it was I who put Moolraj's messengers on an ass, and blackened their faces, it was I who detected, and exposed, Shoojan Sing's intrigues, it was I whom Moolraj attempted to poison, and it is I who have to bear, on one side, all the suspicion of betraying the English, and, on the other, all the odium of betraying the Khalsa." Finally, the Raja said, he had many enemies in the Durbar, and that he must put his honor in my keeping: if I doubted him, he was ready to remain a prisoner in my camp, or to fight like a common soldier by my side, but that, if I trusted him, he hoped I would assign him an honorable post in the approaching operations, and give him an opportunity of wiping away the reproach which his father had brought on the family.

The Raja expressed every confidence in the happy settlement of the Hazara affair, if no collision took place, before Jhunda Sing's arrival, and hoped that the breach might not be widened by any severe reproof to the regiments who had marched from Hussan Abdal, as they were under the orders of Sirdar Chuttur Sing. After reconciliation with Captain Abbott, the Raja begged that his father's resignation of the Hazara appointment might be accepted, in such a manner as not to dishonor the Sirdar, (i. e. after refusing once or twice to part with so valuable a public servant) and that he might be allowed to go on pilgrimage for three years, and leave the Raja to celebrate the Maharajah's marriage.

I have given but an imperfect account of the Raja's lengthy arguments, but his manner was earnest and convincing, and I feel assured that, if the Raja is unable to make the Sikh force very active allies in the approaching siege, he

will, at least, prevent them from being enemies. his conduct has, as you are aware, given me satisfaction all along, and I shall be glad if he is able to complete his claim to your approbation, by exhibiting a Sikh force fighting, for once, on the side of Government and order.

Inclosure 31 in No 35.

*Lieutenant Nicholson to the Resident at Lahore*

*Camp, Hussan Abdal, August 20, 1848.*

SIRDAR JHUNDA SING joined me here this morning from Nara, having, he informed me, been unable to effect anything like a compromise between Captain Abbott and Sirdar Chuttur Sing; as the latter demanded an assurance of full pardon for all his past conduct, as a preliminary measure.

Considering how extremely desirable it is that matters should, if possible, be peaceably arranged, believing, also, that the Sirdar's conduct, of late, though heinous in many respects, had its origin in fear, I have taken upon myself the responsibility of offering him the following terms, which, whether he accept (as Jhunda Sing seems to think he will), or not, I hope will meet your approval, viz.

That if the Sirdar, immediately, come in to me, and send back the troops to their posts, I guarantee his life and izzut being spared, but I neither guarantee his Nazimship nor his Jagheer, which, indeed, I have intimated to him, he cannot expect to be allowed to retain. Further, he is to reside in any part of the Punjab he may be desired, and, if considered advisable, he is to leave the Punjab, for a year or two, on a pilgrimage.

All things considered, I trust you will agree with me, that the loss of the Nizamut and of his Jagheer will be a sufficient punishment, and that I have acted rightly in offering these terms.

Captain Abbott, I regret extremely to find, does not concur with me in thinking the march of troops from Lahore advisable.

I am still of the opinion expressed by me yesterday.

Should the troops not be wanted, they can go back again, but Captain Abbott seems doubtful of his ability to prevent a junction between the Pukhri and Hurrpore forces, and, should that junction take place, there cannot be the slightest doubt but that we shall not have the means of opposing them in the field. They might march anywhere they pleased throughout the Punjab, plundering and destroying as they went; or they might (as they probably would) besiege Attock, in which the Peshawur force could no longer be expected to remain staunch.

Pertaub Sing's regiment, which fear induced to retire from Janeeka Sung, is still at Rawul Pindee, notwithstanding Captain Abbott's orders to it to return to its post at Kurara, and my promise that, on its doing so, its pay should be sent to it. In the present state of affairs, I cannot leave this for a day, or I would go down to Rawul Pindee, and give them the lesson I suspect they will not be satisfied till they get.

When this corps was in open mutiny on the road, six days ago, I sent Sirdar Lal Sing, Morareea, a roobukaree, directing him to stop the return leave men of the Peshawur and Hazara forces at Rotas, lest their numbers should swell the mutinous ranks. Lal Sing has neither acted on this roobukaree, nor written in reply to it.

I have since removed the restriction as regards the men of the Peshawur force.

I am not so sanguine as Jhunda Sing seems to be, of Chuttur Sing accepting my offered terms, I suppose I shall know, by this time to-morrow, whether it is to be peace or war.

Were I not afraid of the Sikh troops at Rawul Pindee seizing on Margulla, or, by a forced march, getting between me and Attock, I would move nearer Hurrpore; I am sure it would assist negotiations.



## Inclosure 32 in No. 35.

*The Resident at Lahore to Major Lawrence.*

Lahore, August 22, 1848.

I HAVE little doubt that the outbreak in Hazara arose from the cause to which you attribute it, but, whatever cause for violence and alarm Sirdar Chuttur Sing had, in the first instance, his conduct, since the outbreak, has been highly culpable.

Lieutenant Nicholson's prompt movement to Attock and Hussan Abdal, and his energetic and judicious conduct since he arrived there, have been of the greatest possible service in checking the spread of the disturbance. The Sirdar has, evidently, not found the support which he seems to have expected, and his sons, Raja Shere Sing and Sndar Golab Sing, appear to be staunch in the reprobation of his conduct, and in their endeavours to bring him to a right course.

I have waited, hitherto, to see the effect of my letters to him and the emissaries sent from Lahore by the Durbar. I shall now summon him to Lahore, that his conduct may be inquired into here.

## Inclosure 33 in No. 35

*The Resident at Lahore to Captain Abbott*

Lahore, August 23, 1848.

I, YESTERDAY, had a long and confidential conversation with Sirdar Golab Sing regarding his father's conduct and position at Hazara, at which the young Sirdar convinced me that he and Raja Shere Sing were quite ignorant of the treasonable designs on the part of the Sirdar, attributed to him by you before this outbreak, and that they were in no way parties to, or approvers of, his conduct since. The young Sirdar begged me, as Raja Shere Sing has done, in his letters, and through Lieutenant Edwardes, to look with as much leniency as possible on their father's misconduct, into which they are satisfied that he has been betrayed by mistrust, engendered by your withdrawal of your confidence from him, and declared suspicions of his fidelity, and by fear at the Mahomedan population having been raised, as he believed, for his destruction, and that of the Sikh army.

Golab Sing did not attempt to defend the later acts of his father, but pleaded his age, the infirmity of his health, his high position in the State, and the services of Raja Shere Sing and himself, as causes which would, he hoped, induce me to view that conduct with leniency, and save, if possible, the family from the ruin which must otherwise await it. I assured Sirdar Golab Sing, on this occasion, as I have done on others, of my anxious desire to save his father from bringing disgrace and ruin on himself and family, and of my entire readiness to give every possible consideration to the arguments for leniency he used.

I, afterwards, summoned the members of the Durbar to a special meeting, and it was determined, by my advice, and at the desire of Sirdar Golab Sing, that Sirdar Chuttur Sing should be sent for to Lahore, there to have his conduct and the motives thereof inquired into by myself, assurance being, at the same time, given to him that, if he immediately complied, having first ordered back the corps called from Hussan Abdal to their cantonments, and directing the Pukli brigade to remain where it was, he would be treated with the consideration due to his rank and position.

A purwanna from the Maharajah, directing the Sndar to repair, without fear or hesitation, to Lahore, has been sent by this post to Hazara, with a moorasila from myself, assuring the Sirdar of honorable treatment, and a full inquiry into the affair, if he immediately complies with the orders of the Durbar.

The Durbar have addressed the officers of the Hazara and Hussan Abdal regiments, hitherto under the Nazim's orders, and, therefore, not without excuse in having obeyed him, directing them to conform, henceforth, to the orders of

yourself and Lieutenant Nicholson, on pain of dismissal from the service of Government, and other punishments.

P.S.—It will be satisfactory to you to know, that Raja Shere Sing has convinced Lieutenant Edwardes that the stories of his treasonable purposes are false. I have never seen reason to think them otherwise.

Inclosure 34 in No. 35

*The Resident at Lahore to Lieutenant Nicholson.*

*Lahore, August 23, 1848.*

I ENTIRELY approve of the intimation, described in your letter of the 20th, which you made, in communication with Sirdar Jhunda Sing, to Sirdar Chuttur Sing, and confirm and ratify your engagement to him, should he have acted upon it

I had, already, determined on sending for the Sirdar to Lahore, on terms very similar to those you have offered to accord to him

Sirdar Golab Sing has written, most earnestly, to his father, urging him to come without delay to Lahore, and to save the family from the ruin which must, otherwise, await it. Golab Sing says that his father is in infirm health, and entirely in the hands of those about him, who are by no means well-disposed persons, and he fears that orders and letters, which were addressed to him, are either not communicated to him at all, or, in his ignorance of Persian, misrepresented to him. He has requested me to inclose the letters to you, to be safely conveyed as addressed, viz to Sudar Chuttur Sing

I consider it would do more harm than good to send British troops towards Hazara, at this time. If ever sent, they must be of strength to overcome all the opposition that the Sikh force on the frontier, joined to those of Hazara and Hussan Abdal, could offer to them

In a letter from Major Lawrence, received to-day, I find that officer concurs with me as to the inexpediency of sending British troops towards Hazara, in the present state of the question

Inclosure 35 in No. 35

*The Resident at Lahore to Lieutenant Edwardes.*

*Lahore, August 23, 1848*

I HAVE the honor to acknowledge the receipt of your letter dated the 19th instant, reporting your interview with Raja Shere Sing regarding the Hazara disturbance

I have read your letter with very great satisfaction, especially after the expressions contained in the close of your private letter of the 17th instant, regarding the ferment into which the Sikh force had been thrown by the arrival of the Hazara messengers, but the result of your conversation with the Raja did not surprise me, for I had, all along, had a high opinion of his integrity of purpose, and fidelity, confirmed by his conduct, since he joined you at Mooltan, which appears to me to have been unexceptionable.

It was in the spirit of this confidence that I have communicated to the Raja, through yourself, all my correspondence with Sirdar Chuttur Sing, and the steps I have taken to bring this unhappy affair to a satisfactory conclusion

Sirdar Golab Sing has, at my request, written daily to Raja Shere Sing, informing him of the position of affairs at Hazara, and of the purport of my conversation with him regarding his father's conduct.

Lieutenant Nicholson and Major Lawrence, with the best opportunities of ascertaining facts, entirely concur with me that the Sirdar's conduct is owing more to his distrust and fear of Captain Abbott's feelings and intentions towards himself and the troops, than from any other cause. The Pukh brigade was, I doubt not, in a very disaffected state, and Moolraj's emissaries wrought them

nearly to a state of rebellion and treason; but I cannot approve of Captain Abbott's purposely abstaining from communicating on this subject with the Nazim, as he says, to test his fidelity and loyalty, which are to be considered as irretrievably compromised by his silence.

I am in hopes, if no collision has taken place, that this affair may yet be settled, without going farther. Sirdar Golab Sing has written, most strongly urging his father not to ruin the family, and each member of the Durbar, Raja Tej Sing, and Deena Nath, Fakeer Noorooddeen, and Bhaee Nidhan Sing, has written, privately, remonstrating with the Sirdar on the madness of his rebellion against the Government.

Inclosure 36 in No 35.

*The Resident at Lahore to the Secretary to the Government of India.*

*Lahore, August 24, 1848.*

SIRDAR CHUTTUR SING has, doubtless, behaved very ill, since the occurrence of the outbreak, but, with reference to all the circumstances that took place before that event, and for the reasons stated in my correspondence, I have considered it right to give him the opportunity now offered him, to escape the ruin which must otherwise, await him, and in which the interests of many others would, probably, be involved.

From the accounts received this morning, I am apprehensive that a collision between the Sikh troops and the Mahomedan peasantry has, already, taken place, in which case the settlement of the affair will be more difficult.

The state of the Peshawur and Bunnoo forces continues satisfactory.

Inclosure 37 in No. 35

*The Secretary to the Government of India to the Resident at Lahore*

*Fort William, August 30, 1848.*

YOU will inform Lieutenant Nicholson that the Governor-General in Council has viewed with much satisfaction, his active and energetic movement on Attock, and you will convey to Mr Cocks the approbation of His Lordship in Council of his public-spirited readiness to undertake the duty which you proposed to him.

It is, however, the opinion of the Governor-General in Council, that officers, under present circumstances, ought not to be detached, unless a secure force can be provided for their protection, and his Lordship in Council is, accordingly, glad that you have not thought it necessary to depute Mr. Cocks to Hazara.

No. 36

*The Governor-General in Council to the Secret Committee.*

*Fort William, September 20, 1848 (No 76)*

SINCE the date of our last dispatch, affairs in the Hazara country have begun to assume a more serious aspect.

Sirdar Chuttur Sing is in open rebellion, at the head of the brigades of Hazara, which, though not formidable by numbers, are far superior, in discipline and equipment, to the raw levies which Captains Abbott and Nicholson can oppose to them.

The Resident, in his letter of the 1st instant,\* now states his opinion that Chuttur Sing has finally taken his line, and will use every endeavour to make his rebellion as formidable as he can. His force is stated to consist of about 2,000 regulars, with eight guns, and perhaps 1,000 armed villagers.

\* Inclosure 33 in No. 36.

The Resident's mission of Sirdar Jhunda Sing has failed, and he has now sent off Dewan Deena Nath to try his persuasions, and bring in the refractory Sirdar. He considers that, even if the Dewan's mission is unsuccessful, the delay occasioned by these negotiations, will be favorable to us, and enable us to take the field against the Sirdar, at a comparatively healthy period.

Sirdar Jhunda Sing has turned out as great a traitor as Sirdar Chuttur Sing. The Resident admits that "the events related by Captain Abbott, certainly, tend to throw very strong suspicion on the fidelity and sincerity of purpose of Sirdar Jhunda Sing, which is strengthened by the notoriety of the influence possessed by that person over Sirdar Chuttur Sing, which was not ill-described by Sirdar Golab Sing, who, on my expressing to him my hope that Jhunda Sing would succeed in his mission, said 'it is well known that my father would obey Sirdar Jhunda Sing before his Gooroo'."

Respecting Dewan Deena Nath's mission, he observes, "I confess I have very little expectation of his being successful, after all the indulgent and considerate measures, which have hitherto failed, and if the lives of our district officers were not in jeopardy and the interests on the frontier were not so vast and important, I should not have considered any further attempts at an amicable settlement of the rebellion, necessary, or, perhaps, proper, but, under the circumstances, I think I have acted rightly in using every means, not inconsistent with the authority of the British Government, or compromising my position, which have any likelihood, be it never so small, of preventing the evil spreading further; and I can see that the people about the Dubai, who have better means of judging, perhaps, than I am in possession of, do expect that the Raja will bring in the rebel Sirdar with him."

It will be observed, that Captain Abbott's position is not so favorable as it was. The disaffected troops have made their escape from the ravine where they were hemmed in by him, and he is now compelled to act as it were on the defensive. He, however, feels secure in his position, and seems to apprehend no immediate danger.

Captain Nicholson and Major Lawrence continue to importune the Resident to send a British brigade to their assistance, but the Commander-in-Chief agrees with the Resident in thinking that such a move would be most premature and hazardous, and would be more likely to lead to a concentration of the disaffected in that wild country, than to the extinction of a rebellion, from the inability of the force sent to act with vigor and effect.

We have observed to the Resident, in our letter of the 14th instant,\* that we fully approve of his determination not to detach a small British force into such a country as Hazara, at so great a distance from its supports, weakening us, at the same time, at Lahore, where it is indispensable that we should be immovably strong.

We assured him that we felt great anxiety for the officers in Hazara, but the detachment of a small force from Lahore would be so full of imminent danger to the State, that it becomes necessary, however distressing it may be, to set aside all considerations of a personal nature.

No intelligence of any importance has reached us from Mooltan, since the date of our last dispatch, but we daily expect to hear of the capture of the town.

With reference to the critical state of affairs in the Punjab, we have now thought it necessary to issue orders for the assembling of the force mentioned in our letter dated the 10th of June †

We have requested the Commander-in-Chief to take immediate measures for collecting, at Ferozepore, an army of about 13,000 men, which, in addition to the 7,000 men now before Mooltan, will make an army of the strength originally contemplated in our letter above mentioned. We have, however, deferred any general augmentation, until affairs in the Punjab shall reach a fuller stage of development, and we shall be able from events to judge of the actual necessity of that measure.

The Commander-in-Chief has been cautioned not to weaken the garrison of Lahore, or the strength of troops in the Jullundur Doab, for the purpose of securing the object we now have in view.

\* Inclosure 47 in No. 36.

† No. 28.

## Inclosure 1 in No. 36.

*The Resident at Lahore to Captain Abbott.**Lahore, July 24, 1848.*

I THINK it right to state, that Sirdar Jhunda Sing never received any orders from Lieutenant Edwardes to return to Leia, he has never, from the first, received any instructions from Lieutenant Edwardes

The Sirdar received orders from me to proceed as far as Leia with Dewan Jowahn Mull Dutt, and there to leave the Dewan, (who had been told by Lieutenant Edwardes to remain at that place), and proceed with his brigade towards Jhung, and he was told that, on arriving in the neighbourhood of that place, he would have further instructions.

Subsequently, when other arrangements were made, and Lieutenant Edwardes expressed a wish to have Jowahn Mull Dutt with him at Mooltan, I sent a second order to Sirdar Jhunda Sing, if he had not left Leia, to remain there, till further orders, if he had started, and made two marches, to proceed on his way, and to remain at Nekokarah, till he heard further. He was to put himself in communication with Lieutenant Edwardes, and act, as that officer might instruct him, but I intimated to the Sirdar that, if Lieutenant Edwardes had no duty for him to perform, it was probable I should recall his brigade to Lahore, where there are no troops at all for the guards of the Maharajah

Lieutenant Edwardes merely told Sirdar Jhunda Sing, that he did not now require his services, and that he should, therefore, obey any instructions that were received from me

The Sirdar expressed much disappointment, at not being allowed to go to Lieutenant Edwardes at Mooltan, but he is, with his brigade, on his way to this.

The Sirdar has been, in no way, slack to obey any orders that have been sent him. All that you surmise of him, may be true, but his ready obedience to orders is indisputable

## Inclosure 2 in No. 36

*Captain Abbott to the Resident at Lahore.**Shirwan, Hazara, July 29, 1848.*

I HAVE the honor to acknowledge the receipt of your letter of the 24th instant, informing me that Sirdar Jhunda Sing had never been ordered back to Leia by Captain Edwardes, and had, therefore, disobeyed no order in standing fast.

I am sincerely happy to find that the Sirdar had warrant for his halt upon the Chenab, for he has served under my eye, and I had formed a high opinion of his talents, conduct, and disposition, and do not think he would swerve from his allegiance, unless this insurrection prove a national revolution, in which case, the most virtuous must be looked for in the opposite rank. But I confess that the appearance of system in all parts of the movement, even after the removal of the reputed head, and the universal and confident belief of the Sikh soldiery, that all the Sirdars are secretly implicated, seem to me to justify such precautions as a national revolution would suggest

The authority upon which I reported that the Sirdar halted contrary to Captain Edwardes' instructions, is a letter from the Sirdar himself. If he failed to report Captain Edwardes' order to the Durbar, the omission is remarkable. In like manner, he failed to report to me, (although he secretly informed Sirdar Chuttur Sing) that he had authority from the Durbar to stand fast. I, naturally, concluded that this authority had been transmitted him, in one of those private communications carried by especial messengers, which pass between the Durbar and the officers of the army.

## Inclosure 3 in No. 36.

*Captain Abbott to the Resident at Lahore.**Shirwan, Hazara, August, 7, 1848. Evening.*

THE Sikhs have assembled in force at Hurrupore, by order of Sirdar Chuttur Sing, to set free the brigade in Pukli who are endeavouring to effect their escape, in order to march upon Lahore. The Sirdar ordered out the troops from the city, contrary to my order yesterday, and ordered Colonel Canora to bring out his guns. The Colonel refused to do so without my order. The Sirdar sent two companies to seize them, the Golundauze betrayed their trust; and whilst Canora was endeavouring to defend himself, he was shot dead. The Sirdar, immediately, ordered up the Hussan Abdal, Rawul Pindee, and Kurara forces, in all about five regiments, with a body of horse. I have ordered out the armed peasantry, and will do my best to destroy the Sikh army. Report says that the officers in Peshawur have been imprisoned by the troops. I trust this may not be true, but it is too likely, as I hear that the Gahundia force has received promise of aid from the Peshawur troops. I trust the precautions I have suggested have been taken, viz, the complete command of the Jhelun. Maharajah Golab Sing is said to have gone to Rujjoree, but I cannot vouch for this news. I understand that Colonel Canora has left a family in Lahore. I earnestly trust the Government will provide for them as suits the family of a man so faithful, and whose last act was unsurpassed for gallantry by anything recorded in history. He stood alone against the whole Sikh army; and when his dastardly Golundauze refused to fire, took the match into his own hand. After his fall, and before he expired, he is said to have killed two Sikh officers with his double-barrelled pistol. If the precautions I have so often suggested, have been taken, this uprise of the Sikh army may be an eventual benefit. Had the force remained quiescent, it would have been difficult to make arrangements for the security of the country, against an army so ungovernable, and Sirdars so treacherous.

## Inclosure 4 in No 36

*Captain Abbott to the Resident at Lahore.**Nara Gundgurh, Hazara, August 10, 1848*

THE Gahundia brigade being in a state of mutiny, and making no secret of its determination to march upon Lahore, after issue of pay, I deferred the issue about a week, that you might receive timely notice, and that our troops might arrive nearer to Mooltan. This not suiting the conspirators, of whom the head is Sirdar Chuttur Sing, the Gahundia force sold off its grain, called in its cattle, packed up its baggage, and would have marched the next day, had I not closed the roads by means of the armed population. Hearing that Sirdar Chuttur Sing had, upon this, written for aid to Jummoo, Peshawur, and Khatir, I gave secret orders to cut off, or obstruct, any aid that he might thus summon, but not otherwise to make any demonstration. On the arrival of three companies from Hussan Abdal at Hurrupore, the Sirdar ordered the troops out into camp, to be the more ready to aid the Gahundia brigade, or to march forward. Colonel Canora's guns were of the number. He, fully understanding the purpose of this movement, remonstrated, saying that, as it was made without my cognizance, and contrary to my wish, as he believed, it would subject him to the charge of treason. He wrote to me, saying that they wished to take possession of his guns, and asking whether he was to surrender them. In the meanwhile, the Sirdar sent his most confidential servants to persuade him to yield, and, thus failing, ordered two companies to take them by force. Canora loaded his two guns with grape, and ordered the Golundauze to fire, but they replied that they were the Sirdar's servants. On his havildar also refusing, he cut him down, and, seizing the match, applied it to the vent. The gun burnt priming, and, at that instant, two men, one a sepoy of Richpaul Sing's corps, shot him through the thorax. Before he died, he attempted to cut down another man, but was himself cut down by a third sepoy, who was behind him, dying as gallant a death as I have ever heard recorded.

The Sirdar sent me no intelligence of this cold-blooded murder, as base and cowardly as his murder of Peshora Sing; but, on finding it confirmed by eye-witnesses, and that the Sirdar had thus identified himself with the mutineers in Pukli, I ordered all the chiefs of Hazara to rise, and, in every way, harass and molest those who should support him.

I wrote to the Sirdar, also, insisting upon the instant surrender of the murderers of this loyal and gallant officer, and the return of the troops to their cantonments, promising, upon these conditions, to settle all disturbances in the country. The Sirdar wrote several meek replies, in order to gain time, and such is the effect of his bribery, that my information is most imperfect, and three guns and three companies have arrived to-night, within seven miles of Hurrpore. With eight hours earlier intelligence I could have cut them off. The blockade of the Gahundia force is continued. But the holder of the purse and army has serious advantages over an individual who is dependent wholly upon the loyalty and gallantry of a people much divided amongst themselves, and I trust the precautions so often suggested by me, have been long since adopted. If so, the delay may render this rebellion futile. We hear, to-day, from a man who comes from Peshawur, that, the Sikh troops there being in a mutinous state, Captain Nicholson got possession of all their guns, and has been able to set them at defiance. The Sirdar has cut off all my daks since he murdered Canora, and we are four days without intelligence. It is now that the isolation of our several positions, by the removal of Captain Nicholson and Lieutenant Lumsden, will be felt.

The Sirdar is intriguing largely, and offering the most extravagant jagheers, and rewards, to all who will forsake me.

Inclosure 5 in No. 36

*Lieutenant Lake to the Resident at Lahore*

*Camp, near Mooltan, August 12, 1848.*

I HAVE the honor to submit, for your final orders, a case which has been made over to me for investigation, and in which there are three defendants, Shoojan Sing, Durbara Sing, and Chunda Mull, who are charged as follows —

Shoojan Sing.—1 For conspiring to bring about the death of Raja Shere Sing

2 For carrying on a secret and treasonable correspondence with the enemy.

3. For joining in attempts to inveigle and corrupt the soldiers in Raja Shere Sing's force.

Durbara Sing.—1. For acting as a spy to the rebel force

2. For assisting in carrying on a secret and treasonable correspondence between Shoojan Sing and the rebel force.

3 For knowingly abetting an attempt to inveigle, and corrupt, the servants of the Lahore Government.

Chunda Mull.— For conspiring to bring about the death of Raja Shere Sing.

As, in cases of this nature, it is important that punishment should follow immediately after the offence, I would beg the favor of your favoring me with your orders in this case, as early as possible

Inclosure 6 in No. 36.

*Captain Abbott to the Resident at Lahore.*

*Nara, Foot of the Gundgurh Mountain, Hazara, August 13, 1848.*

COLONEL CANORA had long been apprehensive, from the reports of his Golundauze and others, that the Sikh regiments would seize his guns, for their march upon Lahore, and had expressed some anxiety about his position. When ordered out into camp, without my authority, at the moment that the Pukli brigade was endeavouring to march, he remonstrated with Sirdar Chuttur Sing, that such a step would subject the force to the charge of mutiny. The Sirdar,

however, insisted, and sent his confidential servant to persuade him to comply. Failing of this, he ordered two companies to seize the guns by force. Canora wrote to me, begging my orders whether to give, or refuse them. His note reached me with the messenger reporting his murder. The companies came to seize the guns, which were doubly charged with grape. Canora ordered to fire, the Golundauze refused. He cut down the havildar, and applied the match. The gun burnt priming, and he was shot by two of the Sirdar's servants. He attempted to rise, and cut down an officer, but his throat was severed from behind by a sabre cut. A more loyal and gallant death I have never heard of. The Sirdar rewarded the murderers, by his own confession, with 1,000 rupees. He says, that Canora was engaged to join the peasants in plundering Hurripore. He knew nothing whatever of what was passing amongst the people of the country, and, more than once, expressed anxiety lest the town should be plundered. The Sirdar immediately cut off my daks, sent me no explanation of the event, but called up troops in all haste from Hussan Abdal, &c. He had previously called up three companies without my sanction, upon plea of the unsettled state of a country which has not known such tranquillity during forty years past. Such a move was suspicious, as the numbers of the troops are always exaggerated on such occasions, and, when I heard he had summoned more aid, I was obliged to assemble the zemindars to arrange, if possible, for its interception. The rapidity with which troops move, and the delay attending the assembly of levies of armed peasantry, enabled him to get in his troops without accident. I remonstrated with him, demanded the murderers of Canora for trial, and ordered him instantly to send back the troops summoned, taking upon myself, in that case, the settlement of the whole country, and assuring him that, unless he obeyed, the worst consequences were likely to happen. The officers received his orders with distrust, demurred, delayed, but were finally borne along by the men. Boodh Sing made his escape—a curious commentary upon the two attempts to shake his loyalty. I left Shirwan, for a position nearer the new theatre of operations, the foot of the Gundgurb mountain, terrible to the Sikhs for three most bloody and disastrous defeats, from numbers not one-fourth of their own. It is within sight of Hurripore, and may be called the throne of Hazara, as here I have at my back the bravest and most loyal of the population, and my orders are better obeyed than from any other locality. The levies, however, are not assembled, and my purse is so light, that, as yet, I have not ventured to enrol more than 400 matchlocks, to cope with a regular army of 4000, with cavalry, and twelve guns. Captain Nicholson, with his usual promptitude and judgment, rode over to Attock, on hearing of disturbance here, and found his way into that important stronghold, turning out the Sikh company. The effect of this move has been, already, beneficial, and may be of the utmost consequence. I think, with submission, that he might, with advantage, levy a few corps of Mahomedans, to hold Attock against attacks on either side, and to hold in awe his district. To my repeated, and, I think, moderate demands, Chuttur Sing has given me no decided answer. His last letter is so insolent that all correspondence, henceforth, is impossible, nevertheless, I have released his vakeel, with a schedule of my demands, and with refutations of his charges against me, and have given him until to-morrow morning for decision. If he then refuse the terms, I shall be satisfied that it is not mere alarm about himself from the population of Hazara, but a sense of detected guilt, and consequent desperation, which has led to this rebellious conduct. If he comply, the country need not be ravaged, nor the army destroyed, and his conduct may be made the subject of legal investigation. Upon this point, I confess I am anxious. This country has been restored to order and peace by my hand, and it would cost me many a pang to undo all that I have effected, and it is only by making a waste around the Sikh army, that armed peasantry can cope against the bayonets, artillery, cavalry, and fortifications of a regular army.

The Pukli brigade is still in limbo. I have allowed Lieutenant Robinson, at his own request, to superintend the sealing of the Mahugul pass. It is unfortunate that the Pukli brigade got intelligence of my possession of that pass in time, as, in all probability, it would have been destroyed. As it never actually marched, I am reluctant to order it to be destroyed, until in motion. I am most happy to hear that there is a good reserve at Ferozepore, for great efforts will be made to shake the Peshawur force, and the troops here say they have



promise of co-operation from people of some of the British battalions in Lahore. This, I trust, is not true; but even a report of this nature seems too important to be withheld. The troops here declare that they will march for Lahore, the instant the Gahundia brigade joins them, this is what they have, for the last two months, been bent upon, but the opportunity has still disappointed them

Inclosure 7 in No. 36

*Captain Abbott to the Resident at Lahore*

*Camp, Nara, Gundgurb, Hazara, August 13, 1848.*

I HAVE had the honor to address you several times, since the murder of Colonel Canora, and the open rebellion of Sirdar Chuttur Sing, Nazim of Hazara, The regular dak was arrested, by the Sirdar, the day following the commission of that atrocious deed

That the Sirdar has been secretly engaged in the Mooltan affair, cannot, I think, be doubted, but that he ever intended to announce himself as a rebel, until at least his own son was free of Lahore, seems improbable, and only, perhaps, his clumsy murder of a gallant and most loyal officer could so far have committed him as to render him careless of unveiling. Even to this moment, he will not allow that he was cognizant of the treason previously, but labors to make out that I have driven him to his present disloyal conduct, by the measures taken to arrest the march of the Pukli brigade. Those measures, which were purely precautionary, and strictly forbade any molestation of the troops, until the moment they might march, he describes to his correspondents as a deliberate and unprovoked attempt to massacre the force. He utterly denies that there was any design of marching, until the pay of the whole force was detained in the Treasury a few days, by my order. Whereas, it was because the men made no secret of their purpose to march, on the disbursal of pay, that I took upon me to detain it—a fact which he must be fully aware of. He utterly denies all knowledge of the Pukli mutiny, although men were at several times put in prison by the officers, when the mutiny became too notorious, in order that I might suppose it partial in extent. To this I have previously replied that, hoping and supposing his innocence, I should have adopted precisely the precautions actually taken by me under a doubt of his loyalty—preserving that secrecy without which my precautions must have been vain.

Last night, I intercepted letters from Sirdar Chuttur Sing to Maharajah Golab Sing, the Rajas Jowahr Sing and Runbeer Sing, and others, entreating the aid of four Jummoo regiments from Moozuffurabad, and the march to Hazara of all the Jummoo corps in Meerpoor Choomooh, and that the Maharajah Golab Sing will write to the Peshawur troops to join him. In a grossly insolent letter received the same day, after venting his malice, and exhausting his ingenuity in accusations, he observes “and if the high and mighty Durbar of Lahore should order me to conquer Hazara, should I shrink from the task”

It is observable that there is nowhere any notice of reference to the authority of the British Resident at Lahore, to quell any imputed treason—although no one can better know that a word from that authority were more effective than an army. The pretence of extreme peril from a people whom two of my chupprassies would settle in three days, is eagerly seized, for collecting under his own banner the five regiments now in Hazara, the Peshawur force, and, perhaps, eight regiments of Jummoo troops,—and this, after my repeated assurance that, if the murderers of Colonel Canora are surrendered to me for judgment, and the troops sent back to their several cantonments, I will, instantly, reduce the country to its former profound tranquillity. The expedient is preferred, of exciting to mutiny the bulk of the Sikh army, and of calling upon the Jummoo Prince to invade the country. Yet so plausible is this oldest, and most practised, of Sikh intriguers, and so awkward is his position, owing to his son's presence at Lahore, that, even writing to accomplices, he, evidently, calculates the possibility of disclosure, and words his letters in a tone of virtuous indignation.

The language of the Sirdar's last letter to me is so gross as to admit of no further correspondence.

Noon.—Intelligence has just arrived from Hurripore that the Pukli

Gahundia brigade has made its escape, and arrived at Nowa Shihr, the petty chiefs having been bribed off with gifts and promises of Jagheers, and that the Hazara force awaits only its arrival to march with it upon Lahore. This news requires confirmation. I see not how this force is to march until joined by that in Peshawur, and Captain Nicholson has possession of Attock. I have sent messengers for further intelligence. Lieutenant Robinson, at his own request, started last evening for Mahugul, the pass leading out of Pukli, in order to encourage the peasantry to destroy that force, should it attempt to escape. I have proclaimed all traitors who hold intercourse with Sirdar Chuttur Sing. The want of funds has prevented me from levying any considerable body of troops, and I am dependent upon the armed peasantry, who need a week's notice to collect, and will not act far from hence. This gives the most serious advantage to a foe possessing a regular army and a full Treasury, and wholly unscrupulous in promising. I, nevertheless, am making great efforts to nullify these disadvantages, and hope to be at least partially successful.

3 P.M.—The news of the escape of the Pukli brigade, so confidently bruited at Hurripore, is not confirmed at this hour, and I begin to doubt it.

Inclosure 8 in No 36

*Captain Abbott to the Resident at Lahore*

*Nara, Gundgurh, August 13, 1848. Night.*

I DO not know that I have, anywhere, expressed an opinion that Sirdar Chuttur Sing had any notion of personally joining in a rising of the troops, but I certainly believe that those who least appear in this rebellion are its chief fomenters—men who play the game, but stake nothing of their own. Whether or not the Sirdar is one of these, he seems to be universally regarded as such, both by his own servants, and by the rebellious soldiery; and, in order to test the question, I determined to see whether he would give me intelligence of a mutiny, ascribed, by several of my informants, to him. After waiting, in vain, some weeks, I put the question, whether he was aware that there was anything amiss with the Pukli force, and he replied, that he had heard of nothing. Again, I wanted to see whether, as the mutiny ripened, he would consult with me upon it. But, although not only my own servant in the Pukli camp, but the whole jeerga of Munsera, wrote, saying the brigade had sold its grain, called in its cattle, packed up its baggage, and was ready to start at an hour's notice, the Sirdar was entirely silent upon the matter—a matter which he had ten times better means of learning than I possess. His vakeel was in my camp, cognizant of all my movements, excepting indeed that which required the extremest secrecy, viz, the sealing the Pukli pass. Yet, even this was known to him, and to every one, a few hours after issue of the order.

If the Nazim cannot discover amongst his own Sikh army a disorder so obvious as to excite the attention of the peasants of Pukli, so that they wrote to inquire whether I had ordered the march; or if, knowing, he fail to report it to me, it is manifest that he is not worth consulting upon measures for its suppression, or that, being a party concerned, he was no safe person to intrust with a knowledge of arrangements requiring profound secrecy in order to success.

If the Nazim supposed that he observed any disorder amongst the population of the country, it was, assuredly, his duty to inform me. I, who knew they were simply aiding the Government, by obeying its orders, had nothing to inform him of. His silence upon the subject was a remarkable feature calculated to strengthen distrust. He seemed afraid to inquire into arrangements made for the suppression of the mutiny, lest the origin of that mutiny should become, in turn, a topic of inquiry.

He listened instead, to his own fears, murdered Colonel Canora, the most loyal officer in the army, stopped my daks, ordered up troops contrary to my orders; and broke into open rebellion, writing for aid to Jummo, and desiring the Jummo prince to incite the Peshawur troops to mutiny.

With exception of the Pukli mutiny, which I reserved as a test of the various reports ascribing the origin to him, I had very little occasion for conference. The country was profoundly tranquil, the people were happy, and

obedient. My Kutcherry duties occupied me incessantly. His vakeel communicated any trifling affairs requiring the Nazim's attention, and polite letters passed constantly between us. When I foresaw the probable necessity of being obliged to arrest the march of the Pukli brigade, I objected to the presence of his son at the same station, as calculated to defeat all my arrangements, supposing him privy to what was going on. His being near me would have served the purpose of making his father's guilt appear impossible, whilst he would continue to profess utter ignorance of the spirit of his own Sikh army, and want of power to hold them under control.

I trust you will do me the justice to remember, that I am speaking of the dastardly murderer of Peshora Sing, the most artful and unscrupulous intriguer in the Punjab, that the present outbreak has been foreseen by me, for the last two months, that Colonel Canora warned me of it, that my messengers from Bunnoo Tank, from Hussan Abdal, from Hurrpore, and from Pukh, all agreed perfectly in their testimony, and that a correspondent from Raja Shere Sing's camp warned me, that his force had but one purpose, and that was to strengthen Moolraj. This man may have erred from enmity to the Sikhs, but he is one of the ablest men in the Punjab, and had no hint from me of having heard any rumours of a like nature. I was the last person in Hazara, who persisted in believing the Sirdar innocent.

Noon, 14th of August — It is now past the period, fixed by me, for a decisive answer from the Sirdar. It was impossible for me to have answered his foul-mouthed letter, but I released his vakeel, and gave him, yesterday, a statement of my demands, viz, the surrender of the murderers for judgment, and an order to the several regiments to return to their duty, promising, upon this, to settle the country from Pukh to Margulla. I sent also a simple refutation of his charges. His vakeel is not returned, and I cannot imagine any doubt that he has taken up his part as a rebel. It is said that he has written to this effect to Colonel Boodh Sing, Man—"It was for the family of Man that I excited this rebellion, and one of that family has deserted his own and my cause." It is also said that Colonel Bhood Sing was the real, though not apparent, ring-leader in Pukh, and this agrees with one of the reports of my spy there, that, on receipt of news from Sirdar Chuttur Sing, Boodh Sing collected the evil disposed of his corps, and said that, now, he was ready to lead them to the south. Bhood Sing is so superior to Bahdoor Sing, and so much more loved and respected, that people do not easily believe him to be a traitor. Indeed, were not his uncle implicated, there is little doubt that he had remained true.

Colonel Bahdoor Sing is said to have written from Pukh to Chuttur Sing, saying that he had raised the mutiny, at the Sirdar's injunction, and that now the Sirdar was deserting him, insisting upon a definitive answer, whether he would, or would not, save him, that if not, he would make his escape to Moozuffurabad. It seems that the Sirdar ordered the Hussan force to leave its guns, and march up to Gahundia, and that the troops refused, and desired him to lead the way, with the Hurrpore force. This the Hurrpore force object to, part of them being attached to my service, and the rest not relishing the work. The Gahundia force, by report, has twice risen to march, but, finding all the nagmas sounding amongst the mountains to call the people to arms, has again sat down, strongly entrenched in position.

I have placed a force in the Margulla Pass, to destroy Pertaub Sing's Regiment, should it refuse to turn back, at my reiterated orders. It was to have debouched to-day. Captain Nicholson rode over thither, of his own accord, to take command of the operations. I was most anxious to go last night, because my presence might, I thought, prevail upon the regiment to turn, but all my advisers assured me, that the report of my flight would instantly spread, and that next day I should not have a follower. Even in coming hither, fifteen miles nearer the Sikh army, great defection of the faithless Zumolies took place; and it was long before I could resolve upon the step, and not until it was absolutely necessary.

I am very sorry to hear that Sirdar Jhunda Sing is to return to Hazara. It is an arrangement of his own seeking, as I have ascertained from one of his letters to the Sirdar. He is without the slightest doubt engaged in this conspiracy, and I cannot answer for the district, if he return. I earnestly hope he may be recalled. His departure alone prevented our seizure at Hurrpore.

## Inclosure 9 in No. 36.

*Captain Nicholson to the Resident at Lahore.**Camp, Hussan Abdal, August 14, 1848.*

I WAS in hopes, this morning, that I had prevailed on the Kurara regiment to return to its duty. It has, however, advanced to Janeeka Sung, within three miles of Margulla, and, if it think itself strong enough, will, doubtless, attempt a passage. I shall employ all fair means to induce it to return to its duty, but will, forcibly, resist its advance beyond Janeeka Sung, as I consider it of great consequence that it should not be allowed to form a junction with the Hazara force. I was on the ground all last night myself, and am about to return thither.

This constant knocking about prevents my writing, as clearly, or carefully, as I could wish. I am from ten to fourteen hours every day in the saddle, though not very strong, and though the heat is great.

I have ordered Colonels Baboo Pandey, and Noorooddeen, to return hither, and they promise to obey.

When moving out to take up a position last night, I took the party of Goorchurras here with me, and they seemed much pleased with such a show of confidence.

My occupation of Margulla has, I believe, disheartened the Sikh troops in Hazara, and, if I can only frighten, or coax, the Kurara regiment to return to its post, I shall have little doubt of Baboo Pandey's and Noorooddeen's corps following its example. I sincerely trust it will not be necessary to resort to severe measures, more particularly as my levies are, almost entirely, from the people of the country, all, but 100 Peshawurees and 200 Gundgurrees and Mishwanees, from Hazara.

If the Sikh troops in Hazara were under the control of their officers, there would be no difficulty, but, as usual in the Sikh army, few, or none, of the officers have any influence with the men.

## Inclosure 10 in No. 36

*Captain Nicholson to the Resident at Lahore**Camp, Hussan Abdal, August 15, 1848*

HEARING that the troops in Hazara were talking of making a diversion in favor of Pertaub Sing's regiment at Janeeka Sung, and considering it as of the greatest consequence that the junction of that regiment with the Hazara force should be prevented, and as measures having hitherto, failed to induce the corps to return to its duty, I determined, with extreme reluctance, as a last resource, to resort to coercive measures. I, accordingly, drew up a body of militia, raised by me since my arrival here 400 strong, together with about 300 men from Peshawur and Hazara, placed at my disposal by Major Lawrence and Captain Abbott, in front of the position of the corps and its two guns, at Janeeka Sung, about an hour before day break this morning, and sent a message to the officers and men, informing them that my formerly offered terms were still open to them, that I should rejoice if they accepted them, but that, otherwise, I should be compelled to consider them as open mutineers, and treat them accordingly. I gave them half an hour to reflect, assuring them that, at the expiration of that time, if they did not return to their duty, I would attack them.

I have, now, the pleasure to report the success of my exertions. The colonel came out, begged pardon, on his own behalf and that of his men, and declared their willingness to march whithersoever I directed them. I, accordingly, saw them en route to Rawul Pindee, before leaving the ground. The debate between the peace and war parties was a stormy one, the former being in a very small majority.

The moral effect of the failure of this regiment and its guns to enter Hazara, and of their subsequent return to their duty, will be very great, and

I think I may safely calculate on the return of most of the men who marched hence, at Sirdar Chuttur Sing's requisition, at the outbreak of the émeute

I am, myself, disposed to believe that the late unfortunate occurrences in Hazara, are attributable to the mutual distrust entertained by the Nazim and Captain Abbott, of each other's proceedings and intentions.

In a previous letter, I mentioned that I thought the surrender of the artillery-commandant's murderers for trial, would prove a stumbling block in the way of an amicable adjustment. I have since heard from Captain Abbott, that he has intercepted letters from the Sirdar, to Maharajah Golab Sing, calling on him for assistance, and it is beyond a doubt, and might, I believe, be easily proved, that the Sirdar has, in his terror and anxiety, sent agents to corrupt the Peshawur force, and, indeed, all the troops, at whatever stations in the country.

Colonels Noorooddeen and Baboo Pandey were preparing to join me, yesterday evening, when the Sirdar took possession of the former's guns with a party of infantry. I have, accordingly, written to the Colonel to come without his guns.

I marched for Janeeka Sung, at 9 last night, and have been on horseback since, fifteen hours, and I have had the same work, since my arrival here, for, in the present state of affairs, I have considered it necessary to return to Hussan Abdal every day.

If I may say so, without seeming egotism, I believe my arrival in this part of the country to have been very opportune, to have saved Attock, and prevented the occurrence of serious disorder, throughout the upper part of this Doab. It has, likewise, had its effect in Hazara.

I expect a vakeel from Chuttur Sing to-night.

Colonel Boodh Sing is with me, and is very useful.

Inclosure 11 in No. 36

*Captain Nicholson to the Resident at Lahore.*

*Camp, Hussan Abdal, August 16, 1848*

THE return of the Kurara regiment, and its guns, has had the effect I expected in Hazara. Colonels Baboo Pandey and Noorooddeen, with a few men, are en route to join me, and more will, doubtless, follow. I hear that a vakeel from Sirdar Chuttur Sing is also on his way, but my intelligence on this point, is not very positive.

I have already mentioned, that I attribute Sirdar Chuttur Sing's behaviour, in the first instance, to his distrust of Captain Abbott's intentions, which was excited by the assemblage, by that officer, of a body of Moolkias, to overawe the Sikh troops in Pukli, who, he had reason to believe, meditated marching to Lahore.

This distrust was further, unfortunately, increased by the reports of designing parties on both sides, who, for the furtherance of their own interests, endeavoured to create disunion between Captain Abbott and the Sirdar, who has since, I fear, committed himself past forgiveness.

Hopeless as the Sirdar, and troops with him, must now perceive their cause to be, I consider the restoration of amicable arrangements as a matter of no difficulty, if the Sirdar's conduct, in tampering with the troops throughout the country, cutting off Captain Abbott's daks, sending agents to raise the laboring population of this and the adjoining districts, ordering Kardars, out of his jurisdiction, to send him their treasures, and writing to Maharajah Golab Sing for armed aid, can be overlooked, for, all this can be proved against him.

That he will never accede to any terms in which a free pardon for all this is not included, I feel certain. If, therefore, you are not prepared to grant this, I would, respectfully, but earnestly, recommend that a force of one European, and two Native regiments of infantry, with two troops or batteries (for he is strong in artillery) and mortars, be immediately despatched from Lahore, for the people of this country are fickle, and very likely to change sides, in the course of a week or two, if they do not hear of aid being despatched from Lahore.

It is to be remembered, too, that the Sirdar has really great influence in Sind Sagur, and is trying to bribe in all directions. Cavalry are not needed. I

could blockade Hurripore in a few days, but nothing further, the fort having some eighteen or twenty guns, and I being destitute of artillery.

Since yesterday, I have reduced my levies to about 500 men.

I find I brought the affair with the Kurar regiment to a crisis not a day too soon, a force from Hurripore having actually been told off to assist its advance. 500 men secure me in my position here, and, should it be necessary, I can quadruple the number, in a day or two.

Do not give credence to any reports of atrocities, on the part of my levies, which may reach you. I hear that certain parties in Rawul Pindiee (who were most anxious that Pertaub Sing's corps should surprise me) are circulating such

Noorooddeen and Baboo Pandey have just come in, with about twenty of their men.

I would beg to solicit that instructions be, at once, sent to Mr Cocks (who, I suppose, will be here, in the interim), as to whether he is authorized to promise a full pardon to the Sindar for all that has occurred. If he be, there is no difficulty whatever, and if not, as I said before, troops cannot leave Lahore too soon.

Inclosure 12 in No. 36.

*Captain Abbott to the Resident at Lahore.*

*Nara Gundgurh, Hazara, August 17, 1848*

THE question whether to suffer the Pukh brigade to march away unmolested, or to raise the population of Hazara to arrest its progress, was long a most anxious consideration with me, on the one hand, I felt ashamed that a military force should march, in open mutiny, through my district, with impunity, and considered that a lesson of severity was highly desirable, on the other hand, I decided to arouse a high-spirited people to the work of destruction, just as I had succeeded in calming them into such a state of tranquillity and obedience as had never before been known. I reflected that the destruction of the brigade would, in all probability, be misrepresented at Peshawur as an act of treachery on the part of a British officer, and lead to outrage on the British functionaries there, and that, after having destroyed those by whose agency I had governed them, the people might resist all authority and subside into a state of the most hideous disorder. Day and night the subject pressed upon my mind, but when, at length, I received your distinct instruction to take advantage of the hatred of the people for the Sikhs, and destroy the brigade, should it attempt to escape from its cantonment, all my scruples were allayed, and I prepared to carry out my duty at any cost.

How arduous was that duty I cannot easily describe. The Sikh brigade, supplied with carriage, and ready to march at one hour's notice, lay at the distance of two long marches from my station. The only defile in which it could be assailed, with any reasonable hope of success, could be passed by it in a single march, and was one march from my post. The corps mustered upwards of 800 good bayonets, 200 cavalry, 4 field-guns, and 20 zamboorahs, commanded by one of the bravest officers in the service. Up to the very moment of march, I could make no arrangements to intercept them on the road, I could not depend upon being joined by above 500 of the armed peasantry. My own guard did not, at that time, exceed 100 men, and there were 80 Sikh sepoy with me who would, certainly, take part with their comrades. The instant of attacking the mutinous brigade would place me at war with the whole Sikh army, a war which I had no funds to support, the revenue having already been paid into the Nazim's hands. But my duty had been prescribed, and I lived upon the watch to carry it out to the uttermost.

With this view, I increased my guard gradually to the number of 200, dismissed half my Sikh escort, upon plea of want of shelter, and procured from the treasury in Hurripore, in small instalments, about 15,000 rupees, and, as the position I held was one of the least eligible in the country, owing to the treachery and cowardice of the inhabitants, I arranged that, on my departure to take command at the pass, Lieutenant Robinson and Mr Ingram should move to Nara, and take possession of the Gundgurh mountain, there to raise that warlike and faithful population to resist the remainder of the army.

As the information upon which I was about to act, very generally attributed

the movement at Pukh to the secret agency of the Nazim, Sirdar Chuttur Sing, I determined to test his innocence, by waiting to see whether he would inform me of a mutiny, which was already notorious in Hazara. This was the more important, because secrecy alone would give me the slightest hope of arresting the mutineers, and to consult with the Nazim, supposing him to be a party in the plot, were to render null all my precautionary arrangements.

The original design of the Pukh brigade was, to march about the 15th or 19th of Hurr, the 15th being fixed by their priests for some advantage to the cause of Moolraj, and four or five days being necessary to receive the intelligence. This intelligence proved, however, very different from their expectations. Two successive victories of Lieutenant Edwards were announced, and the mutineers in high dudgeon had to fire two successive salutes, declaring all the while that the tidings were false. Even then, an attempt was made to incite the whole brigade to march upon Mooltan, but the Golundauze and Zumoorchies were generally disinclined to the move, and the officers, who knew the victories to be truly reported, did not countenance the men in their move, at that moment, but made a show of putting down the mutiny by confining a few of the ringleaders, and allowing them afterwards to escape.

The ferment thus subsided, and soon after, it was industriously circulated amongst the troops of Hussan Abdal Hurrpore, Pukh, and Bunnoo Tank that the 15th of Sawan was appointed by fate for a splendid victory by Moolraj over the British, and that it behoved the Sikh army to march with one accord, upon Lahore, where there remained only four regiments, some of which had been bought over, and where the Sikh population would join them with one accord. Each portion of the force thus incited, was anxious that the other should make the initial move. But it was manifest that this duty belonged to the Pukh brigade, because, should any other portion of the force commence moving, suspicion would be excited, and measures could be taken to close the passes out of Pukh. The Pukh brigade, accordingly, prepared to take the first step, upon the issue of pay, which was expected before the 15th. But I, who had full intelligence of their design, both from Pukh, from Hurrpore, and from Hussan Abdal, and who thought that the gain of even a day's delay might be of vital consequence, considering the unguarded march of the British troops upon Mooltan, and that we had not yet possession of the stream of the Jhelum, ordered their pay to be detained a week, to the exceeding discontent of the Sirdar's vakeel. At the end of that period, finding they were determined to march without it, in the certainty of receiving it from Sudar Chuttur Sing at Hurrpore, I thought it advisable to give them no shadow of plea in their mutiny, and issued an order for its disbursement, which the Sirdar and his people continued to postpone in various ways, in hopes of exciting the troops against me.

It was on the 31st of July, (if I remember rightly) that the person employed to give notice of the movements of the Pukh force, wrote to say that they would positively march at an early hour the following morning. I immediately issued instructions for sealing the Mahazul Pass, leading out of Pukh, although I feared my precaution was too late, and waited only certain tidings of the march, to proceed myself to the spot to arrest them.

Again, however, a disagreement between the Golundauze and the Sikhs prevented the march that morning. The Golundauze stood to their guns, and were not persuaded, or cowed, into compliance until the following day. The following day, it was known from Moozuffabad to Margulla that I had sealed the passes against their march.

It is necessary to observe that the vakeel of Sudar Chuttur Sing was living in my camp, and cognizant of all my proceedings, for the command of an army of peasants scattered over a mountainous country, is far different from that of a regular army, secrecy is impossible, and, in half an hour's time, the most important arrangements requiring secrecy are known to the whole world. I was curious to know what notice Sirdar Chuttur Sing would take of these arrangements: when I found him profoundly silent, my doubts of his loyalty were strengthened into certainty. He dared not touch upon a subject which might lead to investigation of the springs of this insurrection. He, however, exerted himself, secretly, by promises and bribes, to create a diversion in his favor, and of all the chiefs and Mulicks ordered upon the duty of closing the pass, there remained only two who could be confidently relied upon.

Sirdar Chuttur Sing had offered, once or twice, to come and live at Shirwan,

but this would have nullified every advantage of position which I possessed over the commander of a regular army. It would, in fact, have placed me in his power. He then showed me a letter from Sirdar Golab Sing, his son, saying that Ootar Sing must be sent to reside with me. This is the peculiarity of Sikh intrigue—the movers of the machinery never appear, and have thus the incalculable advantage of living, perhaps, under the very roof of those against whom their operations are directed, and of influencing their counsels by their advice. I excused myself from this arrangement, upon the double, and very valid, plea of insufficiency of the space for even my own establishments, and of the want of shelter during the rainy season. The presence of Ootar Sing would not have prevented the march of the Pukh brigade, of which Sirdar Chuttur Sing affected to be profoundly ignorant, but it would have defeated all my arrangements for destroying that brigade upon its march. The slightest hint of my knowledge of the purposed movement, would have led to the march up to Mahugul of a force from Hurripore to meet it, a design actually adopted by the Sirdar, upon finding the passes sealed.

It was about this time that, in a conversation with the Sirdar's vakeel upon the state of the troops at Pukh, on his broadly asking whether I had any doubt of the Sirdar, I confessed that I thought his silence upon a subject so widely known, a very doubtful circumstance. This led to a correspondence in which he urged the impossibility of one so highly favored as he had been, abusing our goodness. I replied, that I was no judge of hearts—but that, after the battle of Sobraon, when we had taken 300 guns from the Sikhs, and were prepared to destroy them in toto, we had granted to them the greatest of boons, their lives, and that, now again, they were in array against us. It was impossible for me to judge who were exceptions to so wide a multitude of ingrates. I trusted the Sirdar might be, but could not see, in his argument, any explanation of his blindness and deafness to the open mutiny of his own army. It appeared to me far better that the Sirdar should understand that he had incurred suspicion, and be induced to show himself without disguise, than that the dangerous and treacherous system of apparent confidence with traitors should remain in force.

It was, probably, because Chuttur Sing discovered how far I was indebted for intelligence to Colonel Canora, that he determined upon his murder. This I have related elsewhere. It formed the break in the ice of deep and silent treachery, so long carried on with a smiling face. He, instantly, arrested the posts, summoned all the troops to his aid, raised levies in Potowar, and wrote to Maharajah Golab Sing, his sons, and nephew, for aid in troops, and for letters to the Peshawur army, and to the ruler of Cabool. He also set a price upon my head.

I, on my part, assembled the chiefs of Hazara, explained what had happened, and called upon them, by the memory of their murdered parents, friends, and relatives, to rise and aid me in destroying the Sikh forces in detail. I issued purwannas to this effect, throughout the land, and marched to a strong position, 15 miles nearer to, and within sight of, Hurripore, where I could command the co-operation of the bravest and most faithful of the tribes of Hazara.

Here, my levies have been slowly increasing, but I have been prevented from taking active and offensive operations, by your order to await Mr Cocks' arrival. I have, elsewhere, related Captain Nicholson's most opportune and masterly seizure of Attock, and repulse of a Sikh corps, with two guns at Janeeka Sung; both achieved by promptitude, and energy of purpose, without bloodshed.

I have, from first to last, insisted upon two conditions, the surrender for trial of the murderers of Colonel Canora, and the dismissal of the corps mutinously assembled, to their several cantonments. These conditions Sirdar Chuttur Sing evades answering. He has identified himself with the murderers in paying them for their bloody work, and he declares that the troops will no longer obey him. We have seen them obey him, too readily, when he ordered them to destroy an innocent and loyal man, and to mutiny against my authority, and that of their officers; yet when anything is required of them consistent with their allegiance, he assures me they will not obey. In this case, the sooner they are destroyed the better.

The insolence of the Sirdar's language has, long since, closed all epistolary intercourse between him and me. His son's vakeel visited him yesterday, and brought his offer to wait upon me, if I would grant him a free pardon. I declined this; thought it quite impossible that we should meet amicably, until I knew the sentiments of Government upon his conduct, recommended him to remain at



Hurripore, dismiss the army, put the affairs of Hazara into the hands of Sirdar Jhunda Sing, and abide a reference to Lahore. The charges against him are too serious, and I, as prosecutor, am too much biassed to act the part of Judge in their investigation. The vakeel replied, that the army would not obey, until I should have had an interview with the Sirdar, in other words, that the Sirdar would not dismiss them, until after an assurance of pardon. I, steadily, declined any such compromise, but did not object to receive Ootar Sing, he being an innocent person. Such is the state of this affair, on the forenoon of August the 19th

Inclosure 13 in No. 36

*The Resident at Lahore to Lieutenant Lake*

*Lahore, August 17, 1848*

IN reply to your letter, dated the 12th instant, submitting the proceedings and documents in the case of Shoojan Sing and others, charged with offences, I have the honor to inform you, that I, this day, summoned the members of the Durbar to go through the case with me, and record their opinions, as to the guilt, or otherwise of the prisoners, and the sentences they proposed to pass.

You will perceive that the Durbar, unanimously, convict all the prisoners of the crimes laid to their charge, and that the prisoners have been sentenced as follows:—

Shoojan Sing.—To suffer death, by being hung by the neck, or shot, as may be determined by the Raja and Sardars commanding the Sikh force, with the concurrence of Lieutenant Edwardes.

Durbara Sing.—To imprisonment for life, with labor, and irons, in banishment.

Chunda Mull.—To imprisonment for seven years, with labor, in muns.

A purwanna has been sent from the Durbar to Raja Shere Sing and the Sardars, to carry these sentences into effect, in communication with Lieutenant Edwardes.

Inclosure 14 in No. 36

*The Resident at Lahore to Captain Nicholson*

*Lahore, August 19, 1848*

I ENTIRELY approve of all that you have done, since your very opportune arrival at Attock, and Hussan Abdal.

The prompt, energetic, and judicious measures you adopted, in respect to the regiment from Kuiaia, deserved the success which they met with. I assure the Government of India will consider your conduct, on this occasion, as entitled to their entire approbation.

I await, with some interest, the reply of Sirdar Chuttur Sing to my mooriasla, which you sent him on the 15th. His conduct, since the émeute broke out, is, certainly, highly culpable, and I shall require him to account to me for it. But we must bear in mind that, whatever may have been supposed to have been the purpose of the Pukli brigade and the Sirdar, no overt act was committed by either, until the brigade was surrounded in Gahundia, and Hurripore was threatened by the Mahomedan tribes, of whose purpose no notice had been given, by Captain Abbott, to Sirdar Chuttur Sing, the Governor of the province. The initiative was clearly taken by Captain Abbott, I do not say unnecessarily; but it was so taken; and the Nazim now pleads, that he was acting for the protection of himself, and the troops committed to him, and, also of the country under his government, in calling the regiments from Hussan Abdal, and the other cantonments.

## Inclosure 15 in No. 36.

*The Resident at Lahore to Captain Abbott.**Lahore, August 19, 1848*

THE runner who was bringing the western dak, in which your letter of the 14th was, was stopped on the road, and was released by Sirdar Jhunda Sing, on his way to Hazara. Two daks thus arrived together. This is the first instance of anything having happened to the western dak, since I have been at Lahore, which is very creditable to the department.

Your statement of the disturbance in Hazara, does not materially differ from that received from other quarters, nor does it differ in facts, making allowance for different statements of motives and intentions, from that given by Sirdar Chuttur Sing, in his representations to the Durbar, and letters to me.

It is only just to the Sirdar, as well as to yourself, in reference to the Sirdar's assertions, that the matter should be fairly investigated.

It is clear that, whatever may have been the intention of the Pukh brigade, no overt act of rebellion was committed by them till the initiative was taken by you, by calling out the armed peasantry, and surrounding the brigade in its cantonment. It seems, also, that the armed peasants were threatening Hurrpore, before the Nazim ordered the guns out of the town, to the open space between the fort and the city.

The Sirdar states that this was merely a precautionary measure, in consequence of the rising of the population, the cause of which he did not know, while you state that it was for the purpose of bringing off the Pukh brigade, which was surrounded and hemmed in by your orders, of which orders the Governor had had no notice.

The death of Commedan Canora is stated, both by the Sirdar and yourself, to have been occasioned in consequence of his disobedience of the reiterated orders of the Nazim, and to his having offered violent opposition to those whom the Governor, after many remonstrances with the Commedan, sent to enforce his orders.

I cannot at all agree with you as to the character you assign to this transaction. Sirdar Chuttur Sing was the Governor of the province, military and civil, and the officers of the Sikh army were bound to obey him, the responsibility for his orders resting with him. Taking the worst possible view of the case, I know not how you can characterize it as "a cold-blooded murder, as base and cowardly as that of Peshora Sing."

I do not intend, by what I have said above, to justify Sirdar Chuttur Sing—far from it—his conduct since the death of Canora has been highly culpable, and I have no doubt you have just grounds for your suspicion of him before, and of the intentions of the Pukh brigade. Still, there is no proof of misconduct before the raising of the armed population, and his plea is, that all that he has done since, has been of a defensive character.

If the Sirdar will now return to his allegiance, and submit to have his conduct and his allegations investigated by me, he should be allowed to do so. I am awaiting from him a reply to my moorasila of the 10th, and that sent by Sirdar Jhunda Sing, when I shall be able to give more explicit instructions to Lieutenant Nicholson and yourself.

I trust you keep the armed population you have called up, in hand, and that you will be able to restore discipline and order, should the Sirdar now succumb.

I am surprised at what you now say of Sirdar Jhunda Sing when he was ordered towards Mooltan, you wrote to me a very high character of him, and have often said you believed him loyal, up to the time he left you. It was only the other day, when I wrote to explain that you did him injustice in supposing him to have acted in disobedience to Lieutenant Edwardes' orders, that you replied you were very glad to find that such was the case, for that you had a high opinion of his character, while serving under you in Hazara.

I have every confidence in your using your best endeavours, in co-operation with Captain Nicholson, to prevent this out-break from spreading further, and to bring the affair to as satisfactory a conclusion as circumstances will admit of. If the Sirdar did really act, in the first instance, under a mistaken notion of your

feelings and intentions towards him, and if he has been betrayed, by this circumstance, into his present misconduct and difficulties, I am sure that it will give you satisfaction to be instrumental in bringing him back to his allegiance and duty.

I have little doubt, that the prompt measures you took to prevent the Pukli brigade from leaving its cantonments have done much to conduce to the disposition to loyalty which the parties now desire to evince, before committing themselves to any overt act of rebellion.

Inclosure 16 in No 36

*The Commander-in-Chief to the Resident at Lahore.*

*Head-quarters, Simla, August 21, 1848.*

I ENTIRELY concur with you as to the utter inexpediency of compliance with Captain Nicholson's suggestion for the movement of a British brigade with a field battery into the Hazara country

I am distinctly of opinion, that such a movement would be most premature and hazardous, and would be more likely to lead to a concentration of the disaffected in that wild country, than to the extinction of a rebellion, from the inability of the force sent, to act with vigor and effect

I am not at all prepared to assent to the expediency of moving so small a force as that proposed, to such a distance, and to the very point of concentration of nearly the whole of the Khalsa army, leaving, between our force and Lahore, a great proportion of the Sikh territory, in which the disbanded Sikh soldiers reside

Lahore and Jullundur, at such a juncture, should not, in my opinion, be weakened.

So far from being in a position to give additional troops to move to the north-west, I am not prepared as I could wish, and as military precaution requires, to support the troops at present in the Punjab. It must be borne in mind, that the greater proportion of the Sirhind division has, till of late, been Sikh territory, and, within a very recent period, was, to a man, opposed to us, and although how rule may have effected much, still, when disaffection prevails to so great an extent in the parent State, common precaution points out the expediency of being prepared

Inclosure 17 in No 36

*Captain Abbott to the Resident at Lahore*

*Camp, Morie, Hazara, August 23, 1848*

I WAS taking the muster of my levies, on the 20th instant, when two several messengers arrived, with tidings that a regiment and two guns, with some horse and zumboorahs, had actually marched for Pukli. As this move was hardly expected, and as the messengers were from parties who had generally supplied correct intelligence, I marched, at once, with the men I had just mustered, and without revisiting my tent, to gain the passes ere the Sikhs should reach them. A fiery march of more than thirty miles secured this object. But the Sikh detachment did not actually march, and whether it was a feint to throw me off my guard, or whether the messengers had been bribed to give false intelligence, I do not yet know. I had scarcely time, at the Sihud Pass, to make my arrangements for its security, when a messenger from Captain Nicholson brought me intelligence, that Sirdar Chuttur Sing had marched with the whole of the Hurrpore force for Hussan Abdal. In an hour, I was in motion, with all my levies, to aid Captain Nicholson. We marched, under a

burning August sun, forty miles, and halted three miles on the right rear of the Sikh army. Captain Nicholson will inform you of the progress of negotiation. That matters can be accommodated amicably I do not see much hope, because the Sirdar has, from time to time, made me the same offers of submission, whilst writing to Peshawur, Jummoo, and Cabool, for assistance. In fact, he appears to me to be satisfied that his crimes cannot be pardoned. I most sincerely hope I may be disappointed. The dash for Attock was clearly arranged by a better and bolder military genius than Chuttur Sing. It rendered necessary on my part the increase of rigor in the blockade at Pukli and Nowa Shahr. I have neither table, chair, nor tent, my ink is nearly dried up by the intense heat, so that I trust you will kindly excuse this slovenly note. Captain Nicholson occupies a strong post upon the Attock road. I hold back, to act in concert upon the rear, or flank, of the enemy. Considering how very leniently you have judged of Sirdar Chuttur Sing, I cannot understand why he should thus persist in his rebellion, hopeless as it appears. There is some mystery requiring explanation. Had your letters reached me previous to the close of my negotiations with the Sirdar, I should, certainly, have felt myself authorized to hold out great hopes of forgiveness. As it was, I could only say that I could not take upon myself to pronounce a pardon, but that, considering his rank, position, and the merits of his son, in the eyes of our Government, I thought he had good reason for hope. If Chuttur Sing did not encourage, or wink at, the Pukli mutiny, his word is worthy of all evidence in the case of Canoa's death. But if, as I think I can prove, he was a fomentor of that mutiny, then Canoa's death was a deliberate murder, to get rid of the only loyal officer of the Hazara field force. You assume for granted his statement that Hurripore was threatened. Hurripore was never safer. None of the Moolkias were thinking of it, and nothing had been done but to guard the pass out of Pukli. The Pukli brigade was not, as you suppose, invested. The strictest orders were given not to molest it, nor to stint its supplies or communications, so long as it should stand fast, and these orders were well obeyed. Afterwards, I resorted to severer precautions, on finding that Chuttur Sing had summoned troops to his aid.

Inclosure 18 in No 36

*Major Lawrence to the Resident at Lahore*

*Peshawur, August 23, 1848*

LAST night, I got the Governor, Sirdar Golab Sing, to return to his house, adjoining mine, and immediately visited him.

Both he and his son, Colonel Alla Sing, are, decidedly, of opinion that no time should be lost in sending a light brigade of British troops, consisting of not less than one troop of horse artillery, one regiment of cavalry, and three regiments of infantry, one being European, to coerce the Sikh force in Hazara, whom, it is folly to suppose, can be subdued by the people of the country.

They consider that the measure, so far from being likely to irritate, or disturb, the force here (as Captain Abbott supposes), would give them confidence, and confirm them in their present good conduct, and that one brigade would be ample, if put in motion at once, the rumour of which would deter many from joining the Sirdar.

If I may be allowed, I myself would suggest, that a second brigade, with the addition of a light field battery, should follow, with all practicable expedition, to obviate all possible risk of failure, but, on no account, would delay for it the march of the first.

From what I can learn, Sirdar Chuttur Sing would appear to have no intention of coming to an amicable arrangement, unless he and his troops are, first, assured of an entire indemnity for past offences, with which, I have already said, it is impossible we can comply.

Therefore, as he has wealth, extensive possessions, and is looked up to by the Khalsas as the last of their old Sirdars, unless promptly and efficiently

crushed, we shall find him a formidable opponent. Many, whom I consulted, think more so than the Dewan of Mooltan.

It seems hardly necessary for me to observe that, holding, as he does, large Jagheers between this and Lahore, by which he has nearly the whole country at his command, if he is suffered to remain, for any length of time, in a state of rebellion, this force, already sufficiently isolated, will be entirely cut off from the capital, whence we draw all our supplies of pay and military stores.

Inclosure 19 in No 36.

*The Resident at Lahore to Captain Abbott.*

*Lahore, August 24, 1848.*

I HAVE told you, when you assured me that a part of the Hazara field force was about to rise against the Government, in aid of the rebellion in Mooltan, that, if they did rise, I hoped you would use your influence with the Mahomedans around you, whose hatred of the Sikhs is notorious, to prevent their leaving Hazara scatheless, but, at the same time, I cautioned you that there must be no doubt in the case, the insurrectionary movement must have been made, before you took active measures for its suppression.

I have given you no authority to raise levies, and organize paid bands of soldiers, to meet an emergency, of the occurrence of which I have always been somewhat sceptical.

I cannot approve of your having abstained from communication with the Nazim on the state of his administration, for the purpose of making his silence, or otherwise, on the subject, a test whereby his guilt, or innocence, was to be determined by you. You had already withdrawn your office to a distance from the seat of Government, and had ceased all personal communication with the Nazim, and you had told the Nazim's vakeel that you had no confidence in his master. It is not to be wondered at that, under such circumstances, a weak, proud chief should feel offended, and become sullen, and be silent as to the disaffected state of the troops under his Government, if he was really aware of the fact.

It is much, I think, to be lamented that you have kept the Nazim at a distance from you, have resisted his offers and suggestions to be allowed himself to reside near you, or to have his son, Ootar Sing, to represent him at Shirwan, and that you have judged of the purposes, and feelings, and fidelity, of the Nazim and the troops, from the reports of spies and informers, very probably interested in misrepresenting the real state of affairs.

I think, under the circumstances, the making the communication you describe, on the 13th, in the mode you mention, was far from judicious, it would, assuredly, have the effect of outraging the Nazim's feelings, if innocent, and of exasperating him, if guilty.

None of the accounts that have yet been made, justifies you in calling the death of Conmedan Canora a murder, nor in asserting that it was premeditated by Sirdar Chuttur Sing. That matter has yet to be investigated.

You will understand the above remarks, as referring to your conduct before the outbreak on the 6th of the month—and as giving my opinion thereon, gathered from a perusal of the papers which have been lately laid before me. Your proceedings, since Sirdar Chuttur Sing commenced his openly rebellious conduct, to meet the state of things which had arisen, (from whatever cause) have been prompt and energetic, and your combinations for preventing the accomplishment, by the troops, of any treasonable purposes they may have entertained, and for circumventing the rebellious designs of the Nazim, have been judicious and effective. To the energy, and efficient character, of those proceedings, I consider the failure of the Sirdar's schemes, and the hopelessness of the insurrectionary movement, attributable.

In the above proceedings you have been ably seconded by Captain Nicholson, and, as you described, aided by Lieutenant Robinson.

It remains to be seen, if your influence with the chiefs and people whom you have called to your aid, will enable you to induce them to return peaceably

to their homes and occupations, should no cause for active operations have arisen, and to give up again the strongholds they are said to have forcibly possessed themselves of

If the Hazara chiefs evince as much readiness to restore peace and order at your bidding, as they have shown to rise for war at your beck, it will be highly to their credit, and will render them deserving the consideration and favor of their Government.

Inclosure 20 in No 36.

*Captain Abbott to the Resident at Lahore*

*Bullur, Hazara, August 25, 1848.*

OOTAR SING not having waited upon Captain Nicholson, according to promise, I prepared for severe measures with Sirdar Chuttur Sing's force, and marched up my levies, about 2,000 strong, to within a mile of his camp, expecting that his brigade would attempt, this morning, the passage of the ravine. I had been busy, all night, in preparing to undermine the gun road. It is probable that these hints had their effect, for, on riding over to the ravine to select a more effective position for my camp, I met Ootar Sing, saluted him, and passed him over to Captain Nicholson. I supposed his coming was to be regarded as a return of the Sirdar to his allegiance. But Captain Nicholson writes to me, that he insists upon the dismissal of my force, previous to the return of the mutinous regiments to their duty. Now, I did not assemble one of the men with me, until he had called the regiments mutinously around him, and it is quite out of the question to dismiss a man, until he and his army obey orders. He is, evidently, anxious to gain time, and has no disposition to submit. I hope Nicholson will cut short the conference, as, in such negotiations, the honest party is, generally, the loser, and it is difficult to keep together long such a force as mine. The Sirdar, whilst professing submission, and promising to send his son, has sent another son, Taiga Sing, to Rawul Pindce, who has marched up the force there, towards Margulla. The whole of his conduct bears the undoubted stamp of insincerity. Fear alone can make him hold to any promise or agreement.

Inclosure 21 in No 36

*Captain Abbott to the Resident at Lahore*

*Camp, Sooltanpoor, Hazara, August 26, 1848.*

THE result of Ootar Sing's conference with Captain Nicholson was, that no settlement was made. But Captain Nicholson agreed, that I should withdraw my levies to a distance, which I have, very reluctantly, done.

Fear alone brought Ootar Sing to Captain Nicholson's camp. They are making efforts to get up Pertaub Sing's regiment, by some by-road, whilst the conference lasts. It has actually marched for this purpose, by order of Chuttur Sing, which I consider a breach of all good faith. The brigade is still halted opposite the Moti ravine, which they have not dared to cross. My proper post is in that ravine, but, by the terms of compact, I am camped about two and a half miles south of it, on elevated ground, above the Hurroo. Pertaub Sing's corps will, probably, endeavour to get round by Jhung. Matters are so involved that peace seems to me impossible. My orders regarding the Gahundia and Nowa Shihr forces were stringent, on learning the march of Chuttur Sing southward. I cannot alter them, on the faint chance he holds out of submission. I believe that had I, at once, proceeded, according to my wish, to cut off his supplies, and drive sleep from his eyelids, he, or his brigade, would have submitted ere now. The Torbala and Barookote forts have submitted to me, and so, perhaps, had all the hill forts, but that I have repressed the zeal of the mountaineers, who delight greatly in pulling them down. All their garrisons would surrender, were Chuttur Sing defeated. Sirdar Chuttur Sing's fort of Syedpoor fell, before the zeal of the Guebhas. I gave no order to this effect, and have resisted all offers to desroy his

private property, which, as it is the patrimony of the Geebhas, that high-spirited race were too ready to effect. I hear, to-day, that Chuttur Sing's levies, drawn from his Jagheer of Kullar, have joined Pertaub Sing's regiment.

In this case, I shall give permission to invest his castles. There is a report that Ootar Sing had again waited upon Captain Nicholson, according to promise. I shall regret this, if true. I do not think he should be received, whilst Chuttur Sing is acting treacherously, in advancing his forces from Rawul Pindiee.

The decision Chuttur Sing is called upon to give, requires but an hour, to dismiss his mutinous corps to their cantonments, and to submit himself to your decision, of whose favorable view I have informed him. Every hour gained by him is the loss of four hours to us.

I earnestly hope the leniency offered to Sirdar Chuttur Sing may have some effect, but I confess I do not anticipate any good result, because he has had from me ample assurance of your kind disposition towards him, and is, whilst parleying, hurrying up Pertaub Sing's corps, to aid his rebellious projects. He never made a move without the will of Sirdar Jhunda Sing, whilst the latter was with him. If Sirdar Jhunda Sing be sincere in his desire to pacify matters, it is marvellous that, for the first time in his life, he has no influence with Chuttur Sing, to divert him from his own ruin. It is impossible to conceive such madness, if Chuttur Sing be conscious of innocence of the Gahundia mutiny. Shots, it is said, have been exchanged between Pertaub Sing's corps and the defenders of the Margulla pass, to-morrow must show something important. I do not think Golab Sing cognizant of his father's guilt, but I believe that Golab Sing's vakeel did his utmost to strengthen the Hazara corps in their rebellion.

Inclosure 22 in No 36

*Captain Abbott to the Resident at Lahore*

*Camp, Hussan Abdal, August 27, 1848.*

I HOPE my late letters have been received, as they would have prepared you for the event of last night, predicted by me, from the moment that Sikh overtures were received as honest tenders. On the 25th, finding that Sirdar Chuttur Sing had neglected to fulfil his promise of sending his son to Captain Nicholson, I advanced my levies within a mile of his camp, and, half an hour after their arrival the son was sent to wait upon Captain Nicholson, but with no authority to conclude any amicable compact. The same night Captain Nicholson wrote to me that the Sirdar complained of my having advanced my force, after the departure of Ootar Sing. Captain Nicholson stated, that he had agreed that my force should be withdrawn. I remonstrated upon what appeared to me the impolicy, and danger, of this retrograde movement, but carried it out, lest a British officer should be accused of breach of faith. As Captain Nicholson had limited the period for negotiation to the evening of the 26th, I selected a position overlooking the enemy's camp, and rather anxiously watched it, during the day, through my telescope. There was no movement until evening, when Ootar Sing (Sirdar Chuttur Sing's son) was still in Captain Nicholson's camp, and Sirdar Jhunda Sing had ridden over, to offer Sirdar Chuttur Sing the merciful, and considerate, terms dictated in your official despatch, and accepted with a thousand professions of humility and loyalty by the Sirdar. It was then that my attention was attracted by a body of Sikh horse (Sirdar Jhunda Sing's) galloping from the Sikh camp, and, on observing the said camp, it was, evidently, packed up for a move, so that, during the conference between the two Sirdars, and whilst Ootar Sing, to blind Captain Nicholson's eyes, was in attendance upon him, Sirdar Chuttur Sing was actually prosecuting his rebellion by means of a breach of faith. I, immediately, got together my levy with all possible speed, and hastened to the Moti ravine, in the hope of occupying it in time to dispute their passage. But the Mussulmans who observe the fast rigidly, were gasping through thirst. I, however, halted for a moment, and encouraged each separate Gole, showing them that night was favorable to their cause, that the fire of the guns would be harmless, and the sabre master of the ravine, and they pursued their way in light spirits. On approaching the ravine, I perceived, through the twilight, two dark masses which appeared to be elephants, and, thinking to catch

those animals with the guns upon their backs, made a dash at them with my cavalry. The howitzers, however, were loaded, and in position, and opened a fire which swept the whole line of my approach, so that I was obliged to draw the horsemen off, to the right, under cover of the village Tandeh, and to one of the processes of the Moti ravine. I, then, returned to look after the foot, which had wholly disappeared, having dived into a small ravine, when first the artillery opened upon it. In the darkness of the night, it was long before I could discover a single Gole, and very long, ere any considerable portion could be thrown into the ravine. I saw, with feelings of extreme impatience, a long column of dust, indicating that much of the Sikh force had already passed over; and, by the time that, having entered the ravine, I had penetrated down it to the gun road, not a straggler was left on the farther side. I tried to rally my people to an attack with the sabre, but, either they had been bribed to remain inactive, or their fears made them so, for neither encouragement, nor taunt, could persuade more than a handful to follow the Sikh march along the ravine, which, for half a mile, ran parallel to it. I, then, after many fruitless attempts to inspire confidence, ordered the force out of the ravine, that we might unite with Captain Nicholson's camp at Pohr. Owing to the extreme darkness, and our ignorance of the relative position of the different elements of the Sikh army, I made no attempt to charge with the cavalry, about 100 strong. I reached Captain Nicholson, some hours before day-break. He had been told that this move was consequent upon the erroneous intelligence conveyed to the Sikh camp, that Ootar Sing had been imprisoned by him. If so, that intelligence was issued with the approval of Sirdar Chuttur Sing, who has made no explanation of the treachery to this moment. It will be observed, how accurately I estimated the import of Ootar Sing's presence, when any treason of Sirdar Chuttur Sing is a foot. It gives perfect assurance of his good faith to the person whom he attends, and it renders it impossible for the Government to believe that a father can be hatching rebellion, whilst his son is a hostage for his good faith. It, also, gives an insight into the counsels of the party upon whom he is attendant. Captain Nicholson and myself marched this morning to Hussan Abdal, to cover Attock, which we conceive must be the object the Sirdar has in view. Considering the paramount influence which Sirdar Jhunda Sing has ever possessed over the mind and counsels of Sirdar Chuttur Sing, and that the military movements of the latter are far too skilful and bold to be attributed to his own suggestion, that the army was actually preparing for its passage of the ravine, whilst the two Sirdars were in conference, and that Sirdar Jhunda Sing gave no intimation of the design, it does not appear to me safe that he should any further, possess influence over our counsels, or knowledge of our designs. Captain Nicholson has, I believe, informed him, that if he cannot bring the army, or the Sirdar, to obedience, by noon this day, he will receive his dismissal to return to Lahore a measure in which I heartily concur. The deep and artful treachery of Sirdar Chuttur Sing will, I trust, now appear evident, and the precautions taken by me to foil it, when first discovered, will no longer seem to have been dictated by unfounded suspicions.

Inclosure 23 in No. 36.

*Captain Nicholson to the Resident at Lahore.*

*Camp, Hussan Abdal, August 27, 1848.*

PERTAUB SING'S regiment, yesterday, crossed by a pass four miles to the southward of Margulla, which latter a detachment of my levies was watching.

In the evening, while Sirdar Ootar Sing was with me, Sirdar Chuttur Sing advanced his force, in direct violation of a promise not to move, made by him to Sirdar Jhunda Sing, an hour previous. This brought him in contact with Captain Abbott's levies, and a skirmish commenced, which lasted till past midnight, when the Moolkias, having expended their ammunition, and showed their total unfitness to combat with regular troops, fell back, though without loss, as they had fought from the shelter afforded by a large ravine. This move was made by Sirdar Chuttur Sing, after the receipt of the inclosures which accompanied your letter to me of the 23rd instant, and after a written promise, given by him to Jhunda Sing, to obey the Durbar's and your orders in everything.



This morning, Captain Abbott and myself fell back on Hussan Abdal, and the Sirdar advanced to Oosman Khatir.

To-morrow, he will be joined by Pertaub Sing's regiment, and, no doubt, occupy the Margulla pass, and Kalateraie

We cannot expect that, with the force now at his disposal, the Sirdar will abstain from advancing on Hussan Abdal, and Attock; and, as last night's skirmish has shown how little our levies are to be depended on, we shall, most probably, not attempt to defend the former, but Captain Abbott will return to Nara, while I throw myself into the fort of Attock

In addition to what I have already urged of the necessity of speedily sending up troops, I can add nothing

Inclosure 24 in No 36.

*Major-General Whish to the Adjutant-General.*

*Camp, before Mooltan, August 28, 1848*

NOTWITHSTANDING the severe sickness that suddenly assailed Her Majesty's 32nd regiment, during the extremely hot days of the 21st and 22nd instant, the head quarters and six and a half companies of that corps joined this camp in much improved health, on the 25th instant, but having, I regret to say, lost eighteen men. The proportion of our sick (European) has thus increased from five to seven per cent., but I trust only temporarily, and that of the Native branch continues at about one and a half per cent

A most seasonable fall of rain for an hour, from 1 P.M. on the 26th instant, has had a most beneficial effect.

On the morning of the 22nd instant, as previously arranged with Lieutenant Edwardes, I received visits of ceremony from Raja Shere Sing, Sirdar Shumshere Sing, Sindanwalla, Sirdar Soorutt Sing, Majeetia, and other chiefs, and, on the following day, from Sirdar Ootar Sing, Khoosial Sing Manyeal, Gunda Sing Muttoo, and other Sirdars

Inclosure 25 in No 36

*The Resident at Lahore to Major Lawrence*

*Lahore, August 28, 1848.*

I AM induced to think that the Sirdar will not refuse to obey the order sent to him from this, on the 23rd instant, summoning him to Lahore, and that the troops who are with him will obey the Durbar order, and return to their cantonments.

Should the Nazim come in, as directed, his conduct and its motives will be inquired into, by myself, at Lahore.

If the troops return, forthwith, to their cantonments, in compliance with the purwanna of the Durbar, telling them that they are no longer under the orders of Sirdar Chuttur Sing, and if they commit themselves no further, they must be considered not altogether without excuse for their conduct hitherto, for, it must be remembered, that they have been directed to look to Sirdar Chuttur Sing as their Nazim, and all that they have done, hitherto, has been by his orders. Doubtless, they know that he was acting in opposition to the instructions, and actually threatening to offer armed resistance to Captain Abbott; but they may argue that the responsibility of their conduct rests with him, and that they are, moreover, only acting on the defensive

Under no circumstances, would I consent to send a single brigade, as you suggest, to that distance from all support, and without a reserve. If a force is to be sent to coerce the Sikh army in Hazara, and one of the members of the Durbar in rebellion, it must be of strength sufficient to crush all opposition that may be offered to it, by the Sikh army in other quarters, who might be expected to join, and by the armed population that would, as you intimate, be made to rise between this and Hazara, on account of the Nazim. Such a force could not be collected, without much delay.

Inclosure 26 in No. 36.

*Captain Nicholson to the Resident at Lahore.*

*Hussan Abdal, August 28, 1846*

SIRDAR CHUTTUR SING has not yet moved from Oosman Khatu. Yesterday evening he was joined by Pertaub Sing's corps, to which he is, to-day, disbursing pay and gratuity. Captain Abbott started on his return to Nara, this morning.

Sirdar Ootar Sing was with me, when his father advanced on Captain Abbott's position, on the evening of the 26th, and he accompanied me hither, yesterday morning. Having no reason to believe him cognizant of the treachery perpetrated by his father, (whose conduct has now, I conceive, passed the bounds of forgiveness,) I proposed to him this morning that he should prove his loyalty by proceeding, at once, to Lahore, and joining there his elder brother Sirdar Golab Sing. To this he assented, and I gave him his rookut accordingly. Unless his intention was merely to deceive me, which I hope it was not, his desertion of his father, at this crisis, cannot fail to weaken the latter's cause with the troops.

I mentioned, yesterday, that I was unable to oppose the Sirdar in the field, and, if attacked, should, probably, throw myself into Attock: on more mature reflection, however, I am of opinion, that if Major Lawrence can secure that fort without me, I could be more usefully employed, outside, in harassing the Sikh camp, stopping supplies, cutting off their communications and preventing risings, in other parts of the country, in the Sirdar's favor. At Attock, the entire of the rest of the district, and its resources, would be at the Sirdar's command.

I wrote to this effect to Major Lawrence this morning. Till I receive his reply, I shall keep between the Sikh camp and Attock.

An ishtihar from you and the Durbar, confiscating Chuttur Sing's Jagheers, would prevent the armed peasantry on them from joining him.

Sirdar Jhunda Sing has, hitherto, effected nothing. I have desired him to exert himself to detach the officers of the force, should he not succeed to some extent, in the course of a day or two, I purpose giving him leave to return to Lahore.

I do not expect to be allowed to remain here to-morrow.

Inclosure 27 in No. 36

*Captain Nicholson to the Resident at Lahore.*

*Hussan Abdal, August 28. Evening.*

YOUNG Ootar Sing has disappointed me by going back to his father. I gave him the option of doing so, or proceeding to Lahore, and scarcely expected that he would deceive me for no purpose.

I believe Chuttur Sing will advance on this, to-morrow, when I must retire. The intelligence of the arrival of a single brigade on the Chenab now, would get me over half the army, and keep my levies staunch, as it is, some of them are, naturally enough, in communication with the enemy.

P.S.—When Pertaub Sing's corps was in open mutiny on the road, I wrote twice to Sirdar Lal Sing, Morareea, to stop the return leave of absent men, coming up, but he did not pay the slightest attention to my orders.

## Inclosure 28 in No. 36.

*Captain Nicholson to the Resident at Lahore.**Camp, Boorban, 6 miles west of Hussan Abdal,  
August 29, 1848.*

AS I expected, I was obliged to evacuate Hussan Abdal, this morning, on Chuttur Sing's advance. I believe my men are still in Margulla, but they cannot be expected to hold it till to-morrow. Chuttur Sing will, then, have command of the whole line of road from Rotas to Attock, very nearly all of which runs through his own, or his son's, Jagheers. I will endeavour to lay a new dak viâ Gheb and Chuckowal.

I am merely halting here, during the heat of the day, in the evening, I purpose continuing my march towards Attock. If I think the fort can be secured without my presence, I shall not shut myself up in it, but endeavour to harass the enemy in the field, and keep open our communication between Lahore and Peshawur, which would be at once closed, were I besieged in the fort.

If another week be allowed to elapse, without the dispatch of troops from Lahore, the whole of Sind Sagur will declare for Chuttur Sing, and, very probably, the Peshawur force also.

I think my levies would fight well, along side of British troops. I have had some desertions to-day. Chuttur Sing burned a village this morning, which had assisted me with men.

## Inclosure 29 in No. 36

*The Resident at Lahore to the Secretary to the Government of India**Lahore, August 30, 1848*

I FEAR that Sirdar Chuttur Sing, notwithstanding his protestations of loyalty, and his written promise to Sirdar Jhunda Sing to obey the Durbar purwanna, and come to Lahore, ordering back to their cantonments the troops he had summoned, has no intention of availing himself of the opportunity I have afforded him of explaining his conduct, and saving himself from the ruin which must, eventually, await him.

It is just possible that, having now released himself from the restraint of the armed population, and being altogether a free agent, he may, if the troops will let him, come into me, thereby throwing upon Captain Abbott the onus of proving that he ever had any disloyal intention, which his obedience to orders, and proceeding to Lahore, would tend to disprove, but I do not expect this. I cannot tell what his intentions, or expectations, may be, but they must shortly develop themselves. It is believed, in many quarters, that he will be joined by the Khalsa troops, and the military population, and will march to the attack of Lahore.

Raja Tej Sing seems now to suspect that this is his object, but he says, if this is his purpose, he must have a strong party, and many friends here. I have not been able, nor has Raja Tej Sing, to discover that this is the case.

The depths of Sikh intrigue are, however, unfathomable, though their mistrust of one another is so great, that their combinations and plans, generally, prove abortive.

I am, now, clearly of opinion, that, whatever may be the result of the Hazara outbreak, it is necessary that an army assemble at Ferozepore, or some other place, on the immediate frontier of the Punjab districts, at as early a date as possible, to support the Government in the adoption of such measures as they may consider that the events of the past six months call upon them to adopt. Some measures for the re-organization of the military establishments of the country must, under any circumstances, be had recourse to.

## Inclosure 30 in No 36.

*The Resident at Lahore to the Secretary to the Government of India.*

*Lahore, September 1, 1848.*

SIRDAR CHUTTUR SING has now fairly, and I think finally, taken his line, and will use every endeavour to make his rebellion as formidable as he can.

His next move will probably be, to march upon Attock, when, Major Lawrence apprehends, the Sikh force in Peshawur will join him. If Lieutenant Nicholson gets into the Fort of Attock, and the garrison, which is entirely Mussulman, except the Killedar, remains true, the Sikh army could not reduce it, so long as water and provisions last, and with these it is well stored.

The force at present with Sirdar Chuttur Sing is about 2000 regulars, with eight guns, and, perhaps, 1000 armed villagers. Without reinforcements from Peshawur or Bunnoo, this force cannot attempt to march, either on Mooltan, or Lahore. It would not march from its present position to Mooltan, with artillery, in less than sixteen days, by forced marches, at this season of the year, and as our heavy guns are expected in camp on the 4th and 5th, I trust the place may be in our hands at that time.

Still, it is very desirable to gain as much time as we can, with reference to our operations in Mooltan, and the necessity of marching Europeans. The weather is getting much cooler, already, and, twenty days hence, marching to the westward and northward of Lahore will be unattended with inconvenience, or risk.

I shall try, therefore, to hold the Sirdar in parley, a short time longer, though I have no expectation of his coming in to me. I have, to-day, received from him a letter to myself, and an uzec to the Durbar, excusing himself from obeying the Durbar order to come in to Lahore, on the plea that the troops will not allow him, and urging that Raja Tej Sing, or Raja Deena Nath, or some European officer, be sent out, immediately, to assure the troops and himself, and come in with him.

I have summoned the members of the Durbar to come to me this afternoon, and I shall, probably, settle to send Raja Deena Nath to bring in the Sirdar. This will be no bad test of the sincerity of the Raja's fidelity, if he really desires to do so, there can be little doubt of his being able to bring in Sirdar Chuttur Sing. If he is in any way mixed up in the rebellion, (as many strongly suspect, though on what grounds I have not been able to discover,) the Sirdar will keep him with him, and, in that case, he is better there than at Lahore.

I have taken the precaution of requesting Brigadier Campbell, C B, who is commanding the division, during General Whish's absence, to direct that the Jullundur moveable column be held in readiness to move, at once, if called upon. I shall not, however, move it, unless Sirdar Chuttur Sing, reinforced by other troops, or numbers of the disbanded soldiery, marches towards the capital, in which case, it will be desirable to repel, and punish him, ere he can arrive. We could move a light brigade, perhaps, from the troops we now have, which might be sufficient, but the intervention of the Ravee presents some difficulty to the detachment of a small force from the garrison.

## Inclosure 31 in No 36

*Captain Nicholson to Major Lawrence.*

*Attock, noon, August 31*

I HAVE been disappointed in not receiving any more men for the last two days; 600 more are required for the fort, if I am still to keep the field.

I have not yet turned out the Singhs, but don't, really, see how I can avoid it, the risk of keeping them is so very great. I have mentioned that Abbas Khan has not half Jee, or intelligence, enough for a situation of trust, and that I needed more men for a garrison.

Cannot either Bowie or Herbert be spared? I have not let in Dun Raj's companies; he seems to have some doubts of them himself.

Should you not already have done so, pray, on receipt of this, start immediately 600 foot, and a smart commandant. I think Chuttur Sing will be here, to-morrow.

Inclosure 32 in No. 36.

*Captain Nicholson to Major Lawrence.*

4 P.M., August 31, 1848.

ON my arrival here, yesterday morning, I wrote to you by horse dak, but, not having yet heard in reply, I fear the letter has not reached you. I now write to you, by an express messenger, to say that I cannot remain here, beyond to-morrow evening, without doing serious injury to our cause; and to beg you, immediately on receipt of this, to start an efficient commandant for the faithful garrison, by express. He can easily come over in five hours, riding the sowars' horses, now at the different stages on the road.

I have (though I can ill spare them) put 400 of my Puthans in garrison; there should be 600 more here, by to-morrow night. The fort is almost certain to be invested the following morning.

Cannot Bowie or Herbert be spared, for a few days?

Inclosure 33 in No. 36.

*Major Lawrence to Captain Nicholson.*

Peshawur, 11 P.M., August 31.

YOUR'S of 4 P.M. by your servant Bucksbee Sing, has just reached. I had, in the evening, ordered Mahomed Oosman Khan Nezamoodowlah to start for Attock, as your Thannadar, being the best man I could get, and hope he is now on the road. Herewith, I send Herbert, though one can ill spare him. I have ordered off 200 Khyberries, under Futteh Khan Subadar, and have sent Hajee Mahomed to Sirdar Sooltan Mahomed, to get off 400 men, if possible, at once. From what I can understand from your man, you have not taken into the fort any of the three companies under Dun Raj; the Poorbeah company of Ram Sahaie's regiment I should think might decidedly be depended upon; indeed, I should think all three, as may be the Colonel himself; but that is a matter for your own consideration, and, with Herbert and Nezamoodowlah, it matters less.

P S.—By all means turn out all the Sings at once.

Inclosure 34 in No. 36.

*Major Lawrence to the Resident at Lahore.*

Peshawur, September 1, 1848.

I CANNOT sufficiently regret that such high authorities as the Commander-in-Chief and yourself should be of opinion "that, under no circumstances, should a single brigade be sent; that no troops, at present, should be sent; and that if any, ultimately, are, it will be an overwhelming force, which will take a long time to collect."

The consequences of such resolve will, I fear, shortly be so apparent that I deem it needless to dilate on them.

You will, long ere this, have found how fallacious was your expectation of Sirdar Chuttur Sing's meeting Captain Nicholson, and how little disposed the troops are to obey the orders of the Durbar.

From what I can learn, the deputation of Sirdar Jhunda Sing to adjust the differences between his friend Sirdar Chuttur Sing and the troops on one side, and Captain Abbott on the other, has not only signally failed, but many people do not scruple to assert that he has intentionally widened the breach.

Last night, at 11 o'clock, I received an express from Captain Nicholson

from the fort of Attock, urgently calling for additional levies, to the amount of 800 foot, under a Mahomedan commander, in addition to the 400 he had already placed in garrison, having found it necessary to remove the Sikh troops, in whom he had no confidence.

He pressed that the reinforcement should be with him, by sunset this evening, as the rebel Sirdar and troops were confidently expected to beleague the fort on the morning of the 2nd. I had, some days previously, sent him one company of Colonel Ram Sahaie Sing's Poorbeah regiment, and two of Mahomedan Ramgoles; but these he had kept at Khyrabad, on this side of the river.

In an hour of the receipt of the express, 200 foot, under Nezamoodowlah Mahomed Oosman Khan, were en route, and, on the exigency of the case, though I could ill spare him, I sent Lieutenant Herbert, who would reach the fort by sunrise, to take charge of it, on Lieutenant Nicholson's leaving, which he purposed doing, with the view to keep up the spirits of his raw levies, and do as much injury as possible to the rebels.

I hope, in the course of the day, to get off 400 more men. Sirdar Sooltan Mahomed, on whom I called to furnish that number, pleaded that he had given them all leave on the festival of Ead.

Sirdar Khan Sing, Majeetia, who is not given to volunteering his opinion, says, "that should the fort of Attock fall, there can be no longer any hopes of keeping the Peshawur force to their duty," and in this opinion all to whom I have spoken, fully agree.

P.S.—Since writing the foregoing, Sirdar Golab Sing has told me that the troops are talking among themselves of their two months' pay being due, and the little prospect there is of their getting it, as, in the present disturbed state of the country between this and the Jhelum, treasure would not be sent

Inclosure 35 in No 36.

*Captain Nicholson to Major Lawrence*

*Attock, September 1, 1848.*

I WAS glad to see Herbert this morning

I saw to the provisioning of the fort, when passing through, on my way to Hussan Abdal, and there are now three months supplies in it, there is no deficiency of ammunition either, and, with a trustworthy garrison of 800, or 1000 men, there is no reason why it should not hold out, while the provisions last. I have placed the guns in position, and am having their ammunition stored.

I have not either superseded Surmookh Sing, or turned out any of the garrison, but I have made arrangements so that it can be easily effected, if ever necessary.

I have told Nezamoodowlah that he is commandant of the faithful part of the garrison, and Surmookh Sing that he is to do nothing without consulting him. While Herbert remains, however, he will, of course, do as he pleases.

The boats are safer, immediately under the fort, than at Khyrabad, where, at night, 600 yards off, we have no command over them. I have, accordingly, kept them at this side, but moored higher up than formerly. Dun Raj's men will not now be required; indeed, he told me plainly the other day, that, should it be necessary to eject the irregulars, he could not depend on their assisting. I have, therefore, told him to stay at Khyrabad.

Chuttur Sing halted, both yesterday and to-day, to please the faithful in his camp, I believe; it being the Ead.

It is reported both that the Pukh brigade has escaped, and that the Rawul Pindee Goorchurras have joined Chuttur Sing. Both reports, however, require confirmation. Should the latter be true, I shall be obliged to alter my plan of operations, as the enemy will be very superior in cavalry. You will have heard that he has boned your Duffurree, Ram Doss. Abbott is, I believe, investing Hurriore, but he will be able to effect nothing against it.

I gave Jhunda Sing his rookut yesterday.

P. S.—I hear that Chuttur Sing is beginning to think us too strong ~~hope, to~~ be attacked with any chance of success. My intelligence, however, since ~~he~~ came into my own district, has been anything but authentic, owing to all my people fearing to incur the displeasure of the stronger party.

I cannot urge more on the Resident than I have already done, the necessity of sending up troops. If none are sent, our cause will indeed be a desperate one, in the course of a fortnight, or three weeks, if not before.

Inclosure 36 in No. 36.

*The Secretary to the Government of India to the Resident at Lahore.*

*Fort William, September 2, 1848.*

HIS Lordship in Council approves of the arrangement which you have made, for supplying each of the columns and detachments proceeding to Mooltan, with an officer in a political capacity.

Inclosure 37 in No. 36.

*Major Lawrence to the Resident at Lahore*

*Peshawar, September 2, 1848.*

THE reports current to-day, are, that Sirdar Chuttur Sing has given out that he has devoted his head to his God, and will stand, or fall, in the cause he has espoused. Some say that, if disposed to obey the Durbar's orders, he is too much in the power of the troops to be a free agent. Colonel Richpaul Sing is said to be the leading spirit of the mutinous soldiery.

They are burning, and ravaging, all the villages known to have rendered Captain Nicholson assistance, and with shouts proclaim the return of their Gooroojee's rule.

Inclosure 38 in No. 36.

*Major-General Whish to the Adjutant-General.*

*Camp, before Mooltan, September 2, 1848.*

HAVING, after removal to my present ground, expressed a desire that Lieutenant Edwardes' force should advance to the position he contemplated occupying on my arrival here, near Mosum Khan's well, it was arranged that this move (from the southward) should take place, yesterday, whilst I, accompanied by Major Napier and officers of his department, made a close reconnoissance of the northern face of the fort.

Both objects were, most satisfactorily, effected.

We passed half an hour, unmolested, near and about the Edga (rendered memorable by the treacherous tragedy committed there in April), and were retiring from it, when, unexpectedly, the enemy opened a fire from one or two guns, that happily injured no one. They were, however, in strong force to resist Lieutenant Edwardes' advance, as was expected; but he, step by step, ultimately, overcame all opposition, and, with trifling loss, succeeded in forming his camp, with its centre resting upon the gardens called Kutch Byragee and Khodazar, his left on the great Mooltan nullah, and his extreme right half a mile to the right of the Jog Mai, a temple that his troops took possession of, for a time, but were ordered to abandon, on account of its not being, for the present, easily tenable.

Lieutenant Edwardes, in his report of yesterday's operations (which, as I observed, when visiting his camp this morning, have put all his troops in high spirits), reports most favorably of the following officers and detachments:—Lieutenants Lake and Pollock, with a party of Daoodpotras, and two companies of the Sooroojmookhee regiment, and Lieutenant Lumsden's troop of the Guide Corps.

The conduct of Sheik Emamooddeen's division, is also, represented as having been highly creditable. They killed thirty or forty of the enemy, and captured

many of their horses, arms, &c. Raja Shere Sing, too, voluntarily, brought his guns into play, and enlisted the enemy for two or three hours.

Lieutenant Edwardes notices, in terms of high commendation, the valuable services of two volunteers during the morning, namely, Lieutenant Christopher, of the Indian Navy, and Mr. Hugo James, the latter having joined him from Sukkur in June last, when the presence of any European was most acceptable to him.

Before quitting Lieutenant Edwardes' camp, to-day, I decided on a site for a rocket battery in its front, which Major Napier immediately directed to be constructed, and which will, I have no doubt, commence at sunset this evening, under the direction of Captain M'Kenzie, horse artillery.

Inclosure 39 in No 36.

*Lieutenant Edwardes to the Resident at Lahore.*

*Camp, Byragee Garden, before Mooltan, September 3, 1848.*

IN compliance with your instructions, I took an opportunity of suggesting to Major-General Whish, C B, commanding the Mooltan field force, the propriety of summoning the garrison of Mooltan to surrender, before the siege is opened, and also of advising the inhabitants to abandon the city, if they valued their lives and property

Last night, I received from the Major-General a draft of a proclamation to the above effect, with directions to render it into the vernacular, for transmission to Mooltan, but, (as you will perceive) the name of the Maharajah being not once mentioned in the document, I took the liberty of bringing the omission to the General's notice, observing that our Treaty with Duleep Sing is yet in force; that it is against him Dewan Moolraj has rebelled, and that, if we were to exclude his name from a proclamation, recalling the garrison of a Punjab fortress to their allegiance, and mention only the name of Her Britannic Majesty, it would seem as if we had, already, determined to confiscate the State, whereas, if such a thing happens, it will only be under the pressure of events, to which, indeed, we seem very near, but which have, as yet, not elicited from the Government any allusion to such an intention.

Under these circumstances, I suggested the addition of the words "and her ally, His Highness Maharajah Duleep Sing" after the sentence "in honor of Her Most Gracious Majesty the Queen of Great Britain," and, as the Major-General has been good enough to approve the alteration, I think it right to report the matter for your information.

Inclosure 40 in No 36.

*Proclamation by Major-General W. S. Whish, C.B., Commanding the Army before Mooltan, addressed to the Inhabitants, and Garrison thereof.*

I INVITE both to an unconditional surrender, within twenty-four hours after the firing of a royal salute, at sunrise, to-morrow (5th of September), in honor of Her Most Gracious Majesty the Queen of Great Britain.

I shall, otherwise, in obedience to the orders of the Supreme Government of India, commence hostilities, on a scale that must insure early destruction to the rebel traitor and his adherents, who, having begun their resistance to lawful authority with a most cowardly act of treachery and murder, seek to uphold their unrighteous cause, by an appeal to religion, which every one must know to be sheer hypocrisy.

If the town be surrendered to me, as above suggested, private property will be respected; and the garrison of the fort will be permitted to withdraw unmolested, on giving up Dewan Moolraj, and his immediate associates, and laying down their arms, at one of the eastern gates of the town, and fort, respectively.

Given under my hand and seal this 4th day of September, 1848.



*The Resident at Lahore to the Secretary to the Government of India.*

*Lahore, September 5, 1848.*

THE events related by Captain Abbott, certainly, tend to throw very strong suspicion on the fidelity, and sincerity of purpose, of Sirdar Jhunda Sing, which is strengthened by the notoriety of the influence possessed by that person over Sirdar Chuttur Sing, which was not ill described by Sirdar Golab Sing, who, on my expressing to him my hope that Jhunda Sing would succeed in his mission, said, "It is well known that my father would obey Sirdar Jhunda Sing before his Gooroo."

Sirdar Jhunda Sing was appointed, by the former Resident, Deputy Governor of Hazara, where he was described to me to have done excellent service, for which he was, on many occasions, highly praised by Captain Abbott

When it was determined to send a force of Durbar troops, the most trustworthy that could be found, in the commencement of May last, down the Sind Sagur Doab, to aid in the scheme for drawing a wide cordon round Mooltan, Sirdar Jhunda Sing was the officer selected by the Durbar to command the force, as one in whom they could place reliance. Captain Abbott, on the occasion, wrote in high terms of the Sirdar as an intelligent, zealous, and faithful officer

Soon after the defection of a portion of the Churruneet regiment of horse, which formed part of Sirdar Jhunda Sing's brigade (on which occasion the Sirdar's conduct was open to no sort of suspicion), Captain Abbott wrote of Jhunda Sing as one connected with the extensive band of conspirators whom he considered as leagued to aid the Mooltan rebellion

In support of his opinion, Captain Abbott adduced the supposed disobedience of Sirdar Jhunda Sing to Lieutenant Edwardes' orders, and his mutinous march in a prohibited direction

Upon that occasion, I explained to Captain Abbott\*, that if his opinion of Sirdar Jhunda Sing's disaffection rested on the facts he had mentioned, it was without due foundation, for that the Sirdar had, closely and scrupulously, obeyed my orders in every step he had taken after leaving Hazara, and that he had never received any instructions from Lieutenant Edwardes at all. I praised his subordination, and ready obedience, which was somewhat put to the test, for I marched him and his brigade to within thirty-five miles of Mooltan, and ordered it back to Lahore, just after Raja Shere Sing's force (of which it was to have formed a part) had reached that place, and operations, wherein credit and honor might be obtained, were about to be commenced

Captain Abbott† expressed himself pleased at this refutation of the reports of the Sirdar's disobedience and misconduct, of whose character he had, till he left him, entertained a high opinion.

Sirdar Jhunda Sing had just returned to Lahore, and taken his place in Durbar, expecting, and indeed promised by me, to be sent, without his brigade, to Mooltan, when the Hazara outbreak was commenced. His position as Deputy Governor of the province, his previous character for service there with Captain Abbott, his known influence with Sirdar Chuttur Sing, and the strongly expressed desire of the Durbar, and of Sirdar Golab Sing, that the duty in hand should be entrusted to him; all pointed him out as the fittest person to be sent on the mission; which, I must say, he undertook with much apparent reluctance, at first, owing, as he said, to my having promised to let him go to Mooltan, where hard blows would be struck, while this was an affair in which no honor could be gained. Afterwards, when I explained to him the importance I attached to his mission, and the vital interests involved in the rebellion, he appeared to undertake the duty readily, and with a desire to perform it honestly.

The Sirdar has, certainly, accomplished nothing of advantage to Chuttur Sing, or the Government; and Captain Abbott makes out a strong case against his sincerity of purpose. Still, Lieutenant Nicholson, who is not easily deceived, continues to believe him honest, and has, it would appear, taken him with him to Attack.

I have directed Raja Deena Nath to order Sirdar Jhunda Sing back to Lahore. Whether he was treacherous and faithless, as Captain Abbott believes,

\* See my letter to Captain Abbott, dated July 24. Inclosure 1 in No. 36.

† See Captain Abbott's letter to me dated July 29. Inclosure 2 in No. 36.

or not, he cannot act with Captain Abbott, henceforth, at Hazara, and his conduct must be inquired into.

Sirdar Golab Sing was most importunate with me about sending Raja Deena Nath to endeavour to bring in his father, and to put down the rebellion, and he seemed most confident of his success. The Durbar also desired it, and the Raja seemed by no means unwilling to undertake the mission. I confess I have very little expectation of his being successful, after all the indulgent and considerate measures which have, hitherto, failed, and if the lives of our district officers were not in jeopardy, and the interests on the frontier were not so vast and important, I should not have considered any further attempts at an amicable settlement of the rebellion, necessary or, perhaps, proper; but, under the circumstances, I think I have acted rightly in using every means, not inconsistent with the authority of the British Government, or compromising my position, which have any likelihood, be it never so small, of preventing the evil spreading further; and I can see that the people about the Durbar, who have better means of judging, perhaps, than I am in possession of, do expect that the Raja will bring in the rebel Sirdar with him.

I have promised him merely life, and an honorable investigation into his conduct—if he have committed no crime beyond what I was aware of, when Rajah Deena Nath was sent—on the condition of his immediately dismissing the troops to their cantonments, or leaving them, and coming in to me at Lahore.

I, certainly, think that, if on his arrival at Rawul Pindee, the Raja should find an announcement of the occupation of Mooltan by our troops, he may, then, have a better chance of putting down the rebellion, and, as the heavy guns were expected at Mooltan to-day, and everything was ready for commencing operations against the city on their arrival, it is very probable that that intelligence will overtake the Raja, ere he can reach Sirdar Chuttur Sing's camp.

Inclosure 42 in No. 36

*Lieutenant Edwardes to the Resident at Lahore*

*Camp, Byragee Gardens, before Mooltan,  
September 4, 1848*

THE intentions of Raja Shere Sing must of course be a question of the deepest interest to you, and I think it right to lay before you my own impressions on the subject.

If those intentions are to be judged of, by the past conduct of the Raja, then, nothing can be more satisfactory, or loyal. Since the Raja's arrival before Mooltan, he has omitted neither persuasion, threats, or punishments to keep his troops to their duty. He brought to light (about three weeks ago) an extensive treasonable correspondence with Moolraj and his own camp, collected the evidence diligently, and, when the crime was fully brought home to Shoojan Sing, (a Sikh Jagheerdaree horseman of some consideration, and still greater notoriety,) he carried the extreme sentence of the law into effect, and caused the traitor to be blown from one of his own guns. The act was extremely unpopular in the Raja's force, and I rather think that he himself expected resistance; for he begged very hard that the execution might take place in my camp, instead of his own, and when, for political reasons, I refused this request, he remarked, "Very well, I place my honor in your hands, and you must carry me through the consequences."

Again, on the 1st of September, when my force changed ground, and was opposed by the enemy's light troops, in the jungle before Mooltan, Raja Shere Sing, of his own accord, mounted his guns on the high bank of the nullah on our left, and assisted our movement by enfilading the rebels. Of course, I praised the Raja much, for this voluntary act of zeal and loyalty, and he followed it up, on the 3rd of September, by moving out of his camp, and cannonading Moolraj's troops at the bridge, whom he threw into great confusion; but he was obliged to retire, by the heavy guns of the fort, and (I fancy) the refusal of Sirdar Ootar Sing, and Sirdar Shumshere Sing's division, to share in such heretical proceedings! The Raja has, since, acknowledged to me, that "he never expected to effect anything by this move, but he thought it would be a good thing to get a few men killed on both sides, so as to destroy the good under-

standing between his own Sikhs, and those in the garrison." That he fully succeeded in this object is evident from his having gained, in the city of Mooltan, the nickname of "Raja Sheik Sing;" and the Khalsa of his own camp say, they believe he is a Mussulman after all.

The Raja, on the occasion above alluded to, seems to have been adhered to, only by his new Mussulman troops, the regular infantry regiment of Poorbeahs, (suspected by him previously,) and Sirdars Ootar Sing and Shumshere Sing, who were ashamed of their own men.

This being the position of affairs, it must be allowed that the Raja has, hitherto, put himself very prominently forward, on the side of loyalty, and acted, not like one under compulsion, but as if anxious to claim the reward of service. It is useless attempting to analyze his motives in so doing, for, should he continue true to the last, few would give him credit for anything but prudence, and, should he join the rebels to-morrow, it would still be as doubtful as it is to-day, whether his past good conduct was dictated by approval, or disapproval, of his father's projects. In the latter case, he would try, to the last, to save his family, in the former, it would be his interest to deceive us, till all was ripe for revolution. It is one of those questions which time itself will not clear up.

Left, thus, to conjecture, I must say that, should Sirdar Chuttur Sing succeed in attracting the Peshawur troops to his standard, and raising anything like a national movement against us, I should not expect Raja Shee Sing to remain faithful, however well he may be, now, inclined. It would be expecting too much from a son and a Sikh. But I believe him, hitherto, to have taken the sensible view of Punjab affairs; to be convinced of what I have often told him, that another Sikh revolution will annex his country to British India, and that he will only fall away at the last moment, when betrayed by either the reproaches, or successes, of his father.

The Raja and myself are on the best terms. We discuss Chuttur Sing's conduct, as if he was not his father; and I never disguise any bad news I hear of him. Neither do I pretend to be blind to the difficulties of the Raja's position, but fairly meet them with the best advice, and most friendly encouragement, I can offer. Lastly, I appeal to his self-interest, and urge him, should his father ruin the State, to save at least his own Jagheers out of the wreck. The Raja is, I am sure, quite convinced of my sincere desire to stand his friend, and that I will bear ample testimony to his good conduct, so that he has every inducement to continue it, and it is only justice to him to say, that he has, latterly, more than once, and with much warmth, declared that, having received from both you and me written assurances that he is not considered responsible in any way for his father, he washes his hands of the projects in which he seems engaged, considering it the part of a good son to oppose, instead of sharing, his father's folly.

Inclosure 43 in No 36

*Lieutenant Eduardes to the Resident.*

*Camp, Byragee Gardens, before Mooltan,  
September 7, 1848*

BY the invitation of Major-General Whish, C.B., commanding the Mooltan field-force, I, yesterday morning, attended a meeting of officers at the General's tent, to arrange, finally, a plan of attack on the fort and city of Mooltan.

There were present, as well as I can recollect, the following officers —

Major-General Whish, C.B., Commanding the Field Force, Colonel Drummond, C.B., Deputy Quarter-Master General, Major Napier, Chief Engineer; Major Garbett, Artillery, Major Becher, Assistant Quarter-Master General; Captain Siddons, Assistant Engineer; Captain Garforth, Engineer; Captain Whish, Assistant-Adjutant General, General Cortlandt, Sikh Service, Lieutenant Lake, Engineers, in charge of the Daoodpotra army.

Major Napier laid two plans before the Major-General:—

1st. To take, first, the town of Mooltan, by a *coup-de-main*, at any cost, in one day, by the whole force moving down in line, getting within battering distance of the Khoonee Boorj, and storming the breach as soon as practicable.

2nd. To march round to the north, and attack the citadel, by regular approaches.

Major Napier admitted that the first plan must cost life, if successful ; and might prove a failure ; but he recommended the risk being run, for political reasons, and with reference to the state of the Punjab generally, which renders an immediate moral effect necessary , and, this being the avowed reason on which Major Napier advised a *coup-de-main*, the Major-General called upon me, as in your confidence, to state whether I considered the times demanded that so great a risk, and certain loss of life, should be incurred ? I, respectfully, submitted my opinion, that, Sirdar Chuttur Sing having advanced from Hazara, contrary to all orders, things had gone too far wrong to be rectified, by the simple capture of the city of Mooltan , that, as the Sirdar had asked for Raja Deena Nath to be sent to him, and you had complied with that request, it appeared to be Chuttur Sing's object to gain time to feel the pulse of the Peshawur troops, before he finally committed himself, but that I thought the Peshawur troops would, at any rate, stand fast, and await the result of the conference between, perhaps, the two most sagacious men in the Punjab Deena Nath, I have ever regarded as, at heart, bitterly opposed to our administration, and, ostensibly deputed to bring in Chuttur Sing, I should expect that their discussion, will be all as to the possibility of holding out Yet, it is on this alone that I think any hope rests, of preserving the peace of the Punjab , for, whatever may be Deena Nath's inclinations, they seldom prejudice his judgment Sympathizing with the Sirdar's aspirations, he will still point out to him that, however the siege of Mooltan may embarrass us for the time, in the end we can crush the Khalsa army, as easily as, once, we spared it , and that the only result of a rebellion would be the final extinction of the Raj Whether Chuttur Sing will listen to this prudent advice, is another question I merely spoke to the probability that things in Hazara will remain in *statu quo*, until Deena Nath's arrival, and, consequently, that there is no immediate necessity for precipitating the attack on Mooltan General Whish said that, thus being the case, he should reject, at once the idea of a *coup-de main*, which, in his opinion, would be justified only by urgent political necessity The opinion of all the officers present was, also, against a *coup-de-main*

Plan No 2, was then discussed, and Major Napier explained, that it was the one most consonant to military science He wished, however, to know from me, whether, if we marched to the north of Mooltan, I could undertake to keep open the communication with Bahawalpore ? I replied, that I was willing to do so , but, by water, not by land , and, therefore, the communication would be slow. It would also involve the detachment of a strong body of men, to guard Shoo-jabad Colonel Drummond expressed a belief, that there was no water for a camp north of Mooltan, and almost every body was of opinion, that the change of place would be construed by the natives into a defeat Under these circumstances, plan No 2, was given up

Lieutenant Lake submitted a proposition, to run a trench from the battery on the extreme right of the Daoodpotra camp, north-east, to a point called Ram-teerut, which would be upwards of a mile , and to throw up heavy-gun batteries at such points of this entrenchment as would drive away the enemy, without much loss of life, and with certain success This plan being, generally, approved of, was, at last, adopted , and, this morning, General Whish moved the right of his camp to the left, and I extended my right, so as to bring the two forces closer to each other , and, at day-light, the trench was traced, and opened out Thus the base of operations has been laid down, and, I trust, that all will now go on prosperously to a happy issue

Moolraj has, I think, gained more by recruits from the Manjha, during the last fortnight, than he has lost by desertions ; and the corrupt and disloyal conduct of the Kardars between Mooltan and Lahore, in allowing these parties to pass, cannot be too severely censured. No preventive measures which the civil authorities may devise can be effective, if opposed by the whole native executive of the country.

You ask me as to the real fate of Bhace Maharaj I believe that he was, as first reported, drowned, after the fight with Mahee Sing's force, and that his pretended resuscitation at Mooltan was an imposture His name even is, now, seldom heard ; but, whenever the question is asked, the Sikhs of course favor the notion that the Bhace has voluntarily retired, for a short space, and will revisit his followers, at leisure.

## Inclosure 44 in No. 36.

*The Resident at Lahore to the Commander-in-Chief.**Lahore, September 8, 1848.*

I HAVE very little hope of anything satisfactory arising from the mission of Raja Deena Nath, and I am of opinion that measures, for putting down this rebellion, by coercing the rebel force, should not be delayed, pending the issue of the Raja's negotiations.

The efficient measures taken by Captain Nicholson, in communication with Major Lawrence, for the security of the Fort of Attock, seem to have convinced the Sirdar that its reduction was beyond his power, and he knows that, unless it be reduced, there is much probability that the Peshawur force may not join the rebel standard. If the Fort of Attock were to fall into the hands of Chuttur Sing, there is scarcely a doubt that the Sikh portion of the Peshawur troops would immediately join, and the Bunnoo force would endeavour to follow the example.

Sirdar Chuttur Sing has advanced two marches from Hussan Abdal towards Attock, where he remained for some days, he fell back, on the first of the month, one march, and returned to Hussan Abdal, on the second.

He has sent his son, Sirdar Ootar Sing, to the family estate of Bagh Bootah, near Rawul Pindée, as it is said, to raise levies, and join him again, at the latter place.

The Sirdar is himself sending troops and guns to endeavour to open the Hazara passes, and release the Pukli brigade, still surrounded, in Gahundia, by the Mahomedan levies under Captain Abbott and Lieutenant Robinson.

Captain Nicholson, with his levies, has followed the Sirdar, and is encamped within a few miles of him, watching his movements.

New levies from his Jagheers are daily joining the Sirdar, and Sikhs from the Manjha, to the amount of some thousands, are reported, by the Durbar officials, to have proceeded towards Hazara for the same purpose.

The country, from Attock to beyond Rawul Pindée, is in a very disturbed state, and the communication with Peshawur, by that route, is very uncertain.

Major Lawrence, Captain Abbott, and Captain Nicholson, all urge, in the strongest terms, the immediate necessity of sending British troops to the scene of the rebellion, as the only possible means of its suppression.

As I said before, I have but little hope of Raja Deena Nath's mission effecting the suppression of this disturbance, in fact, I was mainly induced to adopt the proposition to send him, in order to gain time. The Raja being unsuccessful, the rebellion must be put down by force of British arms, whether the Sirdar remains in the country between the Jhelum and the Attock, where his own Jagheers lie, or if, as he declares is his purpose, when joined by the Gahundia brigade, he march upon Lahore.

Every day's delay in the moving of British troops will give confidence to the disaffected, who will swell the ranks of the Sirdar, and render more formidable the character of the rebellion. As yet no chiefs have, openly, joined him. doubtless, he has the sympathies, and secret support, of many.

We should lose no time in making preparations for meeting either emergency, the organization of extensive rebellion beyond the Jhelum, or the marching of the rebel force towards the capital.

For this purpose, I propose the following arrangements upon which I should wish to have the benefit of your Lordship's opinion, and advice, at the earliest possible moment.

1st To move up from Jullundur, Brigadier Wheeler, with the Jullundur moveable column, and one of the three regiments of cavalry in the Jullundur, across the Beas, and via Umritsur and the Meanee ferry, across the Ravee, to Eminabad, about thirty-three miles north-west of Lahore. It will take this force about thirteen or fourteen days, moving by easy marches, from Jullundur to Eminabad. I shall not put them in motion, till I receive your Lordship's reply, unless Sirdar Chuttur Sing, in the meantime, moves towards Lahore, when I should send orders for the force marching at once.

2ndly. If Sirdar Chuttur Sing comes to the Chenab, I would, immediately, move out from Lahore the force described in the letter to my address from Brigadier Campbell, C B, dated the 6th instant, (a copy of which, with its reply,

has been, I believe, forwarded by the brigadier to your Lordship ) This detachment could join Brigadier Wheeler's column at Eminabad, in three marches, and the so united force would be enough to crush anything Sirdar Chuttur Sing could bring against it.

If Sirdar Chuttur Sing should not cross the Jhelum, but continue in rebellion in the Sind Sagur Doab, the force under Brigadier Wheeler would halt at Eminabad, until it can be joined by a full brigade, and until arrangements can be made for, at the same time, organizing a third brigade, to follow in support of the advance column, and securing the safety of the garrison of Lahore, during the absence of the force to the westward

In order to effect the accomplishment of these objects, at the earliest possible date, I would propose that the army of reserve, should be directed to assemble at Lahore, instead of at Ferozepore

I consider it most desirable on every account, in reference to the events of the last few months, that the place for assembling the army of reserve should be Lahore.

Should the expedition to the north-west, I have contemplated above, be necessary, and it seems to me, now almost inevitable, the base of operations must be Lahore, and the arrival here of regiment after regiment, of infantry and cavalry, and troop after troop, of artillery, will enable the officer commanding the army to organize the brigades required in advance, without delay, and, at the same time, to secure the safety of the garrison, which might, otherwise, be compromised by the withdrawal of the troops necessary for their formation

Should the expedition to the north-west not be necessary, still the arrangements of the Government, in respect to the Punjab, for facilitating the accomplishment of which the formation of the army of reserve has been determined on, will have to be carried out at Lahore, and the presence of the army here will be most salutary

To Lahore, moreover, nearly every regiment, troop, and battery, which is to constitute the army, must eventually, under all circumstances, come.

The effect of troops marching through the Jullundur Doab, and Manjha, and from Ferozepore at this time, will be most beneficial in keeping quiet the disaffected, and assuring the well-disposed, and preventing the spread of the rebellion, as will the knowledge, which will soon be promulgated, that the order has gone forth for the assembly, forthwith, of an army at Lahore

I would earnestly request your Lordship's early consideration of the above suggestions. The crisis is an important one, and I am satisfied that the sooner the troops are in motion the less will be the work eventually to be performed.

I would recommend that the 29th, from Kusnowlee, now en route to Ferozepore, should be directed to continue its march, accompanied by one of the corps of native infantry, now at Ferozepore, to Lahore. This would bring hither the two regiments, by about the 23rd of this month

Inclosure 45 in No. 36.

*The Resident at Lahore to the Secretary to the Government of India.*

*Lahore, September 8, 1848.*

I AGREE with Lieutenant Edwardes in thinking, that Raja Shere Sing, after all that he has done, will not commit himself, unless his father's rebellion is more successful than, I hope, it will be, but, if the rebellion assume the national character which the Sirdar desires to attach to it, and becomes more general, I cannot expect that Raja Shere Sing will continue faithful.

As yet, no chief has, openly, joined Sirdar Chuttur Sing; not because they are generally better affected to us, but rather because they have all separate and conflicting interests, and feuds, and a combination between them is very difficult.

Neither the army beyond Hazara, nor the chiefs generally, appear to have been prepared for this move of Sirdar Chuttur Sing, and their openly joining, or not joining, will depend greatly on the prospect of ultimate success which they may think the rebellion to bear.

If Raja Shere Sing should not join his father, supposing the rebellion to gain head, it will be very surprising, and it is equally surprising that the Sirdar should have taken his decided line, without having secured the concurrence of his son.

## Inclosure 46 in No. 36.

*The Resident at Lahore to the Secretary to the Government of India.**Lahore, September 10, 1848.*

I FORWARD a letter from Lieutenant Edwardes dated the 7th instant, giving an account of the mode in which it has been determined to attack the city of Mooltan.

If the plan advocated by Major Napier could have been adopted, without the probability of much loss of life, I should have preferred it to the slower, and less imposing, though, perhaps, more certain, and safe process, that has been determined on. I think Major Napier took a correcter view than Lieutenant Edwardes, of the importance, on political grounds, of the announcement of some brilliant success to the British arms, at the present moment.

Lieutenant Edwardes has, also, I consider, entirely overrated the talent of Sardar Chuttur Sing, in calling him one of the most sagacious persons in the Punjab. I know him but little, personally, but my impression, when I used to meet him, at the time of negotiating the treaty, was, that he was a very stupid old man, and this I find is the general impression among those who are well acquainted with him. Mr John Lawrence, in a private letter received yesterday, writing of him, says "I cannot, in any way, account for Chuttur Sing's conduct, I always looked on him as a harmless, old fool." He is, moreover, now very infirm, and suffers much from chronic disease. His conduct is unaccountable, except on the belief that he is acting, under the advice, and with the secret support, of others.

What Lieutenant Edwardes says of the conduct of the Government officials throughout the country, is perfectly correct. There has been a passive favoring of every instance of opposition to the British Government, wherever it has arisen. I have been unable to make the Kardars give any account of the armed parties passing through their jurisdiction, and, with the greatest difficulty, can they be made to seize the property of proclaimed traitors.

In the case of the rebel Bhace Maharaj, the conduct of the executive officers was, more actively, abetting. The Governor-General in Council will perceive from Lieutenant Edwardes' present letter, that what I have already stated of the fate of Bhace Maharaj Sing, and of the Mooltan imposture, is admitted to be correct.

## Inclosure 47 in No. 36

*The Secretary to the Government of India to the Adjutant-General.**September 14, 1848.*

THE Resident at Lahore has, with reference to the present posture of affairs in the Hazara country, intimated the expediency of collecting an army on the frontier.

The Governor-General in Council fully concurs in this view, and I am directed to request that the Commander-in-Chief will take immediate measures for collecting, at Ferozepore, an army of the strength contemplated by his Lordship in Council\*, excluding, of course, from the estimated number of 20,000 men, those who have already been detached on duty to Mooltan. If we reckon these at 7000 men, the army now to be collected at Ferozepore will amount to about 13,000 men.

Circumstances may, hereafter, require the assembly of even a larger force; and, ultimately, it may, possibly, become necessary to have at our disposal, a force which could only be obtained by an augmentation of the whole army, but, until the ulterior measures with reference to the Punjab, are finally determined upon, his Lordship in Council does not wish to commit himself to such an important step as a general augmentation of the army, from which it would not be possible to recede, without public inconvenience, and detriment to the State.

\* Five troops Horse Artillery, 4 Horse Batteries, 4 companies Reserve Artillery, 5 companies sappers, 2 regiments European Dragoon, 3 regiments Native Cavalry, 4 regiments Irregular Cavalry, 4 regiments European Infantry, 14 regiments Native Infantry—amounting to something upwards of 20,000 men.

In any measures which may be necessary, for the purpose of collecting this force of 13,000 men at Ferozepore, the Governor-General in Council trusts that his Lordship will see the absolute necessity of not weakening the garrison at Lahore, and the troops stationed for the protection of the Jullundur Doab

The Governor-General in Council deems it expedient to address to you this letter without delay. Further communications will, very shortly, be forwarded to you on the same subject

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Inclosure 48 in No 36

*The Secretary to the Government of India to the Resident at Lahore*

*Fort William, September 14, 1848.*

I HAVE the honor to acknowledge the receipt of your letter dated the 30th ultimo, relative to the disturbance in Hazara

I am directed to observe, that Sirdar Chuttai Sing's conduct, after the very favorable view taken of it by you, and the lenient measures which you had acquainted the Sirdar were in your contemplation, can only be accounted for by admitting that he is faithless to the British Government, as Captain Abbott has all along declared him to have been

The Governor-General in Council fully approves of your determination not to detach a small British force into such a country as Hazara, at so great a distance from its supports, weakening us, at the same time, at Lahore, where it is indispensable that we should be immovably strong

The Governor-General in Council feels great anxiety for the officers in Hazara, but the detachment of a small force from Lahore would be so full of imminent danger to the State, that it becomes necessary, however distressing it may be, to set aside all considerations of a personal nature

With regard to your opinion that an army should be assembled as soon as possible on the frontier, I am directed to state that his Lordship is in communication with the Commander-in-chief, on the subject, and the result will be made known to you hereafter

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No. 37

*The Governor-General in Council to the Secret Committee.*

*October 7, 1848. (No. 78.)*

WE forward the further correspondence which has taken place with the Governor General's agent at Benares, regarding the Maharanee of Lahore.

Inclosure 1 in No 37.

*Major Macgregor to the Secretary to the Government of India*

*Benares, September 16, 1848.*

I HAVE written to Mr. Newmarch, informing him that Sirdar Jeebun Sing cannot be allowed to act as the Maharanee's vakeel, or to have access to her, on any plea whatever, but that the Maharanee may select some one else as her agent, if she wish to do so

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Inclosure 2 in No 37

*The Secretary to the Government of India to J. Newmarch, Esq.*

*Fort William, September 23, 1848.*

THE Governor-General in Council does not suppose that you have any improper object whatever in view, in seeking permission to communicate with Her Highness in confidence and alone. That permission, however, cannot be conceded in the case of the Maharanee, any more than in other cases of a similar description.



## No. 38.

*The Governor-General in Council to the Secret Committee**Fort William, October 7, 1848. (No. 79.)*

YOU will learn with regret that the siege of Mooltan has been raised, and that Major-General Whish has thought it expedient to retire, several miles, from the fort, and await the arrival of reinforcements.

He is, at present, at Sooraj Koond, about three miles from Mooltan, but intends, ultimately, at his leisure, to form his camp at Tibbee, twelve miles to the south of Mooltan, and to place his siege train, for protection, within Shoojabad, which, when once secure, will leave him free to leave his camp, and engage, in active hostilities, against the enemy.

From his own statement, it would appear that this step was taken, not so much from his own convictions of its necessity, as from an acquiescence in the opinions of those whom he consulted. The immediate cause assigned for this embarrassing proceeding, after he had been fully successful in his preceding efforts, is the defection of Raja Shere Sing's whole force, which went over to the enemy, on the morning of the 14th ultimo.

The Major-General says\*, "the circumstances of this morning induce me to begin a letter that gives me much pain, by observing that, on the 9th instant, the chief engineer expressed his opinion, that the force under my command was inadequate for the reduction of the town, and fortress, of Mooltan. In this I entirely differed from him. On the 11th instant, when talking of Shere Sing's force to Lieutenant Edwardes, and of the expediency of getting rid of it, he said "he would try and so arrange." It was, again, urged that our force was inadequate to prosecute the siege, which I was exceedingly averse to acquiesce in, seeing that the troops were in high health and spirits, that our sick and wounded did not exceed six per cent, and that our artillery had not yet seriously opened their fire, but, on my return from our advanced posts at 8 o'clock this morning, I was surprised by a message from Lieutenant Edwardes, to the effect that Shere Sing, at the head of his whole force, was in full march to join the enemy. I have had the mortification of abandoning my advanced positions, (obtained with considerable difficulty, and cost) as we had no prospect of keeping the town, after taking it, the enemy being 10,000 strong in its immediate suburbs."

Thus, has Raja Shere Sing, by the desertion of his army to the enemy, in the face of day, before British troops, committed an open act of treachery, which he has avowed and gloried in, by his subsequent proclamation "By the direction of the holy Gooroo, Raja Shere Sing and others, with their valiant troops, have joined the trusty and faithful Dewan Moolraj, on the part of Maharajah Duleep Sing, with a view to eradicate and expel the tyrannous and crafty Feringees. The Khalsajee must now act with all their heart and soul.

"All who are servants of the Khalsajee, of the holy Gooroo, and the Maharajah, are enjoined to gird up their loins, and proceed to Mooltan, without delay. Let them murder all Feringees, wherever they may find them, and cut off the daks.

"In return for this service, they will certainly be recompensed by the favor of the holy Gooroo, by increase of rank, and by distribution of rewards.

"Fourthly†. Let all cling closely to their religion, whoever acts accordingly, will obtain grace in this world, and hereafter, and he who acts otherwise, is excluded from the pale of the Sikh faith."

This deliberate exhibition of perfidy, and cowardly malice, against British officers, and professedly on the part of Maharajah Duleep Sing, has brought matters to a crisis, and compelled us, at last, to come to the conclusion, that no other course is open to us, than to prosecute a general Punjab war with vigor, and, ultimately, to occupy the country with our own troops.

The first step necessary for the attainment of this object, is the augmentation of the army, to which we have, at last, most reluctantly, consented. The orders which have been issued, provide for an increase of about 17,000 men, and, as these will be drafted into existing regiments, without adding to the number of European officers, we have observed the most economical scale by which so large an augmentation can be obtained. The recruiting depôts will be

\* Inclosure 25 in No. 38.

† See in orig.

a sufficient garrison for the stations where they may be formed, and thus enable the Commander-in-Chief, at once, to avail himself of nearly an equal number of veteran soldiers, for service in the Punjab.

We have ordered the Government of Bombay to send a brigade through Sind, to act in co-operation with the Punjab army; and, as this has long been in a state of preparation, it will no doubt be early enough in the field to afford effectual assistance.

We have, also, called upon the Government of Madras to aid us with three regiments, by relieving the three Bengal Native Infantry regiments stationed at Midnapore, Khyhook Phyoo, Chittagong, and Dacca. With these means and appliances, we shall be able to form, upon our north-west frontier, a large and powerful army, sufficient to overpower all opposition, and to maintain itself against avowed, as well as secret, foes.

Chuttur Sing's proceedings are very unaccountable, and, at present, exhibit a great want of energy. He occupies much the same position as he did, when we last wrote, except that, by forcing the Dumboo Pass, he has released the Pukli brigade, and thus strengthened himself with more men and guns, of which he is now said to be in possession of fourteen. He marches, and counter-marches, from place to place, in the upper portion of the Sind Sagur Doab, without seeming to be able to come to any decision as to what future course to pursue. He is either waiting for the junction of the Peshawur force, or reinforcements from Golab Sing, and may, then, proceed to Attock, Mooltan, or Lahore. The last is the most improbable, though the most desirable for us, and as it is the one most openly talked of by him and his troops, the declaration is, probably, made to conceal some other design.

Captains Abbott and Nicholson report all well, up to the 19th of September, on which date they had just heard of the retirement of Major-General Whish from Mooltan, an event which will, probably, lead to some more decisive measure on the part of Sirdar Chuttur Sing.

From Major Lawrence, we have heard up to the 16th of September. He had taken the precaution of getting all the guns of the brigade into his own power, and, as he is supported by a strong body of Mahomedans, it is to be hoped that there is no cause for apprehension, even should the Sikh force at Peshawur declare, openly, against him. He reports rumours of a desire, on the part of Dost Mahomed Khan, to take advantage of the present disturbances, and attempt the recovery of Peshawur. Major Lawrence gives no credit to these rumours. If such an attempt were to be made, it would, no doubt, be by the invitation, and encouragement, of the Sikhs, who, forgetting their ancient animosities, and unmindful of the effect of such assistance, should they succeed in their vain endeavour to re-establish the independence of the Khalsa, are alive only to their immediate necessities, and would be ready to invoke his aid, provided he could do anything effectual against us, in the present emergency. Indeed, the dispatch of emissaries to him, both by Moolraj, and Sirdar Chuttur Sing, shows that solicitations have been actually made to him for assistance. Such a junction is, in the present posture of affairs, the only thing which could cause us the least apprehension, not that Dost Mahomed Khan is himself in any strength, or, in any way, formidable in the field, but his declared adhesion to the party in open defiance against us, would go far to withdraw the sympathies of the western Mahomedan population from our cause, and enlist it all upon his, and thus deprive us of many friends, who, in a period of extreme danger to our detached officers, have, hitherto, stood by them, with most unexpected cordiality, and afforded them sincere and valuable support.

The rising on the borders of the Trans-Sutlej Commissionership, which is reported by this mail, was of trifling importance, and has been suppressed.

You will be glad to learn that the Resident has occupied the fortress of Govindgurb, which we urged upon him, when the prospect of hostilities first commenced. We shall derive great advantage from this measure, in our future operations, for the Jullundur and Lahore forces are thus brought into close and uninterrupted connection, and have placed us in a commanding position, in the most disaffected district in the Punjab. The Resident has, also, taken the precaution of occupying the citadel of Lahore, with a British garrison.

It is the intention of the Governor-General to proceed, on the 10th instant, to the north-western frontier, to enable him to regulate our future proceedings, with reference to the Punjab.

## Inclosure 1 in No. 38.

*Captain Nicholson to the Resident at Lahore.*

*Gondul, 7 miles from Attock, on the Hussan Abdal road, 9 A.M.*

I WROTE to you, yesterday morning, from Attock, mentioning Lieutenant Herbert's arrival, and my intention of keeping the field myself. I, last night, joined my levies here, and have just received intelligence that Sirdar Chuttur Sing, who was encamped a mile on this side of Boorhan, started with his force en route to Hussan Abdal again, this morning. I am unable, at present, positively to state to what cause the halt made by the Sirdar, yesterday, and the day before, and his retrograde movement this morning, is attributable. From the intelligence I have received, however, I am disposed to believe that the Sirdar followed me from Hussan, in the hope my entrance into Attock would be opposed by the Sikh and Poorbeah irregular garrison there, and that the fort would surrender to him, on his arrival before it. I have positive proof that a portion of the irregular garrison had been seduced, but some additional reinforcements thrown by me into the fort, the day on which I fell back from Paoree, disconcerted their plans, and rendered any opposition to my entrance on their part, hopeless. I had serious thoughts, at one time, of turning out the whole of the Sikhs and Poorbeahs, but, by placing all the gates, and commanding positions, as also the guns, in charge of my own men, I have rendered the old garrison incapable of mischief, and obviated the necessity for expelling them.

When I passed through Attock, last month, I made arrangements for provisioning it. There are now three months' supplies for 1000 men, there is no deficiency of ammunition, and the fort may be considered secure against any attempt of Chuttur Sing, while its supplies last.

I do not, at present, intend to increase my force in the field (which consists of about 300 horse, and 700 foot), for the reason that, with ten times that number of militia, I could not hope to oppose successfully, in the field, four regular regiments of infantry, and eight guns, besides irregulars.

My true policy, with the means at my disposal, is defensive, and, when I proposed adopting the guerilla system of warfare, the other day, I did so, under the impression that the Sirdar was bent on the siege of the fort of Attock, and that, in no other way, could I divert his attention from it. So long, however, as he remains inactive, doing no mischief, I cannot do better than follow his example, keeping, of course, a sharp watch on his movements.

One of the Khatir chiefs, who was with me, was assassinated two days ago, at the Sirdar's instigation, and I have too good reason to believe that great inducements have been held out to many about me, to kill, or deliver me up.

I shall say no more on the subject of sending up British troops. I have, already, sufficiently often reported my opinion of the absolute necessity of the measure.

The news of Captain Abbott's siege of Hurrpore, or an intention to attempt the release of the Pukh force, may be the cause of the Sirdar's retrograde movement.

## Inclosure 2 in No. 38

*Major-General Whish to the Adjutant-General.*

*Camp, before Mooltan, September 4, 1848.*

IT is with the greatest satisfaction I report the safe arrival, this morning, of the siege train. All arrived in excellent health. The whole force will be paraded at sun-rise to-morrow, and we shall break ground, in the evening, towards the city.

## Inclosure 3 in No. 38.

*The Adjutant-General to the Secretary to the Government of India.*

*Simla, September 5, 1848.*

I AM directed by the Commander-in-Chief to forward a letter from Brigadier C. Campbell, C.B., commanding at Lahore, of the 1st instant, intimating that, at the requisition of the Resident, he has ordered the moveable column at Jullundur to be held in readiness to move towards Lahore, at the shortest notice.

I am to add, that the Commander-in-Chief has communicated to the Resident his opinion, that the garrison of Lahore, as now constituted, is fully equal to the defence of that place, and that his Excellency considers the detaching of so small a body as a brigade of infantry, in a hostile country, beyond the reach of immediate support in case of need, a measure of very questionable expediency, while, at the same time, with his present impressions, which he has communicated to the Governor-General, his Lordship is strongly opposed to the withdrawal of the only European regiment in the Jullundur Doab, or to the force in that district being reduced in any way.

## Inclosure 4 in No. 38

*Major Lawrence to the Resident at Lahore*

*Peshawur, September 5, 1848.*

I REGRET to report, that affairs in this quarter, among the Sikh soldiery, have taken a turn within the last day or two, so that my oft expressed hopes of keeping them to their duty are much shaken

Last night, at 8 o'clock, Colonel Alla Sing reported, that he had just heard that Colonel Ootar Sing's regiment had sent a deputation to Colonel Mehtab Sing's, requiring to know if they would join in an attack on my house, during the night, and that they had replied, that they would, on the corps reaching their lines, that it was arranged to seize the guns first, and, then, advance

Sirdar Golab Sing, immediately, sent for Colonels Ruttun and Mehtab Sing, commanding Sikh regiments in this cantonment (Alee Murdan), and Colonels Meer Jungle, and Ameer Khan, commanding the Mahomedan and Hindostanee corps. The two former declared, they believed the report to be untrue, though they knew that emissaries were about, but that they would go and see if there was any stir in the lines. They, shortly, sent to say, that most of their men were asleep. The General sent, and satisfied himself that such was the case.

He directed the other two Colonels to send four companies from each of their regiments, immediately, to take charge of the guns (twenty), which are posted on the right and left flanks of the cantonments, which was done, expeditiously, and quietly, the other companies of these corps remaining under arms, but in their huts

He then sent to Raja Soochet Sing's cantonment, on the east of the city, in which are located the Khas Dragoons, Colonel Ootar Sing's regiment, Sikhs, eight guns of Futteh Khan's, and, at a quarter of a mile distance, Colonel Ram Sahaie Sing's Hindostanee regiment. The two former were reported to be all ready for mischief, and it was said that the Sikh infantry had made an attempt on the guns, but had been waned off by Commander Futteh Khan. An order was, immediately, sent to Colonel Ram Sahaie Sing, to detach four companies to prevent the Sikhs taking these guns

I sent an express to the Barukzye Sirdars and Urbobs, to attend, forthwith, at my residence, with all their disposable horse and foot.

As the night wore on, messengers returned from Soochet Sing's cantonment, who announced that all was now quiet, the Khas dragoons, and the Sikh infantry, having returned to their houses

At day break, the Barukzye Sirdars arrived, with 160 horse and 700 foot, but few of the Urbobs' men had come.

The Governor and his son, Colonel Alla Sing, with General Elahie Bux, of the artillery, Colonels Ruttan Sing, Mehtab Sing, Meer Junglie, and Ameer Khan, were up all night, backwards and forwards with me, very active and zealous, and the orders, and arrangements, of the Governor were admirable.

At an early hour, he assembled all the Colonels at my quarters, with Sirdar Khan Sing; all attended but Khan Sing Rosa, commanding the Khas dragoons, who pleaded indisposition. Much sound advice was given, and they left, with instructions to assemble their regiments by companies, and ascertain the state of their feelings. It was denied that the Khas dragoons had mounted, and Colonel Ootar Sing declared that only two of his companies had turned out, and that men from different regiments had called on all to march on my quarters, as it was my intention to destroy all the Sikhs, by raising the Mahomedan population. Colonel Khan Sing was reported to have given a flat refusal, and ordered the men out of his lines.

Matters stand thus, at present. I intend this evening to get Futteh Khan's guns down to this cantonment, if possible, without bringing on a collision, but I have many fears that one is unavoidable.

I really believe that most of the officers are very desirous to keep their troops to their allegiance, but, with a people, so easily worked on by designing men, their task is most difficult.

I keep all the Mahomedans as much out of sight as possible, and will do every thing in my power to preserve the peace, but it is utterly impossible to suppose that this state of things can last.

I received a letter of yesterday's date, this morning, from Lieutenant Herbert, who reports all well in Attock, that it was said that Sirdar Chuttur Sing, with the troops, had proceeded to Hazara, to raise the siege of Hurripore, and Gahundia, and that Captain Nicholson had started, with his Moolkias, to aid Captain Abbott.

We have had no Lahore dak for three days, and I much fear this will not reach you.

Inclosure 5 in No. 38

*Major Laurence to the Resident at Lahore*

*Peshawur, September 6, 1848.*

FROM all I can learn not more than 40 or 50 men were engaged in the plot to excite the troops to attack us, the rest were entirely ignorant, and all have expressed their abhorrence, of it, and anxiety that the culprits, when discovered, should be punished.

By the advice of the Governor and principal officers, I have delayed, for the present, removing Futteh Khan's guns from Soochet Sing's cantonment, but, still, have them guarded by 4 companies, both there, and in this, Alee Murdan's, cantonment.

I have returned the troops of the Barukzye Sirdars to the Wazeeur Bagh. Parades and drills are going on, as if nothing had occurred.

Sirdar Chuttur Sing is said to have countermarched, and proceeded towards Bootah.

Inclosure 6 in No. 38

*Major-General Whish to the Adjutant-General.*

*Camp, Mooltan, September 7, 1848.*

NOT having recently adverted to the damming up of the Mooltan grand canal, I report, that Lieutenant Glover, of the engineers, has, after much labor, and frequent disappointments, effectually completed the work, and returned to camp.

Various plans of attack were submitted to me by the chief engineer, that could not be decided on, without the greatest deliberation.

Ultimately, I determined on both camps being drawn near each other, and each compressed to the narrowest limits practicable; and our first parallel, about three quarters of a mile in advance of the (now) small interval between us, was commenced, yesterday, by 1,000 of Lieutenant Edwardes' men, and, at intervals of six hours, by 1,600 from my camp, the half thereof being, at night, from Her Majesty's 10th and 32nd foot; the only casualties reported are one man killed, and one wounded, both of the 72nd Native Infantry. As we could, thus, have no battery ready, and I knew the one armed with light guns, in Lieutenant Edwardes' camp, was annoyed by the enemy's gun, or guns, 1,200 yards in its front, I directed, last night, two of our eight inch howitzers to be sent thither, and went myself, this morning, to see them placed in position, and open fire. The first round of Shrapnells was fired simultaneously, and followed occasionally by rounds of common shell; and I have had the satisfaction of learning, this morning, by the Mooltan Ukhbar, the effects of the heavy howitzers, namely,—killed Oosman Ghunnee Khan (commander of 200 rohillas) and 10 men, wounded 25 men, deserted 80, and the enemy soon after withdrew their gun. ~~By day~~ I have ordered these two heavy howitzers to an eligible position, on the parallels we are engaged on, opposite to a site the enemy seems to have selected for a battery

Inclosure 7 in No 38.

*John Lawrence, Esquire, Commissioner and Superintendent, Trans-Sutlej States,  
to the Resident at Lahore*

*Dhurrumsal, September 9, 1848.*

I HAVE, this day, heard that a body of men under Ram Sing have crossed the frontier from the Lahore, or Jummoo, territory, and are plundering the country towards Shahpore. I, also, understand that some chupprassees of the customs department have been wounded, and that others have been captured, and carried off, by the same gang.

I am about to start for Noorpoor myself, with 100 men of Major Ferris' corps. I have written to Major Hodgson, commanding the 1st regiment Sikh Local Infantry, to send a company of men to Puthankote, and have also directed Captain Davidson, with the head-quarters of the 16th irregulars, to march on the same place.

I have, further, written to Brigadier Wheeler, C. B., requesting that he will direct the officers commanding at Hajeepore, Mooltan, and Noorpoor, to assist me, if necessary. I will again address you, on my arrival at Noorpoor.

Inclosure 8 in No 38

*Brevet-Captain W W Davidson, Commanding 16th Irregular Cavalry, to the  
Adjutant-General*

*Camp, Mookerian, September 9, 1848*

PURSUANT to the requisition of the civil authorities, I marched the head-quarters of the 16th Irregular Cavalry from Hoshiarpore, yesterday evening, and reached this place, at three of the morning of to-day.

I purpose marching again at midday to-day, and hope to reach Puthankote, (the seat of disturbance to be quelled) before nightfall.

Inclosure 9 in No 38

*Major-General Whish to the Adjutant-General.*

*Camp, Mooltan, September 9, 1848*

OUR working parties yesterday made good progress, and, at the village of Ramteerut, which was taken possession of on the 7th, we have now batteries of

two 8-inch howitzers, and of three 8-inch mortars, and, at a few hundred yards from its left, a battery of four 18-pounders; added to which, on the right of the heavy howitzer battery, I hope, this evening, to open a rocket battery.

The enemy were troublesome at day-break yesterday, and midnight, and particularly at 4 A.M. this morning, on which latter occasion their attack on the trench was more decided. Lieutenant Drew, of the 8th Native Infantry, was slightly wounded, and the other casualties are of the 52nd Regiment Native Infantry, viz., 1 havildar, very severely, and 1 naick and 2 sepoys slightly, wounded.

Inclosure 10 in No 38.

*Major-General Whish to the Adjutant-General*

*Camp, Mooltan, September 10, 1848.*

CAPTAIN ABERCROMBIE, of the Engineers, having called upon me yesterday evening, on the part of the Chief Engineer, to request my sanction to dislodge the enemy from a position apparently similar to the one near it, that they were easily driven from on the 8th instant, I acceded to it, with the view to prevent the party about to be employed in an advanced trench towards it, from molestation. The field-officer of the trenches, Lieutenant-Colonel Pattoun, Her Majesty's 32nd Regiment, accordingly, proceeded with detachments of Her Majesty's 10th Foot, and 49th and 72nd Regiments of Native Infantry, subsequently joined by two guns of General Cortlandt's artillery that were near at hand, and attacked the enemy's position with great gallantry and perseverance, but it was so much stronger than the one above adverted to, in its vicinity, having a strong loop-holed building within it, that, after encountering great loss (which, by the intelligence received this morning from the city, was equally experienced by the enemy), the detachment was withdrawn, and our casualty list, which had, up to yesterday evening, been so small, had, I regret to say, on this occasion, an addition of—

*Killed —*

3 privates, Her Majesty's 10th Foot  
1 native officer, 6 rank and file, 72nd Native Infantry.  
1 havildar, 4 rank and file, 49th Native Infantry.

*Wounded —*

1 subaltern, 2 serjeants, 34 rank and file, 10th Foot (1 since dead)  
1 rank and file, 32nd Foot  
2 subalterns, 1 havildar, 22 rank and file, 49th Native Infantry.  
1 native officer, 7 rank and file, 72nd Native Infantry

*Missing —*

3 privates, Her Majesty's 10th Foot, 1 sepoy, 72nd Native Infantry.

*Wounded Officers*

Lieutenant Hollinsworth, 10th Foot, severely  
Lieutenant and Adjutant Richardson, 49th Native Infantry, ditto  
Lieutenant Irwin, 49th Native Infantry, dangerously.

The Chief Engineer thinking it, now, preferable to turn their position, instead of taking it immediately, I, early this morning, directed four 5½-inch mortars to be brought to bear upon it, in addition to the three 8-inch mortars, at 600 yards from it, on the left of Ramteerut, which will, I trust, secure the object, with the least possible further risk. I regret to add that Brigadier Markham passed me, in the trenches at 6 A.M., wounded by a ball through the thigh, but which having been extracted, I trust I may safely calculate upon his early recovery.

I have not received Colonel Pattoun's official report, and do not like to wait for it, the above being from what he stated *viva voce* to me, and from the returns since received of casualties from corps.

Inclosure 11 in No. 38.

*Lieutenant Edwardes to the Resident at Lahore.*

*Camp, Byragee Gardens, before Mooltan,  
September 10, 1848.*

PRESS of business has prevented me from sooner making an official report of the interview which I had with Sheik Emamooddeen, on the morning of the 8th of September. I now detail the very curious statements of the Sheik.

He said, that I must be fully aware that Raja Shere Sing's soldiers had long been in a disaffected state; but that, hitherto, the Sirdars had stood; that the Raja had, from the beginning, been active in suppressing the bad spirit, and volunteering to do service for the State, Sirdar Shumshere Sing, acquiescent in the Raja's arrangements; and Sirdar Ootar Sing, content so long as he was not called upon to fight, that there could be no doubt Sirdar Chuttur Sing had, two months ago, communicated to Raja Shere Sing (by the mouth of Soorutt Sing, Majeetia, who came down from Peshawur, and had an interview with Chuttur Sing, on the road) his intention to create disturbance, on his side the country, and injunction that his son should do the same to Mooltan, that Raja Shere Sing had, up to this time, steadily refused to share such projects, and severely reproached his father, but was now altering his mind, that Chuttur Sing's conduct depends entirely on whether, or no, he gets assistance from two quarters, viz, the Barukzye Sirdars in Peshawur, and Maharajah Golab Sing, that Chuttur Sing, some years ago, exchanged turbans with Sooltan Mahomed Khan, Barukzye, and has always maintained the strictest friendship with him, Chuttur Sing addressing Khwajah Mahomed Khan (Sooltan Mahomed Khan's eldest son) in his letters, as "My dear child" and Khwajah Mahomed replying "My dearest father!" that the benefit promised to the Barukzye is a repossession of Peshawur; that Maharajah Golab Sing is not at all unlikely to instigate Chuttur Sing to ruin himself, for some secret project of his own; but will never give him an open assistance, or leave the smallest trace of having even interfered against the British, that the Mussulman troops in Peshawur may be relied upon, as also the artillery, and that Golab Sing, Poindea, is staunch in our interests; that the Eusufzye are not at all likely to join Chuttur Sing, and, thus, all things considered, that the Sirdar is not very likely to succeed in the Peshawur direction; in which case, he will take again to Hazara, if Maharajah Golab Sing holds out any hopes; and altogether, that the coming in of the Sirdar is more dependent on his getting no assistance from his two great allies, than on the good advice of Raja Deena Nath.

After these statements, I asked the Sheik to explain why he thought Raja Shere Sing's fidelity had been shaken, during the last day or two? He replied, that messengers had come from Chuttur Sing; and the Raja, after reading the letters, which were in Goormooke, had, carefully, put them into water, and obliterated all traces of the contents; and that his motives were beginning to open their mouths, and talk big, like other malcontents.

I then asked the Sheik, how, he thought, the Raja's force would act under these circumstances? He said, some would go over to Moolraj; but the majority would only refuse to fight, and encourage the enemy, by secret correspondence.

Scarcely had the Sheik left me than Sirdar Shumshere Sing sent me word, by a confidential servant, that, on the night of the 7th of September, the Sowars of the Charyarree Dera had held a meeting, at a garden, where their picket is, and sworn on the grunth to demand their arrears of pay (7 or 8 months) from Sirdar Ootar Sing, who would be unable to comply, when, they would ask for their discharge, and take themselves off, whithersoever they chose. This news was confirmed, during the 8th, by many people, and, as a small treasure party had gone to the ghat behind the Raja's camp, to bring away three lakhs of rupees from the steamer, I lost no time in informing the General, who sent out a strong support, and brought the treasure in, without any accident. On the morning of the 9th, Raja Shere Sing and Sirdar Ootar Sing, themselves called to report the mutinous meeting of the Charyarree Sowars; and I asked Ootar Sing, if they had



yet come, as agreed, to demand their pay? He said, "No, but, sitting in Durbar, two or three of them had broached the subject of their arrears." I, then, asked him, if he did not intend to investigate the matter more closely, and punish the ringleaders? The Sirdar, as usual, was much distressed, conscious of his own vacillating disposition, and the little influence he really possesses in the cavalry force over which he is commander. At last, he fairly owned that he was afraid that, if he took any notice, the matter would only get worse.

After the Raja and the Sirdar had taken leave, the former sent back his motbir, to say that he would come, again, to-day, and tell me all about the state of his force. Accordingly, he came this morning, and, after confirming almost all the evil reports which I had heard from other sources, added that, last night, in Sirdar Ootar Sing's Durbar, a man, calling himself a Sadh, but suspected of being a Sikh, stood up, and, with a loud voice, said, "Listen, O Khalsa! This war is not a war between Moolraj and the Durbar, but a strife of religions, and he who wishes to go to heaven, will die a martyr in defence of his faith!" Upon this all the assembly exclaimed, "Wah Gooroo Jee Kee futteh!" Sirdar Ootar Sing, on this occasion, seems to have aroused himself from his apathy, and, straightway, put the Sadh in confinement. Ootar Sing's motbir came, with the Raja, to receive my instructions as to the Sadh. I begged that the evidence of two or three witnesses might be sent to me, and I would hear the case. It seems to me right and necessary that this man, if guilty, should be hung at once, but I cannot trust to the Sirdars to carry out the execution, at this moment.

After the Raja had exhausted his complaints against the divisions of Ootar Sing and Shumshere Sing (the latter, out of consideration for my friendship with Shumshere Sing, he said, was the best of the two,) I asked him what remedy he proposed to apply, and reminded him, that he had, deliberately, undertaken the responsibility of bringing this Sikh army to Mooltan, so that its conduct was a matter personal to himself. This rather alarmed him, and he earnestly deprecated being held responsible for any division but his own, which he still stoutly maintains will do good and loyal service, and he, ultimately, proposed to put the thing to the proof, by my ordering all three of the Sirdars to advance towards Mooltan, and entrench their respective divisions, separately, but near enough to support each other, the Raja in Sookhee-wall-a-Bagh, in the centre, Shumshere Sing under the nullah, on the right, and Ootar Sing in the Sheesh Muhl. "Then," said the Raja, "you will see how things stand. It is very possible that occupation may prevent the malcontents from holding councils, and talking treason over their opium, and, if a fight ensues, and some of the Sikhs are killed by Moolraj's guns, it may make them angry and loyal. Those who wish to go over, will do so."

I need scarcely say how constantly, and anxiously, the condition of this Sikh force occupies my thoughts, and I can only assure you that I have left nothing undone, on my part, that could be effected by conciliation, attention to their wants and wishes, polite exchange of courtesies and etiquette, and the weightier matters of good advice to the Sudas, and seriously, and honestly, keeping before their eyes the real dangers of their country and dynasty. But the material is rotten, and no good can be made of it. The Raja's division is, almost entirely, composed of Mussulmans, and I believe him to have sufficient control over it (with the exception of the Poorbeeah regiment, which he doubts); but Ootar Sing's and Shumshere Sing's divisions are nearly all Sikhs, and the Sirdars have no influence over them whatever. Open abuse is, I hear, not unfrequently, the reply to any loyal advice which a Sirdar ventures to give his men; and Shere Sing is nicknamed "The Mussulman."

The malcontents do not confine themselves to words. Two nights ago, I believe, fifty or sixty Sowars, from Ootar Sing's camp, went over to Moolraj's, though the Sirdar says, only seven or eight. Yesterday, twenty or thirty more walked off, and, as I am writing, the band-master of the Poorbeeah regiment has sent in his brother to acquaint me that, last night, the commandant had induced the 6th, 7th, and 8th companies to desert, but the affair got wind, and the colonel stopped it. Every Ukhbar from Mooltan mentions the good understanding between the rebels and the Sikhs, and the daily desertions of the latter.

I have sent to invite the three Sirdars to a conference this evening, when I shall learn more about the Poorbeeah Regiment; and mean to request them to make, to-morrow, the move suggested by the Raja. Major-General Whish (whom

I consider it my duty to keep fully informed) concurs in thinking that it would be a relief, if those who are ill disposed would go over at once, in order that we may know our enemies.

My feeling is, that I should like to decide the matter myself, instead of leaving things to run their course, by surrounding, and disarming, the Sikh Force, which I conceive present circumstances would, most fully, justify, but, unfortunately, they are in such a position that it is impossible to turn their flank, either right or left, and if I was to move straight down on their rear, they would, in self-defence, be driven into Mooltan.

It becomes, therefore, necessary to consider it a probable contingency that Moolraj's army will be swelled by two-thirds of Shere Sing's numbers; and, without, for an instant, permitting myself to doubt of the result, or to look on this large defection as more than additional difficulty, calling for additional exertion, I would, yet, respectfully venture to suggest that we should do well to neglect none of our resources

Inclosure 12 in No 38.

*Major D. Simpson, Commanding at Hajeepore, to the Adjutant-General*

*Hajeepore, September 10, 1848.*

ON the urgent application of C B Saunders, Esq., assistant commissioner of the district, I have furnished a detachment from the 29th regiment Native Infantry, which marched, yesterday afternoon, under the command of Lieutenant Johnstone, in the direction of Khoh Gurh, there to join, and co-operate with, detachments of irregular cavalry, under the commands of Major Fisher and Captain Davidson, proceeding towards Puthankote, to quell a disturbance in that neighbourhood

Inclosure 13 in No. 38.

*The Commander-in-Chief to the Resident at Lahore.*

*Smla, September 11, 1848.*

I HAD the honor to receive, by express, this morning at 6 A. M. your letter\* of the 8th, with its several inclosures. The information contained in it does not at all surprise me, indeed, it is that which I have expected for some short time.

I quite feel that our officers on the north-western frontier are in a most critical position, and I would, if I could, at once, emancipate them, as I quite join you in the opinion that there is very little to be expected from Raja Deena Nath's mission; it may procrastinate, but it will not, in my mind, prevent a general rebellion in the north-west. To put down this rebellion, at once, would, assuredly, be most desirable, if it could be done with safety to other parts of the Punjab, without awaiting the Raja's negotiations

I greatly admire the energetic measures which appear to have been taken by Major Lawrence, Captain Nicholson, and Lieutenant Herbert; they appear to me to bespeak sound judgment and great firmness, and I trust will be successful; they are, probably, not aware of the weakness of the force within the Sirhind division, or I doubt much their urging a premature forward movement.

It is true that, in a letter from the Governor-General, he says, "without waiting, therefore, for a council, I will take upon myself to request you to issue such orders as you may think necessary for insuring a support to the force now at Mooltan, in case it should need it, and for providing a defence against any outbreak, at any time, or anywhere, upon the frontier. It would be well to avoid the appearance of ostentatiously assembling a large force, lest we should alarm the Sikh army, already sufficiently nervous, as to the

consequences of what they have been about, and so produce the very outbreak we wish to guard against. The more quietly, therefore, this force can be brought either to, or near to, Ferozepore, as though it were part of the ordinary relief movement, the better it will be."

It is quite evident, from the hesitation, and counter marches, of the rebel chief Chuttur Sing, that he has not much confidence in his own strength, on the north-west, and that he relies, mainly, upon support from elsewhere. Had we only to contend with Chuttur Sing, even joined by the whole of the Sikh troops, I would not hesitate to state my opinion, that the moveable column from Lahore and Jullundur, you speak of, would be ample; but we must remember that the Sikh army, before the late campaign, amounted to from 80,000 to 100,000 men of all arms. Say 30,000 of those were put hors-de-combat in the battles of the Sutlej, there still remains a powerful force of brave and well drilled soldiers, either embodied in the Durbar army, which you acknowledge are inimical to our rule, or scattered over the country, without employ, and ready for service. These are the people we are to guard against. These are they on whom the late conspirators relied. Were we to weaken Lahore, and our other posts, which I should strongly deprecate, to attain a doubtful end, it would be exactly to play that part which the conspirators appear to have wished. It must not be forgotten that we have but a very limited force, amongst a most heterogeneous mass, at Mooltan. Until that fort is in our possession, we must be prepared to support it.

All my letters will show that I quite concur in your views, that we should lose no time in making preparations.

I do not consider it would be advisable for the Jullundur moveable column to cross the Beas, until we were prepared to advance, and support Lahore from Ferozepore. It might be judicious, and would be safe, for that column to move either to Bhyrowal, or one of the other ferries leading to Umritsur and Lahore, collecting all the boats there so as to be ready to cross, and, if found practicable, and to be done with safety (that is, with the power of falling back, by re-crossing the river, should a powerful force advance upon it), to place a small party on the opposite side, to cover the landing. By this, we should hazard nothing, and it would, probably, have a most beneficial effect, were Chuttur Sing to approach Lahore. It would, also, make this column available, at the shortest notice, when a combined advance might be found necessary.

I consider that the weakening Lahore, at the moment when the whole of the Manjha country is in revolt, and up in arms, would be most injudicious; for, rest assured, Chuttur Sing, when he dared not attack the little fort of Attock, ill garrisoned as it is, would never attempt to move on Lahore, with its powerful British garrison, unless he knew that the whole country was on his side, in which case, the movement of the two detached columns on Eminabad, without a possibility of supporting them from Lahore, or Ferozepore, would, in my mind, be an act of temerity which I could never recommend.

It would, in my opinion, be imprudent to weaken, to any great extent, the Sirhind division, for, assuredly, the large population, and the no inconsiderable number of Sikh soldiers in our pay, in that district, sympathize, even if they would not take an open part against us, by joining their Sikh brethren.

I regret I cannot concur with you in the expediency of forming the support at Lahore, by regiments, and troops, moving on, as they arrive at Ferozepore. The formation of this force, as I propose, at Ferozepore, will be as well known in the Punjab, as if it was formed at Lahore, whilst, common military precaution points out the former as the place of formation.

I quite feel with you that the crisis is important, and you may rely upon it, I shall expedite the formation of the proposed army of support, as far as rests with me.

Whilst I feel every willingness and anxiety to meet the crisis in the Punjab, and have no doubts whatever of being able most effectually to do so, I still feel that, by injudiciously weakening the posts in our own territories, I might be bringing about results, far more to be deprecated than any which delay can give rise to.

There can be little doubt of a successful issue, in putting down the rebellion, to whatever extent it may reach; and, were our officers safe, we should have no cause to regret the precipitating that which must, ultimately, take place.

## Inclosure 14 in No. 38.

*C. B. Saunders, Esq., to J. Lawrence, Esq**Shahpoor, September 11, 1848.*

IN consequence of reports received from the thannadar of Hajeeopore, mentioning the fact of some chupprassees of the Customs' Department having been killed and wounded by some bodies of men who had collected in the neighbourhood of Puthankote and Noorpoor, I, immediately, waited on Captain Davidson, with a requisition for a body of the troops under his command to proceed for the relief of the above places, which were threatened with an attack from the rebels.

That officer, most readily, entered into my views, and ordered 40 troopers of the head-quarters of his regiment to proceed, immediately, in the direction of Puthankote, taking the command of them himself, with his Adjutant, Mr Smith, in company. We made a forced march to Mookerian, which place we reached at 3 o'clock, A.M. on Saturday the 9th, having left Hoshiarpore on the previous afternoon.

On our arrival, we found that Major Fisher, of the 15th Irregulars, had also, in consequence of a requisition from Mr Ross, the Customs' Patrol stationed at Puthankote, directed the march of a body of 60 sowars of his regiment towards Puthankote. In the course of the morning, in consequence of intelligence communicated by Major Simpson of the 29th Native Infantry, from Hajeeopore, I deemed it advisable, in conjunction with Major Fisher, to forward a requisition for a company of the 29th Native Infantry to join us at the fords of the Beas at Katgurh, Major Simpson complied most obligingly, and we were enabled to cross the whole detachment, during the course of the afternoon and night of the 9th of September. Early on the 10th, Major Fisher marched to Puthankote, where a halt was made for five or six hours, and at 3 o'clock, in consequence of intimation we had received, that the Fort of Shahpoor, in the Kangra District, situated about nine miles due north of Puthankote, was in possession of the rebels, the detachment again started for that place. Ladders were procured at Puthankote, for the purpose of escalading the above fort, if necessary. When we had proceeded about four or five miles from the latter place, we were given to understand that the occupants of the fort were making arrangements to evacuate it. Major Fisher, immediately, ordered the cavalry to proceed at a trot. When we approached Shahpoor, we perceived a number of men on the hill overlooking the fort, and a charge was, accordingly, made through the village, and up the hill side, the detachment of cavalry under Major Fisher and Captain Davidson quickly cleared the height, and, then, proceeded in the direction of the fort, which is well-built and strong, larger, and much more capable of resistance than Puthankote. On Major Fisher's party nearing the fort, a heavy fire of musketry was opened upon him, which was as warmly returned, two or three sowars of the 15th Irregulars were wounded, and two or three hoises were killed, and one or two wounded. The fire, on both sides, was kept up, until it began to get dark, when Major Fisher moved his detachment to an open space to encamp for the night, the company of the 29th Infantry having by this time arrived. In the course of the night, we received intelligence that the rebels were making arrangements to evacuate the fort, and cross the Ravee, on which (at 12 o'clock at night) Major Fisher, immediately, ordered the whole detachment to proceed to storm the fort. Lieutenant Johnston led the attack with his company, supported by the Irregulars, and, after a short time, effected an entrance, a shot or two only having been fired from the fort. On entering, it appeared that the rebels must have evacuated it, and effected their escape, down a precipitous bye-path leading to the Ravee, which flows below the fort, at the depth of several hundred feet.

Major Fisher has forwarded a detailed account of the military operations connected with the storm and capture of the Fort to Brigadier Wheeler. I will not, therefore, dwell further on the subject than to state (though, perhaps, it might be presumptuous in me, as a civilian, to offer my opinion on such a subject), that nothing could have surpassed the zeal, courage, and activity that animated every individual in the detachment. We found two dead bodies of

the enemy, and it is probable that several others were killed or wounded, but were conveyed across the Ravee, into the dominions of Maharajah Golab Sing.

Ram Sing, son of Vuzeer Shama, the chief of the rebels, is still at large, and it is stated that he is in the neighbourhood of Noorpoor, in the midst of a large jungle. We halt, at this place, to-day and to-morrow; Major Fisher has not yet determined whether the fort should be dismantled, or garrisoned; it is quite clear, however, that one of these two courses must be pursued, as it will, otherwise, always afford a refuge to the disaffected. There are several minor forts in the neighbourhood, which ought also to be dismantled, but they are mere mud erections which could easily be levelled to the ground, but the Fort of Shahpoor is really, from its construction, size, and military position, an excessively strong and important stronghold.

We have apprehended several parties, among whom are one of the four principal officers who were in the fort, another is the brother of Damoodah, of Shahpoor, the second in command, and I have made arrangements for the apprehension of all the principal Lumberdars in the neighbourhood, who have leagued with, and assisted, Ram Sing and his party. The first-mentioned prisoner, Gugna by name, Lumberdar of Basma, about three or four miles from this, states that there were 200 men in the fort, but I am disposed myself to think that the number is somewhat exaggerated. When I have completed my investigations into the complicity of the suspected parties, I will communicate the result for your information and orders. It is, I think, quite clear, that unless a speedy termination had been put to the designs of these people, disaffection would have greatly increased, and, in a short time, would have gained such a point, that it would have required a large force to dislodge these rebels, and restore tranquility in the neighbourhood. I trust that the measures that have already been undertaken, will meet with your sanction and approval.

The hoises of the irregular cavalry corps in the detachment, have had a most fatiguing march, and it is absolutely necessary that they should be rested. The day after to-morrow, we propose making a forced march in pursuit of Ram Sing himself, whose apprehension we hope to effect.

If I may be allowed to offer an opinion on the subject, I should suggest that, taking into consideration the present unsettled state of the country, a whole regiment of infantry would not be misplaced, if it were stationed, half at Noorpoor, and half at Puthankote, with a small detail of cavalry to be placed at the disposal of the commanding officer. I think, also, that the fort of Shahpoor should be dismantled, to do which effectually, gunpowder would be necessary, with a view to blow up the gate, and ten bastions surrounding the fort. We have, at present, no efficient means at our disposal for the purpose.

Inclosure 15 in No 38

*The Adjutant-General to the Secretary to the Government of India.*

*September 12, 1848.*

THE Commander-in-Chief directs me to transmit a copy of a dispatch of this day's date, addressed to the officer commanding the Sirhind division, directing certain troops to be held in readiness to march, fully equipped for service, at the shortest notice.

Inclosure 16 in No 38

*The Resident at Lahore to the Secretary to the Government of India.*

*Lahore, September 12, 1848.*

SIRDAR CHUTTUR SING has gone great lengths in rebellion; and Raja Deena Nath justly writes, from Rotas, that there is little hope of putting down, otherwise than by coercive measures, a rebel who has opposed the troops of the State in the field; who has called in the aid of a foreign power to assist in the resistance to authority, and in offensive operations against the Govern-

ment, who has forcibly stopped the public communications, has imprisoned the Government officials; and has directed the executive officers, in charge of districts and treasuries, to obey no orders but his, and send the revenues of the country to him.

Not a moment should be lost, in preparing for the extensive military operations which appear now inevitable.

It is just possible that the statement of troops from Jummoo having joined the Sirdar, may be a mistake, and that the Barukzye Sirdar may refuse his co-operation, in which case, the rebellion would not be as formidable. But if Maharajah Golab Sing has joined his fortunes to those of the rebel Sirdar (a thing one can hardly believe possible, notwithstanding the evidence), the struggle will be a severe one, for there will be many other parties concerned, who do not, at present, appear.

It is not impossible that many of the chiefs, who would have joined this movement, if headed by the Maharanee, will stand aloof, now that it has been got up by the Sirdar Chuttur Sing, not because they hate the British troops less, but that they hate the Attareewallas, and Raja Golab Sing, more.

Inclosure 17 in No. 38.

*The Resident at Lahore to the Commander-in-Chief*

*Lahore, September 12, 1848.*

MY intelligence of yesterday evening, from the north-west, is of anything but a pleasing character, and I cannot but fear that we are on the eve of a general Punjab war, for which every possible preparation should be made, without delay.

Raja Deena Nath writes, from Rotas, that he sees little prospect of being able to effect anything satisfactory with regard to this rebellion, into which Sirdar Chuttur Sing seems to have plunged, with a determination to sacrifice his life to the cause. The Raja says, that he has it, from four different sources, all, he thinks, credible, that one of Maharajah Golab Sing's regiments has already joined the Sirdar's son, Ootar Sing, at Dhangullee, with two guns, and that another is about to do so, when Ootar Sing will rejoin his father, at Rawul Pindiee. I can hardly think this open disaffection, and breach of treaty on the part of the Maharajah, possible, yet the fact is very positively stated, and is generally believed.

A very ugly looking insurrection is reported to have broken out, in the lower hills in the Kangra district, just beyond the Lahore frontier. The abandoned fort of Shahpore has been occupied, and Puthankote and Noorpoor are threatened. This is the report from the Dumbur frontier officers. I have as yet, no letter from Mr Lawrence on the subject.

The Peshawur force is showing symptoms of unsteadiness. An émeute was attempted by a part of two Sikh regiments, but was put down, for the time, by the promptitude and determination of Major Lawrence, and the good conduct of the officers and the Mussulman regiments.

I am informed, by the same authority which has given me very correct intelligence of coming events, hitherto, that if much more delay takes place in the reduction of Mooltan, or if the Hazara rebellion makes head, there will, within a month, be an insurrection of the Malwa Sikhs in the direction of Kythul. I do not know upon what grounds this assertion is made, and the passage of troops to the frontier will, probably check any purposed movement in that part.

The delay in the arrival of the siege train at Mooltan, and in the occupation of the place, is a great misfortune. It and the Hazara disturbance have given confidence to the adherents of Dewan Moolraj, and, within the last month, at least 3000 Sikhs, from the Manjha and other places, have joined him. These, though undisciplined and unorganized, and, therefore, useless in the field, are formidable, fighting behind walls and entrenchments. The city and citadel are both, Major Napier writes to me, stronger than any of our accounts represented. At his suggestion, I have, to-day, written to Sukkur, to have all the mortars that may be in store there, with ammunition and artillerymen, sent up, immediately, by steamers. I hope they may not be required, but Major Napier thinks the precaution advisable.

I trust your Lordship will have ordered the troops moving on Ferozepore to come to Lahore. It would be well if some came through the Jullundur and Umritsur.

P.S.—I have, this instant, received the copy of a letter from Sirdar Chuttur Sing to the Barukzye chiefs at Peshawur, intercepted by Major Lawrence. This letter seems to leave scarcely a doubt of the complicity of Maharajah Golab Sing; and the junction of the Barukzye Sirdars seems most probable. The Sirdar positively declares that he is coming hither

Inclosure 18 in No 38.

*Intercepted letter from Sirdar Chuttur Sing, Attareewalla, to Sirdar Sooltan Mahomed Khan, Barukzye, at Peshawur, dated 17th Bhadon, corresponding with August 30, 1848.*

YESTERDAY, I wrote a full detail of all circumstances to you. I have now sent my confidential representative, Mahomed Buksh, to you. The sign which Maharajah Golab Sing conveyed to you by letter, Mahomed Buksh will himself fulfil, by taking hold of your finger\*. Do, according to his saying

It behoves you to leave your most competent son at Peshawur, and yourself, with all your troops and officers, and all the Sikhs (meaning the Khalsa army), to come hither. If you do not think it good to come yourself, do you remain at Peshawur, and send your son hither. Troops and guns have been already sent from Jummoo. I am only awaiting, in Chuch, your coming. Put away all cautious misgiving, and, trusting in Providence, come quickly. Send a written reply to this, immediately, for this matter brooks no delay. I am bound to the eastward. The Sikh troops at Mooltan have also, now, thrown off the mask.

Inclosure 19 in No. 38.

*The Resident at Lahore to Major Edwardes, C B.*

*Lahore, September 13, 1848.*

I HAVE received, this morning, your letter† of the 10th instant, reporting the purport of conferences held by you with Sheik Emamooddeen, and with Raja Shere Sing and the Sirdars, regarding the state of the Sikh force before Mooltan

The state of things in that force, as shown by your letter, is not only very unsatisfactory, but, at the present moment, embarrassing. I believe that six, out of ten guns with the force, are in Raja Shere Sing's brigade, and under charge of his Mahomedan levies. I hope they may be considered safe, or that arrangements can be adopted for making them so

The move Raja Shere Sing proposes, would be, perhaps, judicious, it would give the soldiers, willing to work, some employment, and would bring to a test the intentions of the disaffected, and wavering. We cannot expect the Sikhs to act with any zeal in the cause of their Government—they have never done so, and, now that the cry of their religion is raised on the other side, if you can, by any means, secure their neutrality, it will be all that can be expected

I have kept you constantly informed of the state of the Hazara insurrection, as far as I can learn it. Sirdar Chuttur Sing gives out that he has the support of Maharajah Golab Sing; and many circumstances seem to favor the truth of that statement

I told you of the report sent to me by Raja Deena Nath, the day before yesterday, that one regiment from the Jummoo Districts had, certainly, joined Ootar Sing, and that another was expected to do so. From a communication received, last night, from the Raja, I am disposed to think that this, almost incredibly open,

\* This refers to a custom common among these people, of intimating that the person who touches a certain joint of a certain finger on the hand intimated, may be trusted in the matter under consideration.

† Inclosure 11 in No. 38

adherence to the rebel's cause by the Maharajah, has not taken place about 700 soldiers, from the Maharajah's territory, have joined Sirdar Chuttur Sing, but it is not distinctly stated that they are enlisted soldiers, or servants of the Maharajah, and, though it is not likely that his people would take other service, without his connivance, I shall probably have a khurreeta from him, complaining that his subjects have been seduced from their allegiance to him, and have deserted to Sirdar Chuttur Sing, notwithstanding all his endeavours to prevent it.

Raja Deena Nath was, still, at Rotas, on the 10th, but it was positively stated that Sirdar Ootar Sing would meet him at Dumuk, on the following day. The Raja seemed to think that this meeting was intended, but he was not certain that treachery to himself might not be meditated. If he failed in his negotiations with Chuttur Sing, he proposed raising troops from the armed population of Dhunee and Pind Dadun Khan, and, by the route of the latter, joining Captain Nicholson, or Captain Abbott, and using all his arts and influence to detach the troops from the Sirdar. I have allowed him to do as he pleases; he seems desirous to do good service at this crisis, not that men in the Punjab are what they seem.

Sirdar Chuttur Sing is using all his endeavours, as Sheik Emamooddeen supposed he would, to induce the Barukzye Sirdars to join him, he had not succeeded on the 7th of the month; and, as he has so constantly declared that his is a purely religious movement, merely to rescue the supremacy of the Khalsa from the enemies of their faith, I do not see how the Barukzye Mahomedans can very consistently join him, or even the Hill Rappoots take an open and declared part in a rebellion for that avowed object.

P S.—It has just been reported to me, that a mule messenger arrived, last night, from Sirdar Chuttur Sing, with letters to Sirdar Golab Sing, and an urzee to the Durbar. These are written on the 5th instant, after his return from Attock, and renew the request that Raja Deena Nath, or Raja Tej Sing, may be sent out, to put down the rebellion, he has now added, “or Moolvee Rujub Ulee!” I send the Sirdar's letter to his son, which he sent me,—that, after having read it, you may give it to Raja Shere Sing. This mule rider was the bearer of other letters to Golab Sing, which he has not shown me.

Inclosure 20 in No. 38.

*Mr. Lawrence to Brigadier Wheeler, C.B.*

*Noorpoor, September 13, 1848.*

I ARRIVED at Noorpoor this morning at 5 A M, in company with Mr. G. Barnes, the district officer, and Lieutenant Wallace, in command of about 150 men of the 2nd regiment of Sikh Local Infantry.

I understand from Captain Park, of the 29th Native Infantry, and from the reports of the native authorities, that the insurgents, under a man named Rām Sing, son of Shama Sing, vuzeer of Noorpoor, have taken up a position about a mile and a half south of Noorpoor, on a long and rather narrow hill, covered with brushwood and jungle. The spies, whom I have examined, say that he has not above 200 or 250 men with him, who are armed with matchlocks and swords; that he occupies the ground close to a tank, for the sake of water, that he has some supplies, and is able to procure more from some villages south of his locality, with the inhabitants of which he has influence.

I understand, from the description given by those well acquainted with the localities of the position, that, to destroy, or seize, this body of insurgents, four detachments would be necessary, to occupy the four different roads which lead to the ground which Rām Sing holds, and none should be less than 100 men. They say that, if attacked by any one line alone, he can easily effect a retreat, and occupy some other strong position. I may further add, that it would appear to me that neither guns nor cavalry are required, but only infantry. I have sent out spies to gather information, and will again communicate with you, to-morrow, on the subject. It will be a great object to attack the insurgents, as soon as possible. Opinion here seems to be divided, as to whether his band will disperse,



or still further increase until attacked. I am rather inclined to think that it will decrease ; and, probably, by the time the troops arrive, it will retreat, or disperse, and again assemble some where else, which would be, of course, a great evil.

I should, therefore, have written, and asked for assistance from the officers commanding at Hajeepore, but that I see, from a letter of your Brigade Major, that Major Sunpson has received your order to detach no troops from his station

Majors Fisher and Davidson, with Mr C. Saunders, are at Shahpoor, about sixteen miles from this. A small fort at that place, which a body of the insurgents had occupied, was surprised, two or three days ago, when four or five of them were killed, and the remainder driven away, with a loss of two men wounded on our side. Mr C Saunders had sent to Noorpoor for powder to blow up the place, and, I understand, Captain Park had detached a portion of his force to escort it

I have written to Major Fisher that, unless he has received instructions from you to a contrary effect, I recommend that he should watch the three ghats noted in the margin\*, and send any infantry he may have to Noorpoor. I have directed Major Davidson, with his cavalry, to occupy Puthankote, and to patrol the road between that fort and Noorpoor. I consider that, by this time, a company of Major Hodgson's corps must also have arrived, or be close to Noorpoor, and I beg to add, that I, yesterday, wrote to that officer to march, with all the men he could muster, to the same place

P.S.—I have written to Mr. C Saunders to send back the men of the 29th Native Infantry, whom Captain Park sent as an escort with the powder.

Inclosure 21 in No 38

*Major-General Whish to the Adjutant-General*

*Camp, Mooltan, September 12 1848*

REFERRING you to my letter of the 10th instant, I have the honor to report, for the information of the Commander-in-Chief, that, thinking the bombardment of the enemy's position must have been effectual, I directed, at noon yesterday, that a shell should only be thrown into it once hourly, having, from my observations at an early hour, satisfied myself that it must be taken without delay. At noon yesterday, the Chief Engineer and Commanding Officer of Artillery waited upon me, when the former apprized me of his having ascertained that the enemy were in great force in its vicinity, but the wind was so boisterous, and the dust so troublesome, the weather seemed adverse to our moving then, and it was put off. At 2 P.M. to-day, Major Napier again called, with a confirmation of his former information, at which hour we had a promise of a repetition of yesterday's dust-storm, but at 4 A.M., finding it was clearing up, I issued the Division Order, of which I inclose a copy, and, being pressed for time, I can only add that my sanguine expectations were more than realized, of which I hope to give the particulars to-morrow. The total of the casualty list will not, I trust, prove heavy, but I have heard with unfeigned regret of the death of Colonel Pattoun and Quartermaster Taylor, of Her Majesty's 32nd Regiment, Major Montizambert, of Her Majesty's 10th Regiment, and Ensign Lloyd, of the 8th Native Infantry.

Inclosure 22 in No 38.

*Division Orders*

*Camp, Mooltan, 4 a.m., Tuesday, September 12, 1848*

THE Major-General proposes to take the enemy's position in front, and near the advanced picket of the trenches, at 9 A.M., for which purpose, as he hopes, this arrangement will bring on a somewhat general action. The following force will be ready, under the command of Brigadier Hervey, to advance from the

\* Srinugger, Shahpoor, and Bunglu, opposite Bussowlee, a large ghat.

trenches a quarter of an hour before the above-mentioned hour, and will, in great measure, be formed from the relieving, and about to be relieved, troops of the trenches.

One troop of Horse Artillery.

A complete squadron of cavalry from each of the three regiments; viz 11th Light, and 7th and 11th Irregular Cavalry.

6 companies of Her Majesty's 10th.

6 companies of Her Majesty's 32nd.

1 regiment of Native Infantry from 1st Brigade (the 8th)

2 regiments of Native Infantry from the 2nd Brigade (49th).

The right column, under Lieutenant-Colonel Pattoun, will be composed of five companies of Her Majesty's 32nd, and 8th Regiment Native Infantry

The left column, under Lieutenant-Colonel Franks, C B, will consist of five companies of Her Majesty's 10th, and 49th Regiment Native Infantry.

The cavalry will be under the command of Major Wheeler, who will attach one troop to the Horse Artillery

The reserve, under the field officer of the trenches, will consist of a company from each of Her Majesty's Regiments 10th and 32nd, and the 51st Regiment of Native Infantry, with two guns of Horse Artillery. Of the details of the force remaining in camp, Brigadier Salter will make such disposition as may be expedient, keeping the whole on the alert. The Commanding officer of Artillery will, in concert with the Chief Engineer, arrange, if possible, for the advance of the heavy howitzers, now in Ramteerut, a few hundred yards, and Lieutenant Edwards will be requested to co-operate from the left of the advanced picket of the trenches, with an efficient detail from the force under his command; and the Major-General calculates upon the most complete success from the zealous and energetic exertions of all concerned, if the enemy should prove to be as numerous, and as strongly positioned, as they are supposed to be

Inclosure 23 in No 38

*Major-General Walsh to the Adjutant-General*

*Camp, Mooltan, September 13, 1848.*

THE columns, formed agreeably to the Division Orders, of which a copy was forwarded yesterday, advanced to the attack at 8 $\frac{1}{2}$  A M, part of Lieutenant Edwards' force being previously engaged with the enemy on our left. The position was a strong one, and stoutly defended, the conflict terminating only in a series of hand-to-hand encounters. A troop of Horse Artillery, under Captain Mackenzie, was brought up at an opportune moment, and prevented an accession of numbers to the enemy, who were repulsed with severe loss in about an hour and a half. I inclose a list of casualties on this occasion, and on the night of the 9th instant, in the previous attack on this post, wherein Captain Christopher, of the Indian Navy, was severely wounded.

The late Colonel Pattoun, who commanded the attack on that occasion, reports, that Captain Christopher rendered him valuable assistance in bringing up supports from the rear intrenchments.

The wounded, I am happy to say, are progressing very favorably, by the Field Surgeon's report

*General Casualty Return of Mooltan Field Force, in the operations on the Enemy's intrenched Position, on the 9th and 12th of September, 1848*

*Mooltan, September 13, 1848.*

4th Troop 1st Brigade, Horse Artillery—1 rank and file, 4 horses killed;

1 European officer, 7 rank and file, 5 horses, wounded.

4th Troop 3rd Brigade, Horse Artillery—4 horses, killed; 1 staff serjeant, 1 serjeant, 2 rank and file, 6 horses wounded.

7th Irregular Cavalry—1 rank and file, killed; 2 horses, wounded.

Sappers and Miners—1 rank and file, wounded.

Her Majesty's 10th Foot—1 European officer, 7 rank and file, killed ; 3 European officers, 2 sergeants, 61 rank and file, wounded.

Her Majesty's 32nd Foot—2 European officers, 4 rank and file, killed , 4 European officers, 39 rank and file, wounded.

8th Regiment Native Infantry—1 European officer, killed , 2 European officers, 1 havildar, 33 rank and file, wounded.

49th Regiment Native Infantry—1 European officer, 2 havildars, 7 rank and file, killed , 2 European officers, 1 havildar, 1 drummer, 42 rank and file, wounded.

51st Regiment Native Infantry—1 havildar, 2 rank and file, killed , 2 rank and file, wounded

72nd Regiment Native Infantry—1 Native officer, 6 rank and file, killed , 1 Native officer, 7 rank and file, wounded

General Cortlandt's Artillery—1 Native officer, 1 rank and file, 1 horse, killed , 2 rank and file, wounded

Total—5 European officers, 2 Native officers, 3 sergeants, 29 rank and file, 8 horses, killed , 12 European officers, 1 Native officer, 1 staff sergeant, 5 sergeants, 1 drummer, 196 rank and file, 13 horses, wounded

Grand total—39 men, 8 horses, killed , 216 men, 13 horses, wounded

Note—One charge in attendance on the Major-General during the attack, killed by a cannon ball

#### *Officers killed*

Lieutenant-Colonel Pattoun, Her Majesty's 32nd Regiment

Major Montizambert, Her Majesty's 10th Foot

Lieutenant Cubitt, 49th Native Infantry

Ensign Lloyd, 8th Native Infantry

Quartermaster Taylor, Her Majesty's 32nd Foot

#### *Officers wounded.*

Captain Mac Gregor, Her Majesty's 10th Foot, severely

Lieutenant Herbert, Her Majesty's 10th Foot, severely

Captain Balfour, Her Majesty's 32nd Foot, dangerously

Captain King, Her Majesty's 32nd Foot, slightly

Lieutenant Birtwhistle, Her Majesty's 32nd Foot, slightly.

Ensign Swinburn, Her Majesty's 32nd Foot, slightly

Lieutenant Bunny, 4th troop 1st Brigade Horse Artillery, slightly

Captain Wroughton, 8th Native Infantry, slightly

Lieutenant Turnbull, 8th Native Infantry, slightly

Lieutenant Hollinsworth, Her Majesty's 10th Foot, severely

Lieutenant Richardson, 49th Native Infantry, severely

Lieutenant Irwin, 49th Native Infantry, severely

#### *Missing*

3 privates, Her Majesty's 10th Foot, and 1 sepoy 51st Native Infantry

Inclosure 24 in No 38

*The Resident at Lahore to the Secretary to the Government of India.*

*Lahore, September 17, 1848.*

IT is with deep regret that I forward the accompanying letters, received last night, at after half-past 9 o'clock, by express from Mooltan

I know that the expedition to Mooltan was undertaken, at this time, without the concurrence of the Government, or the Commander-in-Chief, still, I think circumstances justified my ordering it, when I did, and it will be seen by the inclosed letter from Major-General Whish, C B, that the present check is not, in any way, attributable to the climate, on which the objections of the Government and the Commander-in-Chief were founded ; or the state of the troops, whom the General describes as in high health and spirits, the amount of their casualties and sick not exceeding six per cent of their numbers.

That there was no difficulty on account of inundation, is also evident. The check is, in no way, attributable to the season of the year.

The amount of force sent down by his Excellency the Commander-in-Chief,

was, by all, considered simple: the chief engineer gave me his professional opinion that the reduction of the place was feasible, under the circumstances supposed, with the aid of a much smaller force.

This opinion was formed by Major Napier, after two months of the most constant, and searching, inquiries into the nature, and extent, of the fortifications, and after the preparation of plans, from the most accurate information attainable, by himself, and Major Becher of the Quarter-Master General's department.

I was aware, when I ordered the movement of the force and train, that the utmost expedition was necessary, in carrying the operations to a successful conclusion, as the only means of preventing a general insurrection in the Punjab.

The delay which occurred in the despatch of the force, after I had ordered it, and in the arrival of the siege guns, is much to be deplored.

Doubtless, as stated by Major Napier, a very great change has taken place, within the last two months in the constitution of the rebel force, garrisoning the city and citadel, as well as in its numbers: this is owing to the rebellion of Sirdar Chuttur Sing, and (as it is stated, I fear, with justice) to the machinations of the arch traitor, Raja Sher Singh.

I trust that reinforcements will be pushed on, with all expedition. I shall, to-day, address the Governments of Bombay and Sind, that every exertion may be made by them, pending the orders of the Government of India, for sending troops to Mooltan.

The express reached me between 9 and 10 o'clock last night. I, immediately, requested Brigadier Campbell, C B to come to me, when I arranged with him for having Her Majesty's 53rd regiment under arms at gun-fire, that I might, with the Brigadier, take possession of the citadel, and the property of the State, and place under arrest Sirdar Golab Sing, and the other Sirdars most notoriously supposed to be implicated in this treachery.

I have been, all the morning, thus employed. I have made efficient arrangements for the security of the person of the Maharajah, and of the state jewels and property, and I have placed under arrest, in charge of British sentries, Sirdars Golab Sing, Attareewalla, Nar Sing, Attareewalla, Bishen Sing, and Jhunda Sing, Batooleah.

Inclosure 25 in No. 38.

*Major-General Whish to the Adjutant-General*

*Camp, Mooltan, September 14, 1848.*

THE circumstances of this morning induce me to begin a letter, that gives me much pain, by observing that, on the 9th instant, the chief engineer expressed his opinion that the force under my command was inadequate for the reduction of the town, and fortress, of Mooltan. In this, I entirely differed with him. On the 11th instant, when talking of Shere Sing's force to Lieutenant Edwardes, and of the expediency of getting rid of it, he said, he would try and so arrange, and, yesterday, reported that, after a long discussion, it was settled that one Sikh division should go to Toolumbah, to patrol the road, and all others to Kurumhpore.

In the evening, at the request of Major Napier, (who, I regret to say, has been wounded, by the graze of a cannon-ball, in the leg) I met Lieutenant Edwardes at his tent, when it was, again, urged that our force was inadequate to prosecute the siege which I was exceedingly averse to acquiesce in, seeing that the troops were in high health and spirits, that our sick and wounded did not exceed six per cent., and that our artillery had not yet seriously opened their fire; but, on my return from our advanced posts at 8 o'clock this morning, I was surprised by a message from Lieutenant Edwardes, to the effect that Shere Sing, at the head of his whole force, was in full march to join the enemy.

I met that officer, shortly after, again, at Major Napier's tent, the officer commanding the artillery being present, as also the officers of the Quarter-Master-General's department; and I requested the attendance of Colonel Franks, who was near at hand. Having explained the circumstances above-mentioned, and noticed that the last accounts from the Resident mentioned Chuttur Sing's being in open rebellion, it was the unanimous opinion that the

operations of the siege could not be continued, and I learnt from Colonel Franks that he had come to that conclusion, some days ago; and thus, when within breaching distance of the walls of the town, I have had the mortification of abandoning my advanced positions (obtained with considerable difficulty, and loss) as we had no prospect of keeping the town, after taking it, the enemy being 10,000 strong, in its immediate suburbs.

I have directed our troops to be withdrawn this evening, except a strong picket, with two horse artillery guns, at a post in our first parallel (Ramteerut), and shall, leisurely, change my position to Tibbee, where I shall await the arrival of such reinforcements as the Commander-in-Chief may think proper to send.

Inclosure 26 in No. 38.

*Major Napier, of the Engineers, to the Resident at Lahore.*

*Mooltan, September 14, 1848.*

I, TO-DAY, received the news that Shere Sing had gone over, bodily, to the enemy.

We have been pushing on, under considerable difficulties, caused by the country being so strong in natural defences, and by our scanty number of regular troops, when this news came to us. Moolraj's forces are now very different from what they were when Edwardes met them. Except a few, the irregulars have been exchanged for the old Sikh soldiers. The force has obstinately opposed us at each point, at a sad loss of life, and, with the fact that Shere Sing and Chuttur Sing, in fact, the Sikh nation, were, now, openly against us, the numbers would be sure to increase rapidly.

Our plan of attack had extended our communications far from camp, and it became clear that they would be much more so, before we reached the place. Shere Sing had taken up a position, threatening our right rear, where we were very weak, and it became clear that we could not continue our attack, without danger of finding ourselves fighting in front, and attacked in rear; as we could detach no men, our supplies could be easily intercepted, and our communication on Raj Ghat cut off.

It has, therefore, been determined to withdraw from this attack to our camp, and to wait for reinforcements.

This is very much to be regretted, but it is one of the accidents in war, and must be borne with resolution.

In discussing the next position to be taken up, the General has determined to occupy Edwardes' old position, Sooraj Koond, until reinforcements arrive.

We ought to have, at least, two brigades more, with reference to the strength of the enemy, and the prospect of their numbers being much increased by accessions from the North.

The Bombay Presidency appears the nearest, and best, point from which we can get reinforcements.

I look upon the probable state of the Punjab in the next two months, when I suggest the addition of two brigades.

The labor of siege-works falls entirely on our Europeans.

The General will have written to you to-day.

The attack on the Sikh post, which caused us such a sad loss in officers, was very gallantly made. The place is Bhaee Goordutt Sing's house; and some curious documents fell into Edwardes' hands.

I am much distressed to think of poor Montizambert. The loss in men was small, compared to the officers.

The General remains in the present camp, for some days.

## Inclosure 27 in No. 38.

*Major Edwardes to the Resident at Lahore.*

*Camp, before Mooltan, September 14, 1848,*

THE question of the intentions of the Sikh force under Raja Shere Sing, has, morning, been settled, by the camp moving, bodily, off to Mooltan, and joining the rebels, the Raja putting himself at the head of the movement, and ordering the "Dhurum Ka Dhosa," or religious drum, to be beaten, in the name of the Khalsa.

My private notes have already informed you that the Sikh camp had arrived at so dangerous a pitch of insubordination to the Sirdars (and above all to the Raja, who acted his part so well as to be reviled as a Mussulman, up to the last moment, by the Sikhs of his own camp), that I considered it my duty, three days ago, to take the instructions of Major-General Whish concerning them.

It being impossible to turn the flank of the Raja's position, between two nullahs, and close to Mooltan in front, there was no hope of disarming the Sikh force, and the only alternative which remained was, to induce them, if possible, to withdraw towards the capital, where the strength of the British army would render them harmless. The General, therefore, concurred with me, that the only thing to be done was, to direct the Sirdars to march.

I, then, sent for the three Sirdars, and informed them of the General's wishes. None of them liked the idea of encountering, as they said, the sneers of their enemies in the Durbār, at the failure of their attempts to keep a Sikh force to their duty. They also said, that many of their men would not obey an order to march. I asked them, if they staid here, at Mooltan, would they be answerable for the same men not going over to the enemy? They said, "No; it is very certain, if we remain here, the whole force will go over, gradually, there is no dependence on any one of them." Then, I said, it was better to make an effort to save them, and give the well-disposed, at all events, an opportunity of escaping. Sirdars Ootar Sing and Shumshere Sing agreed in this view of the question; but Raja Shere Sing warmly expostulated at his division (chiefly of Mussulmans) being sent away, when they were ready to give their lives in the cause of the Maharajah. General Cortlandt also had a good opinion of the Poorbeah regular regiment in the Raja's division, and as Major Napier, chief engineer, was, already, of opinion that we had not men enough to prosecute the siege of Mooltan, I agreed to the Raja remaining behind. It was, then, settled, with the full consent and approval of the three Sirdars, that Sirdar Ootar Sing's division should be ordered to Toolumbah, under pretence of keeping open the road, and stopping the influx of recruits, Sirdar Shumshere Sing's division to Kurrumpore, for the same purpose; and Rajah Shere Sing's to take up a position to cover, and protect, the ferry. This morning was fixed for the march.

Last night, Sirdars Ootar Sing and Shumshere Sing came to take their leave, and both, separately, had interviews, in which, after begging for letters to the Resident, exculpating them from blame, and expressing a belief that the majority of their men would march with them, they both took occasion to speak disparagingly of the Raja, Sirdar Ootar Sing asking, how long I thought the three or four hundred Sikhs of the Raja's division would remain faithful to their duty; and Shumshere Sing warning me, in plainer language, that, before three days elapsed, the Raja's Sikhs would be off, to join Chuttur Sing.

I believed this to be spleen at the Raja remaining behind, and thought it was rather in the Raja's favor than otherwise; but, immediately after the departure of the Sirdars, Sheik Emamooddeen came, and positively declared that the Raja had, at last, thrown off the mask, assembled his officers, and taken their oaths to stand by him, in rebellion. In this, he was said to be advised by Soorutt Sing, Majeetia, the same person as was reported to have, upwards of two months ago, brought the injunctions of Chuttur Sing to the Raja to rebel. Sheik Emamooddeen belongs to the party in the State opposed to the Attareewallas, and I was still loth to believe his report, nor (by this morning's denouement) do I think the matter was decided, for it is acknowledged that the three Sirdars tried to move off, and lead their camp, in the right direction, but were surrounded by fanatic orators, who roundly abused them, for deserting the cause of their religion, and stirred up the passions of the Sikh soldiers, till opposition to their will was

no longer safe. Then, Soorutt Sing, Majeetia, took the lead, harangued the crowd, half pushed, and half persuaded, the Raja, until, in a fit, as it were, of confusion and desperation, he consented to adopt the popular side, and put himself at the head of the mutineers. Then, Sirdar Ootar Sing betook himself to his horse, and fled to my tent, followed by Kirpal Sing, Mulwaree, and Kiber Sing, Sindanwalla, and, later in the day, one or two small Sirdars. Shumshere Sing, Sindanwalla is said to have been surrounded, and carried off, by the Raja's people.

The revolted camp moved straight down on the city of Mooltan, but was denied admittance by Dewan Moolraj, who said he doubted the Raja meant treachery (an additional argument, for my view of the question) and ordered him to go and encamp in the Huzoorie Bagh, under the guns of the fort, until he (the Dewan) was satisfied of his intentions.

This being the aspect of affairs, I hastened to lay the same before Major-General Whish, and begged him to consider us as no longer engaged with a rebel Kardar alone, but with the whole Sikh army, in another struggle for independence.

The Major-General adjourned to the tent of the chief engineer, where several senior officers were, also, called together, and an unanimous opinion came to, that the siege was no longer practicable. Colonel Franks even said, that he had come to that conclusion, two days ago. It was, therefore, decided to concentrate the troops, and assume a defensive, yet dignified, position, until the Government can organize its measures for the Punjab war, into which we are thus launched.

I cannot conclude this painful report, without expressing a hope, that my past labors to keep together this Sikh force, since its unhappy arrival at Mooltan, will be, now, sufficiently understood, and exonerate me from any blame in its final defection. I can, conscientiously, say, that I have exhausted both health and faculties in endeavouring to save both the Sirdars and their followers, from an act of national insanity and suicide.

Inclosure 28 in No. 38.

*The Resident at Lahore to the Secretary to the Government of India.*

*Lahore, September 18, 1848.*

IN continuation of my letter of yesterday's date, regarding the defection of Raja Shere Sing and the other Sirdars, I have the honor to state, that I had heard, for some few days, that Sirdar Golab Sing was, secretly, sending his property out of the fort, preparatory, as it was believed, to going off himself to join his father, Sirdar Chuttur Sing.

Sirdar Golab Sing, and his brother Raja Shere Sing, having been charged by Colonel Sir H. M. Lawrence, with the care of the Maharajah's person, and with the superintendence and arrangements of the household establishments, lived in the palace. I have, lately, caused a very strict watch to be kept over the proceedings of Golab Sing, suspecting that he intended himself to decamp; and knowing that he had been urged by his father, if possible, to carry the little Maharajah off with him.

When I entered the palace, and went to Sirdar Golab Sing, soon after daylight yesterday morning, the Sirdar was in the greatest possible state of alarm. I never saw any one look more terrified. I told him, that I had not detected him in any fault, but that I could not allow him, as the representative, at Lahore, of his brother, who had turned traitor with the rest of the family, to remain in his present position; and that it was necessary that he should himself be put under restraint. I asked him, if he had received any letter, during the night, from Raja Shere Sing, he replied, yes, one letter. I asked him the purport, when he sent for the letter, and gave it to me, it was written, for the purpose of being shown me, evidently. It described the meeting, on the 13th, between the Sirdars and Lieutenant Edwardes, and the conversation that took place; and the arrangement which had been determined on, for the march of the Sikh troops to the rear. I told him, that I was pretty sure he had received another communication; he confessed that he had; and I demanded to see it, he, then, produced the letter and inclosure, a translation of which is annexed.

It appears to have been the Raja's intention to have gone off to Hazara, to join his father Chuttur Sing; but, finding the troops averse to this, and more

disposed to join Moolraj, he determined on taking that step; having, probably, settled, with the said troops, and the smaller Sirdars in his interest, that they should take the other chiefs with them, by force. The other superior chiefs do not appear to have been previously cognizant of the Raja's intentions. Sirdars Shumshere Sing and Ootar Sing, when they visited Lieutenant Edwardes, were, certainly, I think, not so

Sirdar Ootar Sing made his escape from the army, as it appears, and joined Lieutenant Edwardes' camp, with a few horsemen, (his son, Lal Sing, having been carried off by the troops) Kehur Sing, the nephew of Sirdar Shumshere Sing, did the same, with all his own horsemen; Kirpal Sing, Mulwae (an intimate friend of Sheik Emamooddeen's) did the same, and, afterwards, in the middle of the day, Shere Daol Sing, son of Futtch Sing Man, escaped, and took refuge in Lieutenant Edwardes' camp, also. The Toshakanah, and all the property of Sirdar Shumshere Sing were brought to Lieutenant Edwardes' camp, by some of the Sirdar's followers, who reported that he himself had endeavoured to escape, but had been carried off by force, to Mooltan. These particulars are learnt from an urzee sent to me by Sheik Emamooddeen, on the evening of the 14th

From the above, it would seem that the move to Mooltan was not premeditated by the Sirdars generally, and, from their reception, it seems that they were not expected by Moolraj

I have no intelligence to-day from Mooltan. I doubt not that many of the Jagheerdars, who are at feud with the Attaree family, will desert from the rebels; but it is to be feared, that the insurgents will be joined by nearly all the the army, and the military population.

The promptest measures are necessary—five thousand men would effect more, at the present moment, than nearly four times that number, two months hence.

Inclosure 29 in No 38.

*Rajah Shere Sing to Sirdar Golab Sing.*

TO my dear brother Golab Sing. After professions of affection—You have frequently written to me to remain firm in my fidelity to Captain Edwardes, and to act, in all things, according to his instructions. I have in no wise deviated from this counsel. The Sing Sahib (Sirdar Chuttur Sing) has, several times, written to me, stating that he constantly obeyed Captain Abbott's directions, but that that officer, acting according to the suggestions of the people of Hazara, has treated him most unjustly, and caused him much grief and trouble, and that he has also exerted himself to destroy and disperse the Khalsa troops. The Sing Sahib writes to me, that I had nothing to do with the treaty made with the English, and that, if I wish to preserve my existence, and the religion of our country, I must act accordingly, and join him.

Hitherto, Captain Edwardes has treated me with great kindness, but, within the last week, his feelings towards me have changed. I resolved, therefore, yesterday, to join the Sing Sahib, and devote myself to the cause of our religion.

If you have any regard to the directions of the Sing Sahib, or my advice, prepare, immediately, on the receipt of this, to join the Sing Sahib, or to go to Jummo, or any other place you may think fit. If you disregard my advice, act as you please, but remember, that it is incumbent upon sons to obey the instructions of their father, for life is short.

Do not wait for another letter.

God is between us. If we live we shall meet; if not, God wills it.

*Inclosed in the preceding.*

The matter is this.—I shall enter the Fort of Mooltan, with my troops, on 1st Asooj (14th of September). If you are with me and the Sing Sahib, make your escape as you best can; if you are not with us, act as you think fit.

It is useless to write more; make arrangements regarding our family, as the Sing Sahib has directed you. Delay not an instant.



## Inclosure 30 in No. 38.

*The Resident at Lahore to the Secretary to the Government of India.**Lahore, September 23, 1848.*

I FORWARD a letter from Lieutenant Edwardes, dated the 16th instant, received to-day, regarding the events which took place at Mooltan, after the closing of his letter of the 14th

It will be seen that Sirdar Shumshere Sing made his escape, on the night of the 14th, from Mooltan, and joined Lieutenant Edwardes' camp the following morning, on foot, and with one follower.

I was nearly certain that the Sindanwalla Sirdars, whatever may be their feeling towards us, could never take part in an insurrection, originated and headed, by one of the Attaree family, nor join a rebellion of which a low caste man, as Moolraj is, was the leader.

Raja Shere Sing's conduct has been very extraordinary, and is almost inexplicable; he is, however, now in open rebellion, and doing his worst to injure the British Government, and to compass the destruction, by any means, of Europeans. It is not worth while to speculate, as to whether he has been all along contemplating treachery, or if he was, up to a certain point, sincere, and, after that point, a traitor. He, certainly, succeeded in deceiving Lieutenant Edwardes to the very last. I do not think he intended to join Moolraj, though he is believed, latterly, to have aided in getting him recruits from the Manjha: he would have proceeded to join his father in Hazara, if he could, but the troops, and lesser Sirdars preferred going to Mooltan, which was in sight.

The letters to General Cortlandt, Sheik Emamooddeen, and the officers, are not worth translating. They are all of the same tenor, and bear the seals of Raja Shere Sing, and the Sirdars, and officers with him. They call on all the Sikhs to unite to re-establish Khalsa supremacy and to destroy the English: they all say that Chuttur Sing is in rebellion, and Maharajah Golab Sing aiding him.

I have annexed the translation of a proclamation\* the Raja put forth, the day after he joined Moolraj, as a specimen of his feelings towards those who have raised his family from obscurity to distinction, and heaped benefits on the heads of every member thereof

## Inclosure 31 in No. 38.

*Major Edwardes to the Resident at Lahore.**Camp, Sooraj Koond, September 16, 1848.*

ON the 14th of September, I informed you of the revolt of Raja Shere Sing's force, and what Sirdars had remained faithful, and come in to me. Amongst those who had not come in, I named Sirdar Shumshere Sing, Sindanwalla, as having been forcibly detained by the Raja; and I am very happy now to be able to tell you that, yesterday morning, the Sirdar succeeded in making his escape, on foot, from the rebel camp, leaving behind him his tents, elephants, and property. Even on the road, he was intercepted by two of the enemy, but he shot one, and the other fled.

Several adherents of the Sirdars who had come in, subsequently escaped, and the party was becoming so numerous in our camp as to cause anxiety to their neighbours; so I took advantage of the Sirdars' desire to look after their families, and gave them their leave to go to Lahore. They started this morning, and go by the Bahawalpore route.

Sirdar Shumshere Sing related to me the interview which took place at the Shvallah, outside the Bohur gate of the city, between Dewan Moolraj and the Sikhs, Sirdars, and officers. Great distrust was shown by the Dewan, who was attended by an overpowering escort, and the grunth was brought in to administer oaths of sincerity to the new comers. All swore fidelity except Shumshere Sing, who declared (he says) before them all, that he owned no

\* Inclosure 32 in No. 38.

cause but that of Maharajah Duleep Sing. The oaths so freely taken did not remove Moolraj's suspicions; and, after the interview, he withdrew all his own troops from the entrenchments in front of the British army, and told Raja Shere Sing to relieve them,—so low has fallen the brother-in-law of the Maharajah.

The Raja seems to have applied himself, at once, to organizing revolution throughout the country, and Shumshere Sing told me that he had forced him (Shumshere Sing) to set his seal to two documents calling on parties to join the rebel standard. Shumshere Sing, further, warned me to be on the look out for letters from the Rajah to Sheik Emamooddeen, and all the regular regiments in my camp; and, many hours had not elapsed, before the Sheik brought me one which he had received, and which I append to this letter. It states that the Raja, in compliance with the commands of Maharajah Duleep Sing, had joined that well-meaning and faithful servant, Dewan Moolraj, in Mooltan, and is busily engaged in the work of re-establishing the state and religion, and expelling enemies, a work in which the Sheik is called upon to join. For the present, the aspect of affairs is not bad enough to render the Sheik's fidelity doubtful, and his hatred of Maharajah Golar Sing, and the Attaree party, who side with him, exceeds, if possible, that which he bears to the Sikh race generally, which he is fond of characterizing as "filthy."

Almost immediately afterwards, Colonel Budice Nath, who commands General Cortlandt's Kuthar Mookhee regiment, brought me a similar letter, addressed to himself, and his officers, by Raja Shere Sing. Both these letters have the advantage of assuring us that not only the Raja, but his father, is in open rebellion.

I have no fear of the Raja being able to seduce any of General Cortlandt's troops from their allegiance, but as Sheik Emamooddeen had two guns belonging to the same troop as the four which were with Sirdar Ootar Sing and Shumshere Sing, and which went over with the Raja to Mooltan, I, this morning, sent for the Sheik, and asked him, what dependence he could place on the artillerymen? He replied, "Just this much, that I have, for the last week, told off 300 men to do nothing but watch the guns, and cut down the artillerymen, on the slightest sign of mutiny." This being the case, I thought no time was to be lost, and directed the Sheik to seize the guns, and confine all the artillerymen, which he promptly did. I have sent the men under a guard to Lahore, and beg to explain that, though they are suspected of behaving ill at Suddoosain on the 1st of July, I have, now, turned them out merely as a prudential measure.

While I am writing, other letters have come from the Raja to Sirkaree troops in this camp, and one to General Cortlandt, bearing the seals of several Sirdars, and officers, who are along with Raja Shere Sing. I append them all.

Agreeably to the orders of the Major-General commanding the field force, my own and Bahawal Khan's force, yesterday, changed ground to Sooraj Koond. The movement was executed, most deliberately, for we had little, or no carriage, and our camels, &c., had to perform three journeys, before all the stores and munitions were removed; but I was resolved not to leave one cannon-ball, or handful of meal, to the enemy, and our whole line remained, cheerfully, under arms, from sunrise till 2 P.M. to cover the operations. Only once, did the enemy try to turn our flank and get at the baggage, with about 1000 horsemen of our late faithful ally, Raja Shere Sing Attareewalla, but General Cortlandt opened his guns upon them, and put them, instantly, to a disorderly flight.

The British force followed us, this morning, and is now encamped on the very ground where the battle of Suddoosain was fought.

This move secures, as you will perceive, the ferry communication with the Leia districts, and the countries beyond the Indus, also with Sind and Bombay, from whence alone, in the present state of the Punjab, it is probable that troops can be spared; and lastly, the communication with Bahawalpore, Ferozepore, and so with Lahore. Some were of opinion that Sirdarpore would have been a better position, as commanding the shortest road to Lahore; but it was generally agreed, that a round-about communication with the capital was preferable, if it combined communication with Sind, Bombay, and Ferozepore.

"P. S.—I have thought it right to request Lieutenant R. G. Taylor to withdraw from Dera Ismael Khan, along with the family of General Cortlandt, as he can be of little use after what has occurred, and his seizure by the Bunnoo troops would be a calamity in every way.

## Inclosure 32 in No. 38.

*Manifesto issued by Shere Sing.*

Seal  
of  
Shere Sing

IT is well known to all the inhabitants of the Punjab, to the whole of the Sikhs, and those who have been cherished by the Khalsajee, and, in fact, to the world at large, with what oppression, tyranny, and undue violence, the Feringees have treated the widow of the great Maharajah Runjeet Sing, now in bliss, and what cruelty they have shown towards the people of the country.

In the first place, they have broken the treaty, by imprisoning, and sending away to Hindostan, the Maharanee, the mother of her people. Secondly, the race of Sikhs, the children of the Maharajah (Runjeet Sing), have suffered so much from their tyranny, that our very religion has been taken away from us. Thirdly, the kingdom has lost its former repute. By the direction of the holy Gooroo, Raja Shere Sing and others, with their valiant troops, have joined the trusty and faithful Dewan Moolraj, on the part of Maharajah Duleep Sing, with a view to eradicate and expel the tyrannous and crafty Feringees. The Khalsajee must, now, act with all their heart and soul. All who are servants of the Khalsajee, of the holy Gooroo, and the Maharajah, are enjoined to gird up their loins, and proceed to Mooltan without delay. Let them murder all Feringees, wherever they may find them, and cut off the daks. In return for this service, they will certainly be recompensed by the favor of the holy Gooroo, by increase of rank, and by distribution of rewards. Fourthly, let all cling closely to their religion. Whoever acts accordingly, will obtain grace in this world, and hereafter, and he who acts otherwise, is excluded from the pale of the Sikh faith.

Seal  
of  
Sookha Sing

Seal  
of  
Soorutt Sing

Seal  
of  
Urjun Sing

Seal  
of  
Baluk Sing.

Seal  
of  
Jeet Sing

Seal  
of  
Rutun Sing

Seal  
of  
Futeh Sing

Seal  
of  
Sahib Sing.

Seal  
of  
Lal Sing

## Inclosure 33 in No. 38.

*Major-General Whish to the Adjutant-General.*

*Camp, Mooltan, September 16, 1848.*

SINCE SHERE SING'S force, about 7,000, (principally horse), went over to the enemy, with his two mortars and ten guns, I found we were continually exposed to false alarms, whenever he or his Sirdars chose to parade within view, accompanied by a strong escort. I, therefore, changed ground this morning to a position nearly three miles south west of the fort, where we shall not be liable to such inconveniences.

Lieutenant Edwardes' force removed to Sooraj Koond yesterday, and is about two miles east of us.

In our march to-day, the enemy offered no molestation, except to the last portion of the column that left the ground, on which some of Shere Sing's guns opened, without effect, and were soon silenced by six of Cortlandt's, that accompanied 2,000 of Lieutenant Edwardes' horse, that I had borrowed for the day, for the better security of the extensive siege train, and engineer's park, camp, equipage, baggage, &c.

On the 18th ultimo, Lieutenant Edwardes estimated Shere Sing's force at

about 4,200, but, consequent to reinforcements by Chuttur Sing and Golab Sing of Cashmere, I have reason to believe it is about 5,000 now, notwithstanding nearly 3,000 went off, on the 14th, to Jhung and Lahore, with three guns, when the remainder, under Shere Sing, publicly took up the cause of the rebel Dewan.

Inclosure 34 in No. 38.

*Major Napier to the Resident at Lahore.*

*Camp, near Mooltan, September 19, 1848.*

THE attack on the City of Mooltan, which was commenced on the 7th instant, was discontinued on the 14th, in consequence of the great accession of strength which the enemy gained during the operations, and, finally, by the defection of the Raja Shere Sing and his associated Sirdars.

It was found impossible to continue the operations, and, at the same time, to protect the siege train, and cover our line of communications, for our whole force was engaged in guarding our camp, and in manning the trenches, whilst the Raja's cavalry and guns were available to move on any points to our rear, from which we drew our supplies. The attack was, therefore, withdrawn.

The transfer of the Raja to the ranks of the enemy, laid open the Ghat of the Chenab, and the road to Shoojabad, and obliged Lieutenant Edwardes to return to his old camp of Sooraj Koond, instead of taking up a position, on the left of our camp, at Seetul-ke-Maree, which was impracticable from want of water.

As the country towards Sirdarpore is in the hands of the Raja Shere Sing's people, no assistance, in the way of supplies, can be looked to, from that frontier.

It appears to me absolutely necessary for the British force to have a depôt for the siege train, and I have suggested Shoojabad as a fit place, and have, with the General's permission, sent an engineer officer to put it in order for the purpose.

As soon as our force is emancipated from the encumbrance of the siege train, it may act in the field, at present, it can only act on the defensive.

The forces of the Dewan Moolraj were found to be excellent defenders of strong ground, and skirmishers, though unable, for a moment, to resist our troops in the field, and their numbers are, by all accounts, said to amount to, at least, 15,000 men, including the Raja's troops.

It is not easy, at present, to foresee what numbers of the enemy may be assembled, by the time reinforcements arrive to enable us to renew operations against the fortress. You will, perhaps, be better able to judge at Lahore what accessions to his numbers may be expected, but I believe that the army, originally destined by the Government for the reduction of Mooltan, will certainly be required here, and the sooner it arrives the better.

The enemy is, at present, occupied in increasing his entrenchments, and sending out parties to occupy the country towards Sudarpore and Toolumbah. In the course of a few days, we shall, I believe, have moved our camp to a position in which we shall have a good opportunity of striking a decisive blow at him, should his increasing numbers encourage him to move out into the field; but it is most probable that he will wait for reinforcements, before acting on the offensive.

Inclosure 35 in No. 38

*The Resident at Lahore to Brigadier Campbell, C.B.*

*Lahore, September 19, 1848.*

I FORWARD two letters from Mr. J. Lawrence, the Commissioner and Superintendent of the Jullundur Doab, dated the 14th and 16th instant, relative to a disturbance which has taken place on the frontier of the Kangra district, and the measures adopted by him, successfully, for its suppression.

I would suggest that Mr. Lawrence's proposition regarding sending the wing of a regiment to Kangra, and strengthening the Fort at Noorpoor, be complied

with, if it can be so without inconvenience: if the forts of Noorpoor and Kangra are firmly held, the presence of a second regiment of infantry at Hoshiarpore would be, perhaps, dispensed with.

You will see, by Mr Lawrence's letter, that he does not consider that there is any objection to the march of the moveable column from Jullundur, if its presence, in a more advanced position, is necessary; and there is no doubt that the tranquillity of the Jullundur districts depends, in an eminent degree, on that of the country on the right bank of the Beas.

I consider a forward move, at this moment, of the Jullundur moveable column—to prevent the occurrence of disturbances in the Manjha, and to be prepared to march, if necessary, to Lahore—to be most desirable.

I wish, also, one of the regiments of native infantry now composing the column to be placed, for the present, in Govindgurh, to relieve the regiment which I have requested you, in my separate letter of this date, to send from this for its immediate occupation.

I propose, as suggested by His Excellency the Commander-in-Chief, that the Jullundur Column move, in the first instance, only to the banks of the Beas (with the exception of the corps to be pushed on to Umritsur), boats being provided for its crossing at any point—there to await further orders, which will be dictated by the state of events, to the north-west, and in the neighbourhood of Lahore.

I request that you will issue the necessary orders to Brigadier Wheeler, with as little delay as possible.

Inclosure 36 in No. 38.

*John Lawrence, Esq, to John Inghs, Esq, Secretary to the Resident at Lahore.*

*Noorpoor, September 14, 1848.*

I HAVE already apprized you of the reports which I had received, that Ram Sing, son of Shama, one of the hereditary vazeers of Noorpoor, had crossed the frontier, with a body of armed men. This information turned out to be correct. They attacked various posts of the customs' line, wounded three chupprassees, one of whom is since dead, and a second one not expected to live, and carried off two or three men connected with the revenue authorities at Noorpoor.

I had written to Major Davidson, to march with the head-quarters of his corps to Puthankote, and requested Major Hodgson to dispatch a company from the Sikh local infantry regiment at Hoshiarpore. Before, however, my letters reached these officers, Major Davidson had heard that some of his men had been cut up, and, at once, started with all the men he could collect, being accompanied by Mr C. Saunders, the assistant commissioner of Hoshiarpore, who volunteered to accompany the party, though the disturbance, which it was their object to suppress, was beyond the limits of the district to which he was attached. It is, with much pleasure, that I, thus, bring to the notice of the chief commissioner, the activity and energy which this gentleman has shown since he has joined this territory, he has, on every occasion, evinced judgment, ability, and zeal.

I have now the pleasure to forward a copy of the assistant commissioner's letter, giving an account of the march, and of the surprise and dispersion of a body of the insurgents, who had taken possession of the fort of Shahpoor, on the Ravee. The chief commissioner will perceive that Major Fisher, with a body of the irregular cavalry corps at Mookerian, and a company of the 28th Native Infantry under Lieutenant Johnston, accompanied them, and I am indebted to the activity, intelligence, and zeal, which these different officers have all evinced, that the disturbance has not extended further than it has done. Mr C. Saunders returned to Hoshiarpore on the 12th, and Major Fisher and the rest of the party arrived here this morning.

I reached Kangra, on the morning of the 10th, despatched Lieutenant Wallace, with 150 men of the 2nd Sikh regiment, from Kangra towards Noorpoor, and, joining them, next day, in company with Mr G. Barnes, the district officer of Kangra, reached this place, yesterday morning at 5 A.M. I then ascertained that Ram Sing, with a body of men, occupied a long narrow hill, in the immediate

vicinity of the town, and that he had perpetrated several dacoities. He seems to have written circular letters to the head-men of villages, and invited them to join him, few, however, have accepted his offer. I annex a copy of a letter, of yesterday's date, to the address of Brigadier Wheeler, giving him all the information I had then collected, regarding the insurgents.

The native authorities in Noorpoor appear to have been very active. Goorbhay and Teyka, father and son, influential chowdrees of Indoura, had, on the requisition of the Tehsildar, collected a number of their friends, and, with the aid of the customs' peons, who had been forced to abandon their posts, secured Puthankote from attack. The chowdrees and their men, subsequently, proceeded to Noorpoor, and, in company with Soochait Sing, another titular vuzeer of the ex-Raja's, who has great influence in these parts, aided the police, and revenue authorities, in keeping the peace. I consider that these individuals deserve much credit for their exertions, which, with the judicious arrangements of Captain Park commanding at Noorpoor, have, probably, saved this important place from plunder.

Ram Sing is still on the hill, described in my letter to Brigadier Wheeler, C B. commanding the Jullundur Doab. We reconnoitred the position this morning, and though it is strong, all the officers present concurred in thinking that, with 300 or 400 infantry, we could destroy, or capture the party. It is difficult to get authentic intelligence regarding the exact number on the hill, for the only people who can, safely, venture up there, are friends of the insurgents, who, of course, will not give true information. Ram Sing has been very cautious in his movements since my arrival, and, now that Major Fisher, with his force, has joined, will, I am afraid, attempt to escape. The country round this town, and the vicinity, which he will, probably, not leave, except he decamps altogether across the Ravee, for it is here where his influence alone lies, is extremely strong. The whole surface consists of rugged hills, more or less covered with trees and brushwood, intersected with strong valleys, cut up in all directions by mountain torrents, on this side of the hill, which the insurgents occupy, is the native village of Ram Sing, some of the people of which, have joined him. He might take up much stronger positions at no great distance, and the object, therefore, is to prevent his escape, until sufficient force can arrive to enable us to attack him.

Through the influential chowdrees and head-men of villages, we are now collecting about 800 men, with whom we hope to occupy the passages leading to the position, while our own force secures the villages of Bussa and Juch, on the south and south-west. The advantage of this movement will be, to restrain the insurgents within narrow limits, to give confidence and security to the villages, and, probably, prevent their escape. If Brigadier Wheeler authorizes the march of the five companies at Hajeepore, the affair would, I think, be settled in a day. Ram Sing is not popular in the country. He has many more enemies, apparently, than friends. At any rate, the people appear to be peaceably disposed, and not inclined to join him.

Should the state of affairs require the march of a considerable portion of the troops, now in the Jullundur Doab, towards Lahore, I consider that they may be removed, without any danger. Tranquillity and security at Lahore, and in the Baree Doab, will have the best effects on the people, in this territory also. But I strongly recommend that a wing of a native infantry regiment be at once ordered to Kangra, to garrison the fort, and another wing be sent to Noorpoor. I should then have Major Ferns' corps, as a moveable force, at my disposal, to march on any point where troops should be required. At present, I had to weaken the garrison of Kangra to a very considerable extent, before I could dispatch Lieutenant Wallace to Noorpoor.

With a native infantry corps divided between the two forts of Kangra and Noorpoor, and the Sikh corps at my disposal, I think there would be no fear of any commotion in the hills, at any rate, none that we could not suppress. As matters are at present, they are not sufficiently protected.

## Inclosure 37 in No. 38.

*Mr. Lawrence to Brigadier Wheeler.**Noorpoor, September 15, 1848.*

ON the receipt of your note of the 11th instant, I sent off an express to Major Wintle, at Booddhapond, requesting that he would dispatch four companies to Noorpoor, to assist in attacking the insurgents, who are still posted on the hill close to the town.

I have informed Major Wintle that I do not think that we shall require any guns, and that Major Fisher concurs in this opinion. I had hoped not to have required the aid of this force, as I had written to Major Hodgson, at Hoshiarpore, to march on Puthankote, with all the men at his disposal, but, in consequence of Mr. Cust's suggestions, telling him he believed the work had been accomplished, that officer has not marched.

We reconnoitered the position of the insurgents, yesterday morning, and again to-day, and, in fact, have seen the country all round it.

On the south, cavalry may act, but with some difficulty; a wide strong ravine, interspersed with rice fields, running along that side, on the north, the country is much more difficult, being broken in every direction into hundreds of little spurs, running out from the main chain on which the insurgents are posted.

I do not apprehend any difficulty in attacking, and beating them, the danger will be that they disperse, and escape to unite elsewhere, the villagers are peaceable and well disposed, anxious for the seizure of the party who have done them some damage. I have collected a body of Rajpoots to assist us in guarding the ground, and preventing the enemy escaping, when attacked by the troops.

I have recommended to the Chief Commissioner at Lahore, that half a corps of native infantry be placed at once in Kangra, so as to render the hill regiment available for detached duty, such as the present work.

I am aware that you have been instructed by the General to accede to my wishes, if I should think it necessary to send regular troops to Kangra. But, as I know you have, subsequently, received notice to be ready to cross the Beas, on a day's notice, I have forbore making the requisition, lest I should impede your arrangements. I have, further, suggested that the force at Noorpoor be raised to five companies, so that a part of them might be available for any emergency in the neighbourhood.

## Inclosure 38 in No. 38.

*Mr. Lawrence to the Resident at Lahore.**Camp, Noorpoor, September 16, 1848.*

WITH reference to the affairs in this quarter, I annex a copy of a letter of yesterday's date, to the address of Brigadier Wheeler, C B. which will put you in possession of all the information I possess.

I have only to repeat that I do not apprehend that there will be any insurrection in these hills. Few people have joined Ram Sing, and, of these, some have done so from compulsion. Since yesterday, his force has rather decreased, and, during our ride this morning, we met the head-men of a village, who told us that a party of 15 men had deserted him, one of whom he had seized, and caused to be severely beaten. I understand that several chowdrees and Putwarees whom he has seized, are now in confinement with him.

I propose doing nothing, till the force arrives from Booddhapond; we have, now, ample means to dislodge him, but not to insure his destruction, or seizure.

I have offered 1,000 rupees, for the apprehension of Ram Sing, and also sums, not exceeding 100 rupees, for each of his principal followers.

On our return from our ride this morning, during which we had been employed in examining the country, a party of Ram Sing's men who had occupied a village at the foot of the hill, from which they could enfilade the road, opened a fire of matchlocks on us. Major Fisher, Lieutenant Wallace, and

other officers of the party, wisely restrained their men to merely firing a volley or two, when, we returned to Noorpoor. The worst that I apprehend is, that the insurgents should take the alarm, and retreat to a position more difficult of access.

Inclosure 39 in No. 38.

*Mr. Lawrence to the Secretary to the Resident at Lahore.*

*Camp, Noorpoor, September 19, 1848.*

WITH reference to the news from Mooltan, I think it more than ever necessary to garrison the fort of Kangra, and to strengthen Noorpoor. I have the greatest confidence in both the Sikh local corps here, but they are required to move about the country, and put down any attempt at insurrection, before it gathers head.

I had been at Noorpoor six days, before I could get together a sufficient body of men to attack Ram Sing, who was within a mile and a half of the fort. During this period, he rendered the high roads unsafe, seized, and tortured the head-men of villages, and forced people to join him. The night before last, he burnt a number of houses in the village of Ghuntul, nine miles from this, and, the next day, was joined by twenty matchlocks from thence. Such is the nature of the country, and the difficulty of the fastnesses, that it was impossible, except by attacking him, to prevent such excursions.

I have the pleasure to state, that we attacked Ram Sing, in his position, this morning at daybreak, on five sides, we dispersed his force, killing and wounding twenty-five to thirty men. The men of the Sikh local corps behaved extremely well, evincing the greatest ardor and spirit.

Owing to the denseness of the jungle, we did not seize Ram Sing, but hope to give a good account of him, hereafter.

Inclosure 40 in No. 38.

*Major Hodgson to Mr. Lawrence.*

*Camp, Noorpoor, September 19, 1848*

AGREEABLY to the general tenor of your instructions, I proceeded this morning at 3 A.M. with the head-quarters' detachment of the 1st regiment of Sikh Local Infantry, consisting of 250 rank and file, to attack and dislodge a party of rebels, assembled under a person named Ram Sing, and who had taken position in the neighbourhood, and occupied the village of Bassa, on the top of a high hill. On arriving at the foot of the hill, I halted the detachment until the dawn, when, I advanced up the ascent, covered by skirmishers. On approaching the village, by a gradual ascent, which became steeper on the top, the rebels challenged, and fired a volley on the party. After going a few more yards in advance, this was returned, and the detachment pushed on smartly, and carried the village of Bassa, and another in its immediate vicinity.

The village I directed to be fired, and thereby destroyed a considerable quantity of supplies, two magazines, and various other property collected by the rebels. Two native British subjects, confined by the enemy, were released, and some mules, formerly captured, belonging to Government, were recovered, and made over to the Commissariat Agent. The dislodged enemy amounting to, I should say, about 100 men, then retired firing, further up the mountain, closely pursued. Having reached the crest, they were joined by others, and attempted to make a fresh stand, but were quickly routed, and chased down both sides of the hill, dispersing singly in all directions. From the extreme density of the cover, it was quite impossible to fire with any great precision, but six dead bodies of the enemy were counted, and I have no doubt that they suffered more severely, though, from the rapid advance of the detachment, I had no means of ascertaining, as it did not return by the same route.

As a pursuit of single stragglers, through a particularly dense, and extensive,



brushwood forest, could be attended with no possible advantage, when it was difficult even to preserve one's footing, I directed the halt of the detachment on an open slope of the hill. The dispersion appearing complete on the part of the enemy, and their strongholds burned and destroyed, I returned to camp, after previously communicating with yourself.

The detachment behaved with gallantry and emulation throughout, and I avail myself of this opportunity of bringing to your notice the circumstances of their having arrived only the night before, after a very harassing march of forty miles, over great part of an unbeaten tract.

The alacrity and cheerfulness with which they performed their duty, was, therefore, very creditable to them, and peculiarly gratifying to me.

My second in command, Brevet Captain Herbert of the 46th regiment, Native Infantry, though suffering from the effects of a severe wound, evinced the greatest judgment and gallantry, and rendered me the most effectual, frank, and soldier-like services.

Serjeant-Major Dawney, whom I placed in command of skirmishers during the first advance, behaved with conspicuous gallantry.

I think it my duty to bring to your notice the admirable tact, skill, and coolness of the guide Misser, who accompanied me, and pointed out with great precision the enemy's position. I beg to recommend him to your notice.

In addition, I am happy to state that, taking into consideration the strength of the position attacked, my loss was very trifling, amounting to only five sepoy's wounded, three most dangerously, one severely, and one slightly.

I avail myself of this opportunity to bring to your notice that, considering the requisition made by you very urgent, I marched with every available man, leaving my guards standing, and the consequence is that they are without relief.

P S—I have since learned that the enemy suffered considerably in both killed and wounded.

#### Inclosure 41 in No. 38

*Major S. Fisher, Commanding 15th Irregular Cavalry, to Major Palmer,  
Major of Brigade*

*Camp, Noorpoor, September 19, 1848.*

I HAVE the honor to report the dispersion, with slaughter, of Ram Sing and his followers, from the position they had occupied.

The hill in the possession of the rebel Ram Sing, was attacked, this morning, by the troops in four separate parties, the villages were burnt, Ram Sing and his followers were driven from the different heights, and dispersed with slaughter, their tents and drums were destroyed, and the character of Ram Sing, as a successful soldier, is, I think, totally annihilated, in the eyes of the predatory soldiery who have, hitherto, been his support. I am happy to add that this has been effected with but the slight loss of one sepoy killed, and nine wounded. The casualty list is duly inclosed.

The loss of the enemy it is impossible to ascertain with any certainty, some fifteen dead bodies have been discovered, but the denseness of the jungle, which also aided Ram Sing's escape, renders it impossible to give any accurate state of the actual loss sustained by the enemy; it must, though, be great.

Nothing could be more deserving of praise than the conduct of both officers and men, of all arms, on this occasion.

#### Inclosure 42 in No. 38.

*Mr. Laurence to the Secretary to the Resident at Lahore.*

*Noorpoor, September 20, 1848.*

MY spies inform me that Ram Sing has fled, and his followers have dispersed. The people I sent out, yesterday evening, and this morning, have counted eighteen dead bodies on the hill, and many more must be lying in the

jungle, which in parts is so dense, I understand, from the officers who went up, that fifty men might be concealed.

I annex a letter from Major Hodgson, commanding the 1st regiment of Sikh Local Infantry, describing the part his corps took in the affair.

We had about 360 men of the 1st Sikh regiment under Major Hodgson, of whom 300 attacked on one side; two companies of the 29th Native Infantry, under Lieutenant Johnston, who went up on another, Captain Rind, of the 71st Native Infantry, with four companies, equal to about 240 bayonets, and Lieutenant Wallace, with 150 men of the Kangra Regiment, made a long circle, and, mounting the eastern extremity of the hill, got possession of the heights, Major Fisher of the 15th Irregulars, who assumed command of the whole force, assisted by a party of his own corps, the 16th, guarded the southern and western sides of the hill, where cavalry could act, while Mr G Barnes, the Deputy Commissioner of Kangra, and I, surmounted the ravines on the other two sides, with upwards of 400 Rajpoots, of whom the Rajas of Mundee and Chumba had sent me 200, and the remainder were collected from the villages of the Noorpoor district. Our whole loss is one sepoy killed, and nine wounded, all of the 29th Native Infantry, and 1st regiment Sikh Infantry.

I have much reason to be satisfied with the way in which Major Fisher, and the officers commanding the different detachments, have behaved; and to Mr. G Barnes I am especially indebted, for the energy and zeal with which he has aided me, in suppressing this disturbance.

I avail myself of this opportunity to add, that last night a Chokeydar came in, from a village on the Ravee opposite Bussowlee, and reported that he was sent by the head-men to say, that a body of 300 armed men had assembled on the right bank, and insisted on crossing to join Ram Sing, who had promised them 8 rupees a month. They called themselves discharged soldiers from Maharajah Golab Sing's army. The villagers are watching them, and I have sent out the Maharajah's vakeel to the spot, to incite His Highness' servants at Bussowlee to seize them. I have, also, sent out spies in all directions to gain information, and, if I find it to be correct, I shall move a force, at once, to the banks of the Ravee, and hope to give a good account of all disturbers of the peace. It is right that I also state, that the Jummoo vakeel assures me, that such an assemblage of discharged soldiers as that now reported, is not the case, and that, he believes, the story must have arisen from his master having sent troops down to secure order, and arrest dangerous characters.

#### Inclosure 43 in No. 38

*Mr. Lawrence to the Secretary to the Resident at Lahore.*

*Noorpoor, September 22, 1848.*

THE dispersion of Ram Sing and his followers appears to be complete.

The day before yesterday, I went over the hill on which they had taken up their position, and found it, in many cases, not accessible to troops, except by narrow footpaths. In the evening, I received information that Ram Sing, with five men, had been seen in a wood, some eight or nine miles off. I, at once, sent off a party after him, who were out all night. It appeared that he had only left the place an hour before their arrival. I have now reason to believe that he has crossed the Beas, and gone towards Seeba, north of Hoshiarpore, where there are extensive jungles, though others seem to think that he has taken refuge in Hurrpore. I have sent off a party of the hill rangers, in the hope of seizing him.

My spies from beyond the Ravee have returned, and say that the Jummoo authorities have established posts along the right bank, to prevent the passage of dangerous characters, and to preserve tranquillity. The disbanded soldiery, on the news of Ram Sing's defeat, which I circulated, in every direction, by letters to the heads of villages, written in the Hill dialect, have all dispersed. I do not know that there were so many as was, at first, reported, but there can be no doubt that there were some collected, and ready to cross.

If Maharajah Golab Sing could be prevailed on to discontinue the disbandment of his surplus soldiery, at the present crisis, it would conduce to the public

tranquillity. At any rate, it would not appear unreasonable that His Highness should, in some measure, be responsible for such characters not collecting in bodies within the Maharajah's territories, and joining malcontents in arms against the British power.

I have directed Major Hodgson, with the 1st regiment of Sikh Local Infantry, to return to Hoshiarpore. With Major Fisher and the cavalry, I propose marching, two days hence, to Puthankote, where I shall post a company of the Sikh corps and some Sowars, to secure that place, and to strengthen the police; and the four companies of the 71st Native Infantry I shall leave here, until I hear from you, regarding the substitution of regular infantry for the hill corps now in Kangra, and the reinforcement of the garrison of Noorpoor.

Inclosure 44 in No. 38.

*The Secretary to the Resident at Lahore to the Secretary to the Government of India*

*Lahore, September 25, 1848*

I AM directed to forward dispatches from the Commissioner of the Trans-Sutlej States, reporting the suppression of the disturbance in Noorpoor. The Chief Commissioner has much satisfaction in bringing to favorable notice the excellent conduct of the officers and men employed on this occasion.

Inclosure 45 in No. 38.

*The Resident at Lahore to the Secretary to the Government of India*

*Lahore, September 21, 1848.*

I FORWARD a correspondence relative to the occupation of the fortress of Govindgurh, at Umritsur, by a British garrison.

I have been all along, since the outbreak at Mooltan in April last, most desirous that that fort should be in the possession of the British troops. It is, as the Government are aware, a most important post, with reference to its position in the direct line of our communications between Lahore and the British provinces, in the centre of the Manjha, the district in which the Sikhs abound, and commanding, completely, the town of Umritsur, which is more populous than Lahore itself, and, also, from the prestige attached by the Sikhs to the possession of this fort, which they consider as the key of the Punjab, and look upon with reverence as the work to which Maharajah Runjeet Sing devoted so much attention, and treasure, during the latter years of his reign.

Besides the positive value of its occupation by us, for the reasons given above, the preventing its being occupied by insurgents, or disaffected parties, is a most important matter. If the disaffected of the Manjha could have secured the fort of Govindgurh as a rallying point at this time, the whole of the Bahee Doab would, most probably, rise, and our communication with the provinces in our rear would become very difficult, and, without a regular siege, we could not have got possession of the fort, yet, we must have possessed ourselves of it, ere we could, with safety, advance towards the north west.

I know that the Governor-General in Council is fully impressed with the expediency of our occupying Govindgurh, but, with a jealous Sikh garrison, who had only to keep their gates shut to defy us, and who care not the slightest for the Dubar orders, getting possession was a delicate operation, while an unsuccessful attempt would be disastrous. This consideration has, hitherto, induced the Government and the Resident to let things remain as long as all went on well.

Under the present circumstances, the occupation of Govindgurh became more than ever desirable, and, in my mind, almost necessary, and this was the feeling of the few real well-wishers we have in the Punjab.

I am sure that the Governor-General in Council will appreciate Mr. Cocks' judicious execution of the duty entrusted to him, in which he received much assistance from Mr. J. Inglis.

I feel much indebted to Brigadier Campbell, C B, for the hearty interest he took in the success of the operation, and for the judicious arrangements he made for securing it, by promptitude, and secrecy.

The Brigadier left me at 11 o'clock a.m. on Tuesday, and, with my instructions, at 7 o'clock on Wednesday morning, the fort was in our possession, and the Sikh garrison outside the walls, and, by 11 o'clock, the regiment of infantry, which was only taken off its duty in the city of Lahore the afternoon before, marched into Govindgurh in perfect order, only two Sepoys being in the rear. The regiment arrived in sight of Govindgurh at 8 o'clock, but, learning, from a messenger sent by Mr. Cocks, that our people were in full possession, and the Sikh garrison out, Colonel Mac Sherry halted, and rested his men, for a couple of hours, and marched them in, quite fresh, and cheerful, at 11 o'clock. The distance from Anarkullee is about thirty-five miles.

Inclosure 46 in No. 38.

*The Resident at Lahore to the Secretary to the Government of India*

*Lahore, September 24, 1848*

THE intelligence received from Mooltan, since the date of my letter to the Commander-in-Chief of the 8th instant\*, has so altered the aspect of affairs, that my proposition,—for the troops ordered to Ferozepore being allowed to come on, and form the army at Lahore, to be ready to move on, immediately, to the north-west,—could not, of course, be entertained.

The first thing, now, must be, to push on our reinforcements to Mooltan.

The force sent from this was generally considered to be larger than was required. I am satisfied that its failure was never, for a moment, anticipated by any one, if the troops arrived at Mooltan, in an effective state. The chief engineer gave his professional opinion that a smaller force would suffice, and he considered failure impossible, and it is certain that, in the season 1845-6, Sir C. Napier, with a smaller force, and with not much more than a quarter of the amount of siege artillery, calculated, after, as he conceived, full investigation, that the reduction of the place would not have delayed his progress towards Lahore, many days. At that time, Moolhaj was in the zenith of his power, and his army on a war establishment, whereas, before this outbreak, he had discharged almost all his regular troops, preparatory to resigning his government, and his present army is composed of new levies.

That the Commander-in-Chief was satisfied of the sufficiency of the force, fixed by General Whish, on the scale laid down by his Excellency, for the duty required of it, and that his apprehension was, on account of the season of the year alone, his Excellency has declared, in a letter to your Lordship, in which is the following sentence—

“Unacquainted, as yet, with the political necessity for the immediate movement of this force, yet, as it is to comprise that detailed in my letter of the 1st instant†, to the address of your Lordship in Council, I do not feel justified in interfering, as neither the character of the army, nor the safety of that portion of it which will be employed, can be compromised, otherwise than by the loss of life, which the season of the year may occasion, and which, it appears, will be guarded against as much as possible.”

The troops have, in no way, suffered, on account of the season, but have, in fact, been more healthy and effective than the corps in any of the cantonments. When operations were suspended, the wounded and sick averaged only six per cent. of the force.

It is, moreover, quite evident, that the General commanding deemed his force ample for the service on which it was to be employed, and he had the best possible opportunities of judging, for the whole force assembled at Mooltan, within sight of the works, full sixteen days before the guns arrived, during that period, Major-General Whish, C.B., an officer belonging to one of the scientific branches of the service, had an opportunity of reconnoitring the works, obtaining every information regarding them, the number and position of his opponents,

\* Inclosure 44 in No. 36.

† Inclosure 11 in No. 32.

and all other points necessary to be known. Had the General considered the force, in any respect, inadequate to the service before it, he would, doubtless, as in duty bound, have reported it, and requested that reinforcements might be sent him.

It is notorious that such a notion never entered into his mind, or that of any officer of the force. Having duly considered what was to be done, and the means he possessed of accomplishing it, Major-General Whish felt so certain of success, that he appointed, in division orders, prize agents to take charge of the spoils which he believed to be already in his grasp.

I cannot but feel that I had full warrant to anticipate that the expedition would be successful, and, had the city only of Mooltan fallen, within a reasonable period after the force sat down before it, a Punjab war, otherwise as I believed inevitable, would have been avoided.

As it is, the effects of this check, supposing it to be no more, will be most serious. It launches us at once, I fear, into a general Punjab war, and we must strain every nerve to meet the emergency.

All reinforcements that can be made available must be sent to Mooltan, from whatever quarter they can be procured, and we must prepare, as we best may, to keep all secure at the capital, and to meet the attack with which we are threatened.

Sirdar Chuttur Sing had not heard of the Durbar troops in Mooltan having joined Moolraj, when the last accounts came away from his camp. He was at Hurrpore, in Hazara, having released the Gahundia brigade, and had with him six regiments of infantry, and fourteen guns. His son, Ootar Sing, was at Rawul Pindee, with one Sikh regiment, and about 300 men from another of Mirajah Golab Sing's, said to have mutinied, and joined the Sirdar, and some 2,000 newly raised levies, and two guns.

The Sirdars are collecting carriage, with the avowed intention of marching on Lahore.

It is most probable that the Sirdar will now again endeavour to persuade the Peshawur troops, and those of Bunnoo, to join him, and, as the defection has become so general, he will, it is to be feared, succeed. He calculates on being joined by the Sikh population of the districts surrounding Lahore, and gives out that the garrison has been, in great part, bought over to his interest.

That all the Sikh population will take advantage of his coming, if he does come, to commit all manner of excesses, there can be no doubt, they appear to be, already, preparing to give him all the aid in their power, but there is no reason to believe that his other assertion is anything but a lie to give confidence to his followers.

If the Sirdar, elated by the news from Mooltan, would execute his boast, and march on Lahore, it would be the best possible move, for us, that he could make, we might, then, continue to hold Attock, and our officers in Peshawur, &c. might be secure. We shall be quite prepared for him here, and shall be able, I doubt not, to give a good account of him.

The Sikh troops move so quickly, when on the march, that I have thought it right to move up Brigadier Wheeler's column to the Beas at once; his appearance on the banks of that river, following up our occupation of Govindgurh, will put a check to the insurrectionary spirit of the Manjha, and prevent many from proceeding to Mooltan, and in the Hazara direction.

It has been determined, in consideration of the late disturbance on the new frontier of the Jullundur district, that Brigadier Wheeler move, in the first instance, to Tanda, and remain there, till further orders, sending to Lahore a regiment of native infantry, to take the place of the first, which is now at Umritsur. The column will, thus, threaten the Noorpoor frontier districts, and be ready to march up to Lahore, in six or seven marches, via Umritsur, if Sirdar Chuttur Sing comes to the Jhelum.

My next report from Sirdar Chuttur Sing's camp will bring accounts of the effect produced by the news from Mooltan. It is, as yet, uncertain what the Sirdar's intentions are, or if he has himself determined his plans.

I fear he will, in the first instance, endeavour to get to Peshawur, and he may now do so, crossing below Attock.

Or, he may continue to occupy the countries between Rawul Pindee and the Jhelum, where his own Jagheers lie, till he has ascertained the extent to which the insurrection may be made to spread.

Or, he may put in execution his boast, and march upon Lahore; but I doubt his doing this, unless he is satisfied that Maharajah Golab Sing will openly assist him.

Or, he may march down the Sind Sagur Doab to join his son in Mooltan, with the hope of defeating our force there, and, then, marching, as a conqueror, to the capital.

How the Durbar is to carry on any operations, I know not; the treasury is nearly empty, and the collection of any revenue will be difficult, under the present circumstances.

Inclosure 47 in No. 38.

*The Adjutant-General to the Secretary to the Government of India*

*Head-quarters Simla, September 20, 1848*

IN forwarding a copy of a letter from Major-General W. S. Whish, reporting that, in consequence of Shere Sing, at the head of his whole force, having joined the enemy, he has felt himself obliged to withdraw the British troops from before Mooltan, I am desired to detail the measures, to meet the present emergency, which the Commander-in-Chief has felt himself called upon to adopt.

Her Majesty's 29th Foot, and the 31st and 56th regiments of Native Infantry, have been ordered to proceed to Mooltan, with every practicable expedition, to reinforce Major-General Whish.

With a view of assembling an army on the frontier, at the earliest possible date, in order to support the Mooltan force, and for whatever further operations circumstances may call for, the movements specified in the annexed memorandum, have been directed in this day's general orders.

The Commander-in-Chief now solicits the authority of Government, for forming the army he has ordered to assemble at Ferozepore, into divisions and brigades, and for appointing to command the same such officers as his Excellency may see fit to select for employment on this occasion; also, the usual proportion of staff officers, and establishments for the several departments.

The Commander-in-Chief recommends that every officer, absent on staff employ from a regiment taking the field, that can at all be spared, should be required to join his corps, immediately; and all medical officers holding appointments under Government, whose services can be dispensed with, should, likewise, his Excellency thinks, be directed to join the army, as soon as possible. Engineer officers of experience will, also, be urgently required with the army.

I am, again, instructed to press on the attention of Government the expediency of the army being recruited up to the former establishment of one thousand privates per regiment of infantry, and five hundred sowars per regiment of irregular cavalry, with the corresponding increase of native commissioned and non-commissioned officers.

If the civil officers were desired to make known, throughout their districts, that recruits are required, his Excellency feels persuaded that our ranks, in a very short time, would be filled to the required extent, and with the ready-trained soldiers who were discharged, with gratuity, two years ago.

Inclosure 48 in No. 38.

*The Secretary to the Government of India to the Adjutant-General.*

*Fort Wilham, September 30, 1848.*

AS the turn which affairs have now taken in the Punjab, renders it necessary that the most strenuous measures should be, immediately, taken for putting down the general insurrection, and maintaining the influence, and honor, of the British Government, I am directed to inform you that the Governor-General in Council has come to the determination that, in order to support the operations

which the Commander-in-Chief will have to conduct in the Punjab, further aid is necessary than that which is, at present, at his Excellency's command. The Governor-General in Council is, therefore, pleased to authorize an immediate augmentation of the army, by recruiting it up to the former establishment of 1,000 privates per regiment of infantry, and 500 sowars per each irregular cavalry regiment, with the corresponding increase of native commissioned and non-commissioned officers.

All the officers on staff, or civil, employ who can possibly be spared, will be directed to join their respective regiments, on the frontier, at the earliest date.

The Governments of Bengal and Agra have, also, been directed to send to the frontier all the civil surgeons whose services can be dispensed with, at their present stations.

I am directed to take this opportunity of acknowledging the receipt of your letter of the 20th instant, and to communicate the approval of the Governor-General in Council to the measures, therein proposed, for forming the army at Ferozepore into divisions and brigades, and for the selection of staff officers, and to all other measures proposed for rendering the army, about to be assembled, efficient.

Inclosure 49 in No 38.

*The Secretary to the Government of India to the Resident at Lahore*

*Fort William, October 3, 1848.*

AS may have been anticipated by you, from the earnest desire expressed by the Government, from the earliest communication made to you, after the commencement of the rebellion at Mooltan, that the fortress of Govindgurh should, in accordance with the terms of the Treaty of Bhyrowal, be occupied by British troops, the Governor-General in Council is perfectly satisfied with the intelligence now communicated to him.

The Governor-General in Council will intimate to his Excellency the Commander-in-Chief his opinion, that an adequate force of artillery should be added to the present garrison, and the utmost vigilance should be enjoined on the officer in command of the fortress.

The thanks of the Government are due to Mr Cocks for the able manner in which he has fulfilled the duty assigned to him, and to Mr. Inglis for his co-operation.

The Governor-General in Council is anxious to convey, with all speed, to Colonel Mac Sherry, the officers, and all the troops employed on this occasion, his high approval of the activity, steadiness, and good conduct displayed by them, and his full confidence that they will answer every expectation that may be formed of them.

Inclosure 50 in No 38.

*The Secretary to the Government of India to the Resident at Lahore.*

*Fort William, October 3, 1848.*

I AM directed to express the satisfaction of the Governor-General in Council, that Lieutenant Edwardes has dismissed Sirdars Shumshere Sing and others from his camp, where the Government can have no confidence in their really filling any other position than that of spies.

The Government can attach no credit, after what has passed, either to the professions, or to the apparent practice, of the Sirdars, or People, of the Punjab.

The Governor-General in Council has, therefore, to request, that no trust of any kind may be reposed in them, by you, and that you yourself will abstain, and also instruct your assistants, throughout the Punjab, to abstain, carefully, from giving any guarantee as to life, or property, which may, hereafter, tend to interfere with any measures which the Government of India may think proper to direct.

I am desired to intimate to you, that the Governor-General in Council considers the State of Lahore to be, to all intents and purposes, directly at war with the British Government, and he expects that those who may be, directly or indirectly, concerned in these proceedings, will be treated, accordingly, by yourself and your officers.

No. 39.

*The Governor-General to the Secret Committee.*

*On the river, off Dinapore, November 1, 1848 (No. 2)*

THE chief events to which I would now call your attention are the successful revolt of the Sikh troops in Bunnoo, and the departure of Raja Shere Sing with his force, from Mooltan, to join his father, Chuttur Sing. The Bunnoo troops, after murdering the Mahomedan Governor, Futteh Khan Towannah, and Colonel John Holmes (of the Sikh army), at first, agreed with Moolraj's emissaries to proceed to Mooltan. "Afterwards," Sir F. Currie states, "special messengers arrived from Sirdar Chuttur Sing, with a letter from himself, stating that they (the Bunnoo troops) would not find Raja Shere Sing at Mooltan, that all the Sikhs from Mooltan and elsewhere, were to assemble, and fight the battle of Khalsa independence, in the neighbourhood of Lahore, and urging them, either to march towards Lahore, or to join him, at once, near Attock. After some consideration, it was determined to join Chuttur Sing, and the 17th of October was fixed on, as the day of departure from Bunnoo." Sirdar Chuttur Sing's force, joined by the Bunnoo troops, will consist, it is said, of ten battalions of infantry, averaging about 500 each, with about thirty guns, and 1,100 regular cavalry, and Raja Shere Sing's force is 5,000 men, with twelve guns. Captain Abbott, on the 11th of October, represented that Chuttur Sing was making every attempt to cross the Indus, and effect a junction with the troops in Peshawur.

From intercepted correspondence, it appears that Shere Sing left Mooltan, under instructions from his father, who tells him to meet him at Goojerat, where, according to the letters, there is to be a grand gathering of the Sikhs, and a junction with the troops of Maharajah Golab Sing. The last accounts from Lahore, dated the 23rd of October, represent Shere Sing to have made a bolder advance than was anticipated, as he is moving his cavalry in the direction of Sheikhoopoor, with the apparent intention of covering the march of his infantry up the left bank of the Chenab, he will, probably, however, re-cross the river, immediately he learns that the Resident is prepared to detach a brigade against him from Lahore, and that reinforcements are, already, on the march from Ferozepore.

Respecting the complexion of Maharajah Golab Sing's conduct, and the prevailing rumours of his secret hostility to the British, I would refer you to Sir F. Currie's letter\* of the 6th ultimo. You will observe that, as yet, there is no evidence of any treacherous act, on the part of the Maharajah. The British Government, however, has a right to demand from him something more than neutrality. He has been lavish in professions of cordial friendship, and the Resident has assented to put those professions to a test which the Maharajah has himself proposed, namely, that he shall send a force against Chuttur Sing.

Major Lawrence holds his position at Peshawur, but he, evidently, regards it as a very precarious one. In the last letter received from him, dated the 13th ultimo, he urges an immediate advance upon Peshawur, lest the force there, "the best disciplined and equipped of the Khalsa army, amounting to nearly 9,000 men, with thirty field-guns, be arrayed against us, to say nothing of our having also to take the nine forts in this province."

You will observe, from the dispatches of the Bombay Government, the measures which they have taken for organizing a field force at Roree, to assist in the operations against Mooltan. The siege will be re-commenced upon the arrival of that force at Mooltan.



## Inclosure 1 in No. 39.

*Major Edwardes to the Resident at Lahore.*

*Camp, Sooraj Koond, September 22, 1848.*

APPENDED to this letter is one out of the many incendiary proclamations, with which Raja Shere Sing, Attareewalla, and his accomplices, ever since their own desertion to the enemy, have been endeavouring to seduce those troops in my camp, which are still faithful to the real interests of Maharajah Duleep Sing

The following is a literal translation of the document

*Proclamation.*

TO all the officers of the Scpoys, and Sikhs, and Mussulmans, and regiments, all others that eat the salt of the Sovereign of the Khalsa, Maharajah Duleep Sing Bahadoor, such for instance as Sheik Emamooddeen, and Jowahir Mull Dutt, and General Cortlandt Sahib Bahadoor, and Colonel Budri Nath, and Soobhan Khan, and Commandant Lahora Sing, &c &c

A religious war being now on foot, it becomes every public servant, whether he be Sikh or Moslem, at sight of this document, to march, without delay, and join the camp of the Khalsa, along with Raja Shere Sing Bahadoor and Dewan Moolraj, in the work of eradicating the Feringees from this country of the Punjab

1st For their own religion's sake.

2nd. For the salt they have eaten

3rd. For the sake of fair fame in this world.

4th. For promotion's sake.

5th For love of the Jagheers and dignities which are to be obtained  
And whoever shall not join in this religious war,

1st. He is unfaithful to the salt of the Sirkar.

2nd An outcast from religion

3rd. Worthy of any punishment that may be inflicted on him.

(N.B.—Sealed by Raja Shere Sing, Dewan Moolraj, Sirdar Khooshal Sing, Morareea and others)

The pithiness of this effusion is only equalled by the art with which it addresses itself to both the good, and the bad, feelings of native soldiery, and it is necessary that it should be counteracted, at once. I would gladly have referred the matter to you, but the danger is immediate, and the mischief might be done, in the interim of my writing, and receiving your reply.

The defection of Raja Shere Sing's force has already obliged General Whish, to raise the siege of Mooltan. A further defection of three regular infantry regiments, and seventeen guns, would, perhaps, compel him to retreat altogether, which could only be considered as a disaster

Under these circumstances, I have thought it my bounden duty to take on myself, the very great responsibility of assuring all the regular troops of Maharajah Duleep Sing, now under my command, that, if the conduct of the Sikh nation should oblige the British Government to declare the treaty null and void, and to annex the Punjab to Hindostan, every soldier who, to the last, shall have faithfully performed his duty to the Maharajah, shall pass, as a matter of course, into the service of our Government, and enjoy the same privileges as he does now.

I beg to assure you, that I have not been induced to take this step from observing the smallest sign of disaffection in the troops alluded to. In their conduct, whether in the camp, or in the field, during two years' intimate acquaintance with these regiments, under very trying circumstances of fatigue and exposure, I have seen nothing but the most cheerful endurance and soldier-like subordination; and it was these very qualities which prevented me, now, from hesitating as to how I should act towards them; for, if our frontiers necessarily be extended, and this large country be taken, still more closely, under

our charge, the local knowledge and rough-and-ready qualities of these troops will make them invaluable to us as frontier locals, if not in the line

One of the three regiments (Soobhan Khan's Mussulman Pultun) has a peculiar claim to our protection; having accompanied General Pollock's army to Cabool, and done good service there.

The other two regiments are chiefly men of our own provinces, raised, drilled, and disciplined, by General Cortlandt, in the same manner as our own sepoy.

For honorable testimony to the conduct of them, I would refer to Major-General Whish, or any British officer in the Mooltan field force.

Inclosure 2 in No 39

*The Resident at Lahore to Major Edwardes.*

*Lahore, September 27, 1848.*

IN consideration of the late excellent service which has been rendered by General Cortlandt, and his regiments, and artillery, during the whole period of these disturbances, and especially in the hard-fought battles of the 18th of June and the 1st of July last, and in reference to the present state of revolt of nearly the whole Durbar army, you were justified in giving to General Cortlandt, and the corps under him, the assurance described in your letter; and I have no hesitation, as the representative of the British Government in these provinces, in confirming the pledge you have made to these corps, on the conditions you have prescribed

I am quite satisfied that the Governor-General in Council will ratify this promise. The British Government will act justly, and will always make a marked distinction between those who serve them, and those who serve them not: on this occasion, faithful service will stand contrasted with treachery and perfidy of the deepest dye; and the British Government will make the reward of both, signal and exemplary.

Upon the conduct of the Durbar troops in Peshawur, the preservation of the lives of the British officers, as well as the possession of the province, depends. I have promised to all of them who remain faithful at this crisis, a full protection of their interests, and the benefits of their service. I consider the redemption of this promise incumbent on me, whatever may be the determination of the Government, as to the future administration of the Punjab.

The Sikh soldiers of the old régime can never again be trusted; and I must say that, to my knowledge, Raja Tej Sing said, two years ago, and has always adhered to the opinion, that it was less dangerous, and would prove less embarrassing, to disband them all, and raise a new army, than to continue a man of them in service. But there are, in the Punjab, excellent materials for forming superior regiments, and, as irregulars, under British officers, the most valuable, and efficient, and perfectly trustworthy, corps, may be organized. Those who remain faithful now, may be thus disposed of, if the Government should determine on the measure you contemplate, and, under all circumstances, service such as has been rendered by General Cortlandt's regiments, will be appreciated, and rewarded, by a just and grateful Government.

Inclosure 3 in No. 39.

*The Resident at Lahore to Major Lawrence.*

*Lahore, September 29, 1848.*

THE position of yourself, and the British officers with you, in Peshawur, is a cause of deep anxiety to me.

The admirable arrangements you have made, the influence you have established over the troops, and the excellent conduct of Sirdar Golab Sing, Powindea, and his son and deputy, Colonel Alla Sing, have enabled you, hitherto, to prevent the insurrectionary movement which has spread in different parts of the Punjab, during the last six months, from affecting the tranquillity of the

province of Peshawur, or materially affecting the subordination of the Durbar troops

For this, you deserve the highest praise, and your colleagues, Native and European, the warm acknowledgments of the British Government

But the recent conduct of Raja Shere Sing, with many smaller Sirdars, and the whole of the troops with them at Mooltan, in going over to the rebel Moolraj, for the purpose of aiding the rebellion set afoot by Sirdar Chuttur Sing, in Hazara, and the general defection of the Sikh troops, make your position more than ever difficult, and render it highly probable that your efforts to keep the Sikh troops in Peshawur to their allegiance, will not be much longer successful

I have every confidence in your judgment, energy, and determination, and I am satisfied that whatever can be done, you will effect, but I consider it right to give you such instructions as I can, for your guidance, in the case of your failure

These instructions can only be general, and I must leave the carrying of them out, very much to your discretion

You were placed at Peshawur, by the late Governor-General, as I understand, to superintend the civil and military administration of the province, on the part of the Durbar, it being deemed of great importance that that province should remain as part of the Lahore territories, and should not be allowed, either by the remissness, or through the intrigues, of the Durbar Governors, to fall into the occupation of the Barukzye Affghans

If the Sikh troops in Peshawur revolt, they will, probably, leave the province, and, in that case, there will be little prospect of any arrangement you can make, preventing the occupation of Peshawur, by the Affghans, from beyond the Khyber, if they take advantage, as they doubtless will, of its defenceless state, to re-establish their possession. You should, however, make the best arrangements with the Urbobs or others, that you can

Perhaps, if Sirdar Chuttur Sing proceeds to Peshawur, and is joined by the Sikh troops there, he may endeavour to retain it for himself, under the idea of establishing for him self a principality from the Indus to the Jhelum

In either case, your remaining at Peshawur, after the revolt of the Durbar troops, should such occur, would seem of little avail, and, directly you find that your exertions are no longer likely to effect the purpose for which you were sent to Peshawur, you should take measures for securing your own safety, and that of the persons, especially European British subjects, attached to your agency, and proceeding to Lahore, or such other place as may be most likely to afford you a secure refuge

Inclosure 4 in No. 39.

*The Resident at Lahore to the Secretary with the Governor-General.*

*Lahore, September 30, 1848.*

RAJA DEENA NATH wrote to me, daily, while on his mission to Hazara. It was very soon evident to me, that Sirdar Chuttur Sing did not intend to give the Raja an amicable meeting, although, to gain time, perhaps, for his ulterior purposes, and that he might learn the result of the Mooltan operations, before proceeding to greater lengths, he caused evasive answers, and promises, never intended to be fulfilled, to be sent to the Raja

Sirdar Chuttur Sing would have been glad to secure the person of Deena Nath, had the latter given him an opportunity. He would, then, have used every endeavour to make the Raja join the rebel cause (if he be not, as Captain Abbott declares he is, already in its interest), and, failing that, he would have considered him a kind of hostage, whereby, eventually, he might make terms for himself; and he would, under all circumstances, have given out that Raja Deena Nath was associated with him, to induce others to join in the rebellion

The Raja was fully aware of Sirdar Chuttur Sing's purposes, and he avoided the line of road on which the Sirdar's adherents were posted, and the country occupied by his dependents; and, taking a route to the south-

ward, pushed on as far as Chuckowal, whence he put himself in communication with Major Lawrence at Peshawur, Captain Nicholson at Futtch Jhung, and Captain Abbott at Nara.

His presence, in that part of the country, had the effect of assuring the inhabitants, and he certainly appears to have used his influence, in every way, to defeat the machinations of Sirdar Chuttur Sing.

When the news of Raja Shere Sing's open defection reached me, I considered the time for negotiation entirely at an end, and I recalled Raja Deena Nath to Lahore.

Since his return, he appears to have entered, zealously, and earnestly, into the measures adopted for punishing the rebels by the confiscation of their Jagheers, and the attachment of their houses and property, and for counter-acting the plots of the insurgents.

But there is no doubt whatever his views and feelings may be regarding this conspiracy, that he is disaffected towards the British Government, as I have constantly reported. Still, in this rebellion, set up by the Attareewallas, I have no reason to believe him to be, in any way, concerned.

It was reported to me, two days ago, and I consider the authority quite trustworthy, that Deena Nath remarked, in the Durbar at the palace, to Raja Tej Sing, that the Sikhs were uniting and combining so generally, that it appeared they were determined to try to make this another Cabool business, and that there was this in their favor, that they had a powerful artillery, whereas the Affghans had no guns. The remark was, of course, not without a purpose.

P S.—While this letter was being copied, Raja Deena Nath came to the residency, with a letter which had been written to him by Raja Shere Sing, dated the 15th of September, telling him, that he had joined Moolraj, and that the whole of the Sikh nation was banded together, as one man, to get rid of the "scoundrels," meaning the English, and exhorting the Raja to join Chuttur Sing, and march, with the victorious Khalsa, to Lahore.

The messenger, the bearer of this letter, had also a number of proclamations, of the tenor already reported, and purwannas to the Peshawur troops. He was seized by one of the only loyal Durbar officials in this country, who sent the other papers to me, and the letter to Deena Nath. Deena Nath, immediately, brought it to me. It would have been more satisfactory if the letter had reached the Raja, in a more secret manner, and he had, then, brought it. He must have known, that I should hear of a letter having been sent him. The affair proves nothing regarding Deena Nath either one way, or the other.

Inclosure 5 in No. 39.

*Major Laurence to the Resident at Lahore.*

*Peshawur, October 2, 1848.*

WITH deep regret, I have to report the murder, by the Sikh troops at Bunnoo, of Colonel John Holmes, their commandant.

For some days, it has been rumoured in the city; to-day, it is confirmed by the arrival of one of his servants, who says that his master's tent was pitched in the centre of the camp, with six sentries round it; that, at night, (informant is not clear as to the date) a large party of armed Sikhs, unchallenged by the sentries, entered the tent, and deliberately shot the Colonel, and cut off his head.

On the intelligence reaching Futtch Khan Towannah, who is within the inner fort, he had the gates closed, and opened a fire on the Sikh troops; of two artillerymen who refused to work the guns, one was killed by Futtch Khan, and the hands of the other cut off.

The Khan is said to have lost no time in raising the Mahomedan population, who have beleagured the Sikhs, to the amount of many thousands; many men, it is reported, have been killed on both sides; among them, the leader of the murderers of the poor Colonel.

The Sikhs are said to be without ammunition, and already straitened for supplies; it is supposed few will escape

Futteh Khan's position is said to be impregnable, but he has a scarcity of water, and what he has, is brackish

P.S.—I have directed Sirdar Sooltan Mohamed to take measures for opposing the passage of any Sikhs, from Bunnoo via Kohat

Inclosure 6 in No 39

*The Resident at Lahore to the Secretary with the Governor-General*

*Lahore, October 4, 1848.*

SIRDAR CHUTTUR SING was still at Huripore \*

Captain Abbott writes of expecting that the Sirdar will attack his position at Nara, and he seems confident that, if the Sirdar does so, he can repulse him with heavy loss. He, moreover, says that, if the Sirdar is defeated in the attack, the rebellion will be at an end

This last supposition is not reconcilable with the statements regarding the extensive ramifications of the plot, and the almost universal participation of chiefs, troops, and people in Chuttur Sing's conspiracy

Whatever Sirdar Chuttur Sing's rebellion may have arisen from, or whoever may have been his partisans hitherto, there seems little doubt that disaffection throughout the country is so general, and so many means have been employed to turn this disaffection to account at this time, that a very general insurrection is about to develop itself, and the mere putting down of Chuttur Sing, in Hazara, would not go very far to restore order

The truth seems to be, that there was a very general conspiracy set afoot by the Maharanee, last cold weather, which, had the Mooltan outbreak not taken place when it did, and as it did, and had it not been followed by the circumstances which subsequently occurred, the Maharanee might have brought to maturity.

There has been, from the period of our occupation, a very general spirit of disaffection pervading the length and breadth of the land, and affecting particularly the army and the disbanded soldiery but shared in by all the Hindoo, and some part of the Mahomedan, population of the Punjab, with the exception only of the poorer classes

Any rebellion that might arise, in any quarter, was sure to find many adherents, and extensive sympathy, though, owing to the extraordinary distrust of all parties towards one another, conflicting interests, jealousies, animosities, family feuds, personal enmities, and the like, a combined and comprehensive rebellion, or insurrection, after the departure of the Maharanee, was of difficult accomplishment

Sirdar Chuttur Sing's rebellion was, in the first instance, a personal affair, I believe. He had been a party to the Maharanee's plans, and in her confidence, and he wished to work out her scheme. The reports that were brought to Captain Abbott, regarding the wide spread conspiracy, had reference, I suspect, to the Maharanee's affair, and were true in themselves, but their application was erroneous

Chuttur Sing is a man of no influence. The family is not one of distinction; and the branch of it to which he belongs, was never recognised in Maharajah Runjeet Sing's time. The family, moreover, has not wealth. Sirdar Chuttur Sing and his sons were raised to their present position, by the arrangements of Lieutenant-Colonel Lawrence, with the approbation of the British Government. The family is unpopular with the chiefs, and the old adherents of Runjeet Sing, as being upstarts, and the creatures of the British Government. They are unpopular with the army, as the murderers of Peshora Sing, and the friends of Maharajah Golab Sing; and they have no weight with the people, as being without wealth, and having the character of being oppressive landlords in the Jagheers, which were bestowed on them, at the instance of the Resident.

\* He marched, as I hear this morning, on the 30th, in the direction of Hussan Abdul. His destination was not known.—F. C., October 5.

It is, on these accounts, that Chuttur Sing's rebellion has not made more head, and become more early formidable. To this day, no Sirdar has joined him, and he has only the Hazara force, and the levies he has raised from his estates, with about 700 Sikhs (mutinous troops) of Maharajah Golab Sing's, and some thousands of the old disbanded soldiery, ever ready to join in any rebellion, or insurrection of any kind.

It was some time after Chuttur Sing revolted, before his son, Raja Shere Sing, made up his mind to follow his example; and, when he could no longer resist his father's importunities, he intended to go off to Hazara, and join him. He was surrounded, at Mooltan, with disaffected parties, who were most of them willing to enter into any plot against British interests. At first, the lesser Sirdars, and the portion of the troops he consulted, agreed to go with him, to Hazara; but, on the evening of the 13th ultimo, they set before him the difficulty of crossing the river, with the British army close by, the certainty of the other Sirdars giving immediate intelligence to Lieutenant Edwardes, the distance they must travel, the low state of their funds, and the service which would be rendered to the cause, by their joining Moolraj in Mooltan. He, then, agreed to go to Mooltan, and wrote, on a separate slip of paper, the new determination, to be put in force in the morning and put it into the cover of his letter, which he had already written, to his brother, Sirdar Golab Sing, at Lahore. Translation of this letter and the postscript was sent with my dispatch of the 18th ultimo.\*

The Raja was not expected by Moolraj, and the reception he has met with, has been anything but pleasant. Moolraj does not trust him, or the troops he has brought with him. They are put to harassing duties, and no pay has been served out to them. It is demanded of them, as a proof of their sincerity, that they go forth and attack the British position, Moolraj's army accompanying. They have twice sallied forth with this avowed purpose but have, both times, returned, without going a mile from the gates of the town. It is fully expected that Raja Shere Sing will make his escape from Mooltan, and go off to Hazara. Nearly a third of the troops that went with him to Mooltan, have already deserted, and gone to their homes.

Moolraj will take care that Shere Sing does not carry away with him, if he deserts, the guns he took with him to Mooltan. He is adding to his numbers, daily, by Sikhs from the Manjha, and other parts of the Punjab.

While this is the state of things in Hazara and Mooltan, disaffection and insurrection are spreading through the other districts of the Punjab, more or less, in connexion with the Hazara rebellion, and consequent upon it; and the Durbar is powerless to prevent this being the case, as all the instruments which are provided by the State revenues for the maintenance of order, are the very parties most ready to oppose the administration.

The inflammatory proclamations of Raja Shere Sing calling on the army and the Khalsa to rise, and unite, for the purpose of destroying the British officers, or expelling them from the Punjab, appealing to their religious feelings and prejudices, which are described as having been outraged by us, while the extermination of the Sikh race has been our object, have been sent, throughout all the districts, and they have caused the greatest excitement. Counter proclamations, by the Durbar, and the Sirdars who have not joined in the rebellion, setting forth the falsehood of the Attarcwalla's assertions, and the treachery, and destructive tendency, of their proceedings, have been put forth, but the people are bent on mischief, and on proceedings which must end in the utter ruin of the Sikh power.

The regiments in Bunnoo have revolted. They have murdered the only remaining European attached to the Sikh force, Colonel John Holmes, a most respectable officer, and a very old servant of the Sikh Government. They were investing the fort of Duleepgurh, in which was the Mahomedan Governor, Futteh Khan Towannah, when I last heard, and were themselves invested in turn by the vuziers of the hills, and the Bunnoochees, who had come to Futteh Khan's aid. I am anxious about the result. There are in Bunnoo, four regiments of infantry, 500 cavalry, and six horse artillery, and four heavy guns.

If they succeed in destroying Futteh Khan Towannah, and in beating off his allies, they will, most probably, march across the Sind Sagur Doab, to the aid of the rebels in Mooltan, and the example will have the worst effect on the troops in Peshawur.

The occupation of Govindgurbh, the appearance of Brigadier Wheeler on the Beas, and the belief that a large army is on its way to Lahore, have had the effect of keeping the country, between the Chenab and the Sutlej, comparatively quiet, hitherto. If the army, or any portion of it, were to enter the Punjab now, we should have little trouble on this side of the Jhelum, or on the other side of the Attock.

Inclosure 7 in No. 39

*The Adjutant-General to the Secretary of the Government of India*

Simla, October 4, 1848.

I HAVE the honor, by direction of the Commander-in-Chief, to transmit, for the information of the Governor-General of India in Council, a copy of a dispatch, of the 25th ultimo, from Brigadier C. Campbell, C B, commanding the Punjab division, forwarding a letter from Brevet Major S. Fisher\*, commanding a detachment of troops, in which he reports having dispersed, near Noorpoor, a band of marauders, under a leader of the name of Ram Sing.

A casualty return of the detachment is inclosed, and I am directed to state that Major Fisher has been informed that his Excellency considers the conduct of the troops employed to have been highly creditable.

Inclosure 8 in No. 39

*The Resident at Lahore to the Secretary with the Governor-General.*

Lahore, October 6, 1848.

THE Attareewallas have, of late, somewhat ostentatiously paraded the name of Maharajah Golab Sing, in all their inflammatory proclamations, which declare that the Maharajah is associated with them, in their insurrection against British aggression, and for the purpose of preserving the Sikh religion, and preventing the extermination of the Sikh race.

I have intercepted letters of Sirdar Chuttur Sing to other parties, in which the same assertion is made of the Maharajah's complicity.

Besides the universal belief, and the assertions of the rebels, there is, against the Maharajah, the fact of one whole regiment of infantry, with the exception of the officers, and 250 men of another regiment, hitherto in the service of the Maharajah, having joined Sirdar Chuttur Sing.

The Maharajah is also at this time, and has, for the last six weeks, been raising new levies extensively at Jummoo, and in other parts of his territories.

In the late disturbance on the hill frontier of the Jullundur district, most of the adherents of the rebel Ram Sing were inhabitants of the Jummoo territory.

These are facts which appear in respect to the Maharajah, in support of the universal assertion, and apparent belief, that His Highness is deeply concerned in all that has taken place, and is now in action.

I have addressed khurreetas to the Maharajah, as to the above circumstances, setting before him, in plain terms, all that is said about him, and sending him the documents, or copies of them, in which His Highness' name is mentioned as being a party to the proceedings alluded to, and I have had many serious conversations on the subject, with Dewan Nihal Chund, the confidant of the Maharajah, whom His Highness had sent to be with me, at this time.

In all his letters and communications, and in all his outward conduct, and in the attention paid to all my suggestions or instructions, the Maharajah has, in no respect, failed in performing the part of a friendly ally, and well-affected neighbour. It is but just to His Highness to give this testimony to his conduct, as a set-off against the universal belief of disaffection I have described.

Nihal Chund, on the part of the Maharajah, protests that the assertions of the Attareewallas are false, and are set forth, partly, in the hope of injuring him with the British Government, and out of enmity because he has refused the aid they have required of him, and, partly, to give importance, and weight, and influence, to their cause. It must be confessed that the very public and

\* Inclosure 41 in No. 38.

ostentatious introduction of the Maharajah's name, is a circumstance somewhat in favor of the Maharajah's innocence; if he is concerned, he would, it is to be thought, take care that the fact should not be proclaimed, before he is ready to declare himself, which is not, it appears, yet the case.

The fact mentioned in paragraph 4, appears, at first sight, to afford a strong proof of the Maharajah's disaffection, and to furnish, at any rate, ground for demanding a serious explanation from him. His reply is very plausible, and not very easily answered though I am far from allowing that the Maharajah is altogether free from blame in the matter, and that the Government have not cause for dissatisfaction with His Highness even by his own showing.

Meean Runbeer Sing, the Maharajah's son, and the Governor of Jummoo, sent me word, some time ago, that a Sikh regiment of the Maharajah's, stationed at Meerpore, had mutinied, and had gone off to Sirdar Chuttur Sing, at Hazara, the officers, and some dogras, to the number of 30 or 35, having separated from the mutineers, and gone to report the circumstance to the Maharajah, at Cashmere. Subsequently, from 250 to 300 Sikhs of another regiment did the same, and a similar report was made.

I wrote very strongly to Meean Runbeer Sing, and to the Maharajah, telling him, that the British Government would hold him responsible for the conduct of his troops, and that an act of hostility, on their part, would be looked on as one on his, and directing him to recall the troops that had left his territory.

At this juncture, Dewan Nihal Chund, the Maharajah's confidant, was sent off to me, from Cashmere.

The statement made to me by the Maharajah, in writing, and through Nihal Chund, was to the effect that, on the Maharajah taking possession of Cashmere, Lieutenant-Colonel Lawrence proposed to him to entertain in his service a part of the Sikh soldiery lately disbanded, and in the process of being paid off, and disbanded, at Lahore; that the Maharajah protested against the measure, stating that he had no confidence in the Sikh soldiers, that they would never do him good service, or remain subordinate to proper authority, and that he was desirous to have nothing whatever to do with them, but his objections were over-ruled by Colonel Lawrence, who said that so many of the Khalsa army being thrown out of employment would have an injurious effect, and all would be disheartened; and that it was the wish of the Governor-General that His Highness should entertain from 3,000 to 5,000 of them in the army, which he would have to raise, for his new possessions in Cashmere, that he, the Maharajah, thus urged by Colonel Lawrence, and his protest being over-ruled, consented to entertain 3,000 Sikhs, but warned Colonel Lawrence that they would be a perpetual source of embarrassment to him, while they remained, and would certainly join the first rebellion, or disturbance, that should occur. For the truth of these statements, he appealed to the khurreetas which passed at the time between Colonel Lawrence and himself, on record in the Residency Office. In all this, the Maharajah states no more than is fact.

The Maharajah, moreover, states that, in the exchange of Hazara with the Durbar last year, and on that province being transferred to the Lahore Government, he took the opportunity to get rid of 1,500 of his Sikh soldiers, still retaining the other 1,500 for a time, but fully intending to get rid of them also;

That, on the occurrence of the outbreak in Mooltan, he considered that it would not be proper of him to disband any more men, at that time, as the dismissed men would, in all probability, go to Mooltan to join Moolraj.

That he continued to keep all right, with the exception of a few desertions, or attempted desertions, all of which, he said, he had reported to me, until the rebellion in Hazara, when Sirdar Chuttur Sing, having applied to him for aid, and been refused, sent emissaries among the Sikh troops of his army, offering them 9 rupees per month, and other advantages, if they would come over to him, when one regiment of 440 men, which was on the frontier, before he could make arrangements for preventing it, mutinied, leaving their officers, who were all dogras, behind, and went off to Sirdar Chuttur Sing; the officers immediately reported this to Jummoo, and themselves went to the Maharajah at

That, on learning the above occurrence, from 250 to 300 Sikhs of another regiment followed the example of their countrymen, above described;

That, on hearing this, the Maharajah gave immediate orders for disarming,



and keeping under surveillance in the hills, all the remaining Sikhs in his service, till the present disturbances were at an end, when he proposed, with my permission, discharging them all;

That all these circumstances, as they had occurred, had been immediately reported to me

Admitting what the Maharajah says, regarding the mutineers, to be true, and that he in no way connived at them, I cannot consider him altogether excused, as knowing, as he says, the disposition of these troops, he might have made arrangements, beforehand, for preventing their defection, or, at any rate, for their leaving his territories, through his district officers

The general impression is, that the troops had intimation given to them to desert, and Captain Abbott has asserted that they mutinied, by orders from Cashmere, but, of this assertion he has given no proof. On the contrary, in a late letter, he appears to acquit the Maharajah of all blame in the matter, and so does Captain Nicholson, whom I desired to make all possible inquiry on the subject.

In regard to the raising of new levies, at this time, the vakeel states that the Maharajah is forming three new regiments, in place of the Sikh corps, and for service in Poonch and Chebul, where there are disturbances, but, as the circumstance has attracted attention, he states that he has directed that the enlistment shall not be further prosecuted at this time

In regard to the fact stated in paragraph six, Mr John Lawrence seems to think that the Maharajah's officers were not in the first instance, to blame, and he is satisfied with the exertions subsequently made by them, for co-operating with the troops sent against Ram Sing, and for seizing the fugitives who have taken refuge in the Jummoo territory

I confess that I have, at times, been staggered by the positive statements made to me, of the Maharajah's complicity, and been led almost to believe that they must be true, though, as his Lordship is aware, I have invariably admitted this approach to belief, with much hesitation

I have, as I said above, set before the Maharajah, and his vakeel, the facts which have appeared against him. I have not kept from him the statements made by all parties about him, and I have explained to him that it is his duty and his interest, to let his conduct, at this juncture, be such as to stop the mouths of his calumniators, if they are such, and to show the whole country that his enemies have belied him

The Maharajah and his vakeel are earnest in their protestations of friendship, but they admit that words, without deeds, cannot be expected to satisfy the British Government.

I submit, with this dispatch, a late khurreeta from the Maharajah, and my reply

It will be seen that I have permitted the Maharajah, at his request, to assemble a force, and send it against Sirdar Chuttur Sing, under the command of his son, Runbeer Sing. This will bring the Raja's conduct, if not his disposition, to the proof, and we shall have the advantage of learning, whether we are to look upon him, in the coming operations, as friend, or foe. The knowledge of the fact is, I consider, of far more importance to us than the fact itself

I have made the Maharajah's khurreeta, and my reply, known throughout the Punjab and the adjoining provinces. The language of the khurreeta is most explicit and unequivocal (in the original more so than in the English translation); his protest, and his declarations of obligations and gratitude, are before the world, and, if he proves false, he is altogether without excuse

Inclosure 9 in No. 39

*Maharajah Golab Sing to the Resident at Lahore*

· YOU are well acquainted with my friendship and regard for you, from which I would hope that you will not heed any injurious reports which may be circulated, by evil-disposed persons, to my injury. My whole force is ready to act, in any way that may be desired by the British Government; and any service you may require at my hands, I am ready, and most anxious, to perform. Do not, I beg of you, let the idea enter your mind that I am, in any way, friendly to the

cause of Chuttur Sing. I esteem the enemies of the British Government mine own, and am ever ready to oppose them as such.

Should you permit it, I will take the field against the rebel Chuttur Sing, previously to the arrival of the British forces, and will take measures for inflicting on the traitor such punishment as will hold out a warning to others how they follow so iniquitous an example

The reports that malicious tongues have circulated concerning me, I assure you to be false.

My confidant, Nihal Chund, has, doubtless, informed you how falsely, and faithlessly, many of the Sikhs have behaved, and I hope you give credence to his words.

By the British Government I am protected, and upheld, and to it I look for support and countenance in all things. How then can it be believed that I should engage in any matter which would be displeasing to you who are my protector?

It has been a source of great pleasure and satisfaction to me, to know that you pay no attention, or credence, to the empty tales of calumnious persons.

I am most anxious for a speedy reply to this letter, pray send me your instructions, quickly.

Inclosure 10 in No. 39.

*The Resident at Lahore to Maharajah Golab Sing.*

YOUR letter, containing expressions of friendship, and fidelity, to the British Government, assurances of your being not only not implicated in the treachery of Chuttur Sing, the traitor, but of your readiness to undertake his chastisement, and to take the field for that purpose, if required, has reached me, and its contents have given me great gratification

From Dewan Nihal Chund, personally, also I have received full confirmation of your friendly disposition toward the British Government. He has assured me that you consider its enemies as your own, and that it is your wish to act solely for the furtherance of its interests

With the general progress of affairs here, and elsewhere, Dewan Nihal Chund will have kept you acquainted, in his letters

I feel assured that you will not, in any way, engage, or implicate yourself, in proceedings detrimental to the interests of the British Government

While conversing with Dewan Nihal Chund, regarding the punishment of the traitor Chuttur Sing, I said, in reply to a proposition from him, that "If you (the Maharajah), to put an end to the reports circulated to your injury, by evil-disposed persons, to the effect that you were implicated in the rebellion of Chuttur Sing, and well-affected towards him, should, communicating with Captain Abbott, take measures for the suppression, and chastisement, of the aforesaid Chuttur Sing, the fact would be placed beyond a doubt, that you, so far from favoring, were ready, and anxious, to put down the nefarious proceedings of the "Attarees," and that the reports of your calumniators would be proved false, and their mouths closed for ever, further, that you would enjoy the credit of being a faithful ally to the British Government, in supporting its interests, and treating its enemies as your own, the hearing of which would be to me a source of the greatest satisfaction.

To your proposition of sending a force to punish, and suppress, Chuttur Sing, previous to the arrival of the British forces, there is no objection; and, by such a step, you will yet more clearly prove the falsehood of those who may have reported that you favored, either personally, or by the presence of any of your adherents in his service, the cause of the traitor Chuttur Sing

## Inclosure 11 in No. 39.

*The Resident at Lahore to the Secretary with the Governor-General.**Lahore, October 8, 1848.*

THE festival of the Dussera has passed, at Lahore, without any disturbance

There was a strong impression in the minds of the townspeople, that it was intended to take advantage of the gathering, and the ceremonies, which take place, on this occasion, to make an attack on the Court party, or on some British officer, which was to be the signal for a general émeute

Many persons who professed to be informed of the popular intention, evidently believed this also. but I doubt very much if such a plan was ever contemplated; at any rate, the precautions taken, and most judiciously carried out, by Brigadier Campbell, C B., commanding the force, defeated any scheme of the sort, if it was entertained

The Durbar, on the occasion of the Dussera, which is attended by the Resident and all his assistants, and at which all the courtiers, and court officials, of any rank and class, make offerings to the Maharajah, and which is sometimes a scene of much confusion, and crowding, and noise was conducted with the utmost decorum.

The citadel, and palace, being now in our hands, the guards at the gates admitted only such persons as were declared entitled to admission, by persons stationed, on the part of the Durbar, at the gates

Two companies of Her Majesty's 53rd Foot were on duty in the palace, and a squadron of Her Majesty's 14th Light Dragoons, a portion of which formed my escort. These preserved order, and the Durbar, though very fully attended, was free from all confusion, or disturbance

After the Durbar, the Maharajah visited the palace, where the Dussera ceremonies are concluded, at a short distance from the city, just beyond the course of the Parade-ground.

On the Parade-ground, two regiments of infantry, a troop of horse artillery, a squadron of Her Majesty's 14th, and one of irregular cavalry, were drawn up. The Maharajah, on passing these, was saluted by a discharge of twenty-one guns from our batteries; and the formidable array, prepared to put down any riot that might occur in the mass of people assembled beyond the Parade, had the effect of keeping all perfectly quiet. The Maharajah, after proceeding to look at the scene, and to receive a salute from two of his own guns, lent to them for the occasion, returned to the palace, and the large crowd dispersed, in a far more orderly manner than usual.

The occupation by our troops of the palace, and citadel, gives us perfect command of the town, which we have not, hitherto, had; by a judicious arrangement, regarding which the superintending engineer and the brigadier are now in communication, by means of the works we now occupy, we could hold, and command, the city far more effectually, than we do at present, and release, at least, three regiments of native infantry, now scattered in small parties, round the extensive wall, and at the distant gateways.

## Inclosure 12 in No. 39.

*Major Edwardes to the Resident at Lahore.**Camp, Sooraj Koond, October 10, 1848.*

RAJA Shere Sing marched, with all his force, from Mooltan, to a place called Gaggera, ten coss to the north-east, yesterday morning before dawn.

I should have reported this officially yesterday, but that it was uncertain whether the Raja had made a *bond fide* departure, or was only beginning with Moolraj to draw the British troops into a snare. The question has been settled, by his continuing his march at midnight, and reaching Sirdarpoor, where he intended to cross the Ravee. It is reported, however, that Moolraj had seized, and pushed off, his boats, and that the Raja is now inclined to follow the

advice of many of his Sikh followers, who are anxious to remove the scene of war to the Manjha, where they can, at once, protect their homes from confiscation, and recruit their ranks.

There are some few timid spirits who secretly advise Raja Shere Sing to make his peace with the British, even at the eleventh hour; and one ~~huskara~~ from his camp states, that the propriety of going to Lahore, and ~~making~~ submission to you, was discussed in open coutehery. If any such discussion took place, it could only be as a blind to conceal more dangerous designs; but I am inclined to think the Raja's plan is, to join his father in Hazara, and, unitedly, arrange a plan of future operations.

Baba Malee Sing's Sikh sowars are said to have made their escape from Mooltan, this morning, and to have joined Shere Sing's camp at Sirdarpoor.

The presence of Raja Shere Sing was very irksome to Moolraj, who, from the first day, distrusted the motives of his defection. He was, also, constantly afraid of the Sikh force exacting rewards from him; a demand which his treasury in Mooltan is, now, unable to meet; and he, at last, hit on the expedient of promising them pay, if they would go out, and have one good fight with the British; which the Sikhs declined. Still, the departure of 5,000 men, and twelve pieces of artillery, cannot but dishearten, as well as weaken, those who are left behind; and I hear that Moolraj has sent off an express to the Bunnoo force, offering them increased pay, if they will hurry to Mooltan.

Food is becoming very scarce. Before the Raja left, six seers of atta only, were to be had in Mooltan, for a rupee. Since he went, it has fallen to nine seers. In camp, the price is eleven and twelve.

Inclosure 13 in No. 39.

*Major Lawrence to the Resident at Lahore.*

*Peshawur, October 13, 1848.*

IT is with deep regret that I have now to acquaint you that Futteh Khan Towannah, after holding the citadel for some days, was driven out by the want of water, and, with six followers, barbarously cut to pieces.

The force is said to be, still, at Bunnoo, undecided as to their movements. They had detached a party to bring in their pay, which had reached Lukkee, from Lahore, and another of 400 Goorchurras to seize the boats, 45, at Beakhsail. Some were for moving on Mooltan, and others on Attock.

Inclosure 14 in No. 39.

*Major Lawrence to the Resident at Lahore.*

*Peshawur, October 13, 1848.*

I HAVE still very reasonable hope that, should a British force move in this direction, even at this the eleventh hour, it will enable me to hold them to their duty, for, as yet, in no matter have I relaxed the reins of discipline, and the officers fully support me.

I will keep my people, to the last, at the Residency, as, while I do so, the Urbobs and people will hold to me. When I can do so no longer, I will take to the fort of Shahmeer Gurh, which I have provisioned for 3000 men for one month, and, if driven from that, will do my best to secure my own safety, and that of the persons attached to the agency.

## Inclosure 15 in No. 39.

*The Resident at Lahore to the Commander-in-Chief.**Lahore, October 18, 1848.*

THE Sikhs, generally, have ceased to consider Mooltan as the place where the battle for their faith is to be fought, and, with the fickleness, and faithlessness, peculiar to their character, are now, apparently, abandoning Dewan Moolraj, without scruple, to his own resources.

That Shere Sing should leave Moolraj is not to be wondered at, from the circumstances under which he joined him, and from their respective positions. I have, in all my communications with Government, since Shere Sing's defection, stated my conviction that he would remain but a short time at Mooltan.

But that his departure should be followed by so extensive a desertion of Moolraj's cause by his Sikh soldiers, horse and foot, was not expected by me. Unless the accounts received, by the last four days, are much exaggerated, the greater part of his Sikh followers had left him, to join, as they say, the national standard, under which a vital struggle is to be made, for the restoration of Khalsa supremacy in the Punjab.

It is remarkable, but very characteristic, that, as stated on good authority, in Shere Sing's camp, since he left Mooltan, vast dissensions are rife, which have caused many of the Sikhs again to desert the Raja, and to go to their homes. Raja Shere Sing contrived to get hold of the Durbar treasure-boat, with the pay of the troops for two months, to the amount of 1,84,000 rupees: the mode in which he has distributed, and appropriated, this, has caused much offence, and the failure of the Raja to keep the promise he made, of marching to Lahore, or to the Manjha, has alienated others.

But the more immediate purpose of this communication, was to inform your Lordship of Raja Shere Sing's present proceedings, as far as they have been ascertained.

The Raja with his whole camp, crossed the Ravee on the 11th and 12th, and proceeded towards Jhung. From Jhung, it is expected that he will march up the left bank of the Chenab, to Jullalpoore, or perhaps Ramnuggur; at one of which places it is most probable that he will cross the Chenab, and proceed, either to Pind Dadun Khan, or to Goojerat.

I sent your Lordship, yesterday, an original letter from the Raja to his confidential officer, Sirdar Soorutt Sing, Majeetia, stating that he was going to meet his father at Goojerat.

He gives out, that he is coming to Lahore; this he will not do; but his coming so near as Jullalpoore, or Ramnuggur, (about 50 miles off) will have a very bad effect, and will encourage all the disaffected, and evil-disposed, in the neighbourhood, to rise, and commit excesses, while his troops will plunder the country, and effectually prevent our getting supplies from these districts, on which the army, when it advances, will very much depend.

If the Raja had any enterprise, which he has not, he might, from Jullalpoore, march and occupy Sheikhoopoor, and thus threaten Lahore itself, knowing that, without reinforcements, we could not march out to oppose him. This, though possible, I do not at all contemplate; but the evils adverted to in the preceding paragraph, will, certainly, follow his advance along the Rechna Doab to Jullalpoore.

The advance of a brigade from Ferozepore to Lahore would make the cross the Chenab, at once, and proceed up the Chuch Doab to his destination, be it Pind Dadun Khan, or be it Goojerat, or Rotas, and we should thus preserve the resources of the Rechna for our own troops, as well as insure the tranquillity of Lahore; and if we are deprived of these resources, and have that district all up in insurrection, we shall feel our advance from Lahore very much embarrassed.

P.S.—I received, last evening, authentic intelligence regarding the Bunnoo troops. They, at first, agreed with Moolraj's emissaries to proceed to Mooltan; but, afterwards, special messengers arrived from Sirdar Chuttur Sing, with a letter from himself, stating that they would not find Raja Shere Sing at Mooltan; that all the Sikhs, from Mooltan, and elsewhere, were to assemble, and fight the

battle of Khalsa independence, in the neighbourhood of Lahore; and urging them either to march towards Lahore, or unite with him on the way, or to join him, at once, near Attock. After some consideration, it was determined to join Chuttur Sing, and the 17th of October was fixed on, as the day of departure from Bunnoo.

Inclosure 16 in No. 39.

*The Resident at Lahore to the Secretary with the Governor-General.*

*Lahore, October 19, 1848.*

I FORWARD a letter from Lieutenant Edwardes, dated the 10th instant\*, reporting the departure, from Mooltan, of Raja Shere Sing, with all his force, on the 9th instant.

His Lordship will not be surprised at this intelligence. I have all along reported my expectation that Shere Sing would leave Moolraj, to join his father in Hazara; though I did not expect that Moolraj would allow him to take away his forces with him, or that the soldiers who accompanied him into Mooltan, would desire to leave Moolraj.

By accounts of four days later than those given by Lieutenant Edwardes in this letter, it appears that Shere Sing crossed the Ravee, at Ram Chountra, a little below its junction with the Chenab, and marched towards Jhung. A very large part of Moolraj's army had deserted the Dewan, to join the Khalsa camp, which, it is supposed, will proceed to Pind Dadun Khan, or Rotas, to unite with the forces under Sirdars Chuttur Sing and Ootar Sing.

Inclosure 17 in No. 39.

*The Resident at Lahore to the Commander-in-Chief.*

*Lahore, October 20, 1848*

I AM satisfied that your Lordship will do all in your power to expedite the movement of troops towards the north-west; the very demonstration of a force anywhere across the Ravee, may save the province of Peshawur, and the lives of our officers on the frontier.

Inclosure 18 in No. 39.

*Captain Nicholson to the Resident at Lahore.*

*Ramnuggur, October 21, 1848.*

SHERE SING'S advanced guard was at Pindee Buttean yesterday, within chupaoing distance.

The Durbar people have, evidently, misinformed you of the state of affairs in the Chuch Doab. Urjun Sing is at Goojerat, with a daily increasing force. Gotar Sing is crossing, from Jullalpoore. The non-advance of our troops has disheartened all our well-wishers (and they were few enough), and proportionately inspired our many secret enemies.

Though Shere Sing is not very near me, yet the route by which he is advancing, is favorable to any attempt he might make to intercept the retreat he knows I must make. Taking all this into consideration, as also the very doubtful disposition of my Sikh allies, I think I am justified in falling back on Goojranwalla, which I purpose doing to-night.

I should also mention that the non-arrival of any reinforcements has increased the despondency which has, for some time, prevailed in my levies, and I have no longer the little confidence I formerly had in them. I do not expect to be able to remain long at Goojranwalla, unless supported.

There are two fords between this and Wuzeerabad.

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\* Inclosure 12 in No. 39.

## Inclosure 19 in No. 39.

*The Resident at Lahore to Brigadier C. Campbell, C.B., Commanding Punjab Division, Lahore.*

*Lahore, October 22, 1848.*

I REQUEST that you will beg Brigadier-General Cureton, C.B., to order up the regiment of cavalry, and troop of horse artillery, mentioned as being ready to march at the shortest notice.

This movement is made necessary by the fact that Shere Sing has thrown forward all his cavalry, as was reported last night, nearly to Pindee Buttean, about sixty miles from this, with orders, as reported, to move in the direction of Sheikhoopoor, to cover the march of his infantry, up the left bank of the Chenab, to Ramnuggur.

I have, this morning, an express from Brigadier Young at Ferozepore, from which I learn that he is only able to send up two regiments of infantry, in compliance with the requisition made through you on the 19th instant.

The two corps under Brigadier Godby, moreover, will not reach Lahore before the 28th instant at the earliest, as they were not to leave till the 23rd, and to make six marches.

## Inclosure 20 in No. 39.

*The Resident at Lahore to the Commander-in-Chief.*

*Lahore, October 22, 1848.*

I FORWARD a letter, this day addressed by me to Brigadier Campbell, C.B., commanding the Panjab Division.

It is a bolder move of Shere Sing's than I expected, and can only have been adopted by him, under the knowledge of our having no disposable troops at Lahore, and in ignorance of the cavalry being across the Sutlej at Gundia Sing Walla.

Sirdar Urjun Sing has occupied Goojerat with a party of irregulars, a portion of which he has pushed down to the Ghat opposite Wuzeerabad; he has, with him, only newly-raised and undisciplined levies, to the amount of 1,500 infantry.

Raja Shere Sing is devastating the country, as he goes along, if we could get at him, push him into the river, and take his guns from him, I should be glad of his coming up the left bank of the Chenab, but, as I fear that cannot be managed, I am in hopes that the movement of the troops upon Lahore will have the effect of making him cross the river at, or below, Jullalpoore.

Supplies of all kinds are becoming very scarce at Lahore, and if Shere Sing is allowed to appropriate, or destroy, those of the Rechna Doab, we shall be quite crippled when the army reaches us.

P.S.—I have this instant received the accompanying letter\* from Captain Nicholson from Ramnuggur.

## No. 40.

*The Governor-General to the Secret Committee.*

*Delhi, November 22, 1848. (No. 3.)*

IT is with much concern that I have to report, on this occasion, that the whole of the troops at Peshawur have joined the cause of the rebels. It might have been hoped that, as they had so long withstood the overtures, and entreaties, of Raja Chuttur Sing and Dewan Moolraj, they would have held out to the last, especially as the Raja was marching from the Indus towards the camp of

**Raja Shere Sing and the other insurgents, in despair at the refusals he had received from the Sikh officers at Peshawur.**

This sudden change in their views and proceedings is attributed, by the Resident, (I know not how correctly) to the machinations of Sooltan Mahomed Khan, the Barukzye chief, who holds a large Jagheer on the other side of the Indus, in which, through the kind intercession of Sir Henry Lawrence, he had been allowed to reside, after having been long kept under surveillance, at Lahore, by the Sikhs. The Resident truly observes, how remarkable it is that all those who are engaged in the most active hostilities against us, are the very persons who have received the most marked consideration and favor, and have derived the most substantial benefit from the establishment of British authority.

It is another of the singular features of the rebellion, that the defection of the troops occurs at the very period when there is the least reason to expect it, and at the very time when some success has been achieved against their cause. Thus, we find the Peshawur troops going over, when, all hopes of their co-operation having failed, Raja Chuttur Sing was seeking the intervention of Maharajah Golar Sing in his behalf; Raja Shere Sing deserting the camp of the allies, just after they had obtained the most signal success, the petty chiefs of Moraree and Rungur Nuggul starting into rebellion, after the occupation of Govindgurh was calculated to extinguish their hopes, and the Poorbeah regiment in Major Edwardes' force, in the late action at Sooraj Koond, deserting the cause of the allies, at the time that the British troops were securing the object of their well concerted attack.

Major and Mrs Lawrence, and Lieutenant Bowie, are, at present, safe in Kohat, and it is to be hoped that they will be able to find refuge in the steamer Meanee, which has been dispatched to Kalabagh to bring them off. If they are unable to effect their retreat, through the assistance of Sooltan Mahomed Khan, there will be every reason to suppose that he has really been playing false, during Major Lawrence's residence at Peshawur, and that his treachery has been purchased, by the promise of restoring Peshawur to the Barukzye family.

It will be remembered that, when the Minister, Raja Lal Sing, contemplated the establishment of an independent power between the Jhelum and the Indus, it was part of his scheme to constitute Sooltan Mahomed Khan as his ally, at Peshawur.

The mere treachery of this intriguing chief will be of no consequence, provided the European officers escape free from his hands, but it is to be feared that his open declaration of the re-establishment of an Affghan dynasty, on the other side of the Indus, may affect the feelings of the Mahomedan population, and, by thus raising up a new combination against us, which has hitherto promised to be one of our main sources of success, add considerable embarrassment at this difficult crisis. The excesses committed by the troops under Raja Shere Sing upon the Mahomedans of Jhung, may, on the other hand, serve to exasperate the feelings of the Mahomedan population against the Sikhs, and altogether neutralize the attempts to maintain the incompatible alliance which has sprung up between them at Peshawur.

The latest accounts from the north-west show that, up to the 6th instant, Raja Chuttur Sing remained at Peshawur, that Captain Abbott maintained his post at Nara, and Lieutenant Herbert at Attock. It is to be feared that the latter will scarcely be able to prevent the garrison from joining the rebels. It consists almost entirely of Mussulmans, but it can scarcely be expected that they will continue loyal, after the open revolt of their brethren at Peshawur. To both these officers, as well as to Major Lawrence, it is my intention to offer my cordial approbation of the energy, judgment, and ability which has marked their proceedings, since they were, first, compelled to act upon the defensive.

Affairs at Mooltan continue in the same state as when I last wrote. The success obtained by Brigadier Markham, on the 7th instant, in an attack, most skilfully conducted, against an advanced position of the enemy, has not materially altered the relative position of the combatants. Major-General Whish is, still, awaiting reinforcements from Sindh, and, notwithstanding the departure of Raja Shere Sing, does not feel himself strong enough to recommence operations against Mooltan, without them.



The latest account represents that the insurgent chiefs are collecting their forces between Wuzeerabad and Ramnuggur, and there seems to be some expectation of an early action between them and Brigadier Cureton's force, which is near the banks of the Chenab.

I expect to be at Umballa on the 25th instant, whence I shall proceed to Ferozepore, in order to be in close communication with the Commander-in-Chief, but, as nearly the whole of the country around Ferozepore has suffered from the drought which has affected many of the districts in the north-west, and supplies of all kinds are exceedingly scarce, it is possible I may not consider it expedient to advance beyond Umballa, at present.

Inclosure 1 in No. 40.

*Major Lawrence to the Resident at Lahore*

*Peshawur, October 1, 1848.*

I DETACHED, yesterday, a troop of artillery of 5 guns, under Commander Futteh Khan, to strengthen the fort of Attock; the troop is escorted by two companies of Ram Sahae's Poorbeahs, and two of Mahomedan Ramgoles, with 100 Khyberries; the escort will remain, or return, as Captain Nicholson may deem expedient.

That officer has long wished me to make this move, but I considered it might bring on a collision, in the present feverish state of the troops, and hence declined; on the Governor, however, assuring me that I might detach them without danger, I have done so, and the result has given me a further gratifying proof of this force being still under control, whatever their feelings may be, and those of the Sikh portion can hardly be doubted to be in unison with that of their brethren.

I have no wish that British troops should cross the Indus; their arrival at Jhelum will, for the present, suffice—the news of which would keep my force loyal, and, most probably, drive that of the rebels to join their brethren at Mooltan, if not to disperse altogether.

Inclosure 2 in No. 40.

*The Resident at Lahore to Brigadier Campbell.*

*Lahore, October 7, 1848.*

IT is of the last importance that coercive measures should be promptly adopted, in regard to some petty chiefs residing in the Baree Doab, who have joined the rebellion set afoot by Sardar Chuttur Sing and Raja Shere Sing, and are endeavouring to bring the insurrection to our neighbourhood.

The presence of Brigadier Wheeler in the neighbourhood of two of these insurgents, affords an admirable opportunity of reading the disaffected a lesson, without moving troops from Lahore.

The chiefs themselves are in open rebellion at Mooltan, the attachment of their houses and property has been ordered by the Government. They have forcibly resisted this attachment; their representatives have garrisoned their dwelling-houses, and have replied to the Government order that their castles stand or fall with Mooltan.

These parties, if they refuse to surrender when the troops arrive, must be coerced; their castles, as they call them, be forcibly entered; all persons offering opposition treated as rebels, and dealt with accordingly; all the property found on the premises attached, and made over to my assistant, to be sent into Lahore; and the houses pulled down, and the materials sold. An example is necessary.

The first place I would wish Brigadier Wheeler to take in hand is Rungur Nuggul, about fifteen miles from the Ghat at Sri Hurgovindpore, directly opposite his position at Tanda.

The premises are described as somewhat extensive, and inclosed by a pukka wall with a gateway. The Durbar sent two companies to attack the

but they state they can do nothing without guns, as there is a garrison of upwards of 100 men inside, who have declared that they will resist to the last.

The fact is that these two companies sympathize with the insurgents, and have not attempted to carry out the Government orders. There is no probability of their fraternizing with the garrison; but the party should, for precaution sake, be of strength sufficient to annihilate them, if they do.

There is no gun, as I am informed, at this place, or at the other, which I will describe presently; and it is most probable that the parties will surrender, when they see the preparations for their coercion ready.

The name of the Chief is Urjun Sing Rungur, Nugglea. It is supposed that there may be property to the amount of from one to two lakhs of rupees on the premises.

The next place I wish the force to visit is Moraree, about twenty-six miles north of Rungur Nuggul, skirting the Jullundur frontier, in the direction of Puthankote and Noorpoor. It is a place of much the same description as that above mentioned, though somewhat more extensive, and laid out with more plan, and reference to defence. The garrison is of about the same strength, but may be reinforced to a certain extent before Brigadier Wheeler arrives.

I must be dealt with in the same way as Rungur Nuggul. The owner, Lal Sing, Morareea, was the second in command to Sirdar Runjore Sing at Aliwal; and the spoils of Buddowal are believed to be, for the most part, in Moraree, with other property also to the amount of many lakhs of rupees.

I believe that the females of both families have been removed. I need not say that, if not, their persons must be protected from all insult or annoyance; but the zenanas must be searched, and all property brought away.

Lieutenant Hodson, my assistant, who is acquainted with these places, will accompany the officer in command, and will be prepared to give any instructions that may be required, in carrying out the measure above described.

I may as well observe that the parties who are holding out in these places, are not disciplined soldiers, and that there is not a Sikh force of any 1, on this side of the Jhelum, except at Mooltan

### Inclosure 3 in No 40

#### *The Resident at Lahore to Brigadier Campbell.*

*Lahore, October 7, 1848.*

AT a town called Goojranwalla, about thirty miles on the other side of the River Ravee, a chief named Urjun Sing, son of Hurrie Sing, infected by the spirit of the times, has shut himself up in his house and premises, which he has garrisoned with some 100 armed men, and has set the Government at defiance.

It is necessary that an immediate example should be made of any who may bring their rebellious proceedings so close to Lahore. If this man is not promptly punished, we shall have his example extensively followed.

A party of fifty foot and twenty-five horse, sent by the Durbar, have been unable to bring in Urjun Sing, and I have directed that they invest the house, and prevent the removal of property, &c., till a party, capable of coercing him, is sent from this.

The house is not a fortified place, or in any way very strong; but a mere square inclosure, with a door and gateway. There may be 100 or 150 men inside, who say they have a small gun, but this is not believed.

The object to be effected is to bring in Sirdar Urjun Sing, with all his property, and to disarm, and make prisoners, his followers.

In all probability, on hearing that British troops are coming, or on seeing them, he will give himself up; if he does not, the premises must be forcibly entered, the Sirdar seized, and all who offer opposition must take the consequences: a penal example is necessary, at this moment.

All the property found in the house, having been declared forfeit to the

State, should be brought into Lahore, and the house should be levelled ~~with~~ the ground.

My chief assistant, Mr. Cocks, will accompany the party sent by you, and he will be prepared to give any detailed instructions to the officer commanding, for carrying into effect the measure above described.

Inclosure 4 in No. 40.

*The Commander-in-Chief to the Resident at Lahore*

*Camp, Kalka, October 20, 1848.*

IN my private letter of yesterday's date, I announced to you that I had desired Colonel Cureton, with the division of cavalry, and with a brigade of infantry, to cross the Sutlej, and occupy the strong position of Kussoor; and that I should, as soon as possible, reinforce Brigadier Wheeler by two, if not three, corps. These movements will, I hope, have as good, if not a better effect, than pushing on a brigade of infantry to Lahore, and halting them there. This latter would look like, and in effect be, a defensive operation, whilst the other is an aggressive one: in my mind, a most important consideration.

If circumstances shall require it, I shall dak on from Loodiana to Ferozepore, so as to be nearer to you.

Inclosure 5 in No. 40.

*Captain Abbott to the Resident at Lahore*

*Camp, Srikote, Hazara, October 20, 1848.*

I HAVE the honor to detail the particulars of an affair between the army of Chuttur Sing, and the levies under my command

It may be remembered that, last year, I excluded the Simulkund branch of the Tarkulli clan from the mountain of Gundguib, and built a castle, in their village, to secure the peace of the mountain. The garrison, consisting of a company of Richpaul Sing's regiment, and about seventy or eighty matchlocks, declared, like most others in Hazara, for Chuttur Sing. Chuttur Sing had sent a deputation of zemindars of Hazara, begging the release of the garrison, but had written, by the same deputation, forbidding it to evacuate the fort. The letter was opened, and read. It being impossible to prevent the Sikh army from relieving the garrison, I had, several times, offered it safe conduct, with arms and baggage, but the offer was declined.

On the morning of the 18th, Chuttur Sing's camp moved up to Ghazi upon the left bank of the Indus, and it was evident that his object was Simulkund. But, owing to his veto to the garrison, the impression was general that he would endeavour, by that route, to carry Srikote.

Simulkund being situated at the foot of the mountains, with a gun-road from the plains, it was not possible for 1,800 matchlocks (my whole available force, inclusive of the levies of the mountain) to prevent the relief of the fort, by six regiments, with artillery and cavalry. But I deemed it important that the evacuation should not be effected with impunity, and that no hope should be opened to Chuttur Sing, of ever ascending the mountain.

Long before daybreak of the 18th, the Sikh army was busied in cooking food for the day's work. At about 8 A.M., the force advanced in two columns, carrying four guns, and two howitzers upon elephants. Being provided with excellent guides, and having a secret understanding with the villages of Kondi and Umbar Khana, who supply some of my best matchlocks, the left column was enabled to avoid the fire of about 800 matchlocks posted upon a cliff above the gun-road under Umbar Khana. Their right column, under Chuttur Sing, advanced, without opposition, at the back of the low hills, and took position upon the most considerable eminence southward of the castle. But, when they pushed forward their detachments, the fire became hot and close, and they were, eventually, driven back with loss.

The left column, about 3,000 strong, with two howitzers, commenced the

ascent of the undulations upon the crest of which was my own post, a path leading to Srikote. I had, at first, only 200 matchlocks to oppose to them. But, as the contest grew warm, about 400 of my people came up from Umbar Khana, the position avoided by the Sikhs, and the hill was disputed from rock to rock, and bush to bush, so that by 2 P.M., they had won only the foot, and easiest acclivity, and had, still, before them not only all the strong ground of my position itself, but the first undulation of the mountain's base; there they turned back, retreating, with much coolness, under the fire of my skirmishers. Could I have persuaded the reserve to charge sword in hand, the retreat might have been converted into a rout. But my exhortations were so coldly received that I desisted.

Meanwhile, the garrison had evacuated, and fired, the fort, and had joined the relieving army. Soon afterwards, the powder magazine exploded, throwing down about twenty feet of the western wall—a beautiful sight, which caused a momentary pause in the skirmishing.

The Sikh army marched back in good order; being strong in cavalry and artillery, they were secure from molestation in ground so open. They consumed fifteen of their dead, in a blazing thatch upon the field, and carried away, it is said, sixty dead bodies, and about 126 wounded. The reports, however, are various. Two officers of consequence were amongst the slain.

The whole affair was managed with skill and judgment, which proves Chuttur Sing to be no contemptible soldier. The troops, if not very dashing, were cool and self-possessed, and I only once saw them run. It was, I believe, when Ata Mahomed Khan and four of his people charged them sword in hand. He was one of the Simulkund chiefs, whom I released lately from prison, and who, by his devotion to the Government, has fully justified my confidence. He fell by a hundred wounds.

My own matchlockmen behaved well, though not in the style of their fathers. The ground was not very strong; but they might, sometimes, have maintained their temporary posts longer. Owing to the large space to be covered with 1,800 matchlocks, I could never bring more than one matchlock to every ten of the enemy, upon any given point.

The number killed on our side amounts, as nearly as I can reckon, to nine or ten. The number of wounded is not, I think, greater. The slaughter on both sides would have been greater, had I not resisted the gallant offer of the Simulkundis to oppose the right column upon level ground. The spot being manifestly untenable against superior numbers and discipline, I forbade the occupation of any post, save such as might be maintained to the last.

The Sikhs, it is said, are disheartened at the result of this affair, in which they have placed *hors de combat* as many men as they have rescued, and this, upon ground of no strength, admitting of wheel carriages. Their loss is attributable to their advancing in masses, against individuals scattered amongst the bushes. My own levies are elated, and will, henceforth, I doubt not, behave with spirit. Three hundred of my best matchlockmen were in league with the enemy not to fire, provided their villages, Koondi and Umbar Khana, were spared. This greatly crippled their skirmishing.

I received the most material assistance from Mr. James Ingram, assistant surgeon (a son of the late Captain Ingram, of this service). I had forbidden him to mix in the skirmishers, from a diffidence of men who had twice deserted me at need. But his ardor led him into the field, and he arrived in time to rally a large party of matchlockmen, who were retreating, upon pretence of escorting their wounded leader.

Chuttur Sing was employed, on the 19th, in burning his dead. To-day, he has marched two coss southward, towards Attock. The number of wounded, for whom he has no litters, is said to be the cause of this short march. The report of his purpose to force his way to Torhaila, was strong, so that I have had my people under arms to resist him. He could not reach Torhaila without heavy loss. I have been the last three days without shelter, and without chair or table, watching the enemy. It was not possible to write sooner, but I deputed Mr. Ingram to inform Lieutenant Herbert and Major Lawrence of the result, the Lahore dak being still suspended.

Mahomed Khan, one of those lately returned from Captain Edwardes' camp in Mooltan, is, I regret to say, amongst the slain.

I could not bring up any of the guns lately sent me by Maharajah Golab Sing, in time for the battle. The first has, this moment, arrived.

In the large reservoir built by me in the castle, I found still ten and a-half feet of pure water, after two months' blockade.

P.S.—Srikote, 21st. The Sikh camp marched southward to-day, but I know not yet its exact position. All was well at Peshawur, on the 17th, and at Attock, on the 19th.

Inclosure 6 in No. 40.

*The Resident at Lahore to the Commander-in-Chief.*

*Lahore, October 24, 1848.*

I HAVE explained to your Lordship the emergency under which I deemed it necessary to order up the brigade from Ferozepore. I now regret that it has been only possible to send two regiments of infantry; and I also regret that these, with the cavalry and artillery, which were already across the river, are coming up so slowly, making marches at an average of eight miles per diem.

Raja Shere Sing is marching up the left bank of the Chenab, declaring his intention of attacking Lahore; and the Bunnoo troops, and those under Ootar Sing, are marching to join him. His boast is believed by the people, who are rising, in all parts as he comes along, to his aid.

He has pushed forward his advanced divisions to within twenty-five miles of Lahore, and his officers are raising the country within twelve or fifteen.

Last night, a party was pushed forward, who had the effrontery to set fire to the bridge of boats which had been just constructed over the Ravee, within a mile and a half of the city walls. Happily, only two boats were destroyed, and the damage will be repaired during the day, and effectual measures, for the protection of the bridge, will be taken.

But the garrison is now menaced, and hemmed in, by the rebels; and, if an attack were to be made on the cantonment of Anarkullee by the insurgents, and a simultaneous rising were to take place in the city, the population of which is all, more or less, hostile to us, and in which there are numbers ready for revolt, we should, without reinforcements, be in a very critical, as well as, in the sight of India, a very discreditable, position.

Neither the occupation of Kussoor, on the Sutlej, four marches in our rear, by British troops, nor the reinforcing Brigadier Wheeler on the Beas, would now afford us the protection we require. These measures, taken a fortnight ago, would, I think, very probably have kept the enemy at a distance, and the people in this neighbourhood from rising; but these positions are too distant to cause the enemy, now that he has closed on us, to fall back, or the insurgents to disperse. The arrival of a force now on the Ravee, threatening the Rechna Doab, would, I think, have the desired effect, to a certain extent; but every day's delay in the arrival of such force gives confidence to our enemies, makes our position more critical, and will enhance the difficulties of our advance.

I regret that Brigadier-General Cureton did not feel himself justified, from prudential motives, in allowing the cavalry and artillery to move up from Gunda Sing Walla, till joined by the infantry from Ferozepore. There is nothing on that road, or, up to this time, on this side the Ravee, anywhere, which a troop of cavalry alone might not walk over; and the knowledge that troops, the number of which would be greatly overrated, were coming up, on separate days, would have had a most beneficial effect at Lahore, and on the surrounding country.

There is a great desire to attack the place, and get up a disturbance in the city, before reinforcements can arrive. These reinforcements are, I hope, to-day at Kussoor, about thirty-four miles from us, and will be here in four days.

## Inclosure 7 in No. 40.

*Major Lawrence to the Resident at Lahore.**Peshawur, October 24, 1848*

IT is with much regret I have to report that this force, so long kept in hand, yesterday broke out in open mutiny.

Everything was going on as usual; Lieutenant Bowie had ridden to the city, and I was about to mount, when the Governor, Sirdar Golab Sing, told me not to do so; that he had just heard matters were not right. I, instantly, sent for Lieutenant Bowie, who, fortunately, promptly obeyed the summons; five minutes later, he would have been either killed or a prisoner, for, on passing the Shere dragoons, which were drawn up in line, they regularly charged him,—two small ditches, and the speed of his horse, alone saved him.

From the house-top, we could see that the two Sikh cavalry corps, and three infantry ones, had assembled on the grand parade, and were, evidently, in a state of revolt. Messengers came shortly after, and confirmed this.

I sent what assistance I could, from Ram Sahaie and the Mahomedan Ramgole regiment, and my new Puthan corps, to the guns under charge of Colonel Meer Junghe's, and those under Ameer Khan's regiment, and got all the rest, with the Moolkias, under arms.

We, shortly afterwards, heard that General Elahie Buksh, on being sent for to join with the guns, and Colonels Meer Junghe, Ameer Khan, and Ram Sahaie with their regiments, had declared that, without the Governor's, or my, order, they would stand to their duty.

Sirdar Khan Sing, Majeetia, returned a like answer for himself and Goorchurras, one missul, under Pumma Sing, alone joining the rebels.

I sent to Sirdar Sooltan Mahomed to attend me with his troops, but he merely sent his son, towards evening, with an excuse that he had to look after his own family; he is said to have had a meeting of the officers at his house, the previous night, when their plans were arranged, this requires confirmation.

During the whole day, the rebel troops remained on the parade in consultation, and sending messages to General Elahie Buksh and the other Colonels, beseeching them to join, but all without effect; they warned them to keep off their guns, or they would fire on them; they also wrote to the Governor to furnish them with carriage, and the pay of Ootar Sing's regiment, which, if he did, they would march and join their brethren; he replied, if such was their intention, let them prove it, by at once marching to Pubbee, distant 11 miles, and, then, they should get the pay, and carriage.

Towards evening, after having made up their minds to attack the guns, and as often given up the idea, they moved off the parade to the cantonment, on the east of the city, where they now are, taking with them a company of Mehtab Sing's regiment, on duty in the Gare Kuttry, two small guns, which were there, and about 8,000 rupees, which the treasurer, contrary to my express orders, had kept there, I fancy, with a view to embezzle them.

I had given positive orders that the gates of the city should not be opened to them, but the Sikh Ramgole regiment on duty with the police, joined them, and, thus, they gained possession of the Gare Kuttry.

Sirdar Khan Sing, Majeetia, and Colonels Boodh Sing and Ruttan Sing, Man, and the other three Colonels, came to me, in the evening, and we consulted on what was to be done, but I can clearly see there is no chance of my being able to make any offensive movement against the rebels, and I expect the moment Sirdar Chuttur Sing arrives, which, it is said, he is to do in a couple of days, all the troops will join him.

In the evening, I visited, and praised the conduct of, the Mahomedan and Nujeeb regiment, with the artillery; and, as they have proved themselves staunch under such a very severe trial, as yesterday was to them, I feel it would not do for me, now that they may be said to have separated themselves from their own people, to seem to mistrust, or forsake them. I have, therefore, resolved to remain here, until they join the rebels, and, then, trust to Providence for our personal safety.

## Inclosure 8 in No. 40.

*Major Lawrence to the Resident at Lahore.**Kohat, October 25, 1848.*

MY letter of the 24th instant, reporting the defection of the Sikh portion of the Peshawur force, will, I doubt not, have prepared you for the intelligence of its being followed by that of the remainder, and that the time, foreseen by you, in your letter\* of the 29th ultimo, had arrived, when my position was no longer tenable, with honor to myself, or credit and utility to the State.

No sooner had I issued pay on the 24th instant, to Colonel Meer Junglie's Mahomedan regiment, than I heard that many desertions were taking place, and, towards evening, the Colonel and Commandant, with the Governor and Deputy-Governor, reported that, such was its state, they could not answer for the safety of the guns, during the night.

I proposed sending 200 or 300 Puthans to aid the Colonel. These proceeded with their Commedan, Meer Assam Ally, and my Moonshee, Hajee Mahomed; the latter says that, on the Puthans nearing the guns, Artillery Commedan Bolund Khan entered into a violent altercation with Commedan Fuggor Sing of Junglie's regiment; and declared that no Puthans should approach his guns; saying which, he wheeled round one or more, facing them on the Residency.

At this period, 8 P.M. two shots were fired by the infantry; on which, the guns were opened, shot, shrapnell, and grape were poured on the house in rapid succession, answered by musketry from the Residency wall; many men were killed and wounded.

On the fire opening, the Governor and his son came to me, in a state of frantic alarm, declaring their only anxiety to be the safety of the British officers, and that, as now it was very evident no dependence could be placed on any of the troops, we ought to seek safety in rapid flight. They professed their readiness to accompany us, but as Sirdar Golab Sing, from infirmity of age, &c. could not move quickly, after some discussion, it was agreed that he should go into the Fort of Shahmeer Ghur, where he could easily make terms for himself, Colonel Alla Sing accompanying us, which he did, till I insisted upon his returning to his father.

The Governor had hardly left me, to execute his intention, when I heard that three companies of Meer Junglie's regiment, with three of the Ramgoles, within the Residency ground, were preparing to attack the Puthans seeing that a general engagement would be the result, which, at such a time of night (and with such a heterogeneous mass of troops, being of all tribes and persuasions) I could not prevent, and that the report of the cannonade would quickly bring down the rebel troops, who would cut off our retreat, Lieutenant Bowe and myself, with Mr. and Mrs. Thompson, and fifty Affghan horse, mounted, which we had scarcely done, ere my own Puthans had gutted the house.

We got out of the south gate with some difficulty, the Ramgole guard only suffering it, thinking we were going to reconnoitre. Two or three laden mules and our led horses were, however, detained, the whole of our property thus falling into the hands of the rebels, leaving us little beyond the clothes on our backs.

During the day, I had sent for Sirdar Sooltan Mahomed Khan, and had received from him the most sacred promises of protection at Kohat, and to be escorted by him, at any time, in perfect safety to Bahawalpore, Mooltan, or Sinde: a written agreement to this effect was to be furnished to me, should circumstances force me to avail myself of his offer.

On leaving the Residency grounds, the cannonade still continuing, in consultation with a few Urbobs who were still with me, it was decided that, from the strength of the enemy in cavalry, (1800 sabres) any attempt at partisan warfare would be insane, and only result in an ignominious death, or captivity; all, therefore, advised flight towards Kohat.

I should have preferred going into the fort of Shahmeer Ghur, or Attock, but the futility of any hopes of my being able to hold the former, after the

recent conduct of the troops, was too apparent; and, to reach the latter, we must have been exposed to the enemy's cavalry, already in motion, their force being encamped on the road, with pickets thrown out on all sides, in addition to which four Bessalas had started, in the morning, for the ferry on the Indus, under the fort of Attock.

Even had I succeeded in reaching that post, my arrival, and its cause, I conceive, would have raised such a panic in the garrison, as, in all human probability, would have led to its immediate evacuation, and thus compromised the safety of Lieutenant Herbert.

Under the foregoing circumstances, I trust it will be considered that I held my position, as long as was practicable, and that, in proceeding to Kohat, I have adopted the plan most expedient, and least likely to embarrass the Government.

Inclosure 9 in No 40

*The Resident at Lahore to the Commander-in-Chief.*

*Lahore, October 26, 1848.*

CAPTAIN NICHOLSON reports, on the night of the 24th, from Ramnuggur, that the Bunnoo force had arrived close to Jullalpoore, on the Jhelum, which river Ootar Sing was crossing at Jullalpoore, on that day. The cavalry of Raja Shere Sing's force, with four guns, were at Jullalpoore, on the left bank of the Chenab, and Sirdar Ootar Sing, Gunrunbea, is, with 2000 Irregulars, at a place called Norkote, near Shekhopoor, about twenty miles from Lahore.

Raja Shere Sing, with his infantry and artillery, was to leave Jhung on Sunday the 22nd, and march up the left bank of the Chenab, his purpose being, as stated in his camp, to form a junction with the Bunnoo force, and that under his brother Ootar Sing, and take up his position at Wuzerabad, and thence to advance on Lahore.

If this purpose was really entertained by Raja Shere Sing and his army, it must have been under the impression, which has become very prevalent of late, that we had no troops to send, for the reinforcement of Lahore.

I doubt not the advance of the troops to-day, as I understand, at Kana Kutch, will cause some change in the movements of the rebels.

I do not think that Captain Nicholson's information about the Bunnoo troops, can be quite correct. They were, I suspect, at least two marches from Jullalpoore, on the 24th, but they are, certainly, on their way to join Raja Shere Sing and Sirdar Ootar Sing. When these forces unite, they will have six regiments of infantry, twenty-six or twenty-eight guns, about 3,500 Irregular Cavalry, and a large horde of newly-raised, unorganized, and ill-armed Irregulars.

Inclosure 10 in No. 40.

*Major Edwardes to the Resident at Lahore.*

*Camp, Sooraj Koond, October 27, 1848.*

THE Sikh troops who revolted in Bunnoo, began crossing the Indus, at the Esakhail ferry, on the 21st of October. The passage was completed on the 22nd, and Sirdar Ram Sing, Chapeewallah, who is their leader, talked of marching next day on Meeunwallah, which is several coos inland, on the high sandy ground which marks the limit of the Indus inundation, and divides the fertile tract called the Cuchee, from the Thull, or desert, of the Sind Sagur Doab.

The Sikhs have left in Lukkee two heavy guns and one mortar, with, it is said, 500 or 600 men, including the missul of Lungur Khan of Sahuwul, commanded by his son. The two heavy guns have been there for a year, and belong to the Jhinsee troop of Colonel Sooltan Ahmed Khan (son of General Elahce Buksh), they are much honey-combed, and want reboing, which accounts for their being left behind. The mortar is also a small one, and not worth much.

One account mentions that the Sikhs have carried away the Thannadar of



Lukkee, Mahomed Ali Khan (son of the Aloowullah Sirdar's mother, with Mr. John Lawrence), but this I scarcely believe, as he was not likely to incur their displeasure by very fierce loyalty.

It is true, however, that Sirdar Ram Sing has carried away with him Lal Baz Khan, of Bazour in Bunnoo, the only Bunnoochee Mullick of influence who, last year, voluntarily paid up his full revenue, and whose good example contributed greatly to the establishment of the Maharajah's Government, for the first time, in that wild valley.

Allum Khan, eldest son of Mahomed Khan, the Chief of Esakhail, and Shere Khan of Esakhail, have, likewise, been carried off; both of them having held out, to the last, with Mullick Futteh Khan Towannah, in Dulcepghur, remarkable, since the days of Elphinstone, for its attachment to the British.

The common talk in the Sikh camp was, that they were going to join Chuttur Sing; and, from Mooltan, I know that they have refused to come to the assistance of Moolraj, who has, however, sent more tempting offers by another messenger.

The course which this Sikh division now pursues, will, I anticipate, reveal to us, with tolerable certainty, the designs of Sirdar Chuttur Sing. If Ram Sing and the Bunnoo troops cross the Jhelum at Khooshab, and join Raja Shere Sing on the left bank, we may conclude that the first essay of the Khalsa will be made at Goojerat, as originally intended, and if they do not cross at Khooshab, but keep along, under the salt range, to Pind Dadun Khan, it will be clear that their views are limited to the line of the Jhelum.

Raja Shere Sing lingered, behind the majority of his Camp, at Jhung, and did not cross the Chenab, till the 23rd of October. The excesses which, at the request of the Hindoos of Jhung, he is reported to have committed against the Mahomedans of that place, are very shameful, and calculated to turn the Sikh rebellion into a religious war. A moulvee, and another learned Mussulman of Jhung, are reported to have been killed, a rich Mahomedan, Khojah, ransomed for 10,000 rupees; and the mosques of the city defiled with every indignity. Soorutt Sing, Majeetia, with two guns and 2,000 men, has been similarly employed at Chuniote. The Mahomedan population are, of course, much enraged, and the proverbial fanaticism of the Sikhs was, perhaps, never more fully shown than in thus provoking two-thirds of the people of the Punjab to side against them, in their struggle for independence.

Inclosure 11 in No. 40.

*Brigadier Campbell to the Adjutant-General.*

*Lahore, October 31, 1848.*

ON the night of the 23rd instant, a party of the enemy, moving about in the district between the Chenab and Ravee, attacked a small post of Durbar troops, on the right bank of the latter river, immediately opposite to Lahore, with the view of getting possession of some zumboorahs (camel guns), of which, eighteen, out of the twenty-four attached to the post, were carried off, the enemy, at the same time, destroying one of the boats of the bridge just completed over the Ravee.

The post of the Durbar troops adjoined a pukka building, with a garden-wall, which I had caused to be converted into a defensible post, at the same moment that the bridge was commenced, (it being within twenty yards of, and completely commanding, the bridge head), with the view of its being occupied by a detachment from the garrison of Lahore, as soon as the bridge might be completed.

A strong detachment of native infantry, under an European officer, was placed in this building on the 24th instant, since which, nothing further occurred to disturb the tranquillity of the city, and its immediate neighbourhood.

The troops continue in excellent health.

## Inclosure 12 in No. 40.

*The Resident at Lahore to the Secretary with the Governor-General.*

*Lahore, November 1, 1848.*

I FORWARD the letter, this day received from Lieutenant Edwardes, dated the 27th ultimo.

The information it contains, regarding the movements of both the Bunnoo troops, and Shere Sing, is, I believe, correct; it corresponds with accounts brought to me from both camps.

Shere Sing kept his intention, if it were not formed in consequence of the late movements on Lahore, secret to the last. He sent on all his cavalry, with the exception of about 500 natives of his own Jagheers, to different positions on the left bank of the Chenab, up to Jullalpoore, the strongest detachment, with two guns, being under Soorutt Sing, Majeetia, at Chunote, having promised that he would, with the infantry and artillery, march up the left bank himself to Wuzeerabad, where he was to be joined by the other rebel troops.

He has now crossed the Chenab, for the purpose of uniting with the Bunnoo troops, when the joint force will, most probably, move, as remarked by Lieutenant Edwardes, either on Pind Dadun Khan, or Goojerat; they give out that they are coming to Wuzeerabad.

The cavalry of Shere Sing are said to be much exasperated at the deceit which they consider has been put upon them. Their Jagheers and houses are all in the Doabs south-east of the Chenab, and chiefly in the Baree, between the Ravee and Beas. When they left Mooltan, Shere Sing promised to march straight upon Lahore, or into the Manjha, for the protection of their property; at Sirdarpore, he persuaded them to come via Jhung, under the solemn assurance that he would move up the left bank of the Chenab, to Wuzeerabad, and now, having pushed them forward, he has crossed the Chenab, and left them, without artillery, or support, on this bank. His own desire is said to be to join his father, who continues waiting on the Indus, in the hope of being joined by the Peshawur force, without which they all feel that they can offer no important opposition to a British army, but the troops with him are not disposed either to go themselves so far with him, or to let him go without them, to rejoin them again, by dak, as he promises.

There is a prevalent report to-day, that Shere Sing will march up the right bank of the Chenab, with his guns, and infantry, in a line parallel with the cavalry on the left.

Lal Sing, Morareea, the Adawlutee\* of the Sind Sagur Doab, who joined the rebels about three weeks ago, has crossed the Chenab, with about 2,000 irregulars, and has occupied Wuzeerabad.

## Inclosure 13 in No. 40

*Brigadier-General C. R. Cureton, C.B., Commanding the Cavalry Division of the Army of the Punjab, to the Adjutant-General*

*Camp, Purhul, November 2, 1848.*

I, THIS morning, crossed the Ravee, by the bridge of boats, and encamped at this place, about six miles north of the river, on the Wuzeerabad road, with the troops named in the margin.†

In consequence of a communication received from Sir F. Currie, I think it my duty to advance, to-morrow morning, with the above-mentioned force, with the addition of No. 10 Light Field Battery, and the 14th Light Dragoons, which I have obtained from Brigadier Campbell, C.B., commanding at Lahore; and the brigade of infantry consisting of the Company's 2nd European regiment, and 70th Native Infantry, under the command of Brigadier Godby, C.B.

\* Inclosure 6 in No. 12, page 66.

† 1st troop 3rd brigade Horse Artillery, 2nd troop 3rd brigade Horse Artillery, 4th troop 2nd brigade Horse Artillery, Her Majesty's 3rd Dragoons, 5th Light Cavalry, 8th Light Cavalry, 12th Irregulars.

## Inclosure 14 in No. 40.

*The Resident at Lahore to Brigadier-General Cureton.**Lahore, November 2, 1848.*

INTELLIGENCE has just reached me that the rebel force under Lal Sing, Morareea, marched, yesterday morning, from Wuzeerabad, to within nine miles of Goojranwalla, and that two other rebel chiefs, Urjun Sing and Jowahir Sing, have also moved with their levies upon the same place, Goojranwalla.

Goojranwalla is the largest town in the Rechna Doab; in about the centre of which, about thirty-six miles from your camp, it is situated, in the fort, which is much out of repair, are almost the only soldiers who have remained faithful to us, the garrison of it. I strengthened them, the other day, by a detachment of 100 men of Ferris' Jezzaalchees, who were enlisted for the purpose by the Durbar.

If Goojranwalla falls into the hands of the rebels, it will strengthen the cause of the insurgents amazingly; and if they retain possession of it, we shall get neither supplies, nor carriage, from the Rechna Doab, upon which we now depend, to enable the army to move forward, it will also very much damage our credit, if these parties, which are considered our most faithful allies, are left unsupported. If your force were to push on, the insurgents would, probably, fall back: if you advance to Emmabad, which is about twenty-five miles ahead of you, you will, then, not only be able to support Goojranwalla, but will command the whole of the Doab. Emmabad commands the road to Lahore, to Wuzeerabad, to Umritsur, and to Ramnuggur.

I have, to-day, a letter from the Commander-in-Chief, dated the 31st; he is marching to Ferozepore. The following is one of the sentences of His Excellency's letter:—"It is my intention to entrust Brigadier-General Cureton, till a senior officer joins, with the command of the troops of every arm of the army of the Punjab, that have moved across the Sutlej."

I send this by my Assistant, Captain Nicholson, who will describe to you the nature and number of the rebel forces, the position of Emmabad, Goojranwalla, and the places where forage, and water, and supplies are procurable.

## Inclosure 15 in No. 40.

*The Resident at Lahore to the Secretary with the Governor-General.**Lahore, November 3, 1848.*

I FORWARD a letter from Captain James Abbott, dated the 20th ultimo, describing a very gallant affair, which has taken place between the Hazara people with him, and a part of the forces under Sirdar Chuttur Sing. Captain Abbott deserves the greatest credit for the excellent service he is doing in Hazara, and for his conduct on the occasion described in the inclosure.

I trust this officer, with Lieutenant Robinson, of the Engineers, and the uncovenanted Assistant Surveyor, is quite safe, at present, in Hazara; the people are decidedly with them, and against the Sikhs, and they are quite out of the reach of Chuttur Sing.

Maharajah Golab Sing has sent a further remittance of Cashmere rupees, 30,000, equal to 15,000 Company's rupees, to Captain Abbott, and the four guns, with ammunition and artillerymen, sent by His Highness, have reached that officer safely.

Sirdar Chuttur Sing has sent his confidential vakeel Heera Nund, with a special message to Cashmere, and the Maharajah writes me, that he has detained him, and sent him off to Lahore, under charge of his chief, and most able, ministerial officer, Dewan Jowala Sahae.

## Inclosure 16 in No. 40.

*The Secretary with the Governor-General to the Resident at Lahore.*

*On the River, off Ghazee-pore, November 4, 1848.*

THE Governor-General is sensible that, although advancing to the frontier as rapidly as circumstances will permit, he is still at such a distance as to render it expedient that he should entrust, as the Government has heretofore done, to your discretion, and to that of the Commander-in-Chief, the detail of such measures as may appear to be necessary to meet the exigency of circumstances as they arise. His Lordship is gratified to observe that you are prepared to afford your cordial co-operation to his Excellency in all matters calculated to promote the public interests, and to secure the objects which the Government have in view, in the operations about to be commenced in the Punjab.

The sudden and frequent changes of position among the disaffected troops, and the consequent variation of measures which speedily becomes necessary to counteract their designs, and to enable our troops to act against them, determine the Governor-General to fetter you and the Commander-in-Chief, as little as possible, with minute instructions as to specific movements, while, at the same time, he states, explicitly, the object which the Government has in view, and is resolved to accomplish.

When the Dewan Moolraj, having put to death the British officers, engaged in open and armed rebellion, the Government of Lahore was informed that, as it had declared itself unable to inflict punishment, or to make reparation, for the gross outrage thus committed against us, the British Government would, at a fitting time, direct its armies against Mooltan, to inflict due punishment on the Dewan and his adherents.

The Governor-General deeply regrets the temporary check which has interrupted the continuous, and apparently successful, progress of operations against Mooltan; and, while his Lordship, in a purely military question such as this, must leave it to his Excellency's judgment to determine what amount of force is absolutely necessary to enable the British troops to attack that fortress with success, his Lordship is fully sensible of the extreme importance of its early reduction, and desires to express his sanguine hope, and confident expectation, that operations will be resumed at the earliest moment at which, in the judgment of the Commander-in-Chief, they can be properly renewed, and that nothing will be left undone, for the purpose of carrying them into effect, with the utmost energy and determination.

The insurrection at Mooltan having been followed by an open rebellion of the great body of the Sikh army and Sikh population, which has, for its avowed object, not only the expulsion of the British Government from that position which they hold by treaty in the Punjab, but the destruction of the British power; it is essential, for the safety, as well as for the honor of this Government, that the hostile and treacherous attack which has thus been contemplated, should, at once, be effectually met, and that the army by whom it is attempted, should be dispersed, and crushed.

The Governor-General hopes to learn that the Commander-in-Chief, by means of the force assembling at Ferozepore, will have been enabled, without exposing the position we already occupy to risk, to attack the forces approaching from different quarters, and to destroy them, before they could effect a junction of the whole.

The Governor-General has perfect confidence that you, and his Excellency the Commander-in-Chief, will act in concert for the purpose of carrying into execution, with all practicable speed, such measures as may tend to accomplish the object the Government has in view, and to secure the safety of the British officers on detached duty, throughout the Punjab, whose position is regarded by his Lordship with deep and constant anxiety.

Inclosure 17 in No. 40.

*Lieutenant Herbert to the Resident at Lahore.**Attock, November 5, 1848*

I WROTE to you, yesterday, an account of my Puthans having solemnly sworn on the Koran to remain true to the British Government as represented by me, and hold out this fortress to their best. I, this morning, gave them the written promise of protection, and reward, to themselves and families, and of punishment to those of their enemies who join the rebels, which they asked for, in return. I quoted your proclamation, saying that both reward and punishment would be in accordance with it. The only man who demurred to take this oath, was the young son of Uisulla Khan of Zedah, who has joined the rebels; and I gave him his rookut, this morning, with all his men, except ten who wished to remain to serve us, in preference to sharing the ruin, which they seem to know must attend the cause of the Sikhs and their adherents. Soon after sunrise this morning, I saw a portion of the Peshawur force, which, as far as I could see through an indifferent glass, I made out to be two regiments, with some cavalry, and artillery, arrive at the ferry opposite Jenangeera, where they are to-night encamped. They give out some intention of coming hither, but less than the whole force is not likely to attack us. I suppose, to-morrow morning we shall see whether, or not, they cross the ferry, which just comes in sight, from our highest towers. I, still, have no certain news of where Chuttur Sing is. It is reported to me that five cossids arrived in the camp with letters, during the day, yesterday, all bringing accounts of our troops having reached the Jhelum, and that a Sepoy, from the the Fort of Rotas, came in and reported that, in consequence of the arrival of British troops on the Jhelum, the garrison of that fort had considered their post untenable, and had evacuated it accordingly. I have received a note as late as the 3rd, from Mrs. Lawrence; they were well, but though nominally guests\*, otherwise, they say, they have nothing to complain of. My last letter from Captain Abbott is also dated the 3rd; all well with them, then, though naturally very anxious\* this makes our holding out of more importance than ever. God grant I may be able to do so until succours arrive! I cannot speak too highly of the valuable assistance and counsel, and the hearty zeal, of Nezamoodowlah and Syud Aleegoodeen.

Inclosure 18 in No. 40.

*The Resident at Lahore to the Secretary with the Governor-General.**Lahore, November 6, 1848.*

IT is with very great regret, though without surprise, that I have to report the revolt of the whole of the Peshawur troops on the 24th ultimo, and the departure of Major Lawrence and Lieutenant Bowie, from Peshawur, during the night of that day.

I had letters from Major Lawrence up to the 19th, at which time all was quiet, openly, though there were indications of uneasiness among the troops. Any letter, which he may have written between that date and the outbreak on the 24th, has been intercepted, I conclude, for none has reached me.

The report of the Peshawur troops having at last joined Chuttur Sing, was prevalent in the Bazaar at Lahore, and was talked of, in the rebel camps, for three days, before anything authentic on the subject reached me. A cossid came to Captain Nicholson the day before yesterday, having arrived from the Indus in eight days, who stated that the troops had certainly revolted, and marched to join Chuttur Sing, and that the British officers had gone to Kohat.

On the same evening, I received a letter from Lieutenant Herbert at Attock, dated the 25th and dispatched the 26th, stating that accounts of the mutiny had reached him, on the evening of the 24th; that it commenced by an attack

\* Sic in orig.

being made on Lieutenant Bowie, when taking his morning's ride, by some troopers of the dragoon regiment, from which he escaped by the fleetness of his horse, and reached home, when the gates of the compound were closed, and the Sikh dragoons were fired on by the Mahomedan guard at the Residency.

The further statements of details contained in Lieutenant Herbert's letter are far from clear, and they are the reports of persons not immediately concerned, but the fact is certain, and has been corroborated by native letters and messengers, that the whole of the troops, eventually, joined the insurgents, and that, during the night of the 24th, the British officers left Peshawur.

Whither they have gone is, as yet, uncertain, but it is believed (and this is most probable) that they have gone to Kohat, the Jagheer and residence of the Barukzye chief, Sooltan Mahomed Khan.

It is said that Attock was occupied, without opposition, by Sirdar Chuttur Sing, on the 28th ultimo, Lieutenant Herbert having previously fled, finding that the garrison were not disposed to resist, but this report is, as yet, unconfirmed; Captain Abbott, writing from Naia on the 28th, had not heard it.

The statement made by the cosids who have arrived, and those contained in letters received by Raja Deema Nath, from parties on the spot, which he has shown me, are to the effect that the outbreak, at last, took place, after the officers had given a final refusal to join Chuttur Sing, by the instigation, and machinations, of Sirdars Sooltan Mahomed Khan and Peer Mahomed Khan, the Barukzye chiefs, to whom Sirdar Chuttur Sing promised the province, as the reward of their assistance, and it is said that the Sikhs, on marching, have made over possession of Peshawur to the Barukzyes. This is highly probable.

Sooltan Mahomed Khan is the most treacherous and intriguing of a race and family notorious for treachery and intrigue. Maharajah Runjeet Sing never, after the conquest of Peshawur, allowed him to leave Lahore, nor did the succeeding rulers. Colonel Lawrence believed that the Sirdar would do no mischief, if allowed to reside on his Jagheer, and permitted him, accordingly, to do so, obtaining, for him and his family, many favors, and much consideration, from the Lahore Government. It is remarkable that all the parties who are taking the most prominent part in the present rebellion, are those who have received the most marked consideration and kindness at the hands of Sir Henry Lawrence, and may be supposed to have benefited most by the establishment of British authority.

When Mrs Lawrence left Peshawur to come to Lahore, at the end of September, a son of Sooltan Mahomed, with a large party of his retainers, horse and foot, was appointed to escort her. At Chuckowal, in the Sind Sagui Doab, some parties told Mrs Lawrence that Chuttur Sing's forces had occupied the road in advance, and so alarmed her that she insisted on returning. She returned to Kohat, where, by Major Lawrence's directions, she has since been residing. I have not been able to learn what the conduct of the Sirdar's son, and of the escort, upon that occasion was; but it is certain that, at that time, and with that strong escort, Mrs Lawrence might have proceeded with safety, or she might have crossed the salt range, and have come by Khooshal, through a part of the country which was then quite undisturbed.

I have little doubt, if the British officers are in Sooltan Mahomed's power, they will receive no injury at his hands; but I fear he will detain them, in the hope of making terms for himself, by negotiation for their release. It is, at present, only from report, and from the fact of Mrs Lawrence being at Kohat, that I suppose the British officers to be with the Sirdar.

I am in the greatest anxiety regarding these officers and Mrs. Lawrence, and also about Lieutenant Herbert, who was at Attock. A few days must relieve this suspense.

I have given Chuttur Sing, and his son Golab Sing, distinctly to understand, in writing, that if any injury is inflicted, by Chuttur Sing, or any of his people, or through his means, on any British officer, it will be visited by the heaviest vengeance of the British Government, on the lives of Chuttur Sing and all concerned.

Major Lawrence deserves the highest praise for having succeeded in keeping the Peshawur force to its allegiance, so long after the fraternization of all the rest of the Durbar army. I am more surprised at the troops so long resisting the overtures and invitation of Sirdar Chuttur Sing and his adherents,

than at their final defection. But it is remarkable that, when the defection did take place, Chuttur Sing seems just to have given up all hope of gaining the troops, and actually to have marched to join Shere Sing and the other insurgents, at the same time, telling them that, without the Peshawur force, there was no chance of their success. He sent, at that time, a special vakeel to Maharajah Golab Sing, to beg his intercession to procure terms for him with the British Government. The vakeel, Heera Nund, is, I believe, on his way to Lahore, sent in by Maharajah Golab Sing, in charge of his chief confidential officer, Dewan Jowala Sahae. It is most probable that the large accession of force accruing to the rebels by the fraternization of the Peshawur troops, will have its effect on the zeal in our cause, of Maharajah Golab Sing himself.

November 7.

P S—While this letter was in the hands of the copyist, a letter was received from Lieutenant Herbert, dated the 29th. He had received a note from Major Lawrence, dated the 26th, stating that the whole of the British party was near Kohat. The garrison of Attock was, at that time to all appearances, staunch, and no attack had been made. Sirdar Chuttur Sing had himself, with a small party, crossed the Indus towards Peshawur.

Inclosure 19 in No 40

*Major Edwardes to the Resident at Lahore.*

*Camp, before Mooltan, November 6, 1848.*

I FORWARD a dispatch from Major G St P Lawrence, which conveys the intelligence of the revolt of the Peshawur garrison, the abandonment of that post, at the last extremity, by the British officers, and the safe arrival of all the Residency party at Kohat, whence it is their intention to make their way, via Kalabagh, Esakhail, &c. to our provinces.

The dispatch was brought this morning by a cossid, from Mukhid on the Indus.

Lieutenant Taylor left this on the 31st of October, for Esakhail, to meet Mrs. G Lawrence from Kohat, and, on the same day, the Meanee steamer passed down the river Chenab, on its way to Dera Ismael Khan, for the same purpose. Lieutenant Taylor will, probably, have arrived at the latter place to-day, and the steamer will now be able to bring away the whole party.

Inclosure 20 in No 40

*Major-General Whish to the Adjutant-General*

*Camp, Mooltan, November 7, 1848.*

I INTIMATED, yesterday, that I should, most probably, consider it my duty to attack the enemy's position this morning.

At 4 P.M. I issued the Division Order, of which I beg to forward a copy, and, at the same time, explained to the Brigadiers and Officers in command, the mode of attack I proposed adopting, viz, 1st, the British force to be drawn up at 6 A.M. precisely, on the eastern side of the Grand Canal, that flanks Lieutenant Edwardes' Camp at Sooraj Koond, the Infantry column to make a detour to the right, to take the enemy's position in flank, and the Cavalry and Horse Artillery to make a corresponding movement, and, on nearing the enemy, to act according to circumstances.

2nd The Allies to move forward, when directed by Lieutenant Edwardes, up the western side of the Canal, taking especial care that none of them cross to the eastern side while the British force is engaged with the enemy.

At 2 A.M., to-day, I learnt with much surprise and regret that several hundred of one of the three regular regiments of the Sikh service that was occupying, for the night, our advanced position (our siege guns having first been withdrawn from it), had gone over to the enemy, and that the 300 Rohillas with Lieutenant Bunny's two Horse Artillery guns remaining, might prove inadequate, which led to my immediately sending on our pickets to their aid. At about 3 A.M., Lieutenant Edwardes came to me, as did other officers. The former, after what had taken place, could not be answerable for his troops performing the duties assigned to them yesterday, but said that a victory would have a most salutary effect upon them. I, then, modified my plan as regarded the west side of the canal, and agreed that measures there should only be defensive, unless the Allies should show a readiness to give effect to the whole of it, and which I am happy to say they did, after gallantly repulsing, at 8 A.M., a severe attack made on them, by the enemy, with all his disposable force.

At 10 A.M. our Infantry reached their destination in echelon of brigades, right in front, and were duly supported by the Horse Artillery and Cavalry, in carrying the enemy's position, and capturing the greater part of his guns, which was effected within an hour, with the small loss of two or three killed, and twelve or fourteen wounded, no officer being among the casualties.

The defection of one of the Sikh regiments made me think it most desirable that I should not leave camp, and as our Cavalry here were to be for the day increased by 1000 of the horse of our Allies, I requested Brigadier Salter to remain also. On several accounts I was averse to delay the attack, and I trust that, independent of its complete success, it will meet with his Lordship's approval.

#### *Mooltan Field Force Division Order*

November 6, 1848.

The operations against the enemy, the last three days, not having had the desired effect, their position will be attacked to-morrow, when the following details will be in readiness, at 4½ A.M., to proceed under the officers named

#### *Cavalry and Horse Artillery*

Brigadier Salter commanding

- 2 squadrons 11th Light Cavalry, completed to 160 rank and file.
- 2 squadrons 7th Irregular Cavalry, completed to 220 rank and file.
- 2 squadrons 11th Irregular Cavalry, completed to 220 rank and file.
- 4th Troop 3rd Brigade Horse Artillery

#### *Infantry*

Under command of Brigadier Markham

Lieutenant-Colonel Franks, C.B., commanding.

- 6 companies H.M.'s 10th Regiment, completed to 400 rank and file.
- 6 companies 8th Regiment Native Infantry, completed to 512 rank and file.
- 8 companies 52nd Native Infantry, completed to 512 rank and file.

Lieutenant-Colonel Brooke commanding.

- 6 companies Her Majesty's 32nd Regiment, completed to 500 rank and file.
- 8 companies 49th Regiment Native Infantry, completed to 352 rank and file.
- 8 companies 51st Regiment Native Infantry, completed to 560 rank and file.

The 72nd Regiment Native Infantry, and all details not included above, will remain in Camp, under command of Brigadier Hervey, who will keep all on the alert from day-break, and direct two-thirds of the disposable Cavalry to patrol the front of Camp, at half a mile distance, with 4 guns of 4th Troop, 1st Brigade, Horse Artillery.

The 2 Horse Artillery guns on the right, and 60 sowars of the 14th Irregular Cavalry, will attend the Major-General.

40 Pioneers will accompany the 4th Troop, 3rd Brigade, Horse Artillery.

The mode of attack will be communicated to Brigadiers and Officers in command, at 4 P.M., at the Major-General's quarters.



The 2 Horse Artillery guns now on the redoubt will be withdrawn, on the post being occupied by the Allies to-night, and they, with the squadron of Cavalry, will take post as a reserve, ready to support the post, during the night, as usual.

At daylight, this squadron and the two guns will retire, and join the camp details of those arms, on the duty above assigned to them.

Inclosure 21 in No 40

*Major-General Whish to the Adjutant-General*

*Camp, Mooltan, November 9, 1848.*

REFERRING you to my letter of the 7th instant, I have now the satisfaction of forwarding, for submission to the Commander-in-Chief, Brigadier Markham's letter of yesterday, detailing the particulars of the gallant and successful attack made on the strong position of the enemy (on the eastern side of the Grand Canal) by the troops placed under his command, on the morning of the 7th instant, to which I have attached the documents noted in the margin\*. The enemy was in strong force on the west side of the canal, but had no guns there, and I never considered the number of them at his main position (on the eastern bank) to exceed six, one of which they began to draw off on first seeing our force, but apparently, primarily, for the purpose of enfilading our infantry, as they drew near, in which they were disappointed, by the rapid advance of our Cavalry, and Horse Artillery, under Major Wheler, and Captain Anderson, which led to the gun on the right being hurried towards the town, and to the capture of the remainder, which was insured by the steady advance and brilliant bayonet charge on the enemy's batteries, in which the Native Infantry most nobly vied with their European comrades.

From my letter of the 7th instant to your address, his Lordship will learn that I remained in camp. when I decided on so doing, it was quite impossible for me to conjecture to what extent the force of the Allies might prove faithless, and Lieutenant Edwardes could not, at that time, give me any encouragement to indulge in auspicious forebodings, but, providentially, everything of an untoward aspect of character was overruled for good, and a day that commenced in gloom ended most joyfully. I regret having to notice that our casualty list, annexed to Brigadier Markham's report, was increased on his force coming back, several men having been wounded by a few of the enemy having so far recovered their spirits as to fire their matchlocks and jingalls from behind the walls and trees, at a considerable distance off. The wounds, in general, his Lordship will rejoice to learn, are slight.

In the vicinity of Camp, on the 7th instant, there was not much to do. Foujdar Khan, with 1000 Horse from Lieutenant Edwardes' camp, joined the Cavalry under Brigadier Salter, and advanced near the Shesh Mahal, as a body of the enemy's cavalry were in that neighbourhood. This gave Lieutenant Graham (who had two guns of the 4th Troop 1st Brigade Horse Artillery) an opportunity of firing a few rounds of shrapnells amongst them, which induced them to retire till they were under the fire of the fort, when Brigadier Salter recalled our party.

It would be unjust to conclude, without particularly bringing to the notice of the Commander-in-Chief, the steady and soldier-like conduct of Lieutenant Bunny, of the Horse Artillery, and Lieutenant Pollock (49th Regiment Native Infantry) Assistant Resident, on the 7th instant. The former had his two guns at our advanced post in battery, and the latter commanded the detachment of the troops of the allies there, of which a large portion went over to the enemy at 2 A.M., increasing his strength probably to 1,200, and in entrenchment, not three hundred yards off.

The cavalry detail, under Captain Mulcaster, that was attached to the guns but at some distance, to be out of the range of those of the enemy) was soon with hem, but it took the pickets a considerable time to join, and the enemy, fully

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\* Reports of the Chief Engineer, and of Major Wheler, commanding the Cavalry.

aware of their position and circumstances, might have made a serious attack on the post with great promise of success, but the above officers remained firm, and gave confidence to the small details with them to continue a similar course.

#### Inclosure 22 in No. 40

*Brigadier F Markham, commanding 2nd Brigade, 1st Infantry Division, Army of the Punjab, to Major-General Whish*

*Camp, Mooltan, November 8, 1848*

ACCORDING to the arrangements made on the morning of the 7th instant, I proceeded with the force under my command, as per margin,\* across the bridges over the nullah, on the right of the Allied Camp in the Sooraj Koond, in open column, flanking the enemy's position, brought our shoulders forward to the left, proceeding directly across their rear. When we had advanced sufficiently far to insure overlapping the most distant part of their position, we wheeled into line, three guns on the right, three on the left, the whole of the Cavalry (with the exception of a small party with the guns) on our right flank, between the line and Sultan Sudoola Gardens. The reserve, in quarter distance column, in rear of the centre of the right brigade, advanced steadily in echelon of brigade, at fifty paces distant from the right, under a smart fire of grape and round shot. At this moment, I ordered the Cavalry to attack a large body of the enemy who were moving to our right, and to prevent their removing their guns.

Major Wheler, in command of the Cavalry, advanced in the most brilliant manner, charged the enemy, cutting up numbers of them, taking a standard, and preventing the removal of the guns, swept the whole of our front, and re-forming speedily, and in good order on our left, moved off to cover the right. As the Cavalry cleared our front, the Horse Artillery opened their fire, the line charged, and took the position, with the whole of the guns, on the bank of the nullah, driving the enemy across, and up, it, with considerable loss. Our own loss in the whole affair (which lasted, from the time we wheeled into line till the enemy were completely routed, about an hour), being, as you will perceive by the accompanying returns, comparatively small. We then destroyed their batteries, and returned to camp.

The conduct of everybody, officers and men was beyond all praise. To all I have to return my most sincere thanks for the manner in which my orders were carried out, to Lieutenant-Colonel Franks and Lieutenant-Colonel Brooke, in command of brigades, for their cordial support, to Lieutenant-Colonel Young, Major Farquharson, Major Finnis, Major Inglis, Major Lloyd, and Captain Jamieson, for the steady manner in which they led their regiments into action. To Major Wheler, in command of the cavalry, and to Captain Anderson, in command of the Horse Artillery, my warmest thanks are due. To Major Napier, Chief Engineer, who accompanied me throughout the day, I am indebted more than I can express. Captain Abercrombie, who attended me personally, and the Engineer Officers who were attached to officers in command of brigades, and the officers in charge of Sappers and Pioneers, I have to thank for the ready assistance which they afforded. To Major Becher, Assistant Quartermaster General, my thanks are also

#### \* DETAILS.

4th Troop 3rd Brigade Horse Artillery.  
2 Squadrons 11th Regiment Light Cavalry.  
2 Squadrons 7th Irregular Cavalry.  
2 Squadrons 11th Irregular Cavalry.  
40 Sappers and Pioneers.  
Her Majesty's 10th Foot, 6 Companies.  
Her Majesty's 32nd Foot, 6 Companies.  
8th Regiment Native Infantry, 8 Companies.  
49th Regiment Native Infantry, 8 Companies.  
51st Regiment Native Infantry, 8 Companies.  
52nd Regiment Native Infantry, 8 Companies.

due. To Captain Kennedy, Aide-de-Camp to the Major-General, who accompanied me in that capacity during the whole affair, I beg to convey my fullest sense of the service he rendered

*Return of Casualties in the Attack on the Enemy's position, under command of  
Brigadier Markham*

*Camp, Mooltan, November 7, 1848.*

4th Troop 3rd brigade Horse Artillery—1 syce, wounded  
 11th Regiment Light Cavalry—14 horses killed, including 1 officer's charger,  
 3 men, 11 horses wounded  
 7th Regiment Irregular Cavalry—2 horses killed, including 1 officer's charger,  
 1 native officer, 4 men, 10 horses wounded  
 11th Irregular Cavalry—9 horses killed, 1 native officer, 4 men, 9 horses  
 wounded  
 Her Majesty's 10th Foot—11 men, wounded.  
 Her Majesty's 32nd Foot—2 men, wounded  
 8th Regiment Native Infantry—1 man, killed, 1 native officer, 9 men,  
 wounded  
 52nd Regiment Native Infantry—2 men, killed, 1 native officer, 19 men,  
 including 1 native officer and 5 men very slightly wounded  
 Total 3 men, 25 horses, killed, 4 native officers, 53 men, 30 horses,  
 wounded

*Return of Ordnance captured*

Two brass  $6\frac{1}{2}$ -pounders, with carriage and limber.  
 Two brass 6-pounders, ditto ditto  
 One brass  $2\frac{1}{2}$ -pounder, ditto ditto

Inclosure 23 in No 40

*Brevet Major F Wheler, Commanding the Cavalry and Horse Artillery, in the  
Column of Attack, to Captain A S. Balfour, Major of Brigade*

*Camp, Mooltan, November 7, 1848.*

FOR the information of Brigadier Markham, I have the honor to report the operations of the cavalry and the horse artillery, (detail as per margin,\*) commanded by me, and placed under his orders, for the attack on the enemy this morning

After the Brigadier had detached two guns and a squadron of cavalry to the left, and placed the remainder of the guns on the right of the infantry, I drew up the cavalry on the right of all

Shortly after we had advanced, I received a message, delivered by Captain Kennedy, Aide-de-camp, from the Brigadier, suggesting the possibility of the cavalry cutting off some horsemen who were gradually retiring from our front, and the front of the infantry. At this moment, we were getting clear of the jungle on to an open piece of ground, and, besides the horsemen above alluded to, I saw to our right front a body of the enemy with a standard, a mass of his cavalry in and around some small villages, a little further retired, on tolerably good ground, and his batteries in the distance. I at once made up my mind to charge the whole, and

\* 4th Troop 3rd Brigade Horse Artillery  
 11th Light Cavalry, 160 sabres  
 7th Irregular Cavalry, 220 sabres.  
 11th Irregular Cavalry, 220 sabres.

well the officers and men responded to the call. With a cheer, they charged with the utmost precision and rapidity, carrying all before them; but rapid and good as the charge was in itself, it was by great good fortune so timed as to be of essential service, for some of the squadrons charged immediately in the rear of the enemy's guns, preventing the line of infantry from being enfiladed. More than this, the enemy's mass of cavalry, not being apparently aware of our proximity, were staggered by the sudden advance, and never made a stand in a body, though parties of them showed a good front, till we were in amongst them. Some squadrons charged repeatedly, while others only charged once, but effectually preventing the guns from being carried off, though the attempt was made. Lieutenant Vibart, 11th Light Cavalry, captured a standard.

Where all behaved nobly, it were invidious to make distinctions. I shall, therefore, satisfy myself with bringing to the Brigadier's notice how much I am indebted to Captain I Inglis, commanding 11th Light Cavalry, Captain Master, commanding 11th Irregular Cavalry, and Lieutenant Graham, commanding detail 7th Irregular Cavalry. To Captain J Anderson, commanding 4th Troop 3rd Brigade Horse Artillery, Brigadier Markham will understand how much we owe, and how difficult it must be for me to describe his movements, after he advanced with his four guns, simultaneously with the cavalry, but to me it seemed that, whether in the attack, or in dispersing parties of the enemy which attempted to re-form, or in the eventual retirement, his guns were always judiciously placed, and well served.

Lieutenant Taylor, of the Engineers, was kind enough to act as my staff on this occasion, and charged by my side.

The Brigadier will be happy to learn, from the accompanying casualty roll, that our loss in men is absolutely nothing, although the enemy, turning their guns, fired rounds of grape into us, as we advanced, or rather as we closed on them—fortunately hitting only the horses.

Inclosure 24 in No. 40.

*Report of the Arrangement in the Engineer Department, for the Attack on the Enemy's position, in front of the Allied Camp, on the 7th of November, 1848*

*Engineer Officers in attendance on the several Commanding Officers*

CAPTAIN ABERCROMBIE, in attendance on Brigadier Markham

Lieutenant Maxwell, in attendance on Colonel Franks.

Lieutenant Taylor, in attendance on Brigadier Salter.

Lieutenant Glover, in attendance on Colonel Brooke

A detail of Sappers, under Lieutenant Greathed, Engineers, and a similar detail of Pioneers, under Lieutenant McMullin, accompanied the columns, and after the capture of the position, effected the demolition of the principal batteries of the enemy. Lieutenant Garforth, Brigade-Major of Engineers, was in attendance with me, and superintended the above arrangements in a satisfactory manner.

Inclosure 25 in No. 40.

*Major F. Mackeson, C.B., Commissioner and Superintendent, Cis-Sutlej States, to the Secretary to the Resident at Lahore.*

*Camp, Ferozepore, November 10, 1848.*

I FORWARD a deposition, taken before me, of Lena Sing, son of Golab Sing, who brought letters from the rebels Moolraj and Raja Shere Sing, for some of the protected chiefs, Cis-Sutlej.

The account given of himself, and his proceedings, by Lena Sing differs in some respects from that given of him by the Putteela Maasahars. The letter he delivered at Putteela, addressed to Teka Sing, was one out of seven he had with him—five of which he has now given in, and one of which he acknowledges to have delivered, through Jel Sing Chabrar, to Boodh Sing, the Bhaidwar Chief.

Lena Sing states, that he received, in all, seven letters—that he does know if they were addressed to any individual Rajas and Sirdars, or to all collectively; but that he was told to deliver them as follows :—

One to Maharajah Naronder Sing of Putteeala.

One to Teka Sing of Nabha

One to the Bhaidwar Sirdars.

One to the Maladh Sirdars.

One to Sirdar Sobha Sing, Kalsia.

One to Galpal Sing Manoliwalla, Singpoorea.

One to Dewan Sing, Sealba, or to the Bhaidwars. All these letters, save one, have reached my hands. The first to Teka Sing was brought to me by Dewan Nehal Chund, as the one Lena Sing had given at Putteeala, as intended for Maharajah Naronder Sing; five others were given to me, here, by the Chabdar of Putteeala, who brought Lena Sing to Ferozepore, and who asserts that the prisoner gave them to him, on the night of his arrival here.

The letter I have not, is to the address of Galpal Sing, Singpoorea, and it is probable that this letter was delivered by the prisoner to Jel Sing Chabrar, for Sirdar Boodh Sing of Bhaidwar.

It may, therefore, be inferred that this letter has been communicated by Boodh Sing Bhaidwar to the Singpoorea Sirdars, and Captain Abbott will be written to, to watch Boodh Sing, Bhaidwar and the Singpoorea Sirdars, to see if they communicate to him the receipt of the letter, and to ascertain, indirectly, whether the letter has been suppressed through enmity, or if it has been received; and if so, report to me before taking further notice.

In the first letter I received, there were two words illegible, and, therefore, wrongly translated. The others are plainer written, and I subjoin a translation, with these two words corrected.

I have no doubt that many similar letters, taken by other hands, will have reached their destination.

#### Inclosure 26 in No. 40.

*Moolraj and Raja Shere Sing, brought by Lena Sing, son of Golab Sing, inhabitant of Sohana Baidwanwalla, Caste Zemindar, Goth Bhaidwar.*

TO our friend the Raja, the abode of infinite goodness, Raja Teka Sing-je; may Heaven protect you.

After compliments, and address, and wishes for a meeting, representeth, that all is well here, and that the continued prosperity of your Highness, is the constant object of our prayers.

At this time, by the blessing of God, all the army of the Khalsa is assembled here, and the British have been defeated, and have fled; and it is becoming in your Highness, that you and all the Rajas and Sirdars assemble together, and make prisoners of, or drive out, all the people of the British; for, by uniting with us, you will preserve your possessions, and your rule, and your faith, which is more precious than all other things, will, also, be preserved. For it is laid down in the Beds and Shastres, that it is the duty of all Chuttees to look after the interests of religion. Let this be impressed on your mind, and, having girded up the lions of resolution and enterprise, unite with us to destroy our enemy. Unless you act thus, it will not be possible for you to preserve your faith, or your rule. Be very careful what side you take in this business, for, if there is union among us, no one can prevail against us. What more need I say?

Raja Shere Sing, who was sent by the English to lay siege to the Fort of Mooltan, being true to his religion, has come over to this side, with all his Khalsa troops, and his seal is also affixed to this paper.

P.S. I have written on a small piece of paper, owing to the dangers of the road.

## Inclosure 27 in No. 40.

*The Resident at Lahore to the Secretary with the Governor-General.**Lahore, November 11, 1848.*

I AM satisfied that the Governor-General will consider that Major Lawrence and Lieutenant Bowie maintained their position, as long as it was possible to do so, and that the ultimate defection of the Peshawur troops, in spite of all Major Lawrence's skilful management, in no way detracts from the merit that is due to him, for the judicious, and intrepid, conduct which has kept that force to their duty, so long after the rest of their brethren were all in open rebellion, and using every endeavour, by appealing to their patriotism, and their religion, to induce them to join the rebel standard.

Major Lawrence had a most difficult task to perform, and he performed it nobly

I have several statements from native correspondents, they all ascribe the immediate outbreak to the intrigues of Sooltan Mahomed Khan, and there seems no doubt that, if he had remained true to British interests, the schemes of the Sikh army might have been frustrated, or, at any rate, the Mahomedan portion of the force might have been kept from joining the rebellion.

The plan for sending the Meanee steamer up the Indus, and for Lieutenant Taylor's going to Dera Ismael Khan, was formed, and executed, at Mooltan, before I had an opportunity of expressing an opinion on its propriety, the main object was to bring off Mrs Lawrence, who might, supposing the Baruk-ye Sirdar to aid in the project, easily reach Kalabagh from Kohat, and, after the departure of the Sikh army from Bunnoo, there was little danger to be apprehended, either to the steamer in navigating the Indus to Kalabagh, or to Lieutenant Taylor in passing through the Trans-Indus districts to Dera Ismael Khan.

It is probable that Sooltan Mahomed Khan, whatever may be his views with regard to Peshawur, will make a merit of aiding and befriending the Residency party,—and I trust this may be the case, but it is also to be apprehended that he may detain the party, either from a desire to conciliate the Sikhs, or for the purpose of negotiating terms with us for their release

The native officers in Attock wrote confidently of its repelling any attack which Chuttur Sing may make upon it. If they are staunch, it would, doubtless, take the force with Chuttur Sing more time to reduce it, than they can spare, under present circumstances

## Inclosure 28 in No. 40

*The Resident at Lahore to the Secretary with the Governor-General.**Lahore, November 15, 1848.*

I FORWARD three intercepted papers, bearing the seals of Shere Sing, Attareewalla, and Lal Sing, Morareca, addressed, respectively, to the British Sikh regiment stationed at Hoshiarpore, to Baba Bikrama Sing, the Bedee Chief in the Jullundur, and to the Sodees of Anundpore, in the Umballa district.

These papers were being carried by a Sikh messenger from the rebel camp, and were intercepted by the agency of Misr Rulla Ram and Sirdar Ram Sing, Jullawassia, at Goojranwalla, and sent to Captain Nicholson, in camp with General Campbell's division.

Inflammatory papers of similar purport, addressed to parties on this side of the Beas and Sutlej, are daily falling into my hands, but I consider it right to put these on record, and to send translations of them to the Government of India, as they, with the letters addressed by Shere Sing and the other rebel leaders, to the Maharajah of Puttecala and other Chiefs of the Cis-Sutlej Territory, ~~for~~ upon the chiefs concerned in the present insurrection, the crime of tampering with our subjects, and troops, beyond the limits of the Lahore State, and of endeavouring to excite revolt in our territories, and to induce our troops to rise against their Government, and to murder their officers, and commit other atrocious acts of hostility to the British power.

As the letter to the Hoshiarpore Regiment purports to acknowledge the receipt of a communication from them, I have thought it right to send it to Mr. J. Lawrence, that he may, in communication with the Commanding Officer, take such steps as he considers expedient, for ascertaining if any correspondence has really taken place between that regiment and the rebels.

Lal Sing, Morareea, the associate of Shere Sing in this transaction, and now a leader of one of the rebel forces, was the Adaltee, or chief civil officer, under the Durbar, in the Sind Sagur Doab. He is one of those who received kindness, consideration, promotion, and emolument, beyond his fellows, at the hands of Sir H. M. Lawrence.

Inclosure 29 in No. 40.

*Raja Shere Sing and Sirdar Lal Sing to the Turuntarun Baba (Bikrama Sing).*

THE Khalsa look to you for assistance, and are ready to obey your commands, as you are their Gooroo. Send an order to the Putteeala Raja to side with us. In Mooltan, the Khalsa has been victorious, the enemy's regiments have gone over, and their guns have been taken.

The Peshawur troops have left that place, with all the guns. The Povindea and Elahee Buksh are in confinement, and the Feringhees have fled to the Khyber. Sooltan Mahomed's people have gone after them, and it is to be hoped that they will be seized.

Inclosure 30 in No. 40

*Raja Shere Sing and Sirdar Lal Sing, Morareea, to Sodhee Punj Sirka (the Anundpooria Sodhee)*

YOU are a Gooroo, and the Khalsa are your followers. The holy Gooroo has raised up again the race of the Khalsa.

Two lakhs of Sikhs have assembled, in fact their number is without limit. Do you also bestir yourselves, and assist our creed.

Pray to the Gooroo that the Khalsa may derive new life, and unite with the Baba Sahib to establish the faith.

None of the Feringees are left at Mooltan. Raja Golab Sing's troops have joined us, and in a few days we shall conquer.

Write to the Raja of Putteeala, that he is one of the Sikhs, and should expel the Feringees from Hindostan. Tell him to set up the standard of religion, and join the Khalsa.

The names of those who have fought for their faith, are contained in the Shastres. There have been many other Rajas, but their names are sunk in oblivion.

Dewan Moolraj's name will be as celebrated as those of Raja Salban and Raja Vikramaditya. The rest of the territory of Putteeala, which the Feringees took away, will be restored to the Raja of Putteeala, should he join us.

Inclosure 31 in No. 40.

*Raja Shere Sing and Sirdar Lal Sing to the Hoshiarpore Regiment.*

RAJA SHERE SING and Sirdar Lal Sing to the Hoshiarpore Regiment.

Your communication has reached us, and we have comprehended its contents. You shall not be answerable for anything you do, and shall retain all that you may lay hands on. Act with all the courage you may, remembering what your religion is, and bestir yourselves. Destroy your enemies, and delay not. You shall continue to receive pay, as formerly. Our camp is at Goojranwalla, and is drawn up opposite to that of the enemy.

The Khalsa of Mooltan have killed all the Feringees, and not one is left. All their guns have been taken, and the Khalsa are advancing upon Lahore.

Get possession of Hoshiarpore, and burn the Jullundur cantonment. Delay not—assistance will reach you; for Raja Golab Sing has joined us. Prithee Sing has come to us, on his part, with his troops.—Written on Tuesday 6th, Kartik.



Inclosure 32 in No. 40.

*The Resident at Lahore to the Secretary with the Governor-General.*

*Lahore, November 17, 1848.*

THE letters of Major Lawrence give the only authentic account I have, of the defection of the Peshawur force. I have, already, reported that Chuttur Sing, after endeavouring, for three months, to seduce the force to his interests, seemed to have just given up all hope of success, at the very moment when, through the intrigues of Sirdar Sooltan Mahomed Khan and his brother, the determination had been made to join him.

There is no doubt that the Sikh portion of the force, with a few exceptions among the officers, have, all along, desired to join the rebels, on this side of the Indus; but, until they were assured of the aid of the Barukzye Sirdars, they dared not take any step openly in the matter. Had the Barukzye chiefs been faithful to British interests, the Mahomedan portion of the force would have resisted all attempts to seduce them from their duty, and the Sikhs dared not, in the midst of a Mahomedan population, and with so large a portion of the troops against them, to have made any hostile movement on the spot, and they could not desert, and join the rebels secretly, for they had no means of crossing the Indus, and dared not, in small numbers, and with a hue and cry after them, attempt to pass through the country.

As the Residency party is now in the power of Sirdar Sooltan Mahomed Khan, it is of much importance to us to know what his purpose is, and what arrangements he has made, and is making, with the Sikhs. He is a thoroughly faithless miscreant, owing the position and influence he now possesses, entirely to the kindness of Sir H. M. Lawrence and his brother; but he is shrewd, and calculating, and will, at this moment, do that in respect to the Residency party, which will, in his opinion, lead most to promote his future interest. It is difficult to hold any communication with a person in his position, but I have taken measures for intimating to him that the British Government will hold him responsible for the safety and honorable treatment of the Residency party, and that, if any harm happens to them, or if they suffer any indignity of any kind, the vengeance of the British Government will pursue him to the last.

Lieutenant Taylor has written to Major Edwardes, from Dera Ismael Khan, if Sirdar Sooltan Mahomed Khan puts no obstacle in their way, the party may, easily, reach Mooltan, by the Meeanee steamer, which has been sent, by Major Edwardes, up the Indus, to bring them off.

No 41.

*The Governor-General to the Secret Committee.*

*Camp, Umballa, December 7, 1848 (No. 4.)*

SINCE I last had the honor of addressing you from Delhi, on the 22nd ultimo, nothing of any importance has transpired in the Punjab.

Our public dispatches are, of course, closed from Peshawur, but private intelligence is occasionally received from the European officers, who were treacherously seized in that province. The latest private note, written by Lieutenant Bowie, who was sent as artillery instructor to Peshawur, was written in good spirits, and reported that all the party were well-treated, but kept under close surveillance. Mrs. Lawrence was, also, with Raja Chuttur Sing, who now has all the European prisoners in his custody. He was reported, on the 19th



ultimo, to be one march from Attock, which still held out under Lieutenant Herbert. A report has been circulated, for some days past, at Lahore, that Attock had been surrendered on the 22nd, through the treachery of the garrison; but it requires confirmation.

Raja Chuttur Sing appears to have left Sooltan Mahomed Khan in full possession of Peshawur. This Barukzye chief is said to have invited the aid of Dost Mahomed Khan, who, if he appears on the stage at all, is more likely to offer opposition, than aid, to a brother who has, hitherto, been treated by him with inveterate enmity.

Major-General Whish, C.B., is still before Mooltan, awaiting the arrival of reinforcements from Bombay.

From Hazara I have received no fresh intelligence.

The neighbourhood of Lahore has been the scene of some skirmishes, in different points, which have all resulted to our advantage. In the Jullundur Doab, the Jeswan Raja, and Bedee Bikrama Sing had seized some of our Thannas, and created considerable alarm for the safety of the station of Hoshiarpore. I had, in consequence, directed the contingent of the Malagurh Raja, and a wing of the Nusseerec battalion to proceed to the banks of the Sutlej, and protect the ghats above Loodiana. Mr John Lawrence directed the movement of a force of about 800 men, accompanied by four guns, against the position of the insurgents, and I am happy to say that I have, privately, received information of the complete dispersion, and flight, of the rebels. Both the leaders are prisoners of our Government, and, with many others who joined them from Nundpoor, Mukhoowal, one of the most holy spots connected with the establishment of the Sikh religion, have forfeited all claim to future favor.

In the upper Barce Doab, Brigadier Wheeler's brigade has done good service, in capturing and dismantling Kullalwala, and some other forts which have been defended by insurgent bodies.

The army, under the personal command of the Commander-in-Chief, is, at present, concentrated upon the Chenab. On the 22nd ultimo, an attack was made, by our cavalry, and artillery, upon a large body of Sikhs, who had crossed over to the left bank of the river, and I regret to say that the enemy were not made to fall back, without severe loss on our side; and I have especially to lament the loss of Brigadier-General Cureton, the gallant and distinguished leader of the cavalry division.

I have, this morning, received intelligence, by express, that Raja Shere Sing, who had entrenched himself strongly on the right bank of the Chenab, had been driven from his position by a combined flank and front movement of the British troops. I have not yet received any public dispatches, but the Commander-in-Chief reports that the enemy are in full retreat towards the Jhelum, pursued by our cavalry; that the enemy blew up some of their powder magazines before their retreat, and left sixty-two boats on the river, many of which are supposed to be filled with ammunition.

On this side of the Sutlej everything is tranquil, and although considerable apprehension was entertained by the Commander-in-Chief, and the Resident, respecting the loyalty of this population, I am assured by all the civil officers, that there has been, at no time, any exhibition of disaffection, and that, with very few exceptions, the mass of the people are well-disposed towards the British Government. The native chiefs of the Cis-Sutlej have, also, shown their friendly disposition, by the readiness with which they have cooperated in furnishing supplies and carriage, and by then offers of pecuniary assistance. A contribution of fifty lakhs of rupees has been promised, and I am happy to say that the Raja of Puttecala has already paid twenty-five lakhs into the treasury at Ferozepore.

Inclosure 1 in No. 41.

*The Resident at Lahore to the Secretary with the Governor-General.*

*Lahore, October 11, 1848.*

I FORWARD letters relative to the coercion of Sardar Urjun Sing, son of the late Sardar Hursie Sing, who had declared for the rebel cause, and had commenced raising armed men, for the purpose of opposing the Government,

and of committing excesses, at a town called Goojranwalla, in the direction of Wuzeerabad, about thirty-six miles from Lahore. When the detachment, sent by Brigadier Campbell, was crossing the Ravee, I heard that the chief, who had been strengthening the defences of his fortified house for some days, and setting at defiance the party sent by the Durbar for his seizure, had suddenly, during the previous night, fled, with a few followers, and that the Durbar party, which was watching the house, attacked the fugitives, and killed the Sirdar's principal attendant.

I directed the detachment, under these circumstances, to stand fast on the other side of the river, and sent on Mr. Cocks, with a rissalah of Skinner's Horse, to ascertain the real state of the case, and to destroy the house, and seize the property of the Sirdar, if he had absconded.

Mr. Cocks has, this morning, returned from his errand. The Sirdar had fled, as stated. Mr. Cocks had a party of Sappers with him, and they blew up and destroyed the fortified house and its defences, and attached what property was found in the premises.

The Sirdar has, it is supposed, gone to join Chuttur Sing.

The detachment has returned to cantonments

Inclosure 2 in No 41.

*The Adjutant-General to the Secretary to the Government of India.*

*Camp, Kalka, October 22, 1848.*

I HAVE the honor, by direction of the Commander-in-Chief, to transmit to you, for the information of the Governor-General of India, a copy of a despatch, of the 15th instant, from Brigadier H M Wheeler, C B, commanding in the Julundur Doab, recounting the manner in which he effected the reduction of the fort of Rungur Nuggul.

The Commander-in-Chief has had much satisfaction in causing to be conveyed to Brigadier Wheeler, and to the troops employed on this occasion, an expression of his warmest approval of their conduct, and his Excellency has, moreover, had pleasure in congratulating the Brigadier in having effected the reduction of this strong place without any expenditure of life, which is entirely to be ascribed, in the opinion of Lord Gough, to the soldierlike and judicious arrangements that were made.

A return of casualties is inclosed

Inclosure 3 in No 41

*Brigadier Wheeler to the Adjutant-General*

*Camp at Rungur Nuggul, October 15, 1848.*

MY last was from the right bank of the Beas, on the 12th instant. I have now the honor to state, for the information of the Commander-in-Chief, that I marched, on the 13th, to Mehta, 13½ miles, and encamped about three miles to the south of the fort, on the 14th, moved the camp to a good position, just clear of the enemy's fire, to the south-east of the fort, and, immediately after the whole had arrived, proceeded with the artillery to drive the enemy from the village, having previously sent the cavalry round to the northern and western faces, to take up distant positions, and watch any attempt that might be made at escape.

No sooner did the party in the village observe these movements, than it hastily abandoned it, and took to the fort, well pressed by a party of the Guide Corps, under Lieutenant W. S. Hodson.

I now turned my attention to the fort, and opened a fire of shell from the two 24-pound howitzers, and one 12, with an occasional round shot from a battery of 9's. The practice was beautiful.

The occupation of the village enabled me to line the wall, and two high pukka houses, with Lieutenant Hodson's Rifles, and a company of the 3rd regiment Native Infantry, whose fire effectually kept down that of the garrison. I drew off at 10 A.M., leaving two companies of the 3rd Native Infantry in the village, aided by a party of the Corps of Guides.

Finding that the western face of the town commanded the gate of the fort, I caused two embrasures to be made through the wall, and at 4 P.M. opened a most destructive fire on the gate and its defences, from three nines, one being placed in the gateway of the village, the 24-pound and 12-pound howitzers being in battery more to the southward, throwing in line shells, the practice, as in the morning, most effective. I drew off at sunset, leaving two companies of Her Majesty's 61st Regiment, and a company of the 3rd Native Infantry, in the village.

I have now the pleasure to state that, a little after midnight, the fort was evacuated, and the gateway taken possession of by a party of the corps of Guides, and held by them, until I went thither this morning early.

The fort, though small, is of great strength, having a double fausse-braie, with a wide and deep ditch, the whole in excellent repair, for it had lately been carefully strengthened.

I inclose a casualty roll, and am proud to say that it could scarcely have been less, indeed, it is wonderfully small, for the enemy was both bold and vigilant. The one death was caused by one of our own 9-pounder shot passing clear over the fort, and striking a sowar in the 2nd Irregular Cavalry, Captain Jackson, in his zeal, having taken up too close a position.

What the loss of the enemy may have been, I have no means of judging, but they were burning their killed during the whole day.

Nothing could be finer than the practice of the artillery, and Major Swinley, commanding that arm, Captain Sissmore, commanding four guns of No. 15 Light Field Battery, and Captain Burnett, commanding No. 19 Light Field Battery, and all the officers and men, greatly distinguished themselves.

The troops, European and Native, were eager for a storm, but I was as determined to avoid one, except as a last resort, and it was fortunate, as it would not, if taken at all by assault, which I doubt, have been done, without a great sacrifice of life.

I have had the most cordial and valuable assistance from Major H. Palmer, Major of Brigade, Lieutenant J. S. Paton, Deputy Assistant Quartermaster-General, and Captain Davidson, 16th Irregular Cavalry, who volunteered his services as my Aide-de-camp, and I cannot allow the mention of Lieutenant Paton's name, without acknowledging the obligations which I owe him for the extraordinary efficiency to which he has brought the intelligence department, as well for its extent as its wonderful correctness, more especially when the very limited means at his disposal are considered.

Lieutenant W. S. Hodson, with his detachment of the Corps of Guides, has done most excellent service, and by his daring boldness, and that of his men, gained the admiration of all.

*Return of Casualties in the Jullundur Movable Column, commanded by Brigadier H. M. Wheeler, C.B., during the operations of yesterday, the 14th of October, 1848, before the Fort of Rungur Nuggul*

*Camp, Rungur Nuggul, October 15, 1848.*

6th Company 8th Battalion Artillery with 4 guns of No. 15 Light Field Battery attached—1 rank and file, wounded.

3d Regiment Native Infantry—2 rank and file, wounded.

2d Irregular Cavalry—1 rank and file, 1 horse, killed, 1 rank and file, 1 horse, wounded.

Total—1 rank and file, 1 horse, killed, 4 rank and file, 1 horse, wounded.

## Inclosure 4 in No. 41.

*Major-General Wheeler to the Adjutant-General.**Camp, near Moraree, six miles north-west of Deenanuggur,  
five south of the Ravee, October 25, 1848.*

THE Fort of Moraree was evacuated during the night, and is now in my possession.

Having reason to expect that they would evacuate the place during the night, I quietly moved with the troop and a (horse) battery of artillery, and the whole of the cavalry, at 7 P M from my camp at Jourah, for the purpose of keeping them in, but in vain.

It is a paltry place, and would have offered no resistance, although several *zumboorahs* are mounted on the walls.

I should state, that I had ordered Major Fisher to move, with 120 sowars of the 15th Irregular Cavalry from Mookerian, to cooperate with the party of the corps of guides under Lieutenant W. S. Hodson, in the endeavour to prevent the escape of the enemy, that he arrived on the morning of the 24th instant, and, though most energetic and zealous, was unsuccessful in his efforts

## Inclosure 5 in No. 41

*Major Lawrence to the Resident at Lahore.**Kohat, November 8, 1848.*

WITH advertence to my letter of the 25th ultimo\*, detailing the occurrences which led to my departure from Peshawur, and arrival here, I report that, up to this date, I have not been able to obtain from Sirdar Sooltan Mahomed Khan the written agreement alluded to in that communication, nor have I, in any way, succeeded in inducing him to fulfil his promise of conveying us to a British post.

It would seem that the Sirdar, having succeeded in his project of ejecting us from Peshawur, and obtaining possession of our persons, has altogether lost sight of the solemn engagement upon which I chiefly relied in placing myself in his power.

I have written to him, repeatedly, without effect, and, for some days past, his son, Sirdar Khoja Mahomed, doubtless by orders, has evidently viewed us in the light of prisoners, not permitting us to go abroad without a guard, and having our residence vigilantly watched, day and night. The few urbobs, who accompanied us from Peshawur, were quickly ordered to return, and the servants we left behind, have not, as yet, been allowed to join us.

Such is their jealousy, and so vigilantly are we guarded, that, although only forty miles distant, we experience great difficulty in holding any communication with our friends at Peshawur, every man coming to, or going from, us, being strictly searched.

Sirdar Peer Mahomed Khan, on the 25th, having given up to the Sikhs the boats I placed under his charge, Sirdar Chuttur Sing, with some officers and a small escort, crossed the Indus at the Bazour ferry, near Jhangera, and made a formal entry, under royal salutes, into Peshawur, on the 3rd instant—all the Barukzye brothers, and their sons, with the officers of the force, meeting him at different distances from the city. Colonel Khan Sng Rosa is said to be the chief of the Peshawur troops, and to have been made a Sirdar.

At a grand Durbar, Chuttur Sng made over the province to Sirdars Sooltan Mahomed Khan and Peer Mahomed Khan, from whom he is said to have received between one and two lakhs of rupees for the gift; the latter was made ostensibly the ruler, though it is well known the former is virtually so. We are said to have been demanded, but the reply was, that we should be kept prisoners till Lahore was taken, when we should be at the disposal of the Sikhs.

The Barukzye brothers have already commenced collecting the revenue,

cancelling the year's settlement made by me, and levying all the taxes which we abolished; in short, they have regularly assumed the reins of government, and seem to consider they are not likely to be called upon to account for their proceedings, their followers, openly and insolently, declaring, that like as we gave up Cabool, so shall we Peshawur.

Noor Mahomed Khan, second son of Sirdar Sooltan Mahomed Khan, and most hostile to us, is reported to have proceeded to Cabool to obtain the countenance and assistance of the Ameer Dost Mahomed Khan; but in this I much doubt his success.

The Sikh force, consisting of about 1,400 cavalry, 5,000 infantry, and thirty field-guns, is reported to have marched with Sirdar Chuttur Sing yesterday, leaving two Mahomedan regiments behind; as also Sirdar Khan Sing, Majeetia, and 200 or 300 Goorchurras. The Sirdar, it is said, has, up to the present date, refused to join the rebels; why the regiments have been left, we have yet to learn.

In conclusion, I regret to say that, till our troops reach Attock, I see no prospect of our liberation; that important fortress, I am happy to report, is not likely to fall into the rebels' hands, then anxiety, now, being to push on to oppose the British army, at length said to be advancing.

Inclosure 6 in No. 41.

*Major-General Whish to the Adjutant-General*

*Camp, Mooltan, November 12, 1848*

WITHIN these two days, I have received from Lieutenants Edwardes and Lake documents which, in justice to the parties concerned, I think it right to forward to you, for submission to the Commander-in-Chief.

His Lordship will observe that, from the 31st ultimo, when the enemy first made their appearance in the vicinity of the camp of the allies, until the 6th instant inclusive, their loss was 37 killed and 144 wounded, and in the action of Sooraj Koond, on the 7th instant, it was — killed, 39 men, 10 horses, wounded, 172 men.

When I wrote my letter of the 9th instant, I was not aware that Second Lieutenant Paton, of Engineers, was on duty at our advanced post, after the defection of the Sikh Regular Regiment there. He was one of several individuals who reported the circumstance to me (at about 2 A.M.), but I am glad to be enabled to associate the above officer with Lieutenants Bunny and Pollock, as highly deserving of being brought to his Excellency's notice.

Inclosure 7 in No. 41.

*Major Edwardes to the Resident at Lahore,*

*Camp, Sooraj Koond, November 10, 1848.*

I FORWARD my letters, together with a report of Lieutenant Pollock, as furnished to Major-General Whish, commanding the Mooltan field force.

I have nothing to add to the details therein given, except that an investigation is now being instituted by General Cortlandt, into the causes of the desertion from the Kuthar Mookhee regiment.

It has been attributed, by some, to the slaughter of a cow by some Mussulmans the night before, close to the Kuthar Mookhee tents; and, certainly, the circumstance caused some excitement at the moment, which subsided, on my arresting the offenders, and imprisoning them, under the terms of the agreement (I believe verbal, but strictly acted up to, by your predecessors at Lahore,) made between the British and Sikh Governments, in March 1846.

In this respect, I have had a hard task to reconcile the rival claims of our numerous Mahomedan allies in the Nawab's and my own forces, and of the Sikh and Hindoo servants of the Durbar. The latter have a holy horror of shedding a cow's blood, and the former as holy an appetite for beef. The treaty obliges me, as a magistrate in the Punjab, to enforce against our friends the most obnoxious prejudice of our enemies.

Still more difficult has it been, to be obliged to request Major-General Whish to forbid the slaughter of kine in his camp, in order that no hungry Mussulman, detected with a steak, might tell me, that he bought it in the shambles of an European regiment.

The general, however, quite coincides with me in the duty of acting up to the treaty.

It is remarkable that the Kuthar Mookhee regiment was the only one of the three regular corps under General Cortlandt which was not with me in the fights of Kineyree and Suddoosain.

Inclosure 8 in No 41

*Major Edwardes to Major-General Whish.*

*Camp, Sooraj Koond, November 9, 1848.*

I FORWARD Lieutenant Pollock's report of the events of the night of the 6th of November, at the battery in front of your camp.

There is no doubt that the defection of the men of the Kuthar Mookhee was premeditated, as those who went had packed up, and taken with them, their most valuable property to the battery, which they would not have done, had they meant to return.

The number of the deserters was 220. At first, half the regiment was reported to have gone; but this originated in the conspirators having called on their other comrades to charge over the entrenchment, when the rebels approached; which they did, but separated themselves from the traitors, and returned to their own camp, as soon as they found out the truth.

The men were all Hindoo, and chiefly from Lucknow; and I am happy to learn that a large proportion of them met a speedy and just retribution in the action of the next day, which their own treachery hurried on.

Inclosure 9 in No 41.

*Major Edwardes to Major-General Whish.*

*Camp, Sooraj Koond, November 9, 1848.*

I HAVE the honor to report such details of the action of the 7th of November, as concerned the irregular auxiliary force under command of myself and Lieutenant Lake.

You will remember that it was decided, at the meeting of staff-officers in your tent, between 4 and 6 A.M. on the 7th of November, that, as about half of one of General Cortlandt's regular regiments had deserted to the enemy during the night, from the battery in front of your camp, it was not advisable to risk entrusting to the irregular force that part of the British attack for which they had been told off over night; while, at the same time, an immediate victory was deemed so indispensable as to require a single attack by the British column, which was finally arranged to come off at 10 A.M.

I left your tent at about half-past 6, and had scarcely reached my own, before a sharp musketry fire opened, at our advanced battery on the nullah; and, growing hotter and hotter, soon proved to be an open attack upon that post by the rebels, in such force as, at one time, to drive completely back the 500 Puthans who held it, and turn the inner flank of the eight-gun battery at the well, 400 yards in front of our camp. The conduct of the gunners, at this trying moment, deserves mention. They drew back their guns from the embrasures, and bringing them to bear on the enemy issuing from the nullah,

discharged grape so rapidly among them as to check the attack. It was only transferred, however, to the bed and banks of the nullah; and though I poured reinforcements on the point, the enemy also received such accession of numbers, that I deemed it right to let you know that the issue was doubtful, and an immediate diversion necessary.

Scarcely, however, had Dr. Cole taken you this message, when General Cortlandt called on his other two regular regiments to prove themselves free from the treachery of the Kuthar Mookhee Pultun; a call readily answered by several companies leaping over their entrenchments. Mr. Quin, my writer, as usual, led them on, and received a spent round shot in his chest, as he mounted the nullah, but one rib only was slightly injured. A close, hand to hand, conflict ensued in the nullah, but a large body of Daoodpotras belonging to the army of Nawab Bahawul Khan, at this moment, gave such timely assistance that the tide was turned, and, after a sharp fight of about half an hour, the rebels were expelled from the nullah, and in full retreat upon their own entrenchments, up to which they were chased by the victors.

This successful repulse completely counterbalanced the effect of the defection of the Kuthar Mookhee, and when (in a shorter time than we could have expected) your column came down to the rescue, I was able to promise Brigadier Markham, that, when he had made his detour, and closed with the enemy's left flank on the east of the nullah, our force should assist him, by taking that share of the attack which was assigned it over night. Accordingly, when, after a lengthened flank movement through the broken ground, most beautifully executed by the British troops, and watched, from the highest banks of the canal, by all our irregulars, with enthusiasm and admiration, the brigades deployed upon the rebel flank, we waited only to give one hearty cheer to the cavalry, as they charged Moolraj's Goochurias, and, then, ourselves formed into line, and advanced up the west side of the nullah to the right of the enemy's entrenchment, in itself a most difficult position, but carried with feeble resistance, in consequence of the rebels being disheartened by one repulse already, and distracted by the British attack upon their left, which they had fondly deemed impregnable.

I regret to say, that the head of the British line reached the east side of the nullah as our irregulars arrived at the passage in the canal, which connected the entrenchment on the east and west, and a party of Sheik Emamooddeen's Rohillas disregarding, in the heat of the action, the order they had received to keep on their own side of the nullah, crossed over, and had captured a gun on the eastern bank, when they were mistaken, by the sepoys, for Moolraj's troops, and two were shot down, before the error could be explained.

I deem it my duty to bring to your notice the noble conduct of a private of Her Majesty's 32nd foot, who, at this juncture, perceiving what was going on, leaped down the canal, and putting himself in front of my Puthans, faced the British troops, and waved his shako on the end of his bayonet, as a signal to cease firing: thus, many friendly lives were saved. The name of this brave man is Howell.

It is only justice for me to mention, that Lieutenant Lake, in command of the Daoodpotras, and Lieutenant Pollock and Mr. Hugo James, at the head of the regular regiments, led their men over, and into, the enemy's works, before General Cortlandt could extricate the artillery from the water cuts in our front, so that the position was carried, without a round shot being fired.

Dewan Chunda Mull, in civil charge of the Nawab's army, was present throughout the fight. Sheik Emamooddeen behaved very well with his men, as did also Dewan Jowahir Mull.

The whole of my cavalry was, along with your reserve troop of horse-artillery, on the right rear of the enemy, and I trust gave you satisfaction.

Our loss, on this day, was, I regret to say, severe (39 killed and 172 wounded), and, during the cannonade from the rebel entrenchment, from the 1st to the 6th of November, 37 killed and 144 wounded. The patient fortitude with which this annoying fire, day and night, was endured, until the fitting moment for action arrived, was very creditable to an irregular force.

I cannot close this report, without acknowledging the indefatigable services of Mr. Assistant-Surgeon Cole, who has, since July last, had upwards of 400 wounded men of this force under his hands, and won gratitude and admiration for European medical skill, in many a mountain home on the banks of the Indus.

**His humanity, however, was, perhaps, never more conspicuous than yesterday, when he saved the lives of many wounded Sikhs upon the field.**

## No. 1.

Return of Killed in the Irregular Force, from the 1st to the 6th of November.

Name of Camp.	Killed.		Wounded	
	men	horses	men.	horses.
Sheik Emamooddeen's .. .. .	10	4	37	..
Foujdar Khan, Futteh Shere Khan, and Kaloo Khan's infantry	9	.	43	..
Ditto cavalry .. .. .	.	..	.	1
General Cortlandt's three regiments and artillery	8	2	26	..
Dewan Jowahir Mull Dutt	5	1	14	1
Misr Sahib Dyal's camp of Rohillas . .	3	.	8	..
Nawab Bahawal Khan's force . .	2	1	15	..
	37	8	143	2

## No 2

Return of Killed and Wounded on the 7th of November, 1818, in the action of Sooraj Koond.

Name of Camp	Killed		Wounded	
	men	horses	men	horses.
Sheik Emamooddeen's .	5	4	30	.
Foujdar Khan, Futteh Shere Khan, and Kaloo Khan's infantry	11	.	41	.
Ditto cavalry .	4	1	10	..
General Cortlandt's three regiments and artillery	12		49	..
Dewan Jowahir Mull Dutt .	2	5	3	..
Misr Sahib Dyal's camp of Rohillas			1	..
Nawab Bahawal Khan's force .	5	.	38	..
	39	10	172	.

## Inclosure 10 in No. 41.

*Lieutenant Pollock to Major Edwards.*

*Camp, Sooraj Koond, November 9, 1848.*

AGREEABLY to your instructions I left the irregular camp, on Monday-night about 10 o'clock P.M., with the Kuthar Mookhee Regiment, 500 of your Murkhas, and about 1,000 of Bahawal Khan's men, the latter accompanied by Lieutenant Lake. Lieutenant Paton of the Engineers came, also, to escort us to the British advanced battery. As our party approached the British camp, a sowar rode up to Lieutenant Lake, and, calling him aside, informed him that the Kuthar Mookhee Regiment had left their own party, and were going over to the enemy. As the men of that regiment were close behind us, and we knew the orders they had received, we concluded that the sowar was laboring under a mistake, and continued our march.

On arriving at the battery, we found that the guns were being withdrawn\*, and proceeded to post our people in the trenches, previously guarded by the regulars, placing more men at each point than they had done, our party being considerably stronger. When our arrangements for the defence of the position

\* With the exception of two Horse Artillery guns, under Lieutenant Bunny, on the left of the



were completed, Lieutenant Lake returned to camp, to prepare for the attack that had been settled to take place next morning.

At about 12 P.M. Colonel Budimath, of the Kuthar Mookhee Regiment, came to the centre of the battery where Lieutenant Paton and myself were lying, and told me that our people were talking among themselves, and murmuring against the withdrawal of the heavy guns. I told him to return, and comfort them with the assurance, that, in the morning, guns would be sent from our camp, and that we need be under no apprehension of an attack, as our party was a much stronger one than the British had considered necessary to detach for the same duty. Sirfiraz Khan was with me from the first, with some of his men, and I told him, also Dewan Sing, and my orderlies, to visit the different posts, and reassure our soldiers. About half an hour had elapsed, when Colonel Budimath returned, evidently alarmed, and told me that the men were leaving. He suggested that he himself should return to camp, and apprise General Cortlandt of the state of affairs. Thus I agreed to, and he left me.

Very soon after this, Sirfiraz's people and my orderlies cried out to us to look out, and, starting up, we heard firing, and shouting, in front of the battery. After a few minutes firing on both sides, other men came running from the trenches, to say that six companies of the Kuthar Mookhees had gone over to the enemy, and that only the Mussulman portion of the corps were staunch. On hearing this, Lieutenant Paton offered to go off to General Whish, to tell him the news, and receive instructions. When he had ridden off, I sent messengers to you and to General Cortlandt, and sent a strong party to Lieutenant Bunny, in case the guns should be attacked. The natives who were round me at the time of the defection, say that they heard the Kuthar Mookhees called, by name, from the front.

When the firing had ceased, I went to consult with Lieutenant Bunny on the left, Sirfiraz Khan and the others accompanying me. I remained with Lieutenant Bunny for about an hour and a half, expecting that the enemy, directly they heard our critical position, would attack us. During this time, as far as I know, not one of Bahawal Khan's men or yours left his post without orders, and I have great pleasure in recording their excellent and soldierly behaviour at so trying a time, behaviour which I feel sure you will not allow to pass unnoticed. Sirfiraz Khan I would mention in particular, as deserving praise; he with his people, as I before mentioned, were with me from the commencement, and I consider the good order that was preserved, where such a scene of confusion might have been expected, mainly attributable to him.

General Whish, on first hearing what had happened, sent a squadron of cavalry under Lieutenant Mulcaster, to assist in withdrawing the guns, but, on his arrival, Lieutenant Bunny nobly refused to abandon me at such a time. Shortly after, Lieutenant Paton returned with the pickets of the British camp, which, after an interview with the General, he had kindly asked out. Had it not been for Lieutenant Paton's zeal on our behalf, reinforcements could not have reached us nearly so soon.

From facts I have since heard, I have no doubt that the Poorbeah Hindoos of the Kuthar Mookhee corps, had arranged, beforehand, that their desertion should take place at this post, and, had an opportunity offered, I have as little doubt that I should, with the other two officers, have been killed, or taken over to the enemy.

In conclusion, I have only to mention that I remained at the battery till about 6 o'clock A.M., when I returned to you for orders, and arrived in time to see the enemy's attack.

Inclosure 11 in No. 41.

*Lieutenant Lake to the Resident at Lahore.*

*Camp, Sooraj Koond, November 9, 1848.*

I FORWARD the copy of my letter to Major-General Whish, C.B. detailing the occurrences in which the Bahawalpore army took a part, during the late attack upon Moolraj's entrenched position. I was well satisfied with the conduct of all parties, but more particularly with the behaviour of Dewan

Chunda Mull, the Nawab's principal officer, of Moizoddeen Khan, a commandant of eighteen hundred, and of Khoora Buksh, Shere Khan, and Mundoo Khan, all commanders of three hundred. I should be glad if, by addressing these individuals direct, or by bringing their names to the favorable notice of the Nawab, you could let them know that their services were appreciated.

**Inclosure 12 in No. 41.**

*Lieutenant Lake to Major-General Whish.*

*Camp, Sooraj Koond, November 9, 1848.*

AS by the plan of attack determined upon by you, against Moolraj's entrenched position, the duty of protecting the British advanced post, during the night of the 6th, devolved upon the irregular force, I proceeded at 9 P.M. to that post, to make arrangements for its occupation. The party told off for this duty were 500 of Lieutenant Edwards' Irregulars, 1000 of the Bahawulpore troops, and the Kuthar Mookhee Regiment, all placed under the command of Lieutenant Pollock. It was midnight before the parties were properly posted; and, as the enemy were then perfectly quiet, I returned to camp, that I might be present, with the main body of my troops, during the contemplated attack on the 7th. For an account of what occurred after my departure, I would refer you to Lieutenant Pollock; I cannot, however, but express my satisfaction at the conduct of the Bahawulpore detachment, who, when they found themselves deserted by large numbers of the Kuthar Mookhee, not only showed no inclination to abandon their post, but repelled an attack made upon them by the Sikhs. This I attribute to Lieutenant Pollock's gallant conduct, who was with them on this trying occasion, and, by his example, restored confidence to all parties.

The defection of the Kuthar Mookhee soldiers became generally known by daylight of the 7th, and produced a very disheartening effect upon the whole of the Nawab's army. Some of his officers counselled an immediate retreat, and separation from the rest of the irregular force; at this juncture, Moolraj's troops made an attack upon our advanced post. Our men gave way; the reinforcements I ordered to their support, did not move with alacrity; our position seemed to be in imminent danger; when, some of General Cortlandt's guns opened grape upon the enemy's advancing column, upon which, at the same time, a flanking fire was brought, by a party of Daoodpotras I sent across the nullah. The enemy, who had, hitherto, advanced, now halted, when a simultaneous rush, made by some Rohillas, and some companies of General Cortlandt's regiments, decided the struggle, and the rebels fled in confusion to their own trenches.

When, at a later period in the day, the British troops had crossed the nullah in front of our camp, and advanced to the attack, the Bahawulpore army, also, moved down, with the remainder of the irregular force, and occupied the enemy's trenches directly in their front. They met with little, or no, resistance.

During the day, the Bahawulpore army suffered a loss of five killed and thirty-eight wounded; of these, the greater number of casualties occurred during the attack on our own camp.

On this occasion, as on every other, I derived the greatest assistance from Peer Ibraheem Khan, the native agent. I feel I cannot speak too highly of his exertions, not only on the 7th, but for six days preceding.

It would be out of place to bring to your notice the conduct of those officers of the Nawab's army, who distinguished themselves on this occasion. I cannot, however, omit mentioning that, during the attack on our camp, Dewan Chunda Mull (the Nawab's chief officer) behaved with the greatest courage and presence of mind.

**Inclosure 13 in No. 41.**

*Lieutenant Taylor to the Resident at Lahore.*

*Esakhail, November 13, 1848.*

I FEAR it is very unlikely that the Sirdar will allow Major Lawrence to leave Kohat.

The present aspect of affairs confirms, to a great extent, the suspicions which, I believe, have previously been entertained, that the interruption to Mrs. Lawrence's first journey did not occur without design, but had, probably, been planned by the Sirdar himself, before Mrs Lawrence left Peshawur. If such be the case, there is little chance of his giving his prisoners up, now, when his designs are, to all appearance, progressing successfully

I am now within eighteen coss of Kalabagh, which is thirty coss from Kohat, a foot traveller can do the whole distance in two days, and Major Lawrence's letter, dated the 9th, reached me on the 12th. Mullick Allyar Khan is most ready to lend every assistance, in his own district of Kalabagh, to the retreating party, and has boats ready for their accommodation, and above him again, on the Kohat road, Mustapha Khan, of Shukur Durrah, is equally willing to assist, and has written to assure me of his anxiety to be of use to Major Lawrence, &c The Fort of Esakhail surrendered to Gholam Hussun Khan, commanding the irregular force now with me, the day before I marched in. In a few days, all the boats above Dera Ismael Khan, and below Attock and its ferries, will, I hope, be in our hands, a good many of them are already so. The garrison of the strong little fort of Lukkee, in Murwut, consisting of 400 or more men, with 2 Junsee guns, a mortar, and zumboorahs, are treating for its surrender, and, at any rate, could do nothing in the open field against this force, and thus, from Kalabagh to Bahawalpore, the journey might be performed without fear of molestation, and you may judge, therefore, of my bitter disappointment at finding that the whole scheme is likely to be baffled by the double dealing of this faithless Affghan. I still, however, hope that when he hears that I am so near, he will, for very shame, and fear of the consequences of the displeasure of our Government, think his wisest course lies in complying with Major Lawrence's, now often reiterated, demand, to be conveyed in safety to Kalabagh. I shall eventually go to the last-named place. I believe Allyar Khan is quite to be trusted, but I have thought it prudent, first, to summon his son who was with me in Bunnoo. I should not be justified in endangering my own liberty, in these times, to procure the liberation of others, whose lives are, I trust, perfectly safe.

I inclose a moorasila, addressed by me, to-day, to Sirdar Sooltan Mahomed Khan, in which I have endeavoured to warn him that, assistance being so near, he can have no excuse for not fulfilling his promises to Major Lawrence, that the whole state of the case will, in a few days, be known to you, that the matter is a much more important one than he may think, and that his future good name, with Englishmen, will depend, entirely, on his conduct in it.

I have, to-day, sent a party of horse to Kalabagh, to conduct my dak, collect, and despatch the boats, &c, the latter I mean to take down to Dera Ismael Khan, and their absence will, I hope, secure this province from annoyance, except indeed from Peshawur itself.

I had the satisfaction of inclosing to Sirdar Sooltan Mahomed Khan a letter of Gholam Kadir Khan, addressed to Sheik Shahahudeen, describing, in familiar, but graphic, terms the late disgraceful defeat of Moolraj's troops at Mooltan, the gallantry of the English troops, and speedy flight of their enemies, the paltry loss of the former, and heavy punishment of the latter. This will encourage the Sirdar as to the ascendant fortune of his new friends, and may not be without its effect.

It will be greatly the Sirdar's wish to force me quickly to retire from this, that his excuse of danger on the road may hold good, and, if there are troops to be spared from the Peshawur or Bunnoo columns, (the latter has, I have just heard, at length crossed the Jhelum, at Korat, 46 coss from this) he may do so, especially as the river, from Attock to Kalabagh, is now open for boats, but now, during the next ten days, he might, with ease, send the whole party to Kalabagh, in safety, and from that place I can be answerable for them. If he fails to

avail himself of the opportunity, no subsequent events can remove the responsibility from his shoulders.

I have received your directions to consider the "bringing away Mrs Lawrence, the sole object of my expedition." At one time, I hoped that I might be fortunate enough to assist the retreat of the whole party, but a new and formidable difficulty has arisen, which, I fear, is likely to frustrate the attempt. All that I am doing in the way of settling this district, and trying to bring Murwut under control, I look upon as mere by-play, but if it results in clearing the atmosphere of those two districts from the presence of the enemy, and enabling a small irregular force to hold them, and collect their revenues, hold all the boats of the Indus, from Kalabagh downwards, and make the annoyance of these well-disposed provinces the work of a considerable force, the time and trouble expended on it will not be thrown away. The instant that, I hear, distinctly, that there is no hope of succeeding, in any degree, in the real object of my journey, I shall turn my thoughts rearwards, and, making the best arrangements I can, for the management of these districts, wend my own way back to Mooltan.

I wrote, many days ago, to Lieutenant Herbert, in Attock, saying that I was totally ignorant of his state and prospects, and merely wrote to tell him that the river route was open, if he wished to take it.

*Esakharil, November 14, 1848.*

P S Late last night, one of Allyar Khan's men arrived, sent by the Mullick himself, to inform me that, on Major Lawrence transmitting to the Sirdar, who was at Peshawur, my first letter, with the request to be immediately conveyed to Kalabagh, the latter sent off two of his sons to Kohat, with directions to convey the males of the party, Major Lawrence, Lieutenant Bowie, and Dr. Thompson, at once, to Peshawur. The Mullick's man had himself gone on Friday, the 10th, to Kohat, to gain information, and arriving there, in the afternoon, found that Major Lawrence and the rest had been carried off, in the morning. Sirdar Chuttur Sing is reported to be still at Peshawur, but Sooltan Mahomed Khan, false double-dealing intriguer as he is, cannot, I trust, prove cowardly ruffian enough to surrender the man who procured his release from irksome durance at Lahore, and restored him to his home, into the hands of the Sikhs. The rights of hospitality and faith, sworn to on the Koran, are things held in some esteem, even by the Affghan Sirdars, and, if he violates them, I trust he will render his own ruin as certain as it will be deserved. I am induced to think that knowing how feasible the plan for bringing off the party was, and how little excuse he would have for not performing his part of the matter, he has invented some new difficulty to serve as a pretext for removing his prisoners from the neighbourhood of help, and I fear my attempt has merely led to the division of the previously comparatively happy party at Kohat, and, perhaps, the substitution of the Peshawur fort for a prison-house, in place of the quiet little country house at Kohat. I did not think Sooltan Mahomed Khan fool enough to pin his faith on men who have been defeated, six times, in the last eight months, and, in the course of those operations, have lost seventeen pieces of cannon.

I have just sent men to Peshawur, to ascertain the fate, and prospects, of the captives.

**Inclosure 14 in No. 41.**

*Major Lawrence to Lieutenant Herbert.*

*Camp, Peshawur, November 13, 1848*

**SIRDAR SOOLTAN MAHOMED KHAN** having given myself, Lieutenant Bowie, and Mr. Thompson, over to Sirdar Chuttur Sing, we arrived in the Sikh camp, on the 11th instant, where we were received by Sirdar Chuttur Sing, who met us at some miles distance, with several officers of rank, and paid us every honorary attention.

We are strictly guarded, but otherwise well treated in every respect; and as Sirdar Chuttur Sing has promised to have my family safely conducted to Jummoo, Syedpore, Rawul Pindee, or any other secure position, deeming it desirable that we should be altogether, I have given Mrs. Lawrence the option of joining me, which I expect she will do to-morrow.

The Sirdar has sent to me, this morning, to say, that he is most anxious to save the shedding of blood, and, therefore, hopes that I will tell you, that he knows, under the circumstances of your position, having no men on whom you can depend, and already more than 100 having deserted, you have no chance of holding Attock, till relieved by our troops; and that he recommends you either joining us, or withdrawing as best you can. He even promises that you and the Nezamoodowlah Mahomed Oosman Khan, shall be conveyed in safety, at once, to Lahore.

Of course, situated as I am, I can give you no orders: you must be the best judge of your own position, and the means of holding it, and will, therefore, act entirely on your own judgment. There are no erasures, or interlineations, in this letter.

Inclosure 15 in No 41

*Lieutenant Herbert to the Resident at Lahore*

Attock, November 14, 1848.

DEEMING the defence of this post, of great importance, I have taken upon myself the responsibility of offering large rewards to the garrison, should they prove faithful to the last.

I received a letter from Sirdar Chuttur Sing, advising me to leave Attock, and place myself in his power, promising to treat me with every respect. I replied, that I had no intention of quitting the fort, until I received orders from Maharajah Duleep Sing, and yourself

Inclosure 16 in No 41

*Lieutenant Herbert to Major Lawrence.*

Attock, November 14, 1848.

WITH regard to my own position, I am perfectly confident that, with the help of God, I can hold out Attock, for a length of time. I have a strong garrison of Mahomedans, inimical to the very name of the Sikhs, at whose hands they have suffered severely, and who have all sworn upon the Koran to stand firm by me to the last

I have, moreover, received a note from the Resident, dated the 2nd of November, from which, I learn, that a large force had then crossed the Ravee, and was moving up

We feel confident of the arrival of succours in a few days.

Inclosure 17 in No. 41.

*Lieutenant Herbert to the Resident at Lahore.*

November,\* 1848.

A LITTLE before midnight on the 9th instant, I received information from my sentries, that the enemy had brought some guns to the neighbourhood of the fort of Khyrabad; and, immediately proceeding to the nearest spot, I saw some figures moving about, as if employed erecting a battery, and directed a few round shot to be fired, intending to hinder their work; but, reflecting that this object could scarcely be effected, I desisted from what might be a mere waste of ammunition.

Early yesterday morning, they opened a fire from four guns, which I am happy to say that my artillerymen returned with good heart, firing with great precision. This continued for some time, but, unfortunately, the carriages of all the guns (four) which I could bring to bear upon the enemy's batteries, failed from age, &c., and became for the time *hors de combat*. They were, however,

repaired during the day and night. The enemy kept up a desultory fire all day, doing, I am thankful to say, no material injury.

The main camp was halted yesterday, but, early this morning, it moved so as to lie close under the hills. Some men have been about, as if arranging spots to erect batteries, and a few shells were fired upon the fort, from a gun in a hollow, screened from sight.

I presume they will endeavour to erect batteries on the land side, during the course of the ensuing night.

I should take this opportunity to report that, having received frequent hints that Commander Futteh Khan was in correspondence with the enemy, and meditated treachery, I deemed it absolutely necessary, a few days ago, to send him from the fort.

I gave the artillerymen (except the Sikhs whom I expelled) the option of accompanying him to the Sikh camp, or remaining to serve the British Government, promising that, if they accepted the latter, they should be considered entitled to the rewards given to the soldiers of the Company's army.

I have, also, given a promise of reward, and protection, to the Puthans and their families, for service to the end of the war, and they have, in return, sworn fidelity on the Koran.

Your private letter of the 2nd instant to Major Lawence has just reached, and the news contained in it of the advance of troops, is most acceptable, and has given a stimulus to all.

Inclosure 18 in No 41.

*Lieutenant Taylor to the Resident at Lahore.*

*Esakhail, November 18, 1848.*

I FORWARD a letter, received this morning, from Mullick Allyar Khan of Kalabagh, inclosing a communication from a private friend of his own at Kohat, from which it appears that Sirdar Sooltan Mahomed Khan has actually been villain enough to give up the whole of his prisoners to Sirdar Chuttur Sing. I can scarcely yet believe it, another day will bring me intelligence from Peshawur itself, I hope. A havildar of the guides whom I dispatched many days ago, has been seen making his way back to me, he will be able to give me certain information on the subject. The impression among those about me is, that Chuttur Sing has insisted on this, in order that he may negotiate the release of his son Golab Sing, and of the Ranee. I remember, when Sirdar Chuttur Sing first rebelled, on my expressing to Sirdar Jhunda Sing, connected with the former by marriage, or rather betrothal, my astonishment at so old and wise a man being guilty of so rash a step, he replied, that it was certainly "very extraordinary so wise a man, and hitherto so faithful, and the devoted servant of the Ranee." I took no notice of the remark, at the time, but have since thought it might prove the key to Chuttur Sing's conduct, during the whole affair.

When the news, received to-day, is confirmed, my object in remaining here will be removed, and I intend to proceed, via Lukkee, to Dera Ismael Khan, and from thence to Mooltan, in time to meet the Bombay columns.

The officers of the Lukkee garrison have come in to me, and, I believe, fully intended to give up the fort, but, on returning to do so with my thannah, the soldiers manned the walls, and told them to keep off. This is extremely inconvenient, as the garrison is strong; they have two guns, a mortar, and zumboorahs, and a strong little fort to defend, while this irregular force has no means and appliances for taking it; as, however, the whole of the Mullicks of Murwut have come in to me here, and have professed their perfect allegiance, I intend to march into the district to assume the civil management of it, without reference to the recusant thannah in the fort; I think the latter will yield after a time, and then the gain will be great, as all enemies will be cleared out of this side of the river, and, with the boats removed, all will be safe.

Meer Alum Khan, the rebel occupant of Duleepgurh in Bunnoo, writes to me that he is only holding the fort till I come, but that he would not advise my coming, just at present, as there are thousands of Wuzerees and Dourees

collected round, and about, him, with the intention of razing the fort to the ground; for the present, therefore, he, Alum Khan, will protect the fort, and the Government property in it, till Mooltan has fallen, and we have leisure to come and take our own, when he will be most happy to surrender all. I have written him a suitable answer, and told him to meet me with the rest of the Bunnoo Mullicks, if I summon them to Lukkee, which I have not yet done. I have received communications from all the rest of the Bunnoo Mullicks

The Mullicks of Murwut were with me this evening, and asked anxiously when the order for cow-killing was coming out, which they seemed to think was unnecessarily delayed.

Inclosure 19 in No. 41.

*Major Edwardes to the Resident at Lahore.*

*Camp, Sooraj Koond, November 19, 1848.*

IT is with great regret I forward to you letters from Major George Lawrence and Lieutenant Taylor, conveying the melancholy intelligence that the former officer is, a second time, a hostage in the hands of Affghans; and Lieutenant Bowie and Mr Thompson with him. Mrs. George Lawrence, her maid servant, and Mrs. Thompson, are still at Kohat, and I gather from this circumstance, that the object of Sooltan Mahomed Khan in sending for the gentlemen of the party, was not to give them up, as requested, to Sirdar Chuttur Sing, but to prevent their making arrangements for escape with the ladies.

Lieutenant Taylor relies upon Koran honor and hospitality to bind the Barukzyes in defending the lives of our countrymen. These, I am afraid, would be feeble ties, but we may rely, with considerable confidence, on so wary an intriguer as Sooltan Mahomed, not closing, hopelessly, behind him the door of reconciliation with the English. The man who preserved, at one time, the complete friendship of two such deadly enemies, Maharajah Goolab Sing, and Raja Lal Sing, is not likely to throw his whole weight into one scale, though tempted with such a bait as Peshawur.

It is a great comfort to think that similar considerations will secure our countrywomen from everything but the mental anxiety attending separation from friends and home.

The train of thought which this new turn of affairs naturally induces, leads me to mention, that it is no secret among the Affghan merchants, now coming down from Khorassan, that Ameer Dost Mahomed Khan is enlisting soldiers to some extent, and gives out that they are to collect revenue in the neighbourhood of Jellalabad.

Inclosure 20 in No. 41.

*Mr. Lawrence to the Resident at Lahore.*

*November 22, 1848.*

I, YESTERDAY, received information from Mr. Barnes, the Deputy-Commissioner, from Noorpoor, that the fort of Puthankote had been attacked by a large body of Sikh insurgents, who were said to have five or six guns, to number upwards of 1000 horse and foot, and who were expecting reinforcements from the Baree Doab. On receiving this information, I made a forced march, this morning, of 30 miles, and arrived here at 11 A.M. I am given to understand by Mr. C. Saunders, that Major Simpson of the 29th Native Infantry had received an express from Mr. Barnes calling for assistance, and that the Major had marched with seven companies towards Puthankote, and had applied to Major Wintle of the 71st Native Infantry at Boodeepind, to supply a wing of that regiment, for the protection of Hajepore. Mr. G. Barnes had written to Major Ferris, commanding the Hill Corps, to move 300 men on Noorpoor, and I sent an express, last night, for the whole regiment to march.

At the present moment, I cannot calculate that more than 300 infantry

from Kangra, and 500 from Hajeepore, are advancing on Puthankote, with the disadvantage of this latter place being so situated, that the two forces can hardly join, without being attacked, singly, by an enterprising enemy.

I leave this, to-morrow morning, for Mookerian, with four guns of the European troop of Horse Artillery, which, at my request, Colonel Wilkinson has placed at my disposal, and with 300 men of Major Hodgson's Sikh Corps.

I have, also, after consulting with that officer, written to Kurtapore, for one squadron of the 10th Cavalry to march on Mookerian, and shall take them on, or not, with reference to the information I acquire there. If I find that the rebels are in great force, and that more troops are necessary, I shall propose to the officer commanding at Hajeepore, to place one company in the fort of Mookerian to guard the ladies of the corps and valuable property, and to take on the four companies with us.

I understand that the insurgents are reported to have with them Lal Sing, Morareea, Bisemer Sing, and other petty Sirdars, as well as Ram Sing, the son of the Noorpoor vuzeer. It is said that they have plundered Sojanpore, and other places in the Sikh territory, as well as several of the British villages on the frontier.

I take the liberty of suggesting that, while the Commander-in-Chief and so large a portion of the army are engaged, beyond the Chenab, and probably, eventually, on the other side of the Jhelum, it would be expedient to have a brigade moving up and down the northern portion of the Baice Doab, between Deenanuggur and Buttala, and another brigade of the reserve force at Puti, so as to command its southern portion. These troops would, thus, overrun the whole of the Baree Doab, and yet protect our own territory. It is the general opinion among intelligent natives who are well inclined to Government, that the Sikhs will endeavour to avoid pitched battles, but break up into small detachments, to ravage and plunder the country, uniting when it may appear advantageous, and separating when pursued. If such should be the case, it is of great moment that the frontier, and rear of the scene of operations, should be well secured.

I, further, beg to add, that the frontier, from Nowshera on the Beas, up to the Hills, is completely exposed to depredation. There are, still, but three companies at Noorpoor, no portion of which are available for the field. The Irregular Cavalry corps, which was stationed at Mookerian, has gone on service, leaving but 40 men, I hear, in their lines, some of whom are temporarily unfit for service. Any force moving towards Puthankote, labors under the disadvantage of having to cross the Beas, and march with their flank exposed, and, therefore, should have a respectable cavalry force with them. In the whole Doab, there is now but the 10th Light Cavalry, a wing of which is at Jullundur, and another at Kurtapore; I would suggest that the one at Kurtapore be transferred to Mookerian, until the irregulars returned from service.

Inclosure 21 in No. 41.

*The Resident at Lahore to the Secretary with the Governor-General.*

*Lahore, November 23, 1848.*

IT is with very great regret that I forward letters, this day received from Major Edwardes at Mooltan, and Lieutenant Taylor at Esakhail, on the Indus, reporting the removal of Major Lawrence, Lieutenant Bowie, and Sub-Assistant Surgeon Thompson, from Kohat to Peshawur, on the night of the 11th instant.

A servant of Syud Ali Reza Kham, one of our Affghan pensioners, residing at Lahore, arrived from Peshawur, about an hour before I received Major Edwardes' letter. He was with Major Lawrence at Kohat, and was present when he arrived at Peshawur, on the 12th instant his account is very circumstantial. From this man's statement, which appears true, there seems no doubt that Sooltan Mahomed Khan has really made over Major Lawrence, Lieutenant Bowie, and Dr. Thompson, to Sirdar Chuttur Sing.

It is scarcely to be believed, that the perfidious Affghan would do this, the motives mentioned by Major Edwardes would, one would have thought, have prevented him. He must really believe that the Sikhs are likely to be shortly more powerful in the Punjab, than the British.



## Inclosure 22 in No. 41.

*The Resident at Lahore to Mr. Lawrence.**Lahore, November 24, 1848.*

ON the receipt of your letter yesterday morning, mentioning the report of a force being at Puthankote, I wrote off to Lieutenant Hodson, who, with Brigadier Wheeler's brigade, would be at Kullalwala, in the Rechna Doab, not very far distant from Puthankote, to make arrangements for your support, and to put himself in communication with you; and I have now sent off your letter to Brigadier Wheeler, directing him to move up to the Ravee, and cross to your aid.

I have urged on the Commander-in-Chief the necessity for employing Brigadier Wheeler's force, on the two sides of the Ravee, and I am forming two small brigades to move about the Barea Doab, which will be ready as soon as the 9th Irregulars arrive at Lahore. In the meantime, Brigadier Wheeler's force on the Ravee will, I trust, be all that is requisite.

I authorize your removing the wing of the 10th Light Cavalry from Kurtarpore to Mookerian, if, notwithstanding the arrangements I have mentioned above, you consider it desirable to do so.

## Inclosure 23 in No. 41.

*The Resident at Lahore to the Commander-in-Chief.**Lahore, November 24, 1848*

I FORWARD a correspondence regarding a band of insurgents who are reported to have attacked Puthankote, on the Hill frontier of the Jullundur districts. Puthankote is on the Ravee, not very far from Deenanuggur; and Brigadier Wheeler at Kullalwala is well situated to reinforce, and support, Mr. Lawrence. I am in hopes that Mr. Lawrence will have ascertained the position of Brigadier Wheeler's force, and will have called on that officer direct for assistance.

These occurrences prove the justice of what I urged on your Lordship,—the necessity for Brigadier Wheeler's force remaining, for the present, in the neighbourhood of the Ravee, ready to put down petty insurgents, on both banks of that river.

## Inclosure 24 in No. 41.

*Raja Shere Sing and the Sardars of his Camp to the Resident at Lahore.**Ramnuggur, November 24, 1848.*

THE British have obtained for themselves a far spread reputation, by the kindness they have shown, in bestowing upon various illustrious persons extensive revenues, as, for instance, the King of Lucknow, for whose support a large sum was settled, which he is allowed to enjoy in peace and security, and in no instance has any breach of faith taken place.

Maharajah Runjeet Sing, till the time of his death, preserved an undiminished friendship with the British, for the space of thirty-five years, in which he was imitated by Maharajah Khurruck Sing, Koonwur Nao Nehal Sing, and Maharajah Shere Sing. After the Sutlej campaign, in which the Khalsa army suffered a becoming punishment, for having broken the friendship which, till that time, had subsisted, the Governor-General, having at heart the welfare of the Maharajah's kingdom, made a new treaty.

It is strange, indeed, that, notwithstanding the efforts of the Khalsa, and the good faith of the British, the present disturbances have taken place. The reason, however, is to be found in the evil dealing, and faithlessness, of the members of the Durbar, who have neither regarded the credit of their own kingdom, nor respected the good name of the British.

Should the British desire to know the whole particulars, they will find them in the annexed points, which will clearly show the origin of all the disturbances which have arisen. When these remarks are taken carefully into consideration, and with a view to the stability of Maharajah Duleep Sing's kingdom, and the preservation of the good name of the British, these disturbances will, immediately, be put a stop to.

*Detail of points urged by Raja Shere Sing and the Sirdars of his Camp.*

Maharajah Runjeet Sing preserved an unbroken friendship with the British, for the space of thirty-five years, without regard to expense, or loss, to himself. At the time of the Cabool campaign, he deputed Koonwur Nao Nehal Sing and the principal Sirdars of the State, to accompany the British troops to Peshawur, with orders to afford every possible aid and assistance. This he did, under the impression that it would tend to strengthen the friendship which existed between him and the British Government.

In like manner, Maharajah Khurruck Sing and Koonwur Nao Nehal Sing kept up the friendly relations which had existed previously, on Mr. Clerk sending for the Ghulzies, they were immediately forwarded under the care of Fakcer Azeezooddeen; and, subsequently, on Mr. Clerk's request, Sirdar Sooltan Mahomed Khan was sent to him, by Koonwur Nao Nehal Sing's orders, under charge of Dewan Hakim Raee.

Subsequently, Maharajah Shere Sing sent his troops under Sirdar Golab Sing, Povindea, to accompany the British army to Cabool; while, at the same time, Koonwur Purtab Sing and Raja Golab Sing were deputed to Peshawur to give assistance in procuring supplies, ammunition, &c. This friendly aid was given, until the arrival of the British troops at Ferozepore.

In the treaty made with Maharajah Runjeet Sing, it was arranged that the Sikh Government should have permission, on giving notice to the British Government, to send 200 or 300 sowars, and a gun, across the Sutlej to punish refractory zemindars. On one occasion, Sirdar Joala Sing, Purdhamia, accompanied by 1,000 sowars and two guns, crossed the river, and inflicted such severe punishment on the people of Kotkupoora, that, from that time, no one dared to create a disturbance.

In the time of Maharajah Duleep Sing, Dewan Hakim Raee, with 100 sowars, was sent across the river, for the purpose of repressing the disturbances then existing beyond the Sutlej, and putting a stop to the prevailing system of murder and highway robbery. In the meantime, an insurrection arose among the Khalsa troops, and Raja Heera Sing was killed. An additional 100 sowars were sent to the assistance of Hakim Raee, who was unable to deal with the zemindars. As this was imagined to be contrary to the treaty, they were not suffered to cross, and their officers were maltreated. In consequence of this, the revenue of the Cis-Sutlej States, estimated at eighteen lakhs, was lost, and the authority of the Sikh Government over the country was put an end to, by the interference of the British Government, who disregarded the terms of friendship, which formerly existed.

When the Sikh army, heedless of the tender age of the Maharajah, and the respect due to the Maharanee, marched, without leaders, and contrary to the counsels of the Sirdars, across the river, they were defeated, and overthrown by the British, who advanced to this side of the Sutlej, and encamped at Kussoor. Raja Golab Sing, Raja Deena Nath, and Bhaee Ram Sing waited on the Governor-General, and explained the disobedience of orders of the Sikh army, upon which, his Lordship, in consideration of the helplessness of the Maharajah and the Maharanee, directed that the sum of 2½ crores of rupees should be paid to defray the expenses incurred in the war. As the Maharanee and Maharajah had nothing to do with what had taken place, which solely originated with the army, who had been punished for their temerity, this arrangement of the Governor-General could merely have been to attain certain ends. If the army had not been sufficiently punished, the Governor-General should have inflicted further castigation upon them. That man is not a friend who assists merely in the time of strength and power; but his friendship is to be depended on, who takes your hand, in the moment of weakness.

When the Maharajah went to Lullianee to pay his respects to the Governor-

General, Raja Golab Sing, Raja Deena Nath, Bhace Ram Sing, and Sirdar Chuttur Sing offered several suggestions, regarding the sum demanded, but in vain. At last, it was settled that the Cis-Sutlej States and Jullundur Doab should be made over in payment, and that  $1\frac{1}{2}$  crore should be paid by three instalments of 50,00,000 the first in Phagoon, 1902; the second in Chait, 1903; and the third in Chait, 1904. After the arrival of the Governor-General at Lahore, this arrangement was broken through, and the Kohistan country and Cashmere were taken, in lieu of one crore, and the gold and silver in the Toshakhana seized in payment of the remaining 50,00,000 rupees.

The Hill country and Cashmere were made over to Raja Golab Sing, who, by the favor of the Sikh Government, was raised from a humble to a lofty position, and who, forgetting what was due from him as a servant of the State, set himself up in an independent sovereignty. It cannot be believed that such an arrangement showed any regard for the previous friendship with Maharajah Runjeet Sing, or for securing the stability of Maharajah Duleep Sing's kingdom. However, not one of the Durbar offered any opposition to the wishes of the British Government.

The British Government, professing a wish to reduce the expenditure of the Maharajah's kingdom, which would indeed have been an act, in accordance with the friendship so long preserved with the Sikh Government, made the following reductions, entailing a loss to the State of seventy lakhs.

- 1 Twenty-two lakhs, for the support of the British troops.
- 2 Thirty Lakhs, remitted to the zemindars on the former revenue
- 3 Eight lakhs, on account of expenses of the various criminal jurisdictions, fixed at four lakhs, and which previously used to pay to the Government four lakhs, in excess of their expenditure.
4. Eight lakhs, lost in the remission of the customs dues.
5. Two lakhs, expended in erecting buildings, making roads, &c.

From the above statement, it is clear that the British Government, acting on the suggestion of evil-disposed persons, have never had at heart the welfare of the Maharajah's kingdom.

Considering the above mentioned loss to the revenue, of seventy lakhs, and the straitened condition of the Maharajah, as to money, and even clothing, it is impossible to imagine that friendship could have guided the views of the British Government. It can only be supposed that, being led astray by evil councillors, they have forgotten what was due to their good name, and their position, as supporters of the Maharajah's kingdom.

Maharajah Runjeet Sing collected, in the government Toshakhana, great quantities of gold and silver articles, and various kinds of clothing, which he was in the habit of sending to the British Government, and distributing to the troops and Sirdars, and from which the State derived great credit and importance. The whole of these have been sold.

It should, also, be considered what sum of money was in the Motie Munder treasury, when the British arrived at Lahore, and what sum is in it now. Notwithstanding the Resident having expressed a wish that it should become as full as formerly, there is now nothing left in it.

The British Government have imprisoned, and sent off to Benares, the Maharanee, mother of the Maharajah, whom it would have been befitting to have treated with the respect due to those of her sex, who are accustomed to remain in privacy and retirement. Since her departure, no advantage has been gained in settling the affairs of the kingdom, and the treatment she has experienced shows but little friendship on the part of the British.

The whole of the people of the Punjab, whether high or low, have been dispirited by this conduct; and the Sirdars, who voted for her expulsion from the country, did so, solely to protect their own dignity and honor, and to meet the wishes of the Resident. How could her well-wishers dare to express their thoughts?

Raja Tej Sing, whose incapacity was well known to Maharajah Runjeet Sing, and who only received an appointment in the army, on account of the Maharajah's affection for Jemadar Khosal Sing, has been promoted to the highest station in the kingdom, notwithstanding that he never led the troops of the Khalsa, as Sirdar Golab Sing, Povindea, Umeer Sing, Man, or General Sooktan Mahomed Khan, has done, and, in no instance, has been known to display any ability, or courage, or to have been entrusted with any share in the government of the country.

Again, Mool Sing, who was a common moonshee on thirty rupees a month, in the service of Sirdar Hure Sing, and, subsequently, in that of Jemadar Khosai Sing, has been raised to a position of great importance, and is entirely in the confidence of the Resident. This has greatly grieved, and disgusted, the Sirdars and others.

Dewan Moolraj, whose father Sawun Mull, for many years, ruled the province of Mooltan, with great reputation, and whose good service has frequently been mentioned, and praised, by the British, seeing the disorder that prevailed in the kingdom, sent in his resignation, and, on Mr. Agnew's being deputed to receive charge of the province from him, made over the fort, and all its ammunition, and stationed that officer's guards inside. By chance, a wretched soldier, without the instigation, or advice, of the Dewan, murdered Mr. Agnew, and, by degrees, the affair acquired its present importance. The sepoy is, to this day, a prisoner in the fort.

By the evil counsel of Tej Sing, a force was sent against Bhace Maharaj Sing, who was a fakeer, and the spiritual preceptor of the Khalsa, and who, in no way, interfered with the affairs of government, and the villages of Kariala, &c. were burnt and sacked. This was pure oppression and tyranny, and has excited the indignation of the whole of the Khalsa.

Many Sirdars, who were of great consideration in the time of Maharajah Runjeet Sing, have, through the instigation of Raja Tej Sing and Mool Sing, been degraded, imprisoned, and even hung; receiving a severe punishment for even a trifling offence. This treatment has caused great apprehension to both Hindoos and Mussulmans, who fear lest they should incur similar undeserved punishment.

The affair in Hazara originated solely in the injustice and oppression exercised by Captain Abbott against Sirdar Chuttur Sing, much might be said on this point, but it is not necessary to allude to all the particulars, at present, at full length.

Notwithstanding that the British Government has nothing to do with the management of affairs in the Punjab, not a single order is issued, except when bearing the Resident's signature.

This is contrary to the spirit of the treaty, made by the British Government with the Lahore State.

Although the army of the Khalsa received severe punishment at the hands of the British, Raja Tej Sing proclaimed, in open Durbar, that the hair and beards of all the Khalsa should be cut off. Such a speech was highly offensive to the Sikhs, and has caused general indignation.

In every former, and in the present, treaty, it was stipulated that the crime of cow killing should be severely punished. In Maharajah Runjeet Sing's time the penalty was hanging, and, in the code promulgated by the British, the punishment is imprisonment, for life, or for a term of years. No punishment, however, is inflicted upon those who transgress in this point, which is clearly contrary to all notions of friendship, and is in opposition to the faith of the Khalsa.

In Peshawur, Major George Lawrence, through enmity, and opposition to the Sikhs, removed the guns from the Khalsa troops, and collected 4000 or 5000 of the Moolkias to attack them at night, whereas the Sikhs had never disobeyed, or acted contrary to his orders.

When Raja Shere Sing, with the Sirdars and the troops, were deputed to Mooltan, to assist Major Edwardes, they implicitly followed the directions of that officer, in no way deviating from his orders. In fact, Major Edwardes, in writing to the Resident, expressed his approval of their behaviour. In accordance with Major Edwardes' orders, Soojan Sing, Alloowalla, who was a Sirdar, was blown away from a gun, notwithstanding that such condign punishment is opposed to the customs of the Khalsa. By this conduct they hoped to have obtained credit for themselves, but instead, they became objects of suspicion and want of confidence, which was shown by Major Edwardes directing the Sirdars to remove their troops to a distance from the British camp. Consequently, all the troops became dispirited and grieved, and, at length, resolved to join Dewan Moolraj. Had Major Edwardes not shown this want of confidence, the Sikhs would never have gone over.

Major Edwardes wrote to all the Puthan zemindars, on the other side of the Indus, directing them to join him to oppose the Sikhs, and promising to

remit to them seven years' revenue; and also made over to the people of Bahawal Khan the districts that he obtained possession of, in the Mooltan territory.

This conduct has greatly irritated the Khalsa

When the insurrection took place among the troops at Mooltan, Sirdar Shumshere Sing, Sindanwalla and Sirdar Ootar Sing, Kaleewala, in company with the other Sirdars, came to an agreement, in Raja Shere Sing's tent, to go over to Moolraj; but, after having joined the Dewan, they seized an opportunity of escaping, and instilled into Majoi Edwardes the confidence that he formerly had in them.

Much might be said as regards Futteh Khan Towanah having, by the instigation of Majoi Edwardes, imprisoned Ram Sing, Chappeewalah, and planned the murder of the officers of the Bunnoo troops; but there is not room to dilate on this subject.

Should you have any wish to examine, more fully, into the points above mentioned, in which the grievances of the servants of Government, and of the Sirdars of the State, are set forth, further particulars shall be given; and it is to be hoped that, after a careful consideration as to which side is in the right, you will be enabled to come to such a decision as may extinguish the torch of dissension which is now lighted, and make arrangements which will secure the stability of the Maharajah's kingdom, and redound to the credit of the British Government.

Inclosure 25 in No. 41.

*The Resident at Lahore to the Secretary with the Governor-General.*

*Lahore, November 25, 1848.*

I CANNOT attempt to send Lieutenant Herbert instructions as to giving up Attock, or trying to hold out. Eleven days have elapsed since his letter was written, and the fate of the fortress must have been decided ere this, or, at any rate, long ere any reply from me could reach him.

I have scarcely any hope of the fortress holding out, if the siege is prosecuted by the rebel army, and I have little doubt of treachery within.

I cannot see any prospect of our troops reaching Attock, under the most favorable circumstances, for some months; and I think Lieutenant Herbert would have been perfectly justified in giving up the fort, and securing his own present safety, under the circumstances in which he was placed.

I have had no intimation of what Sirdar Chuttur Sing may propose to effect, by the possession of the persons of the British officers.

There seems very little doubt, that the Ameer Dost Mahomed Khan is in communication with the Sikh Sirdar, and that the province of Peshawur has been made over to the Baukzyes, but it remains to be seen, whether Dost Mahomed will give the aid of his troops in the coming operation.

Inclosure 26 in No. 41.

*Mr. Lawrence to the Resident at Lahore.*

*Camp, Deenanuggur, November 26, 1848.*

IN my letter of the 22nd instant, I had the honor to report, that a body of Sikh insurgents had crossed the frontier, and invested the fort of Puthankote, which was garrisoned by fifty men of the second Sikh Local Infantry, and some police. The fort would have fallen into their hands from want of provisions, but that Major Simpson, commanding the 29th Native Infantry, kindly marched to its relief, on the 22nd instant, with six companies of his corps, on the requisition of Mr. G. C. Barnes, the Deputy Commissioner of Kangra. The insurgents then retired to Deenanuggur. I was on my way to the spot, with the Sikh corps under Major Hodgson, and four guns of Horse Artillery under Major Waller, but, in the way, heard of its security. I, however, continued my march to Mookerian, but countermanded the squadron of the 10th Light Cavalry I had summoned from Kirtarpore.

At Mookerian, I heard that Major Simpson had called for support from Boodh Pind, and that a wing of the 71st Native Infantry, and two nine-pounders, which had marched to his aid, had crossed the Beas, and moved, via Deenanuggur, towards Puthankote; but the officer in command, on hearing of the retreat of the insurgents, retraced his steps to Mookerian. At Major Simpson's request, whom I had asked to remain at Puthankote, I have requested the officer commanding the 71st Native Infantry to allow two companies of the 71st Native Infantry to garrison Hajeepore, and sent the remainder of the detachment, and guns, back to Boodh Pind.

Yesterday, the 25th, having ascertained from my spies that a portion of the insurgents, to the number of about 300, were at Deenanuggur, that they had plundered, and murdered several people, and were raising men in every direction, I determined to make an attempt to disperse them. I, accordingly, wrote to Major Ferris, C. B., of the 2nd Sikh Local Infantry, and to Major Simpson of the 29th Native Infantry, requesting them to make a night march from Puthankote, so as to cut the enemy off from retreat by the Ravee, and, with 300 men of Major Hodgson's Sikh Corps, two guns under Major Waller, and 100 horse, I crossed the Beas last night, and marched on the insurgent camp. We arrived between six and seven o'clock, one hour too late to catch them all asleep. As it was, we came on them, and they turned out to fight, but were dispersed by a few rounds from the Horse Artillery. Unfortunately, Major Ferris' march had been so delayed by the difficulties of the road, that his force arrived later by an hour than we did, which enabled the enemy to effect their retreat. We killed, however, several of them, and wounded others, taking prisoners some fourteen or fifteen (the return I have not yet obtained), and among others a noted character of Shahpore, in the Kangra District, who was one of Ram Sing's chief aides in the late disturbance at Noorpoor. I may here observe that the Sikh corps, though knowing that they were going against Sikhs, evinced the greatest spirit and alacrity on the occasion.

Could I have staid here a few days, I think I might have done some good, and arrested a number of the ringleaders of the insurgents, but, yesterday, I heard, from Mr G. Barnes, that the Raja of Muhlmore, the representative of the old Katoch Rajas, has occupied the Palace at Teera, seized, and confined the police, fired a royal salute, and is raising men for rebellion. Mr Barnes started, this morning, with half the Hill Corps which had come down from Kangra, and the other half follow, to-morrow, from this place. I can hardly yet believe that the Raja can mean to rebel. He is, physically and mentally, (though but a young man) utterly unsuited for such an enterprise. He, and his late brother, whom he succeeded, were rescued from poverty and contempt by the British Government, and made free and independent. He has, personally, been on the most friendly footing with both Mr. Barnes and myself, from whom he has invariably received kindness and attention.

I also regret to have, further, to report that I have, this day, received an express from Mr C. Saunders, at Hoshiarpore, informing me that the old Raja of Jeswan has rebelled, and seized the Rissaldar and Thannadar of Umb. This old chief was not only confirmed in all his estates by Government, but actually obtained a pension of 6,000 rupees a year for his own, and his son's, life, besides all the expenses which he was supposed to have incurred during the late war. He is weak even to imbecility, but his son, and some of his chief servants are disreputable and intriguing characters, but I never imagined could prove dangerous.

Inclosure 27 in No. 41.

*Roobukaree of the Resident at Lahore, November 27, 1848.*

A DOCUMENT purporting to have been signed and sealed by the following persons :

Shere Sing, Attareewala.  
Ootar Sing, Attareewala.  
Ram Sing, Chappeewala.  
Lal Sing, Morareea.

Jowahir Sing, son of Hurree Sing.  
 Urjun Sing, son of Hurree Sing.  
 Ruttun Sing, Goorjakea.  
 Shumshere Sing, Mareewalah.  
 Soorutt Sing, Majeeta.  
 Urjun Sing, Rungurnuglia.  
 Khooshal Sing, Morareea.  
 Meean Prithee Sing  
 Raee Bucheler, son of Raee Kesree Sing.  
 Dewan Hakim Raee.  
 Dewan Gunput Raee.  
 General Bal Sing, artillery  
 General Bishur Sing.  
 Sirdar Shere Sing, son of Joandar Khooshal Sing.  
 Deebee Sahae.

With a paper containing twenty-five paragraphs, has been sent to me by Mr. Cocks, the chief assistant to the Resident with his Excellency the Commander-in-Chief, who states that it was sent to him, from the camp of Shere Sing, and others in arms against the Government.

These documents were accompanied by similar papers addressed to the Governor-General of India

It is needless to advert to the subjects mentioned, with much distortion and perversion of facts, in the twenty-five paragraphs of the paper above alluded to; nor is it necessary to refer to the matters omitted, the conduct and offences of the persons now in arms against the Government of the Maharajah, and the British power

A Government cannot hold any communication with rebels, with swords in their hands, and in arms against constituted authority.

A proclamation was issued from this office on the 18th of this month. It behoves all persons to note well what was written in that paper. Those who really desire the good of their country, and who have any respect to their own safety and interests, should attend to the warnings and injunctions of that proclamation.

The disaffected, and rebellious, who continue in arms, must be punished; and the authority of the Government in all the provinces must be re-established; before any question can be entered upon, regarding arrangements for the administration of the country, or other matters.

#### Inclosure 28 in No. 41

*The Resident at Lahore to the Secretary with the Governor-General.*

*Lahore, November 28, 1848.*

I FORWARD certain documents addressed to his Lordship, and forwarded to me by Mr. A. H. Cocks, my assistant with the Commander-in-Chief

These documents have been sent by Raja Shere Sing and the rebel Sirdars of his camp. They are the counterparts of documents addressed to myself

I have not considered it right to address the writers in reply; but I have recorded an official roobukaree, a copy of which I have directed Mr. Cocks to forward to Shere Sing and his associates

Mr. Cocks gave the messenger a reply from the Commander-in-Chief, merely stating his acknowledgments for the safe restoration of an European soldier, who had been seized, at a distance from the camp, and was sent in to the Commander-in-Chief; and dismissed him from the camp, stating that the papers had been forwarded, but that operations against the rebels would not be suspended, pending any reply which might be given.

The paper containing the twenty-five articles is not unskillfully drawn up, though it abounds with mis-statements, and the facts which are mentioned are distorted and perverted, in order to make out a case of grievance against the British Government.

The writer is supposed to be one Hakim Raee, a person whom Sir H. M. Lawrence removed from Peshawur, some time ago, and who has lately joined the

insurgent camp. He is a clever, but intriguing, man, and is the person of whose mission to Cashmere some mention is made, in the papers regarding the investigation into the conduct of Raja Lal Sing.

Inclosure 29 in No. 41

*Mr. Lawrence to the Resident at Lahore.*

*Camp, Hajeepore, November 28, 1848.*

MY letter of the 26th instant will have made you acquainted with the state of affairs on the line of the Beas, on that evening, I received a note from you, through Lieutenant Hodson, apprizing me that Brigadier Wheeler had been directed to march towards the Ravee. Lieutenant Hodson also informed me that he would be at Nurote, twelve miles from Deenanuggur, next day. This information determined me to return, at once, to Mookerian. I requested Major Ferris to march back, to support Mr. Barnes in his movement on Teera, Major Simpson with the right wing of the 29th Native Infantry, to return to Hajeepore, to secure that part of the Doon, and I have left two companies of the 29th Native Infantry, and 60 sowars, at Puthankote. I consider that it would be highly expedient that Brigadier Wheeler should cross the Ravee, to keep in order the turbulent Sikh population in the northern part of the Baree Doab. Such a movement will not only keep that tract tranquil, but secure the whole line of the Beas in that quarter, as well as the country up to Noorpoor.

On my arrival, yesterday morning, at Mookerian, I learnt that the son and vuzer of the Jeswan Raja had plundered the revenue, and police, stations at Umb, eighteen miles north of Hoshiarpore, and was collecting armed men from all sides, and had taken possession of the Naree pass, which leads to Hoshiarpore. It was then believed that Bedee Bikrama Sing, of Oonah, the great Priest of the Sikhs, had, or at any rate would join them. Mr. C. Saunders informed me that Colonel Wilkinson, commanding at Hoshiarpore, had ordered up a troop of light cavalry from Jullundur, as well as three companies of infantry.

After consulting with Majors Waller and Hodgson, I determined on the following movements —

To march with the four-horse artillery guns, 500 of the Sikh corps, which Major Hodgson considers perfectly staunch, two companies of the 71st Native Infantry who were at Mookerian, and 70 horse, by Hajeepore, on Umb. By this movement we turn all the passes from the plains, and sweep the whole line of the Doon, or valley, above the lower range of hills. We arrived here this morning, to-morrow (29th) we shall be at Tullwara, 30th at Dungoh, and, on the 1st of December, be at Umb, in front of the insurgents. I have asked Colonel Wilkinson to dispatch three companies to the foot of the Naree pass, to threaten them on that side, and, if safe, to make a simultaneous movement, on the morning of the 1st, on Umbota, a village at the head of the pass, which we shall attack, on our side.

On our arrival this day, we received letters from Hoshiarpore, from Mr. C. Saunders, informing us that the Bedee of Oonah had certainly joined the rebels, who had completely destroyed the roads by the Naree and Chenee passes. Raja Nurain Pal and the Sikh Sirdar of Suntokhgurh, the only remaining Jagheer-dars of the eastern Doon, are said to remain faithful. The above news which I had expected, only confirms me in the expediency of my present plans. The Raja of Dutarpoor, on the western side, has evinced his fidelity, by assisting the police, and the Raja of Seeba, the only remaining chief in the Doon, has, as yet, remained quiet.

I do not know what troops are at Loodiana, and do not wish to send any requisitions which might impede the military authorities at that station, but I shall suggest to Colonel Wilkinson, the senior officer in the territory, in the absence of Brigadier Wheeler, the propriety of having any troops, now at Loodiana, destined for this side the river, moved across.

Mr. Barnes writes to me, from Noorpoor, (26th) that he still thinks he will be able to bring the Muhlmooee Raja to reason. Neither he, nor his people had yet committed any outrages, and it was Mr. Barnes' opinion, that the Raja's acts had originated in hostility to his uncle, Raja Jodbeer Sing of Nadown,



who aspires to the chiefship of the clan, and not against us. Be this as it may, the acts of the Raja are equally fraught with evil, for he has excited the minds of the population, and collected men, whom, even if he wishes it, he, probably, will be unable to control. I suggest that the Goorka Battalion at Simla be directed to move to Belaspoor, on the Sutlej, to cross and move up on Muhlmoree, the residence of the Raja, on hearing from Mr. Barnes of the advantage of doing so. I will write to Mr. William Edwards, the superintendent at Simla, to have the Goorka corps ready to march, on receipt of your letter.

The son of the Jeswan Raja is connected by marriage with Maharajah Golab Sing, from whom it is possible he may have been led to expect assistance. Should the Maharajah's son cross the Ravee, it would be with the design of attacking Puthankote and Noorpool, in which case Brigadier Wheeler, from Deenanuggur, would be on his flank. I have no reason for supposing that Mean Runbeer Sing has any such designs, but the possibility of his making such a diversion, is an additional argument for Brigadier Wheeler being close at hand.

I beg to acknowledge the receipt of your letter informing me that you were organizing two light-brigades for service in the Baree Doab; this will, probably, keep all the Sikhs quiet in that tract, the stronghold of that population. It will secure the communications of the British army in advance, and will be as beneficial to this territory, perhaps more so than if present within its limits.

P S —The Raja of Jeswan has no fort of any kind, with the exception of the strong gateway at Rajpoor, in which there are no gates. His residence at Carote is perfectly indefensible. The Bedee Bikrama Sing resides at Oonah. His residence is a massive fortified house, strong from its position.

Inclosure 30 in No 41.

*The Resident at Lahore to Mr Lawrence*

*Lahore, November 30, 1848*

I ENTIRELY approve of the movements you are making, but am a little apprehensive about the Sikh regiment, which forms the main strength of your party. It will be very gratifying to hear that it has remained staunch, and acquitted itself creditably.

I have sent a copy of your letter to Brigadier-General Wheeler, and have requested him to move across the Ravee, or, at any rate, to send Lieutenant Hodson with a detachment thither.

I have no notion that Mean Runbeer Sing will take any open part in these disturbances, at present, at any rate.

Inclosure 31 in No 41.

*The Resident at Lahore to Brigadier-General Wheeler.*

*Lahore, November 30, 1848.*

AS far as I can judge from the information I possess, it certainly seems desirable that you should move across the Ravee, when you have dispersed, the insurgents at Khilaspore and Carote. At Deenanuggur, you command the upper part of the Baree Doab, and are in a position to move across either the Beas or Ravee, as the state of the country may require the presence of your force, or of detachments from it.

The insurgents are, for the most part, a mere rabble, requiring for their coercion but a small body of regular troops.

I trust that you are to-day at Kelaspore, and will soon be free to move towards Deenanuggur, or, at any rate, to detach a party thither with Lieutenant Hodson.

## Inclosure 32 in No. 41.

*The Resident at Lahore to the Commander-in-Chief.**Lahore, November 30, 1848.*

THESE outbreaks, at this time, in the hills beyond the Jummoo boundary tend to make the complicity of Maharajah Golarab Sing, in the present insurrection, the more to be suspected, and demand the greater caution in all our proceedings.

The Maharajah has a force of about 3000 men of all arms at Minawur, between the Chenab and Jhelum, ostensibly for the purpose of cooperating with your Lordship, if called upon, in accordance with the stipulation of his treaty. He will, I think, take care that these troops commit no act of hostility, though they could not be depended on, perhaps, to act against the Sikhs. I should recommend that, when the British troops cross the Chenab, the Maharajah's be directed to cross the Jhelum, in their own territory, and not to pass their own border to the plains, without positive instructions.

## Inclosure 33 in No. 41.

*The Secretary with the Governor-General to the Resident at Lahore**Camp, Umballa, December 2, 1848.*

THE service\* thus rendered to the British Government has afforded great gratification to the Governor-General; and you are requested to convey the thanks and praises of his Lordship to Major Edwardes, Lieutenant Lake, and General Cortlandt, as well as to all the other officers and troops who distinguished themselves on that occasion, by their gallant conduct, and steady co-operation with the British forces, who have already received their meed of approbation from their own Government.

## Inclosure 34 in No. 41.

*The Secretary with the Governor-General to the Resident at Lahore.**Camp, Umballa, December 2, 1848*

YOU are requested to assure Major Edwardes that his Lordship fully recognises the readiness with which the services of his force have been afforded to the Major-General commanding at Mooltan, whenever he has requested them, as well as their efficiency in the field.

It is, undoubtedly, very desirable that the occupation of Sirdarpore and Toolumba, and of other neighbouring districts, should be effected without delay, in order to secure property and revenue, and to repress the outrages of marauders. It is, also, very desirable that the heavy expense involved in the support of the large force at Mooltan, should be lessened, and that no risk should be incurred of a deficiency of supplies, for the very large British force which will, shortly, be assembled before that place. His Lordship, therefore, approves of your sanctioning the employment of Sheik Emamooddeen, for the occupation of his own districts of Sirdarpore and Toolumba.

The removal of the entire irregular force under Major Edwardes and Lieutenant Lake is not, at present, considered expedient; it is, therefore, desired that, only after the arrival of the full reinforcements at Mooltan, the troops of the Nawab of Bahawalpore may be permitted to retire, with the exception of a select body, which should remain with Lieutenant Lake, and take part in the siege. The whole force, then left, under Major Edwardes, may remain, if their services are considered useful in keeping open the communications with Bahawalpore and the Ghats, and if there is no deficiency of supplies.

If the services of the whole of that force are not required, or if supplies are scanty, General Cortlandt, with such a body of troops as Major Edwardes

\* On the 7th of November.

may think necessary, should be detached for service across the Indus; and Major Edwardes himself, with as many officers and men as he may select, should remain to take part in the siege.

After the close of these operations, Major Edwardes will apply for further orders as to the disposal of his force, conveying, at the same time, his own views and suggestions.

Inclosure 35 in No. 41

*The Secretary with the Governor-General to the Resident at Lahore.*

*Camp, Umballa, December 2, 1848*

I ACKNOWLEDGE the receipt of your dispatch, reporting the surrender of Major Lawrence, Lieutenant Bowie, and Mr Thompson, to Sirdar Chuttur Sing

In reply, the Governor-General desires me to state that he deeply laments the surrender of the officers to Chuttur Sing, more especially, as we are, at present, not in a condition either to compel their release, or to punish the treachery

The conduct of Lieutenant Herbert, in holding out the fort of Attock, is, in the opinion of the Governor-General, most gallant, and honorable to him, but his Lordship cannot even hope that the promise of reward to the garrison which he has made, and which must be observed by us, will enable him to keep much longer his position

Inclosure 36 in No. 41.

*The Secretary with the Governor-General to the Resident at Lahore.*

*Camp, Umballa, December 2, 1848.*

THE Governor-General has read, and considered, the letter, and memorial, signed by Raja Shere Sing and his associates

The Governor-General considers that you have acted rightly, in simply intimating to the memorialists that you have sent their memorial to the Governor-General. His lordship does not think the memorial entitled to any reply, but, lest any misrepresentation should be made of our motives, in case no answer should be given, the Governor-General directs me to request that you will inform the memorialists that you have been instructed to state that the memorial has been received by the Governor-General, and that his only answer will be the advance of the British army.

No 42 .

*The Governor-General to the Secret Committee.*

*Camp, Ludhiana, December 22, 1848. (No. 7.)*

THE papers, now forwarded, contain the detailed particulars of those occurrences in the Punjab, of which the bare report only had reached me at the date of my last dispatch.

The Commander-in-Chief's letter of the 23rd ultimo,\* describes the action which took place on the preceding day, and notices the causes to which his Excellency attributes the loss sustained by the troops on that occasion. Those causes are stated to have been the unknown difficulties of the ground, and the precipitate eagerness of the cavalry, "who, notwithstanding these difficulties," his Excellency writes, "charged to the bank of the river, thereby exposing themselves to the fire of about twenty-eight guns," which, from the river intervening, it was impossible to capture.

Being satisfied, from accounts which had reached me, that, in any extended

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\* Inclosure 3 in No. 42.

advance which his Excellency might attempt to make, he would experience very great difficulty in procuring supplies for the army, I requested his Excellency on no consideration to advance into the Doab beyond the Chenab, except for the purpose of attacking Shere Sing, in the position he held, without further communication with me

This injunction is based upon certain circumstances, and is to continue in force, only while those circumstances remain unchanged. The information which I have since received, has led me to believe that, in many material respects, they have undergone a change. I have, therefore, acquainted his Excellency that, if he can satisfy his own judgment regarding the state of his supplies, his supports, and communications, if the intelligence he may receive, and the reconnoissances he may be able to make, shall satisfy him that the enemy may be attacked with success, with such force as he may have safely disposable, and without a heavy loss, in such case, I should be happy indeed to see a blow struck that would destroy the enemy, add honor to the British arms, and avert the prospect of a protracted, and costly, war. Meanwhile, his Excellency, with the British army, remains at Ramnuggur.

Major-General Sir Joseph Thackwell's dispatch of the 6th instant,\* gives an account of his operations against Shere Sing, and of the escape of the Sikh force, on the night of the 3rd. The force under Sir Joseph Thackwell crossed the Chenab on the 1st and 2nd instant, at Wuzzeerabad, a town twenty-two miles up the river from Ramnuggur. The Commander-in-Chief, then, pushed his batteries and breastwork to the bank of the river, opening a cannonade upon the enemy's front, to divert their attention from the flank movement intended by Sir Joseph Thackwell. His Excellency, at the same time, detached another brigade of infantry, under Brigadier Godby, which effected the passage of the river, at a ford six miles from Ramnuggur. Sir J. Thackwell's orders were to await the arrival of Brigadier Godby, unless the enemy attempted to retreat; and, under these orders, he halted at noon of the 3rd, when within four miles of the enemy's left. The enemy, encouraged by the halt, advanced to attack, and opened "a smart distant cannonade," which was not returned, till they came well within range of the British guns, which, then, opened upon them a destructive fire. After a cannonade of two hours, the enemy's fire slackened. "Sir Joseph Thackwell was, then, induced," the Commander-in-Chief writes, "by the exhausted state both of man and horse, to postpone the attack upon the enemy's flank and rear, till the following morning, the day having nearly closed when the cannonade ceased." In the night, Shere Sing, fled with the whole Sikh force; and by the last accounts, was on the left bank of the Jhelum.

I request your attention to the letter addressed by the Secretary † to the Resident at Lahore, on the 18th instant, respecting the desire evinced by Shere Sing and the Sikh Sudars, to treat, either with respect to the release of the British prisoners they have with them, or with respect to making terms generally. On the latter proposal, I have said that the Government will not treat with rebels in arms; and, with respect to the former, while I feel the deepest solicitude for the recovery of the prisoners, I have informed the Resident that the Government would not be justified, were it to consent to the sacrifice of great public objects, to accomplish their freedom. Shere Sing has been informed, that a terrible retribution will be exacted if any injury is done to them.

By a letter from Lieutenant Herbert, dated the 6th instant, (which is the latest account from him,) I regret to inform you that his tenure of the fort of Attock had become very precarious. He had been blockaded for twenty-seven days, and his troops were showing strong symptoms of insubordination.

The insurrectionary movements in the Jullundur Doab, have been entirely suppressed, by the judicious measures of Mr. Lawrence, and the well-planned and successful movements of Brigadier Wheeler. I have instructed Mr. Lawrence that no terms should be offered to the chief insurgents, but that they should be thrown into prison, immediately they are captured, or surrender.

At Mooltan, the position of affairs is still unaltered, the arrival of the Bombay force was daily expected, and I trust that, in my next dispatches, I shall be able to report to you the re-commencement of operations against that fortress.

\* Inclosure 12 in No. 42.

† Inclosure 15 in No. 42.

My latest account of Captain Abbott, is comprised in a private letter dated Srikote, the 11th of December. He is under no apprehension about the security of his own position. A report had, just then, reached him of our passage of the Chenab, with a loss of seven guns to the Sikhs. He considers Lieutenant Herbert's position very precarious, and would proceed to his assistance, could he rely upon his troops, who would not be disposed to fight on open ground, so far from hills to which they could retreat. He says that the hills about Attock are occupied by the enemy, who have from three to five regiments, and eight or ten guns.

I am without any certain intelligence of Chuttur Sing's movements. Captain Abbott, on the above-mentioned date, states that he had not returned from Peshawur, that Dost Mahomed Khan was at Jellalabad; and his son at Ali Musjid

Inclosure 1 in No 42.

*The Resident at Lahore to the Secretary with the the Governor-General.*

*Lahore, November 16, 1848.*

THE Commander-in-Chief will have communicated his movements direct to the Governor-General; it is therefore, perhaps, unnecessary for me to mention that his Excellency, with the head-quarters of the army of the Punjab, marched into Lahore on Monday last, the 13th instant, and crossed the Ravee, in advance this morning

It was my wish to accompany the Commander-in-Chief, in his advance from Lahore, and, at one time, my intention to do so, but, on full consideration, it appears to me that my presence is more necessary at the capital. The chiefs who remain at Lahore, professedly loyal to the Maharajah, and faithful to the British Government, are, with one or two exceptions, really disaffected, and more or less in the interest of the rebels; while some are in confinement, and under surveillance, in the fort. The desire of the insurgents to possess the person of the Maharajah is still very strong, and constant vigilance in regard to him is necessary. The removal of two regiments from the garrison, and of Brigadier Campbell, makes the protection of the city and cantonments also a very responsible charge, while the intrigues of all at Lahore and the neighbourhood, and the disposition to rise, on any opportunity being given (exhibited by parties in the Barea and Rechna Doabs, away from the vicinity of the troops) render constant and anxious vigilance indispensable.

I have, therefore, thought that, till matters take a decided turn, it is not expedient for me to leave Lahore.

I have deputed my chief assistant, Mr. Cocks, to accompany the head-quarters camp, and he will be joined by Lieutenant Lumsden and the Guide Corps, as soon as they arrive from Mooltan, which will be in a few days. I hope Captain Nicholson is with Brigadier-General Campbell's division, and Lieutenant Hodson is with Brigadier Wheeler.

It has been a question of some consideration with me what arrangement I should make, in respect to an officer, on the part of the Durbar, being deputed to accompany the British army: some officer of rank and consideration in the State, and of influence, and if possible of integrity, was necessary to assist Mr. Cocks, in arrangements for the administration of the districts as they are recovered from the rebels; for the provision of carriage, and supplies, to the advancing army; for the collection of the revenue, withheld during the disturbance; for giving information regarding the country, the Durbar officers, the Jagheerdars, and the inhabitants of the several districts, with numerous other duties requiring intelligence, and, to a certain extent, integrity of purpose.

I have, therefore, selected Mir Sahib Dyal as the chief officer, on the part of the Durbar, to accompany the head-quarters. He is an able and highly intelligent person, of considerable experience, and knowledge of the country, and of approved fidelity to the interests of the young Maharajah, and the British Government. I have, on former occasions, mentioned Mir Rulla Ram and his sons, of whom Mir Sahib Dyal is the eldest, as the only family in the Punjab which has shown itself really, and actively, and disinterestedly, faithful to the present administration.

## Inclosure 2 in No. 42.

*The Secretary with the Governor-General to the Resident at Lahore.*

*Camp, Patursee, December 13, 1848*

THE Governor-General conceives you were quite right in not moving from your post at Lahore, at the present time, and his Lordship requests that the utmost vigilance may continue to be exercised for insuring the safe custody of the persons of the Maharajah and the Sirdars, and of their property.

## Inclosure 3 in No. 42.

*The Commander-in-Chief to the Governor-General.*

*Ramnuggur, November 23, 1848.*

DEEMING it necessary to drive the rebel force, at this side the river, across, and to capture any guns they might have had on the left bank, I directed Brigadier-General Campbell, with an infantry brigade of the troops under his command, accompanied by the cavalry division, and three troops of horse artillery, under Brigadier-General Cureton, to proceed, during the night of the 21st, from Saharun, four miles in front of my camp at Nonwulla, to effect this object. I joined the brigadier at three in the morning, to witness the operation.

I hope to be able to inclose Brigadier-General Campbell's report, with a return of the killed and wounded, which, I regret to say, is much greater than I could have anticipated, in a great measure, from the officers leading being unacquainted with the difficult nature of the ground in the vicinity of the river, and of which no native information ever gives you a just knowledge, and, in some measure, to the impetuosity of the artillery and cavalry, who, notwithstanding these difficulties, charged to the bank of the river, thereby exposing themselves to the fire of about twenty-eight guns. I deeply regret to say a gun was left behind, but spiked, having actually, in the impetuosity of the advance, plunged down a bank close under the fire of the enemy's guns. It was reported to me it would occasion a fearful loss of life to bring it away, which alone could be effected by manual labour, and scarping the banks, under the fire of even the matchlockmen on the opposite bank. I could not, therefore, consent to such a sacrifice. Though blamable as it may appear to have taken the guns into such close proximity to the enemy's guns in position, which could not, from the river intervening, be captured, it is impossible not to admire the daring gallantry exhibited by the troops both of cavalry and artillery.

I witnessed with intense anxiety, but equally intense admiration, a charge made by Lieutenant-Colonel Havelock, at the head of the 14th Light Dragoons, who, I fear, misconceived the orders he received from the officer commanding the cavalry division, or, from the inequalities of the ground, and the fearful dust occasioned by such a rapid movement, mistook the body he was instructed to charge, and moved upon, and overwhelmed, another, much closer to the river, which exposed him to a cross fire from the enemy's guns. I never witnessed so brilliant a charge, but I regret to say the loss was considerable, were it only in that of Brigadier-General Cureton, than whom a better, or braver, soldier never fell in his country's service. The brave leader of the 14th, Lieutenant-Colonel Havelock, is missing; he charged into a gale of the enemy, and has not since been seen, regretted by every soldier who witnessed his noble daring.

The enemy suffered severely; numbers were precipitated into the river, and drowned, and a standard was captured.

The Goorchurras were more daring than I have before seen them, but the brilliant charges both of the 3d and 14th Light Dragoons will have taught them a lesson they will not readily forget. This was a cavalry affair alone, the infantry never was, nor could have been, brought into play, without an unnecessary exposure of life; but the cavalry and artillery, engaged under Brigadier-General Campbell, whose judicious arrangements were most creditable to him, nobly supported the well-earned fame of the Indian army, and is but a prelude to, I have no doubt, the honorable fulfilment of what their country expects of them.

Brigadier White conducted the movements of the force, of which the 3d formed a part, and, as usual, acted with gallantry and judgment; and Lieutenant-Colonel Grant commanded the artillery arm with much credit. I regret to say that gallant old soldier, Lieutenant-Colonel Alexander, has lost an arm, but I am thankful that all are doing well.

Inclosure 4 in No 42.

*The Commander-in-Chief to the Governor-General*

*Camp before Ramnuggur, November 27, 1848.*

IN continuation of my letter to your Lordship of the 23rd instant, I now do myself the honor to forward the report of Brigadier-General C. Campbell, C.B., commanding the troops on the morning of the 22nd instant, of the operations of that day.

I also beg to inclose a copy of a general order, which I have caused to be issued to the Army of the Punjab on the occasion.

Inclosure 5 in No 42

*Brigadier-General C Campbell, C.B. commanding 4th Division, to the Adjutant-General*

*Camp, near Ramnuggur, November 24, 1848*

I HAVE the honor to report to you, for the information of the Commander-in-Chief, that, in obedience to his Lordship's instructions, the troops in advance under my orders moved, at 3 o'clock A.M., on the morning of the 22d instant, from their encampment near to Saharun, with a view to attack a considerable portion of the enemy's regular troops, who were, with several guns, stated to be on this bank of the Chenab, in the vicinity of Ramnuggur. On reaching the high ground to the right of the town, it was ascertained that these troops, with their guns, had crossed to the encampment of the enemy, on the opposite bank, where his whole force was in position, at the same time, however, several small parties of the enemy were observed to be retreating from the town of Ramnuggur, in the direction of the ford in front of the enemy's encampment, when Captain Warner and Lieutenant-Colonel Lane's troops of Horse Artillery were ordered by Brigadier Cureton, in command of that arm and of the cavalry of the army, to pursue these parties, and to open fire on them, while crossing at the ford. These troops of Horse Artillery, in their eagerness to overtake the enemy, pushed forward, through the deep and heavy sand which extends, for a long distance, on this side, to the very margin of the river, and through which the guns could only be moved with great difficulty. Their fire inflicted considerable loss on the enemy while crossing.

In withdrawing from this position, which was effected under the fire of the whole of the enemy's artillery, amounting to 28 guns, posted on the high ground which immediately overhangs the river on the opposite bank, I regret to say that one gun and two ammunition-waggons, belonging to Colonel Lane's troop, got so imbedded in the heavy sand behind a deep bank, that they could not be recovered.

The enemy, upon observing the difficulty in which this gun was placed, immediately crossed, with great confidence, the whole of his cavalry, in numbers between three and four thousand. They clung to the banks of the river, and kept constantly under cover of the fire of their artillery, on the opposite bank.

This cavalry was charged, on separate occasions, by Her Majesty's 3rd and 14th Light Dragoons, and 5th and 8th Regiments of Light Cavalry. His Lordship the Commander-in-Chief was an eye-witness of the brilliant conduct of these several corps, and of the intrepid manner they were led by their officers. The enemy were overthrown upon every occasion, who fled for shelter to the river side, to be under the cover and protection of their artillery, but I lament to say that these several defeats of the enemy's cavalry were not effected without loss.

Brigadier-General Cureton, commanding the cavalry of the army, was killed, while leading a squadron of Her Majesty's 14th Light Dragoons, to the support of the 5th Light Cavalry. In this officer, who had the honor of enjoying his Lord-

ship's entire confidence and warmest regard, the service has lost one of its most distinguished officers, and one who was beloved by the whole army

I regret also to have to report that Lieutenant-Colonel Havelock, commanding Her Majesty's 14th Light Dragoons, is reported to be missing. He was last seen charging the enemy at the head of his noble regiment, and has not since been heard of.

I am sorry to have further to report that Lieutenant-Colonel Alexander, commanding the 5th Regiment Light Cavalry, has been severely wounded, and lost his arm. Some other officers and men have also been wounded, whose names are mentioned in the inclosed return of casualties

*Return of Killed, Wounded, and Missing, of the Advance Force of the Army of the Punjab, under the command of Brigadier-General C Campbell, C.B., in the Action with the Enemy, on the 22nd of November, 1848.*

Personal Staff—1 European officer wounded

Horse Artillery

1st Troop 3rd Brigade—3 horses killed; 1 rank and file, 1 lascar, 4 horses, wounded, 1 horse missing

2nd Troop 3rd Brigade—1 syce killed, 1 rank and file wounded, 1 horse missing.

Total—1 syce, 3 horses, killed, 2 rank and file, 1 lascar, 4 horses, wounded, 2 horses missing.

*Cavalry Division.*

Staff—1 European officer killed.

1st Brigade

Her Majesty's 3rd Light Dragoons—6 horses killed, 5 rank and file, 10 horses, wounded, 1 rank and file, 10 horses, missing

5th Regiment Light Cavalry—1 havildar, 8 rank and file, 18 horses, killed; 3 European officers, 1 Native officer, 12 rank and file, 22 horses, wounded.

8th Regiment Light Cavalry—1 rank and file, 1 horse, killed, 1 rank and file, 1 syce, 2 horses, wounded, 1 Native officer, 3 horses, missing.

Her Majesty's 14th Light Dragoons—1 sergeant, 2 rank and file, killed, 5 officers, 5 sergeants, 26 rank and file, 25 horses, wounded, 1 officer, 9 rank and file, 34 horses, missing.

Total—1 European officer, 2 sergeant and havildar, 11 rank and file, 25 horses, killed, 8 European officers, 1 Native officer, 5 sergeants, 44 rank and file, 1 syce, 59 horses, wounded, 1 European officer, 1 Native officer, 10 rank and file, 47 horses, missing

Grand Total—90 officers and men, and 140 horses

Mem—The 2d Troop 3rd Brigade Horse Artillery lost 1 gun and 2 ammunition-waggons

*Officers Killed, Wounded, and Missing.*

Personal Staff of the Commander-in-Chief—Ensign G N. Hardinge, extra Aide-de-Camp, severely wounded.

Cavalry Division—Brigadier-General C. R. Cureton, C.B., commanding, killed.

5th Regiment Light Cavalry—Brevet Lieutenant-Colonel W. Alexander, severely wounded, Brevet Captain J S. G. Ryley, severely wounded; Captain A. Wheatley, wounded

Her Majesty's 14th Dragoons—Captain R. H. Gall, severely wounded; Captain J F. Fitzgerald, very severely wounded, Captain A. Scudamore, slightly wounded, Lieutenant W. M'Mahon, severely wounded; Cornet the Hon. R. W. Chetwynd, slightly wounded; Lieutenant-Colonel W. Havelock, K.H., missing.

12th Irregular Cavalry—Lieutenant J. G. Holmes, severely wounded.



## Inclosure 6 in No. 42.

*General Orders to the Army of the Punjab.**Camp, Ramnuggur, November 27, 1848.*

THE Commander-in-Chief has now received a report from Brigadier-General C Campbell, C.B., detailing the particulars of the affair of the 22nd instant.

The Brigadier-General expresses his cordial approbation of the conduct of all the troops engaged on the occasion, and dwells in terms of high admiration on the brilliant charges on the enemy's Cavalry, in number between 3000 and 4000, of Her Majesty's 3rd and 14th Light Dragoons, and the 5th and 8th Regiments of Light Cavalry. In one of those charges, a handsome silk standard was captured, and the standard-bearer slain, by Trooper Aluf Khan, 1st Troop, 5th Light Cavalry.

The claim of this brave young soldier to admission to the Order of Merit will be investigated by a duly constituted committee, which the officer commanding the Cavalry Division will be so good as to cause to be assembled.

The Commander-in-Chief was himself an eye-witness of the brilliant conduct of these several corps, and of the intrepid manner in which they were led by their officers. The enemy were signally overthrown on every occasion, and only saved from utter annihilation, by their flight to the cover of their guns, on the opposite bank of the river.

In the death of Brigadier-General C. R. Cureton, C.B., commanding the Cavalry Division, and of Lieutenant-Colonel W Havelock, K.H., commanding the 14th Light Dragoons, and Captain J F Fitzgerald, of the same noble regiment, the service has sustained a loss which the Commander-in-Chief is sure that the whole army will unite with him in lamenting.

The officers and men wounded on this occasion are doing well, the Commander-in-Chief is happy to think, and though the very severe injuries sustained by Brevet Lieutenant-Colonel W. Alexander, commanding the 5th Light Cavalry, Brevet Captain J S G Ryley of the same corps, Captain R. H. Gall and Lieutenant W. McMahon, of the 14th Dragoons, Lieutenant J. G. Holmes, commanding the 12th Irregular Cavalry, and Ensign G. N. Hardinge, extra Aide-de-Camp to the Commander-in-Chief, must, for a long time, render those gallant officers unfit for duty, his Excellency trusts that, eventually, they will be restored to the service, whose honor and character they have so nobly upheld.

## Inclosure 7 in No. 42.

*The Resident at Lahore to the Secretary with the Governor-General.**Lahore, December 2, 1848.*

THE Commander-in-Chief had crossed the Ravee; misrepresentations of the purposes of the British Government were being sedulously circulated by the disaffected; and those whose interests are on the side of the British supremacy in the Punjab, were urgent with me, as to the expediency of putting forth some declaration to the people, which would allay the general apprehension that was felt, at the advance of the Commander-in-Chief.

The insurgents have sent, throughout the provinces, inflammatory papers, in which they style themselves the United Khalsa, the loyal and obedient subjects of Maharajah Duleep Sing, whom the British oppressors have imprisoned, and in which they declare that the object of the British Government is the wholesale extermination of the Sikhs indiscriminately, and the suppression of the Khalsa religion.

There is nothing too extravagant for the common people of India to believe, if it is told them by their priests and the Sirdars; the report that the offences of the rebels were to be visited on the Sikh population at large, was gaining extensive credit, and the insurgent leaders were, on this account, gaining the sympathies of many, and extensive additions to their ranks, which they would, otherwise, have been without.

I considered it, therefore, necessary to counteract their machinations at once, by a declaration to the people of the Punjab, of the real object of the present advance of the British army.

Inclosure 8 in No. 42.

*Proclamation by the Resident at Lahore, November 18, 1848.*

TO the subjects, servants, and dependents, of the Lahore State, and the residents, of all classes and castes, whether Sikh, Mussulman, or other, within the territories of Maharajah Duleep Sing, from the Beas to the mountains beyond Peshawur. Whereas certain evil-disposed persons, and traitors, have excited rebellion and insurrection, and have seduced portions of the population of the Punjab from their allegiance, and have raised an armed opposition to the British authority; and whereas the condign punishment of the insurgents is necessary; therefore, the British army, under the command of the Right Honorable the Commander-in-Chief, has entered the Punjab districts. The army will not return to its cantonments, until the full punishment of all insurgents has been effected, all armed opposition to constituted authority put down, and obedience and order have been re-established.

And whereas it is not the desire of the British Government that those who are innocent of the above offences, who have taken no part, secretly or openly, in the disturbances, and who have remained faithful in their obedience to the government of Maharajah Duleep Sing, be they Sikh, or be they of any other class, should suffer with the guilty; therefore, all persons who are not concerned, directly or indirectly, in the present disturbances, are assured that they have nothing to fear from the coming of the British army. Such persons are exhorted to remain, without apprehension, in their villages and homes, and, as loyal subjects of the Maharajah, to give every aid by providing carriage, supplies, and the like, to the army which has entered the Lahore territories, not as an enemy to the constituted government, but to restore order and obedience. Furthermore, all classes of the community, be they Sikh, or be they of any other caste or tribe, who, merely through ignorance, may have been led away, by the false statements of the evil-disposed and insurgent Sirdars and others, and have left their homes, and assembled themselves under the standard of rebellion, are, hereby, admonished, instantly to separate themselves from the insurgents, and to return to their villages. If they do so now, without hesitation or delay, no injury will happen to them; if they neglect this warning and advice, certain destruction will come upon them, in common with the other insurgents and rebels, and disturbers of the public peace.

Inclosure 9 in No. 42

*The Secretary with the Governor-General to the Resident at Lahore.*

*Camp, Sirhind, December 14, 1848.*

THE Governor-General approves of your having issued this proclamation.

Inclosure 10 in No. 42.

*The Commander-in-Chief to the Governor-General.*

*Flying Camp, Hillah, December 5, 1848.*

IT has pleased Almighty God to vouchsafe to the British arms the most successful issue to the extensive combinations rendered necessary for the purpose of effecting the passage of the Chenab, the defeat and dispersion of the Sikh force under the insurgent, Raja Shere Sing, and the numerous Sikh Sirdars, who had the temerity to set at defiance the British power. This force, from all my information, amounted to from 30,000 to 40,000 men, with twenty-eight guns, and

were strongly entrenched on the right bank of the Chenab, at the principal ford, about two miles from the town of Ramnuggur

My dispatch of the 23rd of November will have made your Lordship acquainted with the motives which induced me to penetrate thus far into the Punjab, and the occurrences of the previous day, when the enemy was ejected from the left bank of the Chenab. My daily private communications will have placed your Lordship in possession of the difficulties I had to encounter, in a country so little known, and in the passage of a river, the fords of which were most strictly watched by a numerous and vigilant enemy, and presenting more difficulties than most rivers, whilst I was surrounded by a hostile peasantry

Finding that, to force the passage at the ford in my front must have been attended with considerable loss, from the very strong entrenchments, and well selected batteries, which protected the passage, I instructed the Field Engineer, Major Tremeneere, in cooperation with the Quartermaster-General's Department, to ascertain (under the difficulties before noticed) the practicability of the several fords reported to exist on both my flanks, while I had batteries erected, and made demonstrations so as to draw the attention of the enemy to the main ford in my front, and with the view, if my batteries could silence their guns, to act simultaneously with the force I proposed to detach, under an officer of much experience in India, Major-General Sir Joseph Thackwell

On the night of the 30th of November, this officer, in command of the following force,—

Three Troops Horse Artillery,

Two Light Field Batteries,

One Brigade of Cavalry,

Three Ditto of Infantry,

Two 13-pounders with elephant draft, and detail artillery, pontoon train, with two companies sappers,

moved up the river, in light marching order, without tents, and with three days' provisions, upon a ford which I had every reason to consider very practicable (and which I have since ascertained was so), but which the Major-General deemed so difficult and dangerous that he proceeded (as he was instructed, should such turn out to be the case) to Wuzcerabad, a town twenty-two miles up the river, where Captain Nicholson, a most energetic Assistant to the Resident at Lahore, had secured sixteen boats, with the aid of which, this force effected the passage, on the evening of the 1st, and morning of the 2nd instant

Upon learning, by an Aide-de-Camp sent for the purpose, that the Major-General's force had crossed, and was in movement, I directed a heavy cannonade to commence upon the enemy's batteries, and encampment, at Ramnuggur, which was returned by only a few guns, which guarded effectually the ford, but were so buried that, although the practice of our artillery was admirable, under Major Mowatt and Captain Sir Richmond Shakespear, we could not, from the width of the river, silence them. This cannonade, however, inflicted very severe loss to the enemy in their camp and batteries, and forced him to fall back with his camp about two miles, which enabled me, without the loss of a man, to push my batteries and breastworks, on the night of the 2nd, to the bank of the river, the principal ford of which I, then, commanded. By this time, I was enabled to detach another Brigade of Infantry under Brigadier Godby, at daylight, on the 3rd, which effected the passage, with the aid of the pontoon train, six miles up the river, and got into communication with Major-General Sir Joseph Thackwell

The cannonade, and demonstration to cross at Ramnuggur, was kept up on the 2nd and 3rd, so as to fix a large portion of the enemy there to defend that point. Having communicated to Sir Joseph Thackwell my views and intentions, and, although giving discretionary powers to attack any portion of the Sikh forces to oppose him, I expressed a wish that, when he covered the crossing of Brigadier Godby's brigade, he should await their junction, except the enemy attempted to retreat, this induced him to halt, within about three or four miles of the left of their position. About 2 o'clock on the 3rd, the principal part of the enemy's force, encouraged by the halt, moved to attack the detached column, when a smart cannonade on the part of the enemy took place; and an attempt to turn both Major-General Sir Joseph Thackwell's flanks, by numerous bodies of cavalry, was made. After about one hour's distant cannonade, on the part of the Sikhs, the British artillery never returning a shot, the enemy took courage, and advanced, when our artillery, commanded by an excellent officer, Lieutenant-Colonel C. Grant, poured in upon them a most

destructive fire, which soon silenced all their guns, and frustrated all their operations, with very severe loss upon their side; but the exhausted state both of man and horse, induced the Major-General to postpone the attack upon their flank and rear, as he was directed, until the following morning, the day having nearly closed when the cannonade ceased.

I regret to say that, during the night of the 3rd, the whole of the Sikh force precipitately fled, concealing, or carrying with them, their artillery, and exploding their magazines. I, immediately, pushed across the river the 9th Lancers and 14th Light Dragoons in pursuit, under that most energetic officer, Major-General Sir Walter Gilbert. The Sikhs, it appears, retreated in the greatest disorder, leaving in the villages numerous wounded men. They have subdivided into three divisions, which have become more a flight than a retreat, and I understand a great portion of those not belonging to the revolted Khalsa army, have dispersed, and returned to their homes, thus, I trust, effectually frustrating the views of the rebel Shere Sing, and his rebel associates.

I have not received Major-General Sir Joseph Thackwell's report, nor the returns of his loss, but I am most thankful to say that our whole loss subsequent to the 22nd of November, does not much exceed forty men. No officers have been killed, and but three wounded. Captain Austin, of the Artillery, only appears severely so.

I have to congratulate your Lordship upon events so fraught with importance, and which will, I have no doubt, with God's blessing, tend to most momentous results. It is, as I anticipated, most gratifying to me to assure your Lordship that the noble army under my command has, in these operations, upheld the well-established fame of the arms of India, both European and Native, each vying who should best perform his duty. Every officer, from the General of Division to the youngest subaltern, well supported their Commander-in-Chief, and cheerfully carried out his views, which, at a future period, and when we shall have effected the views of the Government, I shall feel proud in bringing to your Lordship's notice.

*Return of the Strength of the Force sent under the command of Major-General Sir J Thackwell, K C B*

*Camp, Ramnuggur, December 5, 1848*

3 troops of Horse Artillery, 2 Light Field Batteries, 1 European Dragoon regiment, 2 Light Cavalry regiments, 1 Irregular Cavalry regiment, 2 regiments of European Infantry, 5 regiments and 2 companies of Native Infantry, 1 company of Pioneers, proceeded with Major-General Sir J. Thackwell

Reinforcement sent: 1 regiment of European Infantry, 1 regiment and 2 companies of Native Infantry

N B —Two 18-pounders, two 9-pounders, Pontoon Train, detachment of Irregular Cavalry, returned from Wuzzeenabad

European regiments employed —3rd Light Dragoons, H.M 24th, H.M 61st, 2nd European Infantry

Inclosure 11 in No. 42

*The Commander-in-Chief to the Governor-General.*

*Camp, Ramnuggur, December 10, 1848*

IN continuation of my letter of the 5th instant, I have now the honor to inclose to your Lordship a copy of Major-General Sir Joseph Thackwell's dispatch, dated the 6th idem, but only received last night, detailing the operations of the force under his command, after it had been detached from my head-quarters.

I can only repeat the warm approval I have already expressed of the conduct of the Major-General, and of every officer and man under his command, and I beg your Lordship's favorable consideration of the services of those named by Sir Joseph Thackwell.

## Inclosure 12 in No. 42.

*Major-General Sir Joseph Thackwell, K.C.B., commanding the advanced part of the Army, to the Adjutant-General.*

*Camp, Heyleh, December 6, 1848.*

I HAVE the honor to report, for the information of the Commander-in-Chief, that, agreeably to his Excellency's orders, I left the camp at Ramnuggur, with the troops named in the margin \*, at about half-past 3 o'clock on the morning of the 1st of December, 1848, instead of at 1 o'clock, as I had ordered, some of the troops having lost their way among the intricacies of the rear of the encampment; and proceeded to the vicinity of the ford on the Chenab, at Runnee Khan-ke-Puttun, distant thirteen miles from Ramnuggur, which, owing to the broken ground, and narrow roads, where any existed, for the first four miles, I did not reach before 11 o'clock. The enemy had infantry at this ford, which report afterwards magnified to 4000 men, but the villagers said it was much deeper than the one at Allee Shere-ke Chuck, a mile higher up the river. I am much indebted to Lieutenant Paton, Deputy Assistant Quartermaster-General, for his anxious exertions in examining this ford, and, from his report, I came to the conclusion that this ford of Allee Shere-ke Chuck could not have artillery on the left bank of the river, to cover the passage of the troops, from the insecure bottom of the first ford, neither could the pontoon train be of much use, for the same reason, and the deep sands which lay between the fords. The pontoon train might have been laid over the main stream, under cover of a battery, near the enemy's infantry, but, beyond the river, the sands seemed wet and insecure, and a branch of the river beyond them was said to be deep, with a muddy bottom. Under all these disadvantages, I came to the decision that it was more advisable to try the passage of the river near Wuzeerabad, where Captain Nicholson, Assistant to the Resident at Lahore, informed me that at the ferry were seventeen boats, and a ford not more than three feet ten inches deep, with a good bottom, than to run the risk of a severe loss, by passing the river near the enemy. This survey of the ford occupied three hours, and, at 2 o'clock, I put the column in movement to the ford and ferry at Wuzeerabad, which was in the possession of Captain Nicholson's Puthans, where the leading infantry arrived, about 5 o'clock in the afternoon, having made a march of about twenty-five miles. The 6th Brigade of Infantry, and some of the guns, were passed over the Chenab immediately, and I am indebted to Brigadier-General Campbell, Lieutenant-Colonel

\* Major Christie's Troop Horse Artillery  
 Captain Huish's Troop Horse Artillery  
 Captain Warner's Troop Horse Artillery  
 Captain Kinleside, No. 5 Light Field Battery  
 Captain Austin, No. 10 Light Field Battery  
 Captain Robinson and two 18-pounders, under the command of Lieutenant-Colonel Grant, Horse

**Artillery**

Two Companies of Pioneers  
 The Pontoon Train  
 The 1st Brigade of Cavalry, commanded by Brigadier White  
 3rd Light Dragoons, commanded by Major Yerbury  
 7th Light Cavalry, commanded by Captain Wheatley  
 8th Light Cavalry, commanded by Captain Moore  
 3rd Irregular Cavalry, commanded by Major Tait  
 12th Irregular Cavalry, commanded by Lieutenant Cunningham.  
 3rd Brigade of Infantry, Brigadier Eckford  
 31st Native Infantry, Major Corfield  
 56th Native Infantry, Major Bamfield  
 3rd Division of Infantry, Brigadier-General Campbell, commanding.  
 6th Brigade of Infantry, Brigadier Pennycuik  
 Her Majesty's 24th Foot, Major Harris  
 2 Flank Companies, 2nd Battalion Company, 22nd Native Infantry, Major Sampson  
 25th Native Infantry, Lieutenant-Colonel Corbett  
 8th Brigade of Infantry, Brigadier Hoggan  
 Her Majesty's 61st Foot, Lieutenant-Colonel McLeod  
 36th Native Infantry, Major Fleming.  
 46th Native Infantry, Major Tudor  
 Of the above detail, the following returned in charge of the two 18-pounders and pontoon

**train —**

2 guns of No. 10 Light Field Battery.  
 12th Irregular Cavalry.  
 2 Companies, 22nd Native Infantry.

Grant, H.A., and Captain Smith, of the Engineers, for their great exertions in forwarding this object. Brigadier Eckford I hoped would have crossed the river by the three fords that evening, but, as it became too dark and hazy for such an operation, he halted for the night on the dry sands, near the last branch of the river. Major Tait, 3rd Irregular Cavalry, was enabled to pass over three of his Resselahs, in doing which, I am sorry to say, three sowars and one horse were drowned. On the morrow, the infantry, cavalry, and all the troops were soon over the river by ferry and ford, and all the baggage and commissariat animals passed the same by 12 o'clock, without any further loss.

At 2 P.M., after the troops had dined, I marched in order of battle, three Brigade columns of Companies at half distance, left in front, at deploying interval; the 1st Brigade of Cavalry, in the same order, on the right, with strong flanking parties and rear guard, and the 3rd Irregular Cavalry on the left, with orders to patrol to the river, and clear the right bank, aided by Infantry, if necessary. In this order, I arrived at Doorawul at dusk, about 12 miles from the ferry, and halted for the night. On Sunday, December the 3rd, at daylight, the troops proceeded in the same order, towards the Sikh position, and I intended to have reconnoitred, and commenced an attack upon it, by 11 o'clock. Hearing, however, when within about four miles of it or less, that reinforcements were expected to pass over the Chenab, at the ford near Ghurree-ke-Puttun, it became necessary to secure that post, which had been found without an enemy an hour before, but to which it now seemed that a body of about 600 of the enemy were seen approaching, and I detached a wing of the 56th Native Infantry, and two Resselahs of the 3rd Irregular Cavalry, under Major Tait, who secured the post, and frustrated the attempt of the enemy. This caused so much delay that enough of daylight would not be left for the advance and attack on the left and rear of the enemy's position. About 2 P.M. some of the enemy's guns opened on a patrol of the 5th Light Cavalry, and he was seen advancing in large bodies of Cavalry and Infantry, and the pickets, which occupied three villages with large plantations of sugar-cane, being too much in advance to be supported, fell back, without any loss, and the enemy occupied these villages with Cavalry on the right, guns, and bodies of infantry, and the main body of their Cavalry with Horse Artillery were on their left. When the enemy's guns opened, I ordered Brigadier-General Campbell to deploy the Infantry into line, in front of the village of Sadoolapoor, Brigadier Eckford and part of Brigadier Hoggan's brigade being extended, in order not to be outflanked. It was not until the enemy came well within range of our guns, that I caused them to open their fire, which they then did, with great effect. The enemy tried to turn both our flanks, which having foreseen, I had caused Captain Warner to move his troop of Artillery to the left of the Infantry, and had sent the 5th Light Cavalry to the left to support these guns, and to act in conjunction with the two Resselahs of the 3rd Irregular Cavalry under Captain Biddulph, who were posted on open ground, and these soon drove the enemy back. The attempt to turn our right was met by extending the 8th Light Cavalry and Her Majesty's 3rd Light Dragoons, supported by Major Christie's troop of Artillery. As the Cavalry of the right advanced, the enemy's sowars gave way, and they fell back on their Infantry, having lost some men by the skirmishers of the 3rd Light Dragoons. After a cannonade of about two hours, the fire of the enemy slackened, and I sent Lieutenant Paton to desire the Cavalry on the right to charge, and take the enemy's guns if possible, intending to support them by moving the brigades in echelon, from the right at intervals, according to circumstances, but as no opportunity offered for the Cavalry to charge, and so little of daylight remained, I deemed it safer to remain in my position than attempt to drive back an enemy so strongly posted on their right and centre, with the prospect of having to attack their intrenched position afterwards. From this position, the Sikhs began to retire at about 12 o'clock at night, as was afterwards ascertained, and as was conjectured by the barking of dogs in their rear. I have every reason to believe that Shere Sing attacked with twenty guns, and nearly the whole of the Sikh army were employed against my position, which was by no means what I could have wished it, but the fire of our artillery was so effective that he did not dare to bring his masses to the front; and my brave, steady, and ardent Infantry, whom I had caused to lie down to avoid the heavy fire, had no chance of firing a shot, except a few Companies on the left of the line. The enemy's loss has been severe, ours, comparatively, very small. I regret not being able to capture the enemy's guns, but with the small force of Cavalry, two regiments on the right only, it would have been a matter of difficulty for tired Cavalry

to overtake Horse Artillery, fresh, and well mounted. In these operations, the conduct of all has merited my warmest praise, and the patient endurance of the Artillery, Cavalry, European Infantry, and Sepoys, under privations of no ordinary nature, has been most praiseworthy.

To Brigadier-General Campbell I am much indebted for his able assistance during these movements, and to Lieutenant-Colonel Grant, commanding the Artillery, Major Christie, Captains Huish, Warner, Austin, and Kinleside, and the officers and men under their command, I cannot bestow too much praise, for their skill and gallantry, in overcoming the fire of a numerous artillery, some of which were of heavy calibre. I am also greatly indebted to Captain Smith, of the Engineers, for his exertions in passing over guns at the Wuzerabad ferry, and for his assistance in conveying my orders, on various occasions, and my thanks are due to Lieutenants Yule and Crommelin, of the same corps, and to Lieutenant Bacon, of the Sappers. To Lieutenant Paton, Deputy Assistant-Quartermaster-General, my best thanks are due, for his exertions and assistance in the advance of the troops, and during the action, and to Captain Nicholson, Assistant to the Resident at Lahore, I beg to offer my best thanks for his endeavours to procure intelligence of the enemy's movements, for his endeavours to procure supplies for the troops, and for his able assistance on all occasions. Captain Pratt, my Deputy Assistant-Adjutant-General; Lieutenant-Tucker, Deputy Assistant-Quartermaster-General; Lieutenant Thackwell, aide-de-camp, and Volunteer Mr. John Angelo, my extra aide-de-camp, have been most zealous in performing their respective duties, and have rendered me every assistance, and I feel assured that, if the cavalry and infantry had been brought into close action, I should have had the great satisfaction of thanking Brigadiers, commanding officers of corps, and the officers and men, for their gallantry and noble bearing in action, as I now do for their steadiness and good conduct. To Major Mainwaring, Captains Gerrard, Sampson, Faddy, and James, I am much indebted for their exertions in their respective departments.

I beg further to state that, on the morning of the 4th, I put the troops in motion to pursue the enemy, who had retreated during the preceding night, and encamped about 11 miles from the Chenab, on the road to Jullalpoor, the 9th Lancers having been pushed to the front, but without seeing anything of the enemy, who had retreated by the Jhelum, Jullalpoor, and Pind Dadun Khan roads, and, on the following day, I arrived at this place, and sent two regiments of cavalry on the road to Dingee, one of them the 14th Light Dragoons, and two regiments of cavalry and a troop of horse artillery on the road to Jullalpoor. The latter party observed two bodies of the enemy, of about 800 and 400 men each, imagined to be a strong rear guard, about eight miles from this, and behind a thick jungle which reaches to the river, and the former went to Dingee, which place the enemy had left, and the villagers said had gone over the Jhelum. Both parties returned to this camp, without, I am sorry to say, having overtaken any of the enemy's troops or guns. I beg leave to inclose a return of the killed and wounded.

*Return of Killed, Wounded, and Missing, of a Detachment of the Army of the Punjab in the Action of the 3rd of December, 1848.*

*Camp, Heyleh, December 6, 1848.*

- 1st Troop 2nd Brigade Horse Artillery—1 serjeant, 1 rank and file, 3 horses, killed, 1 European officer, 1 serjeant, 1 rank and file, 2 horses, wounded
- 3rd Troop 2nd Brigade Horse Artillery—2 horses wounded
- 1st Troop 3rd Brigade Horse Artillery—4 rank and file, 8 horses, killed, 7 rank and file, 4 horses, wounded
- Total—1 serjeant, 5 rank and file, 11 horses, killed; 1 European officer, 1 serjeant, 8 rank and file, 8 horses, wounded.
- No. 5 Light Field Battery and 3rd Company 7th Battalion—1 horse killed; 2 drivers, 1 syce, 2 horses, wounded.
- No. 10 Light Field Battery and 1st Company 1st Battalion—2 horses killed; 1 European officer, 2 rank and file, wounded.
- Total—3 horses killed, 1 European officer, 2 rank and file, 2 drivers, 1 syce, 2 horses, wounded

**Cavalry.****1st Brigade.**

Her Majesty's 3rd Light Dragoons—3 horses killed, 1 rank and file, 1 horse, wounded.

5th Light Cavalry—2 horses killed, 1 havildar, 1 horse, wounded

8th Light Cavalry—1 rank and file, 3 horses, killed, 1 horse wounded

Total—1 rank and file, 8 horses, killed, 1 havildar, 1 rank and file, 3 horses, wounded

3rd Irregular Cavalry—1 havildar, 2 rank and file, 11 horses, killed, 1 European officer, 2 rank and file, 1 horse, wounded, 1 rank and file, 1 horse, missing

Remarks—1 Bheestie wounded, and drowned crossing the river on the night of the 1st of December, 1848; 3 sowars and 1 horse, not included in this return.

12th Irregular Cavalry—1 rank and file killed

**Infantry****3rd Brigade**

31st Regiment Native Infantry—1 havildar, 6 rank and file, wounded

**6th Brigade.**

Her Majesty's 24th Regiment—1 serjeant, 1 rank and file, killed, 1 serjeant, 3 rank and file, wounded

22nd Regiment Native Infantry—1 havildar killed, 1 Native officer, 2 rank and file, wounded

25th Regiment Native Infantry—1 Native officer, 4 rank and file, killed, 1 havildar, 7 rank and file, wounded

Total—1 Native officer, 2 serjeant and havildar, 5 rank and file, killed; 1 Native officer, 2 serjeant and havildar, 12 rank and file, wounded

**8th Brigade**

Her Majesty's 61st Regiment—2 rank and file killed, 1 serjeant, 8 rank and file, wounded

36th Regiment Native Infantry—1 Native officer, 1 rank and file, killed; 1 European officer, 2 rank and file, wounded.

46th Regiment Native Infantry—1 rank and file wounded

Total—1 Native officer, 3 rank and file, killed, 1 European officer, 1 serjeant, 11 rank and file, wounded

Total—21 men, 33 horses, killed, 51 men, 14 horses, wounded; 1 man, 1 horse, missing

Grand Total—73 men, 48 horses

*Last of Officers Killed, Wounded, and Missing, of a Detachment of the Army of the Punjab, on the 3rd of December, 1848.*

1st Troop 2nd Brigade Horse Artillery—Lieutenant E. J. Watson, wounded.

10th Light Field Battery, 1st Company 1st Battalion—Captain E. G. Austin, severely wounded.

22nd Regiment Native Infantry—Jemadar Sudar Khan, severely wounded, amputation of leg

25th Regiment Native Infantry—Thunnoo Ram, Jemadar, killed.

36th Regiment Native Infantry—Lieutenant Garstin, severely wounded.

3rd Irregular Cavalry—Lieutenant A. Gibbings, wounded.

Inclosure 13 in No. 42.

*The Commander-in-Chief to the Governor-General.*

*Camp, Ramnuggur, December 16, 1848.*

IN further continuation of my letter of the 10th instant, I feel it my duty to forward the inclosed letter from Major-General Sir Joseph Thackwell.



## Inclosure 14 in No. 42.

*Major-General Sir J. Thackwell to the Adjutant-General.**Heyleh, December 14, 1848*

IN continuation of my dispatch of the 6th instant, relative to the action of Sadoolapoor on the 3rd, I have the honor to state my regret that Brigadier-General Campbell had not brought to my notice the services of the officers of the Staff of the 3rd Division of Infantry, by which omission the names of Major Ponsonby, Assistant Adjutant-General, Captain Haythorne, Aide-de-Camp to the Brigadier-General, and Lieutenant Garden, Deputy Assistant-Quartermaster-General, have been omitted. I now beg leave to state that the Brigadier-General considers that these officers have rendered him every assistance in their respective situations.

## Inclosure 15 in No. 42

*The Secretary with the Governor-General to the Resident at Lahore.**Camp, Saneewall, December 18, 1848*

I ACKNOWLEDGE your letter, dated the 14th instant, inclosing letters from Major Lawrence to Mr Cocks, showing that some of the British prisoners are with Shere Sing's army, on the left bank of the Jhelum; and indicating a desire on the part of the Raja and the Sirdars, to treat, either with respect to the release of the prisoners, or with respect to making terms generally.

With regard to the latter proposal, I am desired to state, that the only answer the Governor-General has to give to all applications from the Sikh army, for the opening of negotiations regarding terms, is, that the Government will not treat with rebels in arms. No proposal will be listened to, but that of absolute, unconditional surrender. If the surrender shall be immediate and complete, no one's life will be considered as forfeited by reason of their rebellion. If, on the other hand, the surrender shall not be immediate and complete, the Sirdars and their troops must endure the consequences of their acts; and their blood will be on their own heads. From this statement, the Dewan Moolraj and his followers must be understood to be excluded.

With regard to the release of the British subjects who are prisoners in the hands of the rebels, his Lordship entertains the deepest solicitude for their recovery. But, in resorting to every expedient, in putting forth every exertion for that purpose, his Lordship considers that he cannot, in his anxiety for their safety, forget the duty which he owes to the State. He feels the full weight of the conviction that he would not be justified before those he serves, or in the eyes of the country, if he were to consent to the sacrifice of great public objects, in order to accomplish the freedom of the prisoners, or if he should do any act which would encourage our enemies in India to believe that the possession of the persons of one or more British subjects, would, at any time, paralyze the energies of the Government, and insure, to those who held such prisoners, immunity from all punishment, however heinous their conduct may have been.

His Lordship has already caused intimations to be made to Sirdar Chuttur Sing, calculated, as it is hoped, to insure their personal safety. As the rebels have now brought the prisoners to the neighbourhood of our army, and have manifested an inclination to treat for terms, it would be desirable to repeat the attempt to effect their restoration.

It has, already, been stated that no negotiation can be allowed for general terms, to the Sirdars and rebel army. But the Governor-General is ready to assent to an exchange of the prisoners respectively held by us and by them. Raja Shere Sing may, accordingly, be informed, that on the safe return of the British prisoners, and their delivery to his Excellency the Commander-in-chief, the British will deliver up the Raja's brother, Sirdar Golab Sing, and any others who may be in our hands belonging to that family, with such other Sirdars as are in our possession. Raja Shere Sing should be further informed, that if the British prisoners are kept in captivity, and especially if any injury whatever is done to them, the British Government will exact a terrible retribution.

The Maharanee Junda Khore, and Raja Lal Sing, whose names have been adverted to, must, of course, be excluded from any arrangement of the above nature.

Your opinion is requested as to whether any advantage would arise from taking measures to make it known, that the Government would highly reward any one who should bring the prisoners safe into camp.

Inclosure 16 in No. 42.

*Major Edwardes to the Resident at Lahore.*

*Camp, Sooraj Koond, December 4, 1848*

SHEIK EMAMOODDEEN and his force marched from this, on the 1st of December, and crossed the Chenab at the ferry of Shah Ali, in rear of the British camp, next day, on their way to Jhung

The day after, the Sheik received, by the hand of a cossid of Moolhaj, a letter from that rebel, inclosing another from Chuttur Sing, both of which the Sheik transmitted to me, with the cossid who brought them.

*Dewan Moolraj to Sheik Emamooddeen.*

TO be loyal and true to one's master, is the very gem of manhood. You are the wise man of this age. Let bygones, therefore, be bygones; and, looking on my house as your own, come hither, in all confidence of a hearty welcome, and unite with me in the public cause

Seal of  
Moolraj  
" Verbum  
Sap "—

P S.—I inclose, my dear friend, a note to your address, from Sirdar Chuttur Sing. Please send a reply."

*Chuttur Sing to Sheik Emamooddeen.*

*November 9, 1848.*

Every Hindoo and Mussulman subject who has eaten the salt of our great, pure, and mighty Government, has proved himself true to both his Sovereign, and his religion. It becomes you, therefore, to remember what favors and honors you have received, in your day, from the Durbar, now, when the time has come for evincing gratitude by faithful service. It is unaccountable, indeed, that, up to this present writing, you are still pursuing a career of treachery and infamy! What can be your motives? the result of such baseness can only be ruin in this world, and the next. Reflect upon what you owe to your Sovereign; you, whose whole house has been raised from nothing, and, without further delay, join either Dewan Moolraj, or my beloved son Shere Sing. I have written this advice to you, for old acquaintance sake, wishing you well.

Seal of  
Chuttur Sing      on the cover.

Sheik Emamooddeen does, indeed, as described by Chuttur Sing, stand out in creditable relief from the majority of Durbar servants; and his position is one of proportionate difficulty, and maintained alone by the constant support you give him on all occasions. You will, I am sure, be much pleased by his conduct in this matter.

## Inclosure 17 in No 42.

*The Resident at Lahore to Major Edwardes.**Lahore, December 8, 1848.*

I ENTIRELY concur with you in the terms in which you characterize the conduct of Sheik Emamooddeen, and I have addressed him direct, expressing my satisfaction at all his conduct, hitherto, connected with these operations, and every confidence that he will execute, successfully, the duty now assigned to him

## Inclosure 18 in No 42

*Lieutenant Herbert to the Resident at Lahore.**Attock, December 6, 1848.*

IT is with great grief that I report that, in consequence of the non-arrival of any succour, the tenure of the fort of Attock is becoming extremely precarious

Serious symptoms of insubordination have exhibited themselves among the men, particularly on a month's pay becoming due, when it was demanded in a most unbecoming manner

I have had great difficulty in raising a loan sufficient to disburse a month's pay to the garrison, and to carry on the current expenses; and I fear I shall be unable to meet a second demand of a similar nature.

The blockading force is reduced to a small number. I am assured it does not exceed 2,000 or 2,500, with the guns in the batteries—six horse artillery guns and a ten-inch mortar,—and have, therefore, little reason to fear a reverse from the physical force of the enemy. But no effort is spared to excite treachery within, and the minds of the men being much shaken by the prolongation of the blockade, and the unexpected delay in the coming of succour, they are only too liable to be tampered with, despite of every effort to prevent the approach to the walls of the enemy's agents

Though anxious to make a sally upon the enemy's guns, I am prevented from the attempt, by being unable longer to place any confidence in my men. Scarcely a night passes without several desertions, and it is with extreme sorrow I state that I feel it impossible to answer for their good conduct, from day to day.

I would respectfully remind you that I have no regular troops except my artillery (who belong to the enemy, I may say, though they have behaved very well till within the last two nights, during which seven men have deserted); and my Puthan levies have nothing to bind them to the cause, except the hopes of large reward, and speedy relief

Under these circumstances, I humbly, but urgently, beg that you will do your utmost to hasten forward the march of troops to our aid. We have now been blockaded for twenty-seven days

## Inclosure 19 in No. 42.

*The Resident at Lahore to Lieutenant Herbert.**Lahore, December 17, 1848.*

YOU will have heard of the advance of the British army.

Succour is, you will see, on the way, and, though it may be delayed beyond the time expected, it will arrive eventually.

I am also endeavouring to make some arrangements for supplying you with funds.

Your conduct has been most gallant and admirable, and your success in defending the fort so long against your besiegers, and in keeping together your garrison, is highly appreciated by the Governor-General.

It would seem that the enemy is in despair of gaining the fort by force, and was expected to raise the siege entirely; but against the treachery of the garrison it is far more difficult to guard. I am quite satisfied that, whatever can be effected by energy, firmness, and judgment, you will accomplish; and if your garrison should have betrayed you, your character will not stand the less high in the estimation of the Governor-General, and of your country.

Inclosure 20 in No. 42.

*The Resident at Lahore to the Secretary with the Governor-General.*

*Lahore, December 8, 1848.*

ON looking, this morning, through the papers I have accumulated, regarding the outbreak at Mooltan, I perceive one which I had translated at the time, intending to send it to Government, but which does not appear to have been submitted.

It is the deposition of a man named Kootub Shah, and was taken on the 3rd of June last. It gives only the particulars regarding the first outbreak of disturbances at Mooltan, which have been, already, reported to Government, but it is valuable as corroborating the statements of others, and should, I think, be placed on record.

The conduct of Sirdar Khan Sing, Man, and the treatment he has received, and continues to receive, are not very intelligible. We have still, I think, much to learn in respect to him.

Sirdar Khan Sing, Man, is still a close prisoner in the Fort of Mooltan, and he was never allowed to see any of the Sikh party, or to hold any communication with them, during the time that Shere Sing and the other Sikh Sirdars remained at that place.

From all I can learn, it appears that, on the murder of the British officers, Sirdar Khan Sing, Man, was placed in confinement, for a few days; that he had an interview with the Dewan, after which, he was released, and treated with consideration, for about a month, or six weeks, when, he was, suddenly, placed in close imprisonment, from which he has not yet been released, and that he was studiously kept out of sight and reach, while Shere Sing's party was at Mooltan.

I have in my possession letters and papers, of the authenticity of which there is little doubt, which prove that Sirdar Khan Sing was in the interest of the Maharanee, and deeply concerned in the conspiracy for the murder of the British officials, and their expulsion from Lahore, before he was selected for the Mooltan appointment, and that his mission to Mooltan was to be made subservient to the cause, and that he was to create a disturbance, or insurrection, in that province, shortly after his getting the government.

And, furthermore, the papers show that, after the murder of Mr. Agnew and Lieutenant Anderson, Sirdar Khan Sing, in conjunction with Dewan Moolraj, was in correspondence with the Maharanee, for the purpose of furthering the interests of the conspiracy. Parts of this correspondence are in my possession; it took place between the date of the murder of Mr. Agnew at Mooltan, and of the execution of General Khan Sing, and the Maharanee's Moonshee, at Lahore.

Statements have been, at different times, and by various parties, made to me, and to the assistants, to the effect that Sirdar Khan Sing and Moolraj had an understanding together, from the first, and that, after the outbreak, they were, for a time, acting in concert, that, when General Khan Sing and the Moonshee were seized, convicted, and executed at Lahore, Sirdar Khan Sing, Man, believed the whole conspiracy discovered, and the game up, and that he, then, set to work to organize a scheme at Mooltan, by which he might seize Moolraj, get possession of the fort, and make both over to the British Government, in order to save himself. It is asserted that these machinations came to the knowledge of Moolraj, who, immediately, seized Khan Sing, and placed him under the close restraint from which he has never been released. This statement has been current for the last five months, but I have never been able to find any one who was cognizant of the fact, so as to be able to give evidence thereto. It is the solution generally given, and believed, of the somewhat enigmatical conduct of Moolraj towards Sirdar Khan Sing, Man.

## Inclosure 21 in No. 42.

*Deposition of Kootub Shah, June 3, 1848.*

I WAS, formerly, in the service of Sheik Emamooddeen, but, on his leaving Cashmere, remained in Lahore without employment.

On Sirdar Khan Sing being appointed Nazim of Mooltan, I accompanied him, in hopes of finding service, which he promised to give me, on our arrival there.

On Mr. Vans Agnew, Lieutenant Anderson, and the Sirdar reaching Tileya, Jowala Sahae, a servant of Dewan Moolraj, came to pay his respects, and, after a short interview, returned to Surai Sidhoo.

When the servants of the British officers and the Sirdar went to Sidhoo, to purchase supplies, Jowala Sahae ordered the Zemindars not to furnish them. I mentioned this to Sirdar Khan Sing, who remarked that supplies should only be taken, with the consent of the villagers.

The next day, on our arrival at Khalik Wullee, Jowala Sahae returned to Mooltan. The villagers of the place mentioned to us, that a refractory spirit had shown itself at Mooltan, and that Sahib Deen, their Jagheerdar, was their authority for the report. I informed the British officers of this, and remarked that it was strange that none of the Dewan's officials had appeared to welcome them. To this, they replied that the report was without foundation. On Monday, at noon, we arrived at Raj Ghat, which is three coss from Mooltan where we were met by Rungram, who informed us that the Dewan had ordered the Huzooreebagh to be prepared for the British officers, and the Edga for Sirdar Khan Sing. He then took leave and returned to Mooltan. I, again, mentioned to the Sirdar the reports I had heard, but he replied that they were untrue, and that Rungram had made proper arrangements for their accommodation.

The next day, Rungram made his appearance, and accompanied the British officers to the Huzooreebagh, which, however, appearing not to afford sufficient room, it was resolved that they should take up their quarters in the Edga. This was accordingly done, while Sirdar Khan Sing encamped in the inclosure of the Edga.

At 9 o'clock, Dewan Moolraj set out, from the fort, to have an interview; intelligence of which reached Mr. Agnew while the Dewan was in progress. Mr. Agnew requested the Sirdar to inform the Dewan, that he had better come in the afternoon, in order to avoid the heat of the midday. Sirdar Khan Sing said, that it would be advisable to give him an interview, at once.

Preparations were, accordingly, made to receive him, in the inclosure of the Edga, on his arrival, he was taken by the hand by Mr. Agnew, and seated by his side. In about an hour, he took leave. The Dewan was accompanied by 200 soldiers. He presented a Surwana of 250 rupees to Mr. Agnew, who said that they would proceed to business, in the evening.

In the evening, accordingly, the Dewan came again. The interview took place, in the presence of several officers of either party. It was remarked that Moolraj paid no attention to Sirdar Khan Sing, but treated him with studied coldness.

The Dewan said, that it was his wish to return his charge into the hands of the Sarkar, and that, if the British officers would visit the fort the next day, he would make over his authority.

Mr. Agnew requested the Dewan to furnish him with the collection papers of the last ten years, that he might ascertain the revenue of the various districts, and also desired him to hold a review of the troops.

The Dewan made objections to giving up his papers, and said, that he had merely held the territory in farm from the Government, at a fixed sum, which he had paid regularly, and that he possessed no papers.

On Mr. Agnew urging the point, the Dewan promised to supply him with the papers of six years collections, and said that he would make over the fort, the next day. He desired Mr. Agnew to give him a razeenamah, and an acknowledgment of having received charge of the territory, to which Mr. Agnew replied that, on receiving the papers, and getting possession of the fort, he would do so; the Dewan, then, left.

Khan Sing requested Mr. Agnew to take a few companies with him to occupy the fort, but that officer observed that a single Puhurra would be sufficient. On Sirdar Khan Sing repeating his request, Mr Agnew said that he would go, first, alone, and that the Sirdar should follow on his receiving charge of the fort. At length, it was settled that two companies and fifteen sowars should accompany them.

The next day, the Dewan was waited for, but, as he did not make his appearance up to 9 o'clock, a message was sent to him, to enquire the reason, and to request his presence.

The British officers and the Sirdar mounted an elephant, and, after inspecting their guns, were preparing to go to the fort, when Moolraj appeared, accompanied by 300 or 400 mounted men.

He alighted from his horse, and, getting on an elephant, went with the other party to the fort; when they reached the inner gate, they dismounted, and entered the fort; about ten people attended the British officers, but the rest of the troops who accompanied the Sirdar, were not allowed to proceed inside, and one or two of them were even struck, slightly.

I said to Mr Agnew, "if the Dewan intends to give up the fort, why does he not allow our troops to enter, and why do you go in thus unattended?" Mr Agnew requested the Dewan to allow the Lahore soldiers to be admitted. Both the companies were, then, permitted to enter. The British officers inspected the fort, Dewan Moolraj pointing out the magazines and other places. He, then, showed them a part of the fort, which he asserted to be proof against shot from outside.

About 100 soldiers were drawn up in review by the Dewan, to whom Mr Agnew gave every encouragement, telling them that they would be taken into the service of the Lahore Government, and that, after receiving their pay up to that date from the Dewan, they would be paid by him, in future. Mr. Agnew, then, proposed to leave.

Two companies, under Bhaee Esra Sing and Golab Sing, were left in the fort. As they were leaving the place, and were approaching the outer gate, the Dewan pressed on his horse, at the same time, a soldier stepped forward, and cut at Lieutenant Anderson, twice, with his sword. That officer spurred on, after the Dewan, five of whose sowars, turning round, attacked him, and wounded him in several places. He arrived, with some difficulty, at the Edga. A soldier, then, struck at Mr. Agnew, who was, however, not wounded. The same soldier then struck him, three successive times, with his sword, while Mr Agnew tried to defend himself with his stick. Sirdar Khan Sing dismounted, and, attended by a few of his sepoys, went to the British officer's assistance. Elaahee Buksh wounded the soldier who had attacked Mr Agnew. Ten or twelve of the Dewan's men, then, drew their swords. During this time Sirdar Khan Sing's troops were inside the fort.

The Sirdar took up Mr. Agnew, and, mounting an elephant, returned to the Edga.

Moolraj's soldiers fired off a gun and several matchlocks.

On arriving at the camp, it was found that Lieutenant Anderson was severely wounded, which was not known previously to Mr. Agnew.

Mr. Agnew wrote off, immediately, to Lahore, to Bahawalpore, and to Bunnoo, while his wounds were being dressed. Sowars were sent off, to hasten the arrival of Mr Wilkenson (the apothecary), who was on his way from Lahore.

After a short time, a message came from the Dewan, to state that he had had nothing to do with what had taken place, and that it originated entirely from his troops, who had acted without his knowledge.

Mr Agnew wrote to the Dewan, stating that he did not consider him to blame, but requesting him to send the soldiers who had attacked them.

He, also, ordered purwannas to be written, in the name of the troops, reprimanding them for having acted without the orders of the Dewan.

Rungram, on hearing that the British officers were wounded, advised the Dewan to visit them, unattended by his people.

While the Dewan was hesitating, a soldier, who was standing near Rungram wounded him with his sword. A commotion, then, ensued among the troops, who collected near the tomb of Shumstabreez. Mr. Agnew sent for me and Kurrum Ullahee, and ordered us to go to Moolraj, and enquire into the cause of the tumult.

On arriving near them, we heard the sound of several matchlocks, while, at the same time, the soldiers threatened to kill us, if we approached nearer.

We replied to this, that we came to speak to them, and not to fight. They did not, however, attend to us.

Presently, the two companies who had been left in the fort, came out, but no opposition was offered to them. I asked Esra Sing what was the reason of his leaving the place, to which he replied, that the Dewan's soldiers had begun to fire at his men, and that they were, consequently, obliged to quit.

We, then, returned to our camp, where we heard that Mr. Agnew's camels and cattle, which had been sent out to graze, had been seized by the Dewan's people.

In the evening, seeing that our forces were much scattered, I recommended Sirdar Khan Sing to collect them, and the guns, together. This was, accordingly, done by Mr. Agnew's directions, and they were all drawn up, close to the Edga. That night passed.

In the morning, a person dressed as a fakeer came to Sirdar Khan Sing. People said, however, that he was not a fakeer, but a Golundaze in the Dewan's service, sent to pick up intelligence; he shortly left. About three hours after, shots were fired from the fort. The firing continued till twelve o'clock, when Mr. Agnew sent for Sirdar Khan Sing, and, ordering 1000 rupees to be distributed among the troops, endeavoured to inspire confidence among them. I took the money to Bhaee Esra Sing, requesting him to divide it among his men, it appeared, however, that they all, under some pretext or other, refused to accept it.

I left the money with Bhaee Esra Sing, and mentioned what had taken place to Mr. Agnew, who directed the officers to appear before the Sirdar.

At length, the officers and their men appeared, and, after a few excuses, took the money, and promised to show good service. Kurum Elahee whispered to me, that the whole of the troops had gone over, and joined the rebels. I mentioned what he had told me, to the Sirdar, who encouraged the troops, and reminded them of their duty to the Sirkar.

In reply, they made great professions of loyalty.

Kazee Gholam Hoossen was then sent to the Dewan, to inquire into the cause of the disturbance, and to remind him that he had voluntarily surrendered his charge into the hands of the Government.

On the Kazee taking this message, he was told to make the best of his way to Lahore, leaving the British officers where they were. The Kazee answered, that the troops would fight for the Sahibs, and not desert them.

Assud Khan, a Belooch of Sungur, was sent, with the Kazee, among the Mooltan troops, under pretence of stopping the Dewan's guns; some were, accordingly, stopped, but others continued to be served, apparently, by the Dewan's orders. Before the Kazee returned, the Dewan's troops approached the Edga, upon which the Lahore soldiers took away their property and arms, and joined them.

I was standing among the troops, and endeavouring, by Mr. Agnew's orders to persuade them to return. Seeing Esra Sing, I told him to draw up his guns in front of the Edga, to prevent approach. Esra Sing replied, "you are mad, it is impossible to do so." He then went over to the Dewan's soldiers. I mentioned all these circumstances to Mr. Agnew. Kurum Elahee, and five or six others besides myself, were with Sirdar Khan Sing, while three or four servants were in attendance upon Mr. Agnew.

Sirdar Khan Sing offered to devote his life, but Mr. Agnew objected, saying that it was useless for him to sacrifice himself; that, alone, he could do nothing; and that he had better ask for quarter.

The Sirdar's people went outside the Edga, and demanded quarter.

The troops then entered the place, and plundered every thing. On their approaching the Sirdar, he said that he had asked for quarter, and that it would be useless to kill him, but that they might do what they pleased. He requested them to spare the wounded British officers. They, however, refused to listen to him, and seized him; while I was carried off by the Mussulmans of the Dewan's zumboorkhanah.

An Affghan, whose name I do not know, but whom I can recognise, together with a Nuhung, attacked Mr. Agnew, one firing a carbine at him, and the other striking off his head, which he took to the Dewan, who bestowed 300 rupees, and a horse of Mr. Agnew's, upon him.

During that day, the Sirdar was kept in confinement, in the Amkhas, the next, he was taken to the fort, where he was put in irons, with his son.

I remained under guard two days, the third day I was sent for by Moolraj, who said "if you wish to go, I will give you a pass" I had been advised, however, not to consent, as I should, probably, have been only imprisoned more strictly.

I, accordingly, refused to go, and offered to take service under him, requesting him to send for my family. On hearing this, he was greatly pleased and ordered my release from confinement. He, also, directed passports to be given to Kazee Gholam Hoossen, to bring my family to Mooltan. I then remained in Mooltan.

All that took place there has already been related by Vuzeer Alikhare, and the other officers who accompanied Mr Agnew

The next day, Ram Doss, brother of Hursookh, a general in the Dewan's service, came to me, and offered me a note of hand for 500 rupees, which the Dewan had sent. I declined taking it, on the plea that I had not earned it by what I had done, but said that I would take a reward, after displaying my services. I remained seven days at Mooltan.

When intelligence reached the Dewan, that Lieutenant Edwardes had marched upon Leia, he sent off Bugwan Dos, with a force of 3,500 men and 10 guns, to oppose him. Asud Khan of Sungur accompanied Bugwan Dos. I was, also, directed to go, but replied that I had no troops at my disposal; upon this, he told me to take Kurum Elakee, and his sowars, with me. We, accordingly, left, and accompanied Bugwan's force, three days. The next day, in the evening, when the troops marched, I remained some coss in the rear, with my sowars, and turned towards Lahore. That day we marched to Ooch-gool-Eenam, 50 coss distant.

When Moolraj sent for me, he mentioned that letters had reached him, before our arrival, from a place named Boorapoor, 30 coss from Mooltan, from the Sikhs in the Lahore force, promising to desert from the Sirdar, and join the Dewan. He showed me the letters, which were written in Goormookhee. He also showed me letters from the Maharanee, and mentioned that he had written to the troops at Peshawur, Hazara, Lahore, and Bunnoo, requesting them to join him.

He desired Sirdar Khan Sing and me to subscribe our names, which we did, for our own safety. The Dewan refused to listen to me, when I said that I held no command, and that it would be of no use to attach my seal to the letter.

The second day after the murder, the bodies of the British officers were wrapped up in a silken khes, and buried in one grave, by the Dewan's orders. The next day an Akalee removed the silk. The Dewan on hearing this, ordered his people to bury the bodies again, decently.

Moolraj directed the inclosure of the Edga to be pulled down

When I left, there was one regiment of Sikhs commanded by Hurdas Sing of Hoshiarpore; a great number of Beloochees, Affghans, and others are, now collected.

Moolraj's companions are Peer Buksh, Adawlutee, Futteh Mahomed Khan, Koornjugur, Mustapha Khan, Khagwanee, Sadik Mahomed Khan, Assud Khan, Belooch of Soongur, Misr Gooljus, Heer Bugwan, &c

Rungram will not suffer his wounds to be dressed, in the hope that he may get a pension for being wounded in the service of Government

Inclosure 22 in No. 42.

*The Commander-in-Chief to the Governor-General.*

*Camp, before Rammuggur, November 27, 1848.*

IT affords me the greatest gratification to forward, for your Lordship's information, a copy of a dispatch of the 23rd instant, addressed to the Adjutant-General of the army, by Brigadier-General H. M. Wheeler, C B, commanding the Punjab division, reporting the reduction of Kullalwala.

I have directed the Adjutant-General to convey to Brigadier-General Wheeler my hearty congratulations and thanks for the important services he, and the brave troops under his command, have rendered on this occasion



## Inclosure 23 in No. 42.

*Brigadier-General H M Wheeler, C B, commanding Jullundur Field Force, to the Adjutant-General*

*Camp, Kullahwala, November 23, 1848.*

IN continuation of my letter of yesterday's date, I have much satisfaction in reporting, for the information of his Excellency the Commander-in-chief, that the strong fort of Kullahwala is in my possession.

A close reconnoissance having been made after the action of the morning by Captain Oldfield, of the Engineers, accompanied by Lieutenant Colonel A. Wilson, of the Artillery, I decided on the positions for three batteries.

One of eight 9-pounders was in a garden, the mud wall of which furnished excellent cover, and through which embrasures were cut. It was about 160 yards from the gate, on which it fired.

One of two 24-pounders and one 12-pounder howitzer, about 450 yards from the fort, and one of five 6-pounders at nearly 300 yards.

The guns were moved into position well covered with cavalry and infantry, the latter lining the garden wall, and keeping down the enemy's fire, and occupying every vantage ground, at a little before 4 P.M., and poured shot and shell, with admirable effect, on the gateway, and into the works. I drew off to my camp at sunset, throwing a strong detachment of the 3rd Regiment Native Infantry into the village, under Captain Wallace, and occupying a position which watched and commanded the gateway.

The village had been held by a large body of the enemy, from which they were dislodged by the detachment of the corps of Guides, in good style, killing several. I had closely invested the whole, both fort and village, with my cavalry, and the investment continued through the night.

The only drawbacks were the darkness of the night, and the close proximity to the fort of large tracts of sugar-cane cultivation.

About 1 A.M. to-day, the enemy attempted to abandon the fort, and succeeded, after losing several men by the fire of the detachment under Captain Wallace, losing many more by the cavalry through which they had to pass, and I believe that I am under the number in stating that, at least, 300 of the enemy have been killed. Of the wounded, excepting a very few, who have been taken to our hospitals, I can give no idea.

I am proud to say, that this success has been achieved, with the loss of but one man killed, and five wounded.

Captain Oldfield of the Engineers has been most active, intelligent, and useful. I have already mentioned Major Swinley, he and Captains Sissmore and Burnett, each commanding batteries, and all of that arm, gave me great satisfaction, as indeed have the officers and men of every branch.

I also brought to the favorable notice of Lord Gough, the officers acting as my staff in the operations of the morning, and have great pleasure in stating that their services were as zealous and effective in those of the evening.

I have the honor to inclose a return \* of casualties.

## Inclosure 24 in No. 42.

*Mr. Lawrence to the Resident at Lahore.*

*Camp, Tulevara, November 29, 1848.*

AFTER the dispatch of my letter of yesterday's date, I received further intelligence, that Bedee Bikrama Sing had turned the police officers of Oonah and Noorpoor out of their districts, and put some of them in irons. He has also sent messengers into the villages below the hills, and instigated the petty Sikh Jagheerdars to rise, and attack Hoshiarpore. In consequence of this intelligence, which I communicated to Major Waller commanding the force, that officer explained to me that, though Major Hodgson still continued to have full confidence in the Sikh corps, he distrusted them; and requested me to ask Major Simpson, commanding at

\* Not received.

Hajeepore, who was then at Mookerian, on the way to his station, to join our force. The Sikh corps has, as yet, behaved so remarkably well, that I am still inclined to think, with Major Hodgson, that they will continue to do so. I was also averse to denude the station of Hajeepore, from which assistance could readily be afforded to Noorpoor and Puthankote, of troops. However, after full consideration, as there can be no doubt of the wisdom of avoiding all risks that can possibly be guarded against, I wrote to Major Simpson, requesting him to join us, to which that officer readily acceded. He reached Hajeepore just as our rear-guard left the place, and will be in the camp with the headquarters of the corps, and find five companies this evening. We are now strong enough, in my judgment, for any emergency. Colonel Wilkinson also writes to me, that he will co-operate with us by the Naree Pass, on the morning of the 1st proximo, with four companies, leaving four others, and a troop of regular cavalry, to guard Hoshiarpore.

The circumstance of the Bedee having joined the insurrection, will have an immense effect, no doubt, on all the Sikhs in the Doab, they are not numerous, compared to the whole population, but are, no doubt, the most warlike portion of it. They, and, in particular, the Sikh Jagheerdars, are hated by the villagers, but, at the same time, much dreaded; and it is difficult to say what disturbance they may not create. I heard, this morning, that a number of them have met, and sworn to drive us out of the Doab. Nearly all the Rajas in the hills seem to be raising men, and are, doubtless, more or less implicated, and watching events in the hope of benefiting by them. It would, therefore, I think, be expedient, that Brigadier Wheeler cross the Ravee at once, and be near enough to pass into this territory, on a moment's warning. It will, however, be equally necessary that troops should be posted in the Baree Doab, lightly equipped, so as to be able to march, at once, on any point where insurgents may collect. The 4th Native Infantry have now one wing at Nukodur, the other is at Loodiana, and I have recommended to Colonel Wilkinson the expediency of having the other wing over.

I have written to Brigadier Wheeler, advising him of the state of affairs in this territory, and requested him to dispatch towards Hajeepore a couple of nine-pounders, and a few mortars, in case we should not be able to take Oonah without them.

Inclosure 25 in No. 42.

*Mr. Lawrence to the Resident at Lahore.*

*Camp, Dugoh, November 30, 1848.*

I ARRIVED this day at Dugoh, with the troops under Major Simpson. We marched, after sunrise, the distance about fifteen miles up the Doon. On the road, we heard that a party of the Jeswan insurgents had come down the day before, and driven the police out of the fort of Dugoh, which, when the other forts in this part of the hills were destroyed, was reserved for their accommodation. We further ascertained that the Raja of Duttarpoor was also raising men, and that his son was in the fort with some men, having connived with the Jeswan men in ousting the police. Dugoh was built by the Rajas of Mulote, in the territory of Duttarpoor, which was wrested from the ancestors of the present Raja, some eighty years ago.

I wrote to the Duttarpoor Raja, both the day before yesterday, and yesterday, encouraging him to remain faithful, and assist our police. I further told him to come out and meet me during the morning march. As we approached the fort, we ascertained that the insurgents were leaving it; accordingly, Mr. Cust and I galloped on with a few sowars, and were fortunate enough to overtake the Raja's son, with a few matchlockmen, stealing off. I called on him, by name, to stop, which he did, and gave himself up, without making the least resistance. I then sent word to the father, that his son was with me, and that, if he did not come in, within two hours, I would instantly attack him. He has just arrived, and I have placed both father and son under restraint. The heads of villages joined us on the march, the majority declaring that they had neither joined in the insurrection, nor allowed their people to do so, and others saying that

those who had joined, had been forced into the act. I consider that nearly one half the Doon will now be safe.

The Seeba Raja, who resides in the second range above the Doon, has certainly rendered himself suspected. There is little doubt but that he was in communication with the Raja of Jeswan, to whose clan he belongs. But our prompt advance has terrified him, and he has obeyed my summons, and joined my camp, this day.

I hear, from all sides, that Bedee Bikrama Sing has been the prime mover in the present insurrection, and has seduced these foolish Rajas, who are a primitive, unsophisticated race, to seize the present opportunity for asserting their independence. To-morrow, we shall be at Umb, where the Jeswan Raja's forces must either fight, or disperse. Their number it is difficult to ascertain, the accounts varying from 1,000 to 5,000. Probably, they do not exceed 2,000, and I anticipate that many will desert this night, directly the fate of Dughoh reaches them.

We have many friendly Zemindars with us and, as we go on, they, and their friends, go ahead, procure us excellent intelligence, and exert their influence on the insurgents, some of whom are their relations, and many their friends or acquaintances. I do not anticipate much resistance from the Jeswan Rajpoots, but I feel satisfied that the Bedee will resist to the uttermost. I hear that he feels disappointed at the few Sikhs who have, hitherto, joined him. From his lineage, being the descendant of Nanuk, he is venerated, but his personal character is said to be so infamous that even many of his sect do not regard him in the same light as they would a more moral man.

I have no news from Teera to-day, but hope to hear, in two days, of Mr. Barnes' arrival at that place. There was a report, last night, that the insurgents were again collecting at Deenanuggui. I hope, should this prove the case, that they will not be allowed to gather strength.

Inclosure 26 in No. 42

*Mr. Lawrence to the Resident at Lahore.*

*Camp, Umbota, December 1, 1848.*

THE force, under the command of Major Simpson, arrived, at Umbota, this morning, at 9 A.M. from Dughoh, which fort we rendered untenable, before marching. Colonel Wilkinson marched from Hoshiarpore, last night, with 300 men of the 28th Native Infantry, accompanied by Mr. Christian, and this morning ascended the pass. The insurgents, seeing that they were between two parties, dispersed, without firing a shot. We found the pass cut and scarped, so that a few men could easily have defended the position.

The Jeswan Raja is, I understand, in his residence at Khurote, about nine miles from this, with a few hundred men, and his son and vuzeer are on a small hill about five miles distant. I have proposed to Major Simpson that we attack both posts to-morrow morning, and that officer has agreed to do so.

I have suggested to Colonel Wilkinson, that the detachment of the 28th Native Infantry might march back to Hoshiarpore, so as to allow of the return of the companies which have been called in from Boodh Pind.

Inclosure 27 in No. 42.

*Brigadier-General Wheeler to the Adjutant-General.*

*Camp at Mookerian, December 2, 1848.*

I REACHED Kelaspore, on the 30th ultimo, after a long march through ravines and jungle, and found that the enemy had retired to Nerote, about nine miles further north. The troops did not reach their ground until past noon, and, a little after 2 P.M. I received positive information that the enemy had quitted Nerote, with the intention of attacking my camp.

The alarm was sounded, and the troops of all arms were under arms with

the utmost cheerfulness and promptitude; and, in less than a quarter of an hour after receiving the information, I was in full march to meet them, leaving sufficient protection for the camp.

Before I had marched a mile, I obtained intelligence that, after wounding two or three grass-cutters, and carrying off several of their ponies, they had recrossed the Ooj river. I immediately sent off the cavalry in pursuit, and successively sent back to camp the field-batteries, and the 3rd regiment Native Infantry, excepting two companies, with which, and the troop of artillery, I continued my march to support the cavalry, or, if necessary, to dislodge the enemy from any village in which they might post themselves. On reaching the left bank of the Ooj, I learned that the party had returned to Nerote, pursued by the cavalry; and I, consequently, returned to camp with the horse artillery and infantry, which I reached at a little after 5 P M

The cavalry returned about an hour and a half after, without having come up with the enemy, excepting a small party of the 2nd Irregulars, which behaved in the most dashing manner. A report of the affair from Captain G Jackson, commanding that corps, accompanies this

I made my arrangements for moving on Nerote, next morning, (the 1st instant), and just before commencing the march, obtained good information that Nerote was abandoned, and the enemy in full march to plunder Deenanuggur. This altered my plans, and I, immediately, marched for that place, which I reached past noon, having crossed the Ravce, by a very unsound ford, three miles from Kelaspore, and ten from Deenanuggur. I had sent on the 15th Irregular Cavalry, to protect the town, until I came up.

Lieutenant Hodson, from whom I have received excellent information, went with his guides, to Nerote, and I added a ressalah of irregulars, to enable him to follow up the track of the enemy. He joined me, in the evening, at Deenanuggur; and I have great pleasure in reporting, that, on Gunda Sing and Prum Sing reaching the Ravce, they were deserted by the whole of their followers, excepting twenty-five, (which, of course, rendered a move on Deenanuggur out of the question,) and with that number struck off to the hills, to join the rebels there.

The state of our hill territories is such that I have felt it advisable to push on to Hoshiarpore, and have arrived here this morning, having forded the Beas, and made a march of seventeen miles, at the least.

After arranging the affair in that quarter, and dispelling the alarm which has been raised in the Doab, I purpose re-crossing the Beas, and, if necessary, the Ravce, to preserve the tranquillity of both the Doabs.

#### Inclosure 28 in No. 42

*Brevet-Captain G. Jackson, Commandant 2nd Irregular Cavalry, to Brevet-Major H Palmer, Major of Brigade.*

*Camp, Adunanuggur, December 1, 1848.*

I SUBMIT the following account of my proceedings yesterday, when sent in pursuit of a body of the enemy, who had attacked the grass-cutters of the regiment under my command.

On the alarm being sounded in camp, I received the Brigadier-General's instructions to detach a division of my regiment, of the strength named in the margin,\* to ascertain the number and position of the enemy. The division was commanded by Naib Ressaldar Mirza Hyder Beg, and, within a mile of camp, came up with a party of fifty Sikh horsemen, on the banks of a nullah, who immediately crossed to the opposite side to their comrades, but not before one horseman was cut down in single combat by Keramut Ally, sowar. On reaching the opposite bank, the enemy's party was increased to upwards of 100 horsemen; but the Naib Ressaldar, without waiting to count his opponents, dashed through the nullah, and gallantly charged the whole body, killing eight, and wounding several. The Naib Ressaldar, with his division, pursued the enemy a distance of seven miles, and recovered from them several of the tattoos which had been plundered, in the morning, from my grass-cutters.

On receiving from Captain Burroughs, deputy Assistant Adjutant-General, the orders of the Brigadier-General to move with the remainder of my regiment

in support of the detachment, I proceeded in the track ascertained by the dust, but without meeting with any of the enemy in the open; and, on coming up with the Naib Rissaldar's party, then five coss from camp, I fell back, as night was setting in.

I beg particularly to bring to the notice of the Brigadier-General, the gallant conduct of Naib Rissaldar Mirza Hyder Beg, who, not only yesterday, but likewise in the cavalry affair at Kullalwala, on the 22nd ultimo, distinguished himself in a charge, by singling out a Sikh horseman, and, with one sweep of the sword, taking his head clean off. The bold and dashing style in which he, yesterday, led his small party to the attack, and routed a body of the enemy, outnumbering his detachment by eight to one, was most praiseworthy; and I earnestly solicit that his brave conduct may be submitted for the "Order of Merit."

The duffadars and sowars who distinguished themselves, I shall reward by promotion on the opportunity occurring.

The loss of the enemy in the above affair, was eight killed and several wounded; my loss being four sowars wounded.

Inclosure 29 in No. 42

*Mr. Lawrence to the Resident at Lahore.*

*Camp, Umbota, December 2, 1848.*

TWO detachments left camp, during last night; one, commanded by Major Simpson, with the wing of the 29th Native Infantry, which I accompanied, to attack a strong position on a hill above Umb; the other, to assault Khurote, the residence of the Raja of Jeswan. This force, which consisted of the Sikh regiment, about 400 men, was commanded by Major Hodgson; and Mr. Christian, the settlement officer, who was well acquainted with the locality, accompanied him.

Major Simpson drove the enemy from their position, killing a few of them, with the loss of three or four wounded, among whom, I regret to say, was Lieutenant and Adjutant Faddy, whose wound was severe. The insurgents were commanded by the son of the Raja of Jeswan and his vuzeer, both of whom, I am sorry to say, escaped.

Major Hodgson did not meet with much opposition, he had but two men wounded, he killed a few of the enemy, and destroyed the Raja's residence. Mr. Christian remarks, that the Sikh corps behaved particularly well.

I regret to say, that I have just received a letter from Mr. G. C. Barnes, dated the 30th ultimo, informing me that the Mulmoree Raja, Purmodh Chund, has completely committed himself. He has stopped the dak, manned two little forts, carried off the police of Teera, and commenced collecting the revenues. He is said to have 1,000 men, and six guns. Mr. Barnes is within ten coss of Teera, with a wing of the hill corps, and will be joined, I expect, in two or three days, by the other wing from Noorpoor. It is of the greatest importance, in my judgment, that this insurrection should, at once, be put down. I, therefore, strongly recommend that the Nusseerree battalion come down from Simla, and crossing the Sutlej, advance on Teera, by Mulmoree. Mr. William Edwards, or his assistant Mr. Carnac, should accompany it, as the Belaspore territory, on this side the river, is under their jurisdiction. I would gladly go up by Rajpoor to Nadowan, and thence on to Teera, with the Sikh corps, but until the Bedee of Oonah is subdued, could not move from this valley.

If a corps could be spared from the Cis-Sutlej side, it might be sent to Amundpoor Makhawal, across the river Sutlej, and advance on Oonah.

The Tehsildar of Mookerian writes, that the insurgents are again assembling at Deenanuggur, and that nothing has been heard of the approach of Brigadier Wheeler, C.B. Should another irruption be made on the Puthankote side, I really do not know how we can repel it, for there are but seven companies of the 71st Native Infantry, at Boodh Pind, and two at Hajeepoor.

I observe that Brigadier Wheeler has been gazetted to the command of the Punjab Division, retaining that of this territory. It seems to me that, at a time like the present, some officer should be on this side the Beas, with power to act, under the Brigadier-General.

Inclosure 30 in No. 42.

*Major D. Simpson to Mr. Lawrence.*

*Camp, Umbota, December 3, 1848.*

I HAVE the honor to inclose, herewith, a detachment order, issued yesterday, regarding our operations against the rebels of the Jeswan valley.

Inclosure 31 in No. 42.

*Detachment Orders by Major D Simpson, Commanding Detachment in the Jeswan Valley.*

*Camp, Umbota, December 2, 1848.*

MAJOR Simpson, commanding detachments in the Jeswan valley, returns his best thanks to the head-quarters and five companies 29th regiment Native Infantry, for the gallant manner in which they, this morning, stormed the heights above, and routed the mob of the Raja of Umb.

Opposed by 400 men, posted on a very strong hill, well-armed with jezzails and matchlocks, they drove all before them. Officers and men did their duty, more especially, Major Simpson observed the gallant bearing of Captain Park commanding 29th regiment of native infantry, Lieutenant Unwin, 16th grenadiers, officiating interpreter and quarter-master, and Lieutenant and Adjutant Faddy, whose able services he regrets being temporarily deprived of, in consequence of a severe wound.

The number of prisoners released must be a source of pleasure to all those employed.

Lieutenant Johnston 29th regiment Native Infantry, detachment staff, will immediately make over to John Lawrence, Esq., commissioner, 38 prisoners taken in the affair.

Officers commanding companies of the 29th regiment Native Infantry, are requested by Major Simpson to give his thanks to their men.

RETURN of Killed and Wounded of the 29th Regiment Native Infantry, on the 2nd December, 1848

Rank and Names	Killed	Wounded.			Total	Remarks
		Dangerously	Severely.	Slightly.		
Lieutenant .. ..	..	1	..	..	1	All gun-shot wounds
Havildar .. ..	..	..	1	..	1	
Bugler .. ..	..	..	..	1	1	
Sepoys .. ..	..	2	2	3	7	
Name of European officer, Lieutenant Adjutant Faddy.						

Inclosure 32 in No. 42.

*Mr Lawrence to the Resident at Lahore.**Camp, Chaobroo, December 4, 1848.*

AFTER the dispatch of my letter of yesterday's date, I received the intelligence that Bedee Bikrama Sing, the Oonah Chief, intimidated at the result of the two affairs at Umb and Khurote, on the 2nd instant, had fled, and that his force had dispersed. I, instantly, asked Major Simpson to allow two companies of infantry to push on with me towards Oonah; but that officer, considering that there was some danger in doing so, objected to the plan. We, therefore, marched, this morning, from Umbota, and are now half-way to Oonah. I shall go on, in the evening, and secure the place from plunder, as I hear there is some valuable property in it. During the remainder of the day, the report of the Bedee's flight was confirmed by the head-men of villages, and, at night-fall, the Chowdrees of Oonah itself arrived. The Bedee, it seems, passed down the Chenee Ghat, and took a southward direction, accompanied by about sixty armed men. I judge, from this information, that he is moving towards Nukodur or Dhukhneeke Surae, and will cross the Beas in that direction, and endeavour to join the Sikh army.

All the heads of villages in the Jeswan Valley, except three or four noted Chowdrees, who were instrumental in the insurrection here, came in; and now that both the Bedee and Raja have fled, I consider this insurrection as over. I have no doubt but that the Raja will surrender in a few days; and should he not do so, he cannot avoid being captured.

I shall write to him, assuring him that his life, his honor, and a maintenance, will be granted him, if he surrender at once, but nothing more. I cannot but look on him with feelings of commiseration. He is old, feeble, and foolish; his son is a profligate, in whose hands he was a mere puppet.

I have, further, to communicate the agreeable intelligence, that, on the 1st instant, Mr. Barnes, the Deputy-Commissioner of Kangra, with a wing of the 2nd Sikh Local Infantry (hill corps), under the command of Lieutenant Gordon, the Adjutant, completely defeated the Raja of Mulmoree's troops. Mr. Barnes, seeing that the enemy were apparently too strong to be safely attacked, had taken up a position to await the arrival of the other wing of the corps under Major Ferris, which was marching from Noorpoor. The troops of the Raja, however, crossed the Beas, and attacked him, and the result was their complete dispersion. Upwards of twenty-five men were killed. Among the former, I understand, were two men of note. Mr. Barnes marched, next day, to the right bank of the Beas, and, the Nadown Raja advancing on the left side, the remaining levies of the Raja of Mulmoree lost heart, and dispersed, and he himself came down to the ferry, and surrendered. Mr. G. Barnes' conduct, as well as that of Lieutenant Gordon, appears to have been admirable, and I trust will meet with the approbation of Government.

The Sikhs attacked Puthankote on the 19th. On the 24th, the Jeswan Raja and the Bedee rose in the lower range of hills. About the same time, the Mulmoree Raja, in the upper range, also rebelled. The General was absent from the territory, and I and my assistant were thus, necessarily, obliged to act on our own responsibility, to a considerable extent. By the 3rd of the ensuing month, or within thirteen days, peace and order have been restored throughout the territory, by the capture, or dispersion, of the insurgents. This result has been effected, with little loss of life, and hardly any expense to Government. Had we not thus promptly acted, I am convinced that the rebellion would have assumed a formidable aspect, and have cost blood and treasure to suppress. Many who had every intention of joining against us, were paralyzed by our movements; and the good intentions of the well-disposed were confirmed.

## Inclosure 33 in No. 42.

*Major D. Simpson to Mr. Lawrence.**Camp, Oonah, December 5, 1848.*

I INCLOSE a report made by Major Hodgson, commanding 1st regiment Sikh Infantry, of his attack on Ukrote, on the morning of the 2nd instant.

I esteem myself most fortunate in having had an officer of Major Hodgson's skill, to assist me in the simultaneous attacks the detachment under my command made on the enemy's positions.

## Inclosure 34 in No. 42.

*Major J. S. Hodgson to Lieutenant Johnston.**Camp, Umbota, December 3, 1848.*

AGREEABLY to orders, I marched the 1st regiment, Sikh Local Infantry, at 10 P.M. of the night of the 1st instant, for the purpose of attacking and dismantling Ukrote, the place of the residence of the Raja of Jeswan Doon.

The regiment amounting to 400 rank and file, arrived at the foot of the hill on which the enemy were posted, about day-break, after a difficult march of fourteen miles. I, immediately, detached two parties to take the position in flank and rear, and advanced with the main body, covered by skirmishers during the ascent, the enemy kept up a fire of matchlocks, which was returned by the skirmishers.

The opposition was soon overcome, and the enemy, observing that they were being surrounded, dispersed, after losing three men killed, and several wounded; six prisoners were also made, and have been delivered over to the civil power.

The whole of the buildings were dismantled and destroyed. This was a work of time, as one, a Barradurree, being of solid masonry, required time and arrangement to effect its destruction, nor was this work completed before the evening.

Working parties from the regiments were employed to effect this object, and, the men having been without refreshment from the day previous, it was quite impossible to have returned that night.

The regiment behaved, in every respect, to my satisfaction, and I feel it but proper to mention the valuable and spirited aid I received from Mr Christian of the civil service, who guided the march of the regiment, and accompanied it in its advance up the ascent.

I am happy to say I had only one Sepoy wounded.

## Inclosure 35 in No. 42.

*Mr. Lawrence to the Resident at Lahore.**Camp, Oonah, December 5, 1848.*

LAST night, we took possession of the town and residence of Bedee Bikrama Sing, without the slightest opposition. The place was deserted, and much of the transportable property seemed to have been removed. After carefully inspecting the whole of the buildings, I feel perfectly convinced that we might have taken them, with our force, in a single day. The houses are strongly built and loop-holed, but could not have resisted an attack judiciously conducted. I shall have such portions of them dismantled, before the force marches, as may appear necessary.

On the march yesterday, Bedee Bikrama Sing's uncle, Bedee Kahor Sing, an old man of seventy-five years of age, and a considerable Jagheerdar in the territory, came out to meet us. He had, from the first, set his face against his nephew's misdeeds, and I have allowed him to return home, after giving him my assurance of safety and protection.



I have, already, informed you that I had dispatched messengers after Raja Oomed Sing of Jeswan, to endeavour to secure his person, under a promise of security of life, and a maintenance. I have, this morning, heard that he has surrendered himself, and is on his way to my camp.

I request your permission to issue a proclamation, offering a reward of (1,000 Rs) one thousand rupees, for the apprehension of Meean Jey Sing, and of (500 Rs) five hundred rupees for that of Vuzeer Meean Uchur Sing, who was the cause of the whole rebellion

The head-men of villages are coming in from all sides.

Inclosure 36 in No. 42.

*Major J. Ferris, Commanding 2nd, or Hill Regiment, Sikh Local Infantry,  
to Mr Lawrence.*

*Camp, Teera, December 5, 1848.*

I FORWARD two reports from Lieutenant and Adjutant Gordon of the regiment under my command, and it affords me much satisfaction in being able to state, that the whole affair was managed by that officer in the most creditable manner. You will perceive, from his report, that the enemy were three times his numbers, and that they made a most determined resistance. Lieutenant Gordon's arrangements were most admirable, and, to his taking up such a favorable position, is to be attributed the small loss he sustained.

I would beg leave to draw your attention to the gallant behaviour of Jemadar Mustram, who is one of the transfers from the late Major Broadfoot's sappers and miners, and who has received the third class order of merit for former service; as also the gallantry displayed by Kurreem Buksh, sepoy, who captured a standard of the Raja's, and bayoneted the standard-bearer; and I trust you will do me the favor of bringing the names of these two men to the notice of Government, with a view to their being rewarded for the gallantry displayed by them

I trust also that the regiment may be allowed by the Government to add the standard, so gallantly won by their brethren in arms, to their proper regimental colours.

I have, further, to report, that I joined Lieutenant Gordon, on the 3rd instant, with the remainder of my regiment, and am making arrangements, under the directions of Mr Barnes, in destroying the fort, and securing the persons, and property, of the leading rebels

I beg to supply facts, ascertained since our arrival at Teera, which were not positively known, when Lieutenant Gordon sent in his report; which are, that Danee Sing, a Subadar in Lena Sing's regiment, now disbanded, and another leader, name unknown, were both killed, and Surdaroo Mehr and Pahar Chund, both reported wounded.

Inclosure 37 in No 42

*Lieutenant and Adjutant R. K Gordon to Major Ferris, C.B.*

*Camp, Teera, December 3, 1848.*

ON the afternoon of the 2nd of December, I was joined by a company of the 28th regiment Native Infantry, under Lieutenant Kendall, who had made a march of upwards of thirty-three miles in fifteen hours, at the request of the Deputy Commissioner, and I advanced to the banks of the Beas, accompanied by G. Barnes, Esq, to reconnoitre, with sixty men. On our arrival near the river, the enemy, on the opposite bank, opened a tremendous fire of matchlocks, and also the guns in the fort; on hearing which, the whole detachment (including the company of the 28th under Lieutenant Kendall) came down to the Ghat. I, immediately, withdrew my men under such cover as the place afforded, and, after some difficulty, ascertained that the boats were on the opposite side. Seeing that we could not by any means get across the river, I withdrew my

detachment, in light infantry order, to camp, about a mile distant from the Ghat. During the night, intelligence was received of the arrival at Teera, without opposition, of the Nadown Raja, with about 700 men, and that the enemy had evacuated the fort, and, on the following morning, we were enabled to cross with the whole detachment. At the Ghat we were met by the Raja Purmooh Chund, who delivered himself up to the Deputy Commissioner, G. Barnes, Esq., and I immediately despatched a small guard to take possession of the fort. I regret to say that two Sepoys of the 2nd hill regiment have been wounded in the affair.

Inclosure 38 in No. 42.

*Lieutenant and Adjutant R. K. Gordon, Commanding Detachment 2nd Hill Regiment Sikh Local Infantry, to Major Ferris, C.B.*

*Camp, near Toorul, December 2, 1848.*

AGREEABLY to your instructions, I marched from Puthankote, on the morning of the 25th ultimo, strength as per margin\*, with Deputy Commissioner G. Barnes, Esq., towards Teera.

We marched from Koorul at 6 A.M. on the morning of the 1st, and, on the line of march, I received intelligence that the enemy had crossed the Beas, on the evening of the 30th ultimo, in great force, having upwards of 800 men, and were advancing to attack us. I had just arrived at the small village of Toorul, and taken up a strong position on some heights on the left of the road, when I perceived the enemy advancing to the attack, in two divisions, about half a mile in front of my position. My small force was, in a great measure, concealed by brushwood. I, immediately, detached a party in skirmishing order, to take possession of a hill on my left, which I observed one of the divisions, headed by Purmooh Chund, was making for, and secured it. I, also, detached a party to the right, to seize a small mound, and village, about 300 yards in front of our position, which, had the enemy got possession of, would have given us great trouble in dislodging. I then advanced, with the remainder of my men, leaving a small party to protect the baggage, and commenced the attack in front. The enemy made a most determined resistance, but, after about half an hour's hard fighting, and vainly endeavouring to gain the hill, on which I had placed the flanking parties, they at length gave way, and the whole of my men charged most gallantly down the hill, and drove them before them for upwards of three miles. In this charge we took a standard of the Raja's, and the bearer of it was bayoneted by Kurreem Buksh, sepoy, 9th company, whose gallant conduct I beg leave to bring most especially to your notice; as well as the gallant conduct of Jemadar Mustram, 5th company, who repulsed several attempts of the enemy to force his position on the heights. You are aware that this native officer has, already, received the third class order of merit, for former services. His conduct was most conspicuous throughout the affair, and I consider it my duty to bring it to your notice.

I have further to bring to your notice the very able assistance I received from G. Barnes, Esq., who, on the enemy retiring, moved out, with about thirty men I had left to protect the baggage, and took possession of a Ghat through which the enemy were compelled to pass, and kept up a heavy fire on them, by which they sustained a great loss. The number of the enemy killed amounts to thirty, whose bodies were found, and they must have had a much larger proportion wounded. On our side, I am happy to report that we have had none killed, owing principally to our strong position, and one Naick, Juggernaut, 10th company, severely wounded. In conclusion, I have to state that the conduct of the whole detachment was everything I could have wished. I have further to report that Mr Barnes, the Deputy Commissioner, expects a company of the 28th regiment Native Infantry to join our camp this evening, when I purpose reconnoitering the Ghat, but shall hold our present position, until reinforced by you with the remainder of the regiment.

Inclosure 39 in No: 42.

*Mr. Lawrence to the Resident at Lahore.*

*Camp, Oonah, December 6, 1848.*

IT is with much pleasure that I avail myself of this opportunity to express how much gratified I have been with the conduct of the 1st regiment Sikh Local Infantry, during the late operation. Their conduct, discipline, and spirit, have commanded the general admiration of every officer in the camp. During the last fourteen days, they have made forced marches without a murmur. They have experienced fatigue, and privation, with soldier-like alacrity. They crossed the Beas, to fight against their own countrymen at Deenanuggur, with the utmost readiness, and, after the affair at Ukhrote (or Khurote) they voluntarily expressed their willingness to march off, at once, and attack Bedee Bikrama Sing; and I feel convinced that they would have done so. In short, the state of this corps reflects the highest credit on Major Hodgson.

Inclosure 40 in No 42.

*The Resident at Lahore to the Secretary with the Governor-General.*

*Lahore, December 8, 1848.*

THE disturbances which threatened to disturb the peace of the British Trans-Sutlej districts, have been almost entirely suppressed.

The Governor-General will, I am sure, appreciate the promptness and energy displayed, on this occasion, by Mr. J. Lawrence and his assistants, and the ready and zealous co-operation afforded by the military officers, as also the good conduct of the soldiers of the several corps employed.

Inclosure 41 in No. 42.

*The Resident at Lahore to Mr Lawrence.*

*Lahore, December 8, 1848*

ALL the officers under you appear to have acted with much energy and zeal, but the conduct of Mr Barnes is such as to entitle him to the special notice of the Governor-General, as is that of Lieutenant Gordon.

I sanction the issue of the proclamation proposed by you in your letter of the 5th instant, offering rewards of 1,000 rupees and 500 rupees, for the apprehension of Meean Jey Sing and Vuzeer Meean Uchur Sing respectively.

I consider that the early suppression of this disturbance is attributable to the prompt and judicious measures taken by yourself, and by your detached assistants in their different jurisdictions, and by the ready aid furnished, on your requisitions, by the officers in charge of the military posts in the division; whose prompt and zealous co-operation, entered into, at times, on their own responsibility, will, I am sure, receive the approbation of the Governor-General.

His Lordship will be much gratified also by the good conduct of the Sikh regiment, and of all those employed on this occasion.

Inclosure 42 in No 42

*The Secretary with the Governor-General to the Resident at Lahore.*

*Camp, on the right bank of the Guggur,  
December 11, 1848.*

I HAVE laid before the Governor-General, Mr. Inglis' letter, dated the 4th instant, forwarding correspondence regarding the state of affairs in the Trans-Sutlej States.

I am directed, in reply, to convey to you, his Lord-ship's full approval of the measures adopted for the coercion of the rebels. The Governor-General further, directs that you will instruct Mr. Lawrence, that no terms should be offered to the chief insurgents. Immediately they are captured, or surrender, they should be thrown into prison, there to await the pleasure of Government, respecting their final disposal.

Inclosure 43 in No. 42.

*The Secretary with the Governor-General to the Resident at Lahore.*

*Camp, right bank of the Guggur,  
December 11, 1848.*

THE Governor-General has had much satisfaction in perceiving the success which has attended the prompt and energetic measures of Mr. Lawrence; and he entirely approves of what has been done by Mr. Barnes. You will be pleased to intimate the same to those officers accordingly.

Inclosure 44 in No. 42.

*Mr Lawrence to the Resident at Lahore*

*Camp, Jullundur, December 11, 1848.*

I ANNEX documents from Major Ferris, C B, commanding the (Hill Regiment) 2nd Sikh Local Infantry; being the official account of the action of the 2nd instant and subsequent day, between the detachment of that corps and the insurgents near Teera. I have, already, expressed to you my opinion of the conduct and ability which Lieutenant Gordon evinced on that occasion.

It was of great importance that a forward movement should have been made towards Teera, in order to prevent the rebellion from spreading. It was also an object, if possible, to avoid an action, until Major Ferris, with the rest of the Hill Regiment, could join. The insurgents were aware that troops were on their way, and, therefore, hurried on the conflict. Mr G Barnes had written to Captain Tierney, commanding three companies of the 28th Native Infantry in Kangra, for aid, and that officer detached Lieutenant Kendall, with one company, to join Lieutenant Gordon, but, though the detachment was too late for the fight, they evinced their spirit and energy, by making a march of 33 miles in 15 hours, which, in a hilly country, was no ordinary performance. The presence of this company was, no doubt, also of use in the subsequent operations, and, probably, hastened the surrender of the Raja of Mulmoree.

The conduct of Raja Jodbeer Sing, of Nadown, is deserving of much commendation. He is a natural son of the famous Sunsar Chund, of Kangra, and therefore an uncle of the Mulmoree Raja, with whom he has long been at feud. Directly I heard of the insurrection, I wrote to Raja Jodbeer Sing, urging him to show his zeal and loyalty by assisting Mr Barnes, and there is no doubt but that his move on Teera, direct from Nadown, at once, decided the struggle.

The 2nd Sikh Local Infantry, in its appearance and discipline, is not equal to the 1st regiment, but it has many tried soldiers in it, who formerly belonged to the late Major Broadfoot's sappers and Major Ferris' jezzailchees; the rest are Hill men of the Kangra district, and their local knowledge, and adaptation to the climate, and to service in a mountainous country, renders them peculiarly suited for such service as that they have now rendered.

Inclosure 45 in No. 42.

*Mr. Lawrence to the Resident at Lahore.*

*Camp, Jullundur, December 11, 1848.*

THE transactions of the past twenty days, as well as all the information which I have been able to obtain, leave no doubt on my mind but that emissaries from the Sikh chiefs in the Punjab, have been engaged in exciting our

subjects to rebel. It is probable, also, that the Sikh corps has been tampered with. I have been in communication with Major Hodgson, who commands that corps, on the subject, and we both agree that, while it is incumbent on us to take every precaution, it would not be politic to show any distrust of the men. The Sikh regiment does not contain more than 250 soldiers of that persuasion; the rest are Mahomedans, Poorbeahs, and Hill-men, and, during the late émeute in the hills, they have, as I have already had the honor to report, behaved in the most soldier-like manner.

Inclosure 46 in No. 42.

*The Secretary with the Governor-General to the Adjutant-General.*

*Camp, Patursee, December 13, 1848.*

I AM directed to request that his Excellency will be pleased to convey to the Brigadier the expression of his Lordship's thanks for the valuable service which he has rendered on recent occasions, and his Lordship's approbation of the judgment and discretion with which the operation against Kullalwala was planned, and of the satisfactory manner in which it was executed by the officers and troops under Brigadier Wheeler's command

Inclosure 47 in No. 42.

*The Secretary with the Governor-General to the Resident at Lahore.*

*Camp, Loodiana, December 20, 1848.*

I AM desired by the Governor-General to convey his approval and thanks to the officers engaged in the operations \*

The Governor-General is pleased to promote Jemadar Mustram to the rank of Subadar, and the Sepoy Kurreem Buksh to the rank of Havildar, for their gallant conduct, and desires that these distinctions be notified in regimental orders, and on parade

The Governor-General quite approves of the judicious reply which you made regarding the captured standard, and he requests that Major Ferris may be informed, that the grant of a third colour, like every extraordinary honor, should be reserved for very extraordinary occasions; and that, in no case, could his Lordship consent, that a place of honor should be given to a standard stained with disloyalty and rebellion.

No. 43.

*The Governor-General to the Secret Committee.*

*Camp, Mukkoo, January 4, 1849 (No. 3.)*

A LETTER from Major-General Whish to my Acting-Military Secretary, Colonel Benson, dated the evening of the 27th of December, has brought me intelligence of the re-commencement of operations against Mooltan on that day, by a successful attack on the enemy's posts east of the city, which were carried with little loss. This was the first step to a regular attack upon the town and citadel, which Major-General Whish, in communication with the engineer officers of the Bengal and Bombay forces (the Bombay column, under Brigadier Dundas, having arrived on the 22nd of December), determined upon as the surest mode of proceeding. A further letter of the 29th mentions, that two mortar batteries had been playing upon the citadel at 500 yards, and that two breaching batteries, of eighteen pounders, would open without fail at daybreak the following morning, simultaneously upon the Khooni Boorj (the south-east angle) and the Delhi Gate of the city, at a distance of 150 yards, and it was confidently expected that, on that day, or the succeeding one (the 30th or 31st of December), the city would be in the possession of the British troops. Lieu-

\* Letter from Major Ferris, December 5th. Inclosure 36 in No. 42,

tenant-Colonel Sir H. Lawrence had arrived, on the 28th, from Bombay, and intended to remain with Major-General Whish, till the fall of the city. I am now expecting his arrival in my camp with that intelligence.

The Commander-in-Chief, with the British army, has advanced some distance from the right bank of the Chenab, and the rebel force, under Shere Sing, remains on the left bank of the Jhelum. The enemy, it is said, are put to great stress for provisions and clothing, and are beginning to show some indications of a desire to leave their present strong position at Moong, and retire across the Jhelum.

As worthy of particular notice, among the papers now forwarded, I would call your attention to Sir F. Currie's letter of the 25th ultimo,\* which contains a list of the Sikh Sirdars who are openly disaffected to the British power, and many of them in arms against it. You will observe, that though the list is, probably, not a complete one, it contains most of the names of chief note in the Punjab.

Reports have reached Major Abbott of the arrival of Dost Mahomed Khan at Peshawur; of his having seized the district as his own, and appointed his son, Mahomed Hyder Khan, Governor, and his grandson (Mahomed Akbar's son), chief of the Adawlut; of his having sent for Chuttur Sing, and demanded from him, as a first stipulation, the surrender of the British prisoners, and of a party of Sikh and Dooranee horse having been dispatched in consequence, to bring them to Peshawur. It is also mentioned, that Chuttur Sing has tendered to Dost Mahomed all lands westward of the Jhelum. A letter to the Resident, from Lieutenant Taylor at Lukkee, dated the 16th ultimo†, seems to corroborate these reports; but, as yet, I have no authentic information as to their truth, nor even as to the confidently-stated fact of Dost Mahomed's arrival at Peshawur. Three important letters,‡ however (important, that is, if they are authentic), have been intercepted by Sheik Emamooddeen, and made over to Major Edwardes, they are addressed by Moolraj to Dost Mahomed Khan, Sirdar Sooltan Mahomed Khan, and Sirdar Chuttur Sing, respectively. The letters would prove, that Dost Mahomed had held out hopes to Moolraj of making a diversion in the Derajat. They go to show also (what was pretty clear before), that Sooltan Mahomed Khan was not compelled, as he declares he was, to surrender the British prisoners to Chuttur Sing. Both Sir F. Currie and Major Edwardes appear to be satisfied of the authenticity of these documents.

That very gallant officer, Lieutenant Herbert, who has faced the difficulties of his position, with a settled firmness, and high-minded composure, which must gain for him your warm regard and approbation, was still, on the 21st ultimo, retaining, hopeful of aid, with patient endurance, his perilous tenure of the Fort of Attock. Among these papers, is a letter from him to Sir F. Currie, dated the 21st §, inclosing the translation of a reply which, at his dictation, the Mahomedan officers of his garrison returned to letters from Mahomed Shurree Khan, son of Dost Mahomed, and from others, inciting them to desert, and to join, for the sake of their religion, in a war against the British.

Inclosure 1 in No. 43.

*Lieutenant Herbert to Lieutenant Taylor.*

*Attock, December 4, 1848.*

I WROTE to you some days ago, hearing you were coming up with a force to my relief, and begging you to hasten the advance as much as possible, but it is very possible my letter may not have reached you, in consequence of the long delay in the coming succour; we have now been blockaded for twenty-six days. The minds of my men are much shaken, and serious symptoms of insubordination have shown themselves, these have, for a time, been set to rights, but every day increases my difficulties, and I cannot answer for keeping them together, from day to day. It is not physical force, but treachery and stratagem, I have to fear. No effort will, I expect, be spared by the Barukzyes to excite the former among

\* Inclosure 20 in No. 43.

† Inclosures 7, 8, and 9 in No. 43.

‡ Inclosure 11 in No. 43.

§ Inclosure 13 in No. 43.

my people, and their probability of success is too great. Pray, if you are coming, hasten the march to my aid, as much as you possibly can; every day is of vital importance.

P. S.—Scarcely a night passes, without some desertions taking place.

P. S—I have just received a report from Turee, that Dost Mahomed Khan and Sooltan Mahomed Khan have quarrelled, and the former is said to have sent off the latter to Cabool; this is merely rumour.

Inclosure 2 in No. 43.

*Lieutenant Taylor to the Resident at Lahore.*

*Esakhsal, December 10, 1848.*

I INCLOSE Sirdar Sooltan Mahomed Khan's apologies to me, on the subject of his treacherous conduct towards Major Lawrence; his excuses are specious but invalid; had it been his wish to have sent Major Lawrence to Kalabagh, he could have done it, with the greatest ease. I disbelieve, entirely, the story of the Sikhs coercing him by the means of his own family, such a thing has not been even hinted at, by any of the numerous spies and hurkaras, whose accounts I have heard. The statement that Major Lawrence himself sent for Mrs. Lawrence and the children, may be true. The charges preferred against Hajee Mahomed, Major Lawrence's head moonshee, have little to do with the case in point. It is extremely improbable that Colonel Alla Sing ever said that the moonshee had uttered the speech attributed to him. I consider the whole of the Sirdar's defence as unworthy of attention.

Inclosure 3 in No. 43.

*Sirdar Sooltan Mahomed Khan to Lieutenant Taylor.*

YOUR letter has reached me. You may have heard of what has happened here, that Major Lawrence has recalled the Mem Sahib. Khoajah Mahomed Khan, who accompanied her, from fear of the Sikhs and other obstacles, returned from Chuckowal, and arrived with the Mem Sahib, at Kohat.

After that time, I said to the Sahib, "whilst your children and family are in Kohat, there is no safety for mine in Peshawur; who knows but that, in exchange for yours, they may seize on mine? It is better, therefore, that I should dispatch my family also to Kohat." The Major Sahib, following the counsel of Mirza Hajee Mahomed, who is my bitter enemy, would not let me send my family off.

Once he did give permission, but, after I had made preparation, again recalled it. I was only anxious to send my family from Peshawur, out of regard to the Sahib's interest, for, as I told him several times, circumstances might so fall out, that the Sikhs might seize on my family, and demand that of the Major Sahib in exchange.

After this, the Sikhs revolted, and the Major Sahib came to Kohat. Sirdar Chuttur Sing, with his army, arrived at Peshawur, and, at first, in moderate terms, desired me to give up Major Lawrence. Afterwards, when Chuttur Sing's tents were in Wuzerabad, and the officers and troops around, they forcibly seized the person of the Sahib, but I was ready to die, before giving up the Mem Sahib. Thompson Sahib, of his own accord, sent for his children. I heard that Hajee Mahomed, who has been, and who is, my bitter enemy, and of whose venality and evil practices I could tell you much, said that Sirdar Sooltan Mahomed is anxious to remove his family, that he may take the opportunity of revolting. While I was in Kohat, and Mrs. Lawrence had returned from Chuckowal thither, Hajee Mahomed went again to Major Lawrence, with a letter from me, in which I requested leave of absence, to take measures for the punishment of some refractory persons. Hajee Mahomed, notwithstanding that all my family and relations were in Peshawur, and my son, Ibrahim Khan, was in the service of Nicholson Sahib, took bribes from the vakeel of the

refractory persons above-mentioned, and in reply\* that "If you remain in Kohat, people will say that Sooltan Mahomed, like Chuttur Sing, had revolted;" and, in this manner, has instilled suspicion of me into the mind of the Sahib Bahadoor, notwithstanding that many of my relatives are in his service; and has even suggested, that I ought to be hanged. When Sirdar Chuttur Sing, Khan Sing Rosa, and other Sikh officers importuned me to give up Major Lawrence, and said that they would take him by force, Colonel Alla Sing, son of Golab Sing, Povidia, said, in the public assembly, "Hajee Mahomed said before me, that, when the British Government have put down the revolt of the Sikhs, they will hang Sooltan Mahomed." On hearing this, I was quite disheartened; as far as lay in my power, I had endeavoured to save the Major Sahib from Chuttur Sing and the Sikhs, but they took him by force. If I had resisted further, they would have seized my children and family. The truth of this you may hear from any resident of Peshawur. Had my family not been in Peshawur, I would have defended the Major Sahib at the expense of my life.

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Inclosure 4 in No. 43.

*Sirdar Sooltan Mahomed Khan to Lieutenant Taylor.*

YOUR letter, with injunctions regarding the safety of the Mem Sahib and the children, has reached me. Regarding the coming of George Sahib (Major Lawrence) to Peshawur, my former letter will have given you the particulars that the Sikh troops, having entered Wuzeerabad, seized on the Major Sahib, I then said. "The Major Sahib is a man, and by men rough treatment and severity may be readily endured, but I will not give up the Mem Sahib and the children," and, on this subject having taken a bond from the Sikh Sirdars, I took the Mem Sahib and the children under my especial care. After some days, the Sahib wrote a letter (which is now in the possession of Khoajah Mahomed Khan, and a copy of which I will send to you) for his children, and sent the Doctor Sahib to Kohat, to bring them. Whatever was necessary for the journey I furnished, and the Doctor Sahib went to Kohat, and brought the Major's children and his own. Among the Sikh Sirdars, three were averse to the Mem Sahib and the children being summoned, wherefore, it was my intention to have gone myself to Kohat, and to have arranged for their going, in the best manner practicable, but, while waiting for the departure of the Sikh Sirdars, the Doctor Sahib, on the part of the Major Sahib, went and fetched them according to his wish.

Inclosure 5 in No. 43.

*The Resident at Lahore to the Governor-General.*

*Lahore, December 20, 1848.*

I FORWARD a letter from Major Edwardes, C.B., dated the 15th instant, and its inclosures, being three letters addressed by Dewan Moolraj to the Ameer Dost Mahomed Khan, Sirdar Sooltan Mahomed Khan, and Sirdar Chuttur Sing, respectively, and intercepted by Sheik Emamooddeen.

There can scarcely be a doubt of the authenticity of these letters, and there seems no possible reason to think that they have been written, and intended to be intercepted.

If they are genuine documents, and there is no trick about their seizure, they go far to prove the complicity of the Ameer Dost Mahomed Khan in the proceedings at Peshawur; and they show that promises of aid have been made to Moolraj by the Barukzyes, doubtless without the intention of sending troops to Mooltan, though a diversion in the Derajat, on the other side of the Indus, may have been intended.

It is still possible that these documents may have been intended to be intercepted, for the purpose of compromising Dost Mahomed Khan, and inducing

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\* See in orig.



the belief, in our minds, that he has been in the plot from the beginning. I am afraid, however, that there will be sufficient evidence, independently of this correspondence, to prove the fact of Dost Mahomed being, now, in the interest of the Sikh insurgents.

Inclosure 6 in No. 43.

*Major Edwardes, to the Resident at Lahore*

*Camp, Sooraj Koond, December 15, 1848.*

I FORWARD three very remarkable, and valuable, letters from the rebel Dewan Moolraj, to Dost Mahomed Khan, Ameer of Cabool, Sooltan Mahomed Khan, Barukzye, and Sirdar Chuttur Sing, Attareewalla, intercepted by Sheik Emamooddeen, on the Jhung road, together with a large dak of other domestic letters from the Mooltan garrison.

Two questions arise, always, with reference to such letters; 1st. Whether the interceptor forged them or not? and 2nd. Whether, if original, they are not intended to be intercepted?

The letters are decidedly original and genuine. The seal is Moolraj's own, and the handwriting, which is very characteristic, is that of Moolraj's private secretary, Futteh Mahomed Khan, Chakee, (a curious confirmation of which, if required, would be found in the accidental use, by the Mahomedan scribe, of the exclamation, *Alhum d'ool' Allah*) Had the Sheik forged them to show his own exertions, or put words in Moolraj's mouth, he would, most assuredly, have not lost the opportunity of criminating Golab Sing; (the total omission of whose name from this correspondence will not escape the attention of Government.)

The other supposition, viz, that Moolraj intended the letters to be intercepted, will not be entertained by any one after perusal.

The letters, I think, establish that no violence was used to induce Sooltan Mahomed Khan to deliver up Major Lawrence's party to Chuttur Sing; and that Dost Mahomed has held out hopes to Moolraj of making a diversion in the Derajat, if not of sending succour towards Mooltan; and the whole correspondence is marked by a bigoted bitterness of hostility to the British in India, and a gloating over the treacherous capture of our countrymen at Peshawur, which shows, if Moolraj was not accessory to the murder of Mr Agnew and Lieutenant Anderson, he does not repent their murder.

You will, I am sure, testify to the Sheik your sense of his activity, and zeal, in bringing these documents into our possession.

Inclosure 7 in No. 43.

*Dewan Moolraj to Ameer Dost Mahomed, Khan of Cabool.*

MY worthy friend, Sirdar Chuttur Sing, has sent me a copy of your letter to him, from which I learn that you have duly answered my last to you, and dispatched your reply by a *cossid*, but I regret to say that, from some unhappy accident by the way, I have never had the pleasure of receiving it. Perhaps, it has fallen into the hands of the Feringee officials. Be that as it may, I have derived the greatest support and confidence from your kindness, for, to your distinguished encouragement and countenance alone, am I indebted for the complete sympathy with which Sirdar Chuttur Sing (praised be God for it!) threw himself into this business, and joined me in rooting out, and getting rid of, these Feringees, who are in fact the mortal enemies of both Hindoo and Mussulman, and, now that you have collected the mighty armies of Khorassan and the Kohistan, and, with all your noble relatives in Cabool, are turning your steps towards Peshawur; and are planning to send reinforcements to me here, by the route of Bunnoo; and numerous other kindnesses detailed in your letter; I cannot but feel a thousand times more grateful, and overjoyed than ever!

With reference, however, to the former letter and *cossid* which I sent you, and believed to have miscarried, but which I now learn from you came safe to their destination; may I trouble you so far as to beg the favor of another copy

of the reply which you may have sent back, in order that I may know, more particularly, what your plans were for reinforcing me, and have my mind quite set at rest upon that score. Of myself, I shall merely say that, being identified with truth, Providence is most gracious to me.

As for the Feringees who have been such a long while encamped at the safe distance of three coss from Mooltan, not a night or day passes that I do not engage them where they are, either by a cannonade, or else hand to hand, with sword and musket and arrow. By the blessing of God, I have already killed some thousands of them, and have not half done with them yet. With the help of Providence, I hope the day has now come for these Feringees to be ruined, and utterly trodden under foot, in every direction.

Consider me as among the most devoted of your servants, and command me in every way, and let me hear often of your welfare.

Inclosure 8 in No. 43.

*Dewan Moolraj to Sardar Chuttur Sing*

YOUR friendly note, full of the good news of your continuing in good health, and (by the usual good fortune of the Sirkar!) Major George Lawrence, Bowie, the doctor, and the women and children, having been all made\* . . . to you, by that well-wisher of the state, Sooltan Mahomed Khan; together with other particulars of the friendly inclinations of Ameer Dost Mahomed Khan, and also a copy of the Ameer's letter to you, all came safe to hand in a happy hour, and caused me the liveliest delight. Thank God you have got hold of those ill-bred Feringees! The tree of my hopes has indeed borne fruit; and the buds of my desire begin to blossom. The kindness of Heaven alone could have enabled you to do so brave and manly a deed, with such facility; and may the immortal God of the Khalsa bring to a speedy and successful issue what remains to be done at Attock, and bless you more and more. You have shown the wisdom of Aristotle, in inducing Dost Mahomed Khan to join you so heartily in serving our own Sirkar, and destroying the treaty-breaking Feringees; not to mention his sending his sons, Mahomed Ufzul Khan and Mahomed Azim Khan, by the way of Koorum, to assist your humble servant. May God preserve you always, my dear friend! My pen is unequal to do justice to the manly courage you have brought to the assistance of your religion, and your country, so I shall content myself with one verse

“What injury can come to the wall of which you are the cornice?”

For me, indeed, to advise you in these matters, is as preposterous as trying to instruct Æsop. All I say, therefore, is, go on, and do even more than you have done, and finish what is left to do, at Attock, without delay, in order that you may be at liberty to turn your steps this way; for the two armies of the Raja and the ill-bred English are now close to each other, and my anxieties are much more there, than here at Mooltan, where the accursed men are sitting down at my door. I took care that the letters you sent to Sheik Emamooddeen, and Cortlandt, and Dewan Jowahir Mull Dutt, should reach them; but, unfortunately that they are, it is no secret that they have not yet proved faithful to their salt. Never mind! I and my troops are, as yet, unshaken; and the help of God is the one thing requisite at all times. Kindly send on my letter in reply to Sooltan Mahomed Khan, as also the order to Ameer Dost Mahomed Khan, concerning the non-receipt of his letter; and whenever the answers come back, be so good as to send them on. Write often, and let me know what I can do for you.

P.S.—Another thing: the ill-bred Feringees have sent one Taylor, and twelve other Feringees, in a steam-boat towards Dera Ismael Khan, with the view of getting, by that way, to Peshawur, but, for want of water in the river, the boat could not go on; and the said Taylor, with his twelve Feringees, having disguised themselves as fakeers, have set out for Peshawur. It is as well you should know this.

One word more: Raja Shere Sing, when he went away, was good enough to

post a small body of men in Jhung, and establish a kardar of mine there; but the country people have had their heads turned by the English, and they are creating disturbance in that direction; and, although I sent some slight reinforcements from hence, the English have counteracted it, by dispatching Sheik Emamooddeen, with two guns and all his force, to Jhung; and he is doing me as much mischief as he possibly can. I put my trust, however, in God, and pray for his assistance and your friendship.

Seal of  
Moolraj.

Inclosure 9 in No 43

*Dewan Moolraj to Sirdar Sooltan Mahomed Khan, and Hossein Mahomed Khan.*

I HAVE had the pleasure to receive your welcome letter, in every line of which there breathed the perfume of friendship, from the fragrance of its contents my senses were steeped with gladness. Couplet—"I received a letter from a friend, and it appeared a banquet; I opened it, and its words were clothed in the bloom of eteinal spring." I was gratified beyond measure at being assured by yourself of your welfare. You tell me of the three Englishmen who were playing the part of governors at Peshawur, who fled thence to Kohat, and who, being brought back by you, were made over to the noble Sirdar Chuttur Sing, as an earnest of your friendship for him. You, further, state that it is your intention to besiege Attock, capture the fort, and the Englishman who is now within its walls. All these records of the brave and lofty spirit which has animated you, and which still animates you, are only such as might have been expected from one of your worth. Couplet—"That which is worthy of thee, do, and when that is done, still greater than that shalt thou do." In performing so distinguished a service for the Government, and in cementing the bonds of friendship with Sirdar Chuttur Sing, you have raised even my humble hopes. With reference to the present aspect of affairs at Mooltan, you cannot have remained ignorant of the faithless, treaty-breaking Englishmen having attacked me in force, and of the numerous conflicts which have ensued; hitherto, God has allowed all to pass well, and on Him alone rests the future. Still, from the day on which the treaty of friendship was ratified between us, my hopes have in all respects centred in you. I, therefore, now write, and trust, as your feelings are favorably inclined towards me, they may be exercised still more actively in my favor, that, making the exclusion of the English from the Punjab your primary object, you will join the Sirdar, and quickly come on, and as the valiant and exalted Ameer Dost Mahomed has arranged to send his troops, with his sons and brothers, by the Bunnoo route to Mooltan, assistance and support may reach me as quickly as possible. Until we meet, gladden my heart with frequent letters, &c.

Inclosure 10 in No 43.

*The Resident at Lahore to the Secretary with the Governor-General.*

*Lahore, December 26, 1848.*

I FORWARD a letter, this day received, from Lieutenant Taylor, at Esakhail, on the Indus, dated the 16th instant.

I have forwarded the purwannas to Major Mackeson. I am very doubtful of the authenticity of the purwanna said to be from the Ameer Dost Mahomed Khan. With reference to the date of Lieutenant Taylor's letter, it must be at least fourteen or fifteen days since that purwanna was sent from Peshawur; and had Dost Mahomed been there in person at that time, certain intelligence of the fact must, I think, have reached me, or Major Mackeson.

It is extraordinary how very prevalent, in every quarter, is the statement that the Barukzyes have seized Chuttur Sing, and detained him at Peshawur.

## Inclosure 11 in No. 43.

*Lieutenant Taylor to the Resident at Lahore.**Lukkee, December, 16, 1848.*

I INCLOSE two letters in original, received by Gholam Hussun Khan, yesterday, from Peshawur. When at Esakhail, I requested Gholam Hussun Khan to send trustworthy men to Peshawur, in addition to those whom I myself sent; he did so, and entrusted them with a letter from himself to Gool Bashah, a syud resident there, a respectable man whom I know well. The accompanying letter is his answer, which inclosed the letter from Dost Mahomed Khan to Gholam Hussun Khan, and which the latter immediately brought to me. Its contents did not much surprise me, though I do not yet believe them to set forth the true projects of the writer. In this letter, the Dost represents that he is engaged in a religious war against the English, but I shall be much surprised, if he crosses the Indus to carry it out. The hukaras report verbally, as follows.—Dost Mahomed is very much displeased with his brother for his treacherous conduct towards Major Lawrence. He has entrusted the province of Peshawur to Gholam Hyder Khan, and told Sooltan Mahomed that he is to have nothing to say to it, and must do service for his Jagheers. Chuttur Sing was then at Peshawur, having returned from Attock, to pay his respects to the Dost, and he is represented to have requested permission to depart, which was refused by the Dost, unless he should give up the English prisoners to him. The Ameer has 40,000 men and 20 guns with him (this is, of course, assuredly, exaggerated), of the former 8,000 are regular infantry. The report is, that he intends to cross the Indus, and join the Sikh army. His arrival, with an army, at this juncture, is likely to increase our difficulties, and, as soon as it becomes known, it will, I fear, to a great extent, estrange the good feeling which, at present, exists towards us on this frontier. The exultation of Goolbadshah at the establishment of Mahomedan rule in Peshawur, exemplifies a feeling that must, I fear, spread much further. As for Dost Mahomed himself, I think he will, if possible, avoid collision with us, and befriend the Sikhs as little as he can help, and, should the game go against them, will try to make up matters, by representing how little assistance he gave them. His wish to gain possession of the English prisoners is based on the same plan I think, but in this I am only arguing on the hearsay evidence of the spies. It is strange, however, that this report, of Dost Mahomed Khan having forcibly detained Chuttur Sing, has been, for some time, prevalent.

As regards my own position here, this advent of Dost Mahomed and his army is calculated greatly to increase my difficulties. The Mullicks and Moolkias of Moorut have, for some time, shown an independent disaffected spirit, which I attribute to the prospect of Mahomedan rule on this side of the Indus. There is a son of Dost Mahomed at present in Khost (Mahomed Afzul Khan) with a certain force, but not, as far as I can ascertain, a stronger one than is usually sent, at this season, for the purpose of collecting the revenue. It is, however, constantly reported that this Sirdar is on his way to Bunnoo; that detachments have actually arrived, &c. These I believe generally to originate from Meer Alim Khan, the rebel Mullick of Bunnoo, and their effect is very bad. I do not consider myself in danger from the Dooranees, because my intelligence from that quarter is good; and, had they any intention of advancing thus far, I could retreat into the Dera Ismael Khan district, before they could come up. The danger is from the people about me, the Moolkias of Moorut, who would rather the district remained unsettled. Their conduct will be regulated entirely by the report of events in the great world. Thus, if a blow is struck between the Chenab and Jhelum, I should reckon confidently on their remaining quiet. If the Dooranees enter Bunnoo, this small force would not be safe for a day. The worst of it is that, owing to this possibility of attack from without, I am unable to divide my force sufficiently to completely invest the fort, though I hope to be able to accomplish this ere long.

I inclose a letter from Mullick Khan Deen Khan, who has done good service beyond the Salt range, by routing the rebel Gohur Sing and his troops. The news of this will reach Attock, and have a good effect. The siege of

Attack seems to be going on but languidly; the hurkaras tell me that the mortars are fired, at long intervals, in the day, and the guns scarcely at all. I append a copy of a note received this evening from Lieutenant Herbert; the hurkara who brought it, confirms the report of Chuttur Sing having been put under restraint by the Dost.

The soldiers of the garrison of Lukkee have always said that, on receiving a Government purwanna, they would give up the fort. The purwanna sent by you, arrived last night. I have sent it to them to-day, and have not yet received their answer; I do not expect them to comply with it. They have a strong fort, and two good guns which they serve well, and they have seen the weak effect of the guns we have, upon the walls. The trenches are now within 450 yards of the walls, and the battery will eventually be at a distance of 250 yards. We hope that the guns, bad as they are, will do their duty from thence, if not disabled by the fire of the fort; if not, I fear the attempt must be given up.

The party who went to the fort with the Sirkaree purwanna has returned unsuccessful; the Sikhs even threatened to confine my messenger, in retaliation for my having put an hurkara of theirs in irons: this man was seized at the Esakhail ferry, and bore letters from Ram Sing, Chapa, to the soldiers of the garrison, in which I was styled "Tilyar, Feringee, budwash "

#### Inclosure 12 in No. 43

*Ameer Dost Mahomed Khan to Gholam Hussun Khan, one of the Khowaneen of Tank, at present commanding a small force of irregular levies in this district*

AT the time my tents were pitched in the Allee Murdun Khan Bagh, the choice among the lofty and honored of exalted disposition and benignity, and friend sincere, Sahebzadah Gool Badshah, recounted to me the excellence of your friendship. Therefore, looking upon my country and property as your own, hasten with all speed to my presence, for the whole of my energies of lofty aim are, with the body of the men of Islam, bent on eradicating the causes of the disturbance on the part of the English, which tends to evil. In every way with perfect confidence repair to my presence. All other matters will be fully explained in the letters of Gool Badshah; what more can I write?

Pillowed on the command of God.
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#### Inclosure 13 in No. 43

*Lieutenant Herbert to the Resident at Lahore.*

*Attack, December 21, 1848.*

DURING the course of last evening and this morning, letters have reached me from Sirdar Mahomed Shureef Khan, son of Ameer Dost Mahomed Khan, and from Gool Badshah of Peshawur, and Futteh Khan, of Harsar Khanee, to the address of Syud Aheyooden of Kooner, Shahzada Juruhoor, Meer Ufzul Khan of Hatee, Futteh Khan, Khyberree, and to the Affghans composing the garrison; of which I send, herewith, copies, with that of the answer sent.

I have thought it advisable not to show the men that addressed to them.

You will perceive that it is given out, that the Sikhs are to abandon the siege, which it is the hope of the Ameer to complete; that he calls upon the garrison, as good Mahomedans and Affghans, to quit the fort, and join him in (what he would make to appear) a crusade against the British.

I have assembled all the officers, and read to them the letters addressed to the individuals above-mentioned, and, on their unanimously declaring that an answer should be sent such as would show the Ameer they would have nothing to say to his cause, I read to them the answer which was ready, and to which the principal attached their seals, &c., at their own request; thereby, voluntarily, answering that which I thought it advisable to keep from them.

This will enable me to hold on, I hope, for some days longer, but you must know how easily these people may be worked upon by religious excitement, and if the emissaries of the Ameer succeed in spreading, among the garrison, a belief that his war against us is the cause of Islam, I fear the consequence will be the loss of the fort, unless aid arrive very shortly.

Some of the men who showed symptoms of insubordination, and who were too numerous to be expelled at once, have again exhibited signs which threaten ill-conduct on their part, but I hope, by God's blessing, I may be able to keep them in check, for a time.

Sirdar Mahomed Shureef Khan may be expected at Khyrabad in a day or two, as I am assured he has quitted Peshawur, and he will then be in position which will give him great facilities in tampering with my people.

I hope I may not be considered too importunate in again urging the request, that you will do your utmost to hasten some troops to our aid, ere it is too late.

While writing the above, reports have been brought to me, indicative of a decided mutinous spirit on the part of a portion of the garrison, which I fear, it will be difficult to subdue. With such a force as mine, I am at the mercy of my men, and have but small power to punish.

#### Inclosure 14 in No 43

*Answer which Syud Aheyooddeen, and Shahzada Mahomed Juruhoor, and Mee Ufsul Khan, Eusufzye, and Futteh Khan, Afrede, and the rest of the officers and Sepoys of the garrison of Attock, with the advice of Lieutenant Herbert, addressed to Gool Badshah, Peshawuree*

THANKS be to God that, up to the present writing, we are all well, and pray for your welfare. The letter which you sent with the letter of the exalted in rank, Sirdar Mahomed Shureef Khan, arrived safely, and we have learnt its contents. With regard to your injunction to us to leave the fort of Attock, and come out for the sake of our religion, let us ask which of your letters we are to comply with? Not many days are past since you sent us a letter, together with letters from Sirdar Chuttu Sing, and, with a thousand subterfuges, entreated of us to come over to you. If we had acted upon that letter of yours, of a surety we should now have been prisoners in the hands of Chuttu Sing. But the blessing of God was with us, that we took not your advice, but acted on our own judgment. You now write, that the Ameer Saib Dost Mahomed Khan is an aspirant for martyrdom (i.e., intends to wage a war against infidels); and you call on us to join in this holy cause. Good friend! if we could see that the Ameer Saib, having devoted himself to the cause of the true faith, had come in the first instance, waged war, and fought with the race of Sikhs, who are infidels—without the Book, and worshippers of idols—and, afterwards, engaged in a contest with the English (Sahiban Angrez), it would then be evident to all that this was a war for the interests of the true faith (jehad). Be assured that we also would then range ourselves in the army of the Ameer, to fight in the true cause; but as we see with our eyes, and hear with our ears, that the Ameer Saib, actuated merely by worldly interests and motives, has entered into an alliance and friendship with the Sikhs, and, from a desire of acquiring new territory, has entered into hostilities with the English; in this act, we are unable to discern how the objects of religion are to be forwarded; and we, who are the servants, and are eating the salt, of the English,—how can we desire that the Sikhs should be victorious over them? At present, hostilities are being carried on between the army of the English and of the Sikhs. If the Sikhs are defeated by the English, it is our belief that, then, the Ameer Dost Mahomed Khan himself will court the alliance and friendship of the British. If the army of the English is

overcome by the Sikhs, be assured that we, who are Mussulmans, in this garrison will deliver over the fort to the Ameer.

Signed by Aheyoodeen Koonoree.

Shahzada  
Mahomed  
Juruhoor,  
Ludoza.

Meer Ufzul  
Khan, Eusufsy.

Gholam Emamooddeen  
Khan, servant of the  
Shahzada.

Gholam Jehan  
Khan, Bharee,  
also servant of  
the Shahzada.

Akrum Khan  
Kuttuk.

Ussud Khan Ma-  
homadzai, Bush-  
tonguerec, grand-  
son to Izzut Khan

Nussur Oolla Khan,  
Jemadar Momund.

Sheik Sooltan  
Ali, chief of the  
artillery.

Meer Abdoola,  
and others

Inclosure 15 in No 43.

*Major Edwardes to the Resident at Lahore.*

*Camp, Sooraj Koond, December 18, 1848.*

HAVING observed in the public newspapers a statement that, in consequence of the Sikh nation having broken the treaty, the British Government has cancelled the prohibition against the slaughter of kine, and permitted beef rations to be served out to the European soldiers in the camp of the Commander-in-Chief, I write to enquire whether this statement is correct, as, in that case, of course, a similar indulgence may, without impropriety, be extended to the troops at Mooltan.

Hitherto, I have conceived it my duty to solicit the Major-General's authority to enforce the rule so strictly acted on, since we came into the Punjab.

Inclosure 16 in No. 43.

*The Resident at Lahore to Major Edwardes.*

*Lahore, December 23, 1848.*

THE statement you allude to, of Government having notified that the Sikh treaty is no longer in force, and that therefore kine may be slaughtered in the Punjab, is, as might be expected from its resting on the authority you have quoted, totally without foundation.

You will be pleased to bring the stipulation of the treaty referred to by you, to the notice of the officer commanding the Bombay troops, and inform him that the Government will expect him to cause that its violation be not permitted in his camp.

Inclosure 17 in No. 43.

*The Resident at Lahore to the Secretary with the Governor-General.*

*Lahore, December 28, 1848.*

I FORWARD a letter from my assistant, Lieutenant Hodson, describing the measures pursued by him, for dispersing a band of insurgent marauders, headed by two petty Sirdars, who have lately been plundering, and committing excesses, in the country lying at the foot of the hills, between the Ravee and Sealkote.

The affair at Buddee Pind was a most gallant one, far more so than Lieutenant Hodson's modest statement in his letter would lead one to suppose.

I have had accounts of it from parties who were eye-witnesses to the personal gallantry and energy of Lieutenant Hodson, by whose hand, in single conflict, the Akalee fell, after he had beaten off four of the sowars of the 15th Irregulars; and to whose bold activity, indefatigable exertions, and the admirable arrangements made by him, with the small means at his disposal, the successful issue of this excursion is to be attributed.

The whole of this side of the Chenab is now free from marauders, with the exception of a party (Narazun Sing's from Mooltan), which is still, (or was five days ago), surrounded in the fort of Chumote, by the Mahomedan population, under two chiefs in our interest—Lungur Khan of Sahiwal, and Sahib Khan Towannah.

The Commander-in-Chief would have sent a detachment after this party, several days ago, but an erroneous statement was made by Major Mackeson of their having effected their escape from Chumote, and joined Shere Sing's army. Chumote is not more than two marches from Ramnuggur, on the left bank of the Chenab.

Inclosure 18 in No. 43.

*Lieutenant W. S. Hodson to the Resident at Lahore.*

*Camp, Sealkote, December 23, 1848.*

IN a letter of the 13th instant, from Deenanuggur, I had the honor of bringing to your notice the renewal, by the party of insurgents under Prem Sing, Jhulua, and Gunda Sing, of the depredations which had been temporarily suppressed by the march of Brigadier-General Wheeler's column, across the Rechna Doab, after the capture of the fort of Kullalwala. As soon as I was enabled, by the arrival of Sirdar Shumshere Sing, to leave the neighbourhood of Deenanuggur, I re-crossed the Ravee, and, in a second letter from Mungh-Munaseh of the 15th instant, informed you of the position of the insurgents, and the hopes I entertained of being able to come up with them.

I now report my further proceedings in furtherance of that object, which has resulted, I am happy to say, in the total discomfiture of the insurgents, and in their flight across the Chenab.

On the evening of the 15th, my hurkaras returned, with the welcome intelligence that the insurgents were at last within reach, and that they had taken up a position in three parties (numbering altogether from 400 to 500 men) at Zafferwal, Buddee Pind, and Gumrola, distant respectively from fourteen to seventeen coss from my camp at Mungh-Munaseh. As I was aware that it was not the habit of these marauders to remain, two days consecutively, in the same place, it became of the utmost consequence to move, without delay, upon them. I, therefore, marched soon after midnight of the 15th and 16th, with the small force at my disposal, consisting of 100 men of the infantry of the Guides, and fifteen sowars (principally of Major Fisher's regiment of irregular cavalry) and succeeded in getting within a short distance of the insurgent party, at Gumrola, by day-break, and before they were at all aware of my approach.

Halting the guides, under cover of a small wooded village, I advanced to reconnoitre, and found the enemy drawn up, to the number of from 150 to 200 horse and foot on the north side of Gumrola, between the village and a large tank. Just at this juncture, they were joined by the party from Buddee Pind under Meean Jowahir Sing, upon which, the whole body retired, and drew up on the bank of a wide nullah, which ran along the rear of their position.

In addition to the fifteen sowars whom I have mentioned, I was accompanied by a party of Sikh horsemen attached to the kardars, and to Sirdar Ram Sing, Jellowallea. These men were a source of some anxiety to me, at the moment, as, from expressions they had been heard to make use of, it seemed doubtful which side they would take, in the event of a conflict. With the double purpose, therefore, of getting rid of them, and, at the same time, of making them useful by deceiving the enemy as to the strength of my party, I dispatched them, while awaiting the arrival of my men from the rear, to the right and left of the insurgents, telling them to prevent any of the enemy getting into the villages, or hiding themselves among the sugar canes on my flanks.



Before my men could come up, however, the insurgents began to retire, slowly and hesitatingly, and firing random shots at us, from the opposite bank of the nullah. Perceiving that any further delay would enable them to escape altogether, I determined to attack them, with my handful of horsemen. Crossing the nullah bed at a trot, the horsemen fired one volley, and then, throwing aside their matchlocks, charged the retiring enemy. The greater part instantly fled precipitately, but a number of Akalees, seeing that they had no chance of escape on foot, turned and fought with desperation. One man, in particular, succeeded in keeping four sowars at bay for some minutes, and was only mastered after a severe struggle.

By this time, the remainder of the insurgents had fled to a considerable distance, and I did not consider it prudent to pursue them any further, in the face of a hostile population, who came out of the villages, with arms in their hands, which, though nominally brought against the insurgents, might, at any moment, have been turned against us. My sepoy, too, had followed me at a run, for more than a mile, which, in addition to their long march, had exhausted them greatly.

I am happy to say that not one of my little party was injured, while sixteen of the enemy lay dead upon the field, and five were removed by the villagers, who had been wounded severely by our matchlocks. I halted, for the day, at the fort of Buddee Pind, which was deserted before my arrival, and which I have since caused to be levelled with the ground.

By daybreak on the following morning, we continued the pursuit, and, soon after noon, came upon a portion of the insurgent party just beyond Cherokee, on the boundary of the Lahore territories. We chased them for three miles, but they had so greatly the start of us, that they could not be overtaken.

This affair, and rapid pursuit, seems to have completely broken up their party, and disheartened them; for, after this day, they only halted for a few hours at a time, to collect their scattered followers, and cook their food, and hurried to the upper ferries of the Chenab, which the last of the party crossed, early on the 20th.

I have ascertained satisfactorily, that there are no insurgents in arms on this side the Chenab; and I have made some progress in reducing these districts to order. I hope soon to be able to report that every thing has returned to its former quiet state.

I regret extremely that I had not had a larger party of cavalry with me.

Had I been accompanied by even a single troop, I think it is not too much to say, that the whole of the leaders of these bands of marauders would have been either killed, or taken prisoners.

Inclosure 19 in No. 43

*The Secretary with the Governor-General to the Resident at Lahore.*

*Camp, Mukkoo, January 4, 1849.*

YOU will convey to Lieutenant Hodson the strong expression of the Governor-General's satisfaction with his conduct, and with the mode in which he discharges whatever duty is entrusted to him. The Governor-General has had frequent occasions of noticing the activity, energy, and intelligence of his proceedings, and he has added, to the exercise of the same qualities on this occasion, an exhibition of personal gallantry which the Governor-General has much pleasure in recording and applauding, although Lieutenant Hodson has modestly refrained from bringing it to notice himself. The Governor-General offers to Lieutenant Hodson his best thanks for these services.

**Inclosure 20 in No. 43.**

*The Resident at Lahore to the Secretary with the Governor-General.*

*Lahore, December 25, 1848.*

AS it appears to me desirable that the Governor-General should know the names of the openly disaffected Sirdars of the Lahore State, I submit a list of those who are ascertained to be in rebellion and insurrection.

I have not inserted the names of those who are doubtful, or who have been forcibly prevented committing themselves, as Golab Sing, Nar Sing, and Bishen Sing, Attareewalas, Jhunda Sing (of whose treachery Captain Abbott is so convinced), or Khan Sing, Man, at Mooltan.

Nor have I inserted the names of kardars, duftories, and other paid officials, who have joined the rebel standard.

Nor the Barukzye Sirdars, extensive Jagheerdars in Peshawur.

The names of three persons, not actually in armed rebellion, are inserted, viz. :

Runjore Sing, Majeetia, convicted of treacherous correspondence with Moolraj, and in confinement,

Heera Sing, the Maharanee's brother, sent out of the Punjab in August last, on account of disaffection; and,

Goordut Sing, Mulwe, detected in correspondence with the insurgents, and in confinement

With the exception of these three, all, whose names are inserted, are in the rebel ranks.

The list is not, I dare say, a full one; there may be some names omitted. The names of none but Jagheerdars, with the rank of Sirdar, are entered.

**Inclosure 21 in No 43.**

*List of the openly-disaffected Sirdars of the Lahore State, ascertained to be in rebellion and insurrection.*

1. Sirdar Chuttur Sing, Attareewala.
2. Raja Shere Sing, Attareewala.
3. Sirdar Ootar Sing, Attareewala.
4. Sirdar Urjun Sing, Rungurnugha.
5. Sirdar Urbeil Sing, Sheekoporeah.
6. Sirdar Purtab Sing, Munás.
7. Sirdar Urjun Sing, Nulwa.
8. Sirdar Jowahir Sing, Nulwa.
9. Sirdar Jooh Sing, Hurchunder.
10. Sirdar Jowahir Sing, Kalade.
11. Sirdar Bhoota Sing, Kumlah.
12. Sirdar Khurgun Sing, Mokul.
13. Sirdar Dul Sing, Munás.
14. Sirdar Dhora Sing, Nukye.
15. Sirdar Ruttun Sing, Gurchakee.
16. Sirdar Kurm Sing, Gurchakee.
17. Sirdar Golab Sing, Gurchakee.
18. Sirdar Soorjun Sing, Mokul.
19. Sirdar Soodh Sing, Cheeneh.
20. Sirdar Shumshere Sing, Mareewalah.
21. Sirdar Soorutt Sing, Majeetia.
22. Sirdar Goordut Sing, Mulwe.
23. Sirdar Nehal Sing, Summa.
24. Sirdar Vusawur, Sing, Majeetia.
25. Sirdar Veer Sing, Jullawassia.
26. Sirdar Hurmut Sing, Hazarawaleah.
27. Sirdar Lal Sing, Morareea.
28. Sirdar Khoseal Sing, Morareea.

29. Sirdar Shere Sing, Morareea. } It is most probable, from all that I  
30. Sirdar Golab Sing, Povindea. } can learn, that these Sirdars are  
31. Sirdar Alla Sing, son of above. } under restraint with the Peshawur  
32. Sirdar Mehtab Sing, Morareea. } troops  
33. Sirdar Lehna Sing, Morareea.  
34. Sirdar Khan Sing, Nukkye.  
35. Sirdar Goordut Sing, Nubua.  
36. Sirdar Chunda Sing, Kulalwalah. } Brothers-in-law of the late  
37. Sirdar Goordut Sing, brother of above. } Maharajah Khurruck Sing.  
38. Sirdar Kurm Sing, Toheewalah.  
39. Sirdar Runjore Sing, Majeetia.  
40. Sirdar Raja Fuzl Dad Khan, Rhotassia  
41. Sirdar Luqjur Khan, son of above.  
42. Sirdar Murra Sing, Mohul.  
43. Sirdar Gundee Sing, Choolna  
44. Sirdar Thumman Sing, brother-in-law of the late Koonwur  
Peshora Sing  
45. Sirdar Jeswan Sing, brother-in-law of the late Koonwur Kash-  
meera Sing.  
46. Sirdar Meehan, brother of Bhoor Sing  
47. Sirdar Gunda Sing, Muttoo  
48. Sirdar Ram Sing, Chappeewalah.  
49. Sirdar Futteh Sing, son of Koonwur Kashmeera Sing.  
50. Sirdar Jugjoodh, son of Koonwur Peshora Sing.  
51. Sirdar Soormookh Sing, Bootaleah  
52. Sirdar Jooh Sing, a Jagheerdar of note.  
53. Sirdar Heera Sing, the Maharanee's brother, sent to Ben-  
ares, to be out of the way.  
54. Sirdar Chunda Sing, Yurgar  
55. Sirdar Jellal Khan Sing, Buttee.  
56. Sirdar Kurrack Sing, Mawranwalah  
57. Dewan Hakim Raee.  
58. Dewan Keshen Kaur.  
59. Dewan Gunput Raee.  
60. 61. 62. Dewan Dabee Sahaie, with two brothers.  
63. Dewan Misr Roup Lal

Besides these, there are thirty-six persons, Jagheerdars, and who rank as Sirdars, but hold commissions of Generals and Colonels in the army, such as Ruttun Sing, Man, Khan Sing, Rosa, &c. all with the rebel army.

Inclosure 22 in No. 43.

*The Resident at Lahore to the Secretary with the Governor-General.*

*Lahore, December 30, 1848.*

I AM doubtful if any advantage would accrue from making it generally known, that our Government would highly reward any one who could bring the prisoners into camp. The prisoners are not together, but are, it is believed, in different places; the ladies are in the Fort of Sukhoo; Major Lawrence and Mr. Thompson have been sent back from Shere Sing's camp, for the purpose, it is said, of being placed in the Fort of Dooman; and Lieutenant Bowie is, or was till quite lately, still with the troops investing Attock.

It would, thus, be difficult, indeed impossible, perhaps, to secure the simultaneous release of all; and, unless this were effected, the remaining prisoners might, according to native usage, be subjected to greater severity of confinement, and, perhaps, to ill-usage.

## No. 44.

*The Governor-General to the Secret Committee.**Camp, Mukkoo, January 22, 1849 (No. 6.)*

SINCE my last despatch, events of great importance have taken place in the Punjab.

The Commander-in-chief, being informed, on the 10th instant, of the fall of Attock, and the advance of Sirdar Chuttur Sing, to join the main body of the enemy under Shere Sing, determined to attack the latter, and, accordingly, moved with the British army from Loah Tibbee, at daylight of the 12th, to Dingee, a distance of about 12 miles, from Dingee, he advanced, on the morning of the 13th, towards Chulhanwalla. He approached this place about noon, and, having driven back the enemy's picket, which was posted on a mound, took up a position in rear of a village; the enemy opened a fire from some horse-artillery on the skirmishers in front of the village, and a general action ensued, which lasted till after nightfall, terminating in the defeat of Shere Sing's force, and the capture of twelve of his guns; for particulars of the action, and of the loss sustained by the British troops, which I deeply regret to say has been very great, I refer you to the despatch\* of his Excellency the Commander-in-chief, dated the 16th instant, and to its inclosed list.

On intelligence of this victory reaching me, I ordered a salute of twenty-one guns to be fired at all the stations of the army. Regarding the services of the officers and men engaged in the action, I intend addressing you, further, by the next mail.

The spirit of the enemy has not been utterly subdued by the defeat he has sustained: though driven from his positions, he has not crossed the Jhelum, but is still in force on this side.

That Dost Mahomed Khan has taken a part in the hostility which has caused the fall of Attock, no doubt can now be entertained.

Lieutenant Herbert's letter† of the 2nd of January reports the arrival of this Prince, with the main body of his army, at the ferry on the right bank of the Indus, on the 1st instant. Lieutenant Herbert saw a portion of the army commence the passage of the river, and, then, finding the feeling of his men to be such that there was no chance of their opposing the Ameer, he determined, if possible, to escape. Captain Abbott's letter‡ of the 5th instant relates the particulars of Lieutenant Herbert's escape, and expresses fears that he may have been intercepted. Dost Mahomed himself, it is said, has not crossed the Indus, but he has sent a Vakeel to Cashmere, to ascertain the feeling of Golab Sing towards him, and to request his aid in money.

Among the inclosures will be found Major-General Whish's letter§ reporting the capture, by storm, on the 2nd instant, of the fortified city of Mooltan. I am happy to say the loss attending this exploit was very small. On the 18th, the mine was exploded, and the counterscarp was blown in. I am expecting now daily, to hear of the fall of the citadel, immediately after which event, the greater portion of the Mooltan force will proceed to cooperate with his Excellency the Commander-in-chief.

From other quarters where hostilities prevailed, I have received favorable accounts. The Fort of Lukkee was captured by Lieutenant Taylor, before the arrival of the reinforcements dispatched by Major Edwardes; and Ram Sing has been dislodged, by Brigadier-General Wheeler's force, from the difficult position which he occupied, in the hills about Noorpoor. The public dispatches announcing these two events have not yet been received.

\* Inclosure 52 in No. 44.

† Inclosure 10 in No. 44.

‡ Inclosure 9 in No. 44.

§ Inclosure 25 in No. 44.

## Inclosure 1 in No. 44.

*The Resident at Lahore to the Secretary with the Governor-General.**Lahore, December 18, 1848.*

I FORWARD a memorandum, and other papers, showing my reasons for the conviction that an insurrection, and conspiracy, for the purpose of expelling the British from the Punjab, was determined on, before the outbreak in Mooltan, and unconnected with it.

In this paper I have not alluded to the effects produced on the purposes of the conspirators and insurgents, by the Mooltan rebellion, and the events connected therewith.

## Inclosure 2 in No. 44.

*Memorandum by the Resident at Lahore.*

IN a letter received, some time ago, from the Governor-General, I was called upon to report, if I could substantiate by proof, what I had stated to Government, that, before the outbreak at Mooltan, an insurrection had been planned, and a conspiracy set on foot, having for their object the expulsion of the British from the Punjab, and that, unless the reduction of Mooltan were speedily effected, and the rebellion put an end to, and the power of the British Government thus re-established, there would be no possibility of preventing the insurrection becoming general.

The present state of affairs corresponds with that which I declared to be inevitable, if the Mooltan rebellion were not suppressed.

It is difficult to produce proof of the fact, before it shows itself in action, of a conspiracy which every one is interested in concealing, and regarding which the mere oral statement of individuals, making general assertions of intended proceedings, would not be considered evidence.

At the time that the letter of the Government was received, I had got a clue to some correspondence of the Maharanee and others, which I hoped might lead to substantive proof of the fact; and, as I had reason to believe that, by seizing the Maharanee's papers, on her arrival at Benares, and by getting possession of those of Moolraj, in the expected fall of Mooltan, I might obtain more of the correspondence, I delayed my reply to the Government letter, till I could complete the evidence.

The Maharanee had destroyed her papers, or effectually concealed all of importance, and there has been no opportunity of getting Moolraj's.

But I will state, as briefly as I can, the reasons which led my mind to the conviction of the fact I stated.

When I passed through Jullundur on my way to Lahore, at the end of February last, I had a good deal of conversation with Lieutenant Lake, who had been employed all the cold weather, with some of the Durbar officials, in making a revenue settlement of the Manjha districts of the Punjab. I found him fully impressed with the belief, that a rising would take place before many months were over, which was the result, not of any particular tangible circumstance, but of the feeling which he had observed, and the hints which had at different times been thrown out, in his presence.

I mentioned this to Mr Lawrence, and he told me that he knew there was a notion of the kind abroad, but that he put no faith in it. He said that he had been told, positively, by a very trustworthy and intelligent officer, connected with the Government, Mir Sahib Dyal, that a disturbance would take place in the spring, but that, as he could give him no distinct reasons for saying so, he thought little of the matter, though he had no doubt that Sirdar Lehna Sing, Majeetia, had left the Punjab, from apprehension of some such occurrence.

A few weeks after I had been at Lahore, Major Napier wrote to me, stating that, wherever he was employed on the survey duties, allusions were made by the people, and especially by the soldiers of his escort, to his servants, of the inutility of their work, as the Europeans would not be allowed to remain

much longer in the Punjab ; a few months would see them across the Sutlej. He told me he thought it right to let me know this, as the hints had been so frequently repeated, and had been mentioned to him by all his assistants on detached duty. Similar statements will be found in Captain Abbott's papers.

These circumstances made me the more particular in my inquiries on the subject, and I found that there was a very prevalent and pervading belief, that there would be a general disturbance, before many months were passed, but, beyond the fact that the Maharanee was to be the principal agent, I could obtain nothing circumstantial.

The arrangements, which had been all made before my arrival, for the change of administration in Mooltan, and the circumstances under which the British officers proceeded to that province, with the sad events which followed, are known to the Government. At this time, the conspiracy for tampering with the sepoys of the garrison, was discovered, and, though there was much reason to suspect that this was part of some more extensive scheme, there was no proof of any of the Sirdars, or others beyond the immediate dependants of the Maharanee, being concerned in the actual communication with the sepoys.

The voluntary confession of Gunga Ram, the confidential vakeel of the Maharanee, made the night before his execution, stated that the Mooltan murders were premeditated, and preconcerted by Sirdar Khan Sing, Man, with the Maharanee, before he went to Mooltan, and that the Maharanee was in correspondence with all the Chiefs and Sirdars, except Raja Deena Nath, and with Maharajah Golab Sing, for the organization of resistance to the British power, and that the chiefs who had gone to Mooltan, would not act against Moolraj. Gunga Ram would give no proof of what he stated, but said, if his life was spared, he would give information of the last importance to the British Government. It was, of course, impossible to spare his life, on these terms. His confession, implicating the chiefs in treasonable intentions, was forwarded to Government.

It became known to me at that time, that the departure of our troops for Mooltan would have been the signal for a rising, and an attack on Lahore, with the hope of aid from the native troops of the garrison. This fact was notorious, but it was not possible to obtain legal evidence of it, or to fix complicity on any of the Chiefs, or on any individual.

Towards the end of May, or the beginning of June, an officer, intimately connected with the Durbar, sent to me a private message, to say that, if I would allow him to visit me after nightfall, secretly, and that no one connected with the Durbar should know of his coming, he would tell me matters which it much concerned me to be acquainted with. I had several visits from this person, whose name I promised should not be divulged. He assured me that the intention of an insurrection, with the view of getting rid of the English from the Punjab, had been constantly agitated, since the very hour of signing the Treaty, and had never been lost sight of. He said, that the Preyma plot, as it is usually called, was not the scheme of a few parties in the Ranee's interest, but was known to almost every one but the immediate intended victims, and that all subsequent operations, had the murder at Shahmar taken place, were planned. He stated that, from the time of the Maharanee's residence at Sheikhoopoor, intrigues had been constantly on foot; and that, during the last cold weather, a plan for a general insurrection had been determined on, in concert with Maharajah Golab Sing; that the Barukzye Chiefs had been sounded, and had been promised Peshawur, as the reward of their cooperation.

It was from the statements of this individual, corroborated in many points from various other sources, i.e., by the oral statement of other parties, and the occurrence of events in accordance with his disclosures, that I made the report to Government.

It was asserted, by this person, that the visit of Meer Jowahir Sing to Lahore, at the time it took place, was in connection with the Sheikhoopoor intrigues, and that he withdrew from the affair, as most others had, for the present, done, in consequence of the occurrences at Mooltan, which had introduced Dewan Moolraj into the affair, who was not intended to have a part, and whose conduct had caused a disturbance in Mooltan, prematurely. The first outbreak was to have taken place in Mooltan, but it was to have been

brought about, after Moolraj's departure, by Sirdar Khan Sing, Man, when things were more ripe, and arrangements further advanced.

This assertion is partly confirmed by the papers subsequently found on the person of one of the Maharanee's agents, which will be referred to presently. There was nothing in Jowahir Sing's conduct to lead me to think that he had any sinister motive in his visit here, and I watched him closely.

In the month of June, a man named Shibdiyal, a priest of the Maharanee's, was seized at Lahore, and, at that time, papers were found in the possession of the Maharanee's agents, which were translated, at the time, by Mr. Bowring, one of my assistants, and which, with a note of his, explaining the circumstances under which the papers were obtained, and the events they appear to refer to, are sent with this memorandum.

The letters are some of them original, and some of them copies of letters written by, and to, the Maharanee, kept by the confidential amanuensis, who transcribed them. They clearly prove that, before the outbreak at Mooltan, and before the appointment of Sirdar Khan Sing, Man, the Maharanee was in communication with him, regarding an insurrection at Lahore, and the tampering with the British troops, and that a disturbance was to be got up by Sirdar Khan Sing at Mooltan, and that, after the outbreak, Dewan Moolraj was introduced into the plan for a general rising. They also prove, as does the evidence of the parties in the case, that extensive correspondence was carried on by the Maharanee at Sheikhoopoor, at the time indicated in the statements of the officer above referred to.

The letters are, for the most part, not dated, but the facts they refer to, mark the time at which they were written. They are on several subjects: the corruption of the sepoys; the murder of the British officers and soldiers at Lahore; the Mooltan arrangements, and the appointment of Sirdar Khan Sing, Man; the subsequent events in that province, the trial and execution of General Khan Sing and Vakeel Gunga Ram, and the Preyma conspiracy. There are also allusions to a communication to the Durbar, made soon after my arrival here, in consequence of a letter received from the Governor-General, with a petition from the Maharanee about her treatment at Sheikhoopoor.

I would refer to the papers of Captain Abbott, in Hazara, passim, for the evidence, obtained by him, of the intention of a general rising of the Sikhs, incited by the Sirdars, for the expulsion of the British from the Punjab.

The fact of Sirdar Lehna Sing, Majeetia, having again left the Punjab, in the commencement of this year, sacrificing his jagheers and emoluments here, would of itself mark the knowledge that he had of a pending revolt; but Raja Tej Sing assured me, several months ago, that Sirdar Lehna Sing came to him, before he applied to Mr. Lawrence to be allowed to leave the Punjab, stating that he had fully ascertained that there would never be peace in the Lahore territories; that another revolt was certainly at hand, and advising Raja Tej Sing also to return to Hindostan. The Raja says that, upon this, he spoke to Mr. Lawrence about permitting him to leave the Durbar, and go to Delhi, on the plea of ill health, but that Mr. Lawrence dissuaded him. I remember Mr. Lawrence wrote to me, on my way up, of Tej Sing's proposition, and of his having put him off it.

In an urzee received from a special secret intelligence-writer in Cashmere, on the 18th of May last, there is a statement, corroborated by circumstantial proof, that, between the month of November of last year and February of this, messengers passed continually with letters between Maharajah Golab Sing and Sheikhoopoor, just at the time the negotiations were said to have been going on.

On the return from Mooltan of Sirdar Lal Sing, Kaleewala, the son of Sirdar Uttur Sing, the young Sirdar came to me, and told me that he wished to make known to me circumstances that had come to his knowledge, while with the Durbar troops before Mooltan. Having heard what he had to say, I directed him to write down, distinctly, what had passed, and to give me the paper, with his signature. This the Sirdar did; and a translation of the document is annexed. I would beg the attention of the Governor-General to this paper.

I have inserted in this memorandum only such tangible facts and circumstances as occurred to me, not adverting to the oral statements of individuals from all parts of the country, which, as they are corroborated by general accordance, and confirmed by events daily transpiring, small in themselves, but

important as showing the feelings and purposes of the people, cannot fail to bring conviction of their general correctness.

From all that has come to my knowledge, since I have been at Lahore, I am quite convinced that, long before the Mooltan outbreak, there was a plan for an insurrection, which was to take place during the current year, in which nearly all the Sirdars were to join, and of which the Ranee was the prime mover.

The premature outbreak at Mooltan, and the discovery of the attempt, on the part of the Ranee and some of her adherents, to corrupt the sepoy, with the executions which followed, disconcerted the conspirators much; and the subsequent removal of the Maharanee herself from the scene of her intrigues, had the effect of baffling all their schemes for a time.

But the purpose was never lost sight of, as subsequent events have proved, though many circumstances occurred to retard the accomplishment of the scheme, among which the discomfiture of Bhace Maharaj Sing and his large band of followers, and the successes obtained over Moolraj by Major Edwardes and Bahawal Khan's armies, are the chief.

### *Statement of the Case of Shiddiyal Poorohit*

TOWARDS the end of the month of June, a Jemadar in the intelligence department of the Lahore magistracy, named Gama Beg, gave me information that a goldsmith, called Muharaj, had told him that the Maharanee's priest, Shiddiyal, was in the habit of carrying on a clandestine correspondence with Her Highness, and that a man named Mohun, who used to write the letters, and who was a servant of Shiddiyal's, had absconded, on the seizure of Khan Sing and Gunga Ram, taking with him various papers. I, at first, discredited the story; but, as the goldsmith persisted in the truth of his statement, I sent out the Jemadar to seize Mohun and the papers. In a few days, he returned, bringing with him the man, on whose person were found a great number of letters and a small amulet. The priest Shiddiyal, who was then in Lahore, was immediately arrested.

On opening the amulet, which was carefully soldered down, two letters were found to the address of the Maharanee, one purporting to be from Moolraj, and the other from Sirdar Khan Sing, Man. The amulet was brought from Mooltan by a man named Tiloka, or Tilok Sing, disguised as a fakeer, and was given into the hands of Shiddiyal. It arrived, however, the day after the execution of Khan Sing and Gunga Ram, and was consequently not delivered; both the priest and Mohun having absconded, immediately afterwards. The priest finding his name had not been alluded to, returned again to Lahore. The result of the inquiry, and of the Goormookhee letters found on the person of Mohun, is to prove that Sirdar Khan Sing, Man, carried on a treasonable correspondence with the Maharanee, through her family priest, Shiddiyal, having in view the corruption of the British Sepoys, and showing his intention to stir up a rebellion on his receiving charge of Mooltan.

The priest was the medium of correspondence, all letters passing through his hands, and those from the Sirdar, having the priest's seal attached.

The letters tell a plain, well connected, and, apparently, correct story, which it is difficult to imagine could have been fabricated. They are confirmed not only by internal evidence, but by circumstantial facts derived from the Preyma conspiracy, and the recent plot of General Khan Sing and Gunga Ram.

The proofs against Sirdar Khan Sing are confirmed, by the confession of Gunga Ram, on the night before he was hung (See confession taken by Lieutenant Hodson), and by allusions contained in a recent letter of the Maharanee to the Resident, which says, "if you wish to know who stirred up the rebellion in Mooltan, ask Khan Sing, Man."

With regard to Shiddiyal, the proof seems conclusive. His name is mentioned by no less than four defendants in the Preyma plot; by Boota Sing, the Ranee's Moonshee, by Maun Sing Muhung, by Thakoo Doss, Preyma's Moonshee, and by Huryut Khan, as having been in the habit of visiting the Preyma conspirators, on the part of the Ranee, and of conveying letters from her to Preyma.

It is also proved that he absconded on Preyma's being arrested, and, further,



that he ran away on the seizure of General Khan Sing and Gunga Ram. His seal is attested by two receipts written by himself in the Loondee hill character, and acknowledged by him as his handwriting, which bear the same seal as that on the letters. His finger also shows that he was in the habit of wearing a seal ring.

The letters written on the part of the Ranee, are not in her handwriting, but appear to be copies. On the Maharanee leaving Sheikhoopoor, one of the slave girls casually remarked—"You have come just in time; two hours more, and you would have been too late." This is explained by one of the present letters (No. 7), which requests Her Highness to make immediate preparations for her escape, as she would not be allowed to remain any longer at Sheikhoopoor.

With regard to the letter said to be signed by Sirdar Khan Sing, and sent from Mooltan in the amulet, it certainly cannot be proved that this is the same signature as that commonly used by the Sirdar. It is not. But it is said that the Man family have a secret sign among themselves, and there can be no doubt that no one but a Sirdar would make use of so elaborate a device.

As a special proof of the genuineness of the papers, it has been found that, out of eleven Sepoys who deserted, or were apprehended, after the seizure of Khan Sing and Gunga Ram, the names of five are to be found in the letter said to have been written by Oomrao Sing. No papers, bearing on the case, were found by Sirdar Khan Sing's vakeel, but he acknowledges that Shibdiyal was in the habit of visiting the Sirdar, apparently about a case, in which he was a party, concerning the disputed possession of a house.

On a search being made among the papers of Gungoo Shah, Shroff, several notes of hand of the Maharanee were found, directing payment to be made to Boota Sing, Gunga Ram, and Jeebun Sing.

To establish, further, the truth of the story, it would be desirable to ascertain whether the originals of the letters, of which copies are in the present list, or copies of those of which there are originals, are to be found among the Maharanee's papers. It also seems necessary to investigate whether the names of the other Sepoys mentioned as being concerned in the 51st Regiment, and the other corps at Lahore, can be identified. Further, it might be advisable to find out, through Lieutenant Edwardes, whether the Sadh, who lived in Anarkullee in the lines of the 50th Native Infantry, and Oomrao Sing, have really gone to Mooltan, as is asserted in one of Shibdiyal's letters. Should the accuracy of these papers be established, the Whuttree Mohun, and the Jemadar Gama Beg, as also Maharaj Sonar, should be rewarded.

#### REMARKS.

*Beebee Sahib* — Maharanee  
*Shibdiyal* — Her Highness' family priest.

*Oomrao Sing* — A man living in the lines of the 8th Native Infantry, whence he was expelled as a suspicious character. He was engaged in tampering with the troops, but ran off with the Anarkullee Sadh, on the seizure of Khan Sing and Gunga Ram. He is said to have visited the Maharanee twice at Sheikhoopoor.

L. B.

\* See No. 8

#### Translation of Goormookhee Letters found on Mohun Loll.

No. 1. Written by the Beebee Sahib to Shibdiyal and Oomrao Sing.

After compliments.

I have received your letter and understood its contents, with which my heart was greatly delighted. Send Oomrao Sing hither. I have forwarded some property to Nurunjun,\* which take. If you require more, send to me for it by one of your confidential people. Work quickly; delay not. Make much of a few words.

No. 2. Written by the Beebee Sahib to Jowahir Sing.

After compliments.

I have been greatly delighted by reason of your arrival, and have been much pleased by the message which you sent by the hand of Dada (Priest)

Mean Jowahir Sing came to Lahore at this time, ostensibly with a view to settle his dispute with

L. B.

Guddee; place reliance in whatever Dada Shibdiyal may say to you. yourself with any one he may bring to you. Make much of a few words.

., No. 3. Written to the Beebee Sahib by her servant Khan Sing.\*

\* Sardar Khan Sing, Manf.  
L. B.

After respects.

My representation is as follows: On Tuesday, at 8 o'clock in the morning, I took leave from Lahore to go to Mooltan, when Currie Sahib sent for Mol Sing, and told him to get an acknowledgment from the Maharanee, saying that she was contented. The Rajas gave Currie Sahib a bribe, and the matter was consequently abandoned. All the respectable officers in the regiments have told me to write to the Mai Sahib (Maharanee) not to leave Sheikhoopoor and come to Lahore, even if the English should go to bring her away. They say, "When we have killed the Europeans, we will release her." I have obtained the Government of Mooltan by your kindness; this will turn out well for you. I have no care for the Soobedarship; I only wish to devote my body to your service, that all the world may know who was faithful, and did good service, to his mistress. All the Rajas are faithless to their salt. This is my wish, do not lose confidence by my going to Mooltan. I am not going to take charge of the Soobah. I will quickly make my arrangements regarding the fort and troops of Mooltan, as well as the Puthans. In Lahore I have already settled my plans with the regiments and artillery, and have brought about an introduction between them and Shibdiyal,\* who is concerned in the whole matter. The affair is in his hands. From the beginning, my ideas have been the same as his. I have made over to the Shibdiyal money for all expenses, and have told him that I will give more, if necessary. I have already spent much, but it has been given by you, and employed in your service. The Gooroo is granting victory, and if we win, the expenses I have been put to will be gained, and I shall have a reckoning with you afterwards. Shibdiyal has spent 10,000 rupees. He will send me reports concerning the Tilingees, and will write to me, while I will keep him informed of all my plans, and he will reply to you. I have ordered the troops to obey the instructions of Dada Shibdiyal, whether he order during the day or during the night, and to attend to him as they would to myself. The Sepoys told me that all the English karkhana was in their charge, and that both the guns and the troops were in their hands; that they would conquer in an hour, on my writing to them, and that they would murder the guards. Every one says that Currie Sahib has come here for some particular purpose. I will settle his business, will take Lahore without a struggle, and rescue you from Sheikhoopoor. What crime have you committed? I shall consider that I have been as one unborn, until I can get the heads of the Europeans strewn about Lahore. When I have settled my plans at Mooltan, I will write to the Sepoys at Lahore. You have written to me to send all letters through Russool or Hurnund Mier. Thus I shall attend to. All the world shall see and hear of my services.

(Seal of Shibdiyal)

No. 4. Written to the Beebee Sahib Jee by Khan Sing, Manf.

After respects.

Gunga Ram has given your Moorasila to Currie Sahib, who has not mentioned anything about it to any one. Currie sent for the Rajas, and told them that he had received a message from the Maharanee, stating that she was undergoing a great deal of hardship, and that this ought to be put a stop to. The Rajas on hearing this, assembled in Tej Sing's house, and consulted together. They agreed that they must be informed of the contents of the Maharanee's Moorasila, and said that they could manage the matter, if they all consented to one thing. I said, "Rajajee! the grief that has been felt by the Malik (Maharanee) will be felt once more (by you)." Tej Sing said, "I know well, that what took place to Raja Lall Sing will also happen to me, I always said, let the Ranees meet with the fate of Chund Kour. She must be stoned; but all opposed my opinion." I understand that Tej Sing has been told not to ride about in a four-horse carriage; and the Moolvee was heard to say that Raja Tej Sing would be excluded from the council. You wrote to me to mention your affair in the council, and see what the Sahibs have to say. Have confidence in me, I will do all in my power.

When you favor me, what fear have I? Currie Sahib said to Jowahir Sing, "You are the son of the former Wuzer of the Maharaja, have you any connection with the Ranees?"

\* This Shibdiyal was deeply implicated in the Preyma conspiracy of last year, but succeeded in effecting his escape. He went to Cashmere, and when the matter had blown over, returned to Lahore. On Khan Sing and Gunga Ram being seized, he absconded, but finding that his name was not then alluded to, came back to Lahore, where he was arrested.

L. B.

The moorasila here alluded to was mislaid by the Resident for some days, which accounts for the expression used.

L. B.

\* See No. 2.

He replied, "I will give you an answer in four days." You\* should send a confidential person to Raja Jowahir Sing.

No. 5. Written to the Beebee Sahib by her servants Khan Sing and Shiddiyal.

On Tuesday, Moolvee Rujub Ali met me. I asked him whether people would be angry against one who took the Rancee's part, and showed his faithfulness? "Ask the Sahib" The Moolvee mentioned this to the Sahib, who said, "It does not matter, there is no cause to be angry; bring them to me, and I will make inquiries from them." The Moolvee sent to call the person. Shiddiyal, your Poorohit, was then sitting by me, but I did not mention the secret to him, as I did not know whether the Sahib would be angry or not. I went to the Sahib, who asked me what I had to say, to which I replied that I was a faithful servant of the Maharaja, and that the Maharanee was my mother, and that she had committed no crime that she should have been imprisoned, and that justice had not been done to her. The Sahib said, "I did not imprison her; your Rajas imprisoned her; the order was given by them. You may take up her part against them, and I will ascertain the truth." I said, "this wont do." The Sahib said, "how then do you propose to effect what you mention?" I replied, "The question must be disposed of in the Council (of Calcutta)" The Sahib said, "I have written to Calcutta and await a reply. . . ." Don't let any intelligence of my writing to you be known to any one. Send an answer to this quickly, through Shiddiyal.

No. 6 Written to the Beebee Sahib by Khan Sing.

After respects

On Saturday, at 3 o'clock, Mean Jowahir Sing visited Currie Sahib at Anarkullee. . . .

On Sunday the chiefs assembled at Tej Sing's house. The three Rajas and myself were there. The Rajas said, "the Sahib wants us to give him an acknowledgment from the Maharanee, that she is contented; how are we to do this? If the Sahib should send us away in imprisonment, then the Rancee would be contented." Deena Nath said, "I am the servant of the Duftur, the servant of the Maharanee, and your servant" (speaking to Tej Sing). Tej Sing replied, "You want to get out of it, but you had a hand in every business, and, if I die, you shall die with me. . . ."

No. 7. Written to the Beebee Sahib, by Shiddiyal Priest, on Wednesday at 3 o'clock.

The case of Khan Sing and Gunga Ram was read over by the Resident, who asked them by whose advice they had engaged in the present conspiracy. Gunga Ram said, "I told you before, that the Rajas would procure my murder under some pretence." On Khan Sing being asked, he said, "I gave Tej Sing and Deena Nath 12,000 to secure my command, which they did not do. This I mentioned to you, and in revenge this charge has been brought against me." The two Rajas and the Resident consulted together. The Resident then gave an order that the prisoners should be hung. Tej Sing and Deena Nath said, "Make some arrangements about Sheekhoopoor," to which the Resident replied, "Send more people there. He has sent more to you. Bukshee Sing has been transported, and you will be seized. Make some arrangement\* to-day, or to-morrow, for they will not allow you to remain where you are any longer. Gunga Ram, on being taken away, sent for a cow, which was not brought. On Thursday the troops assembled at the place of execution. The prisoners were brought up, their irons struck off, and Gunga Ram had the rope first put round his neck. He said, "Remove the guard from my house; have my women committed any offence?" The Kotwal said, "Don't be afraid; no harm shall be done to them. I will get the guard removed." Four Sahibs were there. The rope was then put round Khan Sing's neck, and his life was extinct. Gunga Ram struggled for some time. Currie Sahib said, "Let him be hung quickly," upon which his legs were pulled, and he expired. The third prisoner was taken back to make some disclosures. He mentioned the names

\* On the Rancee being removed from Sheekhoopoor, one of her slave girls remarked. "It is well for you that you have come now, an hour more, and it would have been too late."

The present letter advising Her Highness to make immediate preparations for flight, accounts for his speech.

of several people, but whose I do not know. Several Sepoys among the troops have been seized through him, while some have escaped. On Friday a proclamation was issued, that all persons joining in the Mooltan rebellion would be punished. Gunga Ram's mother and sister were seized, and beaten, and the amulet demanded of them. There was some paper in it.

Raja Fyzdeen has been ordered to enlist 2000 men, and Sheik Emamooddeen has been told to raise two regiments. They were going to seize the Sâdh in Anarkulle.\* I received intelligence of this, and procured his escape. Oomrao Sing, Poombur ran off with him. They have gone to Mooltan.† Toolsee Ram has mentioned seven names, but I know nothing further. Edwardes Sahib has marched down the river with the Bunnoo troops. Dewan Moolraj's troops have retreated and fled; you have no friend now here. On the 25th, Jeth Jowahir Sing left this. On Saturday evening Mudhoosoodun Pundit arrived in Lahore. All your powder has been thrown into a well. Look to God, and make some arrangements. Some day the Maharaja will be sent away from hence. (Seal of Shibdiyal.)

\* Govind Dos, living in the lines of the 50th Native Infantry.

L. B.

See No. 13.

† Oomrao seized subsequently at Mooltan.

L. B.

#### No. 8. Written to the Beebee Sahib by Shibdiyal

Your servant, Nurunjun, has arrived with your order, and the property, which I have received, its value is 11,000, and with this sum the affair cannot be accomplished. You have desired me to send for more, if required. I will send the day after to-morrow one of my confidential servants. I will send a man to Nurunjun, who will forward him to you. In future do not send gold or jewels, but a draft on Hurjass, jeweller, or Gungoo Shah. Where can I sell the gold and jewels? If you have any suspicion against me, I call down imprecations upon myself, if I do anything contrary to your interests. What you have already sent, and all you may send in future, I will collect, and then distribute it to the troops. In two or three days I will do this, and the affairs will be carried into execution.

See No. 1, Nurunjun.

Do you fear, on account of the former affair, (the Preyma plot?), in which a large sum was spent, but the scheme spoilt? I have sworn to accomplish this matter. The only fear is about money. Except this, there is no cause for fear. (Seal of Shibdiyal.)

#### No. 9. Written to the Beebee Sahib by Shibdiyal

A letter has arrived from Khan Sing, in which he writes professions of fidelity on his own part, and on the part of Dewan Moolraj, and says, "Be assured, you will now see with your own eyes the fruit of the representations I made to you before. Moolraj has plenty of money, and the Shroffs will give him more fight. If you want more money, you can get it. The Dewan has written to the Hazara and Peshawur troops, promising them 15 rupees monthly. He is constantly recruiting. Be careful in your management. When I have settled affairs here, I will come to Lahore, and display my services." Further, Khan Sing writes, "Be assured when I can find an opportunity I will come to you. According to your orders, I have sent a messenger to Golab Sing, on your part, and he has arrived there. The Raja has sent letters of encouragement to you, and says, "Don't be afraid, they (the British) will not remain many days longer. I have arranged my plans. The Dooranee people have joined me, and I have sent a force from Cashmere to Jummoo. From the latter place they will be sent on.' A man leaves this daily. People who come from Jummoo to go to Mooltan collect together in Lahore. Some put up in the villages on the road, and some near the city. When the Peshawur troops have commenced the matter, the Dooranee will join them, and advance to the Attock. The Jummoo troops will march hither. All depends upon the will of Devec.

#### No. 10. Repetition of No. 9.

#### No. 11. Letter in Persian from Shibdiyal to Mohun.

#### No. 12. Agreement of Shibdiyal to pay Mehun 10 rupees a-month as an amanuensis.

## No. 13. Written to the Mai Sahib by Oomrao Sing.

Chet Sing, a notorious Moosad,  
Khan Sing; Toolsee Ram; arrested.  
L. B.

I have received an answer from (Shibdiyal) to the letter which I sent, with a picture (letter) to you. I sent two letters to Bishwu Sing, Sepoy, 5th Company of Chunda-Ka-Prusad's regiment (with Shere Sing), to which I have, as yet, received no answer. Chet Sing, Colonel, Khan Sing, General, whose name has been struck off, and Toolsee Ram, Commandant, are engaged in your service.

(51st Native Infantry). In the Doobarun Regiment, Sheik Jung Ali and Khalufa have made arrangements.

This regiment has marched to Ferozepore.

(73rd Regiment.) In the 73rd Regiment Bidya Sing (Bidasda), Lochun Sing, Ungud Shookur, and Hyder Khan, I have arranged with.

\* Ujoodhya Sing, Gya Deen,  
deserted 12th May.  
L. B.

(50th Regiment.) In the Kareetun (Kristeen) Regiment, I have settled with Bhugwan Sing, Ujoodhya\* Sing, Gya\* Deen, Oomrao Shookur (Sokur, Sokul), Doomya Sing, Jemadar, and Sookhmundun (Sookhoo) Jemadar.

Gunga Sing, Soodhan Shookul,  
deserted 14th May.  
L. B.

(52nd Regiment.) In the Indree Regiment, I have settled with Gunga\* Sing, Luchmun Sing, Soodhan\* Shookal, and Mokhum Sing

Shub Suhai Sing, deserted 13th  
May  
L. B.

(18th Regiment.) In the Raja Regiment I have settled with Sheo Suhai Sing (Shib) Khalufa, Ajoua (Ajwa Sing) Doorgapursand, Bhugwan Sing.

(8th Regiment.) In the Burdwan-Ke-Pultan, I have settled with Mohun Sing (Muhun), Sheo Churn Tavaree, Shunkur Tavaree, and Ruchpal Sing

(46th Regiment.) In the Muroo Regiment, Bishen Tavaree and Meer Hyder Ali, I have arranged with.

(36th Regiment.) In the Bolunteer Regiment, Soobha Sing and Bhuwanee Bheek Sing have joined me.

In the artillery, through Jusuya (Jasoowaya) Sing, I have made arrangements. I have settled with the regiments through Munsa Ram. I have no fear. As soon as you answer this letter I will commence my operations. I am a foreigner. I have sold my head for my religion.

Let no one know anything about this letter; you and I know it, as well as your Poorohit Shibdiyal, but do not mention it to any one else, even to a confidential servant. I send this through Shibdiyal. Send an answer by the 1st Bysakh. I will then write again, and show my services.

Found in the amulet wrapped  
up in letter No. 15.

## No. 14. Written to the Sree Beebee Sahib by her servant Moolraj.

L. B. After respects.

My representation is as follows.

Khan Sing has said to me, I am closely connected with the Beebee. I resolved upon a plan, in concert with the Beebee Sahib, that if you give up the fort, I should take possession of it. I replied, "Write a letter to the Beebee Sahib, while I also will write one, and according to any orders she may give, I will unite myself with you." I have sent one of my people, and Khan Sing two of his, disguised as fakeers.\* Whatever orders you may send I will obey. You must not now treasure up your money, if the affair is to be accomplished by spending money. Spend freely; be confident; write to me whatever you may think befitting. This affair must be accomplished by your poonyn (merit), for I am ignorant. I will come to your feet.

(Seal of Shibdiyal.)

\* An hurkaru named Tiloka, or  
Tilok Sing, delivered the amulet  
containing l. tters. 14 and 15, but  
abandoned.

L. B.

Found in the amulet.

## No. 15. Urzee to the Junab Hazoor Sree Beebee Sahib.

After respects. This is the matter. The Maharaja sent (me) your servant to Mooltan, where I arrived. By the will of the Immortal Being, the affair here has become highly important. At the time of my leaving, a purwana in Goormookhee reached me by the hand of Misr Dada's son (Shibdiyal). It directed me to retain the sepoys of Mooltan in service, and to send intelligence to you. By the grace of the Gooroo, the Dewan Sahib, Dewan Moolraj, has girded up his loins in the service of the Maharaja. An urzee of the Dewan Sahib in Goormookhee will reach you by the hand of the priest's son. Have the kindness to favor me with an answer to it. Arrangements have been made with the Telingas, and as you were in former times in correspondence with the Raja

Golab Sing, write to him, for now is the time. If the present moment should pass away, it will be too late. In future you are master.

(Supposed signature of Khan Sing.)\*

No. 16. Letter in form of an ukbar.

The hukara (Goolaba) was told at the place of execution to give information of the names of the persons concerned. He said he did not know their names, but could recognise them if the troops were drawn up.

Arrangements have been made for removing you, but I do not know the particulars. A plan has also been laid for seizing Budamoo (servant-girl of the Maharanee).

Toolsee Ram has mentioned seven other names, but they have not been identified. Oomrao Sing of Jerirja, says—"You take merchandise, and don't pay for it. If you choose to pay for it, the traffic may still be carried on. The former trade was spoilt, and the merchants ruined. Send the price, and the bargain shall be made."

None of your friends are left here.

On Saturday some regiments were drawn up near the Moree and Cashmere Gates, and the hukara was told to point out the men concerned in the conspiracy. The hukara pointed out a soobadar, and said—"I cannot recognise any one else." It was then settled that a second examination should take place in the afternoon. In the night the soobadar was prepared to desert. 200 sepoy were also ready to start, but, having consulted together, did not do so.

No. 17. Written to the Beebee Sahibjee and the Maharaja.

The string has been put round the cow's (Maharanee's) neck by the Europeans, who are pulling her members to pieces. The master of the cow says—"Release my cow. Buy twelve rupees worth of grain" (alluding to fixing twelve rupees as pay of sepoys who join in the conspiracy). A letter has been sent to Raja Golab Sing, who says in reply—"The order of the English is not to be opposed by me." This is not grain which I alluded to above, but pay for the sepoys. Khan Sing is your mookhtar. He has united with himself in this design Runjore\* Sing and Urjun Sing.

Letters have been sent by the sepoy here to the Jullundur Doab through Khan Sing, to persuade the sepoys there to join also in the plan for releasing the cow, and giving her assistance. Thus they have consented to do, and letters have been received from them. Some day must be fixed, and when this has been settled the matter will be accomplished. Khan Sing sent me to Jowahir Sing, in the Alooowala's garden, where I had a conversation with him.

I have already mentioned to you what kind of a person Jowahir Sing is. The sepoys here and at Jullundur, who have joined us, have been promised promotion.

No. 18. Receipt of Mohun for fifteen rupees, received from Shibdiyal, a recompense for writing work.

No. 19. Receipt of Shibdiyal, bearing his seal.

No. 20. Receipt of Shibdiyal, bearing his seal (same as on other letters) acknowledging the receipt of money from Mohun.

No. 21. Written to the Beebee Sahibjee by Khan Sing.

The matter is as follows. On Thursday, Currie Sahib sent for Mol Sing, and told him that he had already directed the Maharanee's Razeenama to be brought to him, and that by the Governor-General's statement, it appeared that Jeebun Sing was in constant communication with her. Mol Sing promised to give an answer the next day.

On Friday, Shumshere Sing sent a letter refusing to take charge of the Mooltan territory, and saying that he was a soldier, and unacquainted with such matters.

Raja Tej Sing said, "Tell the Sahibs they will make some other arrange-

\* There is some doubt concerning this signature. It is not the usual one of the Sirdar, and resembles somewhat that of Raja Lal Sing. It is said, however, that there is some private signature in the Man family, unknown to strangers.

This letter and No. 14 were found in the amulet seized on the person of Mohun, which arrived a day or two after the execution of Khan Sing and Gunga Ram. It was, consequently, not delivered.

L. B.

No. 16 unsent

\* This is the only mention made in these papers of Sirdar Runjore Sing, but he is notoriously disaffected. His name was constantly mentioned last year in the Preyna plot, and there is no doubt that he carried on a secret correspondence with Moolraj. His complicity in the conspiracy generally, is proved by his attempt to escape, after his being arrested, and by his having destroyed, or concealed, all papers after the year 1902.

L. B.

This receipt bears precisely the same seal as that on the letters

L. B.

ments." I said, "It will be advisable to send some one, over whom you will have control, for if a Sahib should go alone, it will be then out of your power to hold the province under your thumb."

Tej Sing said, "You go." I said, "Very well. I will do as you order." The Rajas consulted with Currie Sahib about my going.

On Saturday, durbar was held in the fort, and I obtained a khillut, consisting of various articles, an elephant, a horse, jewels, and a jageer of 18,000.

I had previously 10,000. You wrote to Hurnund to give your moorasila to the Sahib, saying that you would pay twenty-four lakhs into the Sirkar (keeping the Mooltan territory yourself).

I am leaving Lahore, and the territory is in your hand (which makes it useless for me to forward the moorasila). People there are your servants. My vakeel will give information concerning the Durbar through Shubdiyal, who will also obtain news from Moolvee Raja Ali, and give you intelligence. You have written to me to make some arrangements for sending letters about your release.

You write also that by my advice you have entered into a correspondence with Golab Sing, and that you approve of the measures I have taken concerning the troops. This is no child's play. If the scheme does not answer, the fall will be into an abyss, and one's life will be the forfeit.

The sepoys said to me, "What arrangements have you made concerning the pictures" (letters)? I inspired confidence into them.

The affair that is to take place here I will arrange carefully, as I am going to a distance. When everything has been settled, I will proceed to the execution of my plans.

I will write to you concerning the arrangements I shall make in Mooltan about the fort and the troops.

Shubdiyal will send you intelligence.

No 22. Written to the Beebee Sahib, by Shubdiyal priest.

After respects Khan Sing's vakeel, Urmur Sing, went to Umritsur, from whence he returned seven days ago.

A letter has arrived from Khan Sing. He writes to you confidently, and says that Moolraj sent me privately a communication, stating as follows: "I gave up Mooltan of my own free will."

The Puthans and other Ryots, however, told me to be prepared for a disturbance (resistance). Whatever advice you give, I will consent to. I perceived that the Ryots are well pleased with Moolraj, but would not be so with me. I, therefore, sent him words of encouragement, and took an oath in a letter I sent to him to join him.

The troops who were with me, and those who were formerly at Mooltan, are of one mind in this matter. I think of you by day and by night. You sent for Oomrao Sing, Poorbeah and gave him fifty rupees, and sent Nurunjun back with him. The Poorbeah lives with a Sadh in Anarkullee. This is the same Sadh who was concerned in the Preyma conspiracy. He is an important person.

The plot was spoiled by Preyma. These two were united with the 7th Regiment.

The Sadh was a confederate of Sirdar Jowahir Sing, and took to him Lal Sing, Eesroowala, and Hurnund vakeel, who went across the river and visited four cantonments, where they engaged people to join Jowahir Sing. The cantonments were Loodiana, Ferozepore, Umballa, and Meerut.

If Jowahir Sing had lived fifteen days longer, people from these places would have joined him. This Sadh offers up his life for religion. He has arranged this matter fully with me.

The 7th Regiment has joined him, and an agreement has been entered into with the best men to receive a rupee a-day, and, subsequently, rewards in jagheera. They say that, whenever you order, they will kill the Europeans at midnight, when they are asleep, and obtain a victory in an hour (almost instantaneously).

The Sadh has sent letters to sepoys in other cantonments: this matter is founded on religion, and is to be relied on. The sepoys will only offer their services on being well paid; send some money, and make arrangements concerning it. You know that Jowahir Sing caused Heera Sing and Pundit Julla to be murdered, by dint of money.

Chuttur Sing, nephew of Meean Sing, Cashmereewala, is your servant, and has sent a letter for you, which answer, and give him every encouragement. Last year you sent me to Cashmere; I then said to you, "write," which you did not.

This you afterwards regretted, and if you, now, do not spend plenty of money, you will have as much cause for regret as you had then. 800 or 900 Poorbeahs are collected here, and their expenses must be paid; some getting 10 rupees, others 20 rupees. This matter is settled. You must send money.

No. 23. Unimportant.

No. 24. From the Mai (Maharanee) to Khan Sing Man and Shbdiyal Poorohit.

Copy of former letter See No.  
30 L B.

Your letter has arrived, and I have comprehended its contents. I have also understood what you write concerning occurrences in the month of Chait.

You say that the hoondee was torn. Don't be afraid; Jeebun Sing has written to say that he has no money for his expenses, so I have sent him a bill for 50,000.

Deena Nath sent a man to me to ask whether I considered those to be enemies who were really faithful, and saying that he was still my servant, and would make arrangements for me in Lahore.

To this I replied, when the Gooroo orders me, I will go, and not delay. Ruttun Vizier's son, Poonoo, was sent to me by the Raja, telling me to write to him, that he would do good service, that he was my servant, and that his only object was to please me.

I did not reply.

The man remained with me for some time.

I will not act according to your advice.

You wrote to me, advising me not to write anything, lest the paper should be seized.

Don't be afraid, write without hesitation. I am not so foolish as to write in such a way as will injure me.

I knew that Jowahir Sing was dead. My Jowahir Sing is now alive (you). I have no care.

Written above.

Jeebun Sing will come with Currie Sahib.

No. 25

Relating to the Preyma conspiracy.

I have made arrangements with Mora, Chunda's brother, to kill Tej Sing.

The four brothers have come with their men, three are in Shahdeera, while Mora has come to Lahore.

I placed men on the road to the garden, with directions to shoot the rascal (Jidhe), Tej Sing. Intelligence reached Tej Sing, and a search is being made. I have sent away Mora's men, while he has been concealed in my house two days. When the affair has blown over, I will make a second attempt to kill him, whether it turns out well, or ill. You will hear of his being killed some day. I eat your salt.

JEEBUN SING.

No. 26. Hurelal Soobadar of 7th company of the 51st Regiment has joined me through the Bauhnracharee. He has made arrangements with the other regiments, and says, let some Sirdar be appointed as the Ranee's mookhtar, and I will join you. I brought him to Khan Sing, Man.

In the same writing as No. 25.

I have settled 13 rupees wages for each sepoy.

You wrote to me before, that Khan Sing, Man, was your staunch servant.

No. 27. Written by Shbdiyal to Beebee Sahibjee.

After blessings.

The Rajas have devised a scheme, in concert with John Lawrence, for making away with you, by putting something in your food.

Rajas Tej Sing, Shere Sing, and Deena Nath have joined in the plan.

Don't place reliance in any one; but be wary until Currie Sahib comes.



The Rajas fear you, lest on Currie Sahib's arrival you should make some representation to him; and they will, therefore, endeavour to get rid of you before his arrival.

It is certainly reported that he is coming shortly, so send one of your confidential attendants on in front to meet him, dressed as a fakeer, and on reaching Currie Sahib, let him assume his proper appearance.

Send two lakhs of jewels to give to Currie Sahib. If you have not this amount, get it from Heera Sing. Money is of no value to you, and this is the time for using it. If you order me, I can give you 15,000 worth of property, which you may consider as your own.

Information concerning the person whom you sent to Cashmere has been given at Lahore; so write to him to be circumspect.

Your Toshakhana property has been sent to Anarkullee, and thence to Delhi. Some expenses have been incurred in writing to you.

The butter man\* receives 10 rupees for each letter which he conveys to you in your butter, and the mehtar\* who forwards your letters to me takes 5 rupees for each letter.

I have got an amulet made for you, at an expense of 200 rupees. Whatever wish you may imagine will be accomplished by it.

I will write to you anything else which I may see or hear.

This intelligence you may rely on as correct.

(Seal of Shibliyal)

No. 28. Written by Shibliyal to the Beebee Sahib.

After blessings I have made arrangements for killing Tej Sing, in conceit with Mora, Chunda's brother.

The four brothers came with their men.

Three remained at Shahdeera, while Mora with his men came on to Lahore. His men were placed on the road to the garden to shoot Tej Sing as he went on horseback.

Tej Sing has heard of their coming here, and his men are searching for Mora. I have sent away Mora's people, and hid him in my house.

Some other day I will kill him. You shall hear of it.

Tej Sing is the author of all that is got up against you in the Durbar.

Hurelal Soobadar, 7th company of Doobarun Pultun, which is at the Tuksalee Gate, has entered into an engagement with me to induce the sepoy of his regiment to get up a revolt among the troops. In this manner only is our plan to be effected.

I have introduced Khan Sing to him, as you wrote that Khan Sing was your confidential servant.

I have made them swear an oath, and have settled 12 rupees for each sepoy.

All the sepoys are your servants, and will obey your orders.

You have not answered my former letters; if you write I will answer you.

The English have intentions against Cashmere; so write to Golab Sing to enlist soldiers, if necessary.

He has plenty of money.

Corruption has done its work among the sepoys, but they require a leader.

(Seal of Shibliyal.)

No. 29. Unimportant. Same as No. 28.

No. 30. Written by Shibliyal to the Beebee Sahib

After respects. I wrote, formerly, three urzees, to which I have received no answer.

My urzees are sent through the butter man, and cost 5 rupees each. (It appears from this letter, which is similar to No. 27, that Shibliyal was in the habit of sending duplicates to the Maharanee.)

I have united with myself the British sepoys, and introduced them to the Sirdar.

No. 31. Unimportant.

Lahore, July 3, 1848.

\* The original says that letters which you write and leave in the privy, and which your bhungee removes, each costs me 5 rupees.  
L. B.

*Statement made by Sirdar Lal Sing, Kaleewala.*

On the 23rd Jeth, 1904, corresponding with 3rd of June, 1847, I was sent by the Durbar to Hussan Abdal in charge of 500 sowars, and remained there till 23rd Baisakh, 1905 (3rd of May, 1848), when I received an order to join Shere Sing, on the way to Mooltan immediately. On the 18th Jeth, I joined him. On the 12th, Bahadoor Soorutt Sing, Majeetia, who is now in rebellion, came to visit me. I asked him the cause of the disturbances in Hazara, saying that I little thought a man so weak and enfeebled as Chuttur Sing, could have originated them.

In reply, he stated as follows "When I was deputed by the Durbar to proceed to Peshawur in the month Baisakh, 1904 (or April 1847), I went to Bagh Boota to meet Sirdar Chuttur Sing. Chuttur Sing said, 'Khan Sing, Majeetia, is also coming from Lahore, and will go to Peshawur; when he arrives, come with him to see me before proceeding onwards.' I then went to Syud Keisra, my jagheer, where I remained for some time; and on Khan Sing's arrival we went together to Chuttur Sing.

"Chuttur Sing said, 'the British have behaved harshly to the Maharanee, in sending her to Sheikhoopoor. It is better that the Punjab should be devastated and plundered. It is to be lamented that no one of the Durbar prevented this act, by which the honor of the State has been compromised. Shere Sing has conducted himself in a manner unbecoming my son. Of what avail is his Rajaship, when his honor is gone? The best thing to be done is, that I go to Lahore, and request the British to release the Maharanee. If I am unsuccessful, well; but if not, I will give up my jagheer, and not enjoy the fruits of ingratitude in my old age. I will then create a disturbance in the Hazara country, and, collecting the people of the various tuppehs (districts), turn the British out of Lahore.' Khan Sing replied, 'that such an undertaking could not be attempted without the aid of Raja Golab Sing, as the British were well provided with guns and ammunition.' Chuttur Sing determined to send Bukshee Narayn Sing to Cashmere, saying that Golab Sing would agree to anything which he (Chuttur Sing) proposed. The Bukshee was accordingly dispatched with a Moorasila Khan Sing, and I then took leave of Chuttur Sing, and went to Peshawur, requesting Chuttur Sing to inform us of the Maharaja's reply. Some time after, Chuttur Sing wrote to us, saying that Golab Sing had refused to have anything to do with the matter, saying, that he placed no faith in the Sikhs, who had murdered so many members of his family; but, at the same time, stated that, if Chuttur Sing would swear by the yellow Punjee, and on the Grunth, that he would devote his life, and his property, to any plan which Golab Sing might desire, the Maharajah would place reliance in his professions. Khan Sing and I took the oath of the Punjee and the Grunth, and forwarded it to Chuttur Sing, who, having also taken the prescribed oath, and attached his seal, sent the paper, through a confidential servant, to Golab Sing, who gave him an interview in a house only frequented by himself and Dewan Jowala Sahae. The Maharaja showed the messenger a great quantity of arms and ammunition, which were in the above house, saying that he had been occupied for the space of a year in collecting these materials. He further said, that the conduct of the British had changed, that they had not left even the remnant of a sovereignty in Lahore, and had acted contrary to the Treaty, in assuming the supreme power. He added, that he now placed confidence in Chuttur Sing's promises, but stipulated that the latter should commence operations, by creating a disturbance in Hazara.

"The messenger was then dismissed, and instructed to request Chuttur Sing to write to Sooltan Mahomed Khan and Dost Mahomed Khan to assist in the undertaking. This Chuttur Sing did, on receiving the Maharaja's message; and the person sent by him, whose name is Bukshee, remained a month and a half, in Peshawur, in the house in which Khan Sing and myself resided. He arrived at Peshawur in the month of Asooj, delivered, himself, Chuttur Sing's letter to Sooltan Mahomed, and forwarded that addressed to Dost Mahomed, through a confidential servant of the latter.

"Dost Mahomed Khan wrote in reply, that if he afforded his aid to Chuttur Sing, the latter should stipulate to give up, to the brothers of the Dost, the whole of the country from Peshawur to Attock, promising not to demand anything for the expenses of the affair, until it should be accomplished.

"Sooltan Mahomed Khan replied, that he was ready to act according to Chuttur Sing's suggestions. The rebellion in Hazara then broke out."

I related to my father all that Soorutt Sing told me. He replied that Shere Sing was the servant of the British, and that Captain Edwardes placed unbounded confidence in him; and said that, if he and myself were to separate ourselves from him, he would ruin us by false statements of our conduct to the Durbar. I imagined that if what Soorutt Sing told me were true, Captain Edwardes would obtain information of it.

Subsequently, the defection of Shere Sing and his troops occurred. This is all that I know.

(Seal of Lal Sing, Kaleewala.)

Inclosure 3 in No. 44.

*Lieutenant Herbert to the Resident at Lahore.*

*Attock, December 19, 1848.*

I LEARN that Sirdar Chuttur Sing, having returned from Peshawur, crossed the Indus, the day before yesterday.

Reports vary as to his intentions; some say, that he will carry on the siege of Attock; others, that he will proceed southwards; and that Dost Mahomed Khan has taken upon himself the responsibility of subduing this fort.

Should the Ameer bring his force, either to assist, or succeed, that of Sirdar Chuttur Sing, I fear it could scarcely be expected that my Puthans would remain true. It is the opinion of Nizam-ood-dowleh Mahomed Oosman Khan, whose services have been most essential in keeping them together, that they would not resist him.

With reference to my letter of the 6th instant, it appears that I was deceived as to the strength of the enemy's force, which is greater than I imagined. For several days, only the six horse artillery guns I mentioned, were used by the enemy, but four large guns have since re-opened their fire.

The enemy have, three different nights lately, made efforts to set fire to one of the gates; but, I am thankful to say, without effecting any serious evil.

The minds of many of my men are much shaken by the unexpected delay in the arrival of succour, and I can scarcely hope they will stand by me much longer.

Desertions among my artillerymen have increased. A few nights ago, eight men went, and, on the night following, Bussa Khan, naick of Colonel Noorooddeen's troop (whose name, with that of eight Goolundaze, I, some time ago, sent to you), deserted, with six of his men, two remaining with me, Hussein Shah and Alup Shah. I am afraid that many more are determined to desert.

They have, this morning, begged me to give them their pay, for the month of Muger, now seven days' due, and this demand will, I fear, be followed by that of the whole garrison.

The treasure chest is almost entirely empty again, and though I hope to be able to raise a sufficient sum to meet this demand, and carry on the war a short time longer, I know I shall have great difficulty in managing this. I have put off the demand for pay for a few days, by assuring the men I am making arrangements, and will give it them as soon as I can.

I would repeat that it is not so much physical force that I fear, as the effect of the constant efforts of the enemy to spread treachery and discontent within; and every day's delay in the advance of aid makes the probability of their success greater, as it unnerves the minds of my men.

The Almighty has, in his great mercy, permitted of my holding the fort now for forty days, and on Him I hope that I may be able to do so longer; but, humanly speaking, it would appear almost impossible, and I, therefore, with all humility, earnestly beg that you will do your utmost to induce his Excellency the Commander-in-chief to hasten the advance of the army, or send some troops to the relief of this fort, without delay.

## Inclosure 4 in No. 44.

*Lieutenant Taylor to the Resident at Lahore.**Lukkee, December 25, 1848*

THE garrison of Lukkee still remains contumacious; yesterday they themselves opened negotiations for the surrender of the fort, merely a pretence to gain time; and, this morning, I received an absurd request that I should myself go in person to summon the fort, or send my own moonshee to treat with them. I have not a doubt but that they would like much to secure hostages for their own purposes. Seeing that they had no real intention of surrendering at present, I opened a fire from our new battery which is at a distance of about 280 or 300 yards from the walls, and kept it up briskly till evening. I cannot say that the result was satisfactory. The guns are so old and bad, and the shot small and not fitting the guns, that it is, in the first place, difficult to make good practice with them, and, in the second, the effect of the shot on the walls is very trifling. The garrison, who have two good guns of larger calibre, returned our fire with interest. Their practice was very good, about the third shot, they hit one of our guns in the muzzle, through the embrasure—another shot struck the board in a spare embrasure, knocking down the gunner, who was leaning against it. I have no further intelligence of any intentions of the Barukzyes to take possession of Bunnoo, and advance this way. Meer Alim Khan's force has split up, a number of his men having joined Jaffier Khan, whom I sent to wage war against him, and keep him from assisting the Lukkee garrison. One of Meer Alim Khan's jemadars came into me to-day, and tells me that Mahomed Azim Khan, son of the Dost, at present in Khost, sent men to Meer Alim Khan to see the state of things in Bunnoo, and, though Meer Alim is anxious enough that the Dooranees should come, the jemadar's idea is, that they would not give a very favorable report to their master. The report, then, at Bunnoo was, that I had arrived with a strong force, guns, &c., at Lukkee; an account much corroborated by the conduct of the Lukkee garrison themselves, from whom messages arrived, while the Dooranees were themselves present, begging for assistance, and, as an argument to spur Meer Alim in that cause, saying that they must give up the fort the very next day, if assistance did not arrive. I hear from Nicholson, that the army is to move towards Goojerat; that will give the Sings a fair field, and cause difficulty, of course, a very unimportant feature of the case. I am much annoyed about this Lukkee affair, but still do not actually regret having engaged in it. I think the possession of Lukkee extremely important, for the integrity of our frontier, and protection of these provinces. Supposing it garrisoned by loyal troops, the revenue might be collected with ease, and no enemy, unaccompanied by a large force, could enter the country, but if in the hands of rebels, they may be reinforced, at any time, from Peshawur, or the Pindie Ghebee country, and the whole of the country above the Punnealla and Pezzoo passes must be lost immediately. Again, so much vacillation, and disunion, has been apparent among the members of the garrison, and it has always been so much the opinion of those about me, that they would quickly yield, that I hope I cannot fairly be accused of imprudence in attempting to force them to yield; nearly 110 men have come out of the fort, and those that remain, amounting still to 300 men, are much divided, and many anxious to desert. I have every dependence on the spirit of the irregular troops under the Tonk Khans, who are with me, and the latter have all the qualities that could be wished in assistants in such a game.

## Inclosure 5 in No. 44.

*Lieutenant Herbert to the Resident at Lahore.**Attock, December 26, 1848.*

DURING the course of the last few days, Dooranee soldiers, horse and foot, have been arriving, in small parties, at Khyrabad.

Yesterday morning, observing that men were employed repairing one of the batteries, on that side of the river, left by the Sikhs, I fired a few round shot

to stop their work; these were returned by some matchlock men posted in the village below the fort. During the night, however, the battery was repaired, and this morning a heavy gun was opened from it.

I am, as yet, unable to report the exact force with Sirdar Mahomed Shureef Khan, whom I suppose to have arrived; but, last night, the light of their camp fires behind the hill, at the back of the fort, indicated their position.

The force of Sirdar Chuttur Sing is, I believe, diminished, but I cannot discover their real strength. Reports vary. Their guns are still in the batteries, and the fire was, if anything, warmer this morning than usual, though every day is reported to be the last of their stay.

I am happy to be able to report that the mutinous spirit stated in my last to have shown itself among a portion of the men, is, apparently, perfectly subdued for the time, and the five principal instigators to evil have been expelled from the fort.

At present, the garrison appear in good spirits, and all declare they know the Barukzyes too well to have anything to do with them; but I trust it will not be long now, ere succour arrives. It is the strong report of the near approach of the British force that has, I believe, encouraged the men.

The river is falling very low, and I am in fear lest water should fail; but I hope it will not be quite cut off, though difficulty may arise.

This is, however, a fresh reason for me to beg speedy aid.

Inclosure 6 in No. 44.

*Lieutenant Herbert to the Resident at Lahore.*

*Attock, December 27, 1848.*

I HAVE the honor to acknowledge the receipt, last night, of your letter of the 17th instant, and beg to express how gratified I feel at your commendation of my conduct in holding Attock; but, if I have been successful thus far, it is a cause of gratitude to that Almighty, who, in His mercy, has relaxed the energy of the enemy, and granted that my men have, hitherto, remained staunch.

When I wrote to you yesterday, it was under the impression that our troops had crossed the Jhelum, and were near at hand, and that the main Sikh army was entirely destroyed, of which strong reports were current; but from Captain Nicholson's private note, which accompanied your letter, I learn that, up to the 18th instant, the camp had not moved, neither did there appear any intention on the part of the Commander-in-chief to advance.

This is, indeed, distressing news to me. To raise money for the pay of the garrison, &c., I have disposed of all the surplus stores in the godowns, merely reserving one month's supply, fully convinced that aid must arrive in that space of time; but, if troops do not cross the Jhelum soon, I fear all my efforts will be in vain, and the money expended so much thrown away. It is only by constantly disbursing it, and giving liberal rations, that the men are kept in spirits and good humour, from day to day.

It appears to me that you have a very mistaken idea of the strength of this place, which is so weak that it could not withstand a well-directed and vigorous cannonade of a few hours, and it is only the want of energy on the part of the enemy that has prevented them, long ere this, having effected practicable breaches, where the walls are much battered.

I have formed external barriers of such boughs of trees and brambles as this barren rock affords, and have raised slight defences within, but there is nothing fit to resist cannon.

I am much obliged by your intimation that you are endeavouring to arrange to supply me with funds. It is most desirable, if it can be effected.

I have consulted Nizam-ood-dowleh Mahomed Osman Khan, Shahzada Jumhoor, and Syud Ahey-ood-deen of Kooner, all of whom, from self-interest, are thoroughly true to our cause, and regret to state that it is the opinion of all, that should the Ameer himself cross the river, all hope of the garrison remaining true would be at an end, despite their present protestations; and further, that should I wish to escape, it would be advisable to quit the fort, on his arriving at the ferry, for that, after he has crossed, the people within will prevent any hope of getting away.

They add that the Affghans might fight against the Ameer for a few days, if they had certain information of our troops having advanced some distance on this side of the Jhelum, say to Rawulpindee, by the time he may reach the Indus, but that would be the only cause of their standing by us, or rather not becoming enemies.

I am unwilling to agree with them, but they should be good judges. You may depend, however, on my not leaving the place while a hope remains. My trust is in the merciful protection of Him who is the only giver of all victory, and who has granted me success thus far.

Inclosure 7 in No. 44.

*The Secretary with the Governor-General to the Resident at Lahore.*

*Camp, Mukkoo, January 12, 1849.*

I AM directed by the Governor-General to state, that Lieutenant Herbert's conduct, as shown in the above papers\*, is praiseworthy, as it has been throughout all the transactions in which he has been concerned.

Inclosure 8 in No. 44.

*The Secretary with the Governor-General to the Resident at Lahore.*

*Camp, Mukkoo, January 12, 1849.*

EVERY effort that is practicable and safe, will be made to save Captain Abbott and Lieutenant Herbert.

Inclosure 9 in No. 44.

*Lieutenant Herbert to the Resident at Lahore.*

*Attock, January 2, 1849.*

A PORTION of the army of Ameer Dost Mahomed Khan reached the right bank of the Indus, near the Bazour Ferry, on the evening of the 29th ultimo, and the Ameer himself, with the main body, yesterday morning.

Two regiments, with a number of camels and baggage, crossed the bridge of boats, constructed during the last few days, early yesterday, and I saw a long line of infantry, I imagine, three regiments, under arms, this morning, and watched them till they commenced the passage, when I was obliged to look after my own men, who were assembling tumultuously in considerable number, an unavoidable delay of one day having occurred in the disbursing of their pay.

I held a Dur-bar of all my officers yesterday, to ascertain their state of feeling, when, all disguise was removed; and I regret to state that I have no longer the smallest hope of either them, or their men, opposing the Ameer.

I have, too, no hope of succour; the latest accounts I have received from the army, leaving the war still at Heleh.

Under these circumstances, I have, after mature consideration and consultation with the three gentlemen mentioned in my last, determined on endeavouring to get away from the fort this night, in company with them, and a few others.

I shall be accompanied by Corporal Carthy, of the corps of sappers and miners, whom Captain Abbott some time ago sent to assist me here.

I, of course, shall do my utmost to reach Lahore, or the army, with as little delay as possible; but our first object must be to avoid giving a clue to the direction we take.

I need scarcely assure you that it is with the deepest regret that I take this step; but it is the only chance I see of escaping being delivered up to the Ameer, which, even now, I may be unable to accomplish.

\* Letters from Lieutenant Herbert, December 26 and 27.

occurred, and did not lead me to suppose that he considered me as his friend, nor did any other British officer write to me. My regret increased, when I considered that the British Government placed no confidence in me as their friend. What was destined to occur, then took place. Major Lawrence was seized. Letters reached me from Moolraj, Sirdar Chuttur Sing, and the other Sikh Sirdars, requesting me to come to Peshawur, and take possession of my hereditary country.

Moreover, at one time, the then Governor-General gave me to understand that I might consider the territory of Peshawur under my government and control.

After the seizure of Major Lawrence, I came to Peshawur, where I was met by Chuttur Sing, who left Jehangeera for the purpose, and made over to me the fort, and all that was in it. He requested assistance from me.

Matters are now as follows. The whole of the Affghans of Pukh, Dumtour, Hazara, Chuch, Attock, Swat, Eusufzye, Peshawur, Bunnoo, the Derajat, and other parts, which were formerly comprised in the Dooranee Empire, have devoted themselves to the cause of the race.

I have sent troops to Bunnoo and Daman, to obtain possession of, and superintend, that part of the country.

Whenever the British feel inclined, I will put an end to the feud subsisting between them and the Sikhs, and make them friends again.

As regards what you have written, concerning your being friendly to my interests, if you consider the above arrangements expedient, and have the power to bring them about, I will certainly attach myself to your cause, for the purpose of aiding in the re-establishment of the relations provided by the Treaty, which was subsisting between the British and Maharajah Duleep Sing.

If this proposition be not attended to, it will be found that the encounter with a million of Sikhs, devoted to their cause, will be desperate and deadly, and the British Government will suffer a loss of crores of rupees.

From what I observe of what is occurring in the Punjab, there can be no doubt that the Sikhs are, daily, becoming more and more discontented. Some have been dismissed from service, while others have been banished to Hindostan, in particular, the mother of Maharajah Duleep Sing, who has been imprisoned and ill-treated. Such treatment is considered objectionable by all creeds, and both high and low prefer death. God knows what the end will be. Matters are as I have stated. It is for the British to decide. Inform me of their intentions.

Inclosure 14 in No. 44.

*Minute by the Governor-General.*

January 6, 1849.

THE intelligence which I have received, from time to time, of late, from the Resident at Lahore, and from Major Mackeson, in the camp of the Commander-in-chief, has tended to confirm the truth of the report which has recently prevailed, that Dost Mahomed Khan has made his appearance in Peshawur.

The same letters announce, that the Ameer is accompanied by a considerable body of troops; that he has proclaimed his own sovereignty over the Province of Peshawur, and, further, that he has sent letters to the chiefs in the Hazara, and other hill countries, asserting his supremacy, and calling upon them for submission to his authority.

There are, however, so many conflicting statements, the evidence of various parties is so irreconcilable; and the authenticity of the letters which have been received by our officers, is so doubtful, that I am unable yet to satisfy myself of the accuracy of the information given; and I, even yet, doubt whether Dost Mahomed is really in Peshawur.

At the same time, there is quite sufficient to show that it is not improbable that the Ameer is there; and, as his presence there with troops, if unexplained, would not only be an act of hostility against the British Government, but would be calculated to complicate our difficulties, I think it right to act as if I were fully assured of his presence, and to instruct the Resident accordingly.

My object in drawing those instructions will be to compel the Ameer to declare his intentions, and to avow himself, openly, either as friend or foe. I wish to deter him, if possible, from committing any overt act of hostility, which, while it would be a matter of inconvenience to us, in the first instance, must, of necessity, be gravely injurious to himself, in the end; and I shall seek to lead him to act a friendly and useful part in our favor against his enemies, the Sikhs, while I shall give him no reason to suppose that we stand in need of his aid; and I shall avoid compromising the Government by holding out to him promises of future favor, or advantage to himself. I propose, therefore, to request the Resident at Lahore to address a letter on my behalf to Dost Mahomed Khan, at Peshawur, to the following effect.

"The Governor-General has received from various sources a report that His Highness the Ameer Dost Mahomed Khan has left his kingdom of Cabool, and has come to the city of Peshawur, accompanied by a body of his own troops.

"It is even asserted, by some, that the Ameer has proclaimed his own sovereignty at Peshawur, and has called upon the various chiefs to acknowledge, and submit to, his authority. The Province of Peshawur is a portion of the territories of Maharajah Duleep Sing, and by the provisions of treaty, is subject, during the minority of His Highness, to the control and direction of the British Government.

"The Ameer, therefore, who is a Prince of sagacity and experience, well knows that even his presence with an armed force in Peshawur would in itself be an act of hostility towards the British Government, while a proclamation of His Highness's authority there would be nothing less than a distinct and deliberate declaration of war.

"For these reasons, the Governor-General has lent no ear to the reports that he has received, and is unwilling to give any credence to them.

"The Governor-General does not doubt, that the rumour of the Ameer having proclaimed his rule in Peshawur, has been spread by wicked and designing men, enemies of the Ameer, who desire to sow enmity between His Highness and this Government, in order to bring upon His Highness's authority and power those heavy misfortunes which would be involved in that punishment which the British Government would, undoubtedly, inflict on any Prince who had been guilty of such conduct as that which his calumniators are seeking to attribute to His Highness the Ameer.

"The Governor-General is even unwilling to believe, in the absence of any announcement from the Ameer himself, that His Highness has actually come to Peshawur. If the fact be so, a letter is, doubtless, even now upon the way, declaring to the Governor-General the friendly motives and purposes which have prompted the movement which His Highness has made.

"His Highness is aware that the British Government is now engaged in a war with the army and the people of the Sikhs, the bitter enemies of His Highness. He is aware that they are doing their utmost to injure the British power, and that they hold in captivity certain officers, their wives, and children, who have been basely delivered up to them by His Highness's brother, the Sirdar Sooltan Mahomed Khan, in violation of the rights of hospitality, in disregard of the dictates of gratitude, and in defiance of the holiest precepts of the religion he professes.

"The Governor-General is confident that it is to show his disapprobation of such conduct as this, that the Ameer has come; that he has come to proffer to the Governor-General his assistance in punishing the treachery and violence of the Sikhs, his most inveterate foes; that he has come to declare his abhorrence of the faithlessness of Sooltan Mahomed Khan in thus delivering his guests to their enemies, and so bringing dishonor on the family from which he has sprung.

"The Governor-General conceives that these are the causes of His Highness's arrival, but it is not well that there should be doubt between friends. The Governor-General has, therefore, now addressed His Highness, in order to assure him that the British Government desires, now and always, to cultivate friendly relations with the Ameer of Cabool, and that, in now engaging in hostilities against the Sikhs, it has no hostile design whatever against His Highness, against his authorities, or the territories it left in His Highness's possession.



"The Governor-General entertains the confident belief that His Highness, if he has not already done so, will hasten to convey to the Governor-General assurances of the friendly purpose with which he has come, and that he will give substantial proofs of the sincerity of his declarations.

"The Governor-General trusts that such proofs will be promptly given, and that it will not be necessary for him again to prove that, while the British Government ever evinces its gratitude and fidelity to those who show themselves its friends, it never fails to direct against those who act as its enemies, that vast power, of which the Ameer well knows both the resources and the extent."

Inclosure 15 in No. 44.

*Major-General Whish to the Adjutant-General*

*Camp, Mooltan, December 27, 1848*

MY letters of late will, in great measure, have prepared the Commander-in-Chief for my resuming operations on being joined by the Bombay Column, in the mode specified in the accompanying copy of my field-force order of yesterday. Three columns on the left, that is, towards the Seedee-loll-ke-bed, left and right sides of the Mundee Awa, were to be only of demonstration, unless the resistance of the enemy, simultaneously assailed in various parts of their strong intrenchments, encouraged their becoming (as I confidently hoped they would be) real attacks; which, otherwise, was only to be characteristic of the 4th (or right) column; which, half-an-hour later, was to carry the brick-kilns, village of Wuzeerabad, and, if possible, the Amkhas, all of which was effected, without loss.

Providence has been pleased to crown the efforts of this gallant force with complete success, and with but few casualties on our side, as far as my observation went. His Lordship will judge of the satisfaction I felt on visiting, at 2 P.M., the Mundee Awa, where one of the light field batteries of the Bombay force was located, and which, before daybreak, will be substituted by heavy guns and mortars, and insure us the city, in a little time.

I shall, after dispatching this letter, return to the scene of operations, before leaving which, Brigadier Dundas was making a lodgment in the Seedee-loll-ke-bed for his heavy guns, which he had close at hand.

Inclosure 16 in No. 44.

*Division Orders issued to the Mooltan Field Force.*

*Camp, Mooltan, December 26, 1848.*

THE Major-General congratulates the Bengal Field Force on resuming their old position, after three and a-half months' absence, under the auspicious circumstance of being efficiently reinforced by the Bombay Column, under the command of Brigadier the Honorable H. Dundas, C.B., which will join early this afternoon, within twenty-four hours after which, the Major-General hopes to have carried the enemy's posts that are a requisite preliminary to the commencement of a regular attack upon the citadel, to effect which, the following arrangements are ordered for to-morrow.

wing of Her Majesty's 10th Regiment, and a regiment of Native Infantry from the 1st Brigade, will proceed, at a quarter of an hour P.M. precisely, to take possession of the brick kilns to the north-west of camp. Brigadier Cheape will be pleased to attach an engineer officer to the party, and a company or two of Pioneers.

A squadron of cavalry, and four horse artillery guns, will accompany this party, to act according to circumstances. The name of the senior Infantry officer proceeding with this party to be sent to the Assistant Adjutant-General, without delay.

Three companies of Her Majesty's 32nd Regiment, and six companies Native Infantry from the 2nd Brigade, to parade at the advance picket of that brigade, a quarter of an hour before noon, to accompany heavy ordnance to the front. The name of the senior Infantry officer proceeding with this party to be sent to the Assistant Adjutant-General, as soon as practicable.

The portion of the force not ordered on other duties, will be ready to stand to their arms, from noon till dismissed. The regiment in rear of camp (leaving guards for the protection of their lines) will pile arms, in front of the artillery park, at the same hour.

The officer commanding the Bombay division is requested to have prepared two columns, of a wing of European and a regiment of Native Infantry each, accompanied by a squadron of cavalry and light field battery, (or four guns, as he may consider expedient) to each, at 11 A M. The batteries to open on the enemy's positions at Mundee Awa and Seedee-loll-ke-bed, precisely at noon, and to be followed up by the infantry and artillery, according to the effect produced on the enemy, to the taking of those two positions, if facilities offer, for which purpose a company of Sappers should be attached to each column, with intrenching tools, to secure the posts, if taken.

Brigadier Cheape has been requested to attach an engineer officer, acquainted with the ground, to Brigadier the Honorable H. Dundas, C B, for the day's operations.

The column, acting on the left of the Bombay division, should be warned, that Major Edwardes' force cooperates with this attack, on the west of the canal (or large nullah), to whose troops a few of the Bengal cavalry, Regular and Irregular, will be attached, to facilitate their being recognised as allies.

#### Inclosure 17 in No. 44

*Major-General Whish to the Adjutant-General.*

*Camp, Mooltan, December 28, 1848.*

IN furtherance of the letter I had the gratification of forwarding to you yesterday, by express, I beg to report, for the information of his Excellency the Commander-in-Chief, that the force employed performed the duty assigned to it, in the best spirit and style.

The portion on the extreme left was under the immediate command of Brigadier the Honorable H. Dundas, C B., who appointed Brigadier Capon to the charge of the second column of the Bombay division; next to which, was a detail under Lieutenant-Colonel Nash, C B., 72d Native Infantry; and, on the extreme right, (to reach its destination three-quarters of an hour later) was a detachment, under the command of Lieutenant-Colonel Young, Her Majesty's 10th Foot.

The latter was, under any circumstances, to make a real attack upon the enemy's position, as stated in my letter of yesterday, and, in the margin \*, I

\* Left Column.—Brigadier the Honorable H. Dundas, C B., commanding 5 Companies 1st Bombay Fusiliers (Major Mignan), 4th Regiment Bombay Native Infantry Rifles (Major Honner), No 7 Light Field Battery (Captain Turnbull), Squadron Sude Horse (Lieutenant Merewether), 1 Company Sappers (Lieutenant Kendall), Lieutenants Maxwell and Pollard, Bengal Engineers, conducting the column.

Left Centre Column —Brigadier Capon commanding 5 Companies of Her Majesty's 60th Rifles (Major Dennis), 3rd Regiment Bombay Native Infantry (Major Hallett), No 5 Light Field Battery (Captain Bailey); Squadron 1st Bombay Lancers (Captain Curtis), 1 Company Sappers (Lieutenant Walker), Captain Abercrombie, Bengal Engineers, conducting the column.

Right Centre Column —Lieutenant-Colonel Nash, C B., 72nd Native Infantry, commanding 3 Companies of Her Majesty's 32nd (Major Case, commanding), 6 Companies 72nd Native Infantry (Captain Lloyd commanding); 4 guns 4th Troop 3rd Brigade Horse Artillery (Captain Anderson commanding); 3rd Company Pioneers (Lieutenant Gordon commanding).

Right Column —Lieutenant-Colonel Young, Her Majesty's 10th Foot, commanding. 5 Companies of Her Majesty's 10th Foot (Captain Longden commanding); 52nd Regiment Native Infantry (Captain Jamieson commanding), 4 guns 4th Troop 1st Brigade Horse Artillery (Captain Mackenzie commanding), 1 Squadron 11th Irregular Cavalry (Captain Dowson commanding); 2nd Company Sappers (Lieutenant Grindall commanding); Major Napier and Captain Western conducting Engineers.

have specified separately the troops employed under the gallant leaders above named, to whom, as well as to the troops respectively under their immediate command, who so steadily effected the duty assigned to them, I feel much indebted.

It was intended that a portion of the Irregular Force under Major Edwardes, C.B., and Lieutenant Lake, should make a demonstration to the west of the town, and grand canal, at noon. A little delay, however, ensued, but without detriment to the object in view; and I propose, to-morrow, availing myself of the services of those officers and their troops, to relieve the details of the Bombay division, in charge of the Seedee-loil-ke-bed, which has been, with their usual zeal, tendered simultaneously with a requisition I had made, in a private note to Major Edwardes.

The course pursued by the two centre columns came more particularly under my observation, but the gratifying result of all was the acquisition, with but little loss, of the very strong positions designated "Seedee loil-ke-bed," "Mundee Awa," the suburbs east of it, and to the north-east angle of the citadel, the "Amkhas," "Sawun Mull's Tomb," the "Brick Kilns," with strong intrenchments, the "Shumstabreez," or Blue Mosque, the village (or rather Fort) of Wuzzeerabad; all of which the enemy had, evidently, determined to defend manfully, but were deterred, when the time came, by previously witnessing the discomfiture of their friends, from the triple, and earlier, attack, on the left.

I hope, to-morrow morning, to have an 8-inch mortar battery of six pieces playing on the citadel (at five or six hundred yards distance) from the north of the "Shumstabreez."

Inclosure 18 in No. 44.

*Brigadier the Hon H. Dundas, commanding the Bombay Column of Mooltan Field Force, to Major-General Whish.*

*Camp, Mooltan, December 28, 1848.*

I HAVE the honor to inform you that, agreeably to the instructions received from the Assistant Adjutant-General, Bengal division, I moved from camp yesterday, about 11 o'clock, in two columns\*, the right being under the command of Brigadier Capon, the left under my own orders, Brigadier Stalker having the remainder of the division, ready to move in support, as might be required. On leaving camp, the right column proceeded nearly direct to the front, towards the Mundee Awa, guided by Captain Abercrombie, of the Bengal Engineers. On approaching a building named the Ramteerut, Brigadier Capon directed Major Dennis, commanding the 60th Rifles, to extend two companies, and take possession of the building, which was speedily effected, the battery under Captain Bailey opening on the enemy from this point. Having formed line, the 3rd regiment Native Infantry, under the command of Major Hallett, having also thrown out its skirmishers, the advance was made, and the troops advancing with a cheer, which was distinctly heard by the left column, drove the enemy from their intrenchments, and on mounting the Mundee Awa, found it vacated, and, following down on the other side, and on each flank, drove the enemy, through the suburbs, into the city. The object having been obtained, in thus driving the enemy within the city walls, the guns were speedily placed in position, on the mound, keeping up a continued fire on the enemy.

I regret to state that, almost immediately on mounting the summit of the mound, Lieutenant Hill, of the Engineers, was most severely wounded by the bursting of a shrapnell shell, which was thrown from the town; the same shot killing Lieutenant Younghusband, 9th Regiment Native Infantry, and two artillerymen. Captain Bailey also had his arm carried off by a cannon shot; and I have to regret the fall of Major Gordon, of the 60th Royal Rifles, who was killed in command of a party clearing the suburbs. For further details of the movements of

po.  
be p. Right Column.—No. 5 Light Field Battery, 1 squadron 1st Lancers, 5 companies 60th Royal  
Pioneer Column.—No. 7 Light Field Battery, 1 Squadron Sude Horse, 5 Companies 1st Fusiliers,  
A 50th Native Infantry (Rifles), 1 Company Sappers and Miners.

to act accor  
with this part,

the right column, I beg to refer to the report of Brigadier Capon, herewith inclosed, the operations of the left column, which was under my orders, having been so far separated as to preclude me from observing the movements on the right.

Brigadier Capon reports most favorably of the gallantry and good conduct of all under his command, and of the assistance he received from the staff officers attached to him, Captain Tapp, Deputy Assistant Adjutant-General, Captain Stiles, Major of Brigade, Lieutenant Pollexfen, Deputy Assistant Quartermaster-General, and Lieutenant Gordon, 60th Royal Rifles, who acted in the capacity of Aide-de-Camp.

The left column moved from camp, left in front, being guided by Lieutenant Pollard, of the Bengal Engineers.

The ground it had to pass over was very much broken, and intersected with deep nullahs. From the advance of the 4th Regiment Native Infantry, Rifles, having crossed the first nullah too much to the left of where a practicable road had been cut, some time was lost in getting across, and, the enemy's advanced pickets being distinctly seen, I ordered the advanced guard to extend, and, as soon as the 4th Rifles had got disentangled from the nullahs, I ordered the skirmishers to advance, and drive in the enemy, which was speedily effected. The column moved on to the left, till the head had passed the left of the old intrenchments, when I halted the 1st Bombay Fusiliers, under the command of Major Leeson, forming in the parallel, and the 4th Native Infantry (Rifles) lying down under a bank, in front of a white building or mosque. The battery, under the command of Captain Turnbull, and personal superintendence of Major Leeson, was placed in line, on, opposite a mound, which I understand was the "Seedee-lol-ke-bed," on into it opened, the enemy immediately retiring. A few rounds were, then, fired at the mosque, which was occupied by the enemy, and I directed Major Honner, commanding the 4th Native Infantry (Rifles), to advance against it, throwing forward his left, and thus take it in reverse. Nothing could exceed the steadiness and good conduct of the 4th Native Infantry (Rifles), who, moving in extended order, rapidly drove the enemy from the mosque, and also from another large one, with adjoining buildings, where the enemy had two guns, but which, in retiring, they succeeded in carrying off with them. A general advance, then, took place, the 1st Bombay Fusiliers passing the mound to the right, and the 4th Native Infantry to the left. The guns were moved, as speedily as the nature of the ground would admit, to the top of the mound, from which I had been led to believe a view of the city could be had, but, on arriving there, I found another mound in front, and a third again beyond that. The troops kept gradually advancing over very difficult and strong ground, driving the enemy from every point at which he attempted to make a stand, the 1st Fusiliers pursuing them, through a deserted village, into the suburbs, and the 4th Rifles following them, and driving them out of a large inclosure called the Beegee Bagh, and quite into the suburbs. The guns were, by very great exertion, and the active assistance of the Sappers and Miners, under Lieutenant Kendall, placed in position in the Seedee-lol-ke-bed, from which, however, the city wall was scarcely perceptible, and the distance too great, for the fire of the artillery to produce any great effect. While the guns were being brought up to the hill, a retrograde movement was made by the troops, which had been occasioned by the 4th Rifles having imprudently advanced too far, and having expended their ammunition.

It was, at this time, that the greatest number of casualties occurred in that regiment, but the Fusiliers, falling back gradually, and keeping up a steady fire, checked the advance of the enemy, and covered the retreat of the 4th Rifles.

Both regiments having formed under the hill, the ammunition was replenished, when I directed the Fusiliers to move to the right, and drive the enemy from the deserted village, which was speedily done, the regiment forming under cover of the buildings, the front being covered by their skirmishers. The 4th Rifles re-occupied the Beegee Bagh; and, the object of the attack having been attained, in serving to distract the enemy, I did not consider any good could arise from a further advance. The troops maintained this position until dark, a constant cannonade being kept up from the battery.

Captain Woosnam joined, in the afternoon, with the heavy guns; and two 18-pounders were placed in position on the right of the field battery. All the ammunition of the field battery having been expended, and there being no more of that calibre (9-pounder) in the park, I ordered the battery to return to camp, their place being supplied by the troop of Horse Artillery, under Major Blood. A rein-

forcement of one wing of the 19th Native Infantry under Major Mant, and two companies of the Fusiliers, which I had sent for, arriving in the afternoon, I directed the former to relieve the 4th Rifles in the "Beegee Bagh," the latter regiment being, then, formed in the rear and right of that inclosure, and the two companies of Fusiliers, under cover of an adjoining building. The Beegee Bagh being very extensive, and thickly studded with trees, I deemed it advisable to retire from it at dark, the Sappers having taken the precaution to make several large openings in the wall, to facilitate the re-occupation of it, if necessary. I, then, took up a position to the rear, the left being thrown back, and resting on the large mosque, and the right extending to the right of the "Seedee-lol-ke-bed." The enemy kept up a fire of matchlocks, during the greater part of the night, but without doing any mischief.

I have great pleasure in expressing the satisfaction I experienced at the conduct of the troops. The conduct of the 1st Bombay Fusiliers was most excellent, frequently charging the enemy with the bayonet, and driving him within the city walls. The steadiness and good order in which the 4th Rifles moved over very difficult ground, deserves every commendation. The conduct of the 19th Regiment in maintaining its position in the Beegee Bagh, against all attempts of the enemy to get possession of it, was everything I could wish. The Sindie Horse, under Lieutenant Merewether, were always at hand, ready to support, but the ground was most unfavorable for the movements of cavalry, and, whenever a few showed themselves, the enemy immediately retired.

I had reason to be satisfied with the assistance I received from the officers of the 1st Bombay Fusiliers, Major Green, the Assistant Adjutant-General, Captain Ramsay, the Assistant Quartermaster-General, Captain Skinner, the Deputy Judge-Advocate-General, Captain Threshie, the Assistant Commissary-General, Captain Morse, Superintendent of Bazaars. Major Leeson, in command of the artillery, was indefatigable in his exertions, and the conduct of all ranks of that arm was most exemplary. Major Scott, the commanding Engineer, also afforded me very valuable assistance, particularly in superintending the work of the sappers. Lieutenant Ward, my Aide-de-Camp, and Captain Auchmuty, Lieutenant Henry, 19th Regiment Native Infantry, and Lieutenant Loch, of the 1st Lancers (Junior), who also accompanied me, rendered every assistance. I beg to inclose a return of killed and wounded, which I regret to say is rather large, but am happy to add, that no officer was hurt with the left column.

#### Inclosure 19 in No. 44

*Brigadier D. Capon, commanding 1st Infantry Brigade of Bombay Column,  
Mooltan Field Force, to Major Green, Assistant Adjutant-General.*

*Camp, Mooltan, December 28, 1848.*

HAVING received orders to proceed as near as possible to a high mound, about two miles in front of the Camp, and there continue a cannonade, for some time, from a light Field Battery, as a feint, taking advantage of any opportunity to rush on, and seize the mound, known by the name of "Mundee Awa," I marched at 11 A.M. on the 27th instant, in the following order, Captain Abercrombie, Bengal Engineers, conducting the column.

5 companies of the 60th Royal Rifles in quarter distance column of companies, strength as per margin,\* Major Dennis commanding.

No. 5 Light Field Battery complete, in column of divisions, commanded by Captain Bailey, and attended by a company of Sappers and Miners under Lieutenant Walker.

The 3rd Regiment Native Infantry, Major Hallett commanding, in quarter distance column, while a squadron of Lancers, under the personal command of Brigadier Poole, covered both flanks, and kept up a communication with the Camp in rear.

Having proceeded about a mile, as nearly as the ground would admit, in the

\* 2 Field Officers, 3 Captains, 10 Subalterns, 18 Sergeants, 10 Buglers, and 420 Rank and File.

above order, I caused two companies of the 60th Rifles to extend, and cover the front, and so advanced about a quarter of a mile, when the enemy's round shot beginning to pass through the extended ranks, I directed that a large building, then about 600 yards in front, should be taken possession of by the advanced skirmishers, which was done, under a discharge of round shot and shrapnell from the town, fortunately with no other loss than one private of the 60th Rifles killed, and one wounded, at the same time, the 3rd Regiment Native Infantry was ordered to open out, to wheeling distance. The excellent fire of the Riflemen, in, and about, the building, soon subdued that of the enemy's skirmishers, and I, then, ordered the battery to take ground to itself, and open its fire on the mound "Mundee Awa," and the intermediate space about 700 yards, thus carrying into effect the orders I had received to make a feint. Having fired about twenty minutes, the enemy's fire was continued only by some old intrenchments. I, then, decided on a general advance, under cover of skirmishers, both from the 60th Royal Rifles, and 3rd Regiment Native Infantry, the battery following in the rear, and the Cavalry disposing of itself, as it best might, under the unfavorable nature of the ground. A general rush forward to the mound, with a cheer, now took place, the two Infantry Regiments being nearly in the same line. The enemy fled towards the suburbs, over, and to the left of, the mound, which, on being taken, was found evacuated. The greater part of the 60th Rifles followed the enemy over the mound into the suburbs, I remaining on it, with my staff and a small party of that Regiment. At this time, the 3rd Regiment was actively engaged to the left of the mound, pursuing the enemy, which had taken shelter in a mosque, and under hedges and walls. Here they charged the enemy, and drove them into the city. I then sent orders for its recall, lest the main object, the possession of "Mundee Awa," should be hazarded.

I, also, recalled from the suburbs the 60th Royal Rifles, and directed the light field battery to be brought into position on the mound, which was done, as soon as a road could be cut by the Sappers and Miners. I, also, detached Lieutenant Forbes, of the 1st Cavalry (Lancers), to camp, for reinforcements. In the meantime, observing the approach of part of the Bengal column, on my right, I agreed to the suggestion of Captain Abercrombie, that the suburbs should be held in front, and on both flanks of the mound, as far as possible.

A re-occupation of the suburbs was made, without much resistance, by the 60th Royal Rifles, and part of the 3rd Regiment of Native Infantry, in conjunction with a portion of the Bengal column, consisting of three companies of Her Majesty's 32nd Regiment, under the command of Major Inglis, and part of the 51st Bengal Native Infantry, under the command of Major Finnis. About this time, a shrapnell shell from the town burst over one of the 9-pounder guns, which had commenced to answer the fire from the town, killing Lieutenant Younghusband, 9th Regiment Native Infantry, my acting Aide-de-Camp, and two Artillerymen, and wounding severely Lieutenant Hill, field engineer to the Bombay column, who had accompanied the attack. The 9-pounder guns soon succeeded in silencing the enemy's howitzer or mortar, and only round shot were subsequently fired at the mound, with little effect, save in one instance, when Captain Bailey, commanding the Artillery, had his arm carried off, and an Artilleryman, since dead, was severely wounded. I regret to add that, previous to this, Major Gordon, of the 60th Royal Rifles, when in command of a party clearing the suburbs, in front of the mound, fell mortally wounded by a matchlock ball fired from one of the houses, when crossing an open space; no other casualty of the sort occurring, owing to the steadiness and skill of the men in taking advantage of every cover during the advance. Having examined the position taken up, I found, on my return, that a reinforcement, consisting of a wing of the 9th Regiment Native Infantry, had arrived from camp. A chain of posts was, then, established in the suburbs, and a sharp fire was kept up by the enemy during the night, happily without doing any injury. The following officers were directed by Brigadier the Hon H Dundas, C.B., to accompany me as my staff, in addition to my personal staff.—Captain Stiles, Major of Brigade, and Lieutenant Gordon, 60th Royal Rifles, permitted to act as my aide-de-camp whenever required with the brigade:—Captain Tapp, Deputy Assistant Adjutant-General, Lieutenant Pollexfen, Deputy Assistant Quartermaster-General, Lieutenant Younghusband, 9th Regiment Native Infantry, who volunteered his services as Aide-de-Camp on the occasion. The whole of the above were most zealous and efficient in effecting the arrangements required.

In conclusion, I beg to add, that nothing could exceed the gallantry and discipline of the 60th Royal Rifles, and the alacrity in moving forward of the 3rd Regiment Native Infantry. The exertions of the artillerymen on the battery were unremitting. The reinforcement, composed of a wing of the 9th Regiment Native Infantry, under Major Bellasis, was chiefly employed in guarding the battery, and in working parties, during the night, in which their zeal was conspicuous.

Brigadier Poole's arrangements were most judicious, but the nature of the ground did not admit of cavalry being actively employed.

*Lost of Killed, Wounded, and Missing, in the Bombay Column of the Field Force under the command of Brigadier the Honorable H. Dundas, C.B., in the Action of the 27th of December, 1848*

*Camp before Mooltan, December 30, 1848.*

General and Brigade Staff—1 officer, killed.

Artillery Brigade—4th Company 2nd Battalion Artillery, with No 5 Light Field Battery—2 rank and file, 2 horses, killed, 1 European officer, 9 rank and file, 1 syce, 2 horses, wounded

1st Company 4th Battalion Golundaze, with No 7 Light Field Battery—1 syce, 2 horses, killed.

Total—2 rank and file, 1 syce, 4 horses, killed, 1 European officer, 9 rank and file, 1 syce, 2 horses, wounded

1st Infantry Brigade—Her Majesty's 60th Royal Rifles—1 European officer, 2 rank and file, killed, 2 European officers, 10 rank and file, wounded

3rd Regiment Native Infantry—3 European officers, 1 Native officer, 1 havildar, 17 rank and file, wounded

9th Regiment Native Infantry—1 rank and file, wounded

Total—1 European officer, 2 rank and file, killed, 5 European officers, 1 Native officer, 1 havildar, 28 rank and file, wounded

2nd Infantry Brigade—1st Bombay European Regiment, Fusiliers—1 rank and file, killed, 1 European officer, 1 serjeant, 1 drummer, 24 rank and file, 1 horse, wounded

4th Regiment Native Infantry, Rifles—1 havildar, 4 rank and file, killed, 19 rank and file, wounded, 18 rank and file, missing

Total—1 havildar, 5 rank and file, killed, 1 European officer, 1 serjeant, 1 drummer, 43 rank and file, 1 horse, wounded, 18 rank and file, missing

Engineer Department—1st and 4th Companies Sappers and Miners—1 rank and file, killed, 1 European officer, 5 rank and file, wounded.

Grand Total—2 European officers, 1 havildar, 10 rank and file, 1 syce, 4 horses, killed, 8 European officers, 1 Native officer, 1 serjeant, 1 havildar, 1 drummer, 85 rank and file, 1 syce, 3 horses, wounded; 18 rank and file, missing

*Officers killed and wounded*

Brigade Staff—Lieutenant Younghusband, 9th Regiment Native Infantry, acting Aide-de-Camp to Brigadier Capon, commanding 1st Infantry Brigade, killed.

4th Company 2nd Battalion Artillery—Captain Bailey, commanding No. 5 Light Field Battery, left arm amputated

Her Majesty's 60th Rifles—Major Gordon, killed, Major Dennis, slightly wounded, Second Lieutenant Brooke, slightly wounded.

3rd Regiment Native Infantry—Lieutenant Dyett, Ensigns Shaw and Napier, and 1 Jemadar, wounded

1st Fusiliers—Lieutenant W. M. Mules, slightly wounded, Lieutenant and Adjutant Daly's horse shot through the chest, not killed.

Engineer Department—Lieutenant J. Hill, severely wounded.

## Inclosure 20 in No. 44.

*Major Edwardes to Major-General Whish.**Camp, Beegee Bagh-i-Nigh, December 29, 1848.*

AGREEABLY to the instructions of yesterday, the forces of Lieutenant Lake and myself relieved the Bombay division, of the charge of the Seedee-loll-ke-Bed, and all the posts on the left of it (including Beegee-bagh, the village of Daira, Jog, Marjah &c.,) at 3 P.M. yesterday evening.

We remained undisturbed during the night, but were attacked about 1 P.M., to-day, by 2000 of the enemy, almost all foot, and chiefly regulars, among whom the Kuthar Mookhee deserters were conspicuous.

They issued from the Delhi Gate, filed behind the suburbs in front of the Seedee-loll-ke-Bed, and made their appearance suddenly on our left front, pushing boldly on into the gardens which were unoccupied, and opening a heavy musketry fire from behind the walls, a position, however, from which they were rapidly dislodged by our Rohillas and other irregulars, aided by two companies of General Cortlandt's regiments, who expelled them, and followed them up to the city walls.

Lieutenant Lake, at the head of his own men, Lieutenant Pollock with mine, Lieutenant Pearse, of the Madras Artillery, foremost with the Daood-potras, and Lieutenant Young of the engineers, wherever the presence of a European officer could be useful, were all, actively and most gallantly, engaged in this little affair, as was also Mr Quin with the Soorooj Mookhee company, and a new volunteer, Mr MacMahon, who earned his title to be brought especially to your notice, by encountering, in single combat, the leader of the enemy's infantry, a powerful Sikh, whom he killed with one blow which divided his head.

## Inclosure 21 in No. 44

*Major-General Whish to the Adjutant-General.**Camp, Mooltan, December 30, 1848.*

I WAS in hopes yesterday of being able to forward a complete casualty list in reference to our attacks of the 27th instant, and trust nothing will prevent my doing so to-morrow

I have the gratification, now, of reporting to you, for the information of his Excellency the Commander-in-Chief, that, by a shell from one of the mortars of the battery mentioned in my letter of the 28th instant (laid on the occasion by Lieutenant Newall, Bengal Artillery), the enemy's principal magazine in the citadel was blown up at 9 A.M., and the grand Mu-jid so appropriated completely destroyed, with many houses and other buildings in its vicinity. The sight was awfully grand, and precisely similar to that at the siege of Hattrass on the 1st of March, 1817. I hope the consequence may be the same, in which case the enemy would abandon the fort to-night, otherwise I contemplate assaulting the city to-morrow

Our batteries are as follows —

Six 8-inch mortars	- - - -	opened on the 28th
Three 10-inch ditto	- - - -	ditto
Four 5½-inch ditto	- - - -	ditto
Six 18-pounders, on the Khoonee Boory-	- - - -	29th
Two 8-inch howitzers,	} with the mortars in the first line, 29th.	
Two 10-inch ditto,		
Two 24-pounders,		

And five 8-inch mortars are now being laid down near the three 10-inch mortars.



## Inclosure 22 in No. 44.

*Major-General Whish to the Adjutant-General.**Camp, Mooltan, December 31, 1848.*

THE fire from the citadel was quite subdued yesterday. This morning a small gun has been occasionally used, but the enemy appear to have gone into the city, where a few of them keep up a smart matchlock fire on our breaching batteries. We have no accounts that can be depended upon, as the gates of the city and citadel are closed, and neither ingress nor egress permitted. On looking just now at the progress of the breaches, more battering appeared necessary.

Not having yet been able to get the return of casualties on the 27th instant, from the Bombay division, I inclose that of the Bengal troops employed on the occasion, and am glad to state that many cases of the wounded men are very slight

*Return of Casualties,—Bengal Division, December 27, 1848.*

4th Troop 1st Brigade Horse Artillery—1 horse killed; 1 man, 1 horse, wounded

Her Majesty's 10th Foot, five companies—2 men killed, 4 men wounded.

Her Majesty's 32nd Foot, six companies—2 men killed, 2 European officers, 17 men, wounded

51st Native Infantry—1 European officer, 9 men, wounded

52nd Native Infantry—1 man killed; 1 European officer, 14 men, wounded.

72nd Native Infantry, six companies—7 men killed, 3 European officers, 2 Native officers, 20 men, wounded

*Names of Officers wounded.*

Lieutenant-Colonel Nash, 72nd Native Infantry.

Major Case, Her Majesty's 32nd, severely.

Lieutenant Straubenzee, Her Majesty's 32nd, severely.

Lieutenant Tyrwhitt, 51st Native Infantry

Lieutenant Playfair, 52nd Native Infantry, dangerously.

Lieutenant Gillon, 72nd Native Infantry, dangerously

Ensign Mac Dougall, 72nd Native Infantry

N B.—Three companies, Her Majesty's 32nd and the 51st Native Infantry, went down as a reinforcement to the right centre column, at 2 P.M. for occupation of the suburbs.

## Inclosure 23 in No. 44.

*Major-General Whish to the Adjutant-General.**Camp, Mooltan, January 2, 1849.*

THE army I have had under my command, since the junction of the Bombay reinforcements, has effected, in a week, the reduction of the fortified city of Mooltan, and made the interior of the citadel a wreck. The former was taken by assault this afternoon, after the most obstinate resistance, and, at half-past three P.M. I had the satisfaction of seeing the British standard wave on its walls, having been planted there by the 1st Fusiliers that formed the advance of the left column. In making this report to you, for the information of the Commander-in-Chief, I beg to say that I shall take the earliest opportunity of entering into particulars, and, in the meantime, would offer his Lordship my best congratulations on the success Divine Providence has been pleased to grant to our arms, and, as I have at present every reason to believe, with comparatively but little loss

## Inclosure 24 in No. 44.

*Field-Force Orders issued by Major-General Whish.**Camp, Mooltan, January 2, 1849*

It being the Major-General's intention to assault the city to-day, it will be effected by two columns, constituted as follows

From the Bengal Division—

Her Majesty's 32nd Regiment; 49th Regiment, Native Infantry, 72nd Regiment, Native Infantry, right column, under the command of Brigadier Markham

From the Bombay Division—

1st Bombay Fusiliers, 4th Bombay Native Infantry (Rifles), 19th Regiment Bombay Native Infantry, left column, under the command of Brigadier Stalker, C B

Each column to be conducted by an officer of Engineers, and to be accompanied by a serjeant and 12 artillerymen, furnished with gun spikes, and to have a complete company of sappers and pioneers in attendance

The columns will leave their respective lines at noon precisely, and halt in the vicinity of the "Mundee Awa"

The troops now on duty there, and in the suburbs between it (the Amkhas inclusive), augmented, on either flank, by two guns of horse artillery and a squadron of cavalry, (the Bombay division providing for the left, and the Bengal division for the right), will form the reserve, under the command of Brigadier Hervey

Brigadier the Honorable H Dundas is requested to send the Sinde Horse to Bukurabad, at noon, with two guns of horse artillery, and Brigadier Salter will detach a regiment of Irregular Cavalry, towards the north-west angle of the fort, Major Garbett placing two horse artillery guns at his disposal to accompany the same. One resallah to be told off to the guns, with orders not to quit them on any account

Officers commanding columns will be furnished with particular instructions for their guidance, and outline plans of the city

Officers commanding companies to be impressed with the necessity of preventing their men separating, in search of plunder, or on any other pretext.

The camps will be under charge of Brigadiers Capon and Salter respectively, who will order the troops in them to stand to their arms from 1 P M.

## Inclosure 25 in No. 44.

*Major-General Whish to the Adjutant-General.**Camp, Mooltan, January 7, 1849.*

HAVING now received the report of the Bombay column, during the assault of the city, on the 2nd instant, I have the honor of forwarding that received from Brigadier Markham on the 3rd instant, and associating with it the letter of this date received from Brigadier the Honorable H. Dundas, C.B., commanding the Bombay division of the Field Force, both of which I shall be obliged by your submitting to the Commander-in-Chief.

The steady advance of both columns, under their respective commanders, Brigadier Stalker, C B., and Brigadier Markham (which, as regarded that under the latter, was but temporarily checked from the necessity of entering the city by the left breach) insured the early realization of what each had been directed to aim at, and by sunset the city was in complete possession of our gallant troops, whose conduct throughout was remarkable for humanity to the unarmed inhabitants they occasionally met, and not less so for the severity with which the opposition of the enemy was overcome from street to street, many of which were narrow and intricate, and several barricaded.

In the letters accompanying, the gallantry and good services of various cers are particularized, and, on the fall of the citadel, it will be my pleasing duty to take up that strain regarding many. It will, however, be better timed, now, to mention the spirited proposition, on the 1st instant, of Lieutenant-Colonel Franks, C.B., to escalate the citadel, during the assault of the city, provided I placed 500 of each regiment of the 1st brigade, under his command. After due consideration

of this suggestion, I deemed it most eligible to forego it, as I had not time to examine into the difficulties that might have attended it, nor would the hour fixed for the assault have been auspicious, unless I had deferred it till dawn of the 3rd.

Brigadier Stalker has brought to Brigadier Dundas's notice the conduct of Colour-Sergeant J. Bennet, 1st Fusiliers, on the 2nd instant; and I cannot forbear my testimony to the joyful feelings which it excited in myself, and the officers of the staff around me, when noticing his planting the British standard in the crest of the breach, and maintaining it there, in the midst of the musketry fire of the enemy, until the troops had passed.

The troops of the Bombay column suffered much from an explosion, during the night, of a magazine in the city.

I beg to inclose casualty lists, of which the total of each column is as follows —

Bengal Division—3 European rank and file, and 1 Native rank and file, killed, 3 European officers, 1 serjeant, 17 rank and file, and 6 Native rank and file, wounded

Bombay Division—4 European rank and file, and 22 Native rank and file, killed, 8 European officers, 4 serjeants, 51 rank and file, and 2 Native officers, 5 havildars, 121 rank and file, wounded, 1 Native rank and file, missing

Total—7 European rank and file, and 23 Native rank and file, killed, 11 European officers, 5 serjeants, 78 European rank and file, and 2 Native officers, 5 havildars, and 127 rank and file, wounded; 1 Native rank and file missing.

Grand Total—Killed, 30; wounded, 218; missing, 1;—total, 249.

#### *Names of Officers Wounded.*

##### *Bengal Column.*

Her Majesty's 32nd Foot—Captain J. D. C. Smyth, slightly wounded, Captain C. T. King, slightly wounded.

Engineers—Lieutenant Garforth, M.B., dangerously wounded.

##### *Bombay Column.*

1st Fusiliers—Captain R. W. Leith, dangerously wounded; Lieutenant W. Gray, dangerously wounded; Lieutenant E. Dansey, wounded; Lieutenant G. E. Herne, wounded; Second Lieutenant E. A. Law, wounded.

4th Rifles—Lieutenant T. S. Warden, wounded.

19th Native Infantry—Ensign J. Gordon, wounded.

Engineers—Lieutenant J. A. Fuller, wounded

Inclosure 26 in No. 44.

#### *Brigadier Markham to Major-General Whish.*

*Camp, Mooltan, January 3, 1849.*

ACCORDING to division orders, at 1 o'clock on the 2nd, I proceeded with the brigade under my command to the Mundee Awa, the point of rendezvous with the left column. At 2 o'clock we received orders to proceed to the Delhi gate, from whence the assault was to be made. At a quarter past 3 o'clock, a salvo being fired from the Delhi gate battery (the signal agreed upon for the assault), the leading companies of Her Majesty's 32nd Regiment, under Captain Smyth, commanding the Grenadier Company, moved on to storm the breach. Upon passing the broken ground and ruined outworks of the gate, under a heavy fire of matchlocks, they descended a deep hollow, and found, to their surprise, the city wall in front, about 30 feet in height, unbreached, and totally impracticable, being fairly concealed from view, from the nature of the ground, until directly upon it.

Captain Smyth immediately, and with great judgment and promptitude, decided upon retiring, and rejoined the column, with the loss of several men, which loss, however, would have been very seriously increased, both to the leading companies and the column, had there been any hesitation on his part.

I proceeded, at once, to the breach at the Khoonee Boorj, which I found had already been entered by the left column, and made our way down the ramparts

and streets on our right to the Delhi gate, and from thence to that part of the city close to the Dowlut gate, and directly in front of the fort.

The enemy offered considerable opposition in the narrow streets, and on the ramparts, which were strongly barricaded; but the troops carried all before them, and, before dark, that part of the city was in our possession, and we connected our posts with those thrown out from the left column.

To Colonel Brooke, Major Lloyd, and Captain Lloyd, in command of regiments, and to all under my command, both officers and men, I have to return my thanks, for their steadiness and prompt obedience throughout to my orders.

To Major Napier, of the engineers, who accompanied me, I am deeply indebted, for the very valuable services he rendered me, throughout the afternoon.

*Return of Casualties, &c, in 2nd Infantry Brigade (Bengal division), on the 2nd of January, 1849.*

*Camp, Mooltan, January 3, 1849*

Her Majesty's 32nd Regiment—3 rank and file, killed, 2 European officers, 1 serjeant, 1 drummer, 16 rank and file, wounded

48th Native Infantry—1 rank and file, wounded.

72nd Native Infantry—1 rank and file, killed, 5 rank and file, wounded

Captains J. D. Smyth and C. T. King, Her Majesty's 32nd Regiment, wounded.

Total—4 killed, 26 wounded

*Inclosure 27 in No 44*

*Brigadier the Hon H Dundas to Brevet Captain G P Whish, Assistant Adjutant-General, Bengal Column*

*Camp, Mooltan, January 7, 1849*

I FORWARD the report of Brigadier Stalker, C B, commanding the 2nd brigade Bombay division, which was engaged in storming the city of Mooltan on the afternoon of the 2nd instant.

The brigade, formed in three columns, as directed in the instructions from the Assistant Adjutant-General, assembled in rear of the Mundee Awa, and, about 3 P.M., moved down to storm the left trench at the angle of the Khoonee Boorj.

The storming party, headed by Captain Leith, of the 1st Bombay Fusiliers, speedily mounted the breach, but, on arriving at the summit, found some difficulty in descending, the enemy having re-trenched the breach, and dug deep ditches, into which several of the leading men and officers fell. The obstacles to the advance of the party having been overcome, the column, having succeeded in passing the trench, pushed on to the ramparts, and streets of the town, through a very narrow passage, by the aid of some scaling ladders, placed against a house by a party of Bengal sappers, under Lieutenant Oliphant. I regret to state that, soon after mounting the breach, Captain Leith was severely wounded; and Lieutenant Gray, taking command of the party, moved to the right towards the Delhi Gate, to clear away obstacles between the breach and that point at which it was intended the Bengal column should enter.

Major Mignan, with the 1st column, moved to the left, clearing the ramparts, while the columns under Major Mant and Major Honner, pushing for the centre of the town, established themselves in the grain market.

The narrowness of the streets rendering the preservation of regular formation impossible, the enemy was followed up by the troops, in the best mode in which they could move, and without giving him time to halt, until the town was completely carried, and the several columns established; the left having succeeded in reaching the Lahore gate.

Brigadier Stalker speaks most highly of the conduct of the troops, and nothing can be more honorable to their character than the humanity and kind treatment shown by them towards the unoffending inhabitants.

I have great pleasure in bringing to the notice of the Major-General the conduct of Major Mignan, commanding the 1st Fusiliers; Major Mant, commanding the 19th Regiment; and Brevet-Major Honner, commanding the 4th Native Infantry (Rifles). Brigadier Stalker also reports most favorably of the conduct of Major Hobson, 1st Fusiliers, and of the assistance he received from Captain Tapp, Deputy-Assistant Adjutant-General, who was unfortunately wounded in capturing a gun, Captain Hart, Major of Brigade, Lieutenant Pollexfen, Deputy-Assistant Quartermaster-General, and Lieutenant Henry, of the 19th Regiment Native Infantry, Postmaster to the division. To the commanding Engineer, Major Scott, every praise is due, for his untiring exertions during the operation; as well as to the several officers of that corps employed with the Bombay division. The conduct of Captain Leith, Lieutenants Dansey, Daly, Gray, and Mules is particularly noticed by Brigadier Stalker. I am sorry to add that Lieutenant Gray was severely wounded, after entering the town, and lost his right arm. Lieutenants Dansey, Herne, and Law, are also among the wounded, as also Lieutenant Warden, of the 4th Rifles, and Ensign Gordon, of the 19th Regiment Native Infantry.

Several acts of gallantry have been brought to my notice, particularly on the part of Colour-Sergeant Bennet, of the 1st Fusiliers, which I shall take an opportunity of reporting to the proper quarter.

The suburbs between the Delhi gate and the left breach were occupied by pickets from the 1st brigade, under Major Dennis, 60th Rifles; a company of the 60th Rifles, under Captain Douglas, being stationed in the houses opposite the breach, in the Khoonee Boorj, to cover the advance of the storming party, and two companies, under Captains Young and Sibthorpe, to cover the advance of the Bengal column.

Returns of casualties are herewith inclosed.

#### Inclosure 28 in No. 44.

*Brigadier F Stalker, C B, commanding 2nd Infantry Brigade, Bombay Column, to the Assistant Adjutant-General, Bombay Column, Mooltan Field Force*

*Camp before Mooltan, January 7, 1849.*

I DO myself the honor to report, for the information of Brigadier the Honorable H. Dundas, C.B., commanding the Bombay column, Mooltan Field Force, that, on the afternoon of the 2nd of January, the brigade under my command was formed, in the order laid down for them, under cover, within about two hundred yards of the breach, the approach to which was fully exposed to a fire from musketry and zumboorahs.

The column gained the top of the breach at about  $\frac{1}{4}$  past 3 P.M., with much regularity, under a very galling fire, but, when they reached the summit, found themselves in a sort of inclosure, from which there was only one regular exit, by a narrow lane on the right, and over a low house into the Khoonee Boorj.

The enemy had excavated a trench parallel to the breach, which contracted the space still more: the nature of the ground, therefore, rendered it utterly impossible to preserve any regular formation, and the officers pushed on with the men nearest them, to carry out, as far as possible, the instructions to advance in three columns. The column was detained, nearly twenty minutes, by the obstacles at the top of the breach. The leading column of three companies of the Fusiliers, having lost their commander, Captain Leith, who was dangerously wounded soon after crossing the breach, pushed down the lane to the right, under Lieutenant Gray, and was in part the cause of the enemy abandoning the Khoonee Boorj. It fortunately happened that two short ladders were procured, and placed by the Bengal Sappers, under Lieutenant Oliphant, against the house on the left, just as the enemy found their communication with the town threatened, they were, therefore, obliged to defend both the lane and the tower, and their resistance was, consequently less energetic. As soon as the ladders were placed, the column which

had to advance by the ramparts to the south pushed its way along for some distance, but fortunately followed the retreating enemy along one of the streets, which eventually led them to the end of the town, near the Lahore gate. A company being left at this point, the column returned along the streets nearest the ramparts to the Bohur Gate, where it remained during the night, as it was known that the Pak Gate was in possession of the Bengal 72nd, and a company of the 4th Rifles was sent back to the Hurun gate. During the night, one of the enemy's powder magazines, close to the gateway, blew up, burying several of our men in the ruins. It was impossible to guard against such an accident, indeed, it is only surprising it was the only one on the south side; for the enemy's ammunition was lying about in great quantities, and there was nothing to distinguish their magazines from the other houses. In the morning, Lieutenants Pollard and Maxwell, with the Bengal Sappers, removed a considerable quantity of powder from another magazine, close to a burning house, and threw it over the wall, where it exploded without doing any mischief.

The proceedings of the other column were similar. They all pushed quite through the town, left parties in advance posts, and retired to more open ground in the centre of the town.

When the left column, which was intended to go by the ramparts, and leave guards at the gates, had struck into the town, an application was made to Colonel Dundas, who sent two companies of Her Majesty's 60th Rifles to hold the gates.

The other columns had, however, exceeded their instructions; for a company of the 72nd Bengal Native Infantry had crossed the town, and obtained possession of the Pak, and the road to the Hurun gates, before the 60th Rifles arrived.

The Pak gate was cleared during the night by the Bengal Sappers, the Hurun gate by the Bombay Sappers, and the Bohur gate was nearly opened, when the explosion took place, which rendered it impossible to go on. It was opened, next morning, by the Bengal Sappers.

It is quite impossible to say where the engineer officers were. The troops were so scattered by the narrow lanes, that there were no distinct columns. The only real guide was to follow the retreating enemy, which was done. Not only are the ramparts so incomplete as to render a passage round them by a column of men quite impracticable, but the parts which are complete were, at the time of the assault, crossed by traverses, and cut up by small trenches.

The night closed, before the communication between the different bodies could be effected, but, by morning, the troops were in communication with each other.

It is to be regretted that we had not a couple of hours daylight, as we should then have, probably, avoided the explosion of the magazine; but the town was as completely cleared of the enemy by dark, as it is at the present moment.

The steady and well-directed fire of Her Majesty's 60th Rifles kept down that of the enemy very considerably, while the troops were approaching the breach, and a discharge of grape thrown on the top of the breach by Lieutenant Keir, Bombay Artillery, just over the heads of the Fusiliers, as they advanced, was of the utmost advantage to us; but when the top was gained, and our men became mingled with the enemy, the fate of the day depended on the steadiness and courage of the Fusiliers, and both men and officers answered nobly to the call.

Where all behaved so well, and the operations were on such an extended scale, it would be impossible for me to particularize each act of gallantry. I would therefore beg to refer the Brigadier commanding the division to the report of officers commanding regiments and posts, and merely mention such as came under my notice.

The gallantry of the following officers was conspicuous—Captain Tapp, Deputy Assistant-Adjutant-General, attached to my staff, who was wounded in capturing a gun on our first entering the town, whereby I was early deprived of his valuable assistance.

Captain Leith, 1st Fusiliers, commanding the storming party, who was very severely wounded; and Lieutenants Daly and Mules, 1st Fusiliers.

I would also bring to special notice the conduct of Colour Serjeant John Bennet, 1st Fusiliers, who volunteered to accompany the storming party, and, rushing up the breach, planted the union jack on its crest, standing beside it, until the whole brigade had passed. The colour and staff are riddled with balls.

I beg to mention the names of Major Mignan, commanding 1st Fusiliers; Major Mant, commanding 19th Regiment Native Infantry; Major Honner, commanding 4th Rifles; and Major Hobson, 1st Fusiliers; all of whom exerted themselves to the utmost, and were most successful in their different arrangements.

To Major Scott, commanding Engineer, I am particularly indebted, for his able assistance and untiring zeal, throughout the operations.

My best thanks are also due to the following Engineer officers, for the zeal and activity they displayed in the different duties on which they were employed:

Captain Abercrombie and Lieutenant Taylor, and other officers of the Bengal Engineers, whose names I am, unfortunately, unable to give:

Lieutenants Kendall and Berthon, of the Bombay Sappers, and 2nd Lieutenants Playfair and Fuller of the same corps.

To the following officers temporarily attached to my staff my best thanks are due:

Lieutenant Pollexfen, Deputy-Assistant Quartermaster-General;

Lieutenant Henry, Postmaster to the Force.

I am much indebted to my Major of Brigade, Captain Hart, for the able and zealous assistance he afforded me in his arduous office throughout the operations.

I have the greatest pleasure in bearing testimony to the humanity and forbearance of the troops under my command. Not a single instance of wanton cruelty or ill treatment of the peaceable inhabitants of the town has been brought to my notice.

*Last of Killed, Wounded, and Missing, in the 2nd Infantry Brigade, on the 2nd of January, 1849.*

*Camp Mooltan, January 3, 1849*

1st Bombay European Regiment, Fusiliers—4 rank and file, killed, 5 European officers, 4 sergeants, 1 drummer, 49 rank and file, wounded.

4th Regiment Native Infantry (Rifles)—8 rank and file, killed, 1 European officer, 1 Native officer, 2 havildars, 4 band men, 35 rank and file, wounded.

19th Regiment Native Infantry—4 rank and file, killed; 1 European officer, 3 havildars, 33 rank and file, wounded.

Total of all ranks—16 killed; 139 wounded.

*Last of European Officers Killed, Wounded, and Missing, in the 2nd Infantry Brigade, on the 2nd of January, 1849.*

*Camp Mooltan, January 3, 1849.*

1st Fusiliers—Captain R. W. D. Leith and Lieutenant W. Gray, dangerously; suffered amputation of an arm each; Lieutenants E. Dansey and G. Herne, slightly, 2nd Lieutenant E. A. Law, slightly; wounded

4th Rifles—Lieutenant T. S. Warden, wounded by a bullet in the shoulder.

19th Regiment Native Infantry—Ensign J. Gordon, wounded severely

*Casualty Return of the Engineer Staff and Bombay Sappers and Miners, at the Storm of the City of Mooltan, on the 2nd of January, 1849*

*Camp near Mooltan, January 4, 1849.*

Engineer Staff—1 lieutenant wounded.

Sappers and Miners—10 privates killed; 1 corporal, 1 Native officer, 2 havildars, 3 naicks, 1 bugler, 43 privates, wounded; 1 private missing.

*European Officer Wounded.*

Engineer Staff—Second Lieutenant J. A. Fuller.

## Inclosure 29 in No. 44.

*Major Edwardes to Major-General Whish.**Camp, Beeghee Bagh, January 3, 1849*

IN conformity with your instructions to create a diversion, yesterday, on the south and west of the city, preparatory to the storm of the trenches by the regular force, Lieutenant Lake threw out a large skirmishing party, directly in his front, and close up to the Pak Gate; General Cortlandt, another on the left of the Daoodpotras, and I, a third on the left of General Cortlandt's, thus opening a smart fire nearly down to the Bohur Gate, and securing the attention of a large portion of the enemy's soldiers on the walls. In front of the village of Daira, I also moved out a large body of cavalry, and a troop of horse artillery, while the remainder and main body of the infantry were in reserve at the Beeghee Bagh and Seedee-loll-ke-bed.

At about half-past 1 P.M., the Daoodpotras, under the direction of Lieutenant Lake, and my own and General Cortlandt's, under the direction of Lieutenant Young, of the engineers, Mr. Hugo James, and Mr. Quin, opened their fire, from the most advanced suburbs, and drew a smart return from the ramparts, and the guns on the Motee Bastion. This was kept up, until the advance of the British to the breach, and was, I trust, of service in distracting the enemy's attention.

When the city was completely in your possession, Lieutenant Lake and I withdrew our men to their respective posts; but, subsequently, on being applied to by Major Scott, of the Bombay engineers, Lieutenant Lake occupied the Pak Gate with Daoodpotras, and a small party from the company of the 3rd Bombay Native Infantry, which was on duty at Seedee Loll. The vigilance of this detachment of Daoodpotras, while in charge of the gate, I was myself a witness to, at night, when I visited the post with Lieutenant Lake, and it did great credit to irregular troops.

After withdrawing our skirmishers, I ordered the cavalry from Daira to make a patrol to the westward, and they succeeded in intercepting a party of the enemy's infantry, who had escaped from the city, twenty of whom they killed, when the rest surrendered, and were disarmed.

I cannot conclude this report without bringing to your notice the zeal of Lieutenant Pollock, Assistant Resident, and Mr. McMahon, volunteer. The former joined his corps, hearing it was in the storming party, at the Delhi Gate breach; and the latter volunteered to accompany Captain Smyth, who led the right assault.

## Inclosure 30 in No. 44

*Major-General Whish to the Adjutant-General.**Camp, Mooltan, January 3, 1849.*

IN consequence of our proceedings of yesterday, the number of the enemy, now confined to the citadel, is estimated, from the best accounts procurable, to be only from 2000 to 2500. Major Edwardes communicated to me a proposition, made this morning, for 400 or 500 of them to desert Moolraj, if their lives were spared. Their agent (Ismael Khan) urged their being permitted to retain their arms, which I told him was inadmissible. It is settled that they are to deliver them at the Dowlut Gate, at 4 P.M., to the detachment of Her Majesty's 10th Foot, on duty there, on which Lieutenant Need, my Aide-de-camp, will escort the party to the rear of the camp, and dismiss them to their homes.

These are Eusufzyes; but I declined acceding to a similar desire on the part of some Gundehpoories, as they were not simply enemies, but Ryots of the Maharaja, rebels.



## Inclosure 31 in No. 44.

*Major-General Whish to the Adjutant-General.**Camp, Mooltan, January 4, 1849.*

AT Brigadier Cheape's suggestion, a brigade of the Bombay division, this morning, marched to a site on the north-west angle of the fort, and will take immediate possession of Huzzoorree Bagh.

At the request of Major Edwardes, the Sinde Horse and Captain Turnbull's light field-battery will march towards Sirdarpore to-morrow, in order to expedite the re-establishment there, and at Toolumba, of the kardars of the Durbar.

The party of Rohillas that proposed leaving the citadel yesterday, and surrendering their arms, in order to pass unmolested away, have not made their appearance, nor have I heard anything of them to-day.

## Inclosure 32 in No. 44.

*Major-General Whish to the Adjutant-General.**Camp, Mooltan, January 6, 1849.*

— TWO 5½-inch mortar batteries have been established in our advanced trench and zigzag, which now reaches the glacis east of the citadel, to facilitate operations, Brigadier Cheape has established himself at Wuzeerabad, with the sappers and miners. When there, at 3 P. M. (after visiting all the hospitals of both camps, in which I rejoice to say the sick and wounded are going on well), I met an hurkara from Dewan Moolraj, with two letters, one for me, the other for Major Edwardes. He was escorted by two of our picket. After reading my own, Captain Kennedy took both to Major Edwardes, who immediately accompanied him back to me, when we agreed upon an answer that was immediately forwarded, intimating that no confidential person could be received, unless empowered to tender the Dewan's unconditional surrender.

§ 2. The party of Rohillas who desire to leave the fort, as noticed in my letter of the 4th instant, were to have come out yesterday afternoon, but they now affirm they can only do so by night; I have, therefore, requested Major Edwardes to fix an hour to-morrow night for their surrendering at the Lahore gate, their agent being in his camp.

## Inclosure 33 in No. 44.

*Major Edwardes to the Resident at Lahore.**Camp, Mooltan, January 6, 1849.*

I FORWARD an urzee received by me, yesterday evening, from the rebel Dewan Moolraj, together with a copy of my reply.

I trust the tenor of the latter is in strict conformance with your wishes, and the instructions of the Governor-General.

The garrison of Mooltan is now in the last extremity. The gunners are unable to serve their guns, from incessant shelling; the buildings are almost all unroofed, from the same cause, and afford but little shelter; Dewan Moolraj himself has sought refuge in the gateway of the Sukkee Gate; and every soldier is obliged to grind the wheat for his own dinner, all the flour having been blown up, in the explosion of the Jumma Musjid. In this state of things, Moolraj's chief advisers are urgently pressing him to surrender, and he has promised either to do so, or take poison, if no succour reaches him, in the course of three days. I regard the present overture from Moolraj, therefore, as a sign that his pride is broken down at last, and that he wants the courage to play out his part.

Inclosure 34 in No. 44.

*Dewan Moolraj to Major Edwardes.*

*January 5, 1849*

HAVING sundry representations to make before you, I write to say that, with your permission, I will send a confidential person of my own to wait on you, who will tell you all

Inclosure 35 in No. 44.

*Major Edwardes to Dewan Moolraj.*

*January 5, 1849*

I HAVE received and perused your urzee. You say you have sundry things to represent, and, with my leave, will send a confidential person for that purpose. This, I cannot assent to. It is quite impossible. The time for that was April last. You then preferred war—now go through with it; or, if you are unable, surrender yourself to General Whish. After that, you can represent anything you like.

Inclosure 36 in No. 44.

*The Resident at Lahore to Major Edwardes.*

*Lahore, January 9, 1849*

IF I APPROVE of the reply you have sent to Moolraj, his surrender must be altogether unconditional, if he should surrender unconditionally, he will, as a matter of course, be allowed to say what he may wish in exculpation or defence of his conduct, but, on that subject, you will receive instructions hereafter, when you may report his having surrendered to Major-General Whish

Inclosure 37 in No. 44.

*Major Edwardes to the Resident at Lahore.*

*Camp, Mooltan, January 7, 1849.*

THE rebel Dewan Moolraj had no sooner received my purwanna of the 5th instant, refusing to receive his vakeel, and informing him that no representation on his part would be listened to, until he had surrendered to General Whish, than he addressed a similar request to be allowed to send a vakeel, to the Major General; and sent it through me, begging that I would procure him an answer.

I immediately waited on the General, and, by his desire, sent the answer which is appended

There can be little doubt that the Dewan will send a vakeel to-day or to-morrow; and as little, I should think, that this will be followed by the surrender of the Dewan. I shall, of course, be present at the interview with the motbir, and will take care that he thoroughly understands that his master's surrender is unconditional.

## Inclosure 38 in No. 44

*Major-General Whish to Dewan Moolraj.*

January 6, 1849

I HAVE received your urzee, through Major Edwardes. It is impossible to grant your request to be allowed to send a confidential servant to me to make certain representations indeed, Major Edwardes told you, yesterday, that, until you come into me, nothing you have to say will be listened to.

You are now informed that if the object of sending a confidential person is simply to state, my master wishes to come in, and will do so at such an hour, and will come out from the fort at such a gate, and by such a road, then, he may come, but if he has any anything else to say, on no account send him

## Inclosure 39 in No. 44.

*Major-General Whish to the Adjutant-General.*

Camp, Mooltan, January 7, 1849.

THE day is nearly passed, and I hear nothing further from the Dewan, nor have I yet learnt from Major Edwardes whether the Rohillas adhere to their desire to leave him to-night. After our success on the 27th ultimo, it appeared to me desirable that the position of Seedee-loll-ke-Bed should be occupied by the irregular force of the allies, as it had lost much of its importance; and the regular troops would have lighter duty thereby. This was accordingly done, and I forward Major Edwardes's account of it, and of the subsequent attack of the enemy, in which the gallant bearing of several parties is mentioned, viz., Lieutenants Lake, Pollock, Pearce, and Young, Messrs Quin and McMahon. The latter gentleman was wounded in the hand, on the occasion.

## Inclosure 40 in No. 44

*Major-General Whish to the Adjutant-General.*

Camp, Mooltan, January 8, 1849, 4 P.M.

I WAS just now taking up my pen to address you, when a messenger from the rebel Dewan arrived, with a letter, the purport of which is, that in reference to my answer of the 6th instant (which I noticed in my letter to you of that date), he wishes to send a confidential person to me.

There was a letter, by the same messenger, for Major Edwardes, which I have forwarded to him. I do not expect to be able to report the result of this reference, before to-morrow.

Moolraj may only be making another endeavour to obtain terms. I need not say that nothing of this kind occasions the least relaxation in our siege operations. An 18-pounder battery (seven pieces) opened this morning at within 200 yards' distance, and we shall soon have a battery ready in advance of it, for six 24-pounders, and six 18-pounders, and we have twenty-four shell pieces constantly engaged.

The details that went towards Sirdarpore and Toolumba on the 6th, reached the former place yesterday. Moolraj's kardar had absconded on the 2nd instant, on the fall of the city.

## Inclosure 41 in No. 44.

*Major-General Whish to the Adjutant-General**Camp, Mooltan, January 9, 1849.*

A CONFIDENTIAL agent of the rebel Dewan, named Dya Buksh, waited upon me this morning, agreeably to yesterday's arrangement. Major Edwardes was with me at the time, but, as we soon learnt from him that he was not authorized to tender his master's unconditional surrender, after a short stay, I gave him permission to return. He affected to be ignorant of the purport of my reply to Moolraj's letter of the 6th instant.

On the 4th instant, General Cortlandt, of the Sikh service, called to represent that he was to have the charge of this district after the fall of Mooltan, and solicited leave to take civil possession of the city, which I granted.

## Inclosure 42 in No. 44

*Major Edwardes to the Resident at Lahore.**Camp, Mooltan, January 9, 1849.*

YESTERDAY, Dewan Moolraj, again, addressed letters to General Whish and myself, accepting gratefully the General's permission to send a motbir; and asking for arrangements to be made to let the said motbir be received at the Delhi Gate, or any other the General might prefer, and honorably treated. In reply, the General appointed 9 o'clock this morning for the motbir to come to the Delhi Gate. He came about 11, but there was considerable commotion in the fort, and it is supposed some party opposed the mission. Major Becher, Assistant Quarter-Master-General, received the motbir (Dya Buksh Khan, a confidential adviser of the Dewan), and conducted him to the General's tent, where I was in attendance on the Major-General.

Dya Buksh presented his nuzzur, and then commenced an oration, which I immediately stopped, and requested him to confine himself to a simple statement of the Dewan's wish to surrender, and at what time he would come in. He replied, "Dewan Sahib hazier hy!"—equivalent to "the Dewan submits!" Adding—"But only hear the representations he has told me to make!" and showing clearly that he had come charged with a budget of questions, and doubts to be resolved; in short, that he wished to stipulate, not to surrender unconditionally. I again stopped him, therefore, and asked him plainly, from the General, whether he had authority to tender his master's submission, and arrange for his coming in? Dya Buksh was not prepared for this literal interpretation of the conditions on which he had come, and acknowledged that he had not authority to go, at once, into such final arrangements, but said he would, if allowed, go back, and relate to the Dewan that nothing else would be listened to. The General then gave him his leave, and he returned, evidently much disappointed at his reception.

A new battery of seven 18-pounders had just been opened in our trenches, and played heavily on the fort during this interview, so that conviction must have reached the Dewan that his diplomacy was not likely to gain either time, or terms.

I still think the Dewan will submit, and avoid the last crisis of the siege.

## Inclosure 43 in No. 44.

*The Adjutant-General to the Secretary with the Governor-General.**Camp, Chulhanwalla, January 23, 1849.*

I HAVE the honor, by direction of his Excellency the Right Honorable the Commander-in-Chief, to transmit, for the information of the Right Honorable the Governor-General of India, a copy of a dispatch, of the 7th instant, from Major-General W. S. Whish, C.B., commanding the Mooltan Field Force, and of the detailed reports which accompanied it, of the assault upon that

city, on the 2nd instant, and I am to add, that his Excellency has instructed me to communicate to the Major-General his cordial approval of the arrangements ordered for the attack, which appears to have been made with a spirit and gallantry highly creditable to the officers and troops of every arm employed.

Inclosure 44 in No. 44.

*Lieutenant Hodson to the Resident at Lahore.*

*Camp, Zufferwal, January 1, 1849*

WHEN I reported the dispersion and flight of the parties of insurgents who had infested the northern districts of this Doab, I ventured to express a hope that, these disturbances having once been suppressed, the return to order and quietude would be speedy and permanent.

As far as regards the territories of the Lahore Government, that hope has been fully realized, the revenue collections have progressed satisfactorily, and, in numerous instances, the lands and property of rebels, situated in these districts, have been quietly taken possession of, by the proper authorities.

In the border territories, however, belonging to Maharajah Golar Singh, and lying along the foot of the hills, which form the northern boundary of this Doab, the case is far different, and it becomes my duty to bring to your notice the circumstances which have compelled a new movement of troops towards the frontier, and which will, if not immediately looked to, render utterly nugatory every attempt to maintain order, and to suppress the outrages of parties of armed plunderers in the upper portions of the Rechna and Baree Doabs; and even to maintain inviolate the contiguous territories of the British Government.

Five days ago, a regiment of infantry, about 500 strong, commanded by Ummur Singh, and accompanied by Ram Singh, son of the Vuzeer Shama, of Noorpoor, crossed the Chenab near Bigwat, and marched to the eastward along the border, with the avowed and openly expressed intention of creating a rising in the British districts of Tudoura, Puthankote, and Noorpoor. On the day following, they were followed by a party of from 200 to 300 horsemen, under the notorious robbers, Prem Singh Jhulna and Gunda Singh, and the whole of these men have proceeded, leisurely, along the foot of the hills, by ordinary marches, unmolested, to the right bank of the Ravee, whence, in a few hours, they will be in the district of Noorpoor.

Neither from Jummoo, nor from the Maharajah's local kardars, nor from His Highness's vakeel in my camp, have I received the slightest intimation of these proceedings, or information as to their progress and objects;—and yet, during my recent visit to Jummoo, and since repeatedly, through His Highness's confidential agent, I have received the most distinct and positive promises from Meean Runbeer Singh, that daily reports should be sent to me of the doings of any parties of rebels within their reach, and that not a single armed man should be allowed to traverse the Maharajah's border districts.

These promises have not, even in appearance, been fulfilled, in a single instance. I need hardly add that it would be absurd to suppose that His Highness's officials were ignorant of the march, or intentions, of these parties. His police arrangements are proverbially good, and as I have repeatedly had reason to observe, not a single sepoy, or messenger of mine, can pass into, or through, His Highness's dominions, without being stopped and questioned. Moreover, on one, if not more, of the last five days, the encampment of the insurgent leaders was actually within sight of Jummoo itself.

I need not observe that so large a party as that I have described, could never have passed the Chenab near Bigwat, without attracting the attention of the Maharajah's troops under Dewan Hurrie Chund, in the neighbourhood of Munawur.

Neither Ummur Singh, nor Ram Singh, makes any mystery of their destination and many of their followers are natives of the British territories—while Besawur Singh and Gunga Singh have already made more than one inroad into the neighbourhood of Puthankote. Yet, although the nature and objects of their expedition are notorious, it is doubtful how far Lieutenant Lumsden would

be justified in crossing the border to attack a party thus under His Highness's protection, as they have, as yet, committed no overt act of hostility.

It will appear from what I have stated, that Maharajah Golab Sing's border districts are a privileged highroad for the open enemies of the British Government. I am prepared also to prove that they are places of refuge for all rebels against the Lahore Government.

It will be sufficient to mention a few instances, which have come to my knowledge with great certainty. The families of Dewan Hakim Raee and his son are now partly in a small village on the bank of the Toreh near Jummoo, and partly near Munawur, under the actual protection, as it is asserted, of Dewan Hurrie Chund.

The family and property of Meean Jowahir Sing, of Buddee Pund, are at Pubbial Bahmunon, and those of the Kottee Babas at Bishna, while Gunda Sing's household are in safety near Samba.

The whole of the above have been traced, and seen, by my own emissaries. I might extend the list indefinitely, by hearsay.

As I am aware of the importance of the charges brought, in this statement, against the Maharajah Golab Sing's fidelity, I have carefully abstained from mentioning anything which has not come under my personal observation, within the last few days, but I conceive that I should have been wanting in my duty had I failed to bring them promptly to your notice.

#### Inclosure 45 in No. 44.

*The Resident at Lahore to the Secretary with the Governor-General.*

*Lahore, January 4, 1849.*

I SUBMIT a communication from my Assistant, Lieutenant Hodson, regarding a party sent from the rebel camp on the Jhelum, towards Puthankote, for the purpose of creating disturbances in the Hill districts of the Jullundur Doab, and respecting the uninterrupted passage through the territories of Maharajah Golab Sing, enjoyed by the insurgent bands, and the safe protection afforded to their families and property in the Jummoo districts.

I have had a long conference this morning with Dewan Jowala Sahae upon the subject of Lieutenant Hodson's letter, and have given him the substance of the letter to send to the Maharajah. Jowala Sahae says, fairly enough, that he cannot, of course, contradict what Lieutenant Hodson so positively states, but he pledges himself that, if the fact is established by proof, and the route of the forces can be traced, all parties who have connived at their passage, be they officers of the Maharajah, or Jagheerdars, or Zemindars, shall be punished.

The Dewan has sent off people of his own to raise the country, and prevent the return of the parties mentioned by Lieutenant Hodson, and to attack, and seize them.

He has also given me purwannas, very strongly worded, to the Kardars of Jesrota and Samba, and also a general purwanna, addressed to all the Kardars and Thannadars of the Jummoo territory, directing them to place themselves under the orders of Lieutenants Lumsden and Hodson, and to seize, and make over, any person whom they may demand, and obey all orders they may receive from them, whether they be in the Jummoo territory, or in the Lahore or British districts.

Dewan Jowala Sahae seems to be in earnest in desiring to keep his master straight with the British Government. I am by no means satisfied that he is altogether in his master's confidence.

I have directed Lieutenant Hodson to ascertain the exact route which these insurgent bands pursued, and the villages in the Jummoo territory through which they may have passed.

## Inclosure 46 in No. 44.

*Lieutenant Hodson to the Resident at Lahore.**Camp, Perole, near Kutova, January 4, 1849.*

I HAD the honor to report the passage of several parties of insurgents, along the territories of Maharajah Golab Sing, lying at the foot of the hills with the avowed intention of creating disturbances in the districts of Noorpoor and Puthankote; and that Lieutenant Lumsden had followed in the direction of their march, with a view, if possible, of cutting them off.

On the evening of the 2nd instant, we reached the village of Musroor, on the right bank of the Ooj River, and in a position completely to command the line taken by the insurgents, in the hope of arresting their progress, or (in case they should have passed previous to our arrival), of cutting off their retreat, either in the direction of the Chenab, or in that of the Lahore territories, by the route of Nerote.

During the night of the 2nd, we received information that the main party of the insurgents under Ummur Sing, "the One Eyed," and Ram Sing, son of the Vuzcer Shama, had actually crossed into the British territories near Shahpoor, but that a party, under the notorious Gunda Sing, had not yet crossed the Ravee, but were encamped on its right bank near Kutova.

Early on the morning of the 3rd, we moved from Musroor, in pursuit of this party, towards Kutova. On our arrival, however, at this village, we learnt that, on hearing of the arrival of the British troops at Deenanuggur, Gunda Sing had turned back towards Jesiota, and had attempted to slip by us, and retire in the direction of the Chenab. Leaving our baggage, therefore, in the care of some sepoy of Maharajah Golab Sing, we instantly turned to our left in pursuit.

After about two hours' march, through the heavy jungle, and marshy ground, which lies along the course of the Ooj, we came up to some gardens or groves, in which we perceived parties of Sikhs busily occupied in cooking their dinners. We halted in the bed of the river, for about half an hour, to allow our infantry men to come up, being completely concealed from view by the dense jungle which lined the banks.

On their arrival, Lieutenant Lumsden desired me to attack the enemy in front, and drive them out of the gardens, while he moved round on the left, with his cavalry, to prevent their escape. The instant that they perceived us, they fled precipitately into the marshes through which the Ooj runs. Lieutenant Lumsden instantly pursued them, succeeded in overtaking them, despite the broken and dangerous character of the ground, and cut them up, almost to a man. So bad was the nature of the country over which he followed them, that, at one time, more than half the horses of his troop were down, pursuers and pursued rolling together in desperate strife, in the middle of the deep marshes.

From thirty to forty of the enemy were killed, or mortally wounded, among whom we were able to identify, beyond doubt, the insurgent leaders, Gunda Sing, and his Major, Sooka Sing. There were others killed, who were called Sirdars by their party; but we have not been able to identify them, as yet. I have much pleasure in adding that none of our own men was injured in any way, the pace at which they charged the flying enemy, rendering resistance utterly impossible. Our loss was confined to one horse killed, and one wounded.

The whole of the remaining insurgents having succeeded in getting into the hills behind Puthankote and Shahpoor, and, consequently, into the British territory, Lieutenant Lumsden considers that there is no object in his remaining longer in this Doab, and proposes, after communicating with Brigadier-General Wheeler, who is within one march of this place, at Deenanuggur, returning towards the camp of the Commander-in-chief, beyond the Chenab.

## Inclosure 47 in No. 44.

*The Secretary with the Governor-General to the Resident at Lahore.*

*Camp, Mukkoo, January 12, 1849.*

THE Governor-General trusts that the explanations and conduct of the Maharajah Golab Sing's vakeel, in this matter \*, may be satisfactory.

His Lordship entertains no doubt whatever that the Maharajah's territory is not, and ought not to be, any protection to enemies of the British Government. The Maharajah is bound, by his treaty, to send all his troops to aid us against our enemies, much more than is he bound not to harbour enemies within his own dominions.

British officers should follow any body of men who are in arms against the British Government, into the Maharajah's territory, and punish them there, without hesitation.

## Inclosure 48 in No. 44.

*The Secretary with the Governor-General to the Resident at Lahore.*

*Camp, Mukkoo, January 12, 1849.*

YOU will convey to† Lieutenant Lumsden the approval of the Governor-General, of the gallantry and activity of himself and men in his attack against the insurgents, and his Lordship's sense of the services he has been rendering

## Inclosure 49 in No. 44

*The Secretary with the Governor-General to the Resident at Lahore.*

*Camp, Mukkoo, January 19, 1849.*

WITH reference to your letters, wherein you mention being in consultation with Major Mackeson as to what communication should be made to Maharajah Golab Sing, in the alarm which he feels regarding the possible loss of Cashmere, and other portions of his territory, I am instructed by the Governor-General to request, that you will intimate to the Maharajah, that the British Government will not permit Dost Mahomed Khan to take possession of any territory belonging to His Highness, provided His Highness gives decisive proofs that he may be depended upon as a friend to the British Government, and a peaceful neighbour. The Maharajah has, hitherto, given no real proof of his trustworthiness and amity; for his Lordship cannot regard as such a proof, his sending a few thousand rupees to Captain Abbott, when His Highness owes several lakhs to the British Government.

If the Maharajah shall, really, do effective service against the Sikh army, now in arms against the British Government, or against the Ameer Dost Mahomed Khan, in the event of that person attempting to aid the Sikh army, the Governor-General requests that you will assure the Maharajah, that the Ameer will not be permitted to injure him. If, on the other hand, the Maharajah does not render such service, it is impossible that the British Government can place any reliance on his friendship, and they will proceed to take such measures against the Sikh power, against Dost Mahomed Khan, and the Maharajah himself, as their own interests and security may seem to require.

The British Government sincerely desires to see the Maharajah Golab Sing retained in possession of all his territories, and in friendship with it; and the Governor-General counsels him, now, to take a just view of his own true interest, and to act in accordance with that view.

\* Letter from the Resident, January 4.

† Letter from Lieutenant Hodson, January 4.



## Inclosure 50 in No. 44

*Notification by the Governor-General**Camp, Mukkoo, January 17, 1849*

THE Governor-General has much satisfaction in intimating to the President in Council, and notifying for public information, that he has this day received a demi-official letter from his Excellency the Commander-in-Chief, in which his Excellency announces to the Governor-General, that, on the afternoon of the 13th instant, the troops under his command attacked, and entirely defeated, the Sikh army under Raja Shere Sing, in its position near the River Jhelum.

The action was obstinately, and severely, contested. The enemy was in great force, and occupied very strong positions. They were driven back at every point, with the loss of many of their guns, and had, by the latest intelligence, relinquished all the positions in which they had been entrenched.

The details of these operations have not yet reached the Governor-General as soon as they are received, they will be published for general information.

The Governor-General directs that a salute of 21 guns be fired at every principal station of the army, as soon as this notification shall be received.

## Inclosure 51 in No. 44.

*The Commander-in-Chief to the Governor-General.**Camp, Chillianwalla, January 16, 1849*

MAJOR MACKESON, your Lordship's Political Agent with my camp, officially communicated to me, on the 10th instant, the fall of Attock, and the advance of Sirdar Chuttur Sing, in order to concentrate his force with the army in my front under Shere Sing, already amounting to from 30,000 to 40,000 men, with sixty-two guns, concluding his letter thus:—"I would urge, in the event of your Lordship's finding yourself strong enough, with the army under your command, to strike an effectual blow at the enemy in our front, that the blow should be struck with the least possible delay."

Concurring entirely with Major Mackeson, and feeling that I was perfectly competent effectually to overthrow Shere Sing's army, I moved from Loah Tibbee, at daylight on the 12th, to Dingee, about twelve miles. Having learnt from my spies, and from other sources of information, that Shere Sing still held, with his right, the villages of Luhnecwalla and Futteh Shah-Ke-Chuck, having the great body of his force at the village of Lolhanwalla, with his left at Russool, on the Jhelum, strongly occupying the southern extremity of a low range of difficult hills, intersected by ravines, which extend nearly to that village, I made my arrangements accordingly, that evening, and communicated them to the commanders of the several divisions, but, to insure correct information as to the nature of the country, which I believed to be excessively difficult, and ill-adapted to the advance of a regular army, I determined upon moving on this village, with a view to reconnoitre.

On the morning of the 13th, the force advanced. I made a considerable detour to my right, partly, in order to distract the enemy's attention, but, principally, to get as clear as I could, of the jungle, on which it would appear that the enemy mainly relied.

We approached this village about 12 o'clock, and I found, on a mound close to it, a strong picket of the enemy's cavalry and infantry, which we at once dispersed, obtaining from the mound a very extended view of the country before us, and the enemy drawn out in battle array, he having, either during the night or that morning, moved out of his several positions, and occupied the ground in our front, which, though not a dense, was, still, a difficult jungle, his right in advance of Futteh-Shah-Ke-Chuck, and his left on the furrowed hills before described.

The day being so far advanced, I decided upon taking up a position in rear of the village, in order to reconnoitre my front, finding that I could not turn the enemy's flanks, which rested upon a dense jungle extending nearly to Heileh,

which I had previously occupied for some time, and the neighbourhood of which I knew, and upon the ravine hills near Russool, without detaching a force to a distance : thus I considered both inexpedient and dangerous

The engineer department had been ordered to examine the country before us, and the Quartermaster-General was in the act of taking up ground for the encampment, when the enemy advanced some horse artillery, and opened a fire on the skirmishers in front of the village. I immediately ordered them to be silenced by a few rounds from our heavy guns, which advanced to an open space in front of the village. Their fire was instantly returned by that of nearly the whole of the enemy's field artillery, thus exposing the position of his guns, which the jungle had hitherto concealed.

It was now evident that the enemy intended to fight, and would, probably, advance his guns so as to reach this encampment during the night.

I, therefore, drew up in order of battle, Sir Walter Gilbert's division on the right, flanked by Brigadier Pope's brigade of cavalry, which I strengthened by the 14th Light Dragoons, well aware that the enemy was strong in Cavalry upon his left. To this were attached three troops of horse artillery, under Lieutenant-Colonel Grant. The heavy guns were in the centre.

Brigadier-General Campbell's division formed the left, flanked by Brigadier White's brigade of Cavalry, and three troops of Horse Artillery, under Lieutenant-Colonel Brind.

The field batteries were with the infantry divisions. Thus formed, the troops were ordered to lie down, whilst the heavy guns, under Major Horsford, ably seconded by Brevet-Majors Ludlow and Sir Richmond Shakespear, opened a well-directed and powerful fire upon the enemy's centre, where his guns appeared principally to be placed, and this fire was ably supported on the flanks, by the field batteries of the infantry divisions.

After about an hour's fire, that of the enemy appeared to be, if not silenced, sufficiently disabled to justify an advance upon his position and guns.

I, then, ordered my left division to advance, which had to move over a greater extent of ground, and, in front of which, the enemy seemed not to have many guns. Soon after, I directed Sir Walter Gilbert to advance, and sent orders to Brigadier Pope, to protect the flank and support the movement. Brigadier Penny's brigade was held in reserve, while the Irregular Cavalry, under Brigadier Hearsey, with the 20th Native Infantry, was ordered to protect the enormous amount of provision and baggage that so hampers the movements of an Indian army.

Some time after the advance, I found that Brigadier Pennycuik's brigade had failed in maintaining the position it had carried, and immediately ordered Brigadier Penny's reserve to its support; but Brigadier-General Campbell, with that steady coolness and military decision for which he is so remarkable, having pushed on his left brigade and formed line to his right, carried everything before him, and soon overthrew that portion of the enemy which had obtained a temporary advantage over his right brigade.

This last brigade, I am informed, mistook, for the signal to move in double time, the action of their brave leaders, Brigadier Pennycuik and Lieutenant-Colonel Brookes (two officers, not surpassed for sound judgment and military daring, in this, or any other, army), who waved their swords over their heads as they cheered on their gallant comrades. This unhappy mistake led to the Europeans outstripping the native corps, which could not keep pace, and arriving completely blown at a belt of thicker jungle, where they got into some confusion, and Lieutenant-Colonel Brookes, leading the 24th, was killed between the enemy's guns. At this moment, a large body of infantry, which supported their guns, opened upon them so destructive a fire that the brigade was forced to retire, having lost their gallant and lamented leader, Brigadier Pennycuik, and the three other field officers of the 24th, and nearly half the regiment, before it gave way, the native regiment, when it came up, also suffering severely. In justice to this brigade, I must be allowed to state that they behaved heroically, and, but for their too hasty, and consequently disorderly advance, would have emulated the conduct of their left brigade, which, left unsupported for a time, had to charge to their front, and right, wherever an enemy appeared. The brigade of Horse Artillery on their left, under Lieutenant-Colonel Brind, judiciously and gallantly aiding, maintained an effective fire.

Major-General Sir J. Thackwell, on the extreme left and rear, charged the enemy's cavalry, wherever they showed themselves.

The right attack of infantry, under that able officer, Major-General Sir Walter Gilbert, was most praiseworthy and successful. The left brigade, under Brigadier Mountain, advanced under a heavy fire upon the enemy's guns, in a manner that did credit to the brigadier and his gallant brigade, which came first into action, and suffered severely. The right brigade, under Brigadier Godby, ably supported the advance.

This division nobly maintained the character of the Indian army, taking and spiking the whole of the enemy's guns in their front, and dispersing the Sikhs wherever they were seen.

The Major-General reports most favorably of the fire of his field battery.

The right brigade of cavalry, under Brigadier Pope, was not, I regret to say, so successful. Either by some order, or misapprehension of an order, they got into much confusion, hampered the fine brigade of Horse Artillery, which, while getting into action against a body of the enemy's cavalry that was coming down upon them, had their horses separated from their guns, by the false movements of our cavalry, and, notwithstanding the heroic conduct of the gunners, four of those guns were disabled, to an extent which rendered their withdrawal, at the moment, impossible. The moment the artillery was extricated, and the cavalry re-formed, a few rounds put to flight the enemy that had occasioned this confusion.

With this exception, the conduct of the troops generally was most exemplary. Some corps, both European and Native, acted under most trying circumstances (from the temporary failure in our left centre and right, and the cover which the jungle afforded to the enemy's movements) and with a gallantry worthy of the highest admiration.

Although the enemy, who defended not only his guns, but his position, with desperation, was driven in much confusion, and with heavy loss, from every part of it, and the greater part of his field artillery was actually captured, the march of brigades to their flanks to repel parties that had rallied, and the want of numbers, and consequent support to our right flank, aided by the cover of the jungle, and the close of the day, enabled him, upon our further advance in pursuit, to return and carry off, unobserved, the greater portion of the guns we had thus gallantly carried at the point of the bayonet.

I remained with Brigadier-General Campbell's division, which had been reinforced by Brigadier Mountain's brigade, until near 8 o'clock, in order to effect the bringing in of the captured ordnance, and of the wounded, and I hoped to bring in the rest of the guns next morning. But I did not feel justified in remaining longer out. The night was very dark. I knew not how far I had advanced. There were no wells nearer than the line of this village. The troops had been arduously employed all day, and there was every appearance of a wet night; rain did fall before morning.

I should have felt great satisfaction if I were enabled to state that my expectations in regard to the guns, had been realized, but, although a brigade of cavalry under Brigadier White, with a troop of Horse Artillery, was on the ground soon after daylight, we found that the enemy, assisted by the neighbouring villagers, had carried off their guns, excepting twelve which we had brought in, the night before. Most of the captured waggons I had caused to be blown up, before leaving the ground.

The victory was complete as to the total overthrow of the enemy; and his sense of utter discomfiture and defeat, will, I trust, soon be made apparent, unless, indeed, the rumours, prevalent this day, of his having been joined by Chuttur Sing, prove correct.

I am informed that the loss of the Sikhs has been very great, and chiefly amongst their old and tried soldiers. In no action do I remember seeing so many of an enemy's slain upon the same space; Sobraon, perhaps, only excepted.

I have now, my Lord, stated the general movements of this army, previous to, and during the action of, Chillianwalla, and as that action was characterized by peculiar features, which rendered it impossible for the Commander-in-Chief to witness all the operations of the force, I shall beg leave to bring prominently to your Lordship's notice the names of the several officers and corps particularly mentioned by the divisional commanders.

I have already stated the obligations I am under to Major General Sir Joseph Thackwell, and Sir Walter Gilbert, and to Brigadier General Campbell, for their most valuable services. I warmly concur with them in the thanks

which they have expressed to the several Brigadiers, and officers commanding corps, and to the troops generally.

Sir Joseph Thackwell names, with much satisfaction, Brigadier White's conduct of his brigade, Major Yerbury, commanding the third Light Dragoons, the gallant charge of Captain Unett in command of a squadron of that corps, Major Mackenzie, commanding the 8th, and Captain Wheatley, commanding the 5th Light Cavalry, and the conduct of Captain Moore of the 8th, with a squadron detached in support of the artillery. He further notices the assistance he derived from the zeal and activity of Captain Pratt, Assistant Adjutant-General, and Lieutenant Tucker, Deputy Assistant Quartermaster-General of his division, of Captain Cautley, Major of Brigade, of his Aide-de-Camp Lieutenant Thackwell, and of Lieutenant Simpson, Sub-Assistant Commissary General.

Brigadier-General Campbell speaks in terms of admiration of the 5th Brigade, led on by that distinguished officer, Brigadier Pennycuik, and particularly of the gallant exertions of Her Majesty's 24th Foot, under the command of Lieutenant-Colonel Brookes, and the good and steady advance of the 25th and 45th Native Infantry, under the command of Lieutenant-Colonel Corbett and Major Williams. He particularizes the undaunted example set to his brigade by Brigadier Hoggan, the continued steadiness and gallantry of Her Majesty's 61st Regiment, commanded by Lieutenant-Colonel M'Leod, under the most trying circumstances, the distinguished conduct of Major Flemyng and the officers of the 36th Native Infantry, and of the 46th Native Infantry under Major Tudor, as also the able and zealous exertions of the Brigade Major, Captain Keiller. The Brigadier General also brings to notice his obligations to Major Tucker, Assistant Adjutant General of the Army, and to Captain Goldie and Lieutenant Irwin of the Engineers, who were sent to his assistance, and the cordial and able support which he received from Major Ponsonby, his Assistant Adjutant General; and he particularly mentioned the conduct of Ensign Garden, his Deputy Assistant Quarter Master General, and of Captain Haythorne, his Aide-de-Camp, further naming Lieutenant Grant, of Her Majesty's 24th Regiment, Lieutenant Powys, of Her Majesty's 61st, who attended him as orderly officers, and of Lieutenant and Adjutant Shadwell, of Her Majesty's 98th, who was with him as a volunteer.

Sir Walter Gilbert speaks warmly of the charge led by Brigadier Mountain against a large battery of the enemy, and followed up on his right by Brigadier Godby, and of the subsequent conduct of these officers; as also of the conduct of Major Chester, Assistant Adjutant-General, and Lieutenant Galloway, Deputy Assistant Quartermaster-General of the division, of Lieutenant Colt, his Aide-de-Camp, of Captain Sherwill and Lieutenant Macdonnell, Majors of Brigade, and of Captain Glasford, and Lieutenant W. E. Morton, of the Engineers.

The Major-General further mentions the undaunted bravery, on this occasion, of Her Majesty's 29th Regiment, under Lieutenant-Colonel Congreve, the distinguished conduct of the 2nd European Regiment under Major Steel, and the manner in which Majors Smith and Way, of the 29th, and Major Talbot, of the 2nd Europeans, seconded their able commanders. He also expresses his thanks to Lieutenant-Colonel Jack, commanding the 30th Native Infantry, Major Bamfield, commanding the 56th Native Infantry, who was mortally wounded, Major Corfield, commanding the 31st Native Infantry, and Major M'Causland, commanding the 70th Native Infantry, for the manner in which they led their regiments into action, naming likewise Captain Nembhard, of the 56th, who succeeded to the command of that corps, Captain Dawes, commanding the field-battery of the division, and Captain Robbins, of the 15th, who acted as his Aide-de-Camp.

The reserve, consisting of the 15th Native Infantry, and eight companies of the 69th Native Infantry, was ably handled by Brigadier Penny, well seconded by Lieutenant-Colonels Sibbald and Mercer, commanding the corps. The Brigadier particularly mentions the steady conduct of the rifle company of the 69th, under Captain Sissmore, and acknowledges the services of Captain Macpherson, his Major of Brigade, and Brevet Captain Morris of the 20th Native Infantry, who attended him as orderly officer.

Brigadier General Tennant, commanding the artillery division, rendered me every aid, and presided over the noble arm of which he is the head, most creditably to himself, and most beneficially to the service. The Brigadier-General particularly mentions Brigadier G. Brooke, who commanded the whole of the horse

artillery, Brigadier Huthwaite, commanding the foot artillery, Lieutenant-Colonels C Grant, and F. Brind, Major R Horsford and Major Mowatt, all of whom were in important commands. He further brings to notice Captain J. Abercrombie, Deputy Assistant Adjutant-General, Lieutenant Tombs, Deputy Assistant Quartermaster General, his Aide-de-Camp, Lieutenant Olpherts, Captain Hogge, Commissary of Ordnance, and Lieutenant de Teissier, who attended him as orderly officer.

I have, in the beginning of this dispatch, noticed the services of Brevet Major Sir Richmond Shakespear, and Brevet Major Ludlow, in command of the heavy batteries, under the general superintendence of Major Horsford; and it only remains for me to add, that the conduct of Major Fordyce, Captains Warner and Duncan, Lieutenants Robinson and Walker, commanding troops and field batteries, as well as the officers and men of the artillery generally, has been named in terms of praise by the divisional commander.

Lieutenants C. V. Cox and E. Kaye, Brigade-Majors of this arm, have been also named by their respective Brigadiers.

From the Engineer Department under Major Tremenhoe, I received active assistance, ably aided by Captain Durand, Lieutenants R. Bard, Smith, and Goodwyn.

To the General Staff I am greatly indebted, Lieutenant-Colonel Gough, C.B., Quartermaster-General, and Major Lugard, Acting Adjutant-General, and Captain C. Otter, Acting Assistant Adjutant-General of Her Majesty's Forces, Lieutenant-Colonel P. Grant, C.B., Adjutant-General of the Army; Major C. Ekins, (killed) a valued and much regretted officer, Deputy Adjutant-General, and Major Tucker, Assistant Adjutant-General of the Army; Lieutenant-Colonel W. Garden, C.B., Quartermaster-General of the army; Lieutenant W. F. Tytler, Assistant Quartermaster-General; and Lieutenant Paton, Deputy Assistant Quartermaster-General of the Army; Lieutenant-Colonel Birch, Judge Advocate-General, and Lieutenant G. B. Johnson, Deputy Judge Advocate-General; Major G. Thomson, Assistant Commissary-General, Lieutenant-Colonel J. G. W. Curtis, Assistant Commissary-General; Captain C. Campbell, Paymaster to the Army, Captain J. Lang, Postmaster, and H. Franklin, Esq., Inspector-General of Her Majesty's Hospitals.

To my personal Staff I am also much indebted, Captain F. P. Haines, Military Secretary; Major H. Bates, Aide-de-Camp, Lieutenant A. Bagot, Aide-de-Camp; Lieutenant S. J. Hire, Aide-de-Camp, Captain Gabbett, Aide-de-Camp; Lieutenant G. N. Hardinge, Aide-de-Camp, and Lieutenant W. G. Prendergast, Persian Interpreter.

The unwearied exertions of Dr. Renny, Superintending Surgeon, and of Dr. Mac Rae, the Field Surgeon, in the care of the wounded, have been beyond all praise.

The Earl of Gifford kindly accompanied me throughout the operations, and was most useful in conveying my orders to the several divisions and brigades. I had also the advantage, through the day, of the active services of Lieutenant-Colonel Sir H. M. Lawrence, Major Mackeson, Mr. Cocks, C.S., Captain Nicholson, and Lieutenant Robinson, as well as of Major Anstruther of the Madras Artillery, and Lieutenant H. O. Mayne, of the 6th Madras Light Cavalry.

Captain Ramsay, Joint Deputy Commissary-General, with the several officers of that department, has been most indefatigable, and has hitherto kept the Army well supplied.

*Return of Killed, Wounded, and Missing, of the Army of the Punjab, under the personal command of the Right Honorable Lord Gough, G.C.B., in the Action with the Sikh Forces, under Raja Shere Sing, at Chillianwalla, on the 13th of January, 1849.*

General Staff.—1 European officer, 1 horse, killed; 2 European officers, wounded.

#### *Artillery Division.*

##### *Horse Artillery Brigade.*

1st Troop 2nd Brigade—5 rank and file, 1 lascar, killed; 1 rank and file, 4 lascars, 2 horses, wounded; 1 rank and file, 22 horses, missing.

2nd Troop 2nd Brigade—4 rank and file, 1 lascar, wounded, 2 horses, missing

3rd Troop 2nd Brigade—1 serjeant, 6 rank and file, killed, 1 European officer, 2 rank and file, 3 lascars, 1 syce, wounded; 1 rank and file, 6 syces, 31 horses, missing.

4th Troop 2nd Brigade—1 European officer, 1 syce, 6 horses, killed; 2 rank and file, 2 horses, wounded, 4 horses, missing.

1st Troop 3rd Brigade—1 rank and file, 1 horse, killed, 1 rank and file, 1 horse, wounded.

2nd Troop 3rd Brigade—1 rank and file, wounded.

#### Foot Artillery Brigade.

1st Company 1st Battalion, No 10 Battery—1 horse, wounded.

3rd Company 1st Battalion, No 17 Battery—3 horses, killed, 2 European officers, 1 drummer, 2 rank and file, wounded; 1 horse, missing.

1st Company 4th Battalion—1 rank and file, killed, 7 rank and file, wounded.

2nd Company 4th Battalion—1 rank and file, killed; 1 serjeant, 2 rank and file, wounded.

4th Company 4th Battalion—1 rank and file, wounded.

6th Company 7th Battalion, No 5 Battery—1 horse, killed, 5 rank and file, 1 horse, wounded, 1 horse, missing

Park Establishment—1 serjeant, killed

Total—1 European officer, 2 serjeants, 14 rank and file, 1 lascar, 1 syce, 11 horses, killed; 3 European officers, 1 serjeant, 1 drummer, 28 rank and file, 8 lascars, 1 syce, 7 horses, wounded; 2 rank and file, 6 syces, 61 horses, missing.

#### *Engineer Department.*

6th Company of Pioneers—3 rank and file, wounded

#### *Cavalry Division*

##### 1st Brigade.

Her Majesty's 3rd Light Dragoons—1 serjeant, 23 rank and file, 26 horses, killed, 2 European officers, 14 rank and file, 14 horses, wounded.

Her Majesty's 14th Light Dragoons—1 European officer, 1 rank and file, 2 horses, killed, 1 European officer, 2 serjeants, 12 rank and file, 2 horses, wounded, 2 rank and file, 4 horses, missing.

5th Regiment of Light Cavalry—2 havildars, 1 trumpeter, 3 rank and file, 7 horses, killed, 2 European officers, 1 Native officer, 2 havildars, 11 rank and file, 7 horses, wounded.

8th Regiment of Light Cavalry—8 rank and file, killed, 2 rank and file, 1 horse, wounded; 2 horses, missing.

##### 2nd Brigade.

Brigade Staff—1 European officer, wounded.

Her Majesty's 9th Lancers—4 rank and file, killed, 8 rank and file, 5 horses, wounded, 4 horses, missing.

1st Regiment Light Cavalry—3 rank and file, 1 syce, 1 horse, killed, 1 native officer, 1 havildar, 2 rank and file, 1 syce, 7 horses, wounded, 3 horses, missing.

6th Regiment Light Cavalry—1 European officer, 2 Native officers, 4 rank and file, 2 horses, killed; 2 European officers, 1 warrant officer, 1 havildar, 6 rank and file, wounded, 6 horses, missing.

Total—2 European officers, 2 Native officers, 3 serjeants or havildars, 1 trumpeter, 39 rank and file, 1 syce, 38 horses, killed, 8 European officers, 2 Native officers, 1 warrant officer, 6 serjeants or havildars, 55 rank and file, 1 syce, 36 horses, wounded, 2 rank and file, 19 horses, missing.

#### *2nd Infantry Division.*

##### 3rd Brigade.

2nd European Regiment—6 rank and file, killed; 2 European officers, 5 serjeants, 54 rank and file, wounded.

31st Regiment of Native Infantry—1 havildar, 2 rank and file, killed, 1 European officer, 2 havildars, 12 rank and file, wounded.

45th Regiment of Native Infantry—4 havildars, 13 rank and file, killed ; 4 European officers, 1 Native officer, 1 havildar, 53 rank and file, wounded ; 3 rank and file, missing.

70th Regiment of Native Infantry—2 Native officers, 3 rank and file, killed ; 20 rank and file, wounded

#### 4th Brigade.

Her Majesty's 29th Foot—2 serjeants, 29 rank and file, killed , 4 European officers, 5 serjeants, 4 drummers, 194 rank and file, wounded ; 3 rank and file, missing

30th Regiment of Native Infantry—2 European officers, 1 Native officer, 10 havildars, 1 drummer, 53 rank and file, killed , 9 European officers, 9 Native officers, 12 havildars, 1 drummer, 187 rank and file, wounded.

56th Regiment of Native Infantry—2 European officers, 4 Native officers, 7 havildars, 32 rank and file, killed ; 6 European officers, 6 Native officers, 18 havildars, 4 drummers, 205 rank and file, wounded , 2 havildars, 36 rank and file, missing

Total—4 European officers, 7 Native officers, 24 serjeants or havildars, 1 drummer, 138 rank and file, killed , 26 European officers, 16 Native officers, 43 serjeants or havildars, 9 drummers, 725 rank and file, wounded ; 2 havildars, 42 rank and file, missing.

### *3rd Infantry Division.*

Divisional Staff—1 European officer, wounded

#### 5th Brigade.

Brigade Staff—2 European officers, killed.

Her Majesty's 24th Foot—11 European officers, 4 serjeants, 1 drummer, 188 rank and file, 2 horses, killed , 10 European officers, 8 serjeants, 2 drummers, 256 rank and file, wounded ; 38 rank and file, missing.

25th Regiment of Native Infantry—1 European officer, 6 Native officers, 13 havildars, 2 drummers, 78 rank and file, killed , 2 European officers, 3 native officers, 3 havildars, 2 drummers, 82 rank and file, 1 horse, wounded 2 havildars, 10 rank and file, missing

#### 6th Brigade

Brigade Staff—1 European officer, wounded

15th Regiment of Native Infantry—4 havildars, 4 rank and file, killed ; 3 European officers, 1 Native officer, 7 havildars, 37 rank and file, wounded.

69th Regiment of Native Infantry—1 havildar, 3 rank and file, killed ; 2 European officers, 8 havildars, 2 drummers, 51 rank and file, wounded.

#### 7th Brigade

Her Majesty's 61st Foot—11 rank and file, killed ; 3 European officers, 7 serjeants, 93 rank and file, wounded.

36th Regiment of Native Infantry—1 Native officer, 2 havildars, 25 rank and file, killed ; 6 European officers, 2 Native officers, 3 havildars, 66 rank and file, wounded

46th Regiment of Native Infantry—3 rank and file, killed ; 3 Native officers, 4 havildars, 1 drummer, 43 rank and file, wounded.

Total—14 European officers, 7 Native officers, 24 serjeants or havildars, 3 drummers, 312 rank and file, 2 horses, killed , 28 European officers, 9 Native officers, 40 serjeants or havildars, 7 drummers, 628 rank and file, 1 horse, wounded ; 2 havildars, 48 rank and file, missing.

Total of all arms—22 European officers, 16 Native officers, 53 serjeants or havildars, 5 drummers, 503 rank and file, 1 lascar, 2 syces, 52 horses, killed , 67 European officers, 27 Native officers, 1 warrant officer, 90 serjeants or havildars, 17 drummers, 1439 rank and file, 8 lascars, 2 syces, 44 horses, wounded , 4 havildars, 94 rank and file, 6 syces, 80 horses, missing

Total—602 men, 52 horses, killed , 1651 men, 44 horses, wounded ; 104 men, 80 horses, missing.

Grand Total—2357 men, and 176 horses.

*Nominal Roll of European Officers Killed, Wounded, or Missing.**Adjutant General's Office, Head Quarters, Camp,  
Chalhanwalla, January 17, 1849.*

- General Staff—Brevet Major C. Ekins, Deputy Adjutant-General of the Army, killed, Brevet Major H. T. Tucker, Assistant Adjutant-General of the Army, contusion, Lieutenant J. S. Paton, Deputy Assistant Quartermaster-General, wounded severely.
- 4th Troop 2nd Brigade, Horse Artillery—Lieutenant J. A. Manson, killed.
- 3rd Troop 2nd Brigade, Horse Artillery—Brevet Major E. Christie, wounded very dangerously, since dead.
- 3rd Company 1st Battalion Artillery—Captain M. Dawes, wounded slightly, First Lieutenant C. S. Dundas, wounded severely
- Her Majesty's 3rd Light Dragoons—Captain W. Unett, wounded severely; Lieutenant T. H. Stisted, wounded.
- 5th Regiment Light Cavalry—Lieutenant R. Christie, wounded dangerously, Lieutenant A. P. C. Elliot, wounded severely.
- 2nd Cavalry Brigade Staff—Brigadier A. Pope, C.B., wounded severely
- Her Majesty's 14th Light Dragoons—Lieutenant A. J. Cureton, killed, Major C. Steuart, wounded.
- 6th Regiment Light Cavalry—Lieutenant A. M. Shepherd, killed, Captain W. J. E. Boys, wounded; Lieutenant H. R. Grindlay, wounded.
- 2nd European Regiment—Lieutenant M. R. Nightingale, wounded very severely, Lieutenant J. Bleaymure, wounded slightly.
- 31st Regiment Native Infantry—Captain W. R. Dunmore, wounded slightly.
- Her Majesty's 19th Foot—Major M. Smith, slight contusion, Lieutenant the Honourable H. M. Monckton, wounded severely; Lieutenant H. T. Metge, wounded very severely, Ensign G. H. Nevill, wounded slightly.
- 30th Regiment Native Infantry—Captain W. H. Ross, killed, Ensign A. C. de Morel, killed, Brevet Major M. E. Loftie, wounded severely, Captain W. C. Campbell, wounded slightly, Captain R. S. Ewart, wounded slightly, Captain C. F. Fenwick, wounded very severely, Captain J. Morrison, wounded slightly, Lieutenant H. Swinhoe, wounded severely; Ensign T. Pierce, wounded slightly, Ensign J. C. Wood, wounded very severely, Ensign W. F. Leicester, wounded very severely
- 56th Regiment Native Infantry—Lieutenant W. W. Warde, killed; Ensign F. W. Robinson, killed, Major D. Bamfield, wounded very severely, since dead, Lieutenant W. C. Gott, wounded slightly, Lieutenant L. B. Jones, wounded severely, Lieutenant F. V. R. Jervis, wounded severely, Lieutenant J. H. Bacon, wounded slightly, Lieutenant J. W. Delamain, wounded severely, arm since amputated.
- 45th Regiment Native Infantry—Captain R. Haldane, wounded severely, Lieutenant J. Palmer, wounded severely, Ensign M. H. Combe, wounded slightly; Ensign W. L. Trotter, wounded badly
- Staff, 3rd Infantry Division—Brigadier General C. Campbell, C.B., wounded slightly.
- Staff, 5th Infantry Brigade—Brigadier J. Pennycuik, C.B., and K.H., killed, Captain C. R. Harris, Major of Brigade, killed.
- Her Majesty's 24th Foot—Lieutenant-Colonel R. Brookes, killed, Major H. W. Harris, killed; Captain C. Lee, killed, Captain J. S. Shore, killed; Captain R. W. Travers, killed; Lieutenant G. Phillips, killed; Lieutenant O. B. Payne, killed, Lieutenant J. A. Woodgate, killed; Lieutenant W. Phillips, killed, Ensign H. C. B. Collis, killed; Ensign A. Pennycuik, killed; Major H. Paynter, wounded dangerously, Captain W. G. Brown, wounded slightly; Captain L. H. Bazalgette, wounded severely; Lieutenant G. E. L. Williams, wounded dangerously, Lieutenant R. A. Croker, wounded severely; Lieutenant G. F. Berry, wounded slightly; Lieutenant J. B. Thelwall, wounded severely;



- Lieutenant and Adjutant W Hartshorn, wounded slightly, Lieutenant A. J. Macpherson, wounded severely, Lieutenant J H. Archer, Her Majesty's 96th Regiment, wounded slightly.
- 25th Regiment Native Infantry—Lieutenant A. Money, killed, Lieutenant A. G. C. Sutherland, wounded slightly; Lieutenant F. A. Jeune, wounded slightly.
- Staff, 6th Infantry Brigade.—Brevet Captain A. B. Morris, officiating Brigade Major, wounded slightly.
- 15th Regiment Native Infantry—Lieutenant and Adjutant G. G. Anderson, wounded severely, Lieutenant H. R. Shawe, slightly; Lieutenant W. G. Ellice, wounded slightly.
- 69th Regiment Native Infantry—Captain J. A. James, wounded severely, Lieutenant J. Nisbett, wounded severely.
- Her Majesty's 61st Foot—Captain J. Massey, wounded severely, Ensign J. Nagle, wounded severely, Ensign J. H. H. Parks, wounded slightly.
- 36th Regiment Native Infantry—Captain F. A. Carleton, wounded severely, Lieutenant Interpreter and Quartermaster A. N. Thompson, wounded, since dead, Lieutenant and Adjutant C. S. Weston, wounded severely, Lieutenant J. D. Magnay, wounded slightly; Ensign F. J. S. Bagshaw, wounded severely, Ensign C. J. Godby, wounded dangerously.

*Last of Ordnance and Ordnance Stores captured from the Enemy, in the Action of the 13th of January*

*Camp, Chulhanwalla, January 15, 1849*

No	Cahbre	Nature	Remarks
1	3 84	7 pr	Six of these guns have carriages and limbers, and six are without limbers, all of the pattern nearly in use with our field pieces
2	3 80	7 pr	
3	3 79	7 pr	
4	3 40	5½ pr	
5	3 67	6 pr	
6	3 80	7 pr	
7	3 76	7 pr	
8	3 75	7 pr	
9	2 90	3 pr.	
10	3 94	7½ pr	
11	3 74	6½ pr	
12	3 60	6 pr	

Two ammunition carriages (one partly destroyed by explosion), 1 platform cart, 144 cartridge liners fixed to shot; 16 cartridges unfixed; and 18 port fires have also been brought into Park.

Inclosure 52 in No. 44.

*The Resident at Lahore to the Secretary with the Governor-General.*

*Lahore, January 15, 1849.*

I SUBMIT a list of the Sirdars attached to the Lahore Durbar and State, who have not openly joined the rebels.

## Inclosure 53 in No. 44.

*List of Sardars and others attached to the Lahore Government, who have not openly joined the Rebels.*

1. Raja Tej Sing, Bahadoor
2. Sirdar Bugwan Sing, a youth, cousin of the above
3. Raja Deena Nath
4. Sirdar Utter Sing, Kalcewala
5. " Lal Sing, son of the above
6. " Shumshera Sing, Sindanwala
7. " Keher Sing
8. " Runjore Sing } Brothers of the above
9. " Thakoor Sing }
10. " Hurdut Sing, Pudhaneeah
11. " Richpaul Sing, Mulwye
12. " Goormookh Sing, Lummah
13. " Surdool Sing, son of late Futteh Sing, Man
14. " Jowala Sing, brother of the above
15. " Boor Sing, Mehrab
16. " Rum Sing, Jullawallia
17. " Sheik Emamooddeen, and his relatives and dependents
18. " Dewan Jowahir Mull Dutt
19. " " Misr Rulla Ram
20. " " Misr Sahib Dyal }
21. " " Hurcharu Doss } Sons of No. 19
22. Fakeer Noorooddeen
23. Sirdar Mungul Sing
24. " Jhunda Sing
25. " Nidhan Sing
26. " Golab Sing, Bhagoowala
27. " Jodh Sing, Adawluttee of Umritsur
28. " Mehtab Sing, Majeeta
29. " Hurdut Sing, brother of above
30. " Khan Sing, Attareewala, with his three young relatives, all minors
31. " Khan Sing, Kohareah
32. " Sodhi Nihal Sing
33. " Goor Buksh Sing
34. " Busunt Sing, son of late Khan Sing Banka

## Inclosure 54 in No. 44

*R. Money, Esquire, Officiating Magistrate of Allahabad, to R. Lowther, Esquire, Commissioner of the 4th, or Allahabad, Division.*

*Allahabad, December 29, 1848.*

UJEET SING, the late Raja of Ladwa, has made his escape. I believe he effected it last night. The Burkundauze of the Kotwallee, who was appointed to watch him, was relieved yesterday by another, who was, this morning, found in the Raja's house, most brutally murdered. His legs were tied together, and to his thighs; and his arms tied behind his back, and a large handkerchief had been forced into his mouth so as entirely to fill the orifice, after which a cloth had been bound in several folds over his face, and he was inclosed in a box in which he was this morning found dead. The skin was rubbed off one of his knees, either from his struggling when in the box, or when he was being bound.

I have issued orders for the apprehension of the Raja to all the Thannadars of the district, and to the frontier Sowars, and have sent copies of proceedings to the magistrates of all the districts through which he might pass, and to the Residents of Lucknow and Nepal, and the Governor-General's Agent in Bun-

delcund, and I have also written a letter to the Raja of Rewa, to which place I have reason to believe it is most probable that the Raja has proceeded.

I would make a pursuit myself in the direction of Rewa, were my presence not required here. I have sent sowars in different directions to trace him.

#### No. 45.

##### *The Governor-General to the Court of Directors.*

*Camp, Ferozepore, February 1, 1849. (No. 8.)*

I HAVE the honor to forward papers regarding the re-appointment of Lieutenant-Colonel Sir H. M. Lawrence, K.C.B., to the Residency at Lahore.

I have thought it desirable that Sir H. Lawrence should, for the present, discharge all the functions, and exercise all the powers, which were conferred on Sir F. Currie, by Mr. Elliot's letter of the 15th of January of last year.

I have directed my best thanks to be conveyed to Sir F. Currie for the services which he has rendered, and for the cordial and effective manner in which he has carried out the instructions of the Government of India, during the important period of his tenure of office at Lahore.

#### No 46

##### *The Governor-General to the Secret Committee.*

*Camp, Ferozepore, February 7, 1849. (No. 9)*

YOU will have received, through the Government of Bombay, by the last mail, the intelligence of the unconditional surrender of Moolraj, and the occupation of the citadel of Mooltan by British troops.

The inclosed papers contain full details of this event, and I beg to call your attention to the\* notification which I caused to be published, together with Major-General Whish's dispatches, conveying my warmest thanks to the Major-General for the valuable service which has thus, under Providence, been rendered to the Government, by the united forces which he commands, and my congratulations to the army, on this successful result of a siege, steadily and skilfully prosecuted, and attended with a loss of life very small in proportion to the end attained, and the blow inflicted upon the enemy.

Major-General Whish, with his whole force, excepting a portion of the Bombay division left at Mooltan, is now proceeding, with all possible expedition, to join his Excellency the Commander-in-Chief. The troops commenced moving, on the 27th ultimo, and were all on their way by the 31st. It is calculated that they ought to effect the junction with the Commander-in-Chief's army, by the 20th instant.

I stated, in my letter of the 22nd ultimo, that I intended further to notice the services of the officers and men engaged in the action at Chillianwalla on the 13th ultimo, and I now forward to you a copy of a general order† which I issued on the 24th ultimo, on the occasion of publishing the Commander-in-Chief's dispatch, for the information of the army, and of the people of India.

During the last fortnight, no change has taken place in the position of the Commander-in-Chief's army, or in that of the enemy opposed to it. Shere Sing has been joined by his father Chuttur Sing. The transactions of the latter with the Ameer Dost Mahomed Khan, for the purpose of obtaining his cooperation, are thus described by Captain Abbott —“Chuttur Sing has given 60,000 rupees to the Ameer,—that is, 30,000 rupees in cash, 15,000 in shawls, leaving a balance of 15,000 to be received at Rawul Pindee. For this sum the Ameer has lent him the services of, nominally, 1000 Horse, but, really, less than 800, who have marched with the Ameer's son, Akram Khan, for Rawul Pindee. The men are said to be greatly disheartened at the order to march, and to consider it equivalent to a sentence of death.” Dost Mahomed, by the last accounts from Captain Abbott, which reach to as late as the 30th ultimo, was still on the right bank of the Indus, with half his force; the other half being at Shumsabad. He has now

\* Inclosure 19 in No. 46.

† Inclosure 28 in No. 46.

committed himself to an extent which it is hardly possible for him to explain away.

Two documents worthy of your attention among these papers are, the letter\* addressed to the Resident at Lahore on the 27th ultimo, regarding his communication with the vakeel of Maharajah Golab Sing, and the Resident's letter of the 30th ultimo,† forwarding the translation of a letter from Golab Sing. I have considered it necessary to address Golab Sing in strong language of advice and warning, intimating plainly to him what part the British Government expect him to adopt, in the present state of affairs, conformably with the obligation imposed upon him by treaty, and pointing out to him the consequences of even a lukewarm conduct, at a time like the present, when the British Government look for, and have a right to demand, his cordial and strenuous cooperation.

You will be sorry to observe, from Brigadier-General Wheeler's report‡ of the proceedings of the force under his command, that the defeat and dispersion of Ram Sing and his followers, which was noticed in my dispatch of the 22nd ultimo, was not effected without loss, two officers having been killed.

Lieutenant Taylor, having gained possession of the fort of Lukkee, retains his hold there firmly; his position has become an important one. A son of Dost Mahomed Khan's, with 2,500 men and two guns, is at Duleepgurh in Bunnoo, three marches from Lukkee, and "is trying," Lieutenant Taylor writes, "to induce the Bunnoochees and surrounding tribes to join him in a religious war against the Sikhs and Feringees." The advance of the Affghans to Bunnoo occurred, immediately after Attock had fallen into their hands. There is, at this moment, no obstacle to their aggressions west of the Jhelum, except the presence of Lieutenant Taylor, with the irregular force under his command, which has, lately, been considerably strengthened.

You will have received from the Bombay Government the intelligence communicated to Major Jacob, Political Superintendent on the frontier of Upper Sinde, of an Affghan army being on the march from Candahar to Quetta, for the purpose of invading Cutchee and Sinde. The report wants further confirmation of its accuracy; and the season is not one in which it is easy for troops to march through the passes, provided the snow has fallen in its usual quantity; but there seems little reason to doubt that some gathering of troops had taken place at Candahar, and that some move was contemplated. Thus, from various quarters, Dost Mahomed's hostile intentions are manifest. Affghans are in Peshawur—have seized Attock—are in Bunnoo—are said to be moving against the British territory from Candahar—are actually in cooperation with Shere Sing. Affghans are urging the hill chiefs about Cashmere to rise, and aid them to gain possession of that province, promising them jagheers and rewards. Much, therefore, will still remain for the British troops to effect, after the enemy, now immediately opposed to them, has been swept away. The Affghans also must be driven forth from a province which they have invaded, and taken possession of, and be punished for their temerity. Dost Mahomed, untaught by the experience of the past, must be made to feel the folly, and see the utter futility, of his ambitious attempts against the British power.

Inclosure 1 in No. 46.

*Major-General Whish to the Adjutant-General.*

*Camp, Mooltan, January 11, 1849.*

ON the 7th instant, the seven eighteen-pounder battery was completed and armed, and a mortar battery for three ten-howitzers.

On the 8th instant, the battery for six (twenty-four-pounders) and six (eighteen-pounders) was commenced, and trenches widened: the object of this battery is to keep down the fire of the citadel opposite it, and, eventually, to breach at the north-east angle: the sap (commenced on the 6th) was carried on, the object being to blow in the counterscarp.

On the 9th instant, the sap was advanced about ninety-five feet; the seven eighteen-pounder battery, constructed of fascines and sand-bags, was set on fire

\* Inclosure 32 in No. 46.

† Inclosure 33 in No. 46.

‡ Inclosure 31 in No. 46.

about 3½ P.M. by a shell of the enemy's, and burnt down, in spite of every effort to extinguish it. The guns and powder were saved by the exertions of the sailors of the Indus flotilla, who had been working the guns, when the accident occurred. The enemy, observing the occurrence, kept up a very heavy fire, and several men were wounded. A position was prepared in the city for six guns, and four five-and-a-half-inch mortars, and roads leading to it widened.

On the night of the 10th, 110 gabions were added, in continuation of the sap, which brings it pretty near the foot of the glacis. The enemy alarmed, and continued a very heavy fire throughout the night, which impeded the work. After daylight, the fire was kept down by riflemen, for whom advantage had been taken of a temporary lull to construct cover, which flanks the head of the sap.

Inclosure 2 in No. 46.

*Major-General Whish to the Adjutant-General.*

*Camp, Mooltan, January 19, 1849.*

AFTER carefully examining both breaches, yesterday afternoon, I came away satisfied that additional means were only necessary for filling up the ditch, which Brigadier Cheape promises without delay. I rode all round Mooltan this morning, to see whether our investment was sufficiently close; and Major Becher, Assistant Quarter-Master General, has just returned, after carrying into effect some modifications that I had considered necessary. In this tour, I learnt, from our pickets, that about 140 of the garrison had surrendered to them, in the course of the night, their arms were taken from them, and the men were then sent to the Assistant-Resident, who means to detain them all, until the campaign is over.

At about 2 o'clock, I received a letter from Moolraj, by a messenger from the fort, who had also one for Major Edwardes (no doubt to the same effect), requiring permission to send a confidential agent to me. I mean, in reply, to desire the unconditional surrender of himself and garrison, at 8 A.M. to-morrow.

An hour ago, one of our hurkaras came in with information, that a chief, named Davee Doss, who has about 300 followers, offered to try and persuade Moolraj to surrender (saying, that his father, and Maharajah Runjeet Sing himself, used to attend to his advice); I remarked, that I had now two roads into the citadel, but that, if he would do as he proposed (if the Dewan did not acquiesce in his proposition), that is, open one of the gates, he had better come to me this evening, and settle the best plan of proceeding. I do not expect any satisfactory result from either of these projects.

Inclosure 3 in No. 46.

*Major Edwardes to the Resident at Lahore.*

*Mooltan, January 19, 1849.*

YOU will be naturally anxious to know how Lieutenant Taylor is prepared to meet the new enemy who has appeared in Bunnoo and I hasten to assure you, that he is not only in a position to protect himself, but also the important frontier under my charge.

During the siege of Lukkee, Lieutenant Taylor had with him 2,000 men; irregular levies, but, as their services have proved, fully to be relied on in any difficulty. His artillery consisted of four very bad guns, out of the fort of Dera Ismael Khan; but the capture of Lukkee fort gave him two serviceable heavy guns, and several zumboorahs. As soon as the city of Mooltan was taken by General Whish, I despatched 1,000 more irregulars and ten zumboorahs, to the assistance of Lieutenant Taylor, who, in his letter of the 12th, expresses ignorance of their whereabouts, but, on that very day, they were at Dera Ismael Khan, only four marches from him. A few days after the despatch of the 1,000 irregulars, I also sent a troop of excellent horse artillery, with two companies of regular infantry, and 100 Pushtun horse:

and, thinking that another European officer would be required to assist Lieutenant Taylor, I put this last detachment under the command of Lieutenant George Pearse, of the Madras artillery, whom you had kindly placed at my disposal for general service. This reinforcement was, I believe, at Dera Ismael Khan yesterday, and is, to-day, within reach of a forced march from Lukkee. When Lieutenant Pearse joins Lieutenant Taylor, those two officers will have 3,300 men, twelve guns, and about twenty zumboorahs, with the fort of Lukkee in their possession, as a rallying point; and if Lieutenant Taylor takes up the position he proposes, with his left on the fort of Lukkee, his right on the town and his front towards Bunnoo, I consider it perfectly unassailable by any, but a regular, and well-provided, force.

Still, it is desirable that Lieutenant Taylor should be strong enough, not only to hold his own in Murwut, but to make the Dooranees uncomfortable in Bunnoo, and, for this purpose, I am preparing 1,000 more regular infantry, 500 irregular ditto, 500 irregular horse, and six more guns, who will leave Mooltan in a day or two, and, by the time this reinforcement reaches Lukkee, not only Mooltan will have fallen, but, it is to be hoped, the Sikh army will have been driven over the Jhelum, and the rebel cause be so evidently hopeless, as to induce Mahomed Azim Khan to abandon Bunnoo. Should he not do so, I have told Lieutenant Taylor, that the forcible re-occupation of that valley is a duty which he is neither required, nor expected, to attempt, though its recovery is highly desirable, should a favorable opportunity offer itself.

This discretion may well be left to Lieutenant Taylor, whose judgment is as sound, as his zeal for the public service is remarkable, and I feel sure that he will, already, have earned your warmest approbation, by completing the reduction of Lukkee, the key of the Derajat, in the face of an obstinate resistance from within, and the most discouraging rumours of Dooranee invasion from without, this too, without one regular soldier, and with means which would have been altogether inadequate, in the hands of any one less resolute. The value of the fort of Lukkee is well understood upon the Trans-Indus frontier, and the rapid and unexpected march of Dost Mahomed's son from Khorassan to Bunnoo, was solely to raise the siege of that place, and had he succeeded (that is, had he arrived twenty-four hours sooner,) Lieutenant Taylor must have fallen back behind the Peyzoo Pass, in Tak, leaving Murwut and Esakhail, in the hands of the Dooranees, a reverse which would have placed the rest of the Derajat in danger, and necessitated the dispatch of a regular brigade, at least, Trans-Indus, to prevent the left flank of Lord Gough's operations from being turned. As it is, I believe that Lieutenant Taylor will be able to confine the Dooranees to Bunnoo, and preserve the peace of the frontier, throughout the war, without the assistance of one regular soldier from the army of the Punjab.

Inclosure 4 in No. 46.

*Major-General Whish to the Adjutant-General.*

*Camp, Mooltan, January 21, 1849*

IN my letter of the 19th instant, I mentioned having had another messenger from Dewan Moolraj, with a note, requesting permission to send a confidential agent to me. In reply, I desired his unconditional surrender at 8 A.M. next day, and, when I received the answer from Major Edwardes to sign and send, I took occasion to notice emphatically to the messenger, that I should confine to the guard any men that brought any documents or message from the Dewan, who were not authorized to the above effect. Nothing transpired regarding it, yesterday, and I issued the orders for making the assault at both breaches, at daylight this morning. The counterscarp, on the city side, not having, however, been blown in, as was calculated upon, I postponed the attack till 6 A.M. to-morrow. However, at 11 A.M. to-day, just as Major Edwardes had called to speak on matters connected with our march hence, the vakeel, who had waited on me on the 9th instant, Dya Buksh, came, under a guard from our

pickets, with a letter from the Dewan to each of us, the purport of which was, that he required assurance of his life, and that the females of his family should not be disgraced. I said, in reply, that, regarding the former, I had only authority to require the Dewan's unconditional submission to the justice of the British Government, and that no stipulation was necessary regarding the latter, for women and children, as a matter of course, would not be molested. Dya Buksh then said, his master would certainly come in, and suggested 9 A.M. to-morrow, for the time of his doing so; but I could not agree to so late an hour. I told him the fire of all my batteries would continue until 5 o'clock to-morrow morning, and that the Dewan must, at latest, present himself and garrison at the Dowlut gate of the city, at sun-rise, where arrangements would be ready to facilitate their surrender, and to afford protection to their families.

I will, in conclusion, venture my opinion, that the Dewan is now sincere in his desire to submit. His followers are leaving him in large numbers, and our cavalry took prisoners about 300, who stole from the citadel, last night; but if it prove otherwise, I shall have nothing to regret in having attended to a third reference from him, for the sake of humanity, and for the welfare of my troops; and the only difference it will make in my arrangements will be, that the assault on the citadel will commence an hour later, and be equally attended, under Providence, with, I trust, complete success.

Inclosure 5 in No. 46.

*Major Edwardes to the Resident at Lahore.*

*Camp, Mooltan, January 21, 1849.*

THE rebel is reduced to the last extremity; he was, all yesterday, endeavouring to rally the garrison, but they told him, plainly, that he must do one or the other of two things. sally out, at the head of his troops and cut his way through the besiegers, or, immediately, surrender, as it was impossible for the soldiers to stand the shelling any longer. At last, Moolraj made up his mind to surrender, and, this morning, sent urzee No. 1, to the Major-General Commanding, enclosed in one to me, as usual.

The urzee was brought by two vakeels, Dya Buksh and Hakim Raee, from whose manner it was evident that the surrender had been conclusively decided on. They, at first, urged a little the condition of sparing the Dewan's life; but, being again told, as on all former occasions, that the General had no authority either to give, or to take away, (except in fight) Moolraj's life, they seemed quite prepared to yield the point, and catch at any reprieve from immediate death. The other request, for the safety and honor of the women, was so consonant to the wishes of every Englishman, and violence is so difficult to prevent in the fury of an assault, that both Major General Whish and myself considered it would be no departure from the spirit of Government-instructions to grant it without scruple.

Sunrise to-morrow morning, at the Dowlut gate, has, accordingly, been fixed for the Dewan's surrender. The assault was, yesterday, ordered to be made this morning at dawn; but, subsequently, postponed till the same hour to-morrow, to allow of the breach on the city side being improved; and should Moolraj not come in, as now arranged, it will only delay the attack an hour.

Inclosure 6 in No. 46.

*Dewan Moolraj to Major-General Whish.*

YOU yesterday ordered me to come in, and surrender before 9 A. M., but I was prevented by sickness from complying sooner. I am now ready to come in, and for this purpose have sent my vakeel to arrange with you; your slave desires only protection for his own life, and the honor of his women. The whole of this disturbance was set on foot by my soldiers, and all my endeavours failed to quell it; now, however, I surrender myself. I

ask only for my own life, and the honor of my women. You are an ocean of mercy—what more need be said.

**NOTE.**—The letter apparently was intended to end here, but is continued in a hurried, and seemingly different, hand as follows:—

This whole affair originated in accident, and my own force was ready to kill and insult me; of my own free-will, I would never have done what I have; nevertheless, I confess myself an offender in every way. If you grant me my life, and protection to my women, I surrender: otherwise,

“It is better to die with honor than to live with disgrace.”

You are a sea of compassion, if you forgive me, I am fortunate; if you do not, I meet my fate with contentment.

Inclosure 7 in No. 46.

*Major-General Whish to Dewan Moolraj.*

I HAVE received your urzee. In it you write that you only ask for your own life, and the honor of your women. This is my answer: That I have neither authority to give your life, nor to take it, except in open war, the Governor-General only can do this:—and, as to your women, the British Government wars with men—not with women. I will protect your women and children, to the best of my ability. Take notice, however, if you intend to come in at all, you had better do so, before sunrise to-morrow, and come out by the Dowlut gate. After sunrise, you must take the fortune of war.

Inclosure 8 in No. 46

*Notification.*

*Camp, Mukkoo, January 25, 1849.*

THE Governor-General has the highest satisfaction in intimating to the President in Council, and notifying for public information, that he has, this day, received intelligence, that, on the morning of the 22nd instant, when, practicable breaches having been effected, the troops were about to storm the citadel of Mooltan, the Dewan Moolraj surrendered himself with his whole garrison, unconditionally, to the British Government.

The Governor-General directs that a salute of twenty-one guns shall be fired, at every principal station of the Army, as soon as this notification shall be received.

Inclosure 9 in No. 46.

*The Adjutant-General to the Secretary with the Governor-General.*

*Camp, Chillianwalla, January 28, 1849.*

BY direction of the Commander-in-Chief, I have the honor to inclose, for the information of the Governor-General of India, a copy of a dispatch of the 22nd instant, from Major-General W. S. Whish, C B, commanding the Mooltan field force, reporting the surrender, on the morning of that day, of the garrison and citadel of Mooltan.

I am further to add, for communication to his Lordship, that, on the receipt of this dispatch, his Excellency was pleased to issue to the army of the Punjab an order (a copy of which is herewith transmitted) expressive of his sense of the great services thus brought to a brilliant and successful termination by the Major-General, and the admirable troops under his command.



Inclosure 10 in No. 46.

*General Orders to the Army of the Punjab.*

*Head-Quarters, Camp, Chillianwalla, January 26, 1849.*

THE officer commanding the artillery will be so good as to direct a royal salute to be immediately fired from the heavy guns, in honor of the capture of Mooltan by the British force, under command of Major-General W. S. Whish, C.B., on the morning of the 22nd instant

The Right Honorable the Commander-in-Chief most heartily congratulates Major-General W. S. Whish, and the brave officers and troops under his command, on the very important success their intrepidity, valor, and exemplary discipline have thus achieved

Inclosure 11 in No. 46.

*Major-General Whish to the Adjutant-General.*

*Camp, Mooltan, January 22, 1849*

I HAVE the satisfaction of reporting to you, for the information of the Commander-in-Chief, that, in accordance with the expectation I expressed in my letter of yesterday, Dewan Moolraj came into my camp this morning, in charge of Major Becher, Assistant Quartermaster-General, the garrison at the same time, between 3,000 and 4,000, surrendering, and laying down their arms, to the columns under Brigadiers Hervey and Capon, that had been in orders for the assault of the citadel. This peaceful and successful termination to our siege operations, after the laborious and gallant exertions of the troops since the 27th ultimo, will, I have no doubt, be very gratifying to his Lordship and to the Government, and I am grateful to Divine Providence for having permitted, in this way, the accomplishment of such an important result

On the 1st instant, with my letter, I had the satisfaction of forwarding Brigadier the Honorable H. Dundas's report of the conduct of the troops of his division, engaged in the attack on the suburbs on the 27th ultimo, of the left column of which he took personal command, particularizing many officers in command of corps or departments, and on the staff, whose services had been valuable. Also on the 7th instant, with my letter, I transmitted similar reports of the proceedings of the two columns under Brigadiers Stalker and Markham, that had taken the city by assault on the 2nd instant, and which will, I trust, meet with the favorable consideration of his Lordship. But, not having, hitherto, availed myself of any occasion to notice, in just terms of commendation, various officers of the Bengal division, who have been with me the last six months, I beg permission to do so now.

To Brigadier Cheape, C.B. chief engineer of the army of the Punjab, and Major Napier, chief engineer of the Bengal division, to Captains Abercrombie, Western, and Siddons; to Lieutenant Garforth, Brigade-Major of engineers, dangerously wounded on the 2nd instant, and to all the officers of the engineer department, and of the corps of Sappers and Pioneers, I am much indebted for their zealous, scientific, and persevering exertions, as also to Major Scott, chief engineer of the Bombay division, and to the officers under him

The practice of the artillery was the theme of admiration with all. My thanks are particularly due to Majors Garbett and Leeson, respectively commanding the artillery of the Bengal and Bombay divisions, and to the officers under them, Brevet-Major Blood, and Captains Turnbull, Daniell, Anderson, Master, and Mackenzie. Lieutenant Mill, Brigade-Major of the artillery of the Bengal division since July, has been particularly brought to my notice by Major Garbett, for his useful services, and as contributing essentially to the advance of our operations. I must particularly commend those of Captain Hicks, Bombay artillery, and Lieutenant P. Christie, Bengal artillery, Commissaries of Ordnance, who were unremitting in their attention to their important duties. The services of Brigadiers Hervey and Markham, commanding infantry brigades, and of Brigadier Salter, commanding the cavalry, as also of their Brigade-Majors Captains Wiggins and Balfour, and Lieutenant Warner, have been very valuable; and it will be in the recollection of his

Lordship that Brigadier-Musharn had the good fortune, on the 7th of November last, and on the 2nd instant, to command columns of attack that were eminently successful.

In my letter of the 7th instant, I noticed the gallant proposition of Lieutenant-Colonel Franks, C.B., commanding Her Majesty's 10th Regiment, for a party being given him to escalade the citadel on the 2nd instant; and I am much indebted to that officer on other accounts.

It is also proper for me to notice, in terms of commendation, the other officers commanding corps in the Bengal division, and under canvass the last six months, namely,—Lieutenant-Colonel Brooke, Her Majesty's 32nd Regiment; Major Farquharson, commanding 8th Native Infantry; Major Lloyd, commanding 49th Regiment; Major Fianis, commanding 51st Native Infantry; Captain Jamieson, commanding 52nd Native Infantry; Captain Lloyd, commanding 72nd Native Infantry (relieved on the 30th of November by Lieutenant-Colonel Nash, C.B., who was severely wounded in the attack of the 27th ultimo); Captain Inglis, commanding 11th Regiment Light Cavalry, Major Wheeler, commanding 7th Irregular Cavalry; Captain Master, commanding the 11th Irregular Cavalry, and Lieutenant Roberts, commanding squadron of the 14th Irregular Cavalry, who relieved from that charge, on the 30th of November, Lieutenant Plowden, of the 50th Native Infantry.

Lieutenant-Colonel Drummond, C.B., Deputy Quartermaster-General, and Major Beecher, Assistant Quartermaster-General, have uniformly given me the most efficient aid, and with a willingness that much enhanced it; and the Assistant-Adjutant-General, Brevet-Captain Whish, has performed his laborious duties with a promptness, intelligence, and zeal, that much lessened mine.

Captain Lloyd, in charge of the Commissariat department (assisted by Captains Cooper and Turner, Lieutenants Tombs, Robertson, and Wiles), has uniformly made such excellent arrangements that the troops have never been inconvenienced for want of supplies; and that department has in every respect been conducted most satisfactorily.

The Superintending Surgeon, Dempster, has, uniformly, and successfully, applied his talents and assiduity to the promotion of the health and comfort of our sick and wounded, and been ably supported by the medical officers of every corps and department.

The officers of my personal staff, Captain Clark Kennedy, Her Majesty's 18th Regiment, and Lieutenant Need, Her Majesty's 14th Light Dragoons, Aides-de-Camp, have been so unremitting in their exertions to promote the service, that I cannot convey a correct idea of the grateful feeling their conduct has impressed on me. They both merit my warmest commendations and thanks.

I have written this dispatch in much haste, and fear I have omitted the names of some to whom I feel much indebted, in which case I shall not fail to repair the omission.

It is very satisfactory to me to add, in conclusion, that I have always experienced, from Brigadier the Honorable H. Dundas, C.B., commanding the Bombay division, and from the brigadiers and officers in command under him, the most willing assistance.

The services of Commander Powell, of the Indian navy, with the steamers under his orders, have been of much value to the objects of the expedition; and a detail of seamen from the vessels has afforded material relief at the batteries on several occasions.

I have had the greatest satisfaction in directing a royal salute to be fired from the citadel at noon, in honor of his Lordship's victory over the Sikhs on the 13th instant; and I shall order another to be fired at sun-set, for the happy termination of military operations in this quarter.

Inclosure 12 in No. 46.

*Major Edwards, to the Resident at Lahore.*

*Camp, Mooltan, January 22, 1848.*

IT is with heartfelt satisfaction that I announce to you the surrender of Dewan Moolraj to Major-General Whish, C.B., at 9 A. M. this morning, and the occupation, by British troops, of the strong fortress of Mooltan, without the bloodshed of an assault.

The morning opened with a severe storm of thunder and rain; which did not interfere, however, with the arrangements for assaulting the citadel, by two breaches, should the rebels fail to surrender by the hour appointed; and the determined attitude of the besiegers, undismayed by the raging elements, must have had no small share in convincing the garrison that further resistance was in vain.

The flag of Old England is now flying out, in a fresh breeze, and bright sunshine, from the highest bastion of the citadel.

Dewan Moolraj is a prisoner in the tent of the chief engineer.

The troops intended for the assault are now disarming the garrison, protecting the women and children.

I congratulate you, and the Government of British India, on the extinction of the firebrand which raised this flame in the Punjab.

Inclosure 13 in No. 46.

*Major-General Whish to the Adjutant-General.*

*Camp, Mooltan, January 23, 1849*

ALTHOUGH I have in due course taken leave to bring to the notice of the Right Honorable the Commander in-Chief, from time to time, the services rendered by the allied troops under Major Edwardes, C.B., Assistant Resident, as I am about to part with that officer, whose willing and valuable aid I have frequently experienced since our first encamping before Mooltan, I will venture upon a brief recapitulation of what has been done by the forces under him and Lieutenant Lake, Engineers, respectively; the latter officer having had unassisted charge of the Nawab of Bahawulpore troops, until he was wounded on the 12th of September last, when he was, for a month, relieved by Lieutenant Taylor, 11th Light Cavalry, Assistant Resident, who was prevented from continuing during the siege, by a chivalrous expedition he undertook to recover our captives from Peshawur. General Van Cortlandt commanded the regular regiments and artillery of the Durbar, and, as far as came under my observation, executed an arduous trust, under occasionally critical circumstances, with much judgment and zeal. Lieutenant Lumsden, Assistant Resident, with a detachment of the guide corps, performed useful service, for the two months he was in the allied camp. Lieutenant Pollock, 49th Regiment Native Infantry, Assistant Resident, has more than once distinguished himself at the head of a detachment during the siege, and joined his corps for the storm of the city on the 2nd instant. Lieutenant Young, Engineers, had charge of the Irregular Sappers and Miners, and, under the orders of Major Scott, Chief Engineer, Bombay division, was eminently useful on the line of attack on the city side. Dr. Cole has been, as usual, foremost in the cause of humanity; and, after attending to his own sick, a very large hospital of the wounded of the enemy experienced the benefit of his skill and care.

Before I conclude this brief notice of the officers attached to the allied forces that, exclusive of, on various occasions, having been successfully engaged with the enemy, maintained our communication with the Sutlej and Chenab, and furnished escorts for our supplies, &c., I beg to notice two gentlemen, at present non-military, who have done good service, Messrs. Hugo James and Mc Mahon, volunteers; the former having joined Major Edwardes, in the hot season, and thence done duty with three companies of infantry, that he had raised and drilled; the latter having joined early last month, and, on the 29th ultimo, distinguished himself, when the enemy twice unsuccessfully attacked the troops commanded by Major Edwardes and Lieutenant Lake, by cutting down the leader of the Sikh infantry in single combat, and by joining the storming column of Brigadier Markham, in the assault of the city, on the 2nd instant.

As the detachment of Bombay troops under Major Hallett, consisting of five troops of Sindie Horse (under Lieutenants Malcolm and Merrett), Captain Turnbull's light field battery, and 3rd Regiment Native Infantry, joined me a fortnight before the main body, and performed during that time most useful service, I beg to acknowledge my obligations to Major Hallett for the same.

Inclosure 14 in No. 46.  
 Major-General, Whisk to the Adjutant-General.

Camp, Mooltan, January 23, 1849.

IN the haste of despatching to you my letter of yesterday's date, I had not time to examine the fair copy previous to signature. I find to-day a clerical error, in the omission of Major Day's (of artillery) name, immediately before that of Brevet-Major Blood, which I shall be obliged by your causing to be corrected, previous to its transmission to higher authority, should such a measure be deemed suitable.

Inclosure 15 in No. 46.

*Return of Casualties in the Operations before Mooltan, 1848-49.*

*Bengal Division.*

Engineer Department, Sappers and Pioneers—18 rank and file, killed, 7 European officers, 1 Native officer, 5 havildars, 34 rank and file, wounded  
 Artillery—1 European officer, 2 havildars, 10 rank and file, killed; 4 European officers, 3 havildars, 62 rank and file, wounded.  
 11th Regiment Light Cavalry—6 rank and file, wounded.  
 7th Regiment Irregular Cavalry—2 rank and file, killed; 2 Native officers, 4 rank and file, wounded.  
 11th Regiment Irregular Cavalry—1 Native officer, 1 havildar, 6 rank and file, wounded.  
 Her Majesty's 10th Foot—1 European officer, 13 rank and file, killed; 4 European officers, 5 serjeants, 1 drummer, 107 rank and file, wounded.  
 Her Majesty's 32nd Foot—2 European officers, 1 serjeant, 16 rank and file, killed; 11 European officers, 3 serjeants, 1 drummer, 102 rank and file, wounded.  
 8th Regiment Native Infantry—1 European officer, 3 rank and file, killed; 3 European officers, 1 Native officer, 2 havildars, 1 drummer, 55 rank and file, wounded.  
 49th Regiment Native Infantry—1 European officer, 2 havildars, 8 rank and file, killed; 2 European officers, 2 havildars, 1 drummer, 56 rank and file, wounded.  
 51st Regiment Native Infantry—2 havildars, 7 rank and file, killed; 1 European officer, 2 havildars, 21 rank and file, wounded.  
 52nd Regiment Native Infantry—1 European officer, 7 rank and file, killed; 1 Native officer, 4 havildars, 38 rank and file, wounded.  
 72nd Regiment Native Infantry—1 Native officer, 24 rank and file, killed; 4 European officers, 3 Native officers, 2 havildars, 1 drummer, 46 rank and file, wounded.  
**Total**—7 European officers, 1 Native officer, 7 serjeants or havildars, 108 rank and file, killed; 36 European officers, 9 Native officers, 29 serjeants or havildars, 537 rank and file, wounded.

Staff—1 European officer, wounded.

Engineer Department, Sappers and Pioneers—12 rank and file, killed; 2 European officers, 1 Native officer, 2 havildars, 1 drummer, 52 rank and file, wounded.

Artillery—9 rank and file, killed; 2 European officers, 2 havildars, 25 rank and file, wounded.

Her Majesty's 60th Rifles, 1st battalion—1 European officer, 1 serjeant, 9 rank and file, killed; 2 European officers, 1 drummer, 27 rank and file, wounded.

1st Bombay Fusiliers—16 rank and file, killed; 6 European officers, 6 havildars, 2 drummers, 78 rank and file, wounded.

3rd Regiment Native Infantry—1 rank and file, killed; 1 European officer, 1 Native officer, 2 havildars, 18 rank and file, wounded.

4th Regiment Native Infantry, Rifles—1 havildar, 28 rank and file, killed ; 1 European officer, 1 Native officer, 2 havildars, 4 drummers, 66 rank and file, wounded.

9th Regiment Native Infantry—1 European officer, 1 rank and file, killed ; 2 European officers, 2 havildars, 8 rank and file, wounded.

19th Regiment Native Infantry—6 rank and file, killed ; 1 European officer, 1 Native officer, 4 havildars, 37 rank and file, wounded.

Indian Navy—1 quartermaster, killed ; 1 European officer, 1 acting master, 3 seamen, wounded

Total—2 European officers, 3 sergeants or havildars, 82 rank and file, killed ; 19 European officers, 4 Native officers, 21 sergeants or havildars, 8 drummers, 314 rank and file, wounded

Grand Total—9 European officers, 1 Native officer, 10 sergeants or havildars, 190 rank and file, killed, 55 European officers, 13 Native officers, 50 sergeants or havildars, 13 drummers, 851 rank and file, wounded.

Killed 210 ; wounded 982.

Total, 1191 casualties

#### *Officers' names*

#### *Bengal Division.*

##### *Killed*

Artillery—Lieutenant James Thompson, January 21, 1849.

10th Foot—Major G S Montizambert, September 12, 1848.

32nd Foot—Lieutenant-Colonel Pattoun, and Quartermaster Taylor, September 12, 1848.

8th Native Infantry—Ensign Lloyd, September 12, 1848.

49th Native Infantry—Lieutenant Cubitt, September 12, 1848

52nd Native Infantry—Lieutenant Playfair, December 31, 1848.

##### *Wounded.*

Engineers—Major Napier, September 13, 1848, Lieutenant Lake, September 12, 1848, Lieutenant Garforth (Brigade Major), and Lieutenant Taylor, January 2, 1849, Lieutenant Gulliver, January 19, 1849, Lieutenant Pollard, January 11, 1849 ; and Lieutenant Garnett, December 31, 1848.

Artillery—Lieutenant Bunny, September 12, 1848 ; Lieutenant Hunter, November 4, 1848, Lieutenant Sankey, January 7, 1849 ; Lieutenant C. Graham, January 17, 1849

10th Foot—Lieutenant Hollinsworth (since dead), September 9, 1848, Captain MacGregor, and Lieutenant J S. Herbert, September 12, 1848 ; Captain G F. Moore, November 6, 1848

32nd Foot—Brigadier Markham, September 10, 1848, Captain Balfour, Captain King, Lieutenant Birtwhistle, and Ensign Swinburn, September 12, 1848, Major W. Case, and Lieutenant Straubenzee, December 27, 1848, Captain King, and Captain Smyth, January 2, 1849, Captain Brine, January 16, 1849, and Lieutenant Maunsell, January 22, 1849.

8th Native Infantry—Lieutenant H. R. Drew, September 8, 1848 ; Captain Wroughton and Lieutenant Turnbull, September 12, 1848.

49th Native Infantry—Lieutenant Richardson, and Lieutenant Irwin, September 9, 1848.

51st Native Infantry—Lieutenant Tyrwhitt, December 28, 1848.

72nd Native Infantry—Captain Matland, November 6, 1848, Lieutenant-Colonel J. Nash, C.B., Lieutenant Gillon (since dead), Ensign MacDougall, December 27, 1848.

#### *Bombay Division.*

##### *Killed.*

60th Rifles—Major Gordon, December 27, 1848

9th Native Infantry—Lieutenant Youngusband, December 27, 1848.

##### *Wounded.*

Staff—Captain Tapp, Deputy-Assistant Adjutant General, January 2, 1849.

Engineers—Lieutenant J. Hill, December 27, 1848 ; Second Lieutenant J Fuller, January 2, 1849

- Artillery**—Captain Bailey (since dead), December 2, 1848 ; Second Lieutenant Henderson, December 30, 1848.
- 60th Rifles**—Major Dennis, Second Lieutenant R. W. Brooke, December 27, 1848.
- 1st Fusiliers**—Lieutenant Mules, December 27, 1848, Captain Leith, and Lieutenant Gray, January 2, 1849, Lieutenant Dansey, January 12, 1849, Lieutenant Herne, January 17, 1849, Second Lieutenant Law, January 20, 1849.
- 3rd Native Infantry**—Lieutenant Dyett, December 27, 1848.
- 4th Native Infantry**—Lieutenant Warden, January 2, 1849.
- 9th Native Infantry**—Lieutenant Baugh, December 29, 1848, Lieutenant Fanning, January 2, 1849.
- 19th Native Infantry**—Ensign Gordon, January 2, 1849.
- Indian Navy**—Acting-Master Elder

Inclosure 16 in No. 46.

*Commander Powell, I.N., commanding the Indus Flotilla, to the Commodore commanding the Indian Navy.*

*Camp before Mooltan, January 11, 1849*

SINCE the despatch of my letter, dated the 3rd instant, announcing the fall of the city of Mooltan, I have the honor to report that the siege has been carried on against the fort, and that our batteries are now within 180 yards of the ditch in one of these, mounting seven 18-pounders, the officers and men of the Indian navy were employed on the 9th, when, unfortunately, the fascines, of which the lower part of the battery was formed, took fire, by the bursting of one of the enemy's shells: every exertion was made by Lieutenant Berthon, and the officers and men under his command, to extinguish it, but without avail, and it became necessary to move the guns out of the battery into the trench, when the enemy opened a very heavy fire of all arms on them, and I regret to state the men, as per inclosed casualty return, were wounded, and Mr. Elder, Acting Master, had his foot crushed by one of the guns, but he is not seriously hurt.

It is also my painful duty to report the death of Alexander Johnstone, Quartermaster, who died yesterday a little after noon, of the wounds he received in the morning this is the same man who was slightly wounded on the 31st ultimo, and had gallantly returned to duty. the rest of the wounded I am glad to say are doing well.

The "Comet" and "Conqueror" steamers are still above Mooltan, stopping all water communication. The former vessel will be despatched to Kurrachee, in a day or two, for Lady Lawrence and her party.

The "Napier" and "Meteor" are stationed off Raj Ghat, protecting the bridge and pontoon boats, also those the siege train came up in, and the "Meeanee" is towing up commissariat grain-boats to the same Ghat. The "Planet" also arrived there yesterday, with two 10-inch mortars, 630 shells, and 44 bales of clothing, she is now having a few repairs made good, and will be held ready for service down the river.

It is not yet decided what portion of this force is to go to the north-east, after the fall of the fort, and I am afraid the flotilla will be able to afford it but very little assistance, beyond protecting the boats, and that only to the junction of the Jhelum, as the water is lower than I have ever seen it.

*Last of Killed and Wounded of the Indian Navy during the Siege of the City and Fortress of Mooltan*

*Camp, near Mooltan, January 11, 1849.*

- Alexander Johnstone, Quartermaster, slightly wounded, December 31, from musket-shot, discharged January 2.
- Henry Sandford, severely wounded, January 2, from musket-shot.

John Chandlor, severely wounded, January 9, from musket-shot.  
 Henry Jones, wounded severely, January 9, from musket-shot.  
 Alexander Johnstone, Quartermaster, wounded from a shell, January 10;  
 since dead.  
 George Elder, Acting Master, slight contusion from gun-wheel, January 9.

Inclosure 17 in No. 46

*Commander Powell to the Commodore commanding the Indian Navy.*

*Mooltan, January 25, 1849.*

I HAVE great pleasure in reporting the occupation of the fort of Mooltan by the troops under Major-General Whish, C.B., on the morning of the 22nd, the Dewan Moolraj, during the night of the 21st, when both breaches had been made practicable, having agreed to an unconditional surrender of himself and garrison, who laid down their arms on the glacis, and marched out at 9 30 A.M. on that date.

During the latter part of the siege, the officers and seamen of the Indian Navy were constantly employed in a battery within the city, in two watches, under Senior Lieutenant Berthon, and Mr Acting Master Davis, and the services of all have been very handsomely acknowledged by Brigadier Leeson, commanding the artillery.

The "Meteor" and "Comet" steamers left Raj Ghat, on the 14th and 16th instant, for Sindé, the former to bring up treasure from Sukkur, and the latter, with a number of wounded officers, for Kurrachee, where she is to receive on board Lady Lawrence and party, and bring them to Bukree, at the junction of the Sutlej and Chenab Rivers.

Since the withdrawal of the "Comet," the "Conqueror" has been employed above Mooltan, stopping all communication by the river, but, as this is no longer required by the Assistant Resident, orders were sent yesterday, directing Mr. McLaurin to drop down to the junction of the Ravee, and assist in making a bridge of boats over that river. The boats in charge of Mr. Acting Second Master Somerville left Raj Ghat this morning, accompanied by the "Meeanee" steamer, with the engineer officers and a company of sappers, who are to make the bridge.

The "Planet" steamer is still at Raj Ghat, where she has been employed with the "Napier" for some time past in guarding the fleet of boats with Government stores on board, and preventing the enemy crossing the river. The "Satellite," "Assyria," and "Nimrod" steamers have been chiefly employed in Lower Sindé, under the orders of Senior Lieutenant Drought, who, as well as all the officers in charge of the tenders and their crews, together with the other officers and men of the flotilla, have evinced the greatest zeal in the performance of the arduous duties which have devolved on them, during the recent move of the Bombay division to Mooltan, and I beg to submit the inclosed copy of a letter from Brigadier the Honorable H. Dundas, C.B., conveying his thanks to myself and the officers and men, whose services he did me the honor of accepting, which will be duly communicated to them.

Inclosure 18 in No. 46.

*Brigadier the Hon H Dundas to Commander Powell.*

*Camp, Mooltan, January 25, 1849.*

THE operations before Mooltan having been brought to a successful termination, I have the honor to request you will accept for yourself, and convey to the officers and seamen under your command, my thanks for the assistance you so willingly rendered, and the service they gallantly rendered, in serving the batteries, and sharing the fatigues which devolved on the artillery, with the order and intrepidity so truly characteristic of the British sailor.

## Inclosure 19 in No. 46.

*General Order by the Governor-General of India.**Ferozepore, February 1, 1849*

THE Governor-General, having received a dispatch reporting the surrender, on the morning of the 22nd instant, of the citadel and garrison of Mooltan, directs that, together with other dispatches relating to the operations against the city and fort, it shall be published for the information of the army and of the people of India

The capture of this important fortress, which, during a protracted period, has resisted the powerful armament brought against it, and has been defended with gallantry and endurance, is a just subject of congratulation to the Government of India and to the Army.

The Governor-General desires to convey to Major-General Whish, C B, his warmest thanks for the valuable service which has thus, under Providence, been rendered to the Government, by the united forces which he commands, for the steady, and skilful, and successful prosecution of a siege, which, at comparatively small loss to ourselves, has inflicted most heavy loss upon the enemy, and has utterly destroyed his strongest fortress

Brigadier Cheape, C.B., the Chief Engineer of the army, is entitled to the best thanks of the Governor-General, for the zeal and ability with which he has fulfilled the important duty intrusted to him, and, in the discharge of which, he has been well supported by Major Napier, Chief Engineer of the Bengal division, and Major Scott, Chief Engineer of the Bombay division, of the force.

To Brigadier Markham, whose services have been conspicuous, to Brigadier Salter, and to Brigadier Hervey, the Governor-General tenders his warm acknowledgments.

To Brigadier the Honorable H. Dundas, C B., commanding the Bombay division, to Brigadier Capon, and Brigadier Stalker, the best thanks of the Governor-General are due, for the ready and effective assistance they have rendered upon all occasions, as well in the attack upon the suburbs, on the 27th of December, as in the assault of the city, which their troops were the first to enter, and in all the subsequent operations of the siege

To Major Garbett and to Major Leeson, commanding the artillery of the Bengal and Bombay divisions, to Commander Powell, of the Indian Navy, and to the heads of the various departments, the Governor-General offers his thanks

And to all the troops of each division, European and Native, to the officers, non-commissioned officers, and men, the Governor-General renders his hearty thanks for the gallantry, perseverance, skill, and discipline, which they have displayed, throughout the service on which they have been employed.

With equal cordiality, the Governor-General offers his best thanks to Major Edwards, C B., with the irregular force under his orders, and to Lieutenant Lake, who has commanded the forces of our ally, the Nawab of Bahawalpore. The Governor-General congratulates these officers on their having been enabled, with their native troops, to witness, in the capture of Mooltan, the complete vindication of the supremacy of British power, which, during the past summer, their own gallantry and enterprise so materially contributed to sustain

The Governor-General will have the utmost satisfaction in bringing the services of the force at Mooltan under the favorable consideration of Her Majesty's Government and the Honorable East India Company.

A salute of 21 guns has been ordered to be fired at every principal station of the army in India.

## Inclosure 20 in No. 46.

*The Secretary with the Governor-General to Major-General Whish.**Camp, Muckoo, January 21, 1849.*

I AM directed to convey to you the desire of the Governor-General that you will reinforce the Commander-in-Chief, without delay, by the force under your command.



## Inclosure 21 in No. 46.

*Major-General Whisk to the Secretary with the Governor-General.*

*Camp, Mooltan, January 25, 1849.*

ON the surrender of the citadel, I called in our cattle, then unavoidably grazing at a great distance; they will be mostly in to-morrow; the next day, (27th) a brigade will march, accompanied by a troop of horse artillery and a regiment of irregular cavalry, and, on the 29th instant, the remainder of the Bengal division, including a siege train of twelve pieces. On the 31st instant, the Bombay division will follow, or rather the following detail of it, one European troop of horse artillery, one light field battery, European company, five troops of the Sind horse, two European and two Native regiments of infantry, with one company of sappers and miners.

The remainder will constitute the garrison of Mooltan, and I have directed the Bombay siege train and Engineer parks to remain there also.

At Brigadier Dundas' recommendation, I have appointed Lieutenant Henry, 9th Bombay Native Infantry, to the charge of the prisoner Dewan Moolraj.

## Inclosure 22 in No. 46

*The Secretary with the Governor-General to the Resident at Lahore.*

*Camp, Mukkoo, January 25, 1849.*

THE Governor-General having received intelligence, to-day, of the unconditional surrender of the Dewan Moolraj, together with the whole of his garrison, his Lordship considers it expedient to issue orders, with as little delay as possible, respecting several points which require to be immediately provided for.

The Governor-General requests that directions be addressed to "the officer commanding at Mooltan," desiring him to send on the Dewan Moolraj, in company with the troops advancing from Mooltan. He will be, ultimately, escorted to Lahore, there to await the pleasure of the Government of India.

The Dewan must not be permitted to have any train, except a few personal attendants, and effectual precautions must be taken for his safe custody.

You will direct Major Edwardes to make temporary provision for the lodging of the women; they must not be allowed to remain in the fort.

The Governor-General forbears giving any orders as to the disposal of the prisoners, until his Lordship receives Major Edwardes' report.

The Governor-General requests that you will make arrangements for bringing Moolraj to Lahore, and there placing him in close confinement, until the pleasure of the British Government shall be made known.

## Inclosure 23 in No. 46.

*The Resident at Lahore to the Secretary with the Governor-General.*

*Lahore, January 25, 1849.*

I CONCLUDE that the Governor-General will direct that Dewan Moolraj, and his principal officers, be sent as prisoners, to Lahore, to be disposed of, according to the orders of the Government of India.

I am of opinion that judicial proof will not be wanting to convict the Dewan Moolraj of having been, at any rate, accessory to the fact of the murder of the British officers, in April last.

Of his rebellion to his sovereign, and of his having worked all the evil in his power to the British Government, and endeavoured to raise insurrection and revolt in the British provinces, there is the clearest evidence, without the necessity of any investigation.

## Inclosure 24 in No. 46.

*The Resident at Lahore to Major Edwardes.**Lahore, January 25, 1849.*

YOU will assume charge of the province of Mooltan, till you receive further instructions, and will make immediate arrangements for the collection of the revenue of the Rubbee harvest

You are requested to report, without delay, what districts are, at present, in the occupation of the officers of the Nawab of Bahawalpore, and what districts are held by the kardars of Sheik Emamooddeen, and Dewan Jowahir Mull Dutt

You will receive instructions, without delay, regarding the disposal of the prisoner Dewan Moolhaj, and his principal officers, who are all, I believe, subjects of the Lahore Government

## Inclosure 25 in No. 46.

*The Secretary with the Governor-General to the Resident at Lahore.**Camp, Ferozepore, January 30, 1849*

THE Governor-General thinks it hardly necessary to say that Major Edwardes interpreted the orders of Government correctly, as precluding him from giving any conditions of surrender to Moolraj, but not precluding him from promising, in the event of unconditional surrender, the fullest protection to Moolhaj's family.

## Inclosure 26 in No. 46.

*The Resident at Lahore to the Secretary with the Governor-General.**Lahore, January 25, 1849.*

I FORWARD a letter received from Sheik Emamooddeen and its inclosure, a letter from Bedee Bikrama Sing, exhorting him to join the rebel standard without delay

Sheik Emamooddeen sent, a few days ago, a letter of similar import, addressed to him by Raja Shere Sing

I doubt not the Governor-General will be gratified at the fidelity of Sheik Emamooddeen, as evidenced by immediately sending these letters to me. I have expressed to him my approbation of his conduct

## Inclosure 27 in No. 46

*Bedee Bikrama Sing to Sheik Emamooddeen.*

ALL the Hindoos and Mussulmans of the country, considering what is due from them as loyal subjects, and upholders of their respective religions, have assembled together Dost Mahomed also, esteeming the friendship of the Sirkar of more value than worldly matters, is marching hither with his army Sirdar Sooltan Mahomed and Peer Mahomed Khan, although formerly enemies to the State, have also thought the time opportune for establishing friendly relations. I have brought about this result, and doubt not that they will continue to abide by my suggestions They have, accordingly, set up their standard, and have been admitted to the holy Punth of the Khalsa It is matter of astonishment that you, who have received so many favors from the Sirkar, have not also joined us Since life is short, it is not becoming in you to forget what is due from you.

Although it was unnecessary for me to write to you, yet, in consideration of

your former services, I have thought it proper to do so. The time is auspicious, and if you are inclined to act with wisdom and with loyalty, you will insure advantage to yourself. If you will not join us, unite yourself, at least, with Sirdar Naran Singh. I need not write more, as you are a well-wisher of, and faithful to, the Sirkar, and will forget the services you have rendered, of late, to the British.

Inclosure 28 in No 46

*General Order by the Governor-General of India*

*Camp, Mukkoo, January 24, 1849.*

THE Governor-General, having received from the Commander-in-Chief in India, a dispatch, dated the 16th instant, directs that it shall be published, for the information of the army and of the people of India

In this dispatch, his Excellency reports the successful operation of the troops under his immediate command, on the afternoon of the 13th instant, when they attacked, and defeated, the Sikh army under the command of Rajah Shere Singh.

Notwithstanding great superiority in numbers, and the formidable position which he occupied, the enemy, after a severe and obstinate resistance, was driven back, and retreated from every part of his position in great disorder, with much slaughter, and with the loss of twelve pieces of artillery

The Governor-General congratulates the Commander-in-Chief on the victory, thus obtained by the army under his command, and, on behalf of the Government of India, he desires cordially to acknowledge the gallant services which have been rendered, on this occasion, by his Excellency the Commander-in-Chief, the Generals, the officers, non-commissioned officers, and soldiers of the army in the field

The Governor-General offers his thanks to Major-General Sir Joseph Thackwell, K C B, and K H, for his services, and to Brigadier White for his conduct of the brigade of cavalry on the left.

Major-General Sir W. Gilbert, K C B, and Brigadier-General Campbell, C.B., are entitled to the special thanks of the Governor-General, for the admirable manner in which they directed the divisions under their orders

To Brigadier Mountain, C B, and to Brigadier Hoggan, the Governor-General tenders his acknowledgments, for the gallant example they offered, in the lead of their men, and to them, to Brigadier Godby, C B, and Brigadier Pennycuik, C B, for their able conduct of their respective brigades

The warm thanks of the Governor-General are due to Brigadier-General Tennant, commanding the artillery division, to Brigadier Brooke, C.B., and Brigadier Huthwaite, C B, for their direction of the operations of that distinguished arm, and for the effective service which it rendered

To the heads of the various departments, and to the officers of the general and personal staff, whose services are acknowledged by the Commander-in-Chief, the Governor-General offers his thanks

The Governor-General deeply regrets the loss of Brigadier Pennycuik, C.B., and of the gallant officers and men who have honorably fallen, in the service of their country

It has afforded the Governor-General the highest gratification to observe, that the conduct of the troops generally was worthy of all praise

The Governor-General, indeed, is concerned to think that any order, or misapprehension of an order, could have produced the movements, by the right brigade of cavalry, which his Excellency the Commander-in-Chief reports.

To the Artillery, European and Native, to the Cavalry on the left, and to the European and Native Infantry, the Governor-General offers his hearty thanks; especially to those corps, European and Native, which his Excellency reports to have acted, under trying circumstances, with a gallantry worthy of the greatest admiration

The Governor-General will have sincere satisfaction in bringing the services of this army under the favorable notice of Her Majesty's Government and the Honorable East India Company.

A salute of twenty-one guns has been ordered to be fired from every principal station of the army in India.

The Governor-General repeats to the Commander-in-Chief, and to the Army, the assurance of his cordial thanks, and expresses his confident belief that the victory which, under Divine Providence, they have won, will exercise a most important influence on the successful progress of the war in which they are engaged.

Inclosure 29 in No. 46.

*The Secretary with the Governor-General to the Adjutant-General*

*Ferozepore, January 31, 1849.*

I AM directed to acknowledge the receipt of his Excellency the Commander-in-Chief's dispatches, dated the 5th, 10th, and 16th ultimo, reporting the particulars of an action with the enemy at Sadoolapore, and the passage of the Chenab, by Major-General Sir Joseph Thackwell, K C B

The Governor-General regrets to find that he, inadvertently, omitted to issue instructions, founded on a minute which he had recorded, on the subject of the dispatches under acknowledgment

His Lordship begs to congratulate the Commander-in-Chief, on the success of the measures which he adopted for effecting the passage of the Chenab, and to convey to him the assurance of his satisfaction with, and his best thanks for, the judicious arrangements by which he was enabled, with comparatively little loss, to carry into execution his plans for the passage of that difficult river, and for compelling the retreat of the Sikh army, from the formidable position which they occupied on its further bank, after they had been engaged, and beaten back, by the forces under Major-General Sir Joseph Thackwell.

The result of his Excellency's movements, in driving the Sikh army from their entrenchments, and forcing them to retire to the other extremity of the Doab, was of much importance

The Governor-General offers his best thanks to Major-General Sir Joseph Thackwell, for his successful direction of the force under his command, and for the dispositions by which he compelled the enemy to retire, and, ultimately, to quit the ground he had occupied.

The Governor-General tenders his best thanks to Brigadier-General Campbell, for the able assistance which he rendered to Major-General Sir Joseph Thackwell, and to Lieutenant-Colonel Grant, for the powerful and effective use which he made of the artillery under his command

The Governor-General has had much gratification in observing the terms in which the Commander-in-Chief has spoken of the army under his command in the field, and he concurs with his Excellency in bestowing upon them the praise which is their due

Inclosure 30 in No. 46.

*The Adjutant-General to the Secretary with the Governor-General.*

*Camp, Chulhanwalla, January 30, 1849.*

BY direction of the Commander-in-Chief, I have the honor to inclose, for the information of the Governor-General of India, a copy of a dispatch, of the 21st instant, from Brigadier-General H M Wheeler, C B, commanding the Punjab division and Jullundur field force, reporting the success of his operations against the rebel Ram Sing.

Inclosure 31 in No. 46.

*Brigadier-General H M. Wheeler, C B., commanding Jullundur Field Force, to the Adjutant-General*

*Camp, Puthankote, January 21, 1849.*

ON the 8th instant, I marched from Puthankote, with my whole force, excepting the 4th Regiment Native Infantry, and a resallah of irregular cavalry, which I sent, under the command of Lieutenant-Colonel D. Downing, up the bed of the

Chukkee river, to take post at the opposite end of the Dulla mountain, where I had ascertained that the ascent was more facile than near Shahpoor. At Shahpoor I found that a range of hills was to be crossed to reach Dulla-hill, and I hoped to be able to take the troops up the bed of the Ravee, and thus avoid it: on examination, it was found that the fords were too deep, with a violent stream, and I was compelled to turn my attention to a gorge which crossed the intervening hill.

This presented great difficulties for guns, but, in three days, a practicable road was made, under the skilful and indefatigable exertions of Captain J. R. Oldfield, Field Engineer, admirably aided by Lieutenant M. J. Turnbull, 7th Light Cavalry, Brigade Quartermaster, and I had the extreme pleasure of seeing the whole of the artillery pass it, and descend into the valley, under the mountain of Dulla.

I take this opportunity of expressing my high opinion of both these officers, to whom I am greatly indebted for aiding me in my reconnoissances, and obtaining information.

On reaching the valley, the positions of the enemy were found to be admirably chosen, and I, at once, saw that a direct attack was out of the question, more particularly as they showed in great strength.

The 12th, 13th, and 14th, were passed in reconnoitering and obtaining information; and I must acknowledge my obligations to Mr J. Lawrence, Mr P. S. Melvill, Lieutenants Lumsden and Hodson, who aided me most cordially.

On the evening of the 14th, I made the following arrangements:—

Lieutenant Hodson (Lieutenant Lumsden having sprained his ankle), with his corps of guides, to move, at noon, on the 15th, up the right bank of the Ravee, re-cross the river, and move up to a high peak of the mountain, visible from my camp; with him went 400 rank and file, 3rd Regiment Native Infantry. I, at the same time, wrote to Lieutenant-Colonel Downing, that my arrangements were definitively settled, and that the sound of my heavy guns was to be the signal for him to cooperate and attack the enemy's position, but that, as it was possible (owing to the intervening hills) he might not hear them, he was not to delay his ascent beyond 8 o'clock A. M. of the 16th.

Another column was formed of the head-quarters 3rd Regiment Native Infantry, and a party of the 2nd Irregular Cavalry (Captain Jackson having volunteered the services of his corps dismounted), under Lieutenant Swinton, second in command, the whole under Major Butler, commanding 3rd Regiment Native Infantry.

Mr Lawrence, on joining me, brought with him a party of the 16th Irregular Cavalry and 1st Sikh Local Infantry, the former the head-quarters and 60 sowars, the latter under Lieutenant J. Peel, second in command, 152; the whole under the command of Captain W. W. Davidson, of the former, who volunteered for his sowars to act on foot.

These were formed into another column, to join that under Major Butler, when he passed that point of the hill where it ascended. Lieutenant Hodson quitted camp at noon, on the 15th, and at 2 P. M. rain began to fall, slightly at first, but it increased and poured all night, and fell more or less until past 1 P. M. of the next day. This so greatly interfered with his progress, the road being a most difficult path over cliffs, and the Ravee having swollen, he was unable to reach his post, until noon on the 16th, instead of 6 P. M. on the 15th, as reckoned on. Of this he could give me no intimation, in consequence of the weather preventing any one from coming round, and the occupation of the mountain by the enemy equally preventing any one from coming across.

All were ready in my camp at 8 A. M., and, although it poured, moved off, in capital spirits, to be ready to ascend at the signal.

Lieutenant-Colonel Wilson has written so modestly of the artillery, that it is my duty to state that his own exertions, and that of all under him, were most zealous and successful. Captains Sissmore and Burnett deserve the greatest credit for getting up 24-pound howitzers and mortars on steep shoulders of the hill, and bringing them to act on the positions of the enemy. These officers have, on every occasion, elicited my praise, and I beg most strongly to recommend them to the favorable consideration of Lord Gough.

The column under Major Butler carried out my wishes with great coolness and courage, and I am indebted to that officer for the judgment which he evinced, and which was crowned with complete success.

The enemy has lost severely, 35 bodies were counted, and many more must

have fallen on different parts of the hill, which have not been seen. Of their wounded, I know nothing.

Major Fisher and Captain Jackson, with the mounted portions of their corps, followed me up the mountain, where, I'll venture to say, cavalry never were before, in the hope of being able to pursue the enemy when beaten, but did not reach in time.

I have had on this, as indeed on every other, occasion, the most hearty and cheerful aid from the staff of all grades, the whole of whom accompanied me.

I received the most cordial aid in all points from Mr. Lawrence and Mr. Melvill, and am most grateful to those gentlemen.

I am, in a word, pleased with all, and of all ranks, who were under my personal command.

Ram Sing's party is utterly broken up for the present, and he has re-crossed the Ravee with two followers.

*Return of Killed and Wounded in the Force commanded by Brigadier-General H. M. Wheeler, C.B., in the Assault and Capture of the Heights of Dulla, on January 16, 1849.*

3rd Regiment Native Infantry—1 sepoy, slightly wounded

2nd Regiment Irregular Cavalry—1 sowar killed, 1 sowar severely, and 1 slightly, wounded

16th Regiment Irregular Cavalry—Captain commanding, Captain W. W. Davidson, severely wounded, bullet in the right hand, 1 native officer, severely wounded, 1 sowar severely, and 2 slightly, wounded

1st Regiment Sikh Local Infantry—Lieutenant second in command, Lieutenant J. Peel, dangerously wounded, since dead, 1 jemadar, 2 sepoy, killed, 1 havildar, 4 sepoy slightly, 1 naick, 3 sepoy, severely, 2 sepoy dangerously, wounded.

Total—4 killed, 20 wounded.

N.B.—Cornet Christie, 7th Light Cavalry, killed

#### Inclosure 32 in No. 46

*The Secretary with the Governor-General to the Resident at Lahore.*

*Camp, Mullaowalla, January 27, 1849.*

WITH reference to your communications with the Dewan of Maharajah Golab Sing, I am directed to state, that the events that have lately happened, render it incumbent upon the Governor-General to address the Maharajah in language still stronger and more explicit.

Ameer Dost Mahomed Khan appears to have committed himself, now, to an extent which it is hardly possible for him to explain away. One of his sons is, undoubtedly, with Chuttur Sing, near the Jhelum.

The Dost himself is on the right bank of the Indus, close to Attock, which he has taken.

Another of his sons, has descended, with a force, into Bunnoo and Lieutenant Taylor, at Lukkee, is in expectation of being there attacked by them.

All this makes it probable that the British troops will have much to do yet, before tranquillity can be restored.

On the other hand, the Commander-in-Chief has defeated the Sikhs at Chillianwalla, but has not destroyed their army, or their power. They are, still, on this side the Jhelum; and, to drive them across the river, another action seems inevitable.

In the hill country, the troops of Maharajah Golab Sing, however inferior they may be in the field, could act with great effect against an enemy: and they are bound to act, for the Maharajah, by Article VI. of the Treaty, engages to "join, with the whole of his military force, the British troops, when employed within the hills."

The Governor-General, therefore, requests that you will address a letter to Maharajah Golab Sing, informing His Highness that the city and fort of Mool-

tan have been captured by the British army, and that a large body of troops is about to join the Commander-in-Chief. Raja Shere Sing, with such remnant of his army as may escape, will be driven into the country beyond the Jhelum. The British Government, justly indignant at the obstinate and ferocious war which has been brought upon them by the Sikhs, will no longer be lenient, but will inflict that severity of punishment which the offence merits.

To this end, they call upon the Maharajah to place his troops in the field, as by Clause VI. of the Treaty, made at Umritsur on the 16th day of March, 1846, he is bound to do. And they call upon him, further, to put forth every exertion for the destruction of the army of the Sikhs, now in arms against the British Government.

If the Maharajah shall act cordially, in compliance with this demand, and shall throw the weight of his power, effectually, against the Sikhs and the Affghans, or whatever troops may be acting against the British Government, then the British Government will be satisfied that the Maharajah is a Prince faithful to his word, and desirous of holding friendship with the English.

If he does not act with cordiality; if he refuses, or neglects, or evades to comply with the demand which the Governor-General now makes on His Highness, by virtue of the Treaty above mentioned, then, the British Government, upon whom the Maharajah's non-fulfilment of his obligations will impose greater labor and greater expense, will necessarily regard the Treaty as violated by him. They will be compelled to regard His Highness not as a friend, but as, in truth, an enemy; and will proceed, in due time, to seize such portions of His Highness's territory as may give reparation for his breach of treaty, and compensate for the expense which will be caused thereby, or to inflict upon His Highness such other punishment as the Governor-General may think suited to the faithlessness of his conduct.

The Governor-General trusts that the Maharajah, by prompt and vigorous action, will avert this misfortune.

The conduct of Dost Mahomed appears, now, to be beyond apology, and requires that the Government should make use of all justifiable means for the punishment of this most gross aggression on his part. It is, now, necessary that the Affghans should be driven forth from a province which they have invaded and taken possession of, and be punished for their temerity.

If pacific overtures should be made by the Dost, in the meantime, and if (which his Lordship can now hardly conceive to be possible) he can explain his proceedings in a manner calculated to satisfy the British Government, the measures contemplated against him will become unnecessary.

If the contrary should be the case, the Governor-General trusts that these measures may be of material advantage in enabling us to effect the total discomfiture of our enemies, especially of those who have so unwarrantably taken up arms against us, from the other side of the frontier mountains.

#### Inclosure 33 in No. 46

*The Resident at Lahore to the Secretary with the Governor-General*

*Lahore, January 30, 1849.*

I FORWARD a letter this day received by me from Maharajah Golab Sing.

The khurreeta was presented by his confidential vakeel Jowala Sahae, who produced a purwanna from the Maharajah to himself, stating that purwannas and letters had been written by the Barukzyes to all the hill chiefs, promising jagheers, and other rewards, if they would join them, in re-possessing themselves of their hereditary country of Cashmere; and directing the Dewan to wait upon me, and take my advice, as to what his Highness had better do, in the present emergency. The purwanna stated, moreover, that the Maharajah understood, that messengers, with letters from Dost Mahomed Khan, were on their way to Cashmere, but His Highness had written to forbid the nearer approach of the messengers, and to bring on their letters, which he would, on receipt, send in original to Lahore. I explained to Dewan Jowala Sahae, what I had so often before done, the necessity for his master's acting more openly

and decidedly than he has hitherto done; and repeated the statement I had before made to him in writing, in accordance with the terms of your letter of the 19th instant.\*

I take this opportunity of acknowledging the receipt of your letter dated the 27th instant, and have this day addressed a khurreeta to the Maharajah, in accordance with the instructions it contains.

Inclosure 34 in No. 46.

*Maharajah Golab Sing to the Resident at Lahore.*

*Srinuggur.*

IN these days, when the misrepresentations of evil-disposed persons bear a high premium, and no distinctions are recognised between friends and enemies, I thought it proper to send to you my trusty and confidential servant, Dewan Jowala Sahae, who has, I trust, made you acquainted with all that has occurred. It is notorious as the day, in what manner I have been treated by the Sikhs, since the death of Maharajah Runjeet Sing, and their feelings towards me remain unchanged. The result has been, that I have thrown aside all my former connections and interests, and attached myself unreservedly to the British, and so strong do I remain in this resolution that, even if the mountains should rock, I should, nevertheless, firmly retain my position. With the exception of the British, I regard all, whether Sikhs or Affghans, as my enemies. The Sikhs are they who murdered five of my family, and plundered my property. The Affghans look upon this country as their hereditary possession, and, without the aid of the British, I could not have kept my hold on it.

On the first occurrence of the present disturbances, my desire was, personally, to lend my assistance, but, as this did not meet with your approval, I considered my own wishes to be subordinate to your orders, and occupied myself by lending all the aid in my power to Captain Abbott. I directed Meean Runbeer Sing to obey your instructions in every respect; and I have sent to Jowala Sahae a detailed account of the difficulties which have arisen here, with the particulars of which he will make you fully acquainted.

The Barukzyes, who consider Cashmere to be an hereditary possession of their family, have sent purwannas to several persons, promising them Jagheers, and have their eyes fixed upon the country. As yet, however, I remain firm in my possession, by the assistance and support of the British, and my only hope is to reside under the shade of their protection. As long as I shall continue to retain my present feelings, I trust to deserve the good will and favor of the British, and desire that the face of those who have defamed me may be blackened. I have written to you thus, that my intentions may not be misunderstood.

Inclosure 35 in No. 46.

*Lieutenant Taylor to the Resident at Lahore.*

*Lukkee, January 12, 1849.*

YESTERDAY evening, I received accounts of Mahomed Azim Khan, to the effect that he had marched from Khoorrum and reached Jhul, on the road to Bunnoo; that he had with him four guns, and a large force. Last night, a messenger from Meer Alim Khan came, stealthily under the walls of Lukkee, and hailed the sentry, who encouraged him to speak, and he then delivered his message, which was, to exhort the garrison of Lukkee to remain staunch, as the Dooranees had arrived in force in Bunnoo, and would be at Lukkee the next day; the messenger was seized, and confined. In the middle of the night, I received letters from Jaffier Khan and a spy, confirming the report, and giving different accounts of the numbers of the enemy. To-day, I have been fully employed in hearing the accounts of messengers, summoning



assistance, repairing the damage done to the fort, and filling in our own trenches. I am inclined to believe that the force with Mahomed Azim Khan, is not, at present, equal to advancing on Lukkee, and, before it is, I trust I shall have been reinforced. The last account says, that the Sirdar intended, originally, to halt four or five days at Duleepgurh, and I doubt not the news of the fall of Lukkee will incline him to wait still longer, if not defer his advance altogether. I do not yet exactly know the number of their guns, some accounts saying four, and some two. Fyze Mahomed Khan has not yet moved from Kohat. To-morrow, we move across the river, and encamp in front of the fort, but under the protection of its guns. There is a very strong position between the fort and town, those two points protecting each flank, and in this, supposing we were obliged to fight a much superior force, I should not anticipate a catastrophe. I have now, from two sources, heard that the fort of Attock has fallen: the account is that Gool Badshah and Futteh Khan Azankhanee-wallah having been sent by the Dost to gain over the soldiers of the garrison, their efforts were attended with success, and Herbert was obliged to come out of the fort. I trust this is not true, but have misgivings on the subject. It is a curious thing that this news reached me almost simultaneously with the accounts of Mahomed Azim's move. It has been a remarkable feature in the late disturbances, that the reports circulated have generally been favorable to us, greatly exaggerating the strength of our troops, the loss of our enemies in engagements, &c. And the man, who reported to me the fall of Attock, refrained from mentioning it, when I, first, examined him before several witnesses, giving as a reason for this, when he subsequently told me, that he feared its being known might do mischief. Major Edwardes writes me, that he has despatched six guns and a regular regiment to my assistance. I do not exactly understand whether these are in addition to 1000 irregulars, formerly despatched, or in place of them: I hope the former, as I want all the force I can get, to show a good front here. It appears to me probable, if Attock has fallen, that the Affghans may descend the left bank of the Indus, and thence threaten the Derajat. Thinking the case emergent, I have summoned Shahnewaz Khan of Tank with 300 men, and Goolad Khan with 200, which will give me 500 more matchlocks, till the arrival of the reinforcements. How extremely fortunate it is that we have the fort. I could not have held my ground, had it remained in the hands of the enemy. Honesty is the best policy. Meer Alim had, for three weeks, been sending every other day, to say that the Dooranees would arrive next day: so that, when they really were coming, the garrison did not believe it, and, losing some men, thought it time to give in. Their chagrin, at finding that, if they had waited twenty-four hours, the fort would have been saved, is great, and not unnatural.

Inclosure 36 in No. 46.

*Lieutenant Taylor to the Resident at Lahore.*

*Lukkee.*

THE Ameer Dost Mahomed seems determined to play the cards out, and his conduct is certainly very strange. All accounts reckon his whole force at less than 15,000; and all who are acquainted with his country, resources, &c., are of opinion that, to collect the force he has with him, he must, to a great extent, have denuded his own provinces; and yet here he is, far from his own border, waging war, as if he were backed by an army equal to the conquest of Delhi. Mahomed Azim Khan, I hear, congratulates himself, on having secured one of the gates of Cabool. He has been joined by Shahebzada of Khost and the Lukhun Peer; the latter a well-known mischievous character. I hope to hear, this evening, of the arrival of Lieutenant Pearse, with reinforcements, at Dera Ismael Khan.

The Sikhs are making head about Pind Dadun Khan, and also in the Pindee Ghebee country, and our partisans are getting alarmed.

P S.—I am repairing and strengthening this fort, as much as possible, levelling the old lines and other obstacles, &c.

## Inclosure 37 in No. 46.

*Lieutenant Taylor to the Resident at Lahore.**Lukkee, January 15, 1849.*

A SON of Dost Mahomed Khan, with 2,500 men and two guns, is at Duleepgurh in Bunnoo, three marches from this, and is trying to induce the Bunnoochees, and surrounding tribes, to join him in a religious war against the Sikhs and Feringees. His force is small, even for the nucleus of such a movement; and as his advance on Bunnoo, which took all by surprise, occurred just about the time that the news of the fall of Attock must have reached him, I am inclined to apprehend that the Ameer would not have directed him to advance, had he not intended to support, and cooperate with, him by other movements. The possession of Attock would enable him to detach a strong force in the direction of the Derajat, which might either march down the left bank of the Indus, or drop down that river in boats, or march through the Kohat country. This force to be joined by the Bunnoo column on its arrival. Our armies on the Jhelum are occupied with the Sikh force in their front; and this small irregular force is, at present, the only obstacle to aggression west of the Jhelum. Supposing, then, the Ameer to wish to assist in the great game, create a diversion in favor of the Sikhs, and, at the same time, lay hands on the provinces ceded to him, in his compact with Chuttur Sing, I can conceive nothing more obvious than such a move as the one above alluded to. Mahomed Azim Khan, with his present force, could not, I think, injure me; but if, by representing that his sole object in coming, is to establish Mussulmanee west of the Indus, and free the oppressed people of these districts from a foreign yoke, he succeeds in inducing the turbulent, and uncertain, population of Bunnoo and Murhut to join him, the case might be different. I am, therefore, of opinion that it is very desirable that this frontier should be strengthened and rendered safe from aggression, and that, not merely with a view to the protection of the provinces themselves, but to avoid the evil effect upon our whole strategy, of their being invaded by the Affghans, at this juncture. Reinforcements to the extent of 1000 irregulars, six guns, and a regiment of infantry, are on their way to join me. This is a good reinforcement, and will, I doubt not, be sufficient; but, supposing the Affghans to make anything like a leading move from above, there should be a stronger nucleus of regular infantry. The Khans with me say, that Mooltan is an affair of vast importance, and so is the campaign on the Jhelum; but the stopping up of this road, and warding off Affghan aggression from these districts, is of equal importance, with either; and, in a minor degree, I concur in the opinion. In all this, I am supposing Ameer Dost Mahomed to be hand and heart in the Sikh cause, or rather in his own cause, as identified with that of the Sikhs, and anxious to aid it to the uttermost; that his forces are numerous, and well equipped; and that he has leaders able to undertake, and carry out, a bold line of strategy; all which points are open to doubt; but that should not, I think, affect our precautionary measures. My wish is, if possible, to halt the supports on the Dera frontier, instead of allowing them to join me here. In case of invasion, both Lukkee and Esakhail are too near the hills to be good positions for an army of limited strength. It would only be on their debouching on the plain, that I should be able to ascertain the real strength of the invaders, and, then, there would be no leisure for taking measures accordingly; whereas, from the Dera border, with the two forts of Esakhail and Lukkee strongly garrisoned in front of me, that leisure would be insured. I do not wish to retire from this immediately, as it would be immediately supposed that I was retiring before Mahomed Azim; but if I see no cause to apprehend attack from him, I shall halt the reinforcements at the Peyzoo Durrah, and, perhaps, send back the Dera guns to join them, and thus make that the main army, while I remain here myself to collect the revenue, settle the province, &c. The Peyzoo Durrah is one long march from this, and it would be a very difficult matter for Mahomed Azim to attack me under the walls of Lukkee, with support so near. Lukkee is being repaired and strengthened, and, with the men I put into it may be counted

on to stand a siege of twenty days, if not more, before the strongest Affghan force.

I hope daily to hear of the fall of Mooltan, which will greatly simplify matters.

Inclosure 38 in No. 46.

*The Resident at Lahore to Major Edwardes.*

*Lahore, January 23, 1849.*

LIEUTENANT TAYLOR'S perseverance, gallantry, and judicious and vigorous arrangements in the siege against Lukkee, are most creditable to him; and his success, at this moment, may be of great benefit to our interests in the Derajat.

As he now is, he must be either reinforced, or recalled; and as you have taken measures for the former, you are right in pursuing that line of policy with all vigor and efficiency.

The force you have detached to Lukkee, is sufficient for all purposes of a defensive character, if it can be depended on; but I think it is hazardous sending General Cortlandt's regulars and guns, without the General himself to command them. At the present moment, it is by no means prudent, in my opinion, to separate them from the influence of the presence of their own commanding officer.

I concur with you in all you say of the gallantry and good conduct of Lieutenant Taylor, which entitle him to very high praise.

Inclosure 39 in No. 46.

*The Resident at Lahore to the Secretary with the Governor-General.*

*Lahore, January 26, 1849.*

MAJOR EDWARDES has sent all the available reinforcements he has, to Lieutenant Taylor, and nothing more can be done at present.

It remains to be seen what line the Dooranees will take, when they hear of the fall of Mooltan, and the reverses of the Sikhs on the Jhelum.

Inclosure 40 in No. 46

*The Secretary with the Governor-General to the Resident at Lahore.*

*Camp, Ferozepore, January 30, 1849.*

THE Governor-General directs that you will communicate to Lieutenant Taylor his Lordship's praise for the gallantry and perseverance displayed by that officer in his proceedings at Lukkee.

Inclosure 41 in No. 46.

*The Resident at Lahore to the Secretary with the Governor-General.*

*Lahore, January 28, 1849.*

AS the correspondence regarding Captain Nicholson's proceedings, since his being ordered by Major Lawrence to Attock, on the commencement of the disturbances in Hazara, has been conducted almost, if not entirely, in private letters, it seems right that a brief official narrative of his proceedings should be recorded, for the information of the Government.

Captain Nicholson, having secured Attock, by turning out the Sikh garrison, and substituting one on which he placed dependence, hastened on

to Hussan Abdal to prevent the junction with Sirdar Chuttur Sing of the regiment moving up at his call from Kahoota, to co-operate generally with Captain Abbott, and to keep in control the inhabitants of the Khafir districts, with whom he was well acquainted.

Captain Nicholson's admirable arrangements at this time, and the success which, for a considerable period, accompanied them, and the opposition offered by him, with his new levies, to Chuttur Sing's army, have been already reported to Government, as have his proceedings, at the time when Sirdar Ootar Sing went to him, while cooperating with Captain Abbott, to prevent the Sikh army in rebellion leaving the fastnesses of Hazara.

After the release of the Pukli brigade, and the advance of Chuttur Sing's force from Hazara, Captain Nicholson, with his levies, continued in his immediate neighbourhood, threatening his flanks and rear, and watching his movements, being ready, had Chuttur Sing, at that time, attempted the siege of Attock, to throw himself into that fortress to assist Lieutenant Herbert, who had, in the interim, been sent with reinforcements from Peshawur in its defence, and, at the same time, was prepared to act on the communications, and cut off the supplies, of the rebel force, had it, as was, at the time, expected by Captains Abbott and Nicholson, marched to the southward.

At this period, the insurrection was spreading in Chuch, and it was a great object to prevent, if possible, its extension in the Khafir districts, and towards Futteh Jung and Chuckowal. The presence of Captain Nicholson, at this time, in these districts was of the greatest benefit. He continued on the very verge of the rebellion, as it were, with a very small force of newly raised followers, assuring the people, awing the wavering officials, and staying the encroaching tide of insurrection.

Captain Nicholson, in these operations, performed several very gallant actions, briefly described to me in a couple of lines in private notes, in one of which, in an attempt to dislodge the enemy from the Boorj which commands the Margulla Pass, he was wounded in the face, in personal conflict with some regulars of Baba Pandee Ramdial's regiment.

He continued in constant communication with Major Lawrence in Peshawur; and when Chuttur Sing and his rebel adherents cut off the Lahore daks, and stopped the direct road, Captain Nicholson kept open the communication with the capital and Futteh Jung, Chuckowal, and Pind Dadun Khan.

Captain Nicholson was thus employed, keeping all along within such distance of Attock that, if a siege or investment of the place were threatened, he could at any time throw himself into the fort, when he received an urgent letter from Mrs. Lawrence, describing herself to be in great danger at Chuckowal, stating that she intended to march towards him, and begging him to move on Chuckowal to her aid. Captain Nicholson immediately set off with the followers he had collected, towards Chuckowal, marching night and day, till he learnt that Mrs. Lawrence's escort, instead of bringing her towards him at Futteh Jung, had conveyed her back towards Kohat. He made a long forced march in the direction of Kohat, in the hope of overtaking her; but, finding that impossible, he moved on Chuckowal, to seize, and punish, the parties who were said to have stopped, and demanded money from, Mrs. Lawrence, and to have closed the road against her further advance.

Captain Nicholson found that, though the disturbance was spreading around Chuckowal, there was, up to the time that Mrs. Lawrence reached the place, nothing to have prevented her proceeding with perfect safety, had her large escort been faithful, and that it was evident that, through the treachery of the escort furnished by Sirdar Sooltan Mahomed Khan, and commanded by his son, Khwajah Mahomed Khan, she had been taken back to Kohat.

At Chuckowal, Captain Nicholson learnt that the insurgents had planned the seizure of the fort of Pind Dadun Khan, and the Government treasure therein, amounting to one and a half lakhs of rupees. This treasure Raja Deena Nath had omitted to bring away with him, on his return from Chuckowal, nor had he made any arrangement for its security. A guard of two companies of Poorbeahs had been sent by me from Lahore, to secure this treasure, some time before; but, instead of proceeding to Pind Dadun Khan, they had halted at Meanee, put themselves in communication with Sirdar Lal Sing, Morareea, at Rotas, and joined the rebels.

The rebels, at this time, occupied the passes of the Salt range, between

Chuckowal and Pind Dadun Khan, but Captain Nicholson, considering it of so much importance to save the treasure and ammunition in Pind Dadun Khan, determined to force the pass, and endeavour to occupy the fort, before the rebels could get there. He, accordingly, made a rapid movement in that direction, selecting the road where the insurgents were in least force, drove them off, after a sharp skirmish, and, marching day and night, reached Pind Dadun Khan a few hours only after it was, through the treachery of the garrison, occupied by the insurgents. Captain Nicholson's party had a conflict with the insurgents, outside of the town of Pind Dadun Khan, and drove them back to the fort. He, then, took up his position at the Ghat, seized the boats, and held them for some days, under the hope that he might be able to do so, until reinforcements should arrive.

All these circumstances Captain Nicholson communicated to me, on his reaching Pind Dadun Khan. The communication with Lahore had been interrupted by the rebels, and I had not heard from him for a considerable period.

At this juncture, the country between Futteh Jung and Pind Dadun Khan became extensively disturbed, and the Government officials in these districts all joined the rebel cause. Captain Nicholson found that the return to his former position was impossible, nor could he, for a long time, get any communication conveyed to Major Lawrence, or Lieutenant Herbert. He continued to hold the boats of the Jhelum for some time, and his presence had the effect of checking, to a certain extent, the rapidity of the progress of the disaffection.

But as it was impossible to send him reinforcements; the insurrection soon spread around him; and he was obliged to fall back, by a forced march, on Ramnuggur, which he reached, after a sharp skirmish with the rebels at Meanee, with all his people, in one night.

When Captain Nicholson reached Ramnuggur, the British troops were assembling at Ferozepore, and my object was, at that time, by any means, to save the Rechna Doab from the depredations of the insurgents, and from the spread of the rebellion, as upon it our army must in a great measure depend for their supplies. I, therefore, allowed Captain Nicholson to remain at Ramnuggur, as long as he could with anything like safety, and I sent him such reinforcements as I could command, with a supply of arms and ammunition. The fidelity of every soldier, of every description, in the Durbar service being doubtful, this was no easy matter. I sent only those on whom I could most depend—some of them remained faithful—others deserted to the enemy.

I was most anxious for the advance of the British troops, at this time, as I had all along been; and I felt that a single brigade, crossing the Ravee, would check the advance of Shere Sing's troops moving up on the left bank of the Chenab, and would also prevent the rebels crossing at Wuzeerabad, and thus allow Captain Nicholson to hold his own at Ramnuggur.

The distressing delay in the arrival of troops from Ferozepore, encouraged Lal Sing, Morareea, to cross the Chenab at Wuzeerabad, when the kardar, with the few Durbar troops there, joined the rebels; and the Sirdars, stationed for the protection of the place, fell back, to Goojranwalla, with the exception of Sirdar Nungul Sing, who gave a friendly meeting to Lal Sing, Morareea, at Wuzeerabad, and remained with him.

Sirdar Soorutt Sing, Majeetia, with the leading column of Shere Sing's troops, who had been kept, for some weeks, in check, by the bold attitude observed by Captain Nicholson, now advanced within eight or ten miles of Ramnuggur; and I considered Captain Nicholson's position no longer tenable there. I, therefore, ordered him in to Lahore, which he reached as Brigadier Godby's brigade crossed the Ravee, meeting it on the bridge.

A few days after this, Brigadier-General Cureton came up, and advanced immediately to Eminabad and Goojranwalla. I sent out Captain Nicholson with that division, as Political Officer.

The nature of Captain Nicholson's duties and services, since the advance of our army, is known to the Governor-General.

No 47.

*The Governor-General to the Secret Committee.**Camp, Ferozepore, February 7, 1849. (No. 10.)*

I FORWARD a correspondence with Major Macgregor, the Governor General's agent at Benares, regarding Maharanee Junda Khore of Lahore, and the communications which Mr. Newmarch, an attorney of the Calcutta Supreme Court, has held with her.

In October, the Maharanee, acting by Mr. Newmarch's advice, preferred complaints to me regarding the treatment to which she has been subjected by being removed from the Punjab, and placed under surveillance at Benares, and applied for an investigation into her conduct. Major Macgregor was told to inform her, that her conduct was examined by the Government of Lahore, and was found to have been such as to render necessary the measures of punishment, and precaution, which have since been taken, and that the Government of India saw no reason to renew, and declined to renew, investigations which had already been completed, and acted upon.

It appears that Mr. Newmarch afterwards made an application to the Supreme Court, to bring the Maharanee's case before that tribunal, and, the application having been refused, he is now prepared to proceed to England, and appeal, on behalf of his client, to the Court of Directors, and to Parliament, provided he receives, for his pains and costs, the sum of 50,000 rupees.

I transmit, in connection with this subject, a letter\* from the Resident at Lahore, dated the 29th ultimo, inclosing a translation of the decision of the Durbar for the removal of the Maharanee from the Punjab.

## Inclosure 1 in No 47

*Major Macgregor, C.B., Governor-General's Agent at Benares, to the Secretary with the Governor-General.*

*Benares, October 16, 1848.*

MR JOHN NEWMARCH, solicitor, arrived at Benares on the 4th, and returned to Calcutta on the 12th instant.

During Mr. Newmarch's stay here, he paid the Maharanee Junda Kore of Lahore several visits, all of which took place in my presence.

The Maharanee related a very full account of all the occurrences which had taken place in the Punjab, in which she happened to be in any way concerned, from the period that her brother was slain by the Sikh soldiery, up to her arrival here, which was explained to Mr. Newmarch, by an interpreter brought with him for that purpose.

She dwelt much on the severity of her imprisonment in the fort of Sheikhoopoor, and on the nature of her rigid confinement now at Benares, and also on the hardship of having been deprived of all her jewels and valuables, on her arrival here.

Mr. Newmarch prepared a letter, to be addressed by the Maharanee to the Governor-General, the contents of which were explained to her, of which she approved.

## Inclosure 2 in No. 47.

*J. Newmarch, Esq, to Major Macgregor.*

*Benares, October 12, 1848.*

I HAVE the honor to inclose a letter addressed, by Her Highness the Maharanee Junda Kore, to the Governor-General of India, which she requests you will do her the favor of laying before his Lordship. The letter is written in English, but it has been very fully explained to Her Highness.

I am also instructed by Her Highness to submit to you the inclosed estimate of the sum which she wishes to be allowed for her monthly expenditure. In perusing this, consideration must be given to the past and present situation of Her Highness. It may be that many of the items are such as appear to an Englishman unnecessary, and in some measure absurd, but they are such as she has been accustomed to expend, though now considerably reduced in amount, and she will feel that she is lowered in the eyes of her attendants, if deprived of the means of keeping them up. Among these, may be instanced the expenses of her own dress, and that of the little boy with her; and it may be urged that she has plenty of dresses by her; but she has been accustomed to purchase new dresses monthly, and will feel annoyed if she be prevented from continuing this custom.

Against the expenses of her servants I myself remonstrated, thinking the outlay extravagant. She has very considerably reduced them, at my request; but I am assured that the expenditure, under this head, even as submitted to me originally, was calculated on a much more economical scale than prevailed while she was mistress of her own resources, and she fears that a more considerable reduction would lessen the attachment of her domestics, and, perhaps, even induce them to desert her service.

I am also instructed by the Ranee to request that, out of the money belonging to her, confiscated by you, a monthly remittance may be made to me at Calcutta, for the support of her Native agent or vakeel at that place. Her Highness mentioned 500 rupees a month as a proper sum. If this be regarded in the light, not so much of a necessary expense, as of a means of supporting her old and attached followers during their exile, still I think that the Government should not prevent her from making such an allowance out of her own funds.

Her Highness also approves of my suggestion, that the services of Behary Loll, who has acted as my interpreter during my stay at Benares, should be continued. He seems to me very intelligent, and well conducted; and his instructor, the Reverend Mr. Sandbey, gives him a high character; he has also the confidence of the Ranee, and her attendants. I trust, therefore, that Government will see no objection to allowing him to be retained, at a moderate salary, say 40 rupees a month, or thereabout.

I also think that it would not be unreasonable, were I to request the Government to refund the actual expenses of my journey hither, and my return to Calcutta, amounting to about 700 rupees, but I do not wish to urge this, if the Government makes any demur on the matter.

I have also to request that you will furnish me with a list of the jewels and property of Her Highness, in your custody, and that you will inform me of any claims to any part thereof, which may be made by the Lahore Durbar, or any other persons; and that you will not deliver up any part, without giving me an opportunity of investigating, and contesting, if necessary, the justice of their claim.

#### Inclosure 3 in No 47.

#### *Estimate of the monthly expenses of Her Highness the Maharanee Junda Khore.*

	Rupees.
Her Highness' dress	300
Dress of the child under her protection	100
Meethaes	100
Table provisions, &c., &c.	500
Pan, nuts, &c. ..	50
Attar	80
Expenses attending worship	30
Wax candles, incense	80
Oil	30
Feed of horses, mules, oxen, &c.	220

#### SERVANTS.

Three female servants at 30 rupees each	90
Nine female servants at 10 rupees each	90
Dhoola Sing Jemadar	20
Four bearers at 6 rupees each	24

Jemadar of the Bawarchee Khana	20
Four cooks at 8 rupees each	32
Jemadar of the Palkee bearers	20
Ten bearers at 6 rupees each	60
Ram Kisaen	30
Khang Sing	30
Golab Sing	30
Modee Khosalee	20
Naram Sing	15
Six sel wallah at 6 rupees each	36
Carriage Jemadar ..	12
Man under him ..	6
Dhobee wages 7 rupees, and 1 rupee per day for Mussalah	37
Durgie .. ..	8
Mihter .. ..	6
Four Syces (engaged at Benares)	16
Jemadars of Ferrashes	15
Two Ferrashes at 6 rupees each	12
Gharree wallah .. ..	15
One man under him ..	6
Barber ..	10
Bheestees .. ..	8
Mehtah Sing .. ..	10
An interpreter .. ..	40
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## Inclosure 4 in No. 47.

*Major Macgregor to the Secretary with the Governor-General.*

*Benares, October 23, 1848.*

I FORWARD a letter from Mr. Newmarch to my address, accompanied by a statement shewing the Maharanee's estimated expenses.

The only objection which I see to a compliance with the Maharanee's request for an increase to her present allowance of 1,000 rupees per mensem, is that, in my opinion, she would, then, be able to save money out of her monthly allowance, which might be applied by her to some improper purpose.

As the cold weather is approaching, and as the Maharanee urges that she requires some warm clothing for herself and slave-girls, perhaps, the Governor General would be pleased to sanction some being made up for that press, and charged for, in my contingent bill.

less objection to Mr. Newmarch's being furnished with a copy of the inventory of the Maharanee's jewels and property, which were attached, on her arrival at Benares

Mr Newmarch, in making allusion to some money belonging to the Maharanee, refers, I believe, to the gold coin, which, with the rest of her property, was made over to the collector here, viz Mr M'Leod, and included in the inventory of the Maharanee's property.

## Inclosure 5 in No. 47

*The Secretary with the Governor-General to Major Macgregor.*

*Off Ghazepore, November 5, 1848.*

THE Maharanee must live within the income provided for her by the Lahore Durbar.

The clothing she has applied for, can either be purchased, and paid for, out of the funds referred to in your letter, or a portion of those funds sufficient for the purchase can be made over to her.



## Inclosure 6 in No. 47.

*Philip Melvill, Esq., the Under-Secretary with the Governor-General, to Major Macgregor.*

*Allahabad, November 14, 1848.*

YOU will acquaint the Maharanee, that her conduct was examined by the Government of Lahore, and was found to have been such as to render necessary the measures of punishment, and precaution, which have since been taken; and that the Government of India sees no reason to renew, and declines to renew, investigations, which have already been completed, and acted upon.

## Inclosure 7 in No. 47

*Mr Newmarch to Major Macgregor.*

*Calcutta, January 3, 1849.*

I HAVE the honor to transmit a letter and a newspaper which I request you will do me the favor to deliver to Her Highness the Maharanee Junda Khore, and allow her interpreter Behary Loll to translate the letter, and the portion of the newspaper relating to Her Highness's affairs, for Her Highness's information.

I also send a power of attorney, for execution by Her Highness, should she approve the suggestions contained in my letter, and I request you will allow the interpreter to explain the same, and attest the execution thereof.

I beg also to renew my request, that you will furnish me with a descriptive list of the jewellery, and other property, of Her Highness, which you have taken possession of, by the directions of Government.

## Inclosure 8 in No. 47.

*Mr Newmarch to the Maharanee Junda Khore.*

*Calcutta, January 3, 1849.*

I FEEL it my duty to inform you of the proceedings which have been taken in your Highness's cause, since I had the honor of receiving your commands at Benares, in October last.

I have received a reply to my letter addressed to Major Macgregor by your Highness's directions (representing the insufficiency of the allowance, at present made for the support of your Highness's establishment, and also requesting that a portion of the funds belonging to your Highness, now in Major Macgregor's hands, might be applied for the maintenance of your native vakeel in Calcutta), in which I am informed, that your Highness will be required to limit your expenditure to the scanty allowance hitherto afforded you.

I have also received an intimation that the Governor-General has refused to grant the investigation which you demanded, into the truth of the charges brought against you, or to make known to you what those charges are.

Upon being made acquainted with the resolution of the Indian Government to adhere to the foolish policy which they have hitherto pursued towards your Highness, I made an application to Her Majesty's Supreme Court, at Calcutta, in order to have your Highness's case brought before that tribunal for investigation. This application was refused; and, indeed, before I made the attempt, I was aware of the technical difficulties which would prevent the Court from granting it, and expected no other event. My object in making the application was, to make it apparent, that your Highness had unsuccessfully tried every possible means for obtaining a fair hearing in this country, before making an appeal to the higher authorities in England.

An appeal to the Court of Directors of the East India Company, to the British Parliament, and to Her Majesty in England, is now the only course which remains open to your Highness.

Before entering upon this, I deemed it expedient to lay a statement of your Highness's case before the public; which I did, in a letter addressed to the Governor-General, and published in the "Englishman" newspaper, the most extensively circulated journal in India. I have the honor to transmit to your Highness a copy of the paper containing my letter; and, from the remarks which appear in the editorial columns of the "Englishman," and also in those of a contemporary journal, the "Calcutta Star," (which I also transmit) your Highness will perceive that my attempts to influence the organs of public opinion in your Highness's favor, have not been entirely unsuccessful.

It will also be gratifying to your Highness to learn that, since the publication of my letter, I have received assurances, from persons in almost every rank of society in Calcutta, of their sympathy in your Highness's misfortunes, and their conviction that, on an appeal to England, the cruel measures pursued towards your Highness by the Indian Government, arising out of delusion and timidity, will be reversed, and your Highness restored to the regency of the Punjab.

I have now to enter upon the discussion of the all-important topic, the method of conducting your Highness's appeal in England. I have no wish to mislead your Highness for my own advantage. It is possible for this appeal to be conducted, without my proceeding to England, and I hope not without good chance of success, and I am now preparing the necessary memorials, and letters to influential persons, to interest them in your behalf. But, at the same time, I must, in spite of all misconstruction to which my advice may expose me, state my conviction, that the probability of securing a speedy and successful issue to your suit, would be much promoted by my going to England to conduct it in person. There are so many subjects of great interest always before the British Parliament, that your case may be postponed and neglected, unless there be one on the spot, well acquainted with its merits, to devote his whole zeal and energy to have it brought properly forward. Facts have to be got well together; influential persons spoken to; the public journals interested; and every exertion made to press the case on rapidly to a hearing, before it has grown stale, and ceased to attract the attention of the public. For all this agitation, the presence of an agent in England is, if not indispensable, most desirable.

I am willing to proceed thither, as your Highness's vakeel, and stay there, if necessary, for a year, but, as this step would entirely upset all my present business arrangements, and most materially affect my prospects in my profession, I could not, in justice to myself and my family, undertake such a mission for a less remuneration than 3,000*l.* (something more than 30,000 rupees) for my personal services, exclusive of expenses of travelling, printing, fees to officers and public writers, and otherwise, for which I ought to be furnished with not less than 2,000*l.* in addition, and this sum (in all 5,000*l.* or somewhat more than 50,000 rupees,) I should require to be paid, before my leaving this country. I beg your Highness will not misunderstand me; I am quite ready, as heretofore, to render my best services in this country, resting my hopes of remuneration on the chance of the eventual success of your Highness's cause, and being content, in case of failure, to have as my reward the consciousness that I have exerted myself, disinterestedly, in the cause of the oppressed. But I cannot suspend my business, and alter all my plans for the future, which my proceeding to England would necessitate, without being paid, in hand, the sum which I have mentioned above. And large as that sum is, I think the vital importance of your Highness's cause being pushed with the utmost vigor, will well justify its expenditure.

Should your Highness concur with me in my views of the best mode of conducting your appeal in England, it remains to be considered how this large sum of 5,000*l.* can be raised.

Most unquestionably, it ought, at once, to be furnished by Government, on the security of the jewels, and other valuable property, belonging to you, which they hold in their hands; or, should your Highness prefer to raise the money by a sale of a portion of those jewels, or by the realization of the hoondies, which I understand from you, are among the property taken possession of by Government, a sufficient portion of the property ought to be made over to me, for that purpose.

Should, however, Government (in the expectation of putting a stop to your appeal,) refuse to sanction such a use of the property which they hold, I have hopes that I should be able, if authorized by you in that behalf, to raise the necessary funds, by loan from persons in Calcutta, upon the personal security of your Highness, or upon security of the property belonging to you, in the possession of the officers of Government.

I send, for signature by your Highness, in case you should approve of my suggestions, a document which would enable me to raise the funds required, by any of the methods which I have mentioned. This document you should have explained to you by Behary Loll, and it should be signed by you, in the presence of one or more of your female attendants, who could, if necessary, make oath as to the fact of your having signed it.

To enable me to complete the copies of documents to be annexed to the memorial to be addressed to Parliament, I require a copy of the English letter which your Highness addressed to the Governor-General in October last. I have, unfortunately, mislaid the draft, and therefore request that your Highness will send me a copy from that which is in your possession.

I beg to renew my assurances to your Highness that, whether I remain in this country, or proceed to England, I shall not cease from the most strenuous exertions, until your Highness's case be brought to a happy issue.

P. S.—I am not altogether without hope, that the strong feeling, which has been excited among the public, in favor of your Highness, since your case has, by my published letter to the Governor-General, been placed fully before them, may have the effect of inducing the Indian Government to revise their measures, without driving us to an appeal to England; but this hope must not lead us to relax, in the meantime, our efforts for the prosecution of that appeal in the most vigorous manner.

Inclosure 9 in No. 47.

*Major Macgregor to the Secretary with the Governor-General.*

*Benares, January 11, 1849.*

I REQUEST to be favored with his Lordship's instructions as to whether or not Mr. Newmarch's letter to the Maharanee's address, and the power of attorney shall be delivered to Her Highness.

I further beg to know whether or not a copy of the "Englishman" Newspaper, containing a letter from Mr. Newmarch to the address of the Governor-General, couched in very disrespectful terms, shall be delivered to the Maharanee, the said newspaper having been sent to me by Mr. Newmarch for that purpose.

Mr. Newmarch renews his request to be furnished with a descriptive list of the jewellery and other property of Her Highness, deposited in the collector's treasury.

Inclosure 10 in No. 47.

*The Secretary with the Governor-General to Major Macgregor.*

*Camp, Mukkon, January 23, 1849.*

YOU are directed to acquaint Mr. Newmarch, that the Government does not wish to interpose any needless obstacles in the way of a fitting communication between him and his client.

But the Government will not permit one of its own subjects, through its own officers, to transmit, to a state prisoner, letters, and documents, containing reflections on the public policy pursued by the Government, which are quite unnecessary for the transaction of business between his client and himself. The Governor-General, therefore, declines to sanction the delivery to Her Highness of these papers, or of the printed letter alluded to by you.

Whenever Mr. Newmarch shall forward, for the Maharanee, letters free from the objections stated above, the Government will authorize their being delivered to his client.

A list, also, of the jewels deposited in the treasury, will, in that case, be furnished to him.

Inclosure 11 in No. 47.

*Major Macgregor to the Secretary with the Governor-General.*

*Benares, January 23, 1849.*

I TRANSMIT a letter from the Maharanee Junda Khore of Lahore.

The Maharanee, on my visiting her a few days ago, expressed a desire that I would communicate a message from Her Highness to the Governor-General. I told her that if she would write what she wished to make known to the Governor-General, I would transmit the document to his Lordship.

Inclosure 12 in No. 47.

*The Maharanee Junda Khore of Lahore to Major Macgregor.*

*January 15, 1849.*

THE friendship which had subsisted for a period of forty years between Maharajah Runjeet Sing and the British Government, was interrupted by the intrigues of several crafty and ill-disposed persons; but, by the payment of crores of rupees, I restored amicable relations between the two States.

During the late struggle, the British Government expended lakhs of rupees; the Government of the Rajah Duleep Sing expended lakhs of rupees; and thousands of lives were lost; and no good resulted to either of the States.

The British Government has done well, in causing my removal; it has saved my life; ungrateful wretches would have taken it. My wish is to requite the British Government, for the good it has done me: how is this to be effected? Why, in this manner: send me back to the Punjab, and I would repress anarchy, and restore good government. I would advance the interests of the British Government. The British should confide in me; I am a person of integrity, and never tell falsehoods.

If the British would send me to the Punjab, I would settle the affairs of that country in four months, and in such a manner as to meet the approval of the British. If it pleased the British, I would make prisoners of the evil-disposed persons, and cause them to be slain: in fact, I would, in no way, act contrary to the wishes of the British: by sending me back to the Punjab, they would see how wisely I would administer the affairs of that country: what good has arisen from keeping me a prisoner? all has gone wrong in consequence. People should regulate their actions, so as to derive some good from them: make use of my services; and the interests of the British Government would thereby be promoted.

When I was confined in the fort of Sheikhoopoor, I was in possession of property to the value of fifty lakhs, besides two lakhs of rupees in cash. If I had entertained unfriendly feelings towards the British, I had then the opportunity of acting inimically towards them; but I did not do so, because I entertain friendly feelings towards the British; and, from that period to the present time, you yourself are aware that I have not in any way committed myself against the British.

If the British desire to avail themselves of my services—which might prove most beneficial to their interests—now is the time to consider the matter, while misrule prevails throughout the Punjab: should they be suspicious of my intentions, let them be assured that I entertain no evil designs whatever, and should promote their interests.

I don't blame the British, for what I have suffered: I blame my own ungrateful servants. I consider that the British have done me good, in removing me from the scene of disturbances, because it is now the more easily discovered

who are the faithful, and who are the unfaithful, servants of the State. Had I remained in the Punjab, the rebels would have declared that the Ranee was at the bottom of all the disturbances: when I was there, I always endeavoured to put a stop to their evil designs: and it was this opposition on my part which induced them to seek for my removal, thinking that when I, who am a clever woman, would be out of the way, the young Maharajah would be completely under their control, and they would then be able to carry out all their evil designs; and thus they caused my removal and imprisonment.

The legitimate ruler (Mahk) of the Punjab being away, the army has become disorganized, the chiefs disunited; were I (the Mahk) to appear among them, under the auspices and in alliance with the British, they would, at once, through fear, submit to me; and whatever the British desired, would be accomplished. Those who resolve to die fighting, cannot be taken alive; and the British may fight many battles, but the Sikhs will never submit to their rule. If the British desire to settle the country, let them send me thither, and I will rule the country on their terms. If the British will not allow me to return to the Punjab, the state of affairs there will become worse. Chuttur Sing has already made over Peshawur to the Caboolees, to secure their cooperation; so in like manner will other parts of the Punjab pass into other hands. You are wise and experienced: if I have written aught objectionable, blot it out: never trust the Sikh Sardars or army: they killed Maharajah Shere Sing, and placed Maharajah Duleep Sing on the throne, when he was only five years old; and then ruled the country themselves. The young Maharajah and myself may be left in the hands of the British, but they (the Sikhs) will in like manner raise another ruler, and serve under him. You are wise. Do as you think best.

Inclosure 13 in No. 47.

*The Secretary with the Governor-General to Major Macgregor.*

*Camp, Ferozepore, January 31, 1849*

THE letter from the Maharanee calls for no answer.

Inclosure 14 in No. 47.

*The Resident at Lahore to the Secretary with the Governor-General.*

*Lahore, January 29, 1849.*

I FORWARD the document, dated the 16th of May last, recording the decision of the Resident, acting in concert with the Durbar, for the removal of the Maharanee Junda Khore from the Punjab, and promulgating the same for the information of the chiefs and people of Lahore.

Inclosure 15 in No. 47.

*Paper recorded, and promulgated, by the Lahore Durbar, in Purwannas, under the signature of the Resident, and the seals of the Lahore Government, and all the Members of the Durbar, to all the Chiefs, the Army, and People of the Punjab.*

ON the 20th of August, 1847, a notification was recorded by the Resident of Lahore, in concert with the members of the Durbar, and issued, for the information of all the subjects of Maharajah Duleep Sing Bahadoor, to the purport following:—"The Governor-General, having respect to the friendly relations established between the British and Lahore Governments, and regarding Maharajah Duleep Sing, during his tender years, with the interest of a parent, has determined, with the full concurrence of the Durbar, that it is necessary, for the well being of the Maharajah, and for the maintenance of the above relations, that His Highness Maharajah Duleep Sing should be

separated from the Maharanee, and, in consequence of this determination, the Maharanee has been removed (on the 19th of August, 1847, corresponding with 5th Bhadoun, 1904,) to the fort of Sheikhoopoor. The causes of the above determination having been come to, are these:—1st. On the occasion of concluding the existing arrangements for conducting the government of the Lahore State, it was determined that the Maharanee should take no part in the administration of public affairs; but that Her Highness should live in ease and comfort, in the enjoyment of the liberal allowance assigned to her; notwithstanding which, the Maharanee has, systematically, interfered with, and opposed, the members of the Durbar, and has engaged in a series of proceedings highly injurious to the interests of the State: to such an extent that the business of the administration has been materially hindered. 2dly. The hatred entertained by the Maharanee to the Sirdars composing the Durbar, and the influence exercised by her over her son, will have the effect, if not counteracted, of estranging the affections of the Maharajah from the persons of the Sirdars, and of preventing the mind of the Maharajah from being endowed with those principles, and qualities, which are so highly essential, to enable His Highness, on the expiration of his minority, so to conduct the government as to promote the welfare of his country and his subjects. 3rdly. Evil disposed persons, enemies to the true interests of the Khalsa State, encouraged by the presence of the Maharanee at Lahore, and the authority which Her Highness assumes, engage in practices which have the tendency, by degrees, to ruin the country.—These are the causes which have induced the removal of the Maharanee, in which measure it behoves all the well-wishers of the State to be satisfied, and well pleased.

On the 2nd of September, 1847, in accordance with instructions received in a letter from the Government of India, dated the 28th of August, the following communication was made to the Maharanee, in consequence of an appeal made by Her Highness to the Governor-General. “The Maharanee is informed that the act by which she was separated from her son, was the act of the Governor-General deliberately taken, and that it will not be revoked; that the Governor-General is the guardian of the Maharajah, during his minority; and that, at his age, he ought to be educated in a manner becoming his future high station; that Her Highness has misused her power over her son, by causing him to counteract the Government, which is attempting to save the Raj, brought to the very verge of ruin, during the time Her Highness was regent, and only saved by the moderation of the British Government; that Her Highness’s mode of life, since March 1846, when, at her solicitation, a British force occupied Lahore, has been of a nature to induce the Governor General no longer to entrust the Prince to be brought up under her tuition, that the motive of the Governor-General’s decision has been proclaimed to the Sikh people, and that it now only remains for Her Highness to be resigned to the decision, which is irrevocable, during the Maharajah’s minority. The Maharanee is, at the same time, warned that it is her duty to her son not to thwart the British Government, in carrying on the government on behalf of her son; and that if her acts, either by letter or by message, are of a nature to convince the Government that she is so reckless as to persevere in abusing the facilities which her present residence may afford, by attempting to excite discontent and disturbance, on account of the separation from her son, then, the Governor-General will not hesitate to take the next step, of removing Her Highness out of the Punjab, in the just exercise of the power vested in him by the late treaty—as it is the duty of the Governor-General to adopt such measures as he may deem to be most conducive to the interests of her son, and the welfare of the State.” Notwithstanding the above warning, and the expostulations and remonstrances which have been, from time to time, addressed to the Maharanee, by the Resident, and the Durbar, Her Highness has not desisted from her intrigues; and, at this time, some of the immediate and confidential dependants of the Maharanee have been convicted of evil practices, and designs, of the most serious character—such as, had they been accomplished, and the intentions of the conspirators fulfilled, would, inevitably, have caused the ruin of the Khalsa State. These persons have paid the penalty of their crimes; but, in the investigation of their case, the name of the Maharanee has been adduced, by the criminals, as the instigator of their offences; and letters from the Maharanee to these parties, in confirm-

ation of their assertions, have been recorded on the proceedings held by the Resident and the Durbar. Although it is hardly credible that the Maharanee should, in her heart, desire the destruction of the Government of her son, yet, as such is the result to be apprehended from her conduct, and from her presence in the Punjab, affording, as it does, an occasion for the enemies of the State to concert measures injurious to the Government, it is determined by the Resident, in concert with the members of the Durbar, that it is expedient, and absolutely necessary, that the provisions of the letter of the Governor-General of the 28th of August, above quoted, should be enforced; and the Maharanee has, accordingly, by the orders of the Resident and the Durbar, been removed, with all due respect to her rank, and consideration to her sex and position, to the other side of the Sutlej, accompanied by her female attendants, and under charge of the faithful friend and attached servant of the late Maharajah Runjeet Sing, the venerable Fakcer Noorooddeen.

Her Highness the Maharanee will reside henceforth at Benares, a place esteemed as of much sanctity by Hindoos; and Her Highness's property, which may be too bulky to accompany her, will be sent after her, in charge of Her Highness's brother, Sirdar Heera Sing. The Maharanee, while at Benares, will be under the charge of the Governor-General's agent; and Her Highness will be prohibited from holding any communication, in writing, or otherwise, with any of the inhabitants of the Punjab, or others, of a tendency injurious to the interests of the Maharajah, and of the State of Lahore. If Her Highness shall not, at Benares, abstain from practices and designs of a tendency to subvert the administration of the Punjab, and injurious to the Maharajah, or the British Government, it will, in such case, be necessary for the Government of India to cause the Maharanee to be confined in the fortress of Chunar. This decision has been recorded, and is promulgated, for the information, and satisfaction, of the various classes of the Lahore subjects, on the 16th of May, 1848.

#### No. 48.

#### *The Governor-General to the Secret Committee.*

*Camp, Ferozepore, February 21, 1849. (No. 13.)*

MAJOR-GENERAL WHISH, C.B., with the advance brigade of the Mooltan force, reached Ramnuggur on the 13th, and, on the 16th, joined his Excellency the Commander-in-Chief, who had moved from his former position, on the previous day, in the direction of Wuzeerabad, the enemy having left their entrenchments, and taken up a position between Goojerat and the Chenab. Want of supplies led to this movement, on the part of the enemy, who were allowed to effect it without being molested by our troops. Their intention appears to have been to have crossed the Chenab, and, after ravaging the Rechna Doab, to proceed to Lahore; but this intention was frustrated by Major-General Whish's having detached a brigade, to guard the fords above, and below, Wuzeerabad. The enemy have, several times, come down to the river, for the purpose of attempting a passage, but, finding our troops on the alert, have retired on Goojerat. The rear brigade, or Bombay column, of the Mooltan reinforcements, under Brigadier-General the Honorable H. Dundas, C.B., reached his Excellency's head-quarters, on the evening of the 19th, thus completing the army at the disposal of his Excellency. His Excellency the Commander-in-Chief will, doubtless, therefore, immediately attack the enemy, who is in considerable force, though a portion of his army, with some guns, is separated from the rest, having crossed the Jhelum, when the main body moved upon Goojerat.

Upon his march, Major-General Whish received the submission of Narain Sing, Moolraj's principal commander. He held the stronghold of Chuniote with about 2,000 men. These, on a promise of their lives, laid down their arms to Major-General Whish, on the 9th instant, and were made over, as prisoners, to Sheik Emamooddeen, who had been investing Chuniote. Narain Sing was taken on, with Major-General Whish's force, and has, no doubt, reached Lahore ere this.

Almost all the chief advisers and officers of Moolraj are now in confine-

ment. Of his soldiers, nearly 4,000 were taken at Mooltan. Major Edwardes has sent to Ferozepore a large number of those whose homes are in the Manjha, the protected Sikh States, and the British Provinces, under charge of Peer Ibraheem Khan, native agent at Bahawalpore. All deserters from the regiments that accompanied Mr. Agnew, or from General Cortlandt's regiments, and all such as have been conspicuous in the part they have taken against the British, have been retained for trial. Among them, is the reputed murderer of Mr. Agnew. Respecting this man, I have instructed the Resident that he should be tried by a Court, consisting of three European officers, and three Native officers, together with another European as President; that the trial should be entered upon, without delay; and the result, with the sentence, be submitted to me, before it is carried into execution.

The removal of Moolraj to Lahore, has been securely effected. I have sanctioned, at the suggestion of the Resident, his being placed in confinement in Govindgurh, for the present.

There appears to be ample and consistent testimony to the fact, that Moolraj was the moving spring of the insurrection, after it had once broke out; but that the first outbreak was unpremeditated, and, in a manner, accidental.

Lieutenant Taylor gives a most satisfactory account of his proceedings at Lukkee. His position is a strong one, and he has made it what it is. Lieutenant Pollock, with 1,200 regular infantry, 1,000 irregulars, and 6 guns, was at Kulloor, six marches from Lieutenant Taylor, on the 8th instant. "He will remain there," Lieutenant Taylor writes, "for the present, thereby protecting my right flank, and exercising a beneficial influence over the country between the Indus and Jhelum. The arrival of Lieutenant Pollock will give me a disposable force of 5,000 men and 12 guns, with a strong fort, garrisoned by 500 men and 5 guns, to protect my rear; and, could I feel secure that they would not be reinforced, I believe this force would be sufficient to enable me to attack that of the Dooranee Sirdars in Bunnoo; but, as long as they count on being relieved, in case of emergency, in a fortnight, and have so strong a fortress as Duleepghur, to rest upon in the interim, I think it would be rash to attempt to drive them out of Bunnoo, and risk a failure, which would, probably, involve the loss of the advantages we, at present, possess." He goes on to say, that "the inhabitants of Bunnoo are decidedly in our favor, and would hail with joy our re-occupation of the valley, contrasting their present state, with what it was so lately under British management, when every man had his right, and every thing was paid for."

I have requested the Resident to communicate to Lieutenant Taylor my high appreciation of his zeal, gallantry, and prudence, as shown in his operations against Lukkee, and in his proceedings since he has held that fort.

Maharajah Golab Sing has replied, very earnestly, to the warning letter addressed to him. "His letter," the Resident remarks, "is, for him, a bold and indignant reply to what he considers an unjust accusation." He desired to have plain and explicit orders as to what was expected, and required of him, at the present time, stating that he was ready to attend to every requisition, even though his country was in danger.

The Resident was instructed to inform His Highness, that I expect, when the Sikhs are defeated, His Highness' army will be actively employed against them, in the hill country, into which they will be driven. The troops of the Maharajah will be able, in that country, to act against them with effect, to render those services which he has professed his readiness to perform, and which, moreover, he is bound by his Treaty to perform. The Resident was, further, told to warn the Maharajah not to disregard these directions, and that his interests would be materially affected, by the manner, and extent, of his compliance. Sir Henry Lawrence has given an opinion, adverting particularly to a letter from Dost Mahomed Khan, which was taken from Moolraj, that Golab Sing has held altogether aloof from the councils of the insurgents. I have never considered that there was any proof of the Maharajah's complicity with the enemies of the British Government, nor have I preferred against him any such accusation; but, between holding aloof from the insurgents, and cordially cooperating against them, is all the difference between the conduct of a neutral power, and an ally. Golab Sing's neutrality, at the present time, would be scarcely one step removed from actual hostility, for the Treaty to which he owes his power, demands from him the hearty assistance of an ally.



You will observe, that the rumour of the gathering of Affghans at Candahar, for the purpose of invading Sinde, is said to be unfounded.

I have the satisfaction to report, that the Fort of Hurrund in the Derajat, which held out, since the commencement of these transactions, against parties detached by Major Edwardes, has, at last, been captured, and the rebels are thus deprived of their last stronghold in the plains.

Captain Abbott has been heard of, up to the 14th instant. He had then left Gundgurb, and proceeded into the Shirwani country, where he thought his services would be more usefully employed, in repelling the projected Dooranee invasion of Cashmere.

Inclosure 1 in No 48

*Major-General Whish to the Adjutant-General.*

*Camp, Mooltan, January 26, 1849*

IT will be satisfactory to the Commander-in-Chief to learn that the remains of the late Mr Vans Agnew, C.S., and Lieutenant Anderson, 1st Bombay Fusiliers, are to be interred this afternoon in the citadel, which will long bear the marks of the retributive justice of the British Government, for their cowardly murders, by its late garrison in April last.

Inclosure 2 in No. 48

*The Secretary with the Governor-General to the Resident at Lahore*

*Camp, Ferozepore, February 13, 1849.*

IN the general order of the Governor-General, dated the 1st instant, relating to the surrender of Mooltan, his Lordship, while thanking Major Edwardes and Lieutenant Lake for the services rendered by the forces under their commands, purposely omitted the name of General Cortlandt, wishing to address him as an officer of the Maharajah of Lahore, through the Resident.

His Lordship now desires that his thanks may be conveyed to General Cortlandt, for his conduct in connection with the force under Major Edwardes, and for the gallantry and firmness which he has evinced, throughout all the operations in the Mooltan district, and Derajat.

You are requested to transmit the thanks of the Governor-General to General Cortlandt direct to himself.

Inclosure 3 in No. 48.

*The Secretary with the Governor-General to the Resident at Lahore*

*Camp, Ferozepore, February 15, 1849*

IT would appear that Moolraj enjoys more liberty than is expedient—his Lordship requests that every precaution may be taken, and that if there should appear to be any reason for believing that his servants are conveying letters to and fro, they should be punished, and replaced by others of Lieutenant Henry's own selection.

*The Resident at Lahore to the Secretary with the Governor-General.*

*Lahore, February 15, 1849.*

I HAD written to General Whish, suggesting that Moolraj should be sent into Lahore in one day, in a Darbar carriage, escorted by a strong party of cavalry: To prevent accidents, riding horses would be also supplied: I have not yet received the General's reply, but have sent the carriage to Ramnuggur. My motive for this step is, lest the prisoner should tamper with the native guard, and, as I do not wish to bring an European one from the army, there will be less chance of attempt to rescue, during a rapid journey, than if the prisoner were brought by regular marches. I have requested General Whish, in case he agree with me, to have the prisoner started at 5 A.M. so that he may be seen at Akalgurh, five miles east of Ramnuggur, his native place, and still reach Lahore before dark. He shall, as ordered, be brought into Lahore under guard, and without any secrecy. I recommend that, after two or three days delay, he be sent to Govindgurh, there to await the Governor-General's final orders. As circumstances alter from day to day, the officer commanding at Ramnuggur must be the best judge of the propriety of sending Moolraj in the manner I suggest.

In regard to the deserters recently captured at Mooltan, I would recommend their being employed on the public works of Mooltan, especially the fortifications, in irons, for terms from two to five years, according to the degree of their guilt. The roads and canals in the neighbourhood will furnish an ample field of labor, when the citadel is put in order. But, perhaps, it would be advisable to suspend judgment on these persons, until the termination of hostilities; simply, for the present, classifying them, according to their degrees of guilt.

Regarding the 2,000 prisoners sent to Ferozepore, I recommend that, at present, no man be released without giving security for future good conduct. All unable to furnish security might, perhaps, be sentenced to hard labor, without irons, inside the frontier jails, for a period of one year, individuals being released whenever they furnished the required security.

Inclosure 5 in No. 48

*The Secretary with the Governor-General to the Resident at Lahore.*

*Camp, Ferozepore, February 19, 1849.*

THE Governor-General has no doubt that proper precautions will be taken by you, for the safe conveyance of Dewan Moolraj to Lahore. His Lordship approves of his being sent to Govindgurh, and requests that the commandant of that fortress may be instructed to confine him, rigidly, under European sentries, until the pleasure of the Government is declared.

The Governor-General concurs in your proposal, respecting the deserters at Mooltan.

His Lordship is of opinion that the man supposed to be the actual murderer of Mr. Agnew, should be tried at Mooltan, in open Court.

The Court should consist, his Lordship thinks, of three European officers and three Native officers, together with another European officer as President. The evidence should be carefully sifted, and recorded, and the result, together with the sentence, should be sent to you, for submission to the Governor-General, before it is carried into execution.

The trial should be entered on, without unnecessary delay.

The Governor-General apprehends that Lieutenant James, now at Mooltan, has been in the habit of hearing judicial cases, and he might fittingly preside in the Court above-mentioned.

**Inclosure 6 in No. 48.**

*The Resident at Lahore to the Secretary with the Governor-General*

*Lahore, February 16, 1849.*

I FORWARD a copy of Lieutenant Taylor's letter of the 8th instant, giving a modest account of his own valuable services. Lieutenant Taylor's prudence keeps so well a-pace with his zeal and gallantry, that I consider myself very fortunate in having him in charge in the Derajat, at the present juncture. As soon as it is prudent to do so, I doubt not he will strike a blow on the enemy. Major Edwardes furnished him, at my suggestion, with portions of his most trusty levies, and, mixed as are their interests, and encouraged as they have been, I have little fear, under ordinary circumstances, of their misconducting themselves.

**Inclosure 7 in No 48**

*Lieutenant Taylor to the Resident at Lahore.*

*Lukkee, February 8, 1849.*

SIRDAR KHOAJAH MAHOMED KHAN, son of Sirdar Sooltan Mahomed Khan, has marched from Kohat to Bunnoo, with about 150 horse and one gun, arriving at the latter place on the evening of the 5th instant. I understand that the Sirdar gives out that more troops are coming from Peshawur; but, as yet, they certainly have not reached Kohat. Time will soon show whether Dost Mahomed Khan is prepared to support him, with more troops, or not. At present, it would appear that his sole object must be to strengthen Mahomed Azim Khan in his position at Duleepgurh, and prevent that, now important, fortress from falling into our hands. His arrival will not enable Mahomed Azim Khan to take the field against the force now assembled here, amounting to 3,300 men, and nine guns. On the other hand, the cousins, supported by 1,500 of their own retainers, and some 2,000 levies from the hills, may hold Bunnoo, in considerable strength.

On the approach of Khoajah Mahomed Khan, I summoned Lieutenant Pearse, who, with the artillery and other troops under his command, had hitherto been halted under the Puzzoo pass; and he, accordingly, marched in, on the morning of the 6th; and I am informed that our salute from eleven guns (nine outside and two in the fort) on the occasion, quite spoiled the éclat of Khoajah Mahomed Khan's arrival in Bunnoo.

Mahomed Azim Khan has, during his stay in Bunnoo, used every possible artifice to induce the Mussulman population of these valleys to join him in a religious movement, and has, hitherto, totally failed, partly, from the inconsistency of his preaching a crescentade here, while his father is leagued with the Sikhs in the Punjab, partly, from the necessity he has been under, of collecting the revenues of the country to pay his troops, and partly, I think, I may truly say, from the general good feeling that exists towards us in these districts: nearly every letter he has written (and they have been most numerous) has found its way to me, and the men whom he has been exhorting to join his standard, have been writing, and sending messages, to me, to come on quickly, and free them from his control. Now, I am of opinion that Mahomed Azim Khan, son of Ameer Dost Mahomed, who is much respected among all Afghans, having been unable to raise the green flag, his cousin, though a much cleverer man, will be equally unsuccessful. Neither Sooltan Mahomed Khan, nor any of his sons, is respected; and the tyrannical and covetous Khoajah Mahomed, preaching a religious war, would be regarded as false and hypocritical, even by Bunnoochee Ghazee. I do not, therefore, at present, apprehend any danger on that score. I say, at present; because I think that, should any difficulty or delay occur in the

conduct of the war in the Central Punjab, a change of feeling might possibly take place in this respect

Lieutenant Pollock, with 1,200 regular infantry, 1000 irregulars, and six guns, is to-day at Kulloor, four marches from Esakhail, and six from this. He will, for the present, take up a position at the former place, thereby protecting my right flank, and exercising a beneficial influence over the country between the Indus and Jhelum

The arrival of Lieutenant Pollock will give me a disposable force of 5,000 men, and twelve guns, with a strong fort, garrisoned by 500 men and five guns, to protect my rear, and, could I feel secure that they would not be reinforced, I believe this would be sufficient to enable me to attack that of the Dooranee Sirdars in Bunnoo; but, as long as they can count on being relieved in case of emergency, in a fortnight, and have so strong a fortress as Duleepgurh to rest upon in the interim, I think it would be rash to attempt to drive them out of Bunnoo, and risk a failure which would, probably, involve the loss of the advantages we, at present, possess; at the same time, I concur heartily in Major Edwardes' expressed opinion of the desirableness of regaining possession of the fort of Duleepgurh, and the province of Bunnoo, should a convenient opportunity offer. Our re-occupation of the valley would be hailed with pleasure, by a large body of the inhabitants; and, had we possession of the fort, I do not think that the people would favor any invader wishing to eject us. When first Mahomed Azim Khan came to Bunnoo, the people were much pleased and delighted at the establishment of Mahomedan rule. The Sirdar, then, gave out that his sole object was to make war with the infidels, and that he had no intention of levying revenue; now, he has both demanded revenue, and subsistence for his men; and his hungry soldiers, of course, take much more than he sanctions; and, on this account, the days of occupation by the Sikhs, under British management, when every man had his right, and everything was paid for, are remembered with favor by the Bunnoochees. You may depend on my watching anxiously for an opportunity of regaining possession of Bunnoo; but, as the expedition involves considerable danger to our defensive position in the Derajat, I shall not willingly undertake it, till there is every prospect of ultimate success.

The fort of Duleepgurh is very strongly built; the walls of the inner fort are twelve feet thick at the summit; and the mud of Bunnoo, when dry, is as hard as stone. The ditch is twenty-five feet deep, and can be filled with water, at a few hours' notice. The labor and difficulty of mining under it, would be incredibly great. It would, therefore, be most desirable that the force proceeding against Duleepgurh, should be provided with one or two guns of heavy calibre, capable of effecting a breach in defences such as I have above described. I must confess that I do not know where such guns could be furnished from, at this juncture, unless indeed some of the heavy guns taken at Mooltan, could be made available for the occasion. If they are not anywhere procurable, I dare say the light guns will do the work; and it is, in fact, only under the impression that the Dost's son and nephew, attacked by another class of Affghans, would make an obstinate resistance; coupled with the remembrance that large Sikh armies have failed before a Bunnoochee Mullick's Gurree; that I have thought it necessary to represent how very advantageous the presence of battering guns with the force would, probably, be. The eight-inch shells which Major Edwardes has sent, with the artillery under Lieutenant Pollock, would, probably, be sufficient to induce any other garrison to surrender.

The defences of the fort of Lukkee are being greatly strengthened; it is a very strong and serviceable outpost.

In conclusion, I beg to bring to your notice, how important it is that I should receive regular intelligence from the main army, on the movements of which, my future plans entirely depend. I have sent numerous harkaras, with letters to the political officers in the Commander-in-Chief's camp, but very few have returned; and my last authentic advices from the army, are of the 17th ultimo. Letters would reach me, via Lahore, in eleven days; and that would be sufficiently quick to put me in advance of the rest of the world about me; the direct road is unsafe for a dak, and I could never reckon certainly, on receiving intelligence by that route. I should, therefore, feel grateful for any arrangement by which you could insure my being regularly informed of the

progress of events in the Central Punjab. Extracts from the Ukhbars would be sufficient, but I should wish them to be inclosed to me, and not sent through the news writers.

Inclosure 8 in No. 48.

*The Secretary with the Governor-General to the Resident at Lahore*

*Ferozepore, February 19, 1849*

THE Governor-General fully concurs with you in the opinion you have recorded of Lieutenant Taylor, and you are requested to communicate to that officer, that his Lordship highly appreciates his zeal, gallantry, and prudence.

Inclosure 9 in No. 48.

*The Secretary with the Governor-General to the Resident at Lahore*

*Camp, Ferozepore, February 8, 1849.*

RELATIVE to military operations in the vicinity of Shahpoor, against the insurgent Ram Sing, and his followers, the Governor-General desires me to record his satisfaction with the conduct of the detachment of the 1st Sikh Local Corps, and the irregular troops, under the command of Captain W. W. Davidson, upon which body the whole business of the attack on the enemy's position seems to have fallen, and who suffered severely in consequence. His Lordship, further, desires me to express his regret for the loss of Lieutenant Peel, second in command of the Sikh corps

Inclosure 10 in No. 48.

*The Resident at Lahore to the Secretary with the Governor-General.*

*Lahore, February 8, 1849.*

I INCLOSE a letter from Sirdar Chuttur Sing to my address, and my answer; also the proclamation which I have issued

Inclosure 11 in No. 48.

*Sirdar Chuttur Sing to the Resident at Lahore*

I HAVE received information of your safe arrival from Europe at Lahore. The Sikhs, both high and low, who were grateful in former days for the kindness and consideration you then showed them, are greatly pleased at this intelligence. As the seasons revolve and change, and do not always continue the same, Major George Lawrence is now residing in the Sikh camp. Every one treats him with attention and respect, and neither he nor his wife suffer any hardship. I inclose a letter from him to you, which I trust will reach you. I shall be happy to forward anything which you may write in reply.

## Inclosure 12 in No. 48.

*The Resident at Lahore to Sirdar Chuttur Sing.**Lahore, February 5, 1849.*

I RECEIVED yesterday evening a letter from you, without date, and also one from my brother, Major Lawrence, dated fourteen days ago.

Your reasons for detaining in confinement my brother and other officers, as well as even ladies and children, are best known to yourself. You say that you are rejoiced at my return, and that you and many other Sikhs are grateful for the kindness which I have shown to you. You are quite right in saying that I have treated you with kindness, for, in truth, you have never received from myself, my brothers, or from Sir Frederick Currie, anything but the utmost kindness.

Your messenger says, you are ready to follow my advice

My advice is, that which has already been given to you, on the part of the British Government, viz., immediately, on receipt of this letter, to deliver over to Major Mackeson, the British officers, ladies, and children, at present in confinement; and, secondly, to come yourself into the British camp, trusting to the mercy of the Governor-General.

Inclosed is a copy of a proclamation this day issued by me, under orders from the Governor-General.

No more can be promised to men with arms in their hands.

## Inclosure 13 in No. 48.

*Proclamation by the Resident at Lahore**Lahore Residency, February 5, 1849*

A PROCLAMATION was issued by Sir Frederick Currie, on the 18th of November last. I now, again, make known, by order of the Governor-General, the terms on which alone pardon may still be obtained.

They are, 1st Unconditional surrender; it being understood that no man's life shall be forfeited, for the part he has taken in hostilities against the British Government.

2nd. That the soldiers now in rebellion shall, on laying down their arms, be permitted to return to their homes, and to remain there in security; and that those Sirdars who possessed Jagheers, shall not be entirely deprived of the means of subsistence.

Let it further be observed, that, in order to be entitled to the terms above-mentioned, the submission must be immediate. No part of these terms refer to Sirdar Sooltan Mahomed Khan, Barukzye.

## Inclosure 14 in No. 48.

*The Resident at Lahore to the Secretary with the Governor-General**Lahore, February 16, 1849.*

I INCLOSE a translation of my communication, of this day, to Maharajah Golab Sing.

## Inclosure 15 in No. 48.

*The Resident at Lahore to Maharajah Goolab Sing.**Lahore, February 16, 1849*

ON receipt of your letter, in reply to Sir Frederick Currie's of the 30th of January, I wrote a brief note to your Highness, and sent your letter to the Governor-General. To-day, I have received instructions to the following effect: "Maharajah Goolab Sing requests plain and explicit orders; tell him that, when the Sikhs are defeated by the British army, his Lordship expects that the Jummo troops will, with heart and soul, pursue, attack, and, to their utmost ability, destroy them, in the hill country, not only on the border, but whithersoever they may fly, whether towards Noorpoor, or beyond the Jhelum, in the direction of Pind Dadun Khan, or elsewhere. To do so is required by the Treaty; to fail is a breach of it. The Governor-General observes that your Highness' interests will be materially affected, by the manner this duty is performed. His Lordship does not question your fidelity, or goodwill, but requires to see its fruits."

My friend, I have, already, in the way of kindness and goodwill, informed you, and told your confidential agent Dewan Jowala Sahae, how, in several ways, you may evince your good faith; by closing the ferries and fords to the supplies and troops of the enemy; by attacking their detached parties that pass through your lands; by delivering up their emissaries; and by furnishing grain and fodder to the British army; in short, by actively showing to the world that you are our friend, and their enemy. I now add that obedience to the Governor-General's injunctions is not only required by the Treaty, but by the real interests, present, and to come, of yourself and your posterity.

## Inclosure 16 in No. 48

*The Secretary with the Governor-General to the Resident at Lahore.**Camp, Ferozepore, February 19, 1849*

I ACKNOWLEDGE your dispatch, dated the 16th instant, submitting a translation of the communication addressed, by you to Maharajah Goolab Sing, respecting the many ways in which his good faith to the British Government may be evinced, at the present time, and what it is that the Government require of him; and in reply, communicate the Governor-General's approval of the tenor of your communication to the Maharajah.

## No. 49.

*The Governor-General of India to the Secret Committee.**Ferozepore, March 7, 1849 (No. 13.)*

UNDER Divine Providence, the British arms have signally triumphed. On the 21st of February, an action was fought, which must ever be regarded as one of the most memorable in the annals of British warfare in India; memorable alike from the greatness of the occasion, and from the brilliant and decisive issue of the encounter. For the first time, Sikh and Afghan were banded together against the British power. It was an occasion which demanded the putting forth

of all the means at our disposal, and so conspicuous a manifestation of the superiority of our arms, as should appal each enemy, and dissolve, at once, their compact, by fatal proof of its futility. The completeness of the victory which has been won, equals the highest hopes entertained. The results are not yet fully developed.

The enemy, estimated at 60,000 men, with 59 guns, were posted near the town of Goojerat. His Excellency the Commander-in-Chief opened his artillery upon them, with tremendous effect, on the morning of the 21st of February. A sustained cannonade of three hours compelled them to retire from the positions they had maintained with resolute hardihood. The subsequent advance of the whole British line drove them back, at once, from every point; and, retreat speedily becoming rout, they fled in the utmost disorder, "their ranks broken" (the Commander-in-Chief writes); "their positions carried; their guns, ammunition, camp equipage, and baggage, captured; their flying masses driven before the victorious pursuers, from midday to dusk, receiving most severe punishment in their flight." It will much enhance the gratification which the intelligence of this great success must afford you, to hear that it has been achieved with comparatively little loss, and that, amongst the 53 guns captured, we have recovered those lost at Ramnuggur and Chillianwalla.

In a general order, issued on the 1st of this month\*, I gave public expression to the sense I entertain of the devoted gallantry of the noble army, which has gained this victory.

In the name, and on behalf, of the Government of India, I offered to his Excellency Lord Gough, Commanding in Chief, to the generals, the officers, non-commissioned officers, and soldiers of the force, my grateful acknowledgments of the service they have rendered to their country.

I took occasion to express the unbounded confidence I feel, and have ever felt, in this army, and my conviction that they will meet, cheerfully and gallantly, as heretofore, whatever obstacles may yet be opposed to them. I stated, further, that I would earnestly commend their past services to the consideration of Her Majesty's Government, and of the East India Company; and I now, accordingly, fulfil this promise.

On the morning after the battle of Goojerat, Major-General Sir W. Gilbert was detached with a force to effect the passage of the Jhelum, and follow the enemy towards Peshawur, in which direction the main body of them that still held together, had fled. Brigadier-General Campbell advanced, at the same time, on the road to Bimber, scouring the country all round in that quarter. He returned, on the 25th, bringing in several guns, which the enemy had abandoned in their flight.

In a letter which I addressed to his Excellency the Commander-in-Chief, on the 27th ultimo†, I stated the objects which I considered Sir Walter Gilbert should endeavour to accomplish: it was impossible for me not to foresee that much would remain to be done, however complete the discomfiture of the enemy; and I had, therefore, given previous instructions for the detachment of this force, so soon as an action should have been fought, with the result which I anticipated. In my letter of the 27th ultimo, I have told his Excellency, that what has come to pass, and, above all, the recent cooperation of the Affghan troops under the Ameer Dost Mahomed Khan, with the Sikh army, and his seizure of the Province of Peshawur, renders it indispensable that the war should be prosecuted, at all hazards, until the entire defeat and dispersion of those who are in arms against us, shall be effected; that though the season is advancing, and the difficulties of military operations in the Hills may possibly be great, nevertheless, it is of such vital importance to crush the resistance of the Sikhs at once, and effectually to break up their combination with the Mahomedan power, that the operations of the present campaign against them must be prosecuted vigorously, and without cessation, until these ends have been fully attained.

The one great object, therefore, which I have directed Major-General Gilbert to hold in view, is the entire and irreparable rout of those in arms against us, and the expulsion of the Ameer and his army from the Province of Peshawur, or their destruction.

Major-General Gilbert experienced some difficulty in crossing the Jhelum, in consequence of the enemy having reached the river before him, and burnt all

\* Inclosure 4 in No. 49.

† Inclosure 16 in No. 49.



the boats, with the view of retarding his passage. The Bengal division was over the river by the 2nd instant, and succeeded in capturing, in the town of Jhelum, two brass mortars, with 9000 rounds of ammunition. On the 5th, they were at the formidable pass of Bakralla, the Bombay division being two marches behind them. The road to the next stage has been broken up by the enemy, but, after repairing it, and reaching Dhuneel, it is the Major-General's intention to stay there, till his ammunition, heavy guns, and commissariat stores, reach him.

The rescue of the British prisoners, now in the hands of the Sikhs, is another object to which Major-General Gilbert will direct his most strenuous exertions, and which I earnestly and anxiously desire to see accomplished.

The prisoners have been heard from, up to the 3rd instant. They had been removed from Sukkoo, and were then at Mamkyala, and were about to be removed to Rawul Pindee, at which place it was given out that Chuttur Sing intended to make a final stand, but it is not probable that, after retiring successively from Jhelum, Rotas, and the very strong and defensible position of Bakralla, they will venture, with a disorganized force, to offer any opposition, at a place much less tenable than those which they have abandoned.

Maharajah Golab Sing's force, under Hurree Chund, and Colonel Steinbach, has been directed to cooperate with Major-General Gilbert's division; and Lieutenant Robinson has been deputed to their army, for the purpose of seeing that the Major-General's wishes are carried into effect. Their proceedings will, shortly, enable us to judge what credit is to be placed on the reiterated professions of the Maharajah. Our brilliant victory, at Goojerat, must, at least, have relieved him of all anxiety as to the success of our cause, and it is to be hoped that he will now prove himself to be ready to afford earnest cooperation, when the special service required of him is distinctly pointed out to him.

From a letter from Lieutenant Taylor, of the 16th ultimo,\* there seems every reason to believe that the communication, which the Resident at Lahore addressed to Dost Mahomed Khan, on the first report of his hostile intentions, reached the Ameer safely, and it is not unlikely that he may now consider it worth his while to reply to it.

No apology of any kind will now be accepted. He has chosen to defy our power, and must abide the consequences. Even before the action of Goojerat, he showed a desire to withdraw his forces towards Peshawur, and concentrate them nearer to his own country. Captain Abbott says, that the troops who were advancing towards Sherwan, were called off, in consequence of the Ameer's apprehension that some opposition had been raised against him in Cabool, and it is remarkable that a simultaneous move occurred on the side of Bunnoo, for Lieutenant Taylor reports that the Fort of Duleepgurb has been abandoned by the enemy, thus leaving everything perfectly secure on the side of the Derajat. The Ameer is said to be encamped at Jehangeera, and his force, united with that of his sons and other relations, may be reckoned at about 8000 men, and 16 guns.

Captain Abbott has been heard from, up to the 25th of February, at which time he was quite safe, and confident in his resources, although, at that time, he had not heard of the decisive action at Goojerat. It is a gratifying spectacle to witness the intrepid bearing of this officer, in the midst of difficulties of no ordinary kind; not merely maintaining his position, but offering a bold front, at one time, to the Sikhs, at another, to the Affghans, notwithstanding that religious fanaticism has been at work to induce his Mahomedan levies to desert his cause. He must have secured the attachment of the wild people amongst whom he has been thrown, by his mild and conciliatory demeanour, in times of peace, as well as by his gallantry as their leader in action; thus enhancing the credit of our national character, and preparing the way for the easy occupation of an almost impregnable country.

\* Inclosure 27 in No. 49.

## Inclosure 1 in No 49

*Notification by the Governor-General**Camp, Ferozepore, February 23, 1849*

THE Governor-General has the gratification of intimating to the President in Council, and notifying for public information, that he has, this day, received a dispatch from Major Mackeson, C B, Agent to the Governor-General with the Commander-in-Chief, conveying the intelligence, that the forces under his Excellency the Commander-in-Chief, on the 21st instant, attacked, and routed the Sikh army, in the neighbourhood of Goojerat

The enemy was beaten at every point and retreated in disorder, leaving, in the hands of the British troops, by whom he was pursued, a great portion of his artillery, his ammunition, and the whole of his standing camp

The official dispatches of his Excellency the Commander-in-Chief will be published as soon as they are received

The Governor-General directs, that a salute of twenty-one guns shall be fired at every principal station of the army, on receipt of this Notification

## Inclosure 2 in No 49

*Notification**Camp, Ferozepore, February 24, 1849*

THE Right Honorable the Governor-General directs the publication of the following letter, from his Excellency the Commander-in-Chief, reporting the complete defeat of the Sikh army, on the 21st instant The detailed dispatches will be published hereafter

## Inclosure 3 in No 49

*The Commander-in-Chief to the Governor-General**Camp, in front of Goojerat, February 21, 1849*

I HAVE the honor to report to your Lordship, that I have, this day, obtained a victory of no common order, either in its character, or, I trust, in its effects

I was joined, yesterday, by Brigadier Markham's brigade, Brigadier-General Dundas having joined late the preceding night I moved on, in the afternoon of yesterday, as soon as these troops were refreshed, from Trikura to the village of Shadewal, [and, at seven this morning, I moved to the attack, which commenced at half-past eight o'clock, and, by one o'clock, I was in possession of the whole Sikh position, with all of his camp equipage, baggage, magazines, and, I hope, a large proportion of his guns, the exact number I cannot, at present, state, from the great extent of his position, and length of pursuit, as I followed up the enemy from four to five miles on the Bimber road, and pushed on Sir Joseph Thackwell with the cavalry The rout has been most complete, the whole road, for twelve miles, is strewed with guns, ammunition-waggons, arms, and baggage.

My loss was comparatively small (I hope within 300 killed and wounded), when it is considered I had to attack 60,000 Sikhs, in a very strong position, armed with upwards of sixty guns The loss of the enemy must have been very severe.

The conduct of the whole army, in every arm, was conspicuous for steadiness in movement, and gallantry in action. The details I shall furnish hereafter.

## Inclosure 4 in No. 49

*General Order by the Governor-General of India**Camp, Ferozepore, March 1, 1849*

THE Governor-General, having received from his Excellency the Commander-in-Chief a dispatch, reporting the details of the brilliant victory which was gained by the British Army at Goojerat, on the 21st ultimo, directs that it be published, for the information of the army, and of the people of India.

The Sikh army, under the command of Sirdar Chuttur Sing and of Raja Shere Sing, combined with the Affghan troops in the service of the Amcer of Cabool, were posted, in great strength, near to the town of Goojerat.

Then numbers were estimated at 60,000 men, and 59 guns were brought by them into action.

On the morning of the 21st, they were attacked by the forces, under the personal command of his Excellency the Commander-in-Chief. A powerful and sustained cannonade by the British artillery compelled them, after some time, to retire from the positions they had well and resolutely maintained.

The subsequent advance of the British army drove them back, at once, from every point, and, retreat having been speedily converted into rout, they fled in the utmost disorder, and, abandoning their guns, and throwing away their arms, were pursued by the artillery and cavalry, till the evening, for many miles beyond the town.

Fifty-three pieces of the enemy's artillery, his camp, his baggage, his magazines, and vast store of ammunition, left in the hands of the British troops, bear testimony to the completeness, and to the importance, of the victory that has been won.

The Governor-General, in the name, and on behalf, of the Government of India, most cordially congratulates his Excellency the Commander-in-Chief, and the whole army, on the glorious success which, under the blessing of Divine Providence, their skill and gallantry have achieved, and he offers to his Excellency, to the Generals the Officers, Non-commissioned Officers, and Soldiers of the force his grateful acknowledgments of the service they have thus rendered to the Government, and to their Country.

The Governor-General begs especially to thank Major-General Sir Joseph Thackwell, K C B, and K II, Major General Sir W. Gilbert, K C B, Major-General Whish C B, Brigadier-General Campbell C B, and Brigadier-General the Honorable H. Dundas C B, for the ability and judgment with which they directed the operations of the divisions respectively under their command.

To the Chief Engineer, Brigadier Cheape, C B, to the Officers commanding Brigades, Brigadier Brooke C B, Brigadier Huthwaite, C B, and Brigadier Leeson, to Brigadier White, C B, Brigadier Hearsey, and Brigadier Lockwood, C B, to Brigadier Hervey, and Brigadier Markham, to Brigadier Mountain, C B, Brigadier Penn, C B, Brigadier Capon, and Brigadier Hoggan, Brigadier Carnegie, and Brigadier McLeod, the best thanks of the Governor-General are due.

The services of Brigadier-General Tennant, and of the artillery of the force, have been recorded, in the dispatch of the Commander-in-Chief, in terms of which they may justly be proud.

The Governor-General cordially joins with his Excellency, in acknowledging their merit, and in bestowing upon them the praise they have earned so well.

To Major Lugard, to Lieutenant-Colonel Gough, C B, and to the Officers of the General Staff of Her Majesty's Army, to Lieutenant-Colonel Grant, C B, to Lieutenant-Colonel Garden, C B, and to the Officers of the General Staff of the Army, to Captain Ramsay, and the Officers of the Commissariat Department, to Mr. Franklin, Inspector-General of Her Majesty's Hospitals, to Dr. Renny, and the Officers of the Medical Department, and to the Officers of his Excellency's Personal Staff, the Governor-General offers his thanks, and assures them of his full appreciation of their services.

And to all the troops of every arm, European and Native, the Governor-General desires to convey his entire approbation of their steady and gallant

conduct throughout the day, particularly to a portion of the 9th Lancers, and the Sinde Horse, for their charge against the Affghan cavalry, to the 3rd brigade of infantry under Brigadier Penny, C.B., for their attack on the village of Kalra; and to a portion of Brigadier Hervey's Brigade, for their charge, led by Lieutenant-Colonel Franks, C.B., all of which have been specially reported by his Excellency the Commander-in-Chief.

The Governor-General estimates, highly, the important results which the battle, gained on the 21st ultimo, is calculated to produce. He entertains a hope that the conviction, which the events of that day must force upon all, of the vast superiority, which the British Army derives, from the possession of science and military resource, will induce the enemy shortly to abandon a contest, which is a hopeless one.

The war in which we are engaged must be prosecuted, with vigor and determination, to the entire defeat, and dispersion, of all who are in arms against us, whether Sikhs or Affghans.

The Governor-General has ever felt, and feels, unbounded confidence in the army that serves in India. He relies fully on the conviction that their services will be given cheerfully and gallantly, as heretofore, whatever may be the obstacles opposed to them, and he does not doubt that, with the blessing of Heaven, such full success will continue to follow their efforts, as shall speedily give to the Government of India the victory over its enemies, and restore the country to the enjoyment of peace.

The Governor-General will not fail earnestly to commend the past services of this army to the favorable consideration of Her Majesty's Government, and of the East India Company.

A salute of twenty-one guns has been ordered to be fired, at every principal station of the army in India.

Inclosure 5 in No 49

*The Commander-in-Chief to the Governor-General*

*Head Quarters, Camp, Goojerat, February 26, 1849*

BY my letter of the 21st instant, written on the field of battle, immediately after the action your Lordship will have been made acquainted with the glorious result of my operations, on that day, against the Sikh army, calculated, from all credible reports, at 60,000 men of all arms, and 59 pieces of artillery, under the command of Sirdar Chuttur Sing and Rajah Shere Sing, with a body of 1,500 Affghan horse, led by Akram Khan, son of Ameer Dost Mahomed Khan. A result, my Lord, glorious indeed, for the ever-victorious army of India, the ranks of the enemy broken, their position carried, their guns, ammunition, camp equipage, and baggage, captured, then flying masses driven before their victorious pursuers, from mid-day to dusk, receiving most severe punishment in their flight and, my Lord, with gratitude to a merciful Providence, I have the satisfaction of adding that, notwithstanding the obstinate resistance of the enemy, thus triumphant success, this brilliant victory, has been achieved with comparatively little loss on our side.

The number of guns taken in the action, and captured in the line of pursuit, I now find to be fifty-three.

The official report made by the Adjutant-General of the army, on the 20th instant, will have informed your Lordship that I had directed Brigadier-General the Honorable H. Dundas to join me, by forced marches, and that I had closed up to so short a distance to the Sikh army, that they could not possibly attempt the passage of the Chenab, in order to put into execution their avowed determination of moving upon Lahore, make a retrograde movement by the Kooree Pass (the only practicable one for guns), or, indeed, quit their position, without my being able to attack them, and defeat their movement.

On the 18th instant, Brigadier Markham had proceeded from Ramnuggur, up the left bank of the river, to Kanokee, to which I had directed forty-seven boats to be sent up. On the morning of the 20th, this officer crossed the Chenab, by my instructions, and joined me at 11 o'clock, A.M. At the same time Lieutenant-Colonel Byrne was directed to move down the left bank, from the position

he held in front of Wuzeerabad, with two corps of infantry and four guns, leaving two regiments of irregular cavalry to watch the fords, and to prevent any marauding parties, or bodies of the routed enemy, from effecting a passage.

On the same day, a reconnoissance was made of the enemy's position, and it was ascertained that their camp nearly encircled the town of Goojerat, their regular troops being placed immediately fronting us, between the town and a deep watercourse, the dry bed of the river Dwara, this nullah, which is very tortuous, passing round nearly two sides of the town of Goojerat, diverging to a considerable distance on the north and west faces, and then taking a southerly direction, running through the centre of the ground I occupied at Shadewal. Thus, the enemy's position, on the night, was greatly strengthened, the nullah giving cover to his infantry, in front of his guns, whilst another deep, though narrow, wet nullah, running from the east of the town, and falling into the Chenab, in the direction of Wuzeerabad, covered his left.

The ground between these nullahs, for a space of nearly three miles, being well-calculated for the operations of all arms, and presenting no obstacle to the movement of my heavy guns, I determined to make my principal attack in that direction, and disposed my force accordingly.

On the extreme left. I placed the Bombay column, commanded by the Honorable H Dundas, supported by Brigadier White's brigade of cavalry, and the Sindh Horse, under Sir Joseph Thackwell, to protect the left, and to prevent large bodies of Sikh and Afghan cavalry from turning that flank, with this cavalry, I placed Captains Duncan's and Huish's troops of horse artillery, whilst the infantry was covered by the Bombay troop of horse artillery, under Major Blood.

On the right of the Bombay column, and with its right resting on the nullah, I placed Brigadier-General Campbell's division of infantry, covered by No. 5 and No. 10 light field batteries, under Major Ludlow and Lieutenant Robertson, having Brigadier Hoggan's brigade of infantry in reserve.

Upon the night of the nullah, I placed the infantry division of Major-General Sir W. Gilbert, the heavy guns, eighteen in number, under Majors Day and Horsford, with Captain Shakespeare and Brevet-Major Sir Richmond Shakespeare commanding batteries, being disposed, in two divisions, upon the flanks of his left brigade.

This line was prolonged by Major-General Whish's division of infantry, with one brigade of infantry under Brigadier Maikham, in support, in second line; and the whole covered by three troops of horse artillery, Major Fordyce's, Captains Mackenzie's and Anderson's, and No. 17 light field battery, under Captain Dawes, with Lieutenant-Colonel Lane's and Captain Kyleside's troops of horse artillery, in a second line, in reserve, under Lieutenant-Colonel Brind.

My right flank was protected by Brigadiers Hearsey's and Lockwood's brigades of cavalry, with Captain Warner's troop of horse artillery.

The 5th and 6th light cavalry, with the Bombay light field battery, and the 45th and 69th Regiments, under the command of Lieutenant-Colonel Mercer, most effectually protected my rear and baggage.

With my right wing, I proposed penetrating the centre of the enemy's line, so as to turn the position of their force in rear of the nullah, and thus enable my left wing to cross it with little loss, and, in cooperation with the right, to double, upon the centre, the wing of the enemy's force opposed to them.

At half-past 7 o'clock, the army advanced, in the order described, with the precision of a parade movement. The enemy opened their fire, at a very long distance, which exposed to my artillery both the position and range of their guns. I halted the infantry just out of fire, and advanced the whole of my artillery, covered by skirmishers.

The cannonade, now opened upon the enemy, was the most magnificent I ever witnessed, and as terrible in its effects.

The Sikh guns were served with their accustomed rapidity; and the enemy well and resolutely maintained his position, but the terrific force of our fire obliged them, after an obstinate resistance, to fall back. I then deployed the infantry, and directed a general advance, covering the movement by my artillery, as before.

The village of Burra Kalra, the left one of those of that name, in which the enemy had concealed a large body of infantry, and which was apparently the key of their position, lay immediately in the line of Major-General Sir Walter Gilbert's

advance, and was carried, in the most brilliant style, by a spirited attack of the 3rd brigade, under Brigadier Pennv, consisting of the 2nd Europeans, 31st and 70th Regiments of Native Infantry, which drove the enemy from their cover, with great slaughter.

A very spirited and successful movement was also made, about the same time, against a heavy body of the enemy's troops, in and about the second, or Chota, Kalra, by part of Brigadier Hervey's brigade, most gallantly led by Lieutenant-Colonel Franks, of Her Majesty's 10th Foot

The heavy artillery continued to advance with extraordinary celerity, taking up successive forward positions, driving the enemy from those they had retired to, whilst the rapid advance, and beautiful fire, of the horse artillery and light field batteries, which I strengthened, by bringing to the front the two reserved troops of horse artillery, under Lieutenant-Colonel Brind, Brigadier Brooke having the general superintendence of the whole of the horse artillery, broke the ranks of the enemy at all points. The whole infantry line now rapidly advanced, and drove the enemy before it. The nullah was cleared, several villages stormed, the guns that were in position carried, the camp captured, and the enemy routed in every direction, the right wing and Brigadier-General Campbell's division passing in pursuit to the eastward, the Bombay column to the westward of the town.

The retreat of the Sikh army, thus hotly pressed, soon became a perfect flight, all arms dispersing over the country, rapidly pursued by our troops, for a distance of twelve miles, their track strewn with their wounded, their arms, and military equipments, which they threw away to conceal that they were soldiers.

Throughout the operations thus detailed, the cavalry brigades on the flanks were threatened, and occasionally attacked, by vast masses of the enemy's cavalry, which were, in every instance, put to flight by the steady movements and spirited manœuvres of our cavalry, most zealously and judiciously supported by the troops of horse artillery attached to them, from whom the enemy received the severest punishment.

On the left, a most successful and gallant charge was made upon the Affghan cavalry, and a large body of Goorchurras, by the Sind horse, and a party of the 9th Lancers, when some standards were captured.

The determined front shown by the 14th Light Dragoons, and the other cavalry regiments, on the right, both regular, and irregular, completely overawed the enemy, and contributed much to the success of the day. The conduct of all, in following up the fugitive enemy, was beyond all praise.

A competent force under the command of Major-General Sir Walter Gilbert, resumed the pursuit towards Jhelum, on the following morning, with a view of cutting off the enemy from the only practicable gun road to the Jhelum. Another division of infantry, under Brigadier-General Campbell, advanced on the road to Bimber, scouring the country in that direction, to prevent their carrying off the guns by that route, and a body of cavalry, under Lieutenant-Colonel Bradford, successfully pushed on several miles into the hills, and 24 from Goojerat, accompanied by that most energetic political officer, Captain Nicholson, for the same purpose, whilst I remained in possession of the field, for the purpose of supporting these operations, covering the fords of the Chenab, and destroying the vast magazines of ammunition left scattered in all directions. I am happy to add that these combinations have been entirely successful, the detached parties coming, at every step, on the wreck of the dispersed and flying foe.

Having thus endeavoured to convey to your Lordship the particulars of the operations of the battle of Goojerat, I beg now to offer my heartfelt congratulations to your Lordship, and to the Government of India, upon the signal victory achieved, under the blessing of Divine Providence, by the united efforts, and indomitable gallantry, of the noble army under my command; a victory, my Lord, as glorious to the army that gained it, as it must be satisfactory to yourself and the Government of India, from the very important and decisive results to be expected from it.

It is quite impossible for me sufficiently to express my admiration of the gallant and steady conduct of the officers and men, as well Native as European, upon this occasion.

The brilliant service they have performed, in so signally defeating so vastly superior a force, amongst whom were the élite of the old Khalsa army, making a last, united, and desperate struggle, will speak for itself, and will, I am confident, be justly estimated by your Lordship.

I cannot too strongly express to your Lordship my deep sense of obligation

to the general officers, and brigadier-generals, in command of divisions, who so ably carried out my views, and directed the operations of their troops, on this day.

I beg to annex for your Lordship's information, the reports I have received from them, and to bring most prominently to your Lordship's notice the brigadiers commanding brigades, the commanding officers of regiments, the troops of horse artillery, and light field batteries, and the several officers of the divisional and brigade staff, enumerated in these reports in terms of such just commendation.

I feel much indebted to Major-General Sir Joseph Thackwell, for the able and judicious manner he manœuvred the cavalry, with horse artillery attached, on the left, keeping in check the immensely superior force of the enemy, whose main object was to turn my flanks. I am also greatly indebted to this tried and gallant officer, for his valuable assistance, and untiring exertions, throughout the present, and previous operations, as second in command with this force.

To Major-General Sir Walter Gilbert, whose services upon this, as on all former occasions, were invaluable, and ever marked by energy, zeal, and devotion, as well as to Major-General Whish, Brigadier-Generals Campbell, and Dundas, for their able assistance, I am deeply indebted.

To Brigadier-General Tennant, commanding that splendid arm, the artillery, to whose irresistible power I am mainly indebted for the glorious victory of Goojerat, I am indeed most grateful. Conspicuous as the artillery has ever proved itself, never was its superiority over that of the enemy, its irresistible and annihilating power, more truthfully shown than in this battle. The heavy batteries manœuvred with the celerity of light guns, and the rapid advance, the scientific and judicious selection of points of attack, the effective and well directed fire of the troops of horse artillery, and light field batteries, merit my warmest praise; and I beg most earnestly to recommend their brave and gallant commanders, with the several officers named in Brigadier-General Tennant's report, to your Lordship's most favorable notice.

From Brigadier Cheape, the Chief Engineer, and the talented officers in that department, as named in the Brigadier's report, I have received the most valuable assistance, in reconnoitring the enemy's position, and on the field of battle. The Sappers and Pioneers, under that most able officer, Captain Siddons, did excellent service, and were ever in front to overcome any obstacle to the advance of the artillery.

To the officers of the General Staff of Her Majesty's service, Major Lugard, Acting Adjutant-General, and Lieutenant-Colonel Gough, Quarter-Master-General, of Her Majesty's forces in India, my best thanks are due for their exertions upon the present occasion, and throughout the recent operations, were most valuable, and I beg to bring them under your Lordship's favorable notice. I am equally indebted to Captain Otter, Acting Assistant-Adjutant-General of Her Majesty's forces, for his valuable services.

To the officers of the General Staff of the army, Lieutenant-Colonel Grant, Adjutant-General, and Lieutenant-Colonel Garden, Quarter-Master-General, whose most onerous and very important duties have invariably been conducted to my entire satisfaction, I am under the greatest obligation. Their valuable assistance in the field, and their indefatigable exertions, throughout operations of no ordinary character, deserve my warmest thanks, and your Lordship's approbation.

To Lieutenant-Colonel Birch, Judge-Advocate-General, I am much indebted for his assistance upon every occasion.

To Major Tucker, Deputy-Adjutant-General, a most gallant, energetic, and valuable officer; to Lieutenant-Colonel Drummond, Deputy-Quarter-Master-General, whose services have been very praiseworthy, to Major Chester, Assistant-Adjutant-General, and Lieutenant Tytler, Assistant-Quarter-Master-General, Lieutenant Johnson, Deputy-Judge-Advocate-General, Major G. Thomson, Lieutenant-Colonel Curtis, Assistant-Commissary-General, and Captain C. Campbell, Paymaster to the army; I offer my best thanks, for their services whilst attending me in the field, and the efficient manner they have performed their several duties.

Mr Franklin, Inspector-General of Her Majesty's hospitals, has been unceasing in his exertions, in rendering every aid to the sick and wounded of the royal service, and giving the benefit of his long professional experience in

such duties; as has Dr. Renny, Superintending Surgeon of this army, who has been indefatigable in his professional exertions, and well organized medical arrangements.

I feel I cannot, too prominently, bring to notice the valuable exertions of Dr. Macrae, Field Surgeon, and of the medical officers of the army generally, they have been most unwearied, and praiseworthy.

To Captain Ramsay, Deputy-Commissary-General, and to the officers of his department, I am much indebted, and feel grateful for their unceasing and successful exertions, amidst all difficulties, to supply the troops, and thus preserve the efficiency of the army.

The officers of my personal staff have well merited my best thanks, and your Lordship's favorable notice, Captain Haines, Military Secretary, who has rendered me most valuable aid, Brevet-Major Bates, A D C, Lieutenant A Bagot, A D C, Lieutenant S J. Hire, A D C, Captain Gabbett, A D C, Lieutenant G Hardinge, A D C, and Lieutenant W G Piendorgast, my Persian Interpreter.

I beg also to acknowledge the valuable assistance I have received from the Political Officers, Major Mackeson, Mr Cocks, Captain Nicholson, and Lieutenant Robinson, both in the field, and throughout the operations. I regret to add that Mr Cocks was seriously wounded, during the action, in a rencontre with a Sikh horseman.

I would also bring to your Lordship's notice the name of Lieutenant Stannus, of the 5th Light Cavalry, this officer has commanded the cavalry party attached to my escort, throughout the operations, to my entire satisfaction. He was severely wounded on the 21st, when gallantly charging a party of the enemy's horsemen.

Major Anstruther, of the Madras artillery, Lieutenant Mayne, of the Madras cavalry, and Captain Showers, of the 14th Native Infantry, attended me in the field.

I have, most unwillingly, been delayed from sooner forwarding this dispatch, from the circumstance of having only this day received Brigadier-General the Honorable H Dundas's report, and some of the casualty returns have not, even yet, reached me. As soon as the whole come in, a full amended general return shall be transmitted, without loss of time, for your Lordship's information.

I have the pleasure to inclose a plan of the battle of Goojerat; also a return of the captured ordnance.

P S—The casualty lists having arrived, I have the honor to inclose the return of killed and wounded, which I am sorry to see so much heavier than I, at first, anticipated. Several of these were occasioned by accidental explosions of the enemy's tumbrils and magazines, after the action.

Inclosure 6 in No. 49.

*Brigadier-General J Tennant, commanding the Artillery Division of the Army of the Punjab, to the Adjutant-General*

*Camp, Goojerat, February 22, 1849*

I have the honor to report, for the information of the Commander-in-Chief, that the Bengal Artillery of the Army of the Punjab were allotted as follows, during the action of yesterday:—

Lieutenant-Colonel C. Grant.

1st Troop, 3d Brigade, Captain W. R. Warner. Attached to Brigadier Lockwood's Cavalry Brigade, on the right.

Major Garbett.

4th Troop 1st Brigade, Captain M Mackenzie. 4th Troop 3d Brigade, Captain J. Anderson. With the 1st division of Infantry, commanded by Major-General W. S. Whish, C.B.

2d Troop 2d Brigade, Major J Fordyce. No. 17 Light Field Battery Captain M. Daves. With the 2d Infantry division, commanded by Major-General Sir W. R. Gilbert, K.C.B.



### Major Mowatt

No. 5 Light Field Battery, Major E. Ludlow. No. 10. Light Field Battery, Lieutenant Robertson With the 3d Division of Infantry, under Brigadier-General Campbell, C B.

4th Troop 2d Brigade, Captain F Duncan. 1st Troop 2d Brigade, Captain A Huish With Brigadier M. White's Cavalry Brigade, on the left.

### Lieutenant-Colonel Brind.

2d Troop 3d Brigade, Lieutenant-Colonel Lane, C.B. 3d Troop 2d Brigade, Captain R Kimleside. Composing the reserve, under Brigadier G. Brooke, C.B.

### Brigadier E. Huthwaite, C.B

### Major Horsford

Four 18-pounders, two 8-inch howitzers, drawn by elephants, Major Sir R Shakespear.

Two 18-pounders, two 8-inch howitzers, drawn by elephants, Captain J. Shakespear

### Major E Day

Two 18-pounders, two 8-inch howitzers, Captain E. Master

Two 18-pounders, two 8-inch howitzers, Captain E. Austin, who, being unable from his wound to accompany his own battery, No 10, did duty with the heavy guns

These batteries engaged in action, by those attached to the 1st and 2d divisions advancing within about 600 yards, and the heavy guns within 800 or 1000 yards, of the enemy's artillery, on which they opened their fire about 9 o'clock A M Shortly after the action commenced, an opportunity was observed of enfilading one of the enemy's batteries, when the reserve artillery, under Lieutenant-Colonel F Brind, was advanced, and placed by Brigadier G Brooke, C B, so as to do so The batteries of the 3d division engaged as they came up, and those with the cavalry brigades supported their movements, as opportunity offered Nearly the whole engagement being a cannonade, no movement of importance took place among the batteries, which maintained their fire until half-past 11 A M, when, many of the enemy's guns were observed to be dismounted, and their line broken, and an advance was ordered in pursuit

I have the honor to state, for the Commander-in-Chief's information, my perfect satisfaction with the professional exertions of the officers, and my high approbation of the steady conduct of both officers and men, during the day.

To Brigadiers Brooke, C B, and Huthwaite, C B, in general direction of the horse and foot artillery respectively, under my orders, Lieutenant-Colonels C. Grant, and F Brind, Majors R Horsford, E F Day, and J. L Mowatt, all of whom held commands, as well as to all the officers commanding troops and batteries above enumerated, I have to acknowledge my best thanks for their exertions, by which these results were obtained To the Divisional Staff, Captain J Abercrombie, Deputy-Assistant-Adjutant-General, and Lieutenant H. Tombs, Deputy-Assistant Quarter-Master-General, and to Lieutenant H. A. Olpherts, my Aide-de-Camp, I am much indebted for their exertions, and also to Captain C Hogge, the Commissary, and Lieutenant P Christie, Deputy-Commissary of Ordnance, for their excellent arrangement of their department, as well as for their assistance in the field

Brigadiers Brooke and Huthwaite mention their Majors of Brigade, Lieutenant C. V. Cox, and Lieutenant E. Kaye, respectively, as having afforded them able assistance I have great pleasure, finally, particularly to bring to His Excellency's notice, the zeal and attention of Mr. Deputy Commissary Spencer, during the day, and beg to recommend that old and deserving warrant officer to his kind consideration.

## Inclosure 7 in No. 49.

*Brigadier J. Cheape, Chief Engineer of the Army of the Punjab, to the Adjutant-General*

*Head Quarters, Camp, Goojerat, February 26, 1849.*

IN reference to general orders of the 21st instant, I beg to submit, for the information of the Commander-in-Chief, a report on the conduct of the Engineer Department, during the late operations, and the engagement of the 21st.

Major Napier, attended by Lieutenant Greathed, and Major Tremenheere, attended by Lieutenant Glover, were employed on the 21st, the former with the right, the latter with the left column of attack, and were very useful from their previous examination of the ground, and, in particular, of the position of the nullah on our right flank.

Captain Western, Lieutenants Goodwyn, Crommeln, and Taylor accompanied me; and to all those officers my acknowledgments are due, for conveying communications, and obtaining information on every point required, during the day.

I have also the gratification to report to his Excellency the zealous and able manner in which Captain Cunningham, and Lieutenant C. Paton, performed the duty assigned to them, of bringing up the fleet of boats ordered by his Excellency from Ramnuggur, and placing them so as to enable the portion of the army, on the other side of the Chenab, to cooperate, and to come up; the former officer arrived before the close of the action, and joined Brigadier-General Campbell's division.

The other officers of engineers were detached with the different divisions of the army, and no mention of these officers is needed from me, as whatever service they may have had an opportunity of rendering, will be more appropriately reported to his Excellency, or acknowledged, by the general officers commanding each division.

Captain Siddons, commanding the sappers and pioneers, was attached to the heavy guns with a portion of his corps, the remainder being detached, by companies, to the different divisions; such duty as was required from them, I need hardly say, was effectively performed; and I trust it may not be considered by his Lordship, out of place, my mentioning here the gallant behaviour, and unwearied exertion, displayed by these men, throughout the present service. I allude, in particular, to the siege operations at Mooltan, and the conduct of that portion of the corps who were employed there.

Prior to the engagement on the 21st instant, the officers of engineers were employed in collecting information, and in surveying and reconnoitring, and it is due to Captain Longden, of Her Majesty's 10th Regiment, who is attached to the engineer department as surveyor and field engineer, to state the very able assistance he has rendered in all these duties, during the whole operations since I have joined the army.

I beg to add, that I am much indebted to Lieutenant J. H. Maxwell, for the very zealous performance of his duties, on all occasions, as Major of Brigade of Engineers; and to Lieutenant J. E. Cracroft, Brigade Quarter-Master, my acknowledgments are also due; and I hope I may be permitted to recommend to his Excellency's favor Lieutenant Hutchinson, of engineers, a very promising young officer, who has been lately acting as my aide-de-camp, and who was very severely wounded, on the 21st instant.

## Inclosure 8 in No. 49.

*Major-General Sir Joseph Thackwell, K.C.B., Commanding the Cavalry Division, to the Adjutant-General.*

*Head Quarters, Camp, Goojerat, February 25, 1849.*

I HAVE the honor to report, for the information of the Commander-in-Chief, the operations of the division of cavalry under my command, in the battle fought on the 21st instant, near the town of Goojerat.

The left column of cavalry, under the command of Brigadier White, C.B., consisting of the troops, named in the margin,\* was assembled in column of troops at half distance, right in front, at deploying interval, on the left of the Bombay column of infantry, at 7 o'clock in the morning.

The right column, composed of the troops named in the margin,† under the command of Brigadiers Hearsey and Lockwood, C.B., was formed in column, left in front, at the same hour.

The 3d Division of Infantry, and the Bombay Brigade, all on the left of the nullah leading towards Goojerat, being under my immediate superintendence, I remained on the left flank of the army, and I make no doubt Brigadier-Generals Dundas and Campbell have made you fully acquainted with the operations of the troops under their command.

On approaching the village of Nuirawalla, just without the range of the enemy's batteries, the infantry deployed into line, and Brigadier White formed his cavalry in front of that village, with its left back and parallel to a gentle rising of the ground, on which was posted the enemy's right, consisting of a large body of Affghans and Goorchurra Horse. From this position, a fire of round shot was opened, and the enemy's cavalry extended to the right, so as to threaten to turn our left flank. To oppose the enemy's guns, I ordered Captain Duncan to remove his troop of horse artillery to the front, which he did in good style, and opened his fire within 500 or 600 yards. This movement was followed by the advance of Captain Huish's troop, and both did considerable execution upon the enemy, but did not prevent the attempt of the Affghans to outflank our left. The Sindie Horse were on the left of my line, and I ordered them to advance, with a squadron of the 9th Lancers, under Captain Campbell, a part of the former to be in reserve, and supported by a squadron of the 9th Lancers, under Major Grant, C.B., in échelon on the right. These troops made a most brilliant charge upon the enemy; at the same time, I advanced the guns and cavalry towards the enemy's line. The fire of the guns soon put the Goorchurras in retreat; and the glorious charge of the troops, on the left, caused their whole force to seek safety in retreat by the Barra Durree. A gun was captured during these proceedings; but, as we were then considerably in advance of the left of the infantry,—although Captain Duncan was enabled to enfilade a battery opposed to them,—and ignorant of the force the enemy might have between the Barra Durree and the town, a space covered with trees, it became necessary to proceed with caution, yet I soon was enabled to open a fire upon the enemy, both on the right and left of the former place, which caused them considerable loss, and hastened their retreat.

I may here observe, that all the enemy's tents were left standing near the Barra Durree, and on the Sikh right of the town, with probably much baggage in them, all of which were probably plundered by the camp followers.

The enemy being now in full retreat, I moved Brigadier White's brigade well to the left front, and soon forced the enemy from the Jhelum road, and, eventually, from that of Bimber also, cutting off large bodies of the enemy, much baggage, and many guns, which were secured by this brigade, as well as the troops of the 2d and 4th brigades, which had been ordered to join in the pursuit. At 20 minutes past 4 P.M., none of the enemy being in sight, and being, as was said by the villagers, nine or ten miles from Goojerat, I discontinued the pursuit, and returned to camp at this place. In this pursuit, Captains Duncan's and Huish's troops of artillery, latterly joined by Major Leeson, with Major Blood's troop of the same arm, brought their guns to bear upon the enemy with good effect on several occasions, and their advance was as rapid as the intersected

\* Left Column. 1st Brigade of Cavalry.

Brigadier White, C.B., Commanding. Her Majesty's 3rd Dragoons (Major Yerbury), Her Majesty's 9th Lancers (Lieutenant Colonel Fullerton), 8th Light Cavalry (Major Mackenzie), Sindie Horse (Captain Malcolm); Captain Duncan's Troop Horse Artillery, Captain Huish's Troop Horse Artillery.

† Right Column. 2nd Brigade of Cavalry

Brigadier Lockwood, C.B., Commanding. Her Majesty's 14th Light Dragoons (Lieutenant-Colonel King), 1st Light Cavalry (Lieutenant-Colonel Bradford), 2 Regiments 11th Irregular Cavalry (Captain Master), 2 Regiments 14th Irregular Cavalry (Lieutenant Roberts), Captain Warner's Troop Horse Artillery.

4th Brigade Cavalry

Brigadier Hearsey, Commanding. 3rd Irregular Cavalry (Major Tait, C.B.), 9th Irregular Cavalry (Major Christie). The 5th and 6th Light Cavalry were left in the rear, to protect the

nature of the ground by nullahs would admit, and the 9th Lancers and 8th Light Cavalry made gallant attempts to close with the enemy's cavalry, which, however, were frustrated by the rapid retreat of the latter; yet a great number of the enemy were slain by this brigade in the pursuit. I witnessed the activity of Captain Unett, and part of his squadron of the 3d Light Dragoons; and Brigadier White mentions that the whole of that regiment was actively engaged in this work of retribution.

Being an eye-witness to all the movements of the 1st Brigade, I have great satisfaction in stating, that Brigadier White conducted them very much to my satisfaction. I am also well satisfied with the manner in which Lieutenant-Colonel Fullerton, Majors Yerbury and Mackenzie, commanded their respective regiments, and in which Major Grant supported the charge of cavalry on the left. The charge of the Sinde Horse reflects the highest credit on Captain Malcolm; and I have great pleasure in having witnessed the gallant bearing of all the officers and men of this brigade, during the operations of the day; and I feel sure that their only regret was that the enemy's cavalry so often declined the attack.

To Captains Duncan and Huish, and Majors Leeson and Blood, I am much indebted for the manner in which they brought their guns into action, whenever an opportunity occurred; and the steadiness and good conduct of both officers and men were very conspicuous.

I have now the pleasing duty to state, that I have received every assistance and support from my Deputy-Assistant-Adjutant-General, Captain Pratt, on the present occasion, as well as during the campaign. To my Deputy-Assistant-Quarter-Master-General, Lieutenant Tucker, I am greatly indebted for his zeal, activity, intelligence, and successful endeavours to procure intelligence of the movements of the enemy during the operations, he, as well as my Aide-de-camp, Lieutenant Thackwell, Lieutenant Young, of the Engineers, Lieutenant Carter, of the Pioneers, and Cornet Beatson, of the 6th Light Cavalry, accompanied me during the battle, and afforded me essential service in carrying my orders, on various occasions, during the operations of the day.

Brigadier White states how greatly he was satisfied with the conduct of his Brigade Major, Captain Cautley, and the whole of the officers and men of his brigade.

As the operations of the 2d and 4th Brigades of Cavalry did not come under my observation, except towards the latter end of the pursuit, I have the honor to forward Brigadier Lockwood's report, and it would appear therefrom that he conducted his brigade judiciously; and I am gratified to learn that both officers and men behaved greatly to his satisfaction, and that the 14th Light Dragoons and 1st Light Cavalry conducted themselves gallantly, and evinced every anxiety to close with the enemy. I am happy to observe that the Brigadier has mentioned, with great approbation, the conduct of Lieutenant-Colonels Bradford and King, in command of their regiments, and I cannot avoid here stating, for the information of his Lordship, that I observed with much satisfaction the zeal and judgment evinced by both officers, when in command of considerable bodies of cavalry, detached from the camp at Chillianwalla, on important duties.

I regret that I have not yet received any report from Brigadier Hearsey, or return of casualties from his brigade, or the Sinde Horse; these will be forwarded when they arrive.

Inclosure 9 in No. 49.

*Brigadier G. H. Lockwood, C.B., Commanding the 2nd Cavalry Division, to the Deputy-Assistant-Adjutant-General, Cavalry Division, Army of the Punjab.*

*Camp, Goojerat, February 22, 1849.*

I HAVE the honor to report, for the information of Major-General Sir Joseph Thackwell, commanding the cavalry division, that, on the morning of the 21st, I formed my brigade, as directed by his Excellency the Commander-in-

Chief, on the right rear of the 1st division of infantry, and parallel to Brigadier Markham's reserve, advancing, in this order, until the enemy opened their fire.

I then deployed the brigade in the following manner: in the first line, 5 troops of Her Majesty's 14th Light Dragoons, two squadrons 1st Light Cavalry, with the 1st troop 3d Brigade Horse Artillery, on the left, escorted by a troop of the 14th, and a ressalah of the 11th Irregular Cavalry; in support, the remainder of the 11th Irregular Cavalry; and in reserve, one squadron 14th, and one squadron 1st Light Cavalry.

In the commencement of the action, I directed Captain Warner to open his fire upon a large body of the enemy, near a village in our front; but, as they returned a heavy fire within accurate range, I changed position left back, and the horse artillery ceased firing.

The enemy's horsemen now appeared, in great force, upon our right, threatening to turn our flank, so I changed front to the right, directing the reserve to retain its front, and communicate with the infantry.

Captain Warner's guns opened with great effect upon the horsemen, and turned them, but they only retired a short distance, and then a regiment of their regular cavalry moved round by a circuitous route, and got completely into our rear. I immediately detached towards them three guns, with a squadron of the 14th, who, in conjunction with Major Christie's corps of irregular cavalry, drove them off.

About this time, a large gale of horse came on towards me, and I prepared to charge, but as they turned, at once, from the fire of the guns, and as there was a nullah in our front, I refrained from advancing after them. The reserve, also, now advanced in support of Colonel Hervey's brigade of infantry.

I then received orders from the Commander-in-Chief to bring on the brigade, which I did, and followed in pursuit of the enemy, until I found myself parallel to the cavalry under the Major-General, when I placed myself in communication with him.

In the pursuit, the 14th Dragoons and 1st Light Cavalry cut down, or shot, a considerable number of the Sikh infantry, both regular and irregular, and Corporal William Pain, of the 14th Dragoons, captured a red silk standard, killing in single combat the horseman who bore it.

I beg to state to the Major-General that I had the greatest satisfaction in witnessing the steadiness of the troops composing the brigade, in performing several manœuvres, under a heavy fire of artillery.

My best thanks are due to Captain Warner, of the Horse Artillery, for the able and efficient manner in which he employed his guns, also to Lieutenant-Colonel Bradford, commanding the 1st Light Cavalry; Lieutenant-Colonel King, 14th Light Dragoons; Captain Master, 11th Irregular Cavalry; and Lieutenant Roberts, 14th Irregular Cavalry; and Lieutenant-Colonel Doherty, who commanded the reserve.

I am also under the greatest obligations to my Brigade Major, Captain Yule, 9th Lancers, for the essential assistance he rendered me, not only during the action, but during the period I have commanded the 2nd brigade.

Inclosure 10 in No. 49.

*Brigadier Hearsey, 4th Brigade, Commanding the Cavalry on the Right Flank of the Army, to Captain Pratt, Assistant-Adjutant-General, Cavalry Division.*

*Camp, near Kores, February 23, 1849.*

I HAVE the honor to report to Sir Joseph Thackwell, K.C.B. and K.H., commanding the cavalry division of the Army of the Punjab, for the information of the Commander-in-Chief, that, agreeably to instructions received from Captain Pratt, Assistant-Adjutant-General, cavalry division, I joined, at about 8.30 A.M. of the morning of the 21st instant, the brigade of cavalry on the right under Brigadier Lockwood, with the 3d and 9th irregular cavalry, and, as senior

cavalry officer, in the field on that flank, I assumed command of the whole of that arm as detailed in the margin,\* and a troop of horse artillery under Captain Warner. Soon after, the action commenced by a cannonade, and heavy bodies of horse, amongst them apparently a regular regiment, showed in our front. The cavalry, under my command, advanced towards them, and the troop of horse artillery was sent to the front, with its support (a squadron of Her Majesty's 14th Dragoon, and a squadron of irregular-horse), and opened a well-directed fire of round and shrapnell, which made the enemy fall back to a respectful distance. On this, very numerous bodies of horse went off to our right, apparently with the intention of turning that flank. I manœuvred to the right with the irregular brigade, and kept them in check. About this time I received orders from the Commander-in-Chief not to separate the left of the cavalry too far from the column of infantry advancing in that direction. I was, therefore, necessitated to close to the left, which I did with Brigadier Lockwood's Brigade. At the same time, as they again pressed on my right, I ordered three guns to support it, the fire from which made the enemy again draw off. I now observed it was their determination to turn the right, and as I had been joined by Colonel Doherty with two squadrons, I placed him to fill up the gap on my left, and order Brigadier Lockwood's brigade and three guns, to join the irregulars on that flank. This checked the enemy, but a very large body now advanced on the space on our left. I immediately opposed it with the Irregular Brigade, and Brigadier Lockwood's, with a half battery; and the enemy were again foiled, but they, perceiving I had only the artillery supports, and ressalah of horse, under the command of Lieutenant Roberts, on my extreme right, made a last effort to turn it.

This was promptly met by the 3rd and 9th Irregulars being sent in that direction, the 9th advancing to meet them with the half battery thus foiled, they returned to our left, Major Christie following their movement. This was their last attempt. A troop of Horse Artillery, with supports of one squadron of 9th Irregulars, commanded by Lieutenant and Adjutant Tytler, pushed to the front, and got under the fire of their artillery, when several men and horses suffered from round shot. It was now apparent, from the distance of the sound of our guns, that the enemy were in retreat, and Major Mackeson informed me it was the Commander-in-Chief's wish that all the cavalry should pursue, and prevent the enemy carrying off their guns. I immediately directed Brigadier Lockwood's brigade to take a sweep to the right, and pushed on myself, with the 3rd Irregulars, and Lieutenant Roberts's ressalah, with Captain Warner's troop of Horse Artillery, the 9th Irregulars, and 11th, under Captain Master, following, as soon as they could get clear of a deep and quaggy nullah, and we perceived the enemy in full retreat, after a canter of four miles. The artillery opened upon the masses of men, whilst the cavalry advanced on the flank, and overtook them near the village of Runnewall, where a great many of the Bunnoo troops were sabred and shot. In this manner the pursuit continued, until a deep nullah prevented the Horse Artillery getting on without delay. Here I left them with two squadrons, and pushed on again, overtaking another body, and punishing them. I detached Captain Biddulph, with half a ressalah, to ascertain the cause of a heavy cloud of dust to our left. He reported it was Sir J. Thackwell's division, and I soon after heard his battery of horse artillery open. Both divisions of cavalry were now closing on the enemy, and Captain Biddulph was so fortunate as to capture five guns, and Major Christie another that had been left in a nullah, by the retreating foe. (Major Christie informs me that this gun would have been left behind, if he had not made great exertions in having it brought into camp; he disclaims the capture of it J.B.H.) The pursuit continued to the village of Sainthul, where I met, and reported to, Sir J. Thackwell, and from whence we returned to camp. The distance the cavalry under my command went over, in pursuit, was fifteen miles. We did not get to the camp of the Irregulars, near the Barra Durree of Goojerat, until ten o'clock at night, and had thus been fifteen hours on horse-back.

I have every reason to be pleased with the conduct of all the officers under my command. Some difference arose as to carrying my orders into effect by

Brigadier Lockwood, in consequence of his receiving directions from supreme authority, of which I was not at the time aware, but I found him most zealous, and desirous of having an opportunity to charge the enemy, at the head of Her Majesty's 14th Dragoons. The conduct of that regiment, throughout the day, was most exemplary and steady, and I have not the least doubt, had an opportunity occurred, it would have been most eagerly seized, to the utter destruction of any body opposed to it. Brigadier Lockwood's report will bear testimony to the energy of the officers commanding regiments in his brigade, as I do, most assuredly, of those officers commanding the regiments of Irregular Cavalry. My thanks are due to Major Tait, C.B. commanding 3rd Irregulars; Major Christie, commanding 9th Irregulars; Captain Master, commanding 11th Irregulars; and Lieutenant Roberts, commanding a ressalah of the 14th Irregulars. The conduct of the Horse Artillery was beyond all praise; and I feel much indebted to Captain Warner, his officers and men, for the able manner in which that noble arm was employed.

I feel much indebted also to Lieutenant Neville Chamberlain, Brigade-Major, 4th Brigade Irregular Cavalry, for his assistance in the field during the forenoon, which I cannot too much appreciate, and for the example he set, in several hand-to-hand affairs with a furious and exasperated enemy, during the pursuit. Lieutenant Crawford Chamberlain, 2nd in command 9th Irregular Horse, although still suffering from his wound, was present with the regiment, the whole day, thus showing his usual energy.

Lieutenant and Adjutant Tytler, 9th Irregulars, also brought to my notice the steadiness of a squadron of that regiment, when under severe artillery fire, by which one sowar was killed, and several men and horses wounded.

I shall forward a list of casualties, as soon I can get them from the different officers in command of regiments and parties; but, from the constant marching we have had since the battle of Goojerat, and the inclement weather we are now enduring, I have not as yet been able to get them.

P.S.—I have just got the return of the casualties of the 3rd and 9th Irregular Cavalry, which I have the honor to inclose.

#### Inclosure 11 in No 49

*Major-General Whish, C.B., Commanding the 1st Infantry Division, Army of the Punjab, to the Adjutant-General*

*Camp, Goojerat, February 22, 1849*

I HAVE the honor to report, for the information of the Commander-in-chief, that the 1st Infantry Division, with Horse Artillery attached, as detailed per margin,\* marched at about half-past 7 A.M. yesterday; the 1st brigade, commanded by Brigadier Hervey, in quarter distance columns of regiments, right in front, at deploying distance, with a troop of Native Horse Artillery, on either flank, drawn up in corresponding order.

The 2nd brigade, in reserve, commanded by Brigadier Markham, and 300 to 400 yards in rear, proceeded in contiguous quarter distance columns.

After advancing about two miles or more, the enemy opened their fire, and, after the army had made some further progress, both brigades, agreeably to his Lordship's orders, (and taken up from the left) deployed, the Horse Artillery conforming thereto. Immediately afterwards, the troops of Horse Artillery and skirmishers (of the 1st Brigade) were ordered to the front, the latter at 300 yards' distance. I then requested Brigadier Markham to take ground to the left, that the interval made by

\* 4th Troop 1st Brigade Horse Artillery.—(Captain Mackenzie)

1st Infantry Brigade.—52nd Regiment Native Infantry, Her Majesty's 10th Foot, 8th Regiment Native Infantry

4th Troop 3rd Brigade Horse Artillery.—(Captain J. Anderson, except 2 guns at Wuzerabad)

3rd Company of Pioneers.—Lieutenant Mc Mulhu, in reserve.

2nd Infantry Brigade.—51st Regiment Native Infantry, Her Majesty's 32nd Foot; 72nd Regiment Native Infantry.

the advance of Captain Anderson's four guns might be covered by the 72nd Native Infantry. Both troops began a spirited cannonade, and continued it for about three hours, at the rate of forty rounds per gun, per hour, until the enemy's guns in our front (like those, I believe, in front of every part of the line, through a similar treatment) were silenced.

During the cannonade, on first receiving an order for the further advance of both troops, I learnt from Major Garbett, who was in command of them, that the guns on our left front had had so many horses killed and disabled, that they must await the arrival of others from the rear, which I observed were making quick progress to their troops, and which, shortly afterwards, I regret to say, lost its gallant Captain, who was mortally wounded by a cannon-ball: the duties continued, however, to be efficiently prosecuted, under the superintendence of Lieutenants Francis and Meham, to the former of whom the command immediately devolved.

After this, both troops being well advanced to the front, and the enemy making one or two threatening demonstrations, I thought it right to make a requisition on the cavalry for a small detachment for their protection, which was promptly complied with, by Brigadier Lockwood.

On the advance of the line being directed, the right brigade found the enemy's infantry in great force in its front, with a strong body of cavalry on their left, which rendered it necessary for Brigadier Hervey to make a short flank movement to the right, and throw back the 52nd Native Infantry, in order to counteract any attack the enemy might have in contemplation.

As this, unavoidably, caused a great gap in the line, I thought it advisable to direct Brigadier Markham, at once, to occupy it by his brigade, which was accordingly done, and the arrangement immediately reported to his Excellency. The enemy were otherwise preparing to take advantage of this opening, but, on seeing the 2nd brigade advancing to it, halted, and gave a few rounds of grape and matchlock fire, which was returned with full effect by firing from the right of divisions and Lieutenant Francis's guns, which latter were being replenished with ammunition, and, for the moment, in rear of the infantry. Lieutenant Need, Aide-de-Camp, on noticing the enemy's cavalry and infantry immediately in front of the 2nd brigade, had made known the same to Lieutenants Francis and Meham, who, on his suggestion, instantly galloped to the front, through an interval made for the purpose by Her Majesty's 32nd Regiment, and, with a few rounds of grape, cooperated with the infantry (who were advancing to the charge) in sending back the enemy in great confusion.

In the flank movement by the 1st brigade, already adverted to, and which, under a heavy fire from the enemy of round, grape, and matchlock, with the reformation to line, (on discovering that the enemy did not make the anticipated attack,) was effected in the most steady and orderly manner, Captain Mackenzie, by his able and judicious cooperation, made his troop particularly useful, and, on the enemy's declining to receive the charge of Her Majesty's 10th, and the 8th, and 52nd Native Infantry, poured in such a continued fire of shrapnell and round, upon their retiring masses, as, with what had occurred from the 2nd brigade, effectually to prevent any further threat or molestation to the division under my command, and, as far as I could observe, every part of the line had been equally successful in defeating the purposes of the enemy, who, long before noon, must have discovered that the entire loss of their guns, ammunition, camp equipage, and cattle, was inevitable.

On reaching Goojerat, the 2nd brigade, agreeably to his Lordship's orders, commenced collecting the enemy's abandoned guns, nineteen of which were sent in by them forthwith, and occupied the town, with the following details, under Major Case, Her Majesty's 32nd Regiment, (which were afterwards reinforced by the 36th Regiment Native Infantry).—

Two Companies Her Majesty's 32nd Regiment, under Captain Pigott,  
Two Companies 51st Regiment Native Infantry, under Lieutenant Wallace

Possession of the eight gates was first taken, and then of the fort, where about eighty of the enemy laid down their arms, and were made over, as prisoners, to the 36th Regiment Native Infantry, with other small parties found in different parts of the town, that, with few exceptions, made no resistance. The above four Companies captured a gun, standard, and some horses, with the loss of one man killed of Her Majesty's 32nd, and an officer of the same corps wounded, Lieutenant Jeffrey. The 1st brigade, on halting here, detached a sub-division of Her Majesty's 10th Regiment, and the Grenadier Company of the 52nd Native Infantry, to expel a party of 200 of



the enemy in occupation of the temple and garden, in rear of which the 8th Regiment Native Infantry is now encamped, which was effected with trifling loss on our side; but the enemy had thirty or forty killed and wounded, and a great number taken prisoners

It is particularly satisfactory to me to bring to the favorable notice of the Commander-in-Chief the conduct of the division under my command, during the services of yesterday, performed under his Lordship's immediate orders and direction, and consisting of, in fact, the Horse Artillery and Infantry of the Bengal (Mooltan) field force, with the exception of the 49th Regiment of Native Infantry, on detached duty. Brigadiers Hervey and Markham conducted their brigades, under the various circumstances of the day (some of which I have briefly specified), in a manner that merits the strongest commendation, and they were, as heretofore, admirably supported by the officers in command of regiments, viz —

Lieutenant-Colonel Franks, C B, Her Majesty's 10th Regiment

Ditto Brooke, ditto 32nd ditto.

Major Farquharson, 8th Regiment Native Infantry, and, on his being severely wounded, Brevet-Major Williams

Brevet-Major Griffin, 51st Regiment Native Infantry

Captain Jamieson, 52nd ditto.

Ditto Lloyd, 72nd ditto

I cordially unite with both Brigadiers in the expression of thanks to the above officers, for the intelligence and zeal with which they carried out their orders, and to all the officers and men under their command, for the steadiness and prompt obedience so uniformly evinced throughout the division

Brigadier Hervey acknowledges the services of his brigade-major, Captain Wiggins, in high terms of commendation, and the active assistance he received, throughout the day, from Lieutenant B Reid (34th Regiment Native Infantry), Interpreter to Her Majesty's 10th Regiment, as does Brigadier Markham those of his brigade-major, Captain Balfour, Her Majesty's 32nd Regiment (who has happily recovered from the wound he received in the action of the 12th of September last), and of Ensign Fraser, 23rd Regiment, appointed Acting Interpreter of the 49th Regiment Native Infantry, who is awaiting the arrival of the regiment from Mooltan, and who gladly made his services useful to the Brigadier.

To Major Garbett, commanding the Horse Artillery attached to my division, my best acknowledgments are due, for his unremitting attention to both troops under his command, and particularly in matters the officers commanding them were not so able of themselves to give directions about. He mentions in the highest terms (as does Brigadier Hervey) Captain Mackenzie and his troop, and notices that, after the lamented death of Captain J Anderson, the four guns of his troop were well commanded by Lieutenant Francis, and I heartily concur in the testimony he bears to the admirable conduct of the officers and men of both troops, who worked their guns with a rapidity and precision that would have been impracticable, except from their uniform coolness and steadiness, under a heavy fire from the enemy, at both positions, 1st at 1000 yards, and 2ndly at 500 yards. Major Garbett also notices, in most favorable terms, the able assistance rendered him by Lieutenant De Teissier, Acting Adjutant 1st Brigade Horse Artillery.

Lieutenant McMullin and his Company of Pioneers deserve much credit, having continued with the 4th Troop 1st Brigade Horse Artillery, and rendered useful service whenever called upon

Having but recently had my attention drawn to the circumstances I am about to mention, I think, in justice to the gallant officer affected by them, I may be permitted so to do, though they refer to anterior conflicts with the enemy. On the 12th of September last, after Lieutenant-Colonel Pattoun was mortally wounded, the command of the six companies of Her Majesty's 32nd Regiment devolved on Major Inglis, and, through the exertions of the gallant troops employed, the enemy's strong position was carried, and a similar result occurred on the 7th of November last, when, from Lieutenant-Colonel Brooke having the command of one of the two columns of attack, that of Her Majesty's 32nd Regiment again devolved on Major Inglis, whose conduct in that important trust was highly satisfactory to the Brigadier commanding, and I have accordingly great satisfaction in soliciting the favorable notice of his Excellency to the same.

Major Napier (attended by Lieutenant Greathed) of Engineers, who was

attached, for the day, to the two divisions on the right, aided me much, by occasionally reconnoitring positions we were approaching, and in giving me the advantage of his reconnoissance of the preceding day. Captain Glasford and Lieutenant R B Smith, of Engineers, having been directed to join me, were extremely useful, during the day, and I feel much indebted to both, as also to Captain Cheape (51st Native Infantry), late Treasurer to the Mooltan field force, who attended me throughout, and for whom it was not difficult to find frequent and active employment.

Major Becher, Assistant Quarter-Master-General, and Captain Whish, Deputy Assistant Adjutant-General of the division, as also my Aides-de-Camp, Captain J. C Kennedy, Her Majesty's 18th Foot, and Lieutenant A Need, Her Majesty's 14th Light Dragoons, afforded me every assistance, and are entitled to my best thanks for their attention and zeal. The horse of the Deputy Assistant Adjutant-General, from which he had just dismounted, having, on the commencement of our cannonade, been severely wounded by a cannon-shot, it was some time before another could join from the rear, and, immediately, a camel served him as a tolerable substitute.

I beg respectfully, in conclusion, to offer to the Commander-in-Chief my hearty congratulations on the complete success of his Lordship's arrangements for the day, and on an issue which, under Divine Providence, has been permitted to be most triumphant.

Inclosure 12 in No 49

*Major-General Sir W R Gilbert, K C B, Commanding the 2nd Infantry Division,  
Army of the Punjab, to the Adjutant-General*

*Camp, Nowrungabad, February 24, 1849*

I HAVE to apologize for the delay which has taken place in complying with general orders of the 21st instant, directing reports of the proceedings of the troops employed against the enemy to be forwarded, for the information of the Commander-in-Chief, but having been, as you are aware, constantly on the move since the morning after the action near Goojerat, in pursuit of the fugitive Sikh army, I have not had any opportunity of doing so.

I have now to report, for the information of his Lordship, that the 2nd Infantry Division, consisting of the troops mentioned in the margin\*, advanced from Shadawal, on the morning of the 21st instant, in line of quarter distance columns, at deploying distance, leaving a battery of heavy guns under Major Horsford, of the Artillery, between the two brigades, No 17 light field battery, under command of Captain Dawes, and Brevet-Major Foidyce's troop of Horse Artillery, between the right regiments of the left and right brigades, respectively.

Having received orders to push forward my light troops, to force the enemy to show their position, I immediately advanced the troop of Horse Artillery and Dawes' light field battery, which instantly drew a very heavy and well-directed fire from two large batteries, which the enemy had established on either side of the village of Kalra, by which they were nearly screened from the fire of our guns, which, with the light companies, were then still further pushed forward, followed by the division which had deployed into line, the heavy guns in our centre at this time opened a very destructive cannonade. Up to this time, the village above-named seemed to be unoccupied, and I directed a party of infantry to take possession of it. Upon the approach of this party, a tremendous fire of musketry was opened from the walls, which were loopholed in every direction. The 2nd European Regiment was then ordered up in support, under the command of Major Steel, and soon carried it, after a most obstinate resistance, in which that gallant regiment suffered rather severely, as well as upon its emerging from the village, soon after which, the enemy left many of their guns, and fled in the greatest confusion.

\* 3rd Brigade — 31st Regiment Native Infantry, 2nd European Regiment, 70th Regiment Native Infantry

4th Brigade — 30th Regiment Native Infantry, Her Majesty's 29th Foot, 56th Regiment Native Infantry.

It affords me the highest satisfaction to record the valuable services of Brigadier A S H Mountain, C B and of Brigadier N Penny, C B, who led the 2nd European Regiment to the attack of the village, in the most gallant and exemplary manner. I should wish particularly to mention the very great assistance I received from Major Horsford, commanding the heavy battery, and Major Fordyce, commanding 2nd troop 2nd brigade, H A, and Captain Dawes, commanding No 17 light field battery. It is impossible to praise too highly their conduct and that of all those under their command.

I beg likewise to bring to his Excellency's notice, the valuable assistance I received from my divisional and personal staff, Brevet Captain J A D Ferguson, Deputy-Assistant-Adjutant-General, Lieutenant A S. Galloway, Deputy-Assistant-Quarter-Master-General, Lieutenant Colt, Aide-de-Camp, Captain Sherwill, and Lieutenant Macdonald, Majors of Brigade, and Captain Goldie and Lieutenant Irwin, of the Engineers.

Captain W P Robbins, 15th N I, who acted as my Aide-de-Camp during the action, afforded me great and active assistance, as did also Lieutenant H B Hooper, 31st N I (Orderly Officer).

My warmest thanks are due to Lieutenant-Colonel Congreve, C B H M's 29th Foot, Lieutenant-Colonel Jack, 30th N I and Lieutenant-Colonel Holmes, 56th N I, and to Majors J Steel, 2nd European Regiment, W R Corfield, 31st N I and J R. McCausland, 70th N I (severely wounded in the attack on the village of Kalra), for the exemplary manner in which they led their regiments. I trust I may be permitted to bring to his Excellency's notice the name of Brevet Captain G Gordon, 50th N I Officiating Sub-Assistant Commissary-General, who, at my request, destroyed the enemy's camp-equipage and loose ammunition.

The conduct of all the troops under my command, European and Native, under a terrific and well-directed cannonade, was such as to call forth my highest commendation.

In conclusion, I regret that, in consequence of our being so constantly on the move, since the action, I am unable to forward herein the returns of casualties, but I shall do myself the honor to transmit them with the least possible delay.

P S—In the absence of the regular returns, I may here add that the amount of loss is very trifling, considering the heavy fire kept up by the enemy's artillery on the centre of the division, where the heavy guns were, the 2nd European Regiment having only lost 8 men killed, and 135 wounded, 31st N I 11 men killed, and 131 wounded, and 70th N I 10 killed, 40 wounded.

In the 4th Brigade, H M's 29th Regiment lost only 2 men, and 6 wounded, the 30th N I 3 men wounded, and the 56th N I only one man wounded.

Inclosure 13 in No 49.

*Brigadier-General C Campbell, Commanding the 3rd Division, Army of the Punjab, to the Adjutant-General.*

*Camp, Dowlunnuger, February 23, 1849*

I HAVE the honor to report to you, for the information of the Commander-in-Chief, that, in obedience to the orders I received from his Lordship at daylight of the 21st instant, I formed the brigades of the 3d division, commanded by Brigadiers Carnegie and McLeod, with the light field batteries attached to them, close to the left bank of the nullah which passed in front of the village of Shadewal, a little after 7 A.M. The Brigade under Brigadier Hoggan, was formed at the same time in rear, to act as a reserve to the whole force intended to be employed on that side of the nullah.

In the advance to the attack of the enemy's position, his Lordship desired me to keep close to the left side of the nullah, and to preserve my communication with the heavy guns, which were placed on the opposite bank.

His Lordship further directed me to approach, but not to pass, that part of the nullah, behind which the right of the enemy's army was formed, without further instructions from him.

With a view to the effectual fulfilment of his Lordship's wishes to maintain close communication with the heavy guns on my right, and to prevent their molesta-

tion by the enemy from the nullah, I directed the Light Company of Her Majesty's 24th to occupy, and move along, the nullah, in advance of the heavy guns, and, to render the communication more secure, I supported this company with two guns from No. 10 light field battery, which moved close along the bank of the nullah.

The two brigades were formed, in the first instance, in contiguous columns of regiments (the brigades at full distance), covered by a strong line of skirmishers, and these immediately supported by Nos 5 and 10 light field batteries, attached to them respectively. These skirmishers communicated, on the left, with those covering the front of the Bombay division, which were likewise supported by the troop of Horse Artillery belonging to that force. The whole line moved forward at a quarter before 8 A M in this order, with the regularity of troops at a review. The country we passed over in our advance was perfectly level, highly cultivated, and without an obstruction, being merely dotted here and there with an occasional tree.

At half-past 9, the skirmishers having arrived within long range of the enemy's guns, the columns were deployed into line, when we again moved forward. At this time the right wing of the enemy's army was plainly to be seen, formed directly in our front, beyond a turn in the nullah, which seemed to run parallel to the front of their position, in the centre of which, and nearly opposite to Nos 5 and 10 light field batteries, they had two very heavy guns, and several six and nine-pounder field guns, which then opened fire, that from the former, in the first instance, caused some loss in the batteries, and here it was, I regret to say, that Lieutenant Day, of the Artillery, a very brave and most promising young officer, was killed by a cannon-ball.

The line moved onwards to the front, keeping in communication with, and as much as possible in the alignment of, the heavy guns, while the field batteries kept up so destructive a fire upon the enemy in their front, in position behind the nullah, that they finally obliged the whole force to abandon it, and take shelter under cover of the bank of the nullah, from which they were afterwards driven, in confusion and fight, by an enfilading fire from the same field batteries.

About three-quarters of an hour before the enemy had been finally driven in flight from the nullah and from the field, a great effort was made by many, apparently of the principal chiefs, to bring forward a large body of their cavalry, which was followed, in a tumultuous manner, by the infantry which had taken shelter in the nullah, to attack the centre of the Bombay division. This attack was taken in flank by No 5 field battery, and caused great loss to the enemy, both in his short advance, and subsequent retreat.

The infantry of the 3d division had not occasion to fire a shot, the enemy were driven from their different positions, and from the field, by the fire of these two field batteries, aided by that of the Bombay Troop of Horse Artillery.

I cannot find language to express my sense of the calm, steady, and admirable manner in which these two batteries were commanded, and worked, by Major Mowatt, the commanding officer, and by Major Ludlow and Lieutenant Robertson, the former commanding No 5, and the latter No 10 battery, nor am I able adequately to express my admiration of the bravery and gallantry of the other officers of these batteries, and of their non-commissioned officers and men, all of whom I beg to recommend, in an especial manner, to the favorable notice of the Commander-in-Chief.

After the troops had crossed the nullah, I received his Lordship's orders to follow the troops of the right wing in their movements towards the east side of Goojerat, while the Bombay division passed the town on the other side. After clearing the town, the division again resumed its communication with the Bombay troops, and proceeded with them in advance, together with the troops of the 2d division on our right, until ordered to halt, and encamp.

I beg leave to bring to the favorable notice of the Commander-in-Chief, the conduct of Brigadiers Carnegie and McLeod, to whom I feel much indebted, for the brave example they set their men, and for the officer-like manner in which they managed their respective brigades during the day. Brigadier Hoggan, commanding the reserve, was under the immediate orders of Brigadier-General Dundas, on the left.

The two former Brigadiers speak, in strong terms, of the merits and services, during the day, of their respective brigade-majors, Captain Clarke of the 25th Native Infantry, and Captain Keller, of the 6th Native Infantry, and I can confirm their opinion of the zeal, activity, and value of these officers' services, from my own personal observation.

I beg also to recommend, to the favorable notice of the Commander-in-Chief, the conduct of the several officers commanding regiments, who all set an example of the greatest gallantry to their respective corps, viz, Lieutenant-Colonel Smith, Her Majesty's 24th Regiment, Lieutenant-Colonel Corbett, 25th Native Infantry, Lieutenant-Colonel Jones, Her Majesty's 61st, Major Tudor, 46th Native Infantry, and Captain Lang, 36th Native Infantry. They are all truly deserving of his Lordship's favorable notice and approbation. Lieutenant-Colonel Jones, of Her Majesty's 61st, speaks, in terms of praise, of the assistance he received from the two majors of that regiment, Major Campbell and Major Stephens, and Lieutenant Colonel Smith, of Her Majesty's 24th Regiment, in a similar manner, notices the conduct of Major Blackford, of that corps.

I received, during the day, the most cordial and valuable assistance from Major Ponsonby, Assistant Adjutant-General of the Division, with whom I found a real pleasure in being associated on service, and to whom I owe great obligation, for the able and careful manner in which he conducts the duties of his department.

I beg to recommend to the particular notice of his Lordship the Commander-in-Chief, the conduct of Ensign Garden, Deputy-Assistant-Quarter-Master-General, to whom I am also under many obligations for the zeal and ability with which he performs his various duties.

Captain Durand and Lieutenant Morton, of the Engineers, were attached to the 3d Division during the action, and accompanied me during the day, they rendered me valuable assistance, and I owe to them, accordingly, my warmest acknowledgments.

I cannot conclude this report without also bringing to the notice of the Commander-in-Chief, the willing and valuable assistance afforded me by my Aide-de-Camp, Captain Haythorne, and also by my brother officer, Lieutenant Shadwell, of Her Majesty's 98th Regiment, who was present in the action as a volunteer.

I beg, herewith, to inclose a return of the killed and wounded, together with a present state of the troops actually engaged, and returns of the quantity of ammunition expended.

Inclosure 14 in No 49

*Brigadier-General the Honorable H Dundas, C B, Commanding the Bombay Column,  
Army of the Punjab, to the Adjutant-General*

*Head Quarters, Camp, Sakerwalla, February 22, 1849*

I HAVE the honor to inform you that, agreeably to the orders I received, the Bombay Infantry Division was formed on the left of the line. I advanced, for some distance, in contiguous columns at quarter distance, the 60th Rifles under Lieutenant-Colonel Bradshaw, and 3d Troop Horse Artillery under Major Blood, being thrown in advance. The division deployed into line, and gradually advanced, as the attack on the right developed itself. A party of the enemy's horse made a demonstration of attacking the line, but speedily moved off to their own right, on receiving one or two rounds from Major Blood's troop. A battery of the enemy, which was in front of the Bengal Division, was also quickly silenced by this troop, which made excellent practice. The division kept gradually advancing, without firing a shot, the enemy moving off so fast we could not reach him, the artillery taking every advantage of opening its fire that was afforded. The infantry kept constantly advancing, passing through the enemy's camp, which was left standing, and round the town of Goojerat on the left, bringing up the left shoulders. The ground, at the first, was studded with bushes and hedges of prickly pear, which caused some delay in getting through, and, on reaching the open country again, not a sign of the enemy was to be seen. Two guns were abandoned by him, on this side of the town. Not a casualty occurred in the infantry division, or in the troop, with the exception of two horses. The troop, afterwards, accompanied Major-General Sir Joseph Thackwell's Division of Cavalry, in pursuit of the enemy, and it has been reported to me by Brigadier Leeson, commanding the Bombay Artillery, that it rendered good service. The Sind Horse, under Lieutenant Malcolm, having been attached, for the day, to Major-General Sir Joseph Thackwell's Division, I had not an opportunity of witnessing a most successful and gallant charge which was made by that distinguished regiment against a party of the enemy's Horse, which was completely overthrown, with the

loss of their standards ; and the attempt to turn our left, which the enemy showed a disposition to try, altogether frustrated. This success was not gained without some loss, which amounted to three killed, and sixteen or seventeen wounded. The field-battery, under Capt Turnbull, was attached to the force protecting the baggage. Where the troops never came in contact with the enemy, who moved off with the utmost rapidity, there is little room for remark on their conduct, beyond making a steady and regular advance, and for a long distance, and preserving a good order of formation. I had every reason to be satisfied with the conduct of all and my thanks are due to Brigadier Capon, commanding the 1st Infantry Brigade, to Lieutenant-Colonel Bradshaw, commanding the 60th Rifles, Major Hallett, commanding the 3d Regiment Native Infantry, Major Mignan, commanding the 1st Bombay Fusiliers, Major Mant, commanding the 19th Regiment Native Infantry, Brigadier Leeson, commanding the artillery, rendering every assistance, and Major Blood, in command of the troop, is entitled to every credit, for the efficient service the troop was enabled to perform.

The steady and good order in which the Brigade of the Bengal army moved, under Brigadier Hoggan, which was in support of the Bombay Division, was very praiseworthy.

I am indebted to the officers of the Divisional Staff for the active assistance they afforded me. Major Gicen, Assistant-Adjutant-General, Captain Hart, Deputy-Assistant-Adjutant-General, Captain Ramsay, the Assistant-Quarter-Master-General; Captain Skinner, the Deputy Judge Advocate-General, Major St John, Pay-Master-General, Lieutenant Mules of the 1st Fusiliers, Post-Master, Lieutenant Ward, 60th Rifles, my Aide-de-Camp, and Lieutenant Crawley, 15th Hussars, Aide-de-Camp to Major-General Aitchison, commanding the Mysore Division, who officiated as my Aide-de-Camp. Brigadier Capon also reports favorably of the assistance he derived from Captain Stiles, Major of Brigade, and Lieutenant Gordon, 60th Rifles, who officiated as Aide-de-Camp. Lieutenant Stevenson, Brigade Major of Artillery, rendered every assistance in his department. The sappers and miners, under Lieutenant Kendall, were kept prepared for any duty that might have been required in sloping down nullahs for the guns, &c, but the ground was so favorable for the movement of the troops, that then exertions were not required in this duty. My thanks are also due to Captain Threshie, Assistant-Commissary-General, on this occasion, as also for the efficient manner in which the duties of his department have been conducted.

Lieutenant Henry, 19th Regiment Native Infantry, Aide-de-Camp to the Governor of Bombay, and who was placed in political charge of the prisoner of war, the Dewan Moolraj, joined me in the afternoon, having ridden post from Lahore, on purpose to be present, after delivering over charge of his prisoner on the 20th instant.

Herewith, I inclose a list of casualties, which are principally in horses, together with a return of ammunition expended.

Inclosure 15 in No 49

*Major J S Leeson, Brigadier, Commanding Artillery Brigade, Bombay Division,  
to the Assistant-Adjutant-General, Bombay Division*

*Camp, Goojerat, February 22, 1849*

IN compliance with your order, I have the honor to report that the 3d, or Major Blood's, troop of Horse Artillery, was ordered to accompany the cavalry division under Major-General Sir Joseph Thackwell, K C B at about half-past one yesterday, to follow the enemy who were then retreating, with this troop I proceeded, accompanied by Lieutenant Hamilton and my staff.

After proceeding at a trot and gallop for about nine miles, we joined the Cavalry Division, and soon joined the enemy's rear, and, at a distance of about 400 yards, opened fire, with manifest good effect, they were then attempting to carry three guns, and a considerable body of cavalry were hovering round to afford them protection, thus they were unable to effect, as our well-directed fire soon obliged the enemy to abandon their guns, camels, carts, bullocks, &c and a great proportion of their baggage, which fell into our hands.

The enemy still continuing to retreat in a most disorderly manner, we advanced at a gallop for about three miles, and again opened fire with such effect that they were compelled to abandon another gun.

We again advanced some distance further, and were halted, by order of the General commanding, who proceeded, and at a quarter to five P.M. we began to fall back towards the camp, which we reached at half-past three o'clock, P.M.

*General Return of Casualties, in the Army of the Punjab, in the Action at Goojerat, on the 21st of February, 1849, between the British Forces, under the personal command of General Hugh, Baron Gough, G.C.B., Commander-in-Chief of all the Forces in India, and the Rebel Army, under Sardar Chuttur Sing and Rajah Shere Sing*

General Staff—Wounded, 1 Provost-Marshal

*Artillery Division*

*Horse Artillery.*

- 4th Troop, 1st Brigade—Killed, 3 rank and file, 1 syce, 17 horses, wounded, 1 Native officer, 5 rank and file, 2 lascars, 5 syces, 11 horses.  
 2d Troop, 2d Brigade—Killed, 7 rank and file, 1 lascar, 25 horses, wounded, 1 serjeant, 1 trumpeter, 17 rank and file, 4 lascars, 13 horses.  
 3d Troop, 2d Brigade—Killed, 1 syce, 7 horses, wounded, 4 rank and file, missing, 1 syce  
 4th Troop, 2d Brigade—Wounded, 1 rank and file, missing, 1 horse  
 1st Troop, 3d Brigade—Wounded, 1 trumpeter, 2 rank and file, missing, 1 horse  
 2d Troop, 3d Brigade—Killed, 1 rank and file, 7 horses, wounded, 2 serjeants, 3 rank and file, 1 syce, 1 horse, missing, 2 horses  
 4th Troop, 3d Brigade—Killed, 1 European Officer, 1 serjeant, 6 rank and file, 1 lascar, 16 horses, wounded, 1 serjeant, 4 rank and file, 1 lascar, 1 syce, 6 horses, missing, 1 horse

*Foot Artillery*

- 1st Company, 1st Battalion, (No. 10 Battery)—Killed, 1 European officer, 1 rank and file, 2 horses, wounded, 2 rank and file, 2 syce drivers, 3 horses, missing, 1 horse  
 3d Company, 1st Battalion (No. 17 Battery)—Killed, 10 horses; wounded, 4 rank and file, and 3 horses.  
 3d Company, 3d Battalion—Killed, 2 rank and file, 5 bullocks, wounded, 2 syce drivers  
 4th Company, 3d Battalion—Killed, 5 bullocks, wounded, 2 rank and file, 1 lascar, 3 syce drivers  
 1st Company, 4th Battalion—Wounded, 1 European Officer, 3 rank and file, 1 lascar  
 4th Company, 4th Battalion—Wounded, 1 rank and file  
 3d Company, 7th Battalion (No. 5 Battery)—Killed, 1 syce driver, 1 syce, 3 horses; wounded, 2 rank and file, 1 lascar, 1 syce driver

Total—Killed, 2 European officers, 1 serjeant, 20 rank and file, 2 lascars, 1 syce driver, 3 syces, 97 horses or bullocks; wounded, 1 European officer, 1 Native officer, 4 serjeants, 2 trumpeters, 50 rank and file, 10 lascars, 8 syce drivers, 7 syces, 37 horses or bullocks; missing, 1 syce, 6 horses

Engineer Department and Sappers and Pioneers—Wounded, 1 European officer, 1 Native officer, 2 serjeants or havildars, and 5 rank and file

*Cavalry Division.*

*First Brigade.*

- Her Majesty's 3d Light Dragoons—Killed, 1 horse; wounded, 1 rank and file, 2 horses, missing, 2 horses  
 Her Majesty's 9th Lancers—Missing, 4 horses.

- 5th Regiment Light Cavalry—Wounded, 1 European officer, 4 rank and file, 1 horse.  
 8th Regiment Light Cavalry—Killed, 1 syce, 1 horse; wounded, 1 Native officer; missing, 1 rank and file, 3 horses

#### 2d Brigade.

- Her Majesty's 14th Light Dragoons—Killed, 1 European officer, 3 horses; wounded, 2 European officers, 4 rank and file, 2 horses  
 1st Regiment Light Cavalry—Wounded, 2 rank and file, 4 horses, missing, 2 horses.

#### 3d Brigade

- 11th Irregular Cavalry—Killed, 2 horses; wounded, 3 rank and file  
 14th Irregular Cavalry—Wounded, 2 rank and file, 4 horses, missing, 2 horses.

#### 4th Brigade.

- 3d Irregular Cavalry—Killed, 1 rank and file, 2 horses, wounded, 1 Native officer, 1 havildar, 5 rank and file, 2 horses  
 9th Irregular Cavalry—Killed, 1 rank and file, 10 horses, wounded, 1 havildar, 12 rank and file, 3 horses

Total—Killed, 1 European officer, 2 rank and file, 1 syce, 19 horses, wounded, 3 European officers, 2 Native officers, 2 havildars, 33 rank and file, 18 horses, missing, 1 rank and file, 13 horses

### 1st Infantry Division.

Divisional Staff—Wounded, 1 horse.

#### 1st Brigade.

- Her Majesty's 10th Foot—Killed, 7 rank and file, 1 horse, wounded, 1 European officer, 53 rank and file  
 8th Regiment Native Infantry—Killed, 1 European officer, 1 Native officer, 3 rank and file, wounded, 2 European officers, 3 Native officers, 4 havildars, 56 rank and file  
 52d Regiment Native Infantry—Killed, 5 rank and file, wounded, 3 European officers, 1 havildar, 30 rank and file.

#### 2d Brigade

- Her Majesty's 32d Foot—Killed, 1 rank and file, wounded, 1 European officer, 4 rank and file  
 51st Regiment Native Infantry—Killed, 5 rank and file, wounded, 1 European officer, 1 Native officer, 1 havildar, 46 rank and file  
 72d Regiment Native Infantry—Killed, 1 rank and file, wounded, 8 rank and file.

Total—Killed, 1 European officer, 1 Native officer, 22 rank and file, 1 horse; wounded, 8 European officers, 4 Native officers, 6 havildars, 197 rank and file, 1 horse

### 2nd Infantry Division

#### 3d Brigade.

- 2d European Regiment—Killed, 1 European officer, 2 serjeants, 6 rank and file, 1 horse, wounded, 5 European officers, 12 serjeants, 123 rank and file, and 1 horse, missing, 3 rank and file  
 31st Regiment Native Infantry—Killed 2 havildars, 9 rank and file; wounded, 1 European officer, 4 Native ditto, 7 havildars, 119 rank and file, 1 lascar.  
 70th Regiment Native Infantry—Killed, 10 rank and file; wounded, 5 European officers, 1 Native ditto, 4 havildars, 34 rank and file.



*4th Brigade.*

Her Majesty's 29th Foot—Killed, 2 rank and file, wounded, 6 rank and file.

30th Regiment Native Infantry—Wounded, 3 rank and file.

56th Regiment Native Infantry—Wounded, 1 rank and file.

Total—Killed, 1 European officer, 4 sergeants or havildars, 27 rank and file, 1 horse, wounded, 11 European Officers, 5 Native officers, 23 sergeants or havildars, 286 rank and file, 1 lascar, 1 horse, missing, 3 rank and file.

*3rd Infantry Division**5th Brigade.*

25th Regiment Native Infantry—Killed, 1 rank and file, wounded, 2 rank and file

*7th Brigade*

Her Majesty's 61st Foot—Wounded, 9 rank and file

36th Regiment Native Infantry—Killed, 1 trumpeter, 3 rank and file, wounded, 2 havildars, 7 rank and file

Total—Killed, 1 trumpeter, 4 rank and file, wounded 2 havildars, 18 rank and file

*Bombay Division*

3d Troop Horse Artillery—Killed, 1 horse

Sinde Irregular Horse—Killed, 1 havildar, 1 rank and file, 24 horses, wounded, 1 Native officer, 1 havildar, 10 rank and file, 11 horses

Total—Killed, 1 havildar, 1 rank and file, 25 horses, wounded, 1 Native officer, 1 havildar, 10 rank and file, 11 horses

Grand Total—Killed, 5 European officers, 1 Native officer, 6 sergeants or havildars, 1 trumpeter, 76 rank and file, 2 lascars, 1 syce driver, 4 syces, 143 horses or bullocks, Wounded, 24 European officers, 14 Native officers, 1 provost marshal, 40 sergeants or havildars, 2 trumpeters, 599 rank and file, 11 lascars, 8 syce drivers, 7 syces or grasscutters, 68 horses or bullocks, missing, 4 rank and file, 1 syce, 19 horses or bullocks.

*Nominal List of European Officers*

General Staff—Wounded, 1 Provost-Marshal, S Budd, severely

*Artillery Division*

4th Troop, 3d Brigade Horse Artillery—Killed, Captain J Anderson

1st Company, 1st Battalion Artillery—Killed, 2d Lieutenant E W Day

1st Company, 4th Battalion Artillery—Wounded, Captain and Brevet-Major Sir R. C Shakespear.

Corps of Engineers—Wounded, 2d Lieutenant B M Hutchinson, very severely, leg amputated.

*Cavalry Division.*

Her Majesty's 14th Light Dragoons—Killed, Lieutenant A. Lloyd, wounded, Captain J. H Goddard, severely, Captain A. Scudamore, dangerously

5th Regiment Light Cavalry—Wounded, Lieutenant H J. Stannus, severely

*1st Infantry Division.*

Her Majesty's 10th Foot—Wounded, Captain R. M. Best, slightly.

Her Majesty's 32d Foot—Wounded, Lieutenant G. Jeffrey, slightly.

8th Regiment Native Infantry—Killed, Lieutenant R. Cox; wounded, Major G. Farquharson, dangerously; Ensign G. H. Griffiths, severely.

**51st Regiment Native Infantry—Wounded, Lieutenant T. C. Darnell, severely.**

52d Regiment Native Infantry—Wounded, Captain J. W. H. Jameson, severe contusion; Lieutenant W. H. Lowther, severely; Lieutenant G. R. Smith, severely.

**2nd Infantry Division.**

**2d European Regiment**—Killed, Lieutenant G. H. Sprot; wounded, Captain A. Boyd, slightly; Lieutenant A. Elderton, slightly; Ensign A. D. Toogood, slightly, Ensign D. A. Sandford, slightly; Ensign J. G. S. Matheson, slightly.

31st Regiment Native Infantry—Wounded, Ensign F. J. Gully, slightly.

70th Regiment Native Infantry—Wounded, Major J. K. McCausland, severely; Brevet Captain C. L. Edwards, slightly, Lieutenant A. Fytche, slightly; Ensign R. C. Whiting severely; Ensign C. Murray, slightly.

*List of Ordnance captured from the Enemy, in the Action at Goojerat, on the  
21st February, 1849*

*Camp, Goojerat, February 22, 1849*

No.	Nature of Ordnance.	No.	Nature of Ordnance.
1 ...	Brass Gun ... 16-pounder	32	Brass Gun . 6-pounder
	" 6-pounder		" 6-pounder
	" 9-pounder		" 8-pounder
5 ...	" 8-pounder	35	8-pounder
	" 9-pounder		8-pounder
	" 8-pounder		8-pounder
	" 8-pounder		8-pounder
	" 3-pounder		8-pounder
	" 8-pounder	40	8-pounder
10 ...	" 12-pounder		" 7½ pounder
	" 9 pounder	42	" 7½ pounder
	" 18-pounder	1	Brass Howitzer
	" 8-pounder		"
	" 9-pounder		"
15* ...	" 8-pounder		"
	" 2-pounder	5	"
	" 7-pounder		
	" 8-pounder		
	" 8-pounder	8	
20 ...	" 2-pounder	1	Brass Mortar
	" 8-pounder		
	" 16-pounder	3	
	" 8-pounder		
	" 9-pounder		53 Total pieces of ordnance
25 ...	" 8-pounder		— captured.
	" 6-pounder		17 Ammunition tumbrils un-
	" 6-pounder		serviceable.
	" 8-pounder		A considerable number [of tumbrils
	" 7-pounder		were also blown up, and otherwise
30 ...	" 6-pounder		destroyed.
	" 7-pounder		

## Inclosure 16 in No. 49.

*The Governor-General to the Commander-in-Chief.**Camp, Ferozepore, February 27, 1849.*

I DO myself the honor, in this dispatch, of conveying to you, for communication to Sir W Gilbert, the instructions with which it is expedient you should be furnished regarding the future prosecution of the war.

The full results of the great victory which was obtained by the army under your Excellency's personal command, on the 21st instant, have not yet been ascertained. The number of guns, however, which have already been secured, and the confusion in which the Sikh army fled from the field, entitle us to anticipate that any opposition which may hereafter be offered, will be of a much less formidable character than it has been heretofore.

Whatever the amount of opposition may be, everything that has come to pass, and, above all, the recent cooperation of Affghan troops, under the Ameer Dost Mohamed Khan, with the Sikh army, and his seizure of the province of Peshawur, render it indispensable that the war should be prosecuted, at all hazards, until the entire defeat and dispersion of those who are in arms against us, whether Sikhs or Affghans, shall be effected.

I am well aware that the season is advancing, and that the difficulties of military operations in the hills may, possibly, be very great.

Nevertheless, it is of such vital importance to crush the resistance of the Sikhs, and, at once, and effectually, to break up their combination with the Mahomedan power which has taken possession of the territories on this side of the mountains, that the operations of the present campaign against them must be prosecuted vigorously, and without cessation, so long as it is possible for us to do so.

There can be neither concession, nor compromise. The one object, therefore, which Major-General Gilbert is to hold in view, will be the entire rout of those in arms against us, and the expulsion of the Ameer and his army from the province of Peshawur, or their destruction.

I abstain from issuing any detailed instructions as to the military measures which it may be right to pursue, for the attainment of this great object. I have every confidence that Major-General Gilbert will, under your Excellency's directions, adopt the course which, in the various circumstances in which he may be placed, shall appear best calculated to carry the views of the Government into effect, and bring the war in which we are engaged, to an early and happy conclusion. I feel it to be almost superfluous to say, that the rescue of the British prisoners, now in the hands of the Sikhs, is an object to which Major-General Gilbert will direct his most strenuous exertions, and the accomplishment of which I earnestly and anxiously desire to see.

My agent, Major Mackeson, C.B., who has accompanied Major-General Gilbert's force, has been fully instructed by me, on all matters of a political nature, and I have to request that the Major-General will refer all such questions to him.

I would also beg that, in communicating these instructions to Major-General Gilbert, your Excellency will be so good as to direct him to transmit duplicates of any important communication he may make to your Excellency, regarding his proceedings, direct to the Secretary to the Government of India with me, in order to avoid the delay, which might possibly arise from the changing positions of your Excellency's camp.

## Inclosure 17 in No. 49.

*The Commander-in-Chief to the Governor-General**Camp, in front of Goojerat, February 22, 1849.*

I DETACHED a force, under Major-General Sir Walter R. Gilbert, at daylight this morning, to effect the passage of the Jhelum.

I have also detached the 3rd Infantry Division, under Brigadier-General Campbell, to follow up the portion of the enemy supposed to have fled towards Bimber, and to drive him from the plains, should he attempt to rally in that direction.

I have not, as yet, received from the political department any authentic information of the exact quarter to which the enemy has fled. By all accounts, they have dispersed in every direction, and no organized body remains unbroken, with the exception of the Affghans, who fled, with the utmost precipitation, early in the day, after having been completely overthrown, by a gallant charge of the Sindie Horse, and a portion of Her Majesty's 9th Lancers. I am informed this body crossed the Jhelum last night, so rapid was their flight

Forty-three captured guns are now in park, and I am not without the expectation that more may be collected, as I can only hear of three having been carried off, and it has been well ascertained they had fifty-nine in the field.

Immense quantities of ammunition and ordnance stores, of every description, have been destroyed, and I am making every exertion to collect that which was left concealed in the different villages.

Major Mackeson has attached himself, with my concurrence, to the force under Sir Walter Gilbert, and Captain Nicholson remains with my head-quarters

Inclosure 18 in No. 49

*The Commander-in-Chief to the Governor-General*

(Without date.)

NINE more guns have been secured

At nine o'clock, last night, I heard that seven guns were concealed in a village at the base of the hills. I immediately ordered off the 1st Light Cavalry, accompanied by that most indefatigable political officer, Captain Nicholson, and he has just returned, and has reported, that the party not only captured the seven, but also two more guns, which were left at a village a few miles further on; thus making the aggregate taken, fifty-one guns. From my information, the enemy had but fifty-nine, leaving still eight guns unaccounted for.

Inclosure 19 in No. 49.

*The Commander-in-Chief to the Governor-General.*

*Camp, Gcojerat, February 25, 1849.*

BRIGADIER-GENERAL CAMPBELL'S division returned, this morning, bringing in two more guns, left unprotected by the enemy in his flight, making up our number now in the park to fifty-three.

Brigadier-General Campbell scoured the country in all directions, until he could find no trace of the enemy

Inclosure 20 in No. 49.

*Major-General Sir W. R. Gilbert, Commanding Field Force, proceeding on Special Service, to the Adjutant-General.*

*Camp, Pooran, February 23, 1849.*

I ARRIVED here, this afternoon, at 4 o'clock, with the whole of the troops belonging to the Bengal Presidency,\* with the exception of the 3rd and 9th Regiments of Irregular Cavalry, having made the whole distance in two marches, as per margin.†

\* Fordyce's Troop Horse Artillery, Dawes's Light Field Battery, Her Majesty's 14th Light Dragoons, 11th Regiment Irregular Cavalry, 2nd Infantry Division.

	Miles.
† 1 Suckree walla	17½
2 Pooran	18
Total	35½

I was unable to commence my march this morning, until rather late, in consequence of a severe dust-storm, which had been blowing from midnight; so that, on arrival at Kooria, I deemed it prudent, as the day was far advanced, to halt the Bombay column, with the above two regiments of irregular cavalry, there, under command of Brigadier-General Dundas, C.B.; but I expect them to join me to-morrow morning, should the road be practicable, after the heavy fall of rain which followed the dust-storm.

Inclosure 21 in No. 49.

*Major-General Sir W. R. Gilbert to the Adjutant-General.*

*Camp, Nowrungabad, Serai, February 24, 1849.*

I MARCHED from Pooran with the troops I had brought through the Pass yesterday, at half-past 9 o'clock this morning, and arrived at this place at half-past 3 P.M., the distance being about fourteen miles.

When about half way between Pooran and this, a report reached me that the enemy were in the act of crossing the Jhelum, with their remaining guns, and I immediately ordered Fordyce's troop of Horse Artillery, Her Majesty's 14th Light Dragoons, and the 11th Irregular Cavalry, to advance rapidly to near the Ghat, but, on my arrival with them, I found the whole of the enemy had crossed the river, taking all the ferry-boats to the opposite side where I perceived them busily employed destroying them, by burning, and cutting them to pieces.

The enemy appeared to be in great force, on the opposite side. I should estimate their number at 20,000 men, at least; but I was not able to distinguish any of them dressed in red, and I am, therefore, disposed to think the force was entirely composed of irregular troops, which is, in some measure, supported by the intelligence received from the people of the country, who declare that none of the Bunnoo troops have passed over by this ford.

The country people report, that there are twenty guns in possession of the enemy on the opposite bank, and I, myself, counted upwards of eight or nine.

Since the troops under my command arrived, and encamped on this ground, a report has reached me, that the whole body of the enemy has again decamped, and that Raja Shere Sing himself had been seen five miles beyond the town of Jhelum.

The Bombay division, under command of Brigadier-General Dundas, marched from Kooria at half-past 8 this morning, and he is now encamped at Shuckshe Kunda, about one mile on this side of Koor; and I have instructed the Brigadier-General to bring the division up to this ground to-morrow, at such time as he may think most prudent, with reference to the capabilities of his men, and the carriage-cattle.

The 3rd and 9th Irregular Cavalry, under command of Brigadier Hearsey, joined my camp this afternoon, on my arrival at this encampment.

Inclosure 22 in No. 49.

*Major-General Sir W. R. Gilbert to the Adjutant-General.*

*Camp, Sookclujupore, 10 A.M., February 28, 1849.*

I MARCHED, with the force under my command, from Nowrungabad, at 6 o'clock yesterday morning, leaving the 3rd Regiment of Irregular Cavalry at that place, to watch the enemy's movements; and reached this about 10 o'clock A.M.

I proceeded to reconnoitre the river Jhelum and its fords, taking with me two guns of Fordyce's troop of Horse Artillery, the 9th Irregular Cavalry, and two companies of the 31st Native Infantry. I found the river running in three distinct streams, the current in all being very rapid, but especially in the middle one, where the depth of the water is likewise so great as to make the ford almost impracticable for men on foot.

Having taken possession of the large island, between the first and second streams, I returned to this camp, leaving my escort (with all but one remnant of the Irregular Cavalry), and reinforced it with the remaining four guns of Fordyce's troop, Dawes' Light Field Battery, the left wing of the 2nd European Regiment, and the remaining companies of the 31st Regiment of Native Infantry, to possession of the island, during the night.

At sunset, the enemy were distinctly seen in large numbers, at a village called Puckawul, just above the ford, over the third channel of the river, and were reported to be in some considerable strength, with guns, zumboorahs, &c.

I am led to believe that my occupying the island above mentioned, and three large villages upon it, so alarmed the enemy, that they abandoned their position at Puckawul during the night; and this morning not a man remains there. From all I am able to learn from spies and others, I am led to believe they have all gone to Bakrals, a hill pass, about fourteen miles from hence. Raja Shere Sing is also reported to have left Jhelum, leaving all his wounded in that town, and to have proceeded also towards Bakrals.

I have ordered a ressalah of irregular cavalry to proceed to the town of Jhelum, in the hope of capturing any persons of consequence, who may have been left there; and I have also informed Major Tait, C.B., commanding the 3rd Irregular Cavalry at Nowrungabad, of the fact of Shere Sing's departure, directing him to open communication with the inhabitants of the town of Jhelum, and endeavour to obtain possession of any boats the enemy may not have destroyed.

Inclosure 23 in No 49

*Major-General Sir W R Gilbert to the Adjutant-General.*

*Camp, Puckawul, March 1, 1849*

I HAVE arrived on the right bank of the river Jhelum, with the 1st brigade of infantry, under the command of Brigadier Penny, C.B.

On a party of the 9th Irregular Cavalry taking possession of the town of Jhelum, yesterday, they found two brass mortars (one said to be of considerable size), and a large quantity of ammunition, all of which has been taken possession of.

Inclosure 24 in No 49

*The Resident at Lahore to the Secretary with the Governor-General*

*Lahore, February 26, 1849*

IN conformity with instructions received from the Governor-General, I have this day issued a notification to the following effect —

To Sirdar Chuttur Sing, the Sirdars, Officers, and Soldiers,  
in arms against the British Government

If, within eight days, Major Lawrence, Lieutenants Bowie and Herbert, and Dr. Thompson, and the ladies and children, now in captivity, are not made over, in safety, to one of the British camps, I will send Sirdars Golab Sing, Nar Sing, and Bishen Sing, and the other Sikh prisoners now in confinement, also their families, and the families of such other rebels as may fall into my hands, to Hindostan. Such will be the first step taken; the next will depend upon circumstances. You should understand, that this proclamation is made by order of the Governor-General, and will be thoroughly carried out.

Inclosure 25 in No 49.

*Brigadier-General Wheeler to the Adjutant-General.*

*Jullundur, February 12, 1849.*

THE field force under my command is still encamped at Deenanuggur.

Everything is tranquil on our most advanced frontier, and in the Baree and Rechna Doabs.

Since my last report, the officers of the Maharajah Golab Sing seized, and sent in, nine prisoners, fugitives from the engagement of the 16th ultimo, whom I have made over to Mr. P. S. Melvill, Assistant to the Commissioner, Trans Sutlej States.

## Inclosure 26 in No. 49.

*The Resident at Lahore to the Secretary with the Governor-General.**Lahore, February 28, 1849.*

I INCLOSE a letter, dated the 16th instant, from Lieutenant Taylor, detailing the circumstances attending the delivery of the letter addressed by my predecessor to the Ameer Dost Mahomed. The story has an air of truth, and will now be, probably, verified by the Ameer no longer delaying a reply.

The rebel chiefs were strongly reinforced from Dost Mahomed's camp, a day or two before the battle of Goojerat, when the Affghans evidently cast their lot, for the time, with them. During the day, the Dooranee Horse behaved with much gallantry, and appear to have more than once charged, and endeavoured to turn our right flank

## Inclosure 27 in No. 49

*Lieutenant Taylor to the Resident at Lahore.**Lukkee, February 16, 1849.*

SIR FREDERICK CURRIE forwarded to me the triplicate of a moorasila to the address of Ameer Dost Mahomed Khan, and requested me to have it conveyed to him by a careful hand, mentioning, at the same time, that he did not wish it to fall into the hands of either Sirdar Chuttur Sing or Sirdar Sooltan Mahomed Khan; and also requesting me to keep the matter quiet. I, accordingly, entrusted the letter in question to a clever spy, a private of the guide corps, on whose intelligence and ingenuity I could depend, and this man, Mammush Khan by name, has just returned, and reports as follows.

Mammush Khan reached the Dooranee camp, on the 6th day after leaving this, and gained access to the Ameer's presence, by conveying to him a message through the door-keeper, to the effect that he had come from Mahomed Azim Khan in Bunnoo, and had something to communicate privately to the Ameer himself. He was, accordingly, admitted to the presence, and found the Ameer alone, he then gave him the moorasila, which he opened and read, and afterwards asked the guide some questions about me, and whether I was well in health, adding, "Why does not he go to his own country of Calcutta, is Hindostan a small place, that he must needs set himself down in the lands of others?" The Ameer reproached the guide, for making himself the bearer of such messages from the English to him, which he said did not become him as a Mussulman. The guide defended himself, on the score of performing his duty to those whose salt he had eaten.

The Ameer inquired, what amount of force I had with me, Mammush Khan, in reply, estimated it roughly at 12,000 men, and twelve guns. The Ameer subsequently read out the moorasila before a number of people, amongst whom was Sirdar Sooltan Mahomed Khan. The guide was, then, made over to the Moonsee, and at his quarters encountered two men, one a native of Sar Lukkee, in the Khuttock country, and the other an Afredee, and, comparing notes with them, found that they had both come on a similar errand with himself; the former having been sent by Captain Nicholson, and the latter by the Resident, probably with the original and duplicate of the moorasila. They had both been detained long periods, and had neither of them been able to obtain an answer to the letters they brought.

Mammush Khan waited for several days, constantly demanding an answer, but always being put off with an excuse, such as, that an answer could not be written until the Ameer's sons returned, to enable him to consult them about it; that there was not fine paper fit for moorasilas in camp, &c; and at length, one Gholam Rusool, a Moonsee, told him, that he was not likely to get an answer quickly from the Ameer; that if the English defeated the Sikhs, the Dost would write an answer, to the effect that he was their servant to command; but if, on the other hand, they suffered defeat themselves, no answer would be given. After waiting eight days, Mammush Khan returned to me, leaving the other two messengers still in attendance.

Dost Mahomed Khan was still at the Bazour ferry: Gholam Hyder Khan had gone towards Hazara to attack Captain Abbott.

## No. 50.

*The Governor-General to the Secret Committee.**Camp, Ferozepore, March 24, 1849. (No. 18)*

THE victory of Goojerat, followed up, as it has been with unfailing vigor, by Sir Walter Gilbert, has led to the delivery of the British prisoners, the surrender of Sikh chiefs, with all the guns that still remained to them, and the entire prostration of the Sikh army. These important results have been obtained, without another shot being fired.

On the 8th instant, the enemy, about 16,000 strong, were at Rawul Pindee, thirty-one miles in advance of the position which Sir Walter Gilbert had reached. In the evening, Mrs. Lawrence and her children, with others of the British prisoners, arrived in the General's camp. The rest, accompanied by Raja Shere Sing, Lal Sing, Moraree, and 450 followers, came in, a few hours afterwards. On the following day, Shere Sing returned to Rawul Pindee, to arrange with his troops, for their unconditional capitulation. Sir Walter Gilbert, however, determined to continue his advance, and to close up his rear division, for the purpose of moving on the enemy's position. On the 10th, he was at Manikyala, where Sirdar Khan Sing, Majeetia, came, and tendered his submission, bringing with him his armed retainers, about 1000 men, with some guns. On the 10th, he was at Hoormook, on the left bank of the Sohan River. There Sirdar Chuttur Sing, Raja Shere Sing, and several other Sirdars and officers of the Sikh army, arrived in his camp, gave up their swords, and made over seventeen guns, intimating that others were on their way.

On the 14th, the General reached Rawul Pindee, and received the surrender of the whole body of the Sikh army, the Sirdars surrendering their swords, in the presence of the commanding officers of divisions and brigades, and their staffs. The total number of guns given up was forty-one, and 16,000 stand of arms were laid down. I have since learnt that the arms amount to more than 20,000.

All the Sirdars that were in arms have surrendered, with the exception of two, Bhaee Maharaj Sing, (still alive, it seems,) and Colonel Richpaul Sing, who have absconded, but without adherents.

"We have now," writes his Excellency the Commander-in-chief, "in our possession, 56 guns, taken at Goojerat, and abandoned by the enemy in his retreat, on the 21st of February—41, surrendered to Major-General Sir W. Gilbert, since that event—12, captured at Chillianwalla—and 50, at Mooltan—making a total of 158 pieces of ordnance, which have fallen into our hands during the present campaign."

In offering to Major-General Gilbert, and to the whole army, my heartfelt congratulations upon the events above related, the results of the battle of Goojerat, and of the operations subsequent to it, so admirably conducted by the Major-General, in fulfilment of his Excellency the Commander-in-chief's instructions, I did not allow the glory of these results to conceal the fact that, although the Sikh enemy was humbled to the dust, and his power utterly crushed, there still remained another, whose wanton and insolent hostility demanded speedy chastisement. I cannot regard the war as concluded, I cannot say that peace is restored—until Dost Mahomed Khan and the Affghan enemy are either driven from the Province of Peshawur, or destroyed within it. This may be—I hope it is—the case, even now. I have heard, already, of Sir W. Gilbert being at Attock, which the enemy evacuated, on his approach. This energetic officer made a forced march of thirty-one miles to that fortress, in order to secure the bridge of boats on the Indus from being burnt and destroyed, and in this object he has been quite successful, having secured no less than seventeen boats, after the bridge had been broken by the retreating Affghans. The Major-General writes, that he hopes to cross the river, with the Bengal division, on the afternoon of the 19th instant, and intends to push on, after the flying enemy, with all expedition. He must, by this time, have reached Peshawur; and the Ameer will hardly venture to meet him in the field.

I have given orders for disarming the hostile portion of the population; and I am happy to state that Major Mayne, the Commandant of the Body-Guard, who was deputed on this mission, to the other side of the river, has



succeeded in capturing 5000 stand of arms, including fire-arms, swords, and spears, and five pieces of ordnance. This has been accomplished in the tract between Ferozepore and Lahore; and measures are in progress, under other parties, for disarming the upper portions of the Barea Doab, where the Sikhs are most martial and turbulent.

The man who was charged as a principal in the murder of Mr. Agnew has been tried by a special commission at Mooltan, appointed under my orders, and has been found guilty, on conclusive evidence. The sentence was that he should be hanged. I have confirmed it, and directed that it should be carried into execution, publicly, and without delay, at Mooltan.

It came out on this trial (though the investigation was directed solely to the question of the prisoner's guilt), that the Dewan Moolraj had taken a much more prominent part than was supposed, in the attack on the Edga, which led to the murder of the British officers. The question of Moolraj's complicity had already been looked into by Major Edwardes, with considerable care, and much very pertinent evidence had been collected on the subject, principally from Moolraj's servants, and persons least likely to inculcate him. Sir Henry Lawrence gave his opinion, in concurrence with Major Edwardes, that a strong *prima facie* case was made out against Moolraj. The perusal of these papers, and of the evidence given on the trial of Goodhur Sing, has greatly weakened the favorable impression which various circumstances had created in my mind relative to Moolraj's innocence of the deaths of Mr. Agnew and Lieutenant Anderson, and has renewed my original belief in his complicity with the actors in that horrible scene, and his consequent guilt. I have, therefore, ordered that Moolraj be put upon his trial, before a commission to be appointed by me, and that the attendance of the deponents be secured, without delay.

The Resident has sent me an intercepted letter in the Goormookhee character and dialect, which he states he has every reason to believe was sent by Maharanee Junda Khore, at Benares, to Chuttur Sing. The letter is couched in terms of the most virulent hostility, and hatred, to the British Government, and Sir Henry Lawrence has no doubt of its genuineness.

Inclosure 1 in No. 50

*Major Edwardes to the Resident at Lahore.*

*Camp, Mooltan, January 29, 1849.*

I TAKE the opportunity of having to forward the inclosed most interesting report of Lieutenant Taylor's operations at Lukkee, to communicate the progress of my arrangements for reinforcing that officer.

Lieutenant G. Pearse, with two companies of regular infantry, 100 Pathan horse, and 6 guns, overtook the former detachment of 1000 irregular horse and foot, and 10 zumboorahs; and the whole reached Peyzoo Pass, two marches from Lukkee, on the 23rd of January. Here they have been halted by Lieutenant Taylor, who prefers keeping his former party of 2000 men at Lukkee, as an advanced guard, and the reinforcements at Peyzoo as a support, in order that the indefinite strength of the latter may deter Mahomed Azim Khan from advancing from Bunnoo.

The above plan does not seem to me so eligible as placing the support at Esakhail on the Indus, thereby watching another of the enemy's roads; and I have written my opinion on this point fully to Lieutenant Taylor, an extract from which is annexed: "I do not believe Dost Mahomed will pursue the course, which would certainly damage us the most, viz., come down to the left bank of the Indus, and carry on operations on the right flank of the Sikhs. Mahomedans work by Mahomedanism, and the Dost will be, now, likely to throw himself into the excitable Hazara country, in the rear of Chuttur Sing, and try to swell his army, by raising the standard of religion. This is the way in which he made himself formidable to Runjeet Sing. Thus being my belief, I calculate you will be left to contend with those junior vipers, Mahomed Azim and Khoaja Mahomed Khan. Their roads of annoyance are two—Bunnoo and Shukkur-durrah. If Azim Khan could pass Lukkee, and Khoaja Mahomed get into Esakhail, they would be joined by the Murwuttees first, then by the Povindeahs, and, gradually by the ryots of many of our provinces trans-Indus. It is, in my

opinion, essential to the successful defence and peace of the Derajat, that the Dooranees should not pass Lukkee, or come into Esakhail.

"Any position you could take up in the rear of these points, would be an acknowledgment of weakness and inferiority, which would destroy your moral influence over the people, and you would be shortly confined to the government of Akalgurh! Instead, therefore, of making Peyzoo your base, as I see you meditate, I would hold my own at Lukkee, in strength, and let Pollock's force march on Esakhail direct, and hold that; right and left, you will be a mutual assistance, and stand at the head of the Derajat, secure yourselves, and protect your country. Pollock's detachment marched this morning.

1,200 regular infantry.  
500 irregular infantry.  
500 irregular cavalry.  
5 horse artillery guns

three European officers and one European doctor, as nice a little command as man could desire. I have told him not to go by Dera Ismael Khan, but march on Esakhail, which will, also, have a good effect in Cuchee. I have sent you 50,000 rupees, seeing that you are hard up. Let me know if you want more, and you shall have it at any cost. Send Gholam Kassim Khan to Pollock, to be officer of the irregulars. You have Hussein Khan for yours, brave men, both, to whom I am grateful. If you pursue the above plan, I cannot think the Dooranees will attack you; but should they, I would fight, unless the odds were absurd, and retreat with a light heart, if reason recommended it."

By the last advices, Khoaja Mahomed Khan, eldest son of Sudar Sooltan Mahomed Khan, was reported to have sent on his "pesh kheyruh" from Kohat, towards Bunnoo, but to have less than 1000 men altogether with him. The ukbar from Lukkee that arrived this morning, represented Mahomed Azim Khan to have marched from Duleepgurh to Cuchee in Bunnoo, on the road to Lukkee, but only with 300 sowars, on pretence of looking for an encamping ground for the whole of his force. The fact, I take to be, that some Mullick in the Cuchee direction, refused to pay him any revenue, and that he has no intention whatever of giving Lieutenant Taylor an opportunity of thrashing him.

Lieutenant Pollock's detachment has, already, made five marches on its way to Esakhail.

It is right I should explain my reasons for not sending General Cortlandt to Lukkee with his troops, viz., that Lieutenant Pollock is now thoroughly acquainted with those troops, and the troops with him, and as the service at Lukkee is purely military, a better person than Lieutenant Pollock could not be sent to assist in it; whereas here, at Mooltan, there is, I assure you, a press of civil work, revenue collections, taking of accounts, and general reduction of anarchy to order, that I could scarcely cope with, without General Cortlandt's valuable assistance.

Inclosure 2 in No. 50

*Lieutenant Taylor to the Resident at Lahore.*

*Lukkee, January, 1849*

ON the 10th of January, I reported to you that the fort of Lukkee had surrendered on that day. I have now the honor to inclose returns of the arms, stores, &c., that have fallen into our hands, by the capture. I also forward a hasty, and unscientific, sketch of the mode of attack adopted, together with a diary of the operations, which, having been conducted by undisciplined levies, in the face of artillery, worked by practised artillerymen, will, I hope, be thought creditable to them.

I have received the greatest support and assistance from the energy, courage, and intelligence of the Tank Khan. Gholam Hussein Khan is a very superior young man, a thorough soldier, and possesses head and judgment. Hayat Ulla Khan is also a very sensible clear-headed man, well acquainted with these districts, and a good adviser in all matters connected with them. Hafiz Sumunder Khan and Hurruck Shere Khan have worked very zealously and well.

The fort of Lukkee is built on a parallelogram, and covers about 120 square yards of ground; the eastern and western bastions of the outer fort are large, and prepared expressly for cannon. The inner fort is formed by a strong wall, fifteen feet in height, well loop-holed. Guns can be mounted on all four bastions of the inner fort. The gate of the outer fort is double the external one, being protected from fire by a strong traverse. The ditch is deep, and full of water. The fort is provided with a well and tank both in good order.

The defence, added by the garrison for the occasion, was a rough cheval-de-frise round the berme, a sally port, and outwork, to enable them to command the bed of the river, and a third wall and wicket to the outer gate, formed by building up the space between the gateway and traverse, also a second wall, or support to the wall, on the side fronting our trenches.

The garrison, at first, amounted to 466 men, and was, subsequently, reduced by deaths and desertions, to 330, the number that came out on the place being given up.

December the 11th.—Arrived at Lukkee from Esakhail.

12th —Reconnaited. Resolved on attacking the north-west angle, where the natural bank of the Gombela was likely to save trouble. Moved the camp up to the position noted in the plan, where some considerable sand hillocks afforded cover from the fire of the fort. In the evening, the garrison turned out a party to occupy, or destroy, the cover afforded by the ruined lines. I ordered out a party to dislodge them. The enemy retired, and our men took possession of the position, under a heavy cannonade from the fort guns.

13th —Commenced a battery for two guns on the right bank of the river, but the enemy's fire was so rapid and well directed, that I feared the gun would be injured on its way down, so was obliged to defer mounting it till nightfall — commenced the trenches. Two-gun battery in the lines, prepared during the night.

14th —Opened a fire on the fort from both batteries; fire very ineffective and weak; guns old, honeycombed, and untrue, and the carriages falling to pieces, hammered shot, carelessly made, and not nearly large enough for the bores of the guns. We often missed the fort altogether, though within easy range.

15th —The garrison put some sharpshooters in the fakcer's hut, who annoyed the men in our trenches a good deal. Gholam Hussein Khan, my right-hand man, received a purwanna from Dost Mahomed, calling upon him, as a good Mussulman, to assist in the good work of eradicating British influence.

16th.—Sent the garrison a Government purwanna, ordering them to surrender the fort to me. After detaining my men for a whole day, consulting on the subject, the garrison, finally, refused to surrender.

17th —The garrison occupied the nullah near the fakcer's hut, under the fire of the fort guns, and in front of our trenches, on which they opened a galling fire. Gholam Hussein Khan, who was commanding in the trenches, pushed forward his men to attack them, and a severe light infantry fight ensued. The irregulars behaved with great spirit, pushing close up to the nullah, finding cover, or making it, where none apparently existed, being exposed at the time to a plunging fire from the fort guns, as well as the fusillade of their immediate opponents. I brought down the zumboorahs to the bank of the Gombela, opposite the nullah, and thus enfiladed the enemy's line of sharpshooters, which had a good effect, and, after losing a number of men killed and wounded, they deserted the nullah, and sought the protection of the fort.

19th and 20th —Trenches being carried forward daily; but we labored under great disadvantages from the hardness of the ground, the want of workmen, and efficient tools. The implement of the country is a light narrow-bladed mattock, which, in the hands of a soldier, is nearly useless, and very ineffective in the most practised hands. Meer Alim Khan, the rebel Mullick of Bunnoo, daily threatened to bring a force to raise the siege; and I was obliged, in consequence, to place strong parties on the main roads, and patrol between them at night.

21st, 22nd, 23rd, 24th.—Trenches carried up to within 250 yards of the wall, and 3 gun battery made.

25th —Battery opened fire, still ineffective, and returned by the fort with great rapidity and precision, every shot striking the battery, passing through

the embrasures, or grazing the crest of the embankment. Their third shot hit one of our guns in the muzzle: another knocked down a gunner.

26th.—Batteries injured by our own fire. I had made gabions, but, there being no good wood for the uprights of them procurable, they opened out from the shock of the explosions, allowing the earth to crumble through the interstices. They were, however, a great improvement on the rough and weak batteries made, at first, by the gunners, and the men were much pleased with them. Mehtab Sing Jemadar, who, when the officers came in to me at Esakhaul, had disappeared, having, as I always supposed, gone to Chuttu Sing for succour, returned, and made his way into the fort at night. We had all along been threatened with the possibility of an attack from Bunnoo, from Peshawur, and from Khoorum, and, lastly, from the people of the country, who, naturally had no wish that the fort should fall, as the contest insured them an immunity from paying revenue. I had, therefore, been unable to distribute the force round the walls, so as to invest the place; and, hence, the communication of the garrison with the outer world remained open, an evil which was, in some measure, counterbalanced by numerous desertions from their ranks.

27th.—Heard that a party of Sikh and Dooranee horse had been seen at a place under the Khuttock hills, obliged to turn out strong patios, to keep them off.

28th and 29th.—Took up two positions in the town, one to be held by Khoda Buksh Khan Khuttock, and the other by the Mulicks of Sekunder Khail, a division of the Murwut district, who volunteered their services. The head of our sap was within 300 yards of the nearest post, so the arrangement was without danger, even in the case of attack from without.

30th.—Three artillery-men wounded in the battery. The garrison received some purwannas from Khoaja Mahomed Khan, son of Sirdar Sooltan Mahomed, contents did not transpire. My men being all natives of this part of the country, it was impossible to prevent men passing the pickets, on one pretence or another.

31st.—The Mulicks of Murwut received purwannas from Khoaja Mahomed Khan, telling them not to pay revenue to me, but keep it for him, as he was coming with a force from Kohat, to be joined by another under Mahomed Azim Khan, from Khoorum. In the evening, we distinctly heard a salute of guns in the direction of the hills: the sound must have come from Khoorum, down the valley of the river; as I have since ascertained that there could have been no guns nearer than that, on the day in question. This ominous salute had more effect in unsettling the minds of the people about me, and, truth to say, in raising anxiety in my own mind, than all the reports of invasion we had been so long receiving.

1st and 2nd of January, 1849.—It was confidently reported, that the Dooranees, under Khoaja Mahomed Khan, had arrived at Khuruck, three marches from this.

3rd.—Some men sent by Meer Alm Khan to enter the fort, and encourage and assist the garrison, succeeded in reaching the gate by a bold ruse. The leader was mounted, his companions walking by his side, much the way in which I was in the habit of moving about at night. On being challenged, one of the footmen replied that it was "the Sahib." The sentry was not satisfied, but refrained from firing for a few seconds, trying to make the party give the watchword, in which interval the latter had come up in a line with the pickets, and they then made a rush, and five succeeded in reaching the fort, two were, subsequently, made prisoners. The garrison threw their 8-inch shells daily, and burst several over our trenches.

4th and 5th.—The garrison constructed an out-work, immediately in front of our sap, to protect their wall from mines.

6th and 7th.—Received intelligence of the capture of the city of Mooltan, fired a salute in the battery, having first turned the guns away from the fort. The garrison fired round shot among us, during the salute.

8th.—We found sand-bags very useful in the trenches, but were hard put to it for a rolling sap, there being no wood fit for it procurable. We tried two sacks stuffed with bhoosa, but (as a specimen of their practice) the fort gunners sent a round shot through each of them, first one, and then the other. I, subsequently, had four sacks sewn together, and stuffed with well-rammed cotton, which answered very well at night. Opened a fire from the new battery, on the edge of the nullah, and 190 yards from the ditch of the fort.

9th.—The garrison had, latterly, not attempted to serve their guns under our fire, but on this day, they returned it with great spirit, and a severe cannonade and fusillade was kept up, for a considerable time, by both parties, battery and sand-bag versus bastion and parapet, and the former had decidedly the best of it. We had one man mortally wounded, and the garrison had six men killed outright.

10th —After a cannonade of some hours, our shot began, at length, to tell a little on the wall, a portion of the parapet of which fell down. The garrison had, in the morning, sent Golab Shah Legun to me, to sue for terms, and, subsequently, sent me a petition couched in humble terms, asking for their pay, freedom from insult, and safeguard to the river, all of which points I eventually agreed to, but insisted on their immediately evacuating the fort. They were very anxious to defer it, till the morning, but, in these uncertain times, I feared that some new difficulty would arise, and, therefore, adhered to the point, and accordingly, after dark, they quitted their comfortable quarters, and my garrison marched in. The following morning, Mahomed Azim Khan arrived in Bunnoo, and, the same night, his messenger reached Lukkee, bearing tidings of the speedy advent of the relieving force. The whole train of circumstances was most providential. Had the garrison not yielded when they did, it must have been many days before we could have made a practicable breach in the outer wall, and our mining operations had been foiled, for a time, by the precautions of the garrison. I should, probably, have had to retire, and the Dooranees would have taken possession of Bunnoo, Murwut, and Esakhail, at one fell swoop. The soldiers of the garrison have since been defeated at the Esakhail ferry.

Inclosure 3 in No. 50.

*Lieutenant Taylor to the Resident at Lahore*

*Lukkee, February 24, 1849*

I REPORTED the retirement of Mahomed Azim Khan and Khoaja Mahomed Khan from Bunnoo, and also that I had sent Jaffier Khan, Mulhick of Bunnoo, with a party of my own men, and his own irregulars, to the borders of the province, from thence to ascertain the condition of Duleepgurh, and, if possible and opportunity should offer, to throw men into it, before any new aspirant should occupy it.

I am happy now to be able to inform you, that Jaffier Khan has performed this duty, with great address and judgment. Arriving at Ghoreewulla on the borders of Bunnoo, on the night of the 19th, the Dooranees having marched on the morning of the same day, he heard that a Mulhick of his own Goordee (faction) had taken upon himself the task of protecting the fort from spoliation and injury (which, at the instigation of the Dooranees, had already commenced), until assistance could arrive. Jaffier Khan, therefore, immediately pushed on, in less than thirty-six hours from the time of my hearing of its evacuation, he had thrown himself, with 400 men, into the fort, which had, I am happy to say, sustained but slight injury.

I have since detached Khoda Buksh Khan Khuttock, with 1000 men, to strengthen the garrison, and have, this day, heard of his having joined Jaffier Khan.

On the first news of the retreat of the Dooranees, I summoned Lieutenant Pollock, with 1200 regular infantry, 5 guns, and 3 mortars, and 700 irregulars, from Esakhail, as I then thought it extremely improbable that the fort of Duleepgurh would be given up, without opposition. The departure of the Dooranees, however, has thrown the game completely into our hands. In recovering the fort, I have received the cordial assistance of many of the Mullicks of Bunnoo, and they have all, subsequently, come in to me; the famed Dilassa Khan among the number. Lieutenant Pollock joined me, on the 22nd.

You will, I hope, be pleased at the recovery of the Province of Bunnoo, and the important military post of Duleepgurh, which insures the peace and safety of the Trans-Indus Provinces, south of the Salt Range, almost under any contingencies that may arise.

I purpose taking on a large portion of the ample grain store of the fort of Lukkee, as a nucleus for that of Duleepgurh, the former can be quickly replaced from this district, which abounds in grain.

## Inclosure 4 in No. 50.

*The Resident at Lahore to Lieutenant Taylor.**Lahore, March 3, 1849.*

I ACKNOWLEDGE your letter of February 24th, reporting the entire abandonment of Bunnoo by the Dooranees, and your occupation of the fort of Duleepgurb, in effecting which, many of the Mulliks of Bunnoo, including the famed, and hitherto troublesome, Dilassa Khan, cordially assisted you.

I feel that Government is mainly indebted for the bloodless recovery of the important frontier under your charge, to the energy and ability, as soldiers, displayed by Major Edwardes, yourself, and the officers employed under you both, as well as to the character you and Major Edwardes have obtained in the districts under your charge, as civil administrators. I shall have much pleasure in making this my opinion known to Government.

## Inclosure 5 in No. 50.

*Major Edwardes to Lieutenant Young**Mooltan, February 3, 1849.*

I REQUEST that you will proceed to Hurrund, under the Solman Range, in the district of Dera Ghazee Khan, and make a reconnoissance of the fort there, which has been held against the Maharajah by Moolraj's soldiers, since June last.

Four hundred Rohillas and Punjabees, under Mayuh Doss, commandant, in the service of Misi Sahib Dyal, and the two guns of Dewan Jowahir Mull Dutt, are placed at your disposal, and will accompany you to Hurrund, with the view of assisting the irregular force now beleaguering Hurrund, in attacking the fort, should your reconnoissance induce you to think it assailable with such means.

The besieging force under Nazir Khan, Populzye, is already about 1500 men, and Nazir Khan has often written to say that he only required two guns to enable him to take the place. Of this, however, you will be the best judge. Hurrund has a very great reputation on the border, and is a new stone building of Moolraj father's, but, I believe, it has no ditch, and I have great hopes, therefore, that it will offer you no great opposition. The garrison is believed to be only 150 men, and much distressed by the blockade.

Should you, after examination, consider the fort of Hurrund to be so strong as to require heavy guns, I shall be obliged by your reporting the same, with your opinion of the number and calibre required, and an estimate of necessaries for the siege, in order that I may do my best to procure the same for you.

Inclosed is a purwanna on Nazir Khan, Populzye, of the Dera Ghazee Khan district, placing him implicitly under your orders. You will find him a brave man, and well acquainted with the tribes around.

It is most probable that the garrison will be glad of the approach of a European officer, and surrender, as the fall of their master, Moolraj, has robbed them even of the excuse of duty. The surrender, however, should be unconditional; and, when the garrison come in, they should be retained as prisoners, until the war is over; and Mokum Chund, the Killeddar, should be carefully ironed, and brought to Mooltan, for trial, as he is not only a conspicuous rebel, but he has to answer for the cold-blooded murder of two vakeels, who were sent into the fort, at his own invitation, by the besiegers.

Should the fort fall into your hands, I should be glad of your opinion as to the number required to garrison it. It stands at a troublesome pass in the hills, and keeps in order a very short-sighted and lawless tribe (the Ghoorchanees); it should, therefore, be made strong at all times, but especially at present; and at least 150 men, in my opinion, should be left there. This, however, I leave to your own discretion, after seeing the place. I have dispatched after you a Jemadar, named Azim Khan Turreem, whom I wish to be the new Killeddar. He is a tried soldier,—his brotherhood will form a nucleus for the new garrison, which should be completed from the Rohillas now along with you.

After performing this service, you ought with advantage to return by Roojhan and Mittunkote, so as to see the forts and tribes at those places, and report what you observe amiss.

If you have leisure, a journal of your progress through a country we know so little of, would be both interesting and valuable.

I need scarcely direct your attention to the conduct of all officials.

The passes into the hills, the tribes beyond them, and their incursions, chiefs, &c., the relative proportion of Benamee and Seylabuh lands, in the plains, the character of the tribes, who are our ryots, and the state of the cultivation in the countries south of Ghazee Khan, are all desiderata for which I should be greatly obliged.

Inclosure 6 in No 50

*Lieutenant Young to Major Edwardes*

*Village of Hurrund, February 12, 1849.*

I WROTE to you from Dera Ghazee Khan on the 6th, and have since deferred writing, until I should be sure of Mokum Chund's intentions. The motif of this letter is, that he does not intend to come out, and that I can take the fort with my present means. I will now give you an extract out of my journal.

19th.—March to village of Hurrund, 11 coss.—I ordered the camp to halt at Tibbee, 2 coss from Hurrund, until I should myself see what would be the proper disposition for it, and came on myself, with Nazir Khan, to the village of Hurrund, 800 yards from the fort. I then went forward to reconnoitre. The fort consists of one well-built brick wall, 24 feet high, with towers every 50 yards. Its area is probably not less than half of the inner wall of Mooltan, and it contains many houses. On my return, I sent for the sappers and bidais to come on, at once, to Hurrund, with the guns, and Dewan Jowahn Mull Dutt's 50 men and 50 sowars, and settled the rest of the camp half a coss more to the rear. There were already 200 men here, and 300 more scattered round the fort. The village itself is surrounded by a good mud wall with towers, so that we live quite under cover. As the enemy made no offer of surrender, I resolved to make a rapid advance of trench work, without waiting to make gabions, and, accordingly, by morning, I had constructed a battery for my two guns, at 250 yards from the wall, and a trench to within 100 yards of the Boori, on which is one of their guns. They fired grape and musketry, but chiefly over our heads. Six men of those who were further off were wounded, but none of them very severely. I got the guns in, during the night, so that they opened two hours after sunrise. The enemy are, certainly, rather frightened, for they sent a vakeel with a note (which I inclose), and to which I sent an answer (of which I inclose a copy). Mokum Chund wrote back, that, if I would let him come out honorably, he would come; and I answered, that he should have as much honor as Moolraj's troops have received. I have heard nothing further from him. During the evening, (11th) I widened and deepened the trench, and improved the battery, and made trenches of approach further to the rear. I cannot advance any further without gabions (i. e., without great danger of loss of life), and, therefore, the sappers are now out cutting brushwood. It will take me the 13th, 14th, and 15th, to make as many as I want, and hope to spring mines on the 19th or 20th (or, possibly, earlier). The garrison is said to be 140 soldiers, but the Bunneabs also come and pass from the walls. Ladders are being made for escalading. I think, after this is over, and I have seen Mittunkote and Roojhan, I had better return hither to meet the Bhoojtees, and other chiefs, on or about the 1st of March, and return to Dera, along the foot of the hills, among the Belooch villages, in order to see the tribes, for my road here (four long marches) has lain chiefly in the Seylabuh portion of the country, inhabited by Punjabee Mussulmans and Jats.

13th.—Making gabions, finished 200, and require 150 more. Rode round the fort. I have certainly attacked on the weakest side, for which thanks to the sagacity of Nazir Khan.

14th.—The enemy have surrendered. I ordered the chiefs to come first, and sent the Subadar of the Sappers' Company to receive them, an honor he

(the Subadar) deserves. They came out five in number, viz., Mokum Chund, Doola Sing, Uttai Sing, Dhyal Sing, and Jodh Sing. These, and the deserters from the Futteh Regiment, and the murderers of the Vakeels, will be sent to Mooltan. The rest, about 130 men, mostly ill, will be put to work deepening the ponds at Dajal. I do not think any property of value belonging to the soldiers will turn up, and I am not allowing the Bunneahs to be looted. I have not yet had time to go into the place myself.

Inclosure 7 in No 50.

*Lieutenant Young to Major Edwardes.*

*Hurrund, February 14, 1849.*

THE enemy have surrendered, and the five Sirdars, Mokum Chund, Doola Sing, Uttai Sing, Dhyal Sing and Jodh Sing, are in one of the boorj of the village; the rest are being penned in on the Maidan, like sheep, with dry prickly bushes. The last two days, I have been gabion-making, but Mokum Chund thought I was mining, and came out from fear of a blow-up; unconditionally, of course. This fort should have some guns put in it. It is excellently built, and in a good situation also an attempt should be made to get good water inside. Perhaps, I may set the bildars to this latter work. I have knocked the parapet off one boorj, which should be rebuilt. Nazir Khan is a first-rate adviser, and a very superior man. Mayuh Doss is a useless fellow, and his Rohillas worse thieves than ordinary. Futteh Sing is so good a soldier that I am sorry to lose his services. The sappers and bildars have behaved very well. Durwesh Mahomed Boozdur is an old man, but soldier-like and vigilant. He commanded, in Nazir Khan's absence he is treated by everybody with the greatest respect. He may be of use in settling matters with the chief of his clan. Madoo Buksh, of the Artillery, has done well, but his guns, from their small size, are slow in operation. Khalik Dar Khan and Morad Ali are very useful in collecting information, &c

Inclosure 8 in No 50

*Major Edwardes to Lieutenant Young.*

*Mooltan, February 16, 1849.*

I ACKNOWLEDGE your two journals, to the 14th of February. I had not heard from you, for some days previously, and, consequently, was most gratefully surprised at your rapid and complete success, which was not, however, more than might have been expected from the energetic steps you took, from the very first day of your arrival at Hurrund. I consider this important result to be entirely attributable to the energy and determination you evinced in carrying your trenches to within 100 yards of the walls of the fort, on the first night of your arrival. I had received a promise to be furnished with heavy guns, and even with regular troops, should they have been necessary, for the reduction of Hurrund; and I feel sure that the Governor-General and the Resident at Lahore will hear with much pleasure, of the engineering ability, and readiness of resource, which has saved the Government so much expense.

At the present moment, when reports are so rife, of an invasion from Candahar and Hurrund, it is more than ever important that that fortress should be in our hands, and not in those of the enemy. I trust, therefore, that before you leave, you will dig a well, according to your own suggestion, within the fort, and take such other measures as you may deem expedient, for the greater strength of the place. It strikes me that the weakness of the fort consists in its being without a ditch. Could not a good and efficient one be dug by the bildars of the country?

I request that you will place Mokum Chund and the chief of the rebels in irons at once, and forward them to Mooltan by the first favorable opportunity, together with such evidence as you may be able to collect on the spot, regarding the murder of the Vakeels, the participators in which crime will, assuredly, be hanged.



Your plan of giving khilluts to such of the hill chiefs upon our frontier as may wish for one, is excellent, and likely to tend to the establishment of a friendly feeling with them. I shall feel obliged by your presenting them with such, of value according to your own discretion, and the advice of Nazir Khan as to the respective ranks of the recipients. Once more congratulating you on your well-deserved success, &c.

Inclosure 9 in No 50.

*The Resident at Lahore to the Secretary with the Governor-General.*

*Lahore, March 3, 1849.*

THE surrender of the fort of Lukkee to Lieutenant Taylor was reported on the 20th of January last. I now forward that officer's journal of the siege, with Major Edwardes' covering letter. I also inclose correspondence, referring to the surrender of the fort of Hurrund to Lieutenant Young of the Engineers. Lieutenant Taylor's letter, reporting the flight of the Doozanees from Bunnoo, and the recovery and re-occupation of the fort of Duleepgurh in that valley, is also herewith forwarded.

All these documents appear to me to be extremely interesting, and I consider both Lieutenants Taylor and Young to have exhibited great skill, promptitude, and gallantry, in conducting the operations intrusted to them.

Lieutenant Young, as an engineer officer, lately distinguished himself at Mooltan. Lieutenant Taylor is, already, very favorably known to Government; but I cannot refrain from again bearing testimony to his good service.

These two officers were detached at different periods from Mooltan by Major Edwardes, who not only equipped their detachments, but has since continued to supply them with funds and military stores. Indeed, I consider it due to this excellent young officer to say, that the Government is indebted, as much to his arrangements and foresight, as to the gallantry, promptitude, and prudence of Lieutenants Taylor and Young, for the bloodless recovery of the Derajat and Trans-Indus territory.

Inclosure 10 in No 50

*The Secretary with the Governor-General to the Resident at Lahore*

*Ferozepore, March 19, 1849*

THE Governor-General fully concurs in the well-merited praise you have bestowed on Lieutenant Taylor and Lieutenant Young, and the other officers associated with them, and requests that you will convey to them the assurance of his warm approbation of their gallant conduct.

Inclosure 11 in No. 50

*Major-General Whish to the Adjutant-General.*

*Camp, Ramnuggur, February 13, 1849*

IN my dispatch of the 22nd ultimo, I expressed my apprehension that I might have omitted mention of some who merited particular notice, and I beg leave now to repair the omission.

After Lieutenant Garforth was wounded, on the 2nd ultimo, Lieutenant Maxwell, of the Engineers, who had, on the 27th of December, accompanied the column of attack, commanded by Lieutenant-Colonel Young, Her Majesty's 10th Regiment, was appointed to officiate as Brigade-Major, and carried on its duties with great efficiency, giving, as his predecessor had done, every satisfaction to the Chief Engineer, who also makes favorable mention of Captain Longden, Her Majesty's 10th Regiment, Acting Field Engineer, whose diligence and useful services have, frequently, during the operations before Mooltan, come under my own notice; and although, at the earliest commencement of

them, I drew his Excellency's attention to the ability and perseverance evinced by Lieutenant Glover, of the Engineers, in performing (in August last) the important duty, assigned to him on my approaching Mooltan, of blocking up the mouth of the Grand Canal, I would fain recur to it in this, as that officer's course has, ever since, been consistent with this beginning

As, from July last, the arduous, and often harassing, duties of Brigade Quartermasters of the Bengal field-force, have been uniformly carried out by the undermentioned officers, with an energy and attention most creditable to them, I beg to bring them to his Lordship's favorable notice

Artillery—Lieutenant W. K. Fooks.

Engineers—Lieutenant J. E. Cracroft, 69th Native Infantry

Cavalry—Lieutenant J. H. Toone, 11th Light Cavalry.

1st Infantry Brigade—Lieutenant G. G. Moxon, 52nd Native Infantry.

2nd Infantry Brigade—Lieutenant J. H. Reid, 51st Native Infantry

I have the honor to inclose a detailed return of the ordnance captured from the enemy, during our operations before Mooltan, total 50 pieces, including 4 large mortars; also Major Garbett's letter of the 23rd ultimo, that accompanied it; and with which I also associate letters, of the same date, from Brigadier Cheape, C B, Chief Engineer, Major Napier, and Captain Siddons.

I have, in conclusion, the honor of forwarding a general casualty list\* of the force, from the 17th of August, 1848, to the 22nd of January, 1849, which will, I trust, prove, under all the circumstances, a satisfactory document

Of all ranks, total killed, 210, wounded, 982.

Inclosure 12 in No 50

*Major H. Garbett, Commanding Artillery, Bengal Column, to the Assistant Adjutant-General, Mooltan Field Force.*

*Camp, Mooltan, January 23, 1849.*

IN forwarding, for the information of the Major-General commanding the Mooltan Field Force, the inclosed document† connected with the late siege of Mooltan, I have, particularly, to bring to his notice, the indefatigable zeal of the Commissary of Ordnance, Lieutenant Christie, and the system and regularity with which the constant and heavy demands of the batteries were supplied

I would also, most strongly, recommend to his notice the conduct of Mr Deputy Commissary Spencer, who, in the embarkation and disembarkation of the train, and, indeed, on all occasions, evinced the utmost zeal and attention; and I should feel highly gratified by the services of this Ordnance officer, of long standing, being brought especially to the notice of the Government

Inclosure 13 in No. 50.

*Brigadier J. Cheape, C B., Chief Engineer, Army of the Punjab, to the Assistant Adjutant-General, Mooltan Field Force.*

*Mooltan, January 28, 1849.*

AT the close of our operations against the town and citadel of Mooltan, I believe it is my duty to report, for the information of Government, the services of the Engineer corps and officers employed in the siege, whose talent and indefatigable exertions have so much contributed to the fall of the place.

§ So general has been the energy displayed by every officer, it would be impossible to make any distinction; and it only remains for me to mention the different officers, with a hope that they may be brought to the favorable notice of his Excellency the Commander-in-chief

To Major Napier, my second in command; and Major Scott, of the Bombay Engineers, the duties of directing Engineer were, chiefly, intrusted; and to their talents and abilities in conducting the operations, our success is owing.

\* See page 557.

† Return of ordnance

Captains Abercrombie, Western, Siddons, and Lieutenant Maxwell, were also employed in directing, at the commencement, when the extended line of our operations against the town and citadel rendered such arrangements necessary, and I have every reason to be satisfied with these officers, especially with Captains Abercrombie and Siddons, who superintended the operations against the city. I am also indebted for the assistance given to these officers, by Lieutenants Fulton, Paton, Glover, and Greathed.

The conduct of Captain Siddons and his corps requires particular mention being made, and I have much pleasure in forwarding his report.

Major Scott reports most favorably of the officers of the Bombay Engineers, Lieutenants John Hill (wounded), Kendall, Walker, Playfair, Fuller, and Berthon; and their services deserve every praise.

To Captain Longden, of Her Majesty's 10th Regiment, and assistant to the Lahore Durbar Engineer, my best thanks are due for his diligence, and the very useful plans and information he has, from time to time, supplied, and I would here acknowledge the valuable assistance and intelligence I received from Major Napier, chief engineer in the former operations against Mooltan.

I have also to mention Lieutenants Taylor (wounded) and Hyde, in charge of the engineer park, through whose able arrangements the operations have been greatly forwarded; and my thanks are due to Lieutenant Cracroft, brigade quartermaster, who generally accompanied me.

Lieutenant Garforth, my brigade major, was wounded severely in the assault on the 2nd of January; and Lieutenant Maxwell has acted since as brigade major; and to both of these officers my warmest acknowledgments are due, not only for every personal assistance to myself, and for carrying on the duties of the department, but for intelligence and zeal in everything relating to the operations.

I have omitted to mention General Cortlandt's Sappers, who, under Lieutenant Young, Bengal Engineers, made themselves very useful in our late operations.

#### Inclosure 14 in No. 50.

*Brevet Major R. Napier, late Chief Engineer, Mooltan Field Force, to the Assistant Adjutant-General, Mooltan Field Force.*

*Mooltan, January 23, 1849.*

THE siege of Mooltan having been concluded, it is my duty to bring to the notice of the Major-General commanding, with the hope of their being favorably mentioned to the Commander-in-chief, the services of the officers employed under me in the early operations of the siege; in those for protecting the British and allied camps, which terminated in the capture of the enemy's position and guns on the 7th of November, 1848; and in the preparation of the plans, and supply of siege materials, with the aid of which, the siege has since been successfully concluded.

To the zeal and ability of Captain Abercrombie, my second in command, I am most highly indebted.

To Captain Garforth, for his services as Brigade-Major, I am also most highly indebted; and his gallantry, and that of Lieutenant Grindall, in the assault of the Dhurru Sala, on the 12th of September, 1848, was conspicuous.

The exertions of Lieutenant Maxwell, who acted as directing Engineer; of Lieutenant Taylor, in charge of the Park, and of every officer belonging to the Engineers, or doing duty with the corps, were deserving of the highest praise. I never met a more zealous body of officers.

The services rendered by Lieutenant Glover in the difficult operation of closing the head of the Wullee Mahomed Canal, and of Captain Longden, Her Majesty's 10th Regiment of Foot, assistant to the Durbar Chief Engineer, have been most valuable.

I have great pleasure in mentioning, particularly, the services of Captain Siddons, Directing Engineer, and the Corps of Sappers and Pioneers under his command; they fully maintained their high character.

To Lieutenant Lake, of the Engineers, in command of the troops of the

Nawab of Bahawalpore, who conducted the left attack, I was also greatly indebted for his support and assistance. He reports very highly of the Company of Sappers under Lieutenants Pollard and Maunsell.

It would be unjust to omit favorable notice of General Cortlandt's Sappers, and the willing assistance afforded by them.

Although the defection of our ally, Raja Shere Sing, snatched from us the prize of success, when it seemed almost within our grasp, it is satisfactory to reflect that our labors have paved the way for the present, comparatively bloodless, triumph; that our trenches of the Khutteh Byragee and the Dhurru Sala made us acquainted with the intricacies of the suburbs; and that, to the respect gained for our bayonets on the 12th of September, may be attributed the rapid fall of the strong positions of the Shumstabreez, Wuzecrabad, and the Munde Awa, on the 27th of December, 1848.

#### Inclosure 15 in No. 50

*Brevet Captain H. Siddons, Commanding the Sappers and Pioneers, to the Brigade-Major of Engineers.*

*Mooltan, January 23, 1849*

ON the occasion of the fall of Mooltan, I believe it is my duty to make a report, as commanding the Corps of Bengal Sappers and Pioneers to write such, in detail, would be to embrace the whole of the siege operations, which, of course, is unnecessary.

Nor need I dwell on the exertions of my men, as their hard work and excellent conduct must have been observed by every one, from the Major-General downwards, and will, no doubt, receive ample justice in Brigadier Cheape's dispatch.

Custom justifies me in naming my Adjutant, Lieutenant Fraser, as having rendered me most important assistance, in carrying on all the details of the corps during the siege, his services were always available, when required, in the trenches, and he superintended the loading, tamping, and firing, of the mines, on the right attack.

I also wish to name Second Lieutenant F. Grindall, who has undergone much more than his share of labor and fatigue, and has behaved in the most gallant manner, in the assaults of the 12th of September, 27th of December, and 2nd of January last, it having been his fortune to lead, on all these occasions. Of my other officers, I can only say, that they could be exceeded by none, in zeal, perseverance, and gallantry.

In like manner, the European non-commissioned officers have all behaved admirably, and I wish to bring the following to favorable notice

The Acting Sub-Conductor, Serjeant-Major Casey.

Serjeant W. Waring, wounded.

Corporal H. Granger.

Corporal H. Bruen, wounded.

2nd Corporal W. Ford.

2nd Corporal W. Burtry, wounded.

In the native branch of the corps, in addition to those I have had occasion specially to recommend, on various occasions, for the third class of the Order of Merit, I beg earnestly to recommend the following to the favorable notice of his Excellency the Commander-in-Chief.

Jemadar Sooful, 1st Company Sappers and Miners. Havildar Sewdeen, 2nd Company Sappers and Miners. Havildar Toola, 1st Company Sappers and Miners. Havildar Chut Kao, 3rd Company Sappers and Miners, wounded. Havildar Goordat Sing, 2nd Company. Havildar Naick Bactour, 3rd Company Pioneers. Havildar Naick Buldaun, 2nd Company Pioneers. Havildar Naick Sewdeen, 2nd Company Pioneers. Sepoy Mukha, 2nd Company Sappers and Miners. Sepoy Oree, 2nd Company Sappers and Miners, wounded. Sepoy Bregloll Sing, 1st Company Sappers and Miners. Sepoy Koosial, 2nd Company Sappers and Miners. Sepoy Munbode, 2nd Company Sappers and Miners.

I have the honor to annex a return of the killed and wounded, and of ammunition expended, since the 27th of December.

## Inclosure 16 in No. 50.

*The Secretary with the Governor-General to the Adjutant-General.**Camp, Ferozepore, March 10, 1849.*

THE name of Lieutenant-Colonel Birch, Judge-Advocate-General, having been inadvertently omitted in the General Order, dated the 1st of March, publishing the details of the action at Goojerat, I am directed by the Governor-General to request that that officer's name may be inserted immediately after that of Lieutenant-Colonel Garden, C.B.

## Inclosure 17 in No. 50.

*The Commander-in-chief to the Governor-General.**Camp, Kullalla, March 15, 1849.*

ON re-perusal of my dispatch relative to the operations of the 21st of February, at Goojerat, I regret to find I omitted mentioning the names of Lieutenants Lumsden and Hodson, of the Corps of Guides, and Lieutenant Lake, of the Engineers, attached to the Political Department.

These officers were most active in conveying orders, throughout the action, and I now beg to bring their names to the favorable notice of your Lordship.

## Inclosure 18 in No. 50

*Brigadier-General Wheeler to the Adjutant-General**Camp, Mookerian, March 5, 1849.*

I RE-CROSSED the Beas this day, with the intention of breaking up this field force.

The great numbers who have returned from the late glorious and decisive engagement near Goojerat, unarm'd, nearly naked, and utterly dispirited, have so entirely depressed the population of the Baree Doab, as to render any chance of an outbreak next to impossible. Thus, and the force under my command having attained the object for which it quitted the Jullundur Doab, have induced me to return.

## Inclosure 19 in No. 50.

*The Resident at Lahore to the Secretary with the Governor-General.**Lahore, March 12, 1849.*

I SUBMIT, for the consideration and orders of the Governor-General, the documents connected with the trial of Goodhur Sing, a Musabee Nihung, for the murder of Mr. Patrick Vans Agnew, on the 20th of April, 1848.

The prisoner was tried by a special commission, held at Mooltan on the 3rd and 4th of March, under the orders of the Governor-General, as a principal in the murder, and as aiding and abetting in its perpetration.

The charges are fully proven.

Wuzeer Ali Moenshee solemnly deposes, that the prisoner, Goodhur Sing, then in court, wounded Mr. Vans Agnew on the neck, cut off his head, and carried it away, that the witness, subsequently, saw the prisoner on several occasions, and recognised him; that he was crippled on the right hand.

Ramjee Mull deposes to the same purport, and adds that, the day after the murder, he saw Goodhur Sing riding one of Mr. Vans Agnew's horses, with a pistol of that gentleman's in his girdle.

Bunseedhur deposes, that he was present when the prisoner cut off Mr. Vans Agnew's head; this witness further declares, that he saw the head in the

prisoner's hand, the next day, and was present when he presented it to Moolraj, who gave him a horse and pistol, the property of the murdered officer.

The prisoner denies the charges, admits that he was at the Edga during the attack; asserts that the murder was committed by a man named Ram Sing; and allows that Moolraj gave a horse and pistol of Mr Vans Agnew to him.

By the above evidence, the guilt of the prisoner is fully established. The special commission convict the prisoner, and sentence him to be hanged by the neck until dead, at such time and place as the Governor-General may direct. I concur in the finding, and recommend that the prisoner Goodhur Sing, a Muzbee Sikh, be hanged at Mooltan, within seven days after the orders of the Governor-General are received there.

I had proposed myself that the sentence should be executed at Lahore, but I now concur with Major Edwardes, that it had better be carried out, where the murder was perpetrated.

**Inclosure 20 in No. 50.**

*Minute by the Governor-General*

*March 15, 1849.*

I HAVE received the report of the proceedings of a Commission appointed for the trial of Goodhur Sing, Muzbee Nihung, for the murder of Mr. Patrick Vans Agnew, of the Civil Service.

I have carefully perused the proceedings of the Commission, and the evidence adduced before it.

I entirely concur with the Commission, in thinking that the guilt of Goodhur Sing is clearly proved.

I confirm the sentence pronounced by the Commission, and direct that it shall be carried into execution at Mooltan.

The prisoner should be executed publicly, and without undue delay, precautions being taken to prevent disturbance on the occasion.

**Inclosure 21 in No. 50.**

*The Resident at Lahore to the Secretary with the Governor-General.*

*Lahore, March 19, 1849.*

I ANNEX a letter in the Goormookhee character and dialect, which I have every reason to believe was sent by Maharanee Junda Khore, from Benares, to Chuttur Sing.

It was seized under the following circumstances. On the 1st or 2nd of March, a couple of sowars at Pusroor, observing in the distance two mounted men, apparently from the lower provinces, whose manner and appearance were suspicious, pursued them; one was overtaken and seized, the other escaped.

On the man who was thus arrested, were found some papers in Hinddee, and two amulets, in which were discovered two letters; one for Chuttur Sing, the other for Moolraj. We cannot recognise the handwriting of the Goormookhee letters, but there is no doubt whatever but that they came from the Ranees Mr. Bowring, who has examined many of her letters, is satisfied that they are so.

The Hinddee letters are written in the character used towards the south-east of Oude, and about Benares; one is dated about two months before the seizure, a period which a horseman would occupy in such a journey. Among them were two leave-tickets of sepoys, one of them, by name Puhlour Sing, was in the "Chund Ke pursad" Regiment, lately with Shere Sing, the man is an inhabitant of Burroda, near Sultanpoor, in Oude.

The sepoy on whom the papers were found, unfortunately, effected his escape, the same night, his name is not known. The sepoys mentioned in the other letters are inhabitants of Oude and Cawnpore, serving in the "Chund Ke pursad" Regiment.

I need not dwell on the virulent spirit which the letter now forwarded to Government evinces; there is internal evidence in it, which convinces me that it must have emanated only from the Rance.

The other letter found in the amulet was to Moolraj, and was of the same tenor as that to Chuttur Sing. I will show them to the latter when he arrives.

Inclosure 22 in No. 50.

*The Maharanee to Chuttur Sing.*

BY the grace of the holy Gooroo, written by the Maec Sahib to Chuttur Sing

I am well, and pray for your welfare also. A hundred praises on your bravery. I am unable to bestow sufficient commendation on it, as long as the earth and heavens exist, so long shall people continue to utter your praises. You have settled matters with the British, right well.

They quake and tremble through fear of you, and have lost all their ascendancy. They have abandoned eating their food, and their tongues falter. Be confident, and firm. The English have no troops, so exert yourself to the utmost.

Give the British, whom you have taken prisoners, one hundred blows each a-day; blacken their faces, and, placing them on donkeys, parade them through your camp, cut off their noses also; by these means, in a short time, not one of the British will be left in the land. Do not interfere with the Hindostanees, but proclaim, by beat of tom-tom, that all who will enter the Maharajah's service, shall be rewarded.

Collect together 1000 or 2000 able-bodied men, and, having disguised them as fakeers, send them across (the Sutlej?). Instruct them to watch the British during the day, and to kill them at night.

The British have no troops in this part of the country, certainly not more than 1000 or 2000 men, and at night are accustomed to sleep with no one near them. Be confident. The British do not molest me at all, being afraid to do so.

*The Maharanee to Moolraj*

A copy, precisely, of the above.

Inclosure 23 in No. 50.

*Major-General Sir W. R. Gilbert, K.C.B. Commanding Field Force on Special Service, to the Secretary with the Governor-General.*

*Camp, Rawul Pindee, March 14, 1849.*

SINCE I addressed you, on the 11th instant, from Hoormook, I have advanced to Rawul Pindee, which place I reached to-day.

I have now the high gratification of reporting, for the information of the Governor-General of India, that the disarming of the Sikh army, commenced at Manikyala, has been, this day, completed, by the surrender of their swords by the Sikh Sirdars, in presence of the commanding officers of divisions and brigades, and their staff.

The total number of guns surrendered is 41, of which a return shall be forwarded hereafter, and the number of stand of arms laid down, before the force under my command, is about 16,000.

## Inclosure 24 in No. 50.

*The Commander-in-chief to the Governor-General of India**Camp, Kullalla, March 16, 1849*

I HAVE the greatest gratification in reporting to your Lordship the further happy results of the decisive victory obtained at Goojerat, on the 21st ultimo.

Major-General Sir Walter Gilbert, with that energy and judgment which induced me to select him to conduct the ulterior operations subsequent to that action, has well fulfilled the trust reposed in him, by rapidly pressing the routed enemy, which has led to their unqualified submission, the surrender of their remaining guns, and about 16,000 stand of arms, all of which are now in our possession, and I rejoice to add, that this fortunate consummation has been obtained, without a single shot being fired.

The whole of the Sikh force, with their Sudais, have now come in, with the exception of Bhace Maharaj and Colonel Ruchpaul Sing, who have absconded, but without followers.

We have now, in our possession, 56 guns taken at Goojerat, and abandoned by the enemy in his retreat, on the 21st of February, 40 surrendered to Major-General Sir Walter Gilbert, since that event, 12 captured at Chilianwalla; and 50 at Mooltan; making a total of 158 pieces of ordnance, which have fallen into our hands during the present campaign.

## Inclosure 25 in No. 50.

*General Order by the Governor-General of India**Camp, Ferozepore, March 17, 1849.*

THE Governor-General has the utmost satisfaction in directing that the dispatches which he has, this day, received from his Excellency the Commander-in-chief, and from Major-General Sir Walter Gilbert, K.C.B., be published for the information of the Army, and of the People of India.

The British subjects who were prisoners in the hands of the enemy, have all returned in safety.

On the 14th instant, Sirdar Chuttur Sing, Raja Shere Sing, and the principal Sikh Sirdars and Chiefs, delivered their swords into the hands of Major-General Sir Walter Gilbert.

Forty-one pieces of artillery were, at the same time, surrendered, and the remains of the Sikh army, to the number of 16,000 men, laid down their arms, in the presence of the British troops.

The Governor-General offers to his Excellency the Commander-in-chief, to Major-General Gilbert, and to the whole army, his heartfelt congratulations on this glorious result of the battle of Goojerat, and of the operations subsequent to it, so admirably conducted by the Major-General, in fulfilment of his Excellency's instructions.

But the war is not yet concluded; nor can there be any cessation of hostilities, until Dost Mahomed Khan and the Afghan army are, either driven from the Province of Peshawur, or destroyed within it.

The British army has, already, resumed its march upon Attock, and the Governor-General confidently hopes, that the entire success which, with God's blessing, will attend it, may enable him soon to announce the restoration of peace.

The Governor-General directs that, in honor of the important events which have now been notified, a salute of twenty-one guns be fired from every principal station of the army in India.



## Inclosure 26 in No. 50

*Major-General Sir W. R. Gilbert to the Adjutant-General.*

*Camp, near Attock, March 18, 1849.*

SINCE my dispatch from Rawul Pindie, of the 14th instant, I have advanced to this place, and beg to report, for the information of the Commander-in-Chief, that I am, to-day, in possession of the fort of Attock.

On the 15th instant, the Bengal division of the force under my command, moved to Jani-Ke-Sung, 17 miles, and, on the 16th, reached Wah, after a march of 14 miles. While at Wah, intelligence reached me that the bridge over the River Indus was still standing, and that Attock was occupied by the Affghan troops seeing, at once, the importance of securing the bridge, or, at all events, the boats forming it, or such of them as could be rescued from the hands of the enemy, I resolved upon advancing on Attock, by a forced march of thirty-one miles, relying with confidence on the utmost exertion being made, by every officer and soldier under my command, to effect so great an object as that of securing the means of rapidly crossing the River Indus. This confidence has not been misplaced.

At 6 o'clock P. M. on the 16th, the force moved from Wah, bivouacked for a few hours at Booran, and reached Shumshabad, about sunrise. From Shumshabad, after feeding the horses, I pushed on, with my cavalry and artillery, to Attock, before which fortress I arrived, with the cavalry, at half-past 11 o'clock, the artillery coming up at 1 P. M. The fort of Attock I found to be evacuated; and the rear-guard of the Affghan army was in the act of crossing the bridge of boats. Our troops had hardly shown themselves, when the bridge was broken up, and many of the boats allowed to float down the river.

The enemy was drawn up, in force, on the right bank, and on the sloping ground extending from the river to the hills in his rear. On the river bank, he had placed three batteries, two of them of three guns each, the third or right battery consisted of a larger number of guns. To his right, was the fort of Khyrabad, where he had placed two guns, outside that fortress. Each battery was supported by a regiment of regular infantry, and crowds of irregulars, both infantry and cavalry, were formed on the sloping ground, in rear of his guns.

From his position, with a rapid river in his front, I was led to expect that he would have offered some resistance to our passage, but in this belief I was mistaken, and was disappointed by his moving off, almost immediately on my arrival with the cavalry, and before my guns could come up.

The batteries on the river side, and the guns at Khyrabad, opened upon such parties as showed themselves, while the guns remained in position, and an exchange of musketry was kept up by the Jezzailchies and some of our troops, until late in the day, but, apparently, without loss on either side.

Seventeen boats have been secured, and are sufficient to form a bridge, which shall be made with all possible dispatch. I hope to cross the river, with the Bengal division, on the afternoon of the 19th instant, and shall push on, after the flying enemy, with all expedition.





